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Articles
The Study of
Culture,
Ethnicity, and Race in
American Psychology
Hector Betancourt and Steven Regeser Lopez
The study of culture and related
concepts,
such as ethnicity
and race, in American psychology are examined in this
article. First, the conceptual confusion and ways in which
culture, ethnicity, and race are used as explanatory factors
for intergroup differences in psychological phenomena are
discussed.
Second,
ways in which to study culture in
mainstream psychology and to enhance hypothesis testing
and theory in cross-cultural psychology are illustrated. Fi-
nally, the importance of examining sociocultural variables
and considering theory in ethnic minority research is ad-
dressed. In
general,
it
is
proposed that by including theory,
conceptualizing, and measuring cultural and related
vari-
ables, mainstream, cross-cultural, and ethnic
research
can
advance the understanding of culture in psychology as well
as the generality of principles and the cultural sensitivity
of applications.
C
ulture and its significant role in human behavior
have been recognized for many years, as far back
as Hippocrates from the classical Greek era (see
Dona, 1991) as well as near the beginning of psychology
as a discipline (Wundt, 1921). More recently, a number
of authors have questioned the cross-cultural generaliz-
ability of psychological theories (e.g., Amir & Sharon,
1987;
Bond, 1988; Pepitone & Triandis, 1987), some ar-
guing for the inclusion of culture in psychological theories
(e.g., Harkness, 1980; Rokeach, 1979; Smith, 1979;
Triandis, 1989). An abundant literature demonstrates
cultural variations in many areas of psychology that can
guide such theoretical efforts (see handbooks edited by
Triandis et al., 1980, and by Munroe, Munroe, & Whit-
ing,
1981;
see also Berman, 1990). Most recently, the need
to study culture in psychology was highlighted in an
American Psychological Association (APA) report on ed-
ucation (McGovern, Furumoto, Halpern, Kimble, &
McKeachie, 1991). Because of the changing demographics
in the nation as well as in the student population,
McGovern et al. indicated that an "important social and
ethical responsibility of faculty members is to promote
their students' understanding of gender, race, ethnicity,
culture, and class issues in psychological theory, research,
and practice" (p. 602).
Despite the historical and contemporary awareness
concerning the importance of culture among a number
of
scholars,
the study of culture and related variables oc-
cupies at best a secondary place in American (main-
stream) psychology. It appears to be the domain of
cross-
cultural psychology and is often associated with the rep-
lication of findings in some remote or exotic part of the
world. In the United States, it is often associated with the
study of ethnic minorities, which is as segregated from
mainstream psychology (see Graham, 1992) as is cross-
cultural research. There seems to be a widespread as-
sumption that the study of culture or ethnicity contributes
little to the understanding of basic psychological processes
or to the practice of psychology in the United States.
The general purpose of this article is to share some
of our preoccupations and views concerning the status of
the study of culture and related concepts, such as race
and ethnicity, in psychology. Our main concern is that
whereas mainstream investigators do not consider culture
in their research and theories, cross-cultural researchers
who study cultural differences frequently fail to identify
the specific aspects of culture and related variables that
are thought to influence behavior. Consequently, we learn
that cultural group, race, or ethnicity may be related to
a given psychological phenomenon, but we learn little
about the specific elements of these group variables that
contribute to the proposed relationship. The limited
specificity of this research impedes our understanding of
the behavior of a group or groups. In addition, it serves
to limit the delineation of more universal processes that
cut across cultural, ethnic, and racial groups. In this ar-
ticle,
we promote the study of culture. This is not to say
that culture is the single most important variable in psy-
chology. It is one of many factors that contribute to the
complexities of psychological processes, and it is obviously
important to the understanding of culturally diverse pop-
Hector Betancourt, Department of Psychology, Loma Linda University
and La Sierra University; Steven Regeser Lopez, Department of Psy-
chology, University of California, Los Angeles.
Walter J. Lonner served as action editor for this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Hector Betancourt, Department of Psychology, Loma Linda University,
Riverside, CA 92515.
June 1993 • American Psychologist
Copyright 1993 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/93/S2.00
Vol. 48, No. 6, 629-637
629
ulations both inside and outside of the United States. In
addition, even though the higher uniformity of cultural
elements makes it less obvious, cultural factors also play
an important role in the behavior of mainstream indi-
viduals. Thus, our focus will be on culture, some of the
problems that in our opinion preclude progress in our
understanding of its role in psychology and some prop-
ositions on how to overcome them. To illustrate our
points, we draw from research in the social and clinical
domains; these reflect our areas of expertise.
As a general approach, we propose that both main-
stream and cross-cultural investigators identify and mea-
sure directly what about the group variable (e.g., what
cultural element) of interest to their research influences
behavior. Then, hypothesized relationships between such
variables and the psychological phenomenon of interest
could be examined and such research could be incor-
porated within a theoretical framework. We believe that
an adherence to this approach will serve to enhance our
understanding of both group-specific and group-general
(universal) processes as well as contribute to the integra-
tion of culture in theory development and the practice of
psychology. Our focus is on the general approach rather
than on specific methodological issues already treated
elsewhere in the literature (see Brislin, Lonner, & Thorn-
dike,
1973; Lonner & Berry, 1988; Triandis et al., 1980,
Vol. 2).
Because culture is closely intertwined with concepts
such as race, ethnicity, and social class, and because con-
ceptual confusion has been an obstacle for progress in
this area, it is important to first define culture and point
out its relationship to these related concepts. Hence, we
first focus on these definitions and conceptual problems.
Then, we address some of the limitations of cross-cultural
and mainstream psychology and suggest ways in which
to infuse the study of culture in mainstream research and
both experimentation and theory in cross-cultural re-
search. Finally, we illustrate ways in which to study cul-
tural variables and discuss the importance of infusing
theory in ethnic minority research.
Definitions
Variations in psychological phenomena observed in the
comparative study of groups identified in terms of na-
tionality, race, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status (SES)
are often attributed to cultural differences without defin-
ing what is meant by culture, and what about culture
and to what extent is related to the differences. This is so
common, even among cross-cultural psychologists, that
it has led to the criticism that little research in cross-
cultural psychology actually deals with culture (e.g.,
Rohner, 1984). Thus, an important problem is the lack
of a clear definition and understanding of culture from a
psychological perspective.
Culture
A number of psychologists interested in the study of cul-
ture agree that the confusion concerning its definition
has been an obstacle for progress (e.g., Brislin, 1983; Ja-
hoda, 1984; Rohner, 1984; Triandis et al., 1980). Al-
though it would be desirable to have a definition that
everyone agrees upon, as noted by Segall (1984), consen-
sus is not absolutely necessary to advance knowledge.
Even without consensus, progress is possible if, as we
propose, cultural research specifies what is meant by cul-
ture in terms that are amenable to measurement.
After reviewing the elements found in the anthro-
pological and cross-cultural psychology views of culture,
Rohner (1984) proposed a conceptualization of culture
in terms of "highly variable systems of meanings," which
are "learned" and "shared by a people or an identifiable
segment of a population." It represents "designs and ways
of life" that are normally "transmitted from one gener-
ation to another." We consider this conception as equiv-
alent to that proposed by Herkovits (1948), who conceives
culture as the human-made part of the environment. Per-
haps the most distinctive characteristic of Rohner's for-
mulation is the explicit statement of aspects such as the
learned, socially shared, and variable nature of culture.
Within the context of this general conception of
cul-
ture,
we consider Triandis et al.'s (1980) reformulation
of Herkovits's (1948) definition as the most practical one
for the purpose of our work. In addition to differentiating
between the objective and subjective aspects of Herkovits's
human-made part of the environment, Triandis's for-
mulation is quite explicit about the psychologically rel-
evant elements that constitute culture. According to
Triandis, although physical culture refers to objects such
as roads, buildings, and tools, subjective culture includes
elements such as social norms, roles, beliefs, and values.
These subjective cultural elements include a wide range
of topics, such as familial roles, communication patterns,
affective styles, and values regarding personal control, in-
dividualism, collectivism, spirituality, and religiosity.
When culture (or subjective culture) is defined in
terms of psychologically relevant elements, such as roles
and values, it becomes amenable to measurement. More-
over, the relationship of the cultural elements to psycho-
logical phenomena can be directly assessed. Hence, it is
possible to deal with the complexity of the concept and
at the same time pursue an understanding of the role of
culture in psychology. By incorporating the conceptual-
ization and measurement of specific cultural elements,
the comparative study of national, ethnic, or cultural
groups is more likely to contribute to the understanding
of the role of culture than are the typical comparative
studies (see Poortinga & Malpass, 1986).
Race
Scholars and pollsters often use the concept of culture
interchangeably with race, ethnicity, or nationality. For
example, in surveys or research instruments, individuals
are often required to indicate their race by choosing one
of a combination of categories including race, ethnicity,
and national origin (such as Asian, American Indian,
Black, Latino, and White). Latinos, for instance, can be
White, Black, Asian, American Indian, or any combi-
nation
thereof.
We are particularly concerned about the
630
June 1993 • American Psychologist
loose way in which culture, race, and ethnicity are used
to explain differences between groups. This not only limits
our understanding of the specific factors that contribute
to group differences, but it also leads to interpretations
of findings that stimulate or reinforce racist conceptions
of human behavior (see Zuckerman, 1990).
Jones (1991) recently argued that the concept of race
is fraught with problems for psychology. For example,
race is generally defined in terms of physical character-
istics,
such as skin color, facial features, and hair type,
which are common to an inbred, geographically isolated
population. However, the classification of people in groups
designated as races has been criticized as arbitrary, sug-
gesting that the search for differences between such groups
is at best dubious (Zuckerman, 1990). Specifically, there
are more within-group differences than between-group
differences in the characteristics used to define the three
so-called races (Caucasoid, Negroid, and Mongoloid).
Also,
studies of genetic systems (e.g., blood groups, serum
proteins, and enzymes) have found that differences be-
tween individuals within the same tribe or nation account
for more variance (84%) than do racial groupings (10%;
Latter, 1980; Zuckerman, 1990). This indicates that racial
groups are more alike than they are different, even in
physical and genetic characteristics. Still, too often in the
history of psychology, race has been used to explain vari-
ations in psychological phenomena between the so-called
racial groups, without examining the cultural and social
variables likely to be associated with such variations (e.g.,
Allport, 1924; Barrett & Eysenck, 1984; Jensen, 1985).
We agree with Zuckerman (1990) that the study of racial
differences in psychological phenomena is of little sci-
entific use without a clear understanding of the variables
responsible for the differences observed between the
groups classified as races. We consider racial group or
identity inadequate as a general explanatory factor of
be-
tween-group variations in psychological phenomena. We
encourage researchers to give greater attention to cultural
elements, as discussed earlier, as they may prove fruitful
in understanding behavioral differences associated with
racial groupings.
Although we focus on the cultural and social vari-
ables associated with racial grouping, we do not imply
that biological factors associated with such groupings are
of no scientific interest. These biological variables are
important, for example, in the study of group differences
in essential hypertension, for which Afro-Americans are
at a higher risk than Anglo-Americans (Anderson, 1989).
From our perspective, what is of scientific interest is not
the race of these individuals but the relationship between
the identified biological factors (e.g., plasma renin levels
and sodium excretion) and hypertension. Moreover, even
if a cause-effect relationship is demonstrated between
these biological variables and hypertension, one cannot
attribute this relationship to race because of intraracial
variability and interracial overlap with regard to the bio-
logical variables (Anderson, 1989). Psychological stress
or factors such as diet, life-style, and objective and sub-
jective culture could be responsible for the racial-group
differences in the biological factors. Also, this difference
may not be observed in a group of the same race in an-
other part of the world or under different living conditions.
In summary, we suggest that when behavioral vari-
ations are studied in relation to race, the so-called racial
variable under study should be defined, measured, and
the proposed relationships tested. The role of specific cul-
tural and social variables could be clearly separated from
that of biological and other variables. The area of research
will determine the relative importance of any one of these
variables. The important point is that the research be on
the relevant variable and not on racial groupings alone.
Ethnicity
The concept of ethnicity is also associated with culture
and is often used interchangeably with culture as well as
with race. Usually, ethnicity is used in reference to groups
that are characterized in terms of a common nationality,
culture, or language. The concept of ethnicity is related
to the Greek concept of ethnos, which refers to the people
of a nation or tribe, and ethnikos, which stands for na-
tional. Hence, ethnicity refers to the ethnic quality or
affiliation of a group, which is normally characterized in
terms of
culture.
However, the distinction between these
two related concepts is an important one for psychology.
Although cultural background can be a determinant of
ethnic identity or affiliation, being part of an ethnic group
can also determine culture. As members of an ethnic
group interact with each other, ethnicity becomes a means
by which culture is transmitted. According to Berry
(1985),
because an ethnic group is likely to interact with
other ethnic groups, such interactions should not be ig-
nored as possible sources of cultural influences. Hence,
it is important that comparative studies of ethnic groups
identify and measure cultural variables assumed to be
responsible for observed differences in psychological phe-
nomena before such differences are attributed to culture
on the basis of group membership. This issue is partic-
ularly important in the United States today because, be-
yond face-to-face interactions, interethnic communica-
tion takes place through the mass media.
We believe that the study of variations in psycho-
logical phenomena between ethnic groups is relevant as
far as the specific variable of theoretical interest is mea-
sured and related to the relevant psychological phenom-
ena. In addition to the specific cultural elements, there
are a range of ethnic-related variables, such as ethnic
identification, perceived discrimination, and bilingualism.
Increased specification with regard to what about eth-
nicity is of interest could reduce the confusion and con-
ceptual problems in this area (for an illustration of re-
search in this direction, see Sue, 1988; Sue & Zane, 1987).
Social and Related Variables
The effect of variables such as the social system and so-
cioeconomic level on behavior can also be confounded
with the influence of culture, race, and ethnicity (for a
discussion, see Rohner, 1984). Some authors do control
for the effects of socioeconomic variables. For example,
June 1993 • American Psychologist 631
Frerichs, Aneshensel, and Clark (1981) found that the
prevalence of depressive symptoms was significantly dif-
ferent for Latinos, Anglos, and Afro-American commu-
nity residents. More Latinos reported significant levels of
depressive symptoms than did the other ethnic groups.
However, when controlling for SES-related variables (e.g.,
employment status and family income), the ethnic effect
disappeared. This suggests that ethnicity, and possibly
culture, are of little or no significance in the prevalence
rates of depression, whereas SES, that is, economic strain,
is viewed as being more significant.
Although this approach has the advantage of reduc-
ing the likelihood of misattributing to culture the influ-
ence of
SES,
the possibility of confusion still exists. It is
possible, for instance, that cultural influences are not
identified and are wrongly attributed to SES. We see at
least two instances in which this can happen. First, in
societies with a history of ethnic or racial discrimination,
segregation may result in significant overlap between cul-
ture and SES. For example, in the United States the ma-
jority of Anglos are represented in higher social strata,
whereas the majority of Latinos are represented in lower
social strata. Thus, by methodologically or statistically
controlling for SES, the cultures are also separated, and
the variance associated with culture is removed along with
the effects of SES. This may then lead one to wrongly
assume that culture does not play a role.
Second, even if
two
social classes are represented in
each of the two cultures, the economic, social, or living
conditions of a segregated lower class that includes both
cultural groups may generate beliefs, norms, or values
specific to that social strata. These cultural elements as-
sociated with lower SES may become significantly differ-
ent from that of other groups (e.g., the middle class) of
the same ethnic group. Although it is possible that some
cultural elements associated with ethnicity are consistent
across the different SES levels of a given ethnic group, it
is also possible that there are beliefs, norms, and values
that are common to an SES level across cultural (ethnic)
groups. Hence, even when social classes are compared
within the same ethnic group, cultural elements unique
to a lower strata may be wrongly attributed to SES—that
is,
income or educational level—when in fact they reflect
cultural or subcultural elements—that is, beliefs and at-
titudes associated with lower class reality.
Sobal and Stunkard (1989) illustrated this point with
regard to obesity and socioeconomic status. They argued
that the prevalence of obesity in developing societies is a
function of structural elements in society, such as the
availability of food supplies, and "cultural values favoring
fat body shapes" (p. 266). The former reflect SES-related
variables, whereas the values associated with body shapes
may be more cultural in nature, even though the cultural
beliefs are associated with social strata. The work of Sobal
and Stunkard is consistent with our recommendation to
measure the specific proximal variables thought to un-
derlie a given behavioral phenomenon. By doing so, the
comparative study of social as well as cultural groups will
be able to better identify the specific social variables (e.g.,
income, educational level) as well as cultural elements
(e.g., values, beliefs) that are relevant to the behavioral
phenomena of interest.
In summary, we encourage investigators to think
carefully about the group of interest, whether it be cul-
tural, racial, ethnical, or social, and go beyond the group
category to the specific factors that underlie the group
category. By doing so, studies will be able to identify what
about culture, race, ethnicity, or social class is related to
the psychological phenomenon of interest. We argue that
cultural variables, specifically social roles, norms, beliefs,
and values, are likely to contribute significantly to the
effects of these demographic variables. However, culture
is only one dimension. Depending on the research prob-
lem and the interests of the investigator, more biological
or social variables could also be assessed. The important
point is that further specification will likely lead to a
greater understanding of the roles of culture, race, eth-
nicity, and social class in psychological phenomena.
Limitations of Mainstream and Cross-
Cultural Psychology
The need to study and understand culture in psychology
represents a major challenge to mainstream and cross-
cultural psychology. A review of the literature reveals im-
portant limitations in the ways both mainstream and
cross-cultural psychology have responded to this chal-
lenge. On the one hand, the study of culture has largely
been ignored in mainstream psychology and is often seen
as the domain of cross-cultural psychology. Usually, the-
ories do not include cultural variables and findings or
principles are thought to apply to individuals everywhere,
suggesting that psychological knowledge developed in the
United States by Anglo-American scholars using Anglo-
American subjects is universal. Even in areas such as so-
cial psychology, in which the importance of variables such
as norms and values is particularly obvious, there is little
regard for the cultural nature of such variables (Bond,
1988).
On the other hand, cross-cultural psychology, nor-
mally segregated from mainstream psychology, has fo-
cused on the comparative (cross-cultural) study of be-
havioral phenomena, without much regard for the mea-
surement of cultural variables and their implications for
theory. Attributing to culture the differences observed
between countries or groups assumed to represent dif-
ferent cultures ignores the complexity of culture as well
as the cultural heterogeneity of nations or ethnic groups
(see Berry, 1985). Moreover, it tells us little about the role
of culture in human behavior. Without a theoretical focus,
cross-cultural research has little connection to main-
stream psychology, thus maintaining its segregation.
Although there is no simple solution to the noted
limitations (see Lonner & Berry, 1986; Malpass, 1977;
Reyes-Lagunes & Poortinga, 1985), we believe that the
following two approaches would help psychologists to en-
hance the study of culture: (a) Begin with a phenomenon
observed in the study of culture and apply it cross-cul-
turally to test theories of human behavior, and (b) begin
632
June 1993 • American Psychologist
with a theory, typically one that ignores culture, and in-
corporate cultural elements to broaden its theoretical do-
main. The former might be considered a bottom-up ap-
proach; one is beginning with an observation from the
study of cultures and moving toward its implications for
psychological theory. The latter might be considered a
top-down approach; one is beginning with theory and
moving to observations within as well as between cultures,
examining the role of culture and searching for universals.
Triandis and associates' research illustrates a bottom-
up approach to cross-cultural research. Drawing from
anthropological research that identified dimensions of
cultural variations, they proposed the following steps: (a)
Develop measures of such dimensions, (b) assess different
cultures along the dimensions so that the cultures could
be placed on a continuum of a designated dimension,
and (c) test predictions relating the cultural dimension
and behavioral phenomenon across cultures. These steps
are evident in the work of Triandis et al. (1986) on col-
lectivism versus individualism. They first developed a
measure; second, they assessed students from Illinois and
Puerto Rico along this dimension. Then, as expected,
this dimension was found to be related to behaviors such
as cooperation and helping (Triandis, Bontempo, Villa-
real, Asai, & Lucca, 1988). Not only did they find differ-
ences between U.S. mainland students and Puerto Rican
students with regard to helping and cooperation, they also
found that the cultural dimension of collectivism versus
individualism accounted in part for these differences.
Thus,
in line with the bottom-up approach, the observed
cultural phenomenon, in this case individualism-collec-
tivism, has served to inform theoretical accounts of help-
ing and cooperation.
The research of Betancourt and his associates serves
to illustrate a top-down approach to the study of cultural
influences. They began with a theory and took steps to
incorporate cultural factors in the theory. In a first study,
Betancourt and Weiner (1982) examined the cross-cul-
tural generality of an attribution theory of motivation
(see Weiner, 1986), specifically assessing whether the re-
lationships between the dimensional properties of attri-
butions and related psychological consequences differed
for Chilean and U.S. college students. Evidence for both
cultural generality and cultural specificity was found. The
relationship between the perceived stability of a given
causal attribution and expectancy of future success was
similar for both groups, suggesting that this part of the
theory has cross-cultural generality. The influence of per-
ceived controllability of attributions for a person's
achievement on interpersonal feelings and reactions was
less important for Chilean students than for students from
the United States; this part suggested cultural specificity.
For example, although Chileans tended to like the person
more when success was due to controllable than to un-
controllable causes, the effect of controllability over liking
was significantly lower than for the students from the
United States. Chileans tended to like the successful in-
dividual, regardless of whether the cause of his or her
achievement behavior was perceived as controllable (e.g.,
effort) or uncontrollable (e.g., aptitude). On the other
hand, U.S. students more systematically liked the person
according to the degree the achievement behavior was
perceived as within the person's volitional control.
In explaining these findings, Betancourt and Weiner
(1982) suggested that the generality observed in the re-
lationship between perceived stability of causes and ex-
pectancy of success was a reflection of the logic of cause-
effect relationships (e.g., if A is the cause of
B,
and A is
stable, B should also be stable). They also suggested that
when such logic applies, we might expect psychological
principles to be fairly universal. However, in the case of
perceived controllability and its relation to interpersonal
feelings and behavior, elements of the culture such as
norms and values are thought to play a role.
Recall that we have criticized comparative studies
of cultures as insufficient in that the aspects of culture
responsible for the observed differences are not identified
or measured, nor are the relationships between these and
the corresponding psychological phenomena demon-
strated. From this perspective, Betancourt and Weiner's
(1982) study was appropriate as a first step, but limited
in that cultural variables responsible for observed vari-
ations were not identified and measured. Hence, one may
not conclusively attribute differences to cultural factors.
To more directly test the specific cultural element
that might underlie the noted difference, Betancourt
(1985) first reviewed the cross-cultural literature on at-
tribution processes in an effort to identify possible cultural
dimensions that might contribute to explaining further
these findings. Key studies were identified that suggested
that the perception of control and the effects of causal
controllability are culturally determined. Specifically, the
relationship observed in the United States between con-
trollability for success and failure and reward and pun-
ishment (Weiner & Kukla, 1970) was replicated in Ger-
many (Meyer, 1970) but was not fully replicated in Brazil
(Rodrigues, 1981). In addition, Salili, Maehr, and Gill-
more (1976) only partially replicated in Iran the findings
of Weiner and Peter (1973) concerning developmental
aspects of the proposed relationship between controlla-
bility of attributions and interpersonal judgment.
The findings from these key studies, in conjunction
with the work of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) on
dimensions of cultural variation, suggested that the cul-
tural dimension of "control over nature versus subjuga-
tion to nature" (control-subjugation) was potentially rel-
evant. When the results on the control-subjugation value
orientation are compared for the countries noted in the
cross-cultural attributional research, Germany, a country
in which results are replicated, scores high on control, as
does the United States, whereas Brazil, Chile, and Iran,
where variations are observed, score low on control.
A series of studies was then designed (e.g., Betan-
court, Hardin, & Manzi, 1992) to investigate the control-
subjugation value orientation and related cultural beliefs
in relation to the attributional components of
a
model of
helping behavior (Betancourt, 1990). Although no cross-
cultural comparison took place, within-culture measures
June 1993 • American Psychologist
633
of the control-subjugation value orientation were used to
examine the influence of value orientation on the attri-
bution process, as well as the relationship between con-
trollability of attributions and helping behavior. In ad-
dition, the manipulation (activation) of beliefs associated
with this value orientation demonstrated how it relates
to the other components of the helping behavior model.
The research by Betancourt and associates progresses
from mainstream social psychological research and theory
to the study of cultural variables relevant to the theory
and search for universals. They identify a specific cultural
element hypothesized to be related to the cognitive pro-
cess and behavior under study and then test the relation-
ships.
Their findings indicate that value orientation in-
fluences attributional processes. Accordingly, attention
to values in attribution theory may serve to broaden the
scope and universality of the theory. This is an example
in which attention to culture may serve to enhance theory
development in mainstream research. In addition, the
work of Betancourt et al. (1992) has methodological im-
plications. Although these authors could have taken a
cross-cultural or between-groups approach by selecting
cultures that vary with regard to value orientation, they
chose a within-culture approach. Specifically, they mea-
sured differences on the theoretically relevant cultural di-
mension and tested its relationship to helping. This re-
search suggests that cultural variables can be studied
within a single culture and that research with mainstream
subjects can also examine culture.
The main limitation of mainstream theories is that
they ignore culture and therefore lack universality. The
limitation of a segregated cross-cultural psychology is that
it fails to use experimentation and develop theory. Two
approaches were described above (Betancourt et al., 1992;
Triandis et al., 1988) to illustrate how these limitations
might be overcome. We submit that progress will follow
if mainstream investigators include cultural elements in
their research and theory and if cross-cultural researchers
incorporate the measurement of cultural variables within
a theoretical network.
Limitations of Ethnic Minority Research
Ethnic minority research shares conceptual problems
similar to those of cross-cultural psychology. Direct mea-
sures of cultural elements are frequently not included,
yet cultural factors are assumed to underlie ethnic group
differences. Furthermore, ethnic minority research often
lacks sufficient attention to psychological theory. It ap-
pears that investigators of ethnicity are more inclined to-
ward description than testing theoretically derived hy-
potheses. In this section, we examine ethnic minority re-
search as it pertains to the study of psychopathology. We
draw attention to the importance of directly examining
the cultural basis of psychopathology and suggest ways to
incorporate psychological theory.
Like cross-cultural research, a typical cross-ethnic
design compares a given set of variables across samples
of two ethnic groups. In the study of ethnic differences
in psychopathology, such research is frequently based on
community or clinic surveys of psychological distress or
rates of mental disorders. Usually, methodological or sta-
tistical controls are included to rule out the effects of
socioeconomic status, age, and other sociodemographic
variables that could possibly be related to the given de-
pendent variable. If group differences are found with these
controls in place, then the investigator frequently argues
that the differences between Asian Americans and Anglo
Americans, for example, reflect cultural influences. In
other words, the observed group differences are thought
to be the result of differences in the groups' cultural values
and beliefs.
Often, researchers will discuss the cultural differences
that are thought to contribute to the observed differences.
It is important to note that the "cultural differences"
thought to underlie the observed group differences are
frequently not directly measured or assessed. It is assumed
that because the two groups are from two distinct cultural
or ethnic groups, they differ from one another on key
cultural dimensions. This may or may not be the case.
Without directly assessing these cultural dimensions, one
cannot be sure whether culture plays a role, nor can one
understand the nature of the relationship between cultural
variables and psychological processes.
In an attempt to more directly assess cultural influ-
ences associated with ethnicity, some investigators have
been using measures of acculturation. Acculturation typ-
ically refers to the degree to which minority groups adhere
to traditional cultural practices (in many cases, those
practices that are associated with people from their coun-
try of origin) or to U.S. cultural practices (for a review,
see Berry, 1990). These efforts represent a step forward
as they serve to increase the specificity in measuring cul-
tural influences.
The inclusion of acculturation measures are not
without limitations. First of
all,
such measures are usually
based on behavioral indices such as language usage (native
language or English) and place of birth (country of origin
or the United States). At best, these are indirect measures
of cultural values and beliefs. It is assumed that individ-
uals of low acculturation are more likely to adhere to
traditional cultural values regarding such variables as sex
role orientation and collectivism-individualism. This may
not be the case for a given sample.
Another reason why acculturation is a poor measure
of cultural influences is that it is confounded with ac-
culturative stress, or the stress experienced in adjusting
from one culture to another culture (Berry, 1990). Some
investigators have attempted to determine whether certain
levels of acculturation are related to psychological ad-
justment and distress, as well as rates of mental disorders
(see Rogler, Cortes, & Malgady, 1991, for a recent review
of Latino research). For example, some researchers find
that low-acculturated Latinos, in this case Mexican
Americans, report more distress than do more accultur-
ated Latinos and Anglos (Vega, Kolody, & Warheit, 1985).
It is not reasonable to interpret findings such as these as
only reflecting acculturative stress. It seems possible that
634
June 1993 • American Psychologist
the results could also reflect the association between level
of distress and specific cultural values, indirectly assessed.
Acculturation indices may serve then as indirect
measures of adherence to cultural values, but they may
also serve as indices of stress associated with adjusting to
the Anglo culture. If an investigator is interested in ex-
amining cultural influences, he or she would do best to
incorporate direct measures of culture-relevant variables
rather than a global measure of acculturation. Further-
more, if acculturative stress
is
the focus of an investigation,
a direct measure of this construct should be included (see
Cervantes, Padilla, & Salgado de Snyder, 1991). Without
directly assessing cultural values and beliefs and without
directly assessing acculturative stress, it is difficult to know
the meaning of finding significant relationships between
acculturation and psychological variables.
In a recent study, Lopez, Hurwicz, Karno, and Telles
(1992) attempted to approximate the goal of directly
measuring culture in the study of psychopathology.
Drawing from the Los Angeles Epidemiologic Catchment
Area database, a large epidemiologic study of the prev-
alence rates of several mental disorders among Mexican-
origin Latinos and Anglos (Karno et al., 1987), Lopez et
al.
took two significant steps to examine possible cultural
influences. First, they chose symptoms as the dependent
variable rather than disorders, the dependent variable
used in past analyses. Influenced by the work of Draguns
(1980) and Persons (1986), they argued that symptoms
may be more sensitive to possible sociocultural influences.
The second step was to test hypotheses regarding
ethnic differences in the report of specific symptoms and
to examine whether specific sociocultural variables ac-
counted for the hypothesized ethnic differences. To de-
velop specific hypotheses, they turned to prior descriptive
work of a clinical nature. For example, some clinical ob-
servers had noted that Latinos may have the experience
of hearing voices, which is reflective of a high degree of
spirituality or religiosity and not reflective of psychosis
(Abad, Ramos, & Boyce, 1977; Torrey, 1972). Religiosity
was also implicated in the relative absence of hypersex-
uality in the symptomatology of Amish with bipolar dis-
orders (Egeland, Hostetter, & Eshleman, 1983). On the
basis of these clinical observations, Lopez et al. (1992)
hypothesized that, relative to Anglo residents, Mexican-
origin residents would report more evidence of auditory
hallucinations, a symptom frequently associated with
schizophrenia, and less evidence of hypersexuality, a
symptom frequently associated with mania. Furthermore,
they hypothesized that religiosity would account for these
ethnic differences.
Consistent with their hypotheses, there were
signif-
icant differences in the reporting of these two symptoms
among Latinos of Mexican origin (U.S. born and Mexican
born) and Anglos. Furthermore, the patterns of findings
are consistent with the hypotheses. With regard to au-
ditory hallucinations, more Mexican-born Latinos re-
ported this symptom (2.3%) than U.S.-born Latinos
(1.6%),
who reported more such symptoms than Anglos
(0.6%).
The opposite pattern resulted for hypersexuality:
Mexican-born Latinos (2.2%), U.S.-born Latinos (4.3%),
and Anglos
(6.8%).
Although these findings are consistent
with cultural hypotheses—that is, there is something
about one or both cultures that contributes to these
symptom patterns—there is no direct evidence that cul-
tural elements are responsible for the findings.
To more closely approximate a direct cultural test,
Lopez et al. (1992) examined the role of religiosity in the
report of these symptoms. Regression analyses revealed
that ethnicity is an important variable in the reporting
of hypersexuality; however, Catholicism accounts for a
greater proportion of the variance. Thus, ethnicity appears
to be a more distal variable, whereas religious affiliation
is a more proximal variable. In contrast to the report of
hypersexuality, religiosity was not found to be significantly
related to the report of auditory hallucinations. It might
be that the report of auditory hallucinations is more re-
lated to spiritual beliefs that may exist independent of
religious background.
Although the past Los Angeles Epidemiologic
Catchment Area research indicates that there are no eth-
nic differences in the prevalence rates of disorders such
as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder (Karno et al., 1987),
suggesting that sociocultural factors are unimportant, the
Lopez et al. (1992) study indicates that ethnic and socio-
cultural factors are related to psychopathology as reflected
in the report of specific symptomatology. Their findings
are consistent with the notion that cultural elements or
the values and beliefs of individuals are likely to shape
the manner in which psychological distress and disorder
are manifest.
This research goes beyond the typical comparative
ethnic study by examining specific sociocultural factors
that are related to psychopathology; however, it falls short
of the ideal study. For example, although Catholicism
may represent a more proximal variable to hypersexuality
than ethnicity, it is not a direct measure of values and
beliefs. Measuring values and beliefs about sexual rela-
tions would have provided a more direct assessment of
cultural elements. Another limitation is that the rela-
tionship between Catholicism and hypersexuality may
reflect the reticence on the part of Catholics to report
this symptom and not their relatively less hypersexual
behavior. Also, this study lacks a specific theoretical base.
To incorporate theory, the authors might have linked
conceptual processes thought to underlie the given symp-
toms.
One such theoretical framework is offered by Ben-
tall (1990), who posited that hallucinations are the result
of impaired reality discrimination. In spite of the noted
limitations, this research serves to illustrate the impor-
tance of including more proximal sociocultural variables
in the study of ethnic group behavior, in this case psy-
chopathology.
Conclusion
We have discussed some of our concerns about the status
of culture in American psychology. We have pointed out
three areas of concern that in our opinion represent lim-
itations that preclude the advancement of knowledge
June 1993 • American Psychologist
635
concerning the role of culture in human behavior and
the universality of psychological theories. At the same
time we have suggested possible ways in which to deal
with some of the limitations in these areas. First, we ad-
dressed and tried to clarify some confusion in the un-
derstanding and use of the concepts of culture, race, eth-
nicity, and social variables, all of which are often used as
general explanatory factors for intergroup variations in
psychological phenomena. Second, addressing the limi-
tations of mainstream psychology, we suggested ways in
which to infuse the study of culture in mainstream re-
search and theory as well as ways to enhance experimen-
tation and the use of theory in cross-cultural research.
Finally, we illustrated ways in which to study sociocultural
variables and to consider theory in ethnic minority re-
search. In general, we propose that by clearly concep-
tualizing and measuring cultural and related variables
and by including theory, cross-cultural, ethnic, and
mainstream research, we can advance the understanding
of the role of culture as well as contribute to theory de-
velopment and applications.
We believe that psychology as a discipline will benefit
both from efforts to infuse culture in mainstream research
and theory and from efforts to study culture and develop
theory in cross-cultural and ethnic psychology. Specifi-
cally, we believe that the advancement of knowledge in
this area is necessary for psychology to enhance its status
as a scientific discipline and its standards of ethical and
social responsibility as a profession. As a scientific dis-
cipline, progress in the understanding of culture and its
role in psychology would result in more universal prin-
ciples and theories. As a profession, it would result in
instruments and interventions that are more sensitive to
the reality and cultural diversity of society and the world.
Our hope is that this article may stimulate attempts to
overcome the limitations we have noted and advance the
study of culture in psychology.
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Remember Your Passport
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