The Psychology of Being "Right": The Problem of Accuracy in Social Perception and Cognition

Abstract

Several difficulties are noted with general questions psychologists have been asking about human accuracy, such as whether people are typically accurate or inaccurate, what the boundary conditions for accuracy are, or the general process whereby accuracy may be improved. Instead, a situationally specific approach to accuracy is adopted in which a central role is assigned to the judgmental process. Accordingly, two general paradigms are distinguished addressing accuracy from realistic and phenomenal perspectives. The realist paradigm focuses on Ss' judgments and the degree to which these correspond to an external criterion. The phenomenal paradigm focuses on Ss' internal criterion as well as their perceptions of the target judgment and the judgment-to-criterion correspondence. Research possibilities in each paradigm are noted. It is suggested that attention to judgmental factors may extend accuracy work in previously unexplored directions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

Full text

Psychological
Bulletin
1989,
Vol.
106.
No.
3.
395-409
Copyright
1989
by
the
American
Psychological
Association,
Inc.
0033-2909/a9/$00.75
The
Psychology
of
Being
"Right":
The
Problem
of
Accuracy
in
Social
Perception
and
Cognition
Arie
W.
Kruglanski
University
of
Maryland, College Park
Several
difficulties
are
noted
with
general
questions
psychologists
have
been
asking
about
human
accuracy,
such
as
whether
people
are
typically
accurate
or
inaccurate,
what
the
boundary
conditions
for
accuracy
are,
or the
general
process
whereby
accuracy
may be
improved.
Instead,
a
situationally
specific
approach
to
accuracy
is
adopted
in
which
a
central
role
is
assigned
to the
judgmental
process.
Accordingly,
two
general
paradigms
are
distinguished
addressing
accuracy
from
realistic and
phe-
nomenal
perspectives.
The
realist
paradigm
focuses
on
subjects'
judgments
and the
degree
to
which
these
correspond
to an
external
criterion.
The
phenomenal
paradigm
focuses
on
subjects'
internal
criterion
as
well
as
their
perceptions
of
the
target
judgment
and the
judgment-to-criterion
correspon-
dence.
Research
possibilities
in
each
paradigm
are
noted.
It is
suggested
that
attention
to
judgmental
factors
may
extend
accuracy
work
in
previously
unexplored
directions.
Researchers' interest
in the
accuracy
of
social perception
has
never
waned
for
too
long. Admittedly, early accuracy
work
came
to a
virtual
halt
after
the
publication
of
Cronbach's
and
Gage's
critiques
(Cronbach,
1955,
1958; Gage
&
Cronbach, 1955;
Gage, Leavitt,
&
Stone,
1956)
and was
supplanted
by
research
on
the
judgmental process (Jones,
1985;
Schneider, Hastorf,
&
Ellsworth,
1979).
The
process
models, however, though initially
descriptive,
soon acquired prescriptive
or
"normative"
over-
tones (Funder,
1987).
Accordingly, researchers' interest
has
come
to
center
on
people's tendency
to
stray
from
optimal
modes
of
judgment (e.g.,
as
embodied
by
models
of
statistical
inference),
and the
emphasis
shifted
from
the
study
of
process
per se to the
study
of
bias
or
inaccuracy (sec Nisbctl
&
Ross,
1980;Tversky&Kahneman,
1974).
For
more
than
a
decade, research
on
judgmental
biases
and
errors
has
exerted dominant
influence
on
views
of the
human
cognitive
process.
Recently,
however,
several authors took issue
with
the
conclusion that laypersons
are
incorrigibly inaccurate
and
error
prone (Einhorn
&
Hogarth, 1981; Funder, 1987;Has-
tie
&
Rasinsky, 1988; Kenny
&
Albright, 1987; Kruglanski
&
Ajzen,
1983;
McArthur
&
Baron,
1983;
Nisbett,
Krantz,
Jep-
son,
&
Kunda, 1983; Swann, 1984). Furthermore, those recent
analyses
raise several
fundamental
issues that
a
comprehensive
treatment
of
accuracy
in
social perception
and
cognition
may
do
well
to
address.
These
new
developments warrant
a
reexamination
of the ac-
curacy problem
in
terms
of the
major themes stressed
by
recent
accuracy analyses.
This
article pursues
this
objective
and
out-
I
am
indebted
to
Reuben
Baron,
Nancy
Cantor,
Lee
Cronbach.
David
Funder,
Douglas
Kenrick,
David
Kenny,
Charles
Stangor,
William
Swann,
and two
anonymous
reviewers
for
helpful
comments
on an
ear-
lier
version.
Correspondence
concerning
this
article
should
be
addressed
to
Arie
W.
Kruglanski,
Department
of
Psychology.
University
of
Maryland,
College
Park,
Maryland
20742.
lines
a
conceptual
framework
for the
study
of
human accuracy,
in
which
a
central role
is
accorded
to
factors
affecting
the
judg-
mental
process
at
large.
Themes
in
Recent
Accuracy
Research
Psychologists' interest
in the
accuracy
of
people's judgments
is
not
hard
to
fathom,
for
accuracy
often
seems
a
valuable asset
to
possess. Beyond
the
intrinsic
value
of
having
a
grasp
on
"real-
ity," accuracy
affords
predictability that
may
help persons cope
with
their social
and
physical
environments.1
An
accurate
ten-
nis
player
may be
able
to
place
his or her
shots
at
just
the
correct
spot
on the
court
to win the
point;
a
spouse
who
accurately
perceives
his or her
partner's
needs
may
avoid unpleasant con-
flicts and
confrontations;
a
teacher
who can
accurately diagnose
a
pupil's
difficulties
may be
able
to
take
the
appropriate reme-
dial
steps;
and an
accurate
personnel
officer
may be
able
to se-
lect
the
best candidate
for the
job.
Because
of the
presumed
importance
of
accuracy (but
see
Taylor
&
Brown,
1988),
it is of
interest
to
investigate
the
degree
to
which
persons
are
generally
accurate
in
their everyday judg-
ments,
the
conditions under which they
are
more
or
less accu-
rate,
and the
psychological factors that facilitate
or
hinder accu-
racy.
However,
before
those questions
are
examined,
it
seems
worthwhile
to
consider
how
accuracy
may be
denned.
Defining
Accuracy
in
Social
Perception
and
Cognition
In
parallel
to
major philosophical conceptions
of
truth
(cf.
Popper,
1959),
recent social psychological literature contains
1
Strictly
speaking,
no
simple
relation
between
accuracy
and
utility
(or
adaptive
value)
should
be
expected.
Rather,
utility
should
depend
on
the
response
to an
accurate
or
inaccurate
judgment.
For
instance,
an
accurate
judgment
that
one is
bankrupt
may
lead
to
maladaptive
de-
pression
and
withdrawal.
By
contrast,
a
mistaken
assumption
that
one
is
considered
successful
and
likable
may
contribute
to
one's
well-being
and
anility
to
cope.
395
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