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Stereotyping and Evaluation in Implicit Race Bias: Evidence for
Independent Constructs and Unique Effects on Behavior
David M. Amodio
New York University
Patricia G. Devine
University of Wisconsin—Madison
Implicit stereotyping and prejudice often appear as a single process in behavior, yet functional neuro-
anatomy suggests that they arise from fundamentally distinct substrates associated with semantic versus
affective memory systems. On the basis of this research, the authors propose that implicit stereotyping
reflects cognitive processes and should predict instrumental behaviors such as judgments and impression
formation, whereas implicit evaluation reflects affective processes and should predict consummatory
behaviors, such as interpersonal preferences and social distance. Study 1 showed the independence of
participants’ levels of implicit stereotyping and evaluation. Studies 2 and 3 showed the unique effects of
implicit stereotyping and evaluation on self-reported and behavioral responses to African Americans
using double-dissociation designs. Implications for construct validity, theory development, and research
design are discussed.
Keywords: prejudice, stereotyping, implicit evaluation, affect, cognition
The distinction between affect and cognition in the human
psyche dates back to the earliest philosophers of the mind and
continues to be a major feature of modern psychology and neuro-
science. Indeed, contemporary theorists have argued that the
affective– cognitive distinction is essential for understanding the
mind, brain, and behavior (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999;
Damasio, 1994; Zajonc, 1980), and neuroscientists have delineated
distinct neural pathways for basic affective and cognitive systems
of learning and memory (Davis & Whalen, 2001; Squire & Zola,
1996). In the intergroup relations literature, affect and cognition
traditionally correspond to two key components of race bias:
prejudice and stereotyping (Allport, 1954; Devine, 1989; Dovidio,
Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996; Fiske, 1998; Mackie &
Smith, 1998). Whereas the term prejudice refers to negative af-
fective responses toward outgroup members (McConahay &
Hough, 1976), the term stereotype refers to cognitive representa-
tions of culturally held beliefs about outgroup members (Hamilton,
1981).
In research on traditional, explicit race biases, the conceptual
distinction between prejudice and stereotyping has provided a
useful framework for examining their respective contributions to
different forms of discrimination (Dovidio, Esses, Beach, & Gaert-
ner, 2004; Park & Judd, 2005). By contrast, in research on more
automatic, or implicit, forms of race bias, little attention has been
given to the affective– cognitive distinction or the important im-
plications it may have for understanding the relationship between
implicit biases and behavior. Because the distinction between
affective and semantic neural circuits are most pronounced in more
basic, implicit levels of processing, theories of implicit race bias
have much to gain by considering the alternative roles of affect and
cognition.
In the present research, we examined the roles of affect and
cognition in implicit race bias and their effects on behavior. On the
basis of theory and research from social psychology and neuro-
science, we argue for a conceptual distinction between implicit
stereotyping and implicit evaluative race bias and propose that
these two forms of implicit race bias are predictive of different
types of discriminatory responses.
Relationship Between Implicit Stereotyping and
Evaluation
A survey of the implicit race bias literature reveals that very few
studies have directly examined the relation between affective and
cognitive aspects of implicit bias (for reviews, see Blair, 2001;
Fazio & Olson, 2003), and none have sought to obtain independent
measures of implicit stereotyping versus evaluation.
1
Indeed, most
expressions of race bias reflect a combination of affective and
cognitive processes, and the most commonly reported African
American stereotypes are negative in valence (e.g., unintelligent,
hostile, poor, lazy, and dishonest; Devine & Elliot, 1995). Yet
despite the common concurrence of negative valence and stereo-
types of stigmatized groups, underlying distinctions between af-
fective and cognitive components may be important for under-
standing mechanisms of implicit race biases and their effects on
behavior.
1
Throughout this article, we use the term implicit evaluation rather than
implicit prejudice as a more precise label to refer to automatic evaluative
associations. By using implicit evaluation, we avoid invoking unintended
connotations associated with the complicated construct of prejudice, such
as consciously endorsed racist attitudes and beliefs (Amodio et al., 2003;
Devine et al., 2002).
David M. Amodio, Department of Psychology, New York University;
Patricia G. Devine, Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin—
Madison.
We gratefully acknowledge Carolyn Stahlhut, Ryan Beld, and Marissa
Langhoff for their assistance in data collection.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to David M.
Amodio, Department of Psychology, New York University, 6 Washington
Place, New York, NY 10003. E-mail: David.amodio@nyu.edu
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2006 by the American Psychological Association
2006, Vol. 91, No. 4, 652– 661 0022-3514/06/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.91.4.652
652
Although the distinction is seldom made, past research has
featured measures that may be characterized as assessing either
implicit stereotyping (e.g., Lepore & Brown, 1997; Spencer, Fein,
Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998), implicit evaluation (e.g., Amodio,
Harmon-Jones, & Devine, 2003; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson,
Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams,
1995; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), or some combi-
nation of stereotyping and evaluation (e.g., Dovidio, Evans, &
Tyler, 1986; Kawakami, Dion, & Dovidio, 1998; Rudman, Ash-
more, & Gary, 2001; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997, 2001). The
use of such measures suggests that both are valid constructs that
have been studied somewhat independently and that both forms of
implicit bias are prevalent among European Americans, such that
African Americans are typically associated with negative evalua-
tions and with the culturally defined stereotype content (Blair,
2001). However, although the distinction between implicit stereo-
typing and implicit evaluation has been acknowledged in past
work (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald et al., 2002),
theorizing has not been advanced to directly address the relation
between cognitive and affective mechanisms underlying these two
forms of implicit race bias.
Distinct Neural Substrates for Basic Affective and
Semantic Associations
In the neuroscience literature, neural substrates of affective
forms of learning and memory have been distinguished from
semantic forms, and this distinction has implications for the
present set of issues. Results from decades of research on animals
and humans suggest that the amygdala and its associated subcor-
tical circuits are central to affective learning and memory (Lang,
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990; LeDoux, 2000). This body of work has
shown that affective associations are learned quickly, often after a
single presentation of an unconditioned stimulus in a fear-learning
paradigm. Once learned, such associations extinguish slowly, and
subsequent reconditioning to the stimulus is facilitated (Bouton,
1994). It is important to note that amygdala-based learning does
not depend on semantic associations; for example, mice easily
learn affective associations despite their inability to process se-
mantic information. By comparison, semantic learning and mem-
ory (e.g., conceptual priming) are embedded in mechanisms for
language, believed to be supported by a phylogenetically newer
network of neocortical structures that are significantly expanded
among humans compared with those of other species (Gabrieli,
1998; Rissman, Eliassen, & Blumstein, 2003; Squire & Zola,
1996). Semantic associations may be learned in the absence of
affective content, such that patients with a damaged amygdala
retain normal semantic associations despite the loss of conditioned
physiological responses in a fear-conditioning paradigm (Bechara,
Damasio, & Damasio, 2003).
An examination of anatomical and neurochemical connectivity
of the amygdala and surrounding structures reveals strong direct
links with neural regions associated with modulating behavior on
the basis of reward and punishment cues (e.g., basal ganglia, motor
cortex, orbital frontal cortex; Davis & Whalen, 2001; Park & Judd,
2005) and for mobilizing fight or flight responses (e.g., via the
hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis; Feldman, Conforti, & Wei-
denfeld, 1995). By contrast, neocortical regions associated with
semantic associations appear to have few, if any, direct connec-
tions to these systems. Rather, semantic associations are likely
embedded in distributed networks in association cortex and thus
may influence social cognition by biasing higher order information
processing, such as when inferring the beliefs and intentions of
another person (Amodio & Frith, 2006). Although systems for
affect- and semantic-based associations typically function in con-
cert, and thus tend to appear blended in outward verbal and
behavioral responses, a consideration of their distinct operations is
critical for understanding the behavioral effects of implicit stereo-
typing and evaluation.
Relationship Between Implicit Stereotyping and Implicit
Evaluative Race Bias
On the basis of social psychological and neuroscientific theo-
rizing, we proposed that implicit stereotyping and evaluation
should represent independent constructs. Although past theorizing
has pointed to this distinction (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;
Greenwald et al., 2002), few studies have explored it directly (cf.
Dovidio et al., 1986; Kawakami et al., 1998; Rudman, Greenwald,
& McGhee, 2001; Wittenbrink et al., 1997, 2001), and none has
examined the respective implications of implicit stereotyping ver-
sus implicit evaluation for behavior. A limiting factor in this line
of inquiry is that in previous research, independent assessments of
implicit stereotyping and evaluative race bias have not been ob-
tained, and thus it has not been possible to examine the conceptual
relationship of implicit stereotyping and evaluative race bias and
their potentially unique effects on behavior. Hence, the first major
goal in the present work was to obtain independent measures of
implicit stereotyping and evaluation that would permit a fair test of
the independence hypothesis.
Differential Effects of Implicit Evaluative Race Bias and
Stereotyping on Behavior
If implicit stereotyping and evaluation reflect independent
cognitive and affective systems, then they may be uniquely
associated with different types of discriminatory responses.
Consistent with this hypothesis, Millar and Tesser (1986, 1989)
argued that instrumental behaviors (e.g., forming judgments
and goals) are driven primarily by cognitive processes, whereas
consummatory behaviors (e.g., appetitive or aversive behav-
iors) are driven primarily by affective– evaluative processes. On
the basis of this theorizing, Dovidio and his colleagues (1996,
2004; Esses & Dovidio, 2002; see also Stangor, Sullivan, &
Ford, 1991) proposed that by considering the match between the
affective versus cognitive nature of race-bias measures and
forms of discriminatory outcomes, greater correspondences be-
tween assessments of race bias and behavior may be attained. In
a meta-analysis focusing on explicit self-reports of stereotyping
and prejudice, Dovidio et al. (2004) showed that affect-based
measures of race bias tended to be predictive of basic approach/
avoidance responses (e.g., nonverbal behaviors and affective
responses) toward African Americans, whereas cognition-based
measures of race bias tended to be predictive of the endorse-
ment of stereotypes and support for policies that disadvantage
African Americans.
Although Dovidio et al.’s meta-analysis focused on explicit
measures of race bias, extant findings from the implicit race
bias literature are generally consistent with these predictions
(Ashburn-Nardo, Knowles, & Monteith, 2003; Dovidio et al.,
653
IMPLICIT STEREOTYPING VS. EVALUATIVE RACE BIAS
1997; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Fazio et al.,
1995; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Wilson, Lindsey, &
Schooler, 2000). For example, Fazio et al. (1995) found that
implicit evaluative bias was predictive of less friendly behavior
toward a Black experimenter but was not associated with par-
ticipants’ views on the Rodney King verdict and ensuing riots.
In other research, greater implicit evaluative bias was associ-
ated with more uncomfortable interactions (e.g., less eye con-
tact, more blinking) with a Black confederate compared with
those involving a White confederate (Dovidio et al., 1997,
2002) and more negative interactions with a Black experimenter
on a host of indicators, including speech hesitations and errors
and behavior judged to be abrupt, unfriendly, and uncomfort-
able (McConnell & Leibold, 2001). By contrast, researchers
have not examined the unique effects of implicit stereotyping
on behavior, although some previous findings bear on the topic.
For example, Kawakami et al. (1998) found that higher levels of
implicit stereotyping were predictive of the attribution of ste-
reotypic traits to a larger proportion of African Americans (in
addition to reporting more prejudiced attitudes). It is important
to note that in previous research, the hypothesis that implicit
stereotyping and implicit evaluation are uniquely predictive of
alternative forms of race-biased behavior has not been directly
tested. Hence, the second main goal of the present work was to
test this hypothesis directly.
Overview of Present Research
In the present research, we examined the relationship between
implicit stereotyping and implicit evaluative race bias and their
respective effects on instrumental versus consummatory forms of
race-biased behavior. Although stereotyping and evaluation pro-
cesses typically operate in concert, it was necessary for us to obtain
relatively pure measures of implicit stereotyping and evaluation to
examine their unique effects on behavior. To this end, we designed
separate implicit association tests (IATs) to assess implicit stereo-
typing and implicit evaluative race bias. The IAT was chosen
because it has been shown to be reliable (Greenwald, Nosek, &
Banaji, 2003), and it has been widely used in the implicit race bias
literature (Devine, 2001). In Study 1, we examined the degree to
which measures of implicit stereotyping and evaluative race bias
were independent (i.e., uncorrelated). In Studies 2 and 3, we
examined the unique effects of implicit stereotyping and evalua-
tion on instrumental and consummatory forms of behavior.
Study 1
Method
Participants and Procedure
One hundred fifty-one European American introductory psychology
students (82 women, 69 men) participated in exchange for extra course
credit. After providing informed consent, participants received instructions
on completing separate IAT measures of stereotyping and prejudice ad-
ministered on a PC using Inquisit software (Millisecond Software, Seattle,
WA). IAT order was counterbalanced across participants. After completing
the measures, participants were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.
Materials
Evaluative IAT. The IAT is a dual categorization task in which par-
ticipants categorize words as pleasant or unpleasant and faces as either
Black or White by pressing one of two keys on the computer keyboard.
Stimuli consisted of pleasant and unpleasant words as used by Greenwald
et al. (1998) and pictures of White and Black male faces displaying neutral
expressions (Malpass, Lavigueur, & Weldon, 1973) as used by Devine,
Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, and Vance (2002; Study 3). Pleasant words
included honor, lucky, diamond, loyal, freedom, rainbow, love, honest,
peace, and heaven. Unpleasant words included evil, cancer, sickness,
disaster, poverty, vomit, bomb, rotten, abuse, and murder.
The IAT procedure comprised five blocks of trials (Greenwald et al.,
1998). Stimuli were presented individually in the center of the computer
monitor in randomized order. In Block 1, participants viewed 10 Black
and 10 White faces and categorized Black faces by pressing the left
response key (“a” on the alphabetic keyboard) and White faces by
pressing the right response key (“5” on numeric keypad). In Block 2,
participants viewed 10 pleasant and 10 unpleasant words, categorizing
unpleasant words with the left response key and pleasant words with the
right response key. In Block 3, stimuli included White faces, Black
faces, pleasant words, and unpleasant words, and response mappings
were combined such that participants categorized Black faces and
unpleasant words by pressing the left response key and White faces and
pleasant words by pressing the right response key. This block consisted
of 40 trials and was referred to as the compatible block (Greenwald et
al., 1998), given that response pairings of White with good and Black
with bad are compatible with Whites’ tendency to prefer White faces
over Black faces. In Block 4, participants viewed 10 Black and 10
White faces but this time categorized White faces with the left response
key and Black faces with the right response key to counterbalance
response mappings. In Block 5, categorizations were again combined
such that participants categorized White faces and unpleasant words by
pressing the left response key and Black faces and pleasant words by
pressing the right response key. This block included 40 trials and was
referred to as the incompatible block. Half of the participants completed
the IAT as described above; half completed a version with reversed
response mappings.
Stereotyping IAT. We designed a new IAT in which participants
viewed two classes of words associated with the positive characteristics of
intelligence and athleticism/rhythmicity, and categorized them as mental or
physical, respectively, in addition to the Black versus White face catego-
rizations. Intelligence and athleticism/rhythmicity are central to the African
American stereotype, such that African Americans are stereotyped as more
athletic/rhythmic and less intelligent than European Americans (Devine &
Elliot, 1995). Because the mental and physical categories were relatively
neutral, the categorization of words relating to athleticism/rhythmicity and
intelligence as mental or physical did not involve evaluative judgments.
2
Target word stimuli used in the stereotyping IAT were selected on the
basis of pretesting.
3
Ten target words were selected for each category on
the basis of category fit and stereotypicality. Mental words included math,
brainy, aptitude, educated, scientist, smart, college, genius, book, and read.
Physical words included athletic, boxing, basketball, run, agile, dance,
jump, rhythmic, track, and football. The procedure for the stereotyping IAT
was identical to that of the evaluative IAT, except that the pleasant and
2
We developed additional IATs for other common African American
stereotypes. Using the method by which Rudman, Greenwald, and McGhee
(2001) measured implicit gender stereotyping, we pretested sets of target
words related to poor (vs. wealthy), hostile (vs. friendly), and lazy (vs.
motivated). In each case, however, the stereotype was strongly related to
evaluation (e.g., poor is negative and wealthy is positive), and therefore
these were not suitable for examining the independence of implicit eval-
uation and implicit stereotyping.
3
Our lab group first generated separate lists of 22 words corresponding
to the physical and mental categories. Sixty-one introductory psychology
students then rated the fit of each word with its respective category and its
degree of association with White and Black Americans on a scale of 1 (not
654
AMODIO AND DEVINE
unpleasant target words and category labels were replaced with
intelligence- and athletics-related target words and the mental and physical
category labels. Hence, the compatible block included Black/physical and
White/mental categorizations and the incompatible block included Black/
mental and White/physical categorizations.
IAT scoring. Responses to the evaluative and stereotyping IATs were
scored using the “improved algorithm,” outlined by Greenwald et al. (2003,
p. 214), which produced the D statistic.
4
However, because the IAT used
in Study 1 consisted of the original five-block version (Greenwald et al.,
1998), steps involving practice blocks were omitted. Following the algo-
rithm, responses with latencies greater than 10,000 ms were removed.
Separate means were computed for correct raw response latencies on
compatible and incompatible blocks. Error responses within each block
were replaced by the mean correct reaction time for that block, plus a
600-ms error penalty. D was quantified as the difference between incom-
patible and compatible mean reaction times divided by the pooled standard
deviation of reaction times on compatible and incompatible blocks. Data
from two participants were excluded because of outlying scores (Student’s
t scores differed significantly from mean, p ⬍ .05), and data from one
participant were excluded because a high percentage of his responses
(18%) on the stereotyping IAT were faster than 300 ms (Greenwald et al.,
2003); results did not differ when outliers were included.
Results
Evidence for implicit bias was examined using one-sample t
tests of D scores (effect size r is presented for each t value). All
tests were two-tailed. Evaluative IAT scores were significantly
greater than zero (M ⫽ .51, SD ⫽ .42), t(147) ⫽ 14.60, p ⬍ .001,
r ⫽ .77, suggesting a negative evaluative association with Black
faces relative to White faces, replicating past work. Stereotyping
IAT scores were also significantly greater than zero (M ⫽ .17,
SD ⫽ .43), t(147) ⫽ 4.72, p ⬍ .001, r ⫽ .36, such that participants
exhibited a pattern of stereotypic trait associations with Black and
White faces. No effects were found for sex or IAT order, Fs ⬍ 1.
Next, we tested our primary hypothesis that levels of implicit
stereotyping and implicit evaluation should be independent by
examining their correlation. Participants’ evaluative and stereotyp-
ing IAT scores were not significantly correlated, r(147) ⫽ .06, p ⫽
.47, supporting our hypothesis.
Discussion
The results of Study 1 showed that participants possessed sig-
nificant levels of implicit evaluative and stereotyping biases but
that their levels of each bias were uncorrelated, suggesting con-
ceptual independence. It is noteworthy that although athleticism,
rhythmicity, and (un)intelligence represent a subset of commonly
observed African American stereotypes, they are among the most
central to the stereotype. Indeed, these three attributes were the
most frequently cited by participants instructed to freely list traits
associated with African Americans (Devine & Elliot, 1995). Be-
cause our stereotyping IAT focused on the three most central traits
of the African American stereotype, and given previous findings
that the activation of a central stereotype typically activates the
constellation of African American stereotypes (Devine, 1989;
Lepore & Brown, 1997), it is likely that our measure of implicit
stereotyping reflected associations with the general African Amer-
ican stereotype. Nevertheless, it would be important to show that
stereotyping IAT scores were predictive of responses to an African
American target, reflecting stereotypic content that reached be-
yond traits of (un)intelligence, athleticism, and rhythmicity.
Studies 2 and 3 were designed with two goals in mind: to
replicate Study 1 findings and to test the hypothesis that implicit
stereotyping and evaluation are uniquely predictive of different
forms of race-biased behavioral outcomes. The behavioral effects
of implicit stereotyping and evaluation in Studies 2 and 3 were
examined using double-dissociation designs constructed to isolate
unique effects of predictors on specific outcome variables. Here,
we tested the hypothesis that implicit stereotyping would be asso-
ciated with instrumental but not with consummatory forms of
race-biased behavior, whereas implicit evaluative race bias would
be associated with consummatory but not with instrumental forms
of race-biased behavior.
Study 2
In Study 2, we examined the degree to which participants’ levels
of implicit stereotyping and evaluation influenced their impres-
sions of an African American student. To measure instrumental
forms of behavior, we assessed participants’ use of stereotypes as
they formed an impression of the African American student on the
basis of the student’s writing sample (Moreno & Bodenhausen,
2001). To measure basic approach/avoidance responses associated
with consummatory behaviors, we examined participants’ prefer-
ence for the writer as a potential friend. We also collected partic-
ipants’ affective ratings of various ethnic groups, including Afri-
can Americans, using a feelings thermometer measure. We
4
IAT effects based on difference scores (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998)
replicated results reported for the D statistic in all studies. Analyses of
difference scores are available from the authors.
at all) to 9 (extremely). Pretest ratings of category fit for physical and
mental target words exceeded the scale midpoint, ps ⬍ .001, indicating that
target words were good exemplars of their respective categories, and fit
scores for the mental and physical target words did not differ, t(60) ⫽ .40,
p ⫽ .69, r ⫽ .05. Physical target words were rated as more stereotypical of
Black people (M ⫽ 7.68, SD ⫽ 0.98) than of White people (M ⫽ 5.19,
SD ⫽ 1.26), t(60) ⫽ 13.12, p ⬍ .001, r ⫽ .86, whereas mental target words
were rated as more stereotypical of White people (M ⫽ 7.23, SD ⫽1.42)
than of Black people (M ⫽ 4.30, SD ⫽ 1.31), t(60) ⫽ 13.31, p ⬍.001,
r ⫽ .86.
A separate sample of 39 participants rated the favorability of words
associated with the mental/physical and pleasant/unpleasant IATs on a
scale from 1 (extremely unfavorable)to9(extremely favorable). Pleasant
words (M ⫽ 7.93, SD ⫽ 0.54) were rated much more favorably than
unpleasant words (M ⫽ 1.75, SD ⫽ 0.58), t(38) ⫽ 38.83, p ⬍ .001, r ⫽ .99.
Unexpectedly, mental words (M ⫽ 7.06, SD ⫽ 0.78) were rated as more
favorable than were physical words (M ⫽ 6.22, SD ⫽ .77), t(38) ⫽ 7.07,
p ⬍ .001, r ⫽ .75, although both mental and physical word lists were rated
significantly above the neutral midpoint of the scale, ps ⬍ .001, and both
were rated as more favorable than unpleasant words, ps ⬍ .001, and less
favorable than pleasant words, ps ⬍ .001. Although mental words were
rated more favorably than physical words, this difference was much
smaller than the difference in ratings between pleasant and unpleasant
words, t(38) ⫽ 28.77, p ⬍ .001, r ⫽ .98. We used covariate analyses in our
hierarchical regressions to ensure that effects of stereotyping IAT scores
were not driven by evaluative associations (and vice versa) because any
shared variance was statistically controlled. If anything, the valence effect
found among the stereotyping IAT words would enhance the relationship
between implicit stereotyping and evaluation, thereby working against our
hypotheses and rendering more conservative tests.
655
IMPLICIT STEREOTYPING VS. EVALUATIVE RACE BIAS
hypothesized that implicit stereotyping but not implicit evaluation
would be related to more stereotypic trait ratings of the African
American student, whereas implicit evaluation but not stereotyping
would relate to a greater desire to befriend the writer and more
negative affective responses toward African Americans.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Thirty-six European American introductory psychology students (15
men, 21 women) participated in exchange for extra course credit. After
providing consent, participants were told that the study consisted of two
parts. The experimenter explained that the first part examined people’s
ability to form impressions of others on the basis of short writing samples.
Participants were shown a set of 10 file folders containing different writing
samples and were asked to choose one at random (although all folders
contained identical materials). Participants were given the chosen folder,
which contained the writer’s demographic information, a copy of the essay,
and a set of forms to record their ratings. The demographic information
included the writer’s name, age, sex, ethnicity, year in college, and home-
town, indicating that he was a 19-year-old male African American soph-
omore from Milwaukee, WI. Participants transferred this demographic
information onto the evaluation form; read the essay, which contained
some grammatical and spelling errors; and then provided their ratings of
the essay and the writer. As the second part of the study, participants
completed the evaluative and stereotyping IATs, in counterbalanced order,
and the feelings thermometer measure. The essay ratings, IATs, and the
feelings thermometer measure were administered in this order to prioritize
the more covert measures as a means of minimizing participants’ suspi-
cions. Lastly, participants were probed for suspicion regarding the cover
story and hypotheses, debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. Five participants’
data were excluded because their scores on one or more measures differed
significantly from the mean ( p ⬍ .05) in a Student’s t distribution and were
considered outliers. Although inclusion of outliers inflated standard errors
and thus weakened effect sizes, it did not change the pattern of effects.
Materials
Evaluative and stereotyping IATs. The evaluative and stereotyping
IATs consisted of the same stimuli described in Study 1 but were admin-
istered using DirectRT software (Empirisoft, New York) and included sets
of 20 practice trials before the compatible and incompatible blocks. The D
statistic was computed as in Study 1, with the additional incorporation of
responses from the practice blocks (Greenwald et al., 2003).
Essay evaluation materials. The essay evaluation form included items
for rating (a) the general quality and style of the essay (included to bolster
the cover story), (b) the trait attributes of the writer, and (c) participants’
liking of and perceived similarity with the writer. Trait ratings of the writer
were made using a scale ranging from 1 (not at all)to10(very much)on
a list of adjectives known to be highly associated with the Black stereotype
(lazy, dishonest, unintelligent, and trustworthy; Devine & Elliot, 1995)
intermixed with filler traits that were relatively neutral and not typically
associated with the stereotype (modest, assertive, and thoughtful). Ratings
were averaged to form separate indices of stereotypic ratings (␣⫽.68,
with trustworthy reverse-scored) and neutral filler ratings (␣⫽.53). Liking
ratings were made for five items (e.g., “The writer seems like the type of
person I would like to get to know better”; “The writer and I have a lot of
things in common”) on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree)to10(strongly
agree; mean ratings: ␣⫽.73).
Feelings thermometer. The feelings thermometer questionnaire
consisted of a scale along which a range of “degrees” were depicted,
from 0° (extremely unfavorable) to 100° (extremely favorable), with
50° labeled neither favorable nor unfavorable. Ratings were provided
for African Americans, European Americans, Asian Americans, and
Latino Americans.
Results
IAT Effects
As in Study 1, participants exhibited significant levels of im-
plicit evaluation (M ⫽ 0.32, SD ⫽ 0.17), t(31) ⫽ 10.96, p ⬍ .001,
r ⫽ .89, and implicit stereotyping (M ⫽ 0.29, SD ⫽ 0.23), t(31) ⫽
7.24, p ⬍ .001, r ⫽ .79, yet IAT scores were not significantly
correlated, r(30) ⫽ .16, p ⫽ .37. No significant effects emerged for
sex or IAT order, Fs ⬍ 2.04, ps ⬎ .16.
IAT Effects on Behavioral Responses
To test our main hypotheses regarding double dissociations of
the stereotyping and evaluation IATs, we used hierarchical linear
regressions. First, the D score for the IAT that was not hypothe-
sized to predict the outcome was entered as a covariate in Step 1.
In Step 2, D for the hypothesized predictor was added to the
regression model. We could then obtain evidence for a double
dissociation by examining the simultaneous effects of the two
predictors in Step 2. The semipartial r (sr) is reported as an effect
size estimate.
Stereotype Ratings
Evaluative IAT scores, entered in Step 1, did not predict ste-
reotype ratings of the African American essay writer, ⫽⫺.17,
t(29) ⫽⫺0.90, p ⫽ .37, sr ⫽⫺.17. However, higher stereotyping
IAT scores were associated with more stereotypic ratings of the
African American essay writer in Step 2, ⫽.39, t(28) ⫽ 2.70,
p ⫽ .03, sr ⫽ .39, whereas the effect of evaluative IAT scores
remained nonsignificant, ⫽⫺.23, t(28) ⫽⫺1.33, p ⫽ .20, sr ⫽
⫺.23. Ratings of nonstereotypic traits were not associated with
scores on the stereotyping IAT, ⫽⫺.01, t(29) ⫽⫺0.04, p ⫽ .97,
sr ⫽⫺.01, or the evaluative IAT, ⫽⫺.02, t(28) ⫽⫺0.11, p ⫽
.92, sr ⫽⫺.02. Finally, when nonstereotypic ratings were included
as a covariate in Step 1, stereotyping IAT scores continued to
predict stereotypic ratings, ⫽.39, t(27) ⫽ 2.73, p ⬍ .01, sr ⫽
.38, whereas evaluative IAT scores did not, ⫽⫺.18, t(28) ⫽
⫺1.13, p ⫽ .26, sr ⫽⫺.18.
Affective Responses
In analyses of preference for the writer, stereotyping IAT scores
entered in Step 1 were not predictive of preferences, ⫽.06,
t(29) ⫽ 0.33, p ⫽ .75, sr ⫽ .06. In Step 2, higher evaluative IAT
scores were associated with less desire to befriend the essay writer,
⫽⫺.32, t(28) ⫽⫺1.79, p ⫽ .08, sr ⫽⫺.32, whereas the effect
for stereotyping IAT scores remained nonsignificant, ⫽.01,
t(28) ⫽ .04, p ⫽ .97, sr ⫽ .01, supporting our hypothesis. Partic-
ipants’ feelings thermometer ratings provided an additional index
of consummatory response toward African Americans that could
be used to corroborate the marginally significant effect on prefer-
ence for the writer. Average thermometer ratings for Whites,
Asians, and Latinos were entered in the first regression step as a
baseline covariate, followed by stereotyping IAT scores in Step 2
and evaluative IAT scores in Step 3. The effect for baseline
thermometer ratings was significant, ⫽.90, t(29) ⫽ 11.40, p ⬍
656
AMODIO AND DEVINE
.001, sr ⫽ .90, which reflected individual differences in scale
usage, but the effect for stereotyping IAT scores was not signifi-
cant, ⫽⫺.10, t(28) ⫽⫺1.25, p ⫽ .22, sr ⫽⫺.10. Notably,
higher evaluative IAT scores were predictive of more negative
feelings toward African Americans, ⫽⫺.18, t(27) ⫽⫺2.04,
p ⫽ .05, sr ⫽⫺.16, consistent with effects for writer preference.
Additional analyses examining IAT effects on thermometer ratings
of Whites, Asians, and Latinos produced no significant effects.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 further supported the independence of
implicit stereotyping and implicit evaluation, such that scores on
the stereotyping and evaluative IATs were not significantly corre-
lated. Furthermore, our regression analyses revealed the hypothe-
sized double dissociation between implicit stereotyping and im-
plicit evaluation effects. These results indicated that cognitive and
affective forms of implicit race bias are uniquely associated with
instrumental versus consummatory forms of race-biased behavior,
respectively, and hence showed discriminant and predictive valid-
ity of the stereotyping and evaluative IATs. It is notable that
although the stereotyping IAT focused on a subset of the African
American stereotype (e.g., athleticism, rhythmicity, and lack of
intelligence), it predicted a broader instantiation of the stereotype,
including the descriptors of lazy, dishonest, and (un)trustworthy,
consistent with research evidencing strong links between subcom-
ponents of the stereotype (e.g., Devine, 1989).
Although Study 2 provided good support for our hypotheses
using conventional social psychological measures, it may have
been limited in some respects. For instance, the procedure of Study
2 did not provide a good model of how implicit race biases would
predict a White person’s responses in anticipation of a real-life
interaction with an African American. A second potential limita-
tion was that the predictor and outcome variables were collected in
the same experimental session, precluding causal inference and
raising the possibility that the outcome measures might have
influenced IAT scores. These limitations were addressed in Study
3, in which participants completed measures of implicit stereotyp-
ing and evaluation several weeks before being recruited for a
purportedly separate experiment in which they expected to interact
with an African American participant.
Study 3
Study 3 comprised two sessions. In the first session, participants
completed IAT measures of stereotyping and evaluative race bias.
In the second, ostensibly unrelated session, participants were led to
believe that they would interact with an African American partner
on various tasks involving tests of academic (verbal and math-
ematic) and nonacademic (sports and popular culture) knowledge.
Participants rated how well they thought that they and their partner
would perform on each of these tasks (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2003)
as an index of instrumental behavior. To assess consummatory
behavior, we measured the distance participants chose to sit from
the partner’s belongings in a row of chairs just prior to their
interactions (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994). We
hypothesized that implicit stereotyping but not evaluation would
predict stereotype-consistent performance expectations, whereas
implicit evaluation but not stereotyping would predict seating
distance from the partner.
Method
Participants
In the first phase of this study, participants were 43 introductory psy-
chology students, 23 of whom were successfully recruited later in the
semester for what they believed was an unrelated study. Evaluative IAT
data from 2 participants were missing because of a computer malfunction,
leaving 21 participants (13 women, 8 men) with valid data from both
sessions. IAT scores of participants who did versus those who did not
return for Session 2 did not differ, ps ⬎ .23.
Procedure
Session 1. Participants completed stereotyping and evaluative IATs in
one of two counterbalanced orders, and the IATs were scored to yield D
scores, as in Study 2.
Session 2. Participants were told the study would involve pairs of
participants. At the scheduled experiment time, the experimenter entered
the waiting room and called out the names of the participant and the
(imaginary) partner. The partner’s name alternated between “Darnell Stew-
art” and “Tyrone Washington” to suggest African American ethnicity
(Greenwald et al., 1998). Noting that the partner had not yet arrived, the
experimenter escorted the participant to the experiment room to get started.
After providing consent, the participant was told the following:
We’re studying peoples’ ability to cooperate with another person on
some tasks assessing different types of general knowledge. You and a
partner are going to complete a set of tasks, and then your combined
score on these tasks will be compared with other teams who are in this
study. You should try your best on these tasks, because the teams with
the top five combined scores will be entered into a drawing for $40.
Participants were then asked to rate their abilities in various subject
areas, including their mathematic and verbal skills and their knowledge of
sports and cultural trivia. The experimenter then left momentarily, purport-
edly to check for the arrival of the partner. After a few minutes, the
experimenter returned to explain that the other participant had arrived and
was filling out initial questionnaires in another room. The participant was
then shown the one-page participant information form identical to that used
in Study 2. The top half was already filled in by the partner so that the
participant would see he was African American. The participant completed
the bottom half of the form.
Next, the experimenter noted they were running behind schedule and
gave the following explanation:
To save time, I’m going to have you decide which tasks you’ll do and
which your partner will do. Then we’ll all go to the main testing room.
Remember, you want to choose tasks for yourself and your partner
that will give you the best combined score, not just so that only you
or he will do well. There are four different tests: one has questions
from the math SAT, another has questions from the verbal SAT, and
the other two have questions about sports and popular culture.
Participants indicated which tasks they chose for themselves and their
partners and then rated their perceptions of how well they and their partners
would perform on each of the tasks.
5
After leaving briefly to check up on
the supposed partner, the experimenter explained that the participant and
the partner would now meet together in another room to complete their
tasks. The experimenter led the participant out of the experiment room and,
5
Participants were rather egalitarian in their assignments of the aca
-
demic tasks, with 20 of 21 participants assigning one of the SAT tasks to
themselves and the other to the partner. This pattern restricted the variance
of task assignments, and thus it was an insensitive measure of stereotype-
consistent behavior.
657
IMPLICIT STEREOTYPING VS. EVALUATIVE RACE BIAS
explaining that the partner had left momentarily to use the bathroom,
directed the participant to sit in one of a row of chairs to wait. Eight
identical chairs were arranged in a line, equally spaced approximately 4 in.
(10.16 cm) apart along the hallway. A coat and backpack putatively
belonging to the partner were placed on the chair nearest to the experiment
room doorway. After the participant chose a seat, the experimenter sur-
reptitiously recorded the participant’s seating position and then left mo-
mentarily to photocopy the participant’s information sheet.
After returning, the experimenter explained that the session would have
to end early and led the participant back into the experiment room. The
experimenter then probed the participant for suspicion regarding the cover
story and the connection between Sessions 1 and 2, provided a debriefing
and full explanation of the procedures, and then thanked and dismissed the
participant. Two participants expressed some suspicion but were unable to
identify key aspects of the cover story, the connection between Sessions 1
and 2, or the hypotheses.
Materials
Participants rated how well they thought that they would perform on the
tests of SAT mathematic and verbal skills, sports trivia, and popular culture
on a scale ranging from 1 (very poorly)to9(very well). Ratings of
expected enjoyment on each task were also made on a scale ranging from
1(not at all)to9(very much). Next, participants rated their expectations
of their partner’s performance and enjoyment on the same tasks, using the
same scales.
Results
IAT Scores
Participants exhibited significant levels of implicit evaluation
(M ⫽ 0.38, SD ⫽ 0.29), t(20) ⫽ 5.93, p ⬍ .001, r ⫽ .80, and
implicit stereotyping (M ⫽ 0.15, SD ⫽ 0.18), t(20) ⫽ 3.70, p ⬍
.001, r ⫽ .64. Evaluative and stereotyping IAT scores were un-
correlated, r(19) ⫽ .02, p ⫽ .93, replicating the findings of Studies
1 and 2.
Ratings of Partner Abilities and Enjoyment
An index was created to represent the extent to which the
partner was expected to perform poorly on academic tasks but to
excel on nonacademic tasks, relative to participants’ own expected
performance. Participants’ self-expectation ratings on each task
were subtracted from their partner-expectation ratings. These
scores were standardized, with ratings of counter-stereotype skills
(mathematic and verbal) reverse-scored, and averaged, such that
higher scores represented more stereotype-consistent expectations
of the partner’s performance, relative to expectations of the self.
The hypothesized double-dissociation effects were tested using
hierarchical regressions as in Study 2. In Step 1, evaluative IAT
scores were not significantly associated with expectations of the
partner’s performance, ⫽⫺.24, t(19) ⫽⫺1.08, p ⫽ .29, sr ⫽
–.24. However, in Step 2, higher stereotyping IAT scores signifi-
cantly predicted more stereotype-consistent expectations for the
partner’s performance, ⫽.47, t(18) ⫽ 2.32, p ⫽ .03, sr ⫽ .47,
whereas the effect of evaluative IAT scores remained nonsignifi-
cant, ⫽⫺.25, t(28) ⫽⫺1.24, p ⫽ .23, sr ⫽⫺.25.
6
When
participant sex was included in Step 1 as a covariate, effects for
sex, ⫽⫺.18, t(18) ⫽⫺0.76, p ⫽ .46, sr ⫽⫺.17, and evaluative
IAT scores, ⫽⫺.19, t(18) ⫽⫺0.79, p ⫽ .44, sr ⫽⫺.18, were
not significant, whereas the effect for stereotyping IAT scores
remained significant, ⫽.50, t(17) ⫽ 2.48, p ⫽ .02, sr ⫽ .49.
Similarly, ratings of expected partner enjoyment on more
stereotype-consistent tasks were not associated with evaluative
IAT scores in Step 1, ⫽⫺.06, t(19) ⫽⫺0.25, p ⫽ .81, sr ⫽
⫺.06, but were significantly associated with stereotyping IAT
scores in Step 2, ⫽.44, t(18) ⫽ 2.07, p ⫽ .05, sr ⫽ .44.
Seating Distance From Partner
On average, participants sat 1.7 (SD ⫽ .78) chairs away from the
partner’s belongings. Stereotyping IAT scores, included in Step 1,
were not associated with seating distance, ⫽⫺.09, t(19) ⫽
⫺0.37, p ⫽ .71, sr ⫽⫺.09. However, as revealed in Step 2,
participants with higher evaluative IAT scores chose to sit further
from the partner’s belongings, ⫽.44, t(18) ⫽ 2.10, p ⫽ .05, sr ⫽
.44, whereas the effect of stereotyping IAT scores remained non-
significant, ⫽⫺.09, t(28) ⫽⫺0.45, p ⫽ .66, sr ⫽⫺.09,
supporting our hypothesis.
Discussion
The results of Study 3 corroborated and extended the findings of
Study 2. Greater implicit stereotyping scores uniquely predicted
more stereotype-consistent expectations for the partner’s perfor-
mance, whereas greater implicit evaluation scores uniquely pre-
dicted greater seating distance from the African American part-
ner’s belongings. These findings provided additional support for
our double-dissociation hypothesis of implicit stereotyping versus
evaluation, whereby implicit stereotyping is rooted in semantic
processes and is uniquely predictive of discrimination associated
with instrumental responses, whereas implicit evaluation is rooted
in affective processes and is uniquely predictive of discrimination
associated with consummatory responses.
The Study 3 findings allayed concerns over some potential
limitations of Study 2. First, the differential effects of implicit
stereotyping and evaluation of Study 2 were replicated in a more
realistic, ecologically valid context. Second, the two-session pro-
cedure used in Study 3 alleviated concerns regarding the order in
which measures were administered in Study 2. Moreover, because
IAT scores collected in the initial session were predictive of
behaviors weeks later, our results suggest the effects of implicit
bias are stable over time.
General Discussion
The present research produced two major findings. First, results
suggest that implicit stereotyping and evaluative race biases rep-
resent conceptually independent constructs. Despite exhibiting sig-
nificant levels of bias on both implicit measures across studies,
participants’ scores on these two measures were not significantly
correlated, consistent with evidence for independent mechanisms
of basic cognitive and affective processes (Cacioppo et al., 1999;
Squire & Zola, 1996; Zajonc, 1980). Second, the results showed
that implicit stereotyping and implicit evaluation have unique
effects on alternative forms of race-biased behavior. The results of
Study 2 showed that implicit stereotyping but not evaluation was
6
IAT scores were not associated with absolute ratings of expected
performance for the self, ps ⬎ .37, or the partner, ps ⬎ .30, indicating that
implicit stereotyping effects were observable only when partner ratings
were anchored by participants’ self-reference.
658
AMODIO AND DEVINE
predictive of stereotype-consistent trait ratings of a Black student
that were based on a short writing sample. In contrast, implicit
evaluative race bias but not stereotyping was predictive of partic-
ipants’ belief that they would get along with the student as a friend.
Study 3 extended these findings by focusing on participants’
behavior as they prepared to interact with an African American
partner. In this study, implicit stereotyping, but not evaluation,
predicted stereotype-consistent expectations of how well the Af-
rican American partner would perform on a series of tasks. On the
other hand, implicit evaluative race bias, but not stereotyping,
predicted how far participants chose to sit from the African Amer-
ican partner’s belongings in a row of chairs. Although the samples
used in Studies 2 and 3 were relatively small, the use of double-
dissociation designs ensured that null effects were always inter-
preted in the context of a complementary significant effect, and
therefore low statistical power cannot account for the pattern of
results. Taken together, these findings support the overarching
hypothesis that implicit stereotyping processes are predictive of
instrumental forms of race-biased behavior, whereas implicit eval-
uative processes are predictive of consummatory forms of race-
biased behavior.
Implications for Theory and Research on Implicit
Race Bias
Clarifying the Construct of Implicit Race Bias
In recent years, social psychologists have grappled with the
meaning of implicit race biases in an effort to understand what
they represent, how they function, and what they may predict (cf.
Devine, 2001; Fazio & Olson, 2003). Against a backdrop of mixed
findings regarding the effects of implicit race bias on behavior
(Blair, 2001), our theorizing and results suggest that significant
effects of implicit race bias on behavior may be observed when
their underlying affective versus cognitive processes are taken into
consideration and are matched with classes of behavior associated
with consummatory versus instrumental responses (cf. Ajzen &
Fishbein, 1977). On the basis of neuroscientific research, implicit
evaluation is supported by subcortical mechanisms and is most
directly expressed in basic approach/withdrawal behaviors. By
contrast, implicit stereotyping is supported by neocortical net-
works and is most directly expressed in biased cognitive process-
ing. This analysis provides a theoretical basis for conceiving of
implicit stereotyping and evaluation as independent constructs and
suggests refined definitions of these constructs that are rooted in
neural mechanisms of learning and memory. Furthermore, it sug-
gests that the effects of implicit stereotyping versus evaluation are
likely to be expressed to different degrees in different situations
and on different assessments (Livingston & Brewer, 2002; Macrae,
Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 1997). Although findings
to date regarding the effect of implicit race bias on behavior are
notoriously mixed, many null effects reported in the literature may
have resulted from a mismatch between forms of implicit bias with
outcome measures of discrimination.
Implications for Theory
To date, theories of implicit race bias have not addressed the
possibility that implicit forms of stereotyping and evaluation may
arise from distinct underlying processes and may affect behavior
via alternative routes of processing (cf. Greenwald et al., 2002).
Granted, stereotypes and affective responses are typically congru-
ent and work together to facilitate a coordinated response (e.g.,
racial discrimination). Nevertheless, the predictive utility of a
theory depends on whether it can be used to discern underlying
processes and their respective effects on behavior. Future models
of implicit race bias will benefit from the conceptual distinction
presented here in several ways. First, a consideration of alternative
forms of implicit bias will enhance predictive validity by permit-
ting more refined hypotheses for how different forms of implicit
bias should affect behavior. Second, our analysis links implicit
stereotyping and evaluative bias to physiological models of the
brain and behavior, permitting integration with other theoretical
approaches and suggesting appropriate physiological indicators for
different forms of bias. Indeed, previous research has associated
indices of amygdala activity with implicit evaluation (e.g., Amodio
et al., 2003; Phelps et al., 2000). Although neural correlates of
implicit racial stereotyping have not yet been determined, event-
related potential research on stereotype-based expectancy violation
is consistent with a neocortical (versus subcortical) substrate (e.g.,
Bartholow, Fabiana, Gratton, & Bettencourt, 2001).
If implicit stereotyping and evaluation arise from distinct neural
substrates, as we proposed, it follows that they are learned and
unlearned via different mechanisms. One may refine theories of
implicit race bias malleability and change by considering the
respective dynamics of classical (fear) conditioning versus seman-
tic associative learning. For example, human and animal models of
learning and memory suggest that implicit evaluations may be
learned more quickly and unlearned more slowly than implicit
stereotypes. They also suggest that claims that implicit prejudice
can be extinguished following a single experimental manipulation
may be implausible and that other interpretations should be con-
sidered (e.g., the manipulation inhibited the initial activation of
bias or elicited preconscious forms of regulation).
Implications for Study Design
It follows from the theoretical implications listed above that
future research will benefit from a careful selection of measures
and response contexts when examining the effects of implicit bias
on behavior. The results of the present work suggest that implicit
evaluation corresponds most directly with consummatory re-
sponses involving basic behavioral approach/withdrawal and that
these effects should be strongest when behaviors involve minimal
controlled processing. By contrast, implicit stereotyping affects
behavior by biasing cognitive processing and thus should be most
evident on measures that involve a higher degree of cognitive
processing, provided that participants are unaware of the poten-
tially biasing effects.
Future Directions
Joint Effects of Implicit and Explicit Race Bias
Although we went to great lengths to distinguish effects of implicit
stereotyping from those of implicit evaluation in the present work,
these two forms of bias typically operate in concert. An important new
theoretical issue concerns the interplay of implicit stereotyping and
implicit evaluation: When and how do they operate in concert? For
example, behaviors that combine elements of consummatory and
659
IMPLICIT STEREOTYPING VS. EVALUATIVE RACE BIAS
instrumental responses may be best predicted by the joint effects of
implicit stereotyping and prejudice. Additionally, there are many
situations in which explicit measures of prejudice and stereotyping
may be better predictors of behavior. Finally, although levels of
implicit stereotyping and evaluation were not correlated in our sam-
ples, these two forms of implicit bias may be more strongly correlated
among some groups of individuals (e.g., highly biased individuals)
than others. Future research is needed to explore how the full range of
discriminatory behavior may be explained by complex interactions
among implicit and explicit forms of prejudice and stereotyping for
different groups of people.
Regulatory Mechanisms for Implicit Stereotyping Versus
Implicit Evaluative Race Bias
Our findings raise new questions as to whether the behavioral
effects of implicit stereotyping and evaluation may be regulated via
different processes and whether either form of implicit bias is more
difficult to regulate. It is likely that regulation occurs at several
different levels. For example, the spreading activation of automatic
stereotypes within a semantic network could be inhibited via lateral
inhibition (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998). Alternatively, the effects
of implicit stereotypes may be inhibited in behavioral channels, such
that a stereotype-congruent response tendency is overridden by a
deliberative unbiased response (Amodio et al., 2004). Implicit evalu-
ation associated with amygdala activation may be inhibited by the
countervailing activation of reward structures in the brain, or its effect
on behavior may be overridden via controlled processes as a behav-
ioral response is formed. The inhibition of implicit stereotyping and
evaluation effects at the response-formation level likely rely on the
same frontal cortical mechanisms of control (Amodio et al., 2004;
Amodio, Kubota, Harmon-Jones, & Devine, 2006). On the other
hand, the inhibition of stereotypes within a neocortical semantic
network and evaluations within a subcortical affective network rely
on different mechanisms, and thus the parameters of regulation may
vary considerably. The present theoretical analysis highlights some
previously unexplored complexities regarding mechanisms for regu-
lating the effects of implicit race bias.
Conclusion
Affect and cognition represent two fundamental processes of the
human mind, and the distinction between affective and cognitive
processes is critical for the understanding of a wide range of
psychological functions (Cacioppo et al., 1999). On the basis of
past social psychological and neuroscientific theories, we showed
that cognitive and affective components of implicit race bias are
conceptually independent and are uniquely predictive of instru-
mental and consummatory forms of race-biased behaviors, respec-
tively. The present work is also notable in that we took a social
neuroscientific approach: We applied neurocognitive models of
learning and memory to elucidate social psychological conceptions
of implicit processes that had been poorly defined. Our findings
suggest that greater conceptual clarity in implicit race bias research
may be achieved by considering the differential effects of implicit
stereotyping and evaluation when interpreting extant findings,
developing new theories, and designing future research.
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Received April 29, 2004
Revision received January 9, 2006
Accepted January 27, 2006 䡲
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IMPLICIT STEREOTYPING VS. EVALUATIVE RACE BIAS
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