October 2023
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247 Reads
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1 Citation
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October 2023
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247 Reads
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1 Citation
December 2020
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34 Reads
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4 Citations
September 2019
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176 Reads
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39 Citations
August 2019
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2,003 Reads
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249 Citations
February 2019
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111 Reads
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31 Citations
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy
"Grandfathering" grants preferential treatment to existing resource users over new entrants based on prior use. Grandfathering is based on the concept of first-in-Time or prior appropriation and has been applied to a broad range of environmental and resource issues. We synthesize legal, economic, and political science perspectives and find that grandfathering removes incentives for users to anticipate regulations with proactive abatement. We analyze institutions ranging from long-enduring common-property regimes to climate negotiations to identify how grandfathering can be detrimental to sustainability, but we also show that it can be the only possible mechanism for bringing stakeholders to the table. © The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: [email protected]
October 2018
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36 Reads
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20 Citations
April 2018
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6,290 Reads
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36 Citations
February 2018
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2 Reads
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1 Citation
February 2018
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20 Reads
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10 Citations
July 2017
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31 Reads
The (experimental) research on community management of natural resources focuses on social dilemma situations between individuals. However, in most real-life situations natural resources are not only shared between individuals living in a community, but also between individuals belonging to different subgroups within the same community. For instance, in the case of tropical fisheries, marine resource management typically involves balancing the needs of members from different villages who form the overall community as well as different types of resource users within the same community. Standard Common-pool resource (CPR) experiment does not capture the dynamics of these situations, as they focus only on individual motivations. We introduce four different variations to standard CPR experiment, where we manipulate the incentives at the subgroup level. These four variations include: (i) standard CPR experiment with sub-groups, (ii) CPR experiments where between subgroup competition is conducive to group level cooperation, (iii) CPR experiments where different sub-groups have different incentives to maintain group-level cooperation, and lastly (iv) nested CPR experiments where sub-group incentives are orthogonal to group-level cooperation. Preliminary findings suggest that, as expected, individuals extract lower amounts from the CPR when individual and sub-group incentives favor cooperation at the group level. Conversely, participants extract significantly higher amount in the case of nested Common-pool resources. Indeed, cooperation is hardest to maintain at both the subgroup and the group level in this case
... However, few studies have discussed the issue of garbage classi cation in scenic spots from the perspective of tourists' psychological ownership of scenic spots. In recent years, the "tragedy of the commons" and its effects have received extensive attention from scholars (Albareda & Sison, 2020;Ortmann & Veit, 2023;Ostrom, 2008). In the eld of tourism, scholars have focused more on the formation of the "tragedy of the commons". ...
February 2018
... En los sistemas democráticos, por ejemplo, implica necesariamente la acción colectiva a través de movimientos sociales, la participación política electoral, el juego de alianzas entre distintas fuerzas sociales para componer mayorías de gobierno, etc. Es decir, requiere de la elaboración de estrategias esencialmente políticas. El diseño de instituciones (Ostrom, 1990(Ostrom, , 2001(Ostrom, , 2009) que favorezcan el logro de la sustentabilidad agraria y la manera de organizar a los movimientos agroecológicos para que puedan implantarlas constituyen precisamente los dos principales objetivos de la agroecología política. ...
Reference:
Introducción a la agroecología política
January 2013
... Institutions evolve in response to social and environmental conditions and changing needs of the society (Giddens, 1984). Nepal's FMIS are communitybased institutions consisting of actors, resources, and rules (Anderies, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2004;Ostrom, Lam, Pradhan, & Shivakoti, 2011). Since the success of FMIS is contingent on functional social institutions in response to availability of water resources, FMIS can also be considered classic Socio-Ecological Systems (SES). ...
August 2011
... The tragedy of the Commons is an example of an organisation in which the pursuit of individual objectives can result in the demise of the Commons [82]. Elinor Ostrom, an economist, identified several principles that prevent this calamity, including restricted access to resources, modifiable rules, weak sanctions, and self-organised and autonomous structures [83]. Coordination between upstream and downstream producers necessitates cooperation, which may conflict with immediate short-term interests. ...
December 2020
... To do that, we suggest focusing on institutional reforms such as developing systems for accountability that bring in the dialogue between state stakeholders and local communities, allowing local communities to initiate and participate in rulemaking, and d) giving local communities the right to challenge the assumptions of current rules and practices at the national/governmental level (Bollier 2016). Parallel to the required reforms at political institutions, legal ones are also important (Ostrom 2012) to secure a relative autonomy of the ones involved in collective care from political stakeholders who promote the interests of institutions that prioritise economic growth. For that reason, we need political parties in power that are friendly to radical institutional reforms that will open up democratic processes and make them more inclusive to nonhumans and to humans who build their everyday worlds through practices of collective care. ...
January 2012
SSRN Electronic Journal
... Whereas place-based initiatives may have knowledge, know-how, and local support, they often lack institutional capacity (Malhado et al., 2017). Collective action and reliance on networks of partners can help provide this missing capacity (Brondizio et al., 2012;Bastos Lima et al., 2021). Isolated households or communities acting alone are rarely well positioned to defend their rights against centralized bureaucratic power or external threats (Menzies, 2007;Paudel et al., 2010). ...
January 2012
... This is in addition to the cultural adaptation of societies to climate change [24]. Culture and the cultural perception of the environment matter [25]; obtaining detailed information about cultures can reveal their similarities and differences, as well as how they might adapt to other cultures, which helps us to understand personal motivations [26,27]. Cultural parameters do affect the parties' decision-making processes and add to the complexity. ...
February 2018
... The sustainable use of natural resources that support the metabolism of human societies is a pressing global challenge [1,2,3]. The governance of natural resources that are used in common by multiple individuals ('common pool resources', or CPRs) is increasingly recognized as a fundamental challenge to ensure the sustainability of the planet. ...
July 2017
... To znamená, že benefity sú primárne smerované a zväčša čerpané, aj keď nie vždy, malou sociálnou skupinou. Týmto spôsobom sa vytvára verejné blaho (public good) či verejný statok (common goods) (Richerson -Gil-White 2007: 832), alebo v termínoch Elinor Ostrom verejný statok (common good) a zdroj spoločného používania (common-pool re sources) (Ostrom 2008;Acheson 2011;Ostrom -Walker -Gardner 1994;Ostrom -Walker 2003). ...
October 2018
... It makes no difference what service users want, they may in Table 2 "Cogenerative learning", "co-production" and "co-creation" compared Co-generative learning Co-creation Co-production Primary source Elden and Levin (1991) Prahalad principle participate in the production of services provides to them whether or not they see it as in their interest to do so, and whether or not they see it as efficient of just to do so. The roots of co-production are at least back until 70's, when Ostrom and Ostrom (1977) used the term to describe relation between provider and receiver of aid and services: "When professional personnel presume to know what is good for people rather than providing people with opportunities to express their own preferences, we should not be surprised to find that increasing professionalization of public services is accompanied by a serious erosion in the quality of those services." Their argument is primarily in line with Osborne et al., that the involvement of service users is about quality of services through bringing their insights as users into the production. ...
August 2019