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Refugee or Internally Displaced Person? To Where Should One Flee?
Abstract and Figures
This study investigates the circumstances that lead some countries to produce a large number of refugees and relatively few internally displaced persons (IDPs) as opposed to a large number of IDPs and relatively few refugees. We develop the hypothesis that refugee flows are greater in the face of state (sponsored) genocide/politicide than they are in response to other state coercion, dissident campaigns of violence, or civil wars. We also argue that countries surrounded by poor, authoritarian regimes will produce fewer refugees (relative to IDPs) than those surrounded by wealthy, democratic neighbors. We employ a sample selection model to conduct statistical analyses using data on a global sample of countries for the period 1976-1995. Our results support many of our hypotheses and suggest that the choice-centered approach produces useful answers to new questions that other scholars have yet to ask.
... Conflict, persecution and human rights abuses are key drivers of forced displacement because they negatively alter the macro-level context (see e.g. Moore & Shellman, 2006). By improving local security (Bove, Ruffa & Ruggeri, 2020) and economic conditions (Bove, Di Salvatore & Elia, 2021), UN missions also impact and reset the macro-level context altered by war. ...
... A genocide or politicide occurring over the same period would be associated with about 574,000 persons choosing to flee' (Davenport, Moore & Poe, 2003: 44). Government violence represents the major push factor and population flows are particularly massive if refugees can easily flee to relatively wealthy and democratic countries, rather than to poor or authoritarian ones (Moore & Shellman, 2006). ...
... IDP and refugee outflows are distinct but strictly connected phenomena, as individuals who experience or are threatened by violence and decide to leave their homes have to decide between remaining in their country and escaping abroad (Moore & Shellman, 2006;Echevarria-Coco & Gardeazabal, 2021). For this reason, we decide to consider the two phenomena in a SUR setting in our Online appendix (Table A4). ...
Do UN missions reduce forced displacement? Facing insecure environments, civilians are left with three choices: staying; moving to a safer community; or moving outside their country. Their aspiration and ability to move depend on individual characteristics and macro-level factors, such as the social, economic and political context in which these people live. Research shows that UN missions can impact and reset the macro-level context altered by war, especially in the security and economic domain. However, we lack empirical evidence on whether this impact helps UN peacekeeping tackle forced displacement and returns. This article offers the first global analysis of whether and how UN missions can shape aggregate population movements during civil wars. We combine data on outflows and returns of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) with data on distinct UN missions’ features that we expect to affect population movements, namely the size of their contingents and their mandated tasks. Using matched samples, we find that the unfolding of the outflows and inflows processes are affected by different features of UN missions. Sizeable deployments decrease IDPs flows and encourage their return; refugee outflows, on the other hand, may increase in presence of UN missions. Furthermore, missions with displacement-related mandates are associated with decreasing IDP flows overall, but only encourage refugees’ returns.
... emerging humanitarian needs. However, our understanding of the individual-level decision-making process leading to flights is still limited because many studies only identify predictors of refugee flows at the aggregated global, national, or sub-national level and do not distinguish between different patterns of violence that induce population movements ( Schmeidl 1997 ;Davenport et al. 2003 ;Moore and Shellman 2004 ). ...
... This study makes important contributions to the literature. First, we complement existing macro-level analyses of flight patterns ( Schmeidl 1997 ;Davenport et al. 2003 ;Moore and Shellman 2004 ;Melander et al. 2009 ) by using a conjoint experiment to study individual-level decision-While some conflicts generate millions of refugees, others generate fewer refugee numbers or more internal displacement. Thus, it is critical to understand how different violent events have varying effects on forced migration. ...
... making processes. Second, previous research has generally focused on the scale of violence to explain forced migration patterns ( Moore and Shellman 2004 ;Melander et al. 2009 ;Adhikari 2013 ;Turkoglu and Chadefaux 2019 ). We conceptualize violence as a more heterogeneous phenomenon. ...
How do heterogeneous patterns of violence affect people's decision to flee? We provide individual-level evidence on flight decision-making in light of violence with a conjoint experiment in Turkey. The results suggest that intense indiscriminate violence nearby forces individuals into the decision to leave. In contrast to previous studies, we find that the fear of repeated violence plays a more important role in flight decision-making than the attack frequency. The survey experiment reveals that violence committed by the government makes a decision to flee abroad more likely than rebel violence. We find that individuals with support networks abroad are less responsive to patterns of violence, making flight decisions more independently and being generally more inclined to move. Our findings contribute to the growing literature on forced migration with individual-level evidence on the decision-making process underlying flight reactions to violence.
... At the macro-level, the expected intensity (Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003;Moore and Shellman 2004) and the form (Kalyvas 2006;Lischer 2007;Moore and Shellman 2006) of civilian-targeted violence, as well as the state's history of repression (Moore and Shellman 2007;Neumayer 2005b), each encourage vulnerable populations to flee. At the meso-level, displacement corresponds to subnational variation in belligerents' military capabilities, strategic interests in specific pieces of contested territory, and therefore the scale and form of violence (Balcells 2010(Balcells , 2017Kalyvas 2006;Schon 2015;Steele 2011Steele , 2017Wood 2010Wood , 2014Zhukov 2015). ...
... At the macro-level, the expected intensity (Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003;Moore and Shellman 2004) and the form (Kalyvas 2006;Lischer 2007;Moore and Shellman 2006) of civilian-targeted violence, as well as the state's history of repression (Moore and Shellman 2007;Neumayer 2005b), each encourage vulnerable populations to flee. At the meso-level, displacement corresponds to subnational variation in belligerents' military capabilities, strategic interests in specific pieces of contested territory, and therefore the scale and form of violence (Balcells 2010(Balcells , 2017Kalyvas 2006;Schon 2015;Steele 2011Steele , 2017Wood 2010Wood , 2014Zhukov 2015). ...
... At the macro-level, the expected intensity (Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003;Moore and Shellman 2004) and the form (Kalyvas 2006;Lischer 2007;Moore and Shellman 2006) of civilian-targeted violence, as well as the state's history of repression (Moore and Shellman 2007;Neumayer 2005b), each encourage vulnerable populations to flee. At the meso-level, displacement corresponds to subnational variation in belligerents' military capabilities, strategic interests in specific pieces of contested territory, and therefore the scale and form of violence (Balcells 2010(Balcells , 2017Kalyvas 2006;Schon 2015;Steele 2011Steele , 2017Wood 2010Wood , 2014Zhukov 2015). ...
Why do some communities flee their homes during armed conflict, while others remain and risk exposure to further violence? This article investigates whether and how whole communities flee home territory, which we refer to as evacuation, in the context of strategic displacement campaigns. We explain variation in the process of forced displacement. Specifically, we differentiate between preemptive (prior to displacement violence) and violent (in response to displacement violence) evacuation. We theorize that social cohesion enhances communities’ ability to preemptively evacuate by facilitating collective action to evade imminent violence exposure. We test the theory in the context of Arab Palestinian communities’ displacement during the 1948 war in Mandate Palestine. We measure village evacuation drawing upon historical accounts of forced displacement during the war and social cohesion using an original dataset based on new archival material from a survey of Arab Palestinian villages conducted during the early 1940s.
... It can also be distinguished from the "natural' response to flee from violent conflict, which has been discussed by Zolberg et al. (1989) and Moore and Shellman (2006). Studies of civilian flight in Syria have, for example, found that IDPs tend to go "where there are people with similar political or ethnic characteristics," and have identified that those "supporting the [Syrian] Regime generally go to [government] areas" while those opposing the [Syrian] Regime "tend to move to opposition-held areas" (Humanitarian Trends Analysis Unit [HTAU], 2015). ...
... The first is to fail to sufficiently acknowledge internal displacement in the first instance (Bakkour & Sahtout, 2023). This has also been a feature of other conflicts, and it is shown, to take one example, the fact that the legal regime for refugees is considerably more enhanced than for IDPs (Moore & Shellman, 2006). Indeed, despite the large numbers of internally displaced (most notably in Iraq after the 2003 US-led invasion of the country), internal displacement remains comparatively insufficiently acknowledged and addressed. ...
In the course of the Syrian Civil War, prominent former Syrian Regime politicians, human rights observers, and foreign observers have accused the Syrian Regime of committing genocide against the country's Sunni majority. This article views these accusations as part of a wider politicization of genocide, and instead progresses beyond them to outline the case for an alternative “framing” of large‐scale atrocities committed against civilians. It accordingly proposes strategic displacement, or the deliberate large‐scale uprooting and dispersal of established communities for tactical and strategic purposes, as a preferable and more sustainable framework of engagement and analysis, and seeks to more clearly distinguish it from “ethnic cleansing” with the aim of demonstrating and underlining its unique contribution to the analysis and understanding of violent conflict. This has two benefits—first, it provides a different basis for conceptual and theoretical engagement that makes it possible to view mass atrocity as a tactical innovation in response to conflict exigencies; and second, it draws attention to internal displacement, an aspect of the conflict that has been repeatedly overlooked by international observers.
... A robust literature exploring civilian agency in conflict displacement processes emphasizes the civilians' responses to incentives to remain in or flee home territory; often labeled push and pull factors. First and foremost, the expectation and intensity of violence exposure (Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003;Moore and Shellman 2004), the form of civilian-targeted violence (Kalyvas 2006;Lischer 2007;Moore and Shellman 2006), and the state's history of repression (Moore and Shellman 2007;Neumayer 2005b), each encourage vulnerable populations to flee. The distribution of belligerents' military capabilities and strategic interests throughout contested territory shapes the local-level variation in the scale and form of violence, and thereby displacement patterns (Balcells 2010(Balcells , 2017Kalyvas 2006;Schon 2015;Steele 2011Steele , 2017Wood 2010Wood , 2014Zhukov 2015). ...
... A robust literature exploring civilian agency in conflict displacement processes emphasizes the civilians' responses to incentives to remain in or flee home territory; often labeled push and pull factors. First and foremost, the expectation and intensity of violence exposure (Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003;Moore and Shellman 2004), the form of civilian-targeted violence (Kalyvas 2006;Lischer 2007;Moore and Shellman 2006), and the state's history of repression (Moore and Shellman 2007;Neumayer 2005b), each encourage vulnerable populations to flee. The distribution of belligerents' military capabilities and strategic interests throughout contested territory shapes the local-level variation in the scale and form of violence, and thereby displacement patterns (Balcells 2010(Balcells , 2017Kalyvas 2006;Schon 2015;Steele 2011Steele , 2017Wood 2010Wood , 2014Zhukov 2015). ...
Why do some communities flee their homes during armed conflict, while others remain and risk exposure to violence? This article investigates whether and how whole communities are forcibly displaced during armed conflict, which we refer to as evacuation. We focus on the form of forced displacement, differentiating between preemptive evacuation (prior to violence exposure) and violent evacuation (in response to violence exposure). We theorize that community social cohesion, by facilitating collective action, enhances communities’ ability to preemptively evacuate and escape violence. We test the theory in the context of the 1948 war in Mandate Palestine. We measure village evacuation drawing upon historical accounts of population displacement during the war and measure community social cohesion using an original village-level dataset based on new archival material from a survey of Arab Palestinian villages during the early 1940s. The findings shed new light on civilian agency in conflict and displacement processes and outcomes.
... 9 As a consequence, quantitative asylum migration models often focus on single drivers in countries of origin (e.g. conflicts [10][11][12] or destination (e.g. migration or asylum policies [13][14][15] ). ...
... To further illustrate the performance of the system over time and space, in the Supplementary Information section we present an analysis of forecasting performances for a selection of 70 dyads comprising of seven countries of origin (Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, Nigeria, Syria, Turkey and Venezuela) 13 and ten destinations (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, The Netherlands and Sweden, and the EU+ as a 12 Applications lodged by Syrian nationals in Greece, Sweden and the EU+; of Venezuelans in France, Spain and the EU+; of Nigerians in Germany and Italy; of Afghans in Germany. 13 Between 2016 and 2019, applications by nationals of the seven selected countries of origin lodged 1 654 040 applications in the EU+, 47.6% out of a total of 3 473 050 applications received. ...
The effects of the so-called "refugee crisis" of 2015-16 continue to dominate much of the European political agenda. Migration flows were sudden and unexpected, exposing significant shortcomings in the field of migration forecasting and leaving governments and NGOs unprepared. Migration is a complex system typified by episodic variation, underpinned by causal factors that are interacting, highly context dependent and short-lived. Correspondingly, migration nowcasts rely on scattered low-quality data and much-needed forecasts are local and inconsistent. Here we describe a data-driven adaptive system for forecasting asylum applications in the European Union (EU), built on machine learning algorithms that combine administrative data with non-traditional data sources at scale. We exploit three tiers of data: geolocated events and internet searches in countries of origin, detections at the EU external border, and asylum recognition rates in the EU, to effectively forecast individual asylum-migration flows up to four weeks ahead with high accuracy. Uniquely our approach a) models individual country-to-country migration flows; b) detects migration drivers early onset; c) anticipates lagged effects; d) estimates the effect of individual drivers; and e) describes how patterns of drivers shift over time. This is, to our knowledge, the first comprehensive system for forecasting asylum applications based on an unsupervised algorithm and data at scale. Importantly, this approach can be extended to forecast other migration social-economic indicators.
... The debate on the effectiveness of migration policies explores their ability to regulate and reduce migration flows. Some studies highlight that control policies hardly stop migration in the long term, as factors such as conflicts, economic inequalities, and social ties exert a greater influence on migration flows than restrictive measures (Davenport et al. 2003;Hatton 2009;Moore and Shellman 2016). On the contrary, other research demonstrates the effectiveness of certain governmental policies in actually reducing illegal immigration, emphasizing how specific control strategies can be effective (Beine et al. 2011;Czaika and de Haas 2017;Helbling and Leblang 2019). ...
In recent years, the Mediterranean crossings have reconfirmed their status as the most perilous routes for migrants attempting to reach European shores, with a significantly high number of deaths. In response, the Italian government has implemented various strategies aimed at reducing the number of landings and controlling irregular migration. This research evaluates the impact of these measures on the dynamics of migrant smuggling, both qualitatively and quantitatively. It examines the effectiveness of these measures and their influence on the adaptation of routes, methods, and organization of criminal groups involved in smuggling. The study emphasizes that while the measures to curb irregular immigration have had a limited direct impact on overall migratory flows and primary routes, they have indirectly influenced smugglers’ strategies. The study is grounded in empirical data sourced from interviews with expert witnesses and judicial investigations conducted by Italian prosecutors, with a comprehensive analysis of quantitative data. The findings aim to contribute to a deeper understanding of the multifaceted nature of irregular migration in the Mediterranean and the impacts of policy interventions.
... Most of the existing literature has focused on conflict (mostly civil war) at origin as a potential determinant of migration, using case-or country-specific data. Moore and Shellman (2006), for instance, show how state violence towards civilians tends to produce international refugees, whereas high levels of dissident violence and civil wars tend to produce internal displacement. Melander and Öberg (2007) suggest that migration is more a product of the geographic scope of violence at origin, and the extent to which it touches urban areas rather than the intensity of ...
This paper analyses how terrorism has shaped global bilateral migration in the past decades. Previous research demonstrates a wide range of psychological and economic effects from terrorism which might serve as a push and/or counter-pull factor for migration and location choice. Yet, the role of terrorism has so far received relatively limited attention in the migration literature. Combining data on yearly bilateral migration rates with data on terrorist activity in 154 countries of origin and destination over the period 1975-2017, we find that terrorism acts both as a push factor for migration and as a repulsive factor for location choice. These results are robust across different specifications, samples and estimation techniques. Our evidence indicates that migration rates respond primarily to variations in the intensity rather than the mere occurrence or frequency of attacks. We find that terrorism induces international emigration only at extreme levels, while modest levels of terrorism are already enough to reduce a countries’ attractiveness to potential migrants. Moreover, the effect of terrorist attacks varies across migration corridors.
... The claim that violence in some places encourages emigration is supported by numerous international studies (Schultz 1971;Morrison 1993;Ibáñez Londoño et al. 2005;Ibáñez and Vélez 2008;Bohra-Mishra and Massey 2011;Contreras 2014;Fernandez-Dominguez 2020). While the majority of them found violence to be significantly related to intra-national migration or displacement only (Schultz 1971;Morrison 1993;Morrison and May 1994;Engel and Ibáñez 2007;Ibáñez and Vélez 2008;Moore and Shellman 2006) found that state violence targeting civilians tends to produce international refugees. Similarly, Bohra-Mishra and Massey (2011) studied how armed violence during a period of civil conflict in Nepal influenced intra-national and international migration 2 They found that people migrated only under conditions of extreme violence in which the threats to safety are perceived to exceed the risks of traveling. ...
This study unveils the causal effect of authoritative violence on individuals’ likelihood to migrate. Specifically, we examine the migration patterns of Venezuelans during the 2017–2018 political and economic crisis. We draw insights from regional-level data on civilian casualties caused by security forces, along with information extracted from the ENCOVI-2018 survey data that captures migration flows. The estimates rely on travel time from the capital city as an instrumental variable and are robust to the inclusion of several household- and socio-economic regional-level characteristics. The findings strongly suggest that authoritative violence is a significant non-economic push factor for international migration. Moreover, additional evidence indicates that this type of violence influences the skill composition of migrants, especially in the context of South-to-South migration flows.
... Despite aforesaid many reasons for transborder mobility (see for details, Uddin and Chowdhory 2019), the history of forced migration informs that crossing the nearby border is a common means of saving lives. Since people in the persecuted setting cannot fly by air to migrate to countries far from their country of origin as it involves passport, check post, immigration, visa and some other legal & technical issues, people usually walk and run towards the closest borders to cross, seek asylum and take refuge in the neighboring country (Moore and Shellman 2006). The history of refugee flows and massive influx around the world provides evidence that people always cross the nearest borders to take refuge (see, Wastl-Walter 2011) until and unless the "third-country refugee resettlement," one of the three standard models of refugee crisis resolution, takes place under any triplicate agreement between the country of origin, the country of migration and the country of resettlements facilitated by the UNHCR. ...
... Canada is commonly known and represented as a welcoming country for refugees (UNHCR Canada 2019) as well as one of the major countries of refugee resettlement (Labman 2019). However, most refugees seek asylum in their country's neighbors first (Moore and Shellman 2006), resulting in Türkiye being the host of the largest refugee population globally (European Commission 2021). Most of the refugees in Türkiye are temporary asylum seekers, who are referred to a third country by the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) once their refugee status is granted (Baban, Ilcan, and Rygiel 2017). ...
While the literature suggests that forced migration negatively affects mental health, fewer studies focus on the mental health of refugee claimants waiting to be granted asylum. In addition, despite the high numbers of refugee claimants in the Global South, fewer studies compare refugee experiences globally. This study attempts to fill these gaps by addressing the mental health of refugee claimants from Iran during the asylum waiting process. Focusing on the Turkish and Canadian contexts, this study asks the following questions: How does the waiting process affect Iranian refugees' mental health and wellbeing? How do their lived experiences of mental health and wellbeing differ based on the country of temporary asylum? In-depth interviews were conducted with 15 Iranian refugees. Nine of them spent their waiting process in Türkiye, and six others spent it in Canada. The analysis results showed that the waiting process is characterized by a sense of temporariness, lack of belonging, precarity, and uncertainty of the future, which lead to adverse mental health outcomes.
... In this study, we examine whether regional variation in conflict intensity affects migration decisions. Previous work reports that the intensity of conflict-related violence in a country increases migration aspirations (Dustmann and Okatenko 2014;Etling et al. 2020;Ozaltin et al., 2020) and the volume of forced migration (Davenport et al. 2003;Moore and Shellman 2006;Shellman and Stewart 2007;Tai et al. 2022). With a few exceptions (Schon 2019) such a link between conflict intensity and migration has also been observed within countries (Engel and Ibáñez 2007;Bohra-Mishra and Massey 2011;Adhikari 2013;Braithwaite et al. 2021;Tai et al. 2022). ...
The literature on migrants’ self-selection is focused on labour migrants, while little is known about refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). We contribute to this scant literature, by (1) examining a broad set of factors that could determine self-selection, (2) contrasting self-selection profiles of refugees and IDPs, and (3) comparing self-selection profiles of refugees across countries. Specifically, we compare the self-selection profiles of Ukrainian refugees and IDPs with stayers in the months directly following the Russian full-scale invasion in February 2022. We draw on unique, cross-nationally comparative data from the OneUA project, which surveyed Ukrainian refugees and displaced persons in Europe as well as those who stayed in Ukraine in the summer of 2022. More than 24,000 Ukrainian women residing in nine countries participated in this survey. We find systematic empirical patterns of self-selection related to people’s region of origin, family status, and individual-level characteristics.
... The causes and solutions of forced migration directly relate to conflicts and wars. The most common hypothesis is that the higher the level of violence, the higher the population migration from the war zone (Davenport et al., 2003;Moore & Shellman, 2006;Weiner, 1996;Zolberg, 1983). However, according to research by Schon J. (2019), using the example of Syria, people who have not witnessed violence usually flee earlier. ...
This study explores the forced migration of residents from Kherson during the initial months of the Russo-Ukrainian war (February-April 2022). In the broader context of a significant war-induced displacement in Ukraine, the research draws upon official data, media sources, and a comprehensive sociological survey. The survey gathered responses from Kherson evacuees and comprised 421 participants. The survey encompassed three sections: evacuation details, current situations, and socio-demographic parameters. During the two months that the city had been occupied, one-third of the population left. Most Kherson evacuees (64%) found refuge within Ukraine, while 36% sought shelter abroad. In Ukraine, most migrants from Kherson were in the Odesa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, and Kirovohrad regions. Migrants who went abroad preferred Poland, Germany, Bulgaria, Spain, Italy, and the Czech Republic. The study highlights the complexity of migration patterns. This research not only investigates the logistical hurdles faced during evacuations but also delves into the personal and demographic characteristics of the migrants. The study identifies information as a critical factor influencing migration decisions. In this dynamic, "real-time war" scenario, the findings underscore the influence of constantly evolving information and misinformation on the choices made by those fleeing conflict zones. This research provides valuable insights for government agencies and international agencies grappling with the scale of migration in conflict zones. It also serves as a unique resource for psychologists studying the psychological impact of war on displaced populations and could support investigations into war crimes against civilians. The study's uniqueness lies in its direct data collection from respondents who had recently evacuated from occupied territories.
... We develop the concept of "second displacement" to better capture, symbolise, and articulate the fact that evicting refugees from self-organised shelters in the receiving countries constitutes a renewed form of displacement, a secondary displacement, against those who have already experienced an initial displacement from their country of origin and are trying to rebuild new homes under precarious conditions in arrival cities (Adey et al. 2020;Hanh€ orster and Wessendorf 2020;Hatziprokopiou et al. 2016;Saunders 2010). We argue that the concept of "second displacement" offers a more nuanced contribution to discussions around internal displacement (Echevarria-Coco and Gardeazabal 2021; Moore and Shellman 2006) and urban displacement (C ß a glar and Schiller 2018;Dunn 2017;Sanyal 2014), as it captures the violations of the refugees' right to the city (centre) from the part of state policies, but also of the refugees' agency and potential to self-organise collective survival strategies. ...
We develop the concept of “second displacement” to symbolise the renewed forms of uprooting that refugees undergo in arrival cities in the name of urban regeneration. Focusing on the eviction of 2,000 refugees from a self-organised settlement in Belgrade's old train station in order to redevelop the site as a luxurious “Waterfront” project, we show how the refugees’ commoning practices and claims for living space in city centres often come into direct conflict with public and private interests over urban regeneration and with imaginaries over who has the right to the city. Whilst most displacement literature focuses on state policies, we call attention to how the uprooting of refugees is often entangled with urban renewal plans and private investors’ interests. In Belgrade, the depiction of the refugees’ living spaces as “badlands” by the state, catalysed the formation of the rent gap that facilitated re-allocation of rights to the city.
... Examples of descriptive statistics are, for instance, the median age of Syrians seeking refugee protection in the European Union or the average monthly trade flow between the United States and China. Causal inference provides estimates of the relationship between two variables, such as the intensity of human rights violations and the number of refugees (Neumayer 2005;Moore and Shellman 2006), or the extent to which displacement contributes to the spread of violence (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006;Bohnet, Cottier, and Hug 2018;Bohnet and Rüegger 2019). Causal inference makes it thus possible to determine whether a hypothesized relationship between two variables exists. ...
Scholars have studied international organizations (IOs) in many disciplines, thus generating important theoretical developments. Yet a proper assessment and a broad discussion of the methods used to research these organizations are lacking. Which methods are being used to study IOs and in what ways? Do we need a specific methodology applied to the case of IOs? What are the concrete methodological challenges when doing research on IOs? International Organizations and Research Methods: An Introduction compiles an inventory of the methods developed in the study of IOs under the five headings of Observing, Interviewing, Documenting, Measuring, and Combining. It does not reconcile diverging views on the purpose and meaning of IO scholarship, but creates a space for scholars and students embedded in different academic traditions to reflect on methodological choices and the way they impact knowledge production on IOs.
... In relation to the political forces of forced migration, violence and conflict are considered to be the main determinant and the subsequent cause of forced migration. According to Moore and Shellman (2004, 2006, 2007, indigenous and dissident violence at the origin and other political forces have an adverse effect on forced migration flow. Similarly, Huyck and Bouvier (1983) have stated that forced migrants flee from an indefensible violent location to an area that is believed to be safe either within or across international borders. ...
Migration is currently perceived as an epitome of globalization and a measuring gauge of global geopolitical mobility. In recent years, Nigeria has been faced with a series of migratory crises such as insurgency and conflict, forcing large numbers of people to flee from their various residential origins to neighboring countries as refugees and asylum seekers or within their country as Internally Displaced Persons. This study therefore explores the types and causes of forced migration due to the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria. The research engages the use of content analysis to examine relevant secondary data on Boko Haram insurgent activities and the geopolitics of forced migration in Nigeria. It is reported that from the total number of 2.1 million forced migrants in Nigeria as of May 2017, 9.7% are refugees in neighboring countries while others are spatially distributed in different states around the country as internally displaced persons. The study revealed that more than 97% of the internally displaced persons migrated due to the Boko Haram insurgent activities from the northeastern part of the country. It concluded that the migratory crises in Nigeria is predominantly caused by the activities of the Boko Haram insurgent group that subsequently forced the people to flee their origin because of fear for their lives coupled with the risk of persecution and the destruction of lives and properties. The study among other things recommended the beefing up of government’s efforts to tackle insecurity as its primary responsibility to save lives and property.
... Campaigns of mass killing, such as genocide and politicide, and other strategic displacement violence are especially likely to trigger population displacement. 30 By comparison, civilians are more likely to remain in their home territory when civiliantargeted violence is more selectively focused on controlling civilian defection. 31 This logic also explains local variation in displacement outcomes. ...
Why do some communities flee their homes during armed conflict, while others remain and risk exposure to further violence? This article investigates whether and how whole communities flee home territory, which we refer to as evacuation, in the context of strategic displacement campaigns. We explain variation in the process of forced displacement. Specifically, we differentiate between preemptive (prior to displacement violence) and violent (in response to displacement violence) evacuation. We theorize that social cohesion enhances communities’ ability to preemptively evacuate by facilitating collective action to evade imminent violence exposure. We test the theory in the context of Arab Palestinian communities’ displacement during the 1948 war in Mandate Palestine. We measure village evacuation drawing upon historical accounts of forced displacement during the war and social cohesion using an original dataset based on new archival material from a survey of Arab Palestinian villages conducted during the early 1940s.
... Campaigns of mass killing, such as genocide and politicide, and other strategic displacement violence are especially likely to trigger population displacement. 30 By comparison, civilians are more likely to remain in their home territory when civiliantargeted violence is more selectively focused on controlling civilian defection. 31 This logic also explains local variation in displacement outcomes. ...
Why do some communities flee their homes during armed conflict, while others remain and risk exposure to further violence? This article investigates whether and how whole communities flee home territory, which we refer to as evacuation, in the context of strategic displacement campaigns. We explain variation in the process of forced displacement. Specifically, we differentiate between preemptive (prior to displacement violence) and violent (in response to displacement violence) evacuation. We theorize that social cohesion enhances communities’ ability to preemptively evacuate by facilitating collective action to evade imminent violence exposure. We test the theory in the context of Arab Palestinian communities’ displacement during the 1948 war in Mandate Palestine. We measure village evacuation drawing upon historical accounts of forced displacement during the war and social cohesion using an original dataset based on new archival material from a survey of Arab Palestinian villages conducted during the early 1940s.
... Campaigns of mass killing, such as genocide and politicide, and other strategic displacement violence are especially likely to trigger population displacement. 30 By comparison, civilians are more likely to remain in their home territory when civiliantargeted violence is more selectively focused on controlling civilian defection. 31 This logic also explains local variation in displacement outcomes. ...
Why do some communities flee their homes during armed conflict, while others remain and risk exposure to further violence? This article investigates whether and how whole communities flee home territory, which we refer to as evacuation, in the context of strategic displacement campaigns. We explain variation in the process of forced displacement. Specifically, we differentiate between preemptive (prior to displacement violence) and violent (in response to displacement violence) evacuation. We theorize that social cohesion enhances communities’ ability to preemptively evacuate by facilitating collective action to evade imminent violence exposure. We test the theory in the context of Arab Palestinian communities’ displacement during the 1948 war in Mandate Palestine. We measure village evacuation drawing upon historical accounts of forced displacement during the war and social cohesion using an original dataset based on new archival material from a survey of Arab Palestinian villages conducted during the early 1940s.
... However, existing scholarship exclusively relies on warrelated violence as a predictor of civilians' decisions about relocation. For instance, Moore & Shellman (2006) assumed that rebels' protection of civilians is observable whenever the government uses violence against civilians who are suspected of collaborating with the rebels; these targeted civilians are expected to remain in their community under the protection of the rebels. Yet, the rebels' provision of protection for civilians is not always observed across cases of civil war (Eck & Hultman, 2007;Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007;Pettersson, Högbladh & Ö berg, 2019). ...
It is common during a civil war that a government’s counterinsurgency operations result in internally displaced persons seeking refuge from the violence by leaving their communities. However, many civilians alternatively choose to stay in their homes and seek accommodation from the rebels. It is, therefore, puzzling that in a civil war situation when rebel cadres often cannot protect civilians, civilians would remain in their communities. This article argues that the wartime provision of public services motivates civilians to stay with the rebel group because it demonstrates the group’s capability for and commitment to developing civilians’ welfare and livelihoods. This argument offers insight into an unanswered question in the literature regarding internal displacement in a civil war: Why do some civilians, when facing protection issues in rebel-held areas, choose to stay, while others opt to leave? Using novel survey data collected over two phases from the former Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) in Pakistan, a two-step Bayesian propensity score analysis reveals that the civilians who received rebel services are less likely to leave their places of residence. Civilians would pursue long-term goals during the crossfire between the government and rebel forces; wartime provisions of public services allow civilians to seriously consider the possibility of improving their lives.
... Engel and Ibáñez (2007) and Ibáñez and Vélez (2008) identified the violence perpetrated by illegal armed groups as one of the main determinants of internal displacement in Colombia. On the other hand, Moore and Shellman (2006) used data on a sample of countries from 1976 to 1995, and found that state violence targeting civilians produces international refugees, whereas civil war and high levels of dissident violence tend to produce internal displacement. Bohra-Mishra and Massey (2011) studied how armed violence during a period of civil conflict in Nepal influenced domestic and international migration. ...
During the 2010s, Venezuela underwent the worst and deepest crisis of any nonwar- ridden country in modern history. The failure of the socialist utopia, the economic crisis, the increasing lack of primary resources, and the dictatorial turn have caused the third, most dramatic, and complex Venezuelan out-migration wave in the past decade. Drawing on exclusive and georeferenced survey data collected in Venezuela and providing information on 21,382 individuals, this paper investigates the role of the police force militarization in the Venezuelan migration crisis of 2018. We find that the higher is the level of authoritative violence - proxied by the share of homicides committed by the security forces - the higher is the likelihood for an individual to migrate. The effect is significant only among males with a lower level of education. Estimates which rely on the travel time from the capital to each state’s most populated city as an instrumental variable, are robust to the inclusion of several households, environmental and sociodemographic characteristics, including the overall level of violence represented by the number of violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants.
... As a consequence, most quantitative asylum migration models focus on single drivers in countries of origin (e.g. conflicts [12][13][14] or destination (e.g. migration or asylum policies [15][16][17]. ...
The effects of the so-called "refugee crisis" of 2015-16 continue to dominate the political agenda in Europe. Migration flows were sudden and unexpected, leaving governments unprepared and exposing significant shortcomings in the field of migration forecasting. Migration is a complex system typified by episodic variation, underpinned by causal factors that are interacting, highly context dependent and short-lived. Correspondingly, migration monitoring relies on scattered data, while approaches to forecasting focus on specific migration flows and often have inconsistent results that are difficult to generalise at the regional or global levels.
Here we show that adaptive machine learning algorithms that integrate official statistics and non-traditional data sources at scale can effectively forecast asylum-related migration flows. We focus on asylum applications lodged in countries of the European Union (EU) by nationals of all countries of origin worldwide; the same approach can be applied in any context provided adequate migration or asylum data are available.
We exploit three tiers of data - geolocated events and internet searches in countries of origin, detections of irregular crossings at the EU border, and asylum recognition rates in countries of destination - to effectively forecast individual asylum-migration flows up to four weeks ahead with high accuracy. Uniquely, our approach a) monitors potential drivers of migration in countries of origin to detect changes early onset; b) models individual country-to-country migration flows separately and on moving time windows; c) estimates the effects of individual drivers, including lagged effects; d) provides forecasts of asylum applications up to four weeks ahead; e) assesses how patterns of drivers shift over time to describe the functioning and change of migration systems.
... It could be manifest in form of civil wars, insurgencies, inter-ethnic or inter-religious clashes. It also happens on the international stage between states or non-state actors (Moore and Shellman 2006). ...
Most employers’ intention to keep the cost of labour as low as possible has resulted in the
proliferation of non-standard employment relations such as contract work and casual work, even
though workers in these categories have prerequisite skills to hold full time jobs with varying
implication for decent work deficits. This study examines the dynamics of casual employment on
employee commitment among workers of new generation banks in Abuja. The specific objective of
the study was to examine how casual workers are treated in new generation banks amongst others.
A Survey research design was adopted to meet the objective. Questionnaire were used to collect the
data. A total of 175 respondents were selected for this study from the six banks, using Yamane
formula. Quantitative analysis was chosen because it is one of the most suitable methods of data
analysis for expressing in detail, the nature and feature of any given variable to avoid readers bias.
A finding to this objective was that there was a significant relationship between casual employment
and employee commitment. The Conflict theory was adopted to help us understand the impacts of
casual employment on employees. It was concluded that the practice of disparity and preferential
treatment between the casual staff and the permanent staff of new generation banks has been a
major source of demotivation and dissatisfaction among employees. Amongst the recommendation
was that there is need for Banks to accord all employees equal rights and privileges in order to
realize their full potentials and goals.
... Schmeidl (1997), Davenport et al. (2003), Moore and Shellman (2004), and Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) use global samples of countries with data spanning from the 1950s to 2000s to identify the drivers of forced migration and conclude that "generalized violence" outweighed political and economic variables as the prominent driver of forced migration. Moore and Shellman (2006) investigate the circumstances that lead some countries to produce a large number of refugees and relatively few IDPs instead of a large number of IDPs and relatively few refugees. They find that civil wars tend to increase IDPs, whereas genocides tend to increase refugees. ...
In this article, we examine the impact of terrorist attacks on asylum-related migration flows. So far, the literature that examines the “push factors” such as terrorism that explain forced migration has omitted the fact that the vast majority of people forced to flee typically do so toward other locations within the country. The novel feature of our research is the estimation of a structural gravity equation that includes both international migration and internally displaced persons (IDP), a theoretically consistent framework that allows us to identify country-specific variables such as terror attacks. For that purpose, we use information on the number of asylum applications, the number of IDP, and the number of terrorist attacks in each country for a sample of 119 origin developing countries and 141 destination countries over 2009–2018. The empirical results reveal several interesting and policy-relevant traits. Firstly, forced migration abroad is still minimal compared to IDP, but globalization forces are pushing up the ratio. Secondly, terror violence has a positive and significant effect on asylum migration flows relative to the number of IDP. Thirdly, omitting internally displaced people biases downward the impact of terrorism on asylum applications. Fourthly, we observe regional heterogeneity in the effect of terrorism on asylum migration flows; in Latin America, terrorist attacks have a much larger impact on the number of asylum applications relative to IDP than in Asia or Africa.
... For example, Davenport, Moore, and Poe have studied the relationship between internal and international forced migration, revealing that people move when there are threats to their personal integrity, but that the type of threat impacts the decision to move domestically versus internationally (2003). And a quantitative analysis of internal migration from around the world has shown that civil wars tend to produce more internally displaced people, while conflicts like genocide produce more international refugees (Moore and Shellman 2006). Despite these macro studies, a closer look at the internal migration process shows that internal migrants do not move in a linear fashion. ...
Executive Summary
This paper examines the experiences of Central American youth who have attempted internal relocation before migrating internationally. Based on interviews and participant observation with Guatemalan, Honduran, and Salvadoran youth migrating through Mexico, this paper shows how youth from the Northern Countries of Central America turn to their domestic networks to escape labor exploitation and gang violence before undertaking international journeys. The paper further demonstrates how those domestic networks lead youth into contexts of poverty and violence similar to those they seek to escape, making their internal relocation a disappointment. The failure of their internal relocation attempts makes them turn to international migrant networks as their next option. This paper sheds light on the underexplored issue of internal migration among Central American youth and that migration's synergy with Central American youths’ migration to the United States. The paper finds that internal relocation is unsuccessful when the internal destination fails to resolve the issues from which youth are attempting to escape. This failure ultimately triggers their departure from their home country.
... There are more than 80 million individuals worldwide currently classified as having been forcibly displaced. Two-thirds of these people were displaced from their homes and forced to move elsewhere within their home country, where they remain as internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Mooney 2005;Moore and Shellman 2006). The final third, or approximately 26 million individuals, fled their homes and crossed international borders in search of safety and opportunity -consequently acquiring refugee status in new host countries (Davenport et al. 2003;Moore and Shellman 2007). ...
Despite popular portrayals, most refugees are highly immobile once they have left their countries of origin. They are subject to the decisions of various governance actors, which affects their individual agency, sometimes trapping them in a state of involuntary immobility in host countries. This has a bearing on their preferences for relocation to a third country. We argue refugees’ preferences for relocation are a function of their perception of the effectiveness of governance actors in managing refugee situations. UN agencies often take on traditional public responsibilities for refugee populations, such as providing healthcare and education. Host governments’ responsibilities, in contrast, are commonly limited to respecting non-refoulement and providing security. Based on these competencies, we can distinguish between refugee perceptions of institutions as bestowing purely or impurely ‘agency-enhancing’ benefits. We expect these different perceptions affect refugees’ well-being in the host state, their perceived ability and aspiration to move onward, and their preferences regarding options outside legal frameworks. We test our expectations with an original survey among Syrian refugees hosted in Lebanon. We find purely agency-enhancing benefits are associated with a lower aspiration, but a higher perceived ability for onward movement. By contrast, impurely agency-enhancing benefits are associated with higher aspiration and a lower perceived ability for onward movement. Using a conjoint experiment, we also find that more positive perceptions of institutions are associated with a lower willingness to consider onward movement outside legal frameworks.
... Violence, not surprisingly, is a critical factor leading to flight. A range of studies have documented a number of pre-conditions, including ethnic and religious conflicts, border disputes, authoritarian practices, economic underdevelopment, and unequal access to resources which can lead not only to violent conflict but also to increases in human rights abuses and atrocity crimes (Schmeidl and Jenkins, 1998;Davenport, Moore, and Poe, 2003;Schmeidl, 2003;Melander and Oberg, 2006;Moore and Shellman, 2006;Rubin and Moore, 2007;Kaya and Orchard, 2019). Further, forced displacement itself can constitute an atrocity crime, with both forced deportations across borders and forcible transfers within them now viewed potentially as crimes against humanity. ...
Over the past twenty years, there has been a growth in international mechanisms to protect forced migrants who are victims of atrocity crimes. Within international criminal law, forced deportations and forcible transfers have been defined as potentially constituting both crimes against humanity and war crimes, while some forms of transfers (such as the transferring of children) may also constitute genocide. While the Refugee Convention is silent on this question, emerging soft and regional law around the issue of internal displacement has clearly defined a right not to be arbitrarily displaced and, in the Kampala Convention, African states have accepted an obligation to protect IDPs from such acts. Finally, there is a clear linkage between forced displacement and the R2P, including through ethnic cleansing and the above-mentioned genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. These represent important steps forward to ensure that forced migrants can be protected from atrocities.
... Such decisions are driven in the aggregate by root causes of flight. The outbreak of war destroys infrastructure and inhibits economic opportunities, making an individual feel as if they have no choice but to leave (Adhikari 2012;Moore and Shellman 2006;Steele 2009). Individual decisions are also affected by interpersonal relationships and whether or not members of their familial and social networks have chosen to flee or stay. ...
While the UNHCR promotes voluntary repatriation as the preferred solution to refugee situations, there is little understanding of variation in refugees’ preferences regarding return. We develop a theoretical framework suggesting two mechanisms influencing refugees’ preferences. First, refugees’ lived experiences in their country of origin prior to displacement and in their new host country create a trade-off in feelings of being anchored to their origin or host country. Second, firsthand exposure to traumas of war provides some refugees with a sense of competency and self-efficacy, leading them to prefer to return home. We test these relationships with data from a survey among Syrian refugees hosted in Lebanon. We find refugees exposed to violence during the war have a sense of attachment to Syria and are most likely to prefer return. Refugees who have developed a detachment from Syria or an attachment to Lebanon are less likely to prefer return.
... Some research has looked at patterns and trends that can be identified between internal displacement and cross-border displacement dynamics. For example, Moore and Shellman (2006) explore the circumstances leading some countries to produce a large number of refugees and relatively few IDPs. They develop and confirm a hypothesis suggesting that refugee flows are greater in the face of state or state-sponsored genocide or politicide than other state coercion, dissident campaigns of violence or civil wars. ...
This report presents a review of research and literature on internal displacement.
Abstracts
What drives refugee movements? Focusing on host countries' domestic political institutions, we argue that refugee entry is determined by the political regimes that shape the incentives of both host governments and displaced persons. Specifically, we theorize that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between political regimes and the volume of refugee entries. When the host country is autocratic, refugee volume becomes smaller due to displaced persons’ unwillingness to risk the high uncertainty of life under such regimes, and when the host country is democratic, refugee volume is similarly curbed due to democratic constraints on the host government. Consequently, a majority of refugees are clustered into anocratic regimes. Using a global dataset, a series of statistical analyses found strong evidence in support of our theoretical expectations regarding not only the hypothesized correlation between regime type and refugee movements but also the preferences of host governments and displaced persons that we theorize underlie this relationship.
Before moving into this book’s core issues surrounding the actors, challenges, and best practices of internal migration, we provide a brief conceptual discussion. Internal migration is an expansive, deceptively tricky research and policy topic.
This article delves into the leadership experiences of Ukrainian Christian forced migrants amidst the ongoing aggressive war against Ukraine. Drawing from theoretical frameworks related to trauma and forced migration, as well as leadership models, this research seeks to comprehend the intricacies of leadership exhibited by Ukrainian displaced individuals. Based on qualitative data from 130 participants, the study identifies key themes concerning leadership during wartime. It contributes to the development of a trauma-sensitive theology of leadership and offers insights into the leadership development requirements of Ukrainians post-war. The insights gathered from these refugees reveal that wartime leadership is dynamic and multifaceted. It encompasses values, adaptability, compassion, and Christian spirituality, extending beyond traditional models to prioritize the well-being of individuals and communities. The experiences and perspectives of these refugees offer valuable lessons for understanding leadership in the most challenging of circumstances, emphasizing the enduring importance of empathy, resilience, and faith in guiding individuals and communities through times of war.
Although also victims, there is a growing appreciation that civilians are actors in civil wars. Scholarship on civilian agency shows how their decisions impact well-being and shape conflict dynamics. Civilians are increasingly framed as impartial forces resisting armed groups and cultivating peace. However, civilians are as likely to support armed groups and deepen violence. This paper seeks to better understand civilian partisanship. I frame forms of civilian support that enhance the coercive capacities of armed groups as ‘indirect violence’. Some forms of support, such as refusing to provide information or protesting enemy abuses, may reduce violence, while providing food or medicine is more neutral. Other actions, such as contributing funds, intelligence, recruits, and weapons, enable armed groups to carry out violence. That civilians contribute indirect violence does not mean they are not victims, but may call their innocence into question, providing a sober account of civilians in civil war.
Drawing on qualitative data from the civil wars in Syria and Libya since 2011, this paper seeks to build a better understanding of immobility and of displacement trajectories within conflict countries and towards neighbouring countries. The paper shows that different types of violent experiences—personal threats, generalized violence, an increasing hopelessness relating to the absence of violence in the future—trigger different exit movements across internal and external borders. Second, the analysis demonstrates that migration decisions in civil war contexts are complex processes with people balancing between strategies of how to avoid violence with strategies of how to realize broader life aspirations related to family, love, work and political change. Life aspirations often play a more important role once people move out of a situation of immediate danger and in later phases of trajectories and influence (im)mobility patterns in three different directions: stay, move (on) or return. Life aspirations, especially related to political change, outweigh perceptions of violence in some cases. Financial vulnerability can force people to stay in or return to violent contexts.
The present chapter discusses the ascending number of Internally Displaced Persons in the African Union. The emergence of this category links with the rising concerns for climate refugees. Environmental Internally Displaced People have become one of the most challenging issues of the modern world. The current chapter critically evaluates the Kampala convention for Internally Displaced People (IDPs, henceforth) due to climatic change. It is examined from the point of property relations (in the form of land or housing or relocation) based on the right to return for IDPs. The method imparts a qualitative engagement with the text concerned. It falls in the terrain of discourse analysis where we trace how the sense of return or restitution or repatriation can be raised in the Kampala Convention as well as other relevant documents. The chapter provides critical insight into the claim for Rights than Guidelines for Internally Displaced Persons. It maps the basic rights under the Kampala Convention, the 1998 Guiding Principles, Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), and the Pinheiro Principles. The conventions addressing their concerns prescribe principles that are not legally binding among the States to follow. It becomes important to politically assert a Right based measure than posing an economic argument for a particular social group.KeywordsEnvironment migrationClimate refugeeIDPsProperty relationsRight to property
The African Shifts report starts with the ground-level realities of how people experience climate vulnerability, and how it affects mobility decisions in Africa today. It then lays out plausible scenarios for how climate mobility might unfold on the continent between now and 2050, and which parts of the continent are likely to be particularly affected. It concludes by presenting an eight-point Agenda for Action for the next eight years, aligning with the Decade for Action to achieve the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement.
The ACMI’s work builds on and contributes to the growing body of research and evidence on climate mobility globally and in Africa. This includes the World Bank’s Groundswell reports that have used a similar modelling approach to forecast future climate-driven movements on the continent. The Report also draws on recent research on African migration and displacement such as UNDP’s Scaling Fences report that documented the profiles and motivations of African migrants in Europe, and the 2020 Africa Migration Report which discussed diverse migration dynamics and highlighted the need for ‘a new paradigm on African migration.’
The Africa Climate Mobility Initiative (ACMI) is a collaboration between the African Union Commission, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the World Bank. It aims to generate political momentum and
a common policy agenda on climate mobility in Africa, and to support implementation capacity and partnerships on the continent. Over a two-year period, the ACMI developed research and modelling studies, and conducted extensive consultations with African and international experts and practitioners to arrive at a shared analysis and recommendations for action for addressing climate-forced migration and displacement, and to form a Community of Practice dedicated to advancing solutions for harnessing climate mobility in the continent.
Bringing together diverse actors and stakeholders from the realms of migration and displacement, development, and climate policy and practice, the ACMI seeks to support the emergence of a new policy ecosystem on climate mobility. It aims to foster a common understanding and integrated action across sectors to advance the implementation of relevant global and regional frameworks. These include the Agenda 2063, the Sustainable Development Goals, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change’s Paris Agreement 1, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, and the African Union’s three-year implementation plan for Africa.
Refugees who seek protection in neighboring countries (first safe countries of refuge) often have weak economic ties to their current place of residence. Refugees in these first safe countries also often have much to gain economically if they move on to Europe or other wealthier countries, as their refugee status opens doors that are closed to many other migrant groups. Still, far from all refugees in first safe countries aspire to move on to other locations. This article examines migration aspirations among Syrian refugees in Jordan and asks what characterizes refugees who aspire to move on to Europe. Building on theories of migration aspirations originally developed to study labor migration, it draws on a representative survey of 7,632 Syrian refugees in Jordan, conducted during the winter of 2017/2018. We show that religious and cultural preferences (preferences for living in a Muslim country and attitudes toward female labor market participation), as well as perceptions of when return to Syria will be possible, were more important in explaining variance in migration aspirations among Syrian refugees in Jordan than economic factors such as poverty or lack of jobs. These findings suggest that selection effects shape Syrian refugee migration to Europe and that refugees who go to Europe differ from those who remain in that they put less value on traditional gender roles and on living in Muslim societies. As such, the article contributes to the literature on how cultural ties and value preferences shape migration aspirations and influence the composition of migrant populations.
Die kollektive Unterbringung von Asylsuchenden ist ein wichtiger Bestandteil der flüchtlingspolitischen Verwaltungspraxis in Deutschland. Bei aller Varianz der Art solcher Sammelunterkünfte sind damit stets auch prinzipielle Herausforderungen verbunden. Denn mit einem zentralen Raum zum Umgang mit Flucht und Ankunft werden zugleich Gefahren und Konflikte örtlich konzentriert. Parallel zur Entwicklung von Konzepten zur Bewältigung dieser Herausforderungen untersuchen die Beiträger*innen des Bandes die Lebensrealitäten in diesen Einrichtungen.
Child marriage is a fundamental violation of human rights. It hinders progress towards development and public health goals. In this study, we argue that armed conflict plays an important role in the occurrence of child marriages; it influences the supply of and demand for young brides. We argue that in conflict settings, families are more willing to marry off their young daughters for protection. Armed conflict can also influence the demand: marriage in general declines due to an imbalance in sex ratio. However, in cases where belligerents use war tactics specifically focused on harming girls, such as sexual violence and girl recruitment, early marriage might increase as the result of armed conflict. To empirically examine these linkages, we combine the Demographic and Health Surveys of West Africa with information on the location of armed conflict. Our study shows that armed conflict generally reduces the occurrence of child marriage with 13% to 18%. However, we observe that when conflict actors use war tactics that specifically harm young girls there is a significant increase of 12% to 18% in the probability of a girl getting married before the age of 18. This research has important implications for our understanding of the relationship between armed conflict, gender inequality, and their impact on children.
The Italian migration control policy during 2017–2018 that sought to combat illegal migration caused a significant reduction in the number of sea arrivals to Italy, especially after Libyan non-state actors began to collaborate with the Government of National Accord to prevent emigration. However, variations in the absolute number of migrants on move is not sufficient in itself to conclude that a migration policy has been effective. Displacement/substitution effects can occur, which means that a policy could lead migration flows to relocate across time/space, change characteristics, or cause manifold side effects, rather than simply ceasing migration. These effects might reduce the intended impact of the policy. In the case of the Italian migration control policy during 2017–2018, some displacement/substitution effects did occur: a spatial redirection of migration flows originating in the North-Western African continent from Italy to Spain and Greece; a decrease or relocation of migrant smugglers; deterioration in migrant smuggling services, which, in turn, made the Central Mediterranean Route even more dangerous than it had been in the past; and the seeds of a possible intertemporal relocation of migration flows in the future. All these elements must be considered when evaluating the impact of the Italian migration control policy of 2017–2018 against illegal migration.KeywordsPolicy evaluationMigrationMigrant smugglingMediterraneanSubstitution effects
Are the causes of refugee and IDPs flows the same? While existing studies examine the causes of displacement in general, there is limited research on different determinants of internal and external displacement. Factors might have varying impacts on the decision to move within the country and flee abroad. Here, I argue the effect of violence on displacement as a function of perpetrator and geography (i.e., how spread it is). Increases in government violence increase the number of refugees because to escape government violence, people may have to cross an international border as governments are generally effective everywhere within their borders. On the other hand, rebel group activities are limited to a certain area and by leaving the conflict zone, civilians can be free from rebel violence. However, the spread of violence determines the decision to flee. If it is limited to a small region, people can escape from that area within the country and rebel violence increases the number of IDPs. If it is widespread, civilians may not have many opportunities within the country and have to move abroad. Therefore, the effect of rebel violence on internal displacement follows a reverse U-shape. The analysis of refugee and IDPs flows between 1989 and 2017 supports the main arguments and the results are robust to different model specifications and additional checks. This study highlights the importance of distinguishing the causes of internal and external displacement.
COVİD, international trade, EU
More than half of the Syrian population has been displaced as a result of war, this paper sets out to understand the scale of displacement, its distribution, as well as, its driving factors. This paper seeks to analyse the correlation between institutions, social capital, economy and so.
The most statistically significant factor was Mortality Rate. Displaced persons appear to seek to settle in areas less affected by conflict. The second strong association was the ‘Social Relationships’ indicator, where displacement rates are associated with low social capital areas. It seems that retrospectively the stresses that the arrival of migrants’ place on the host society has fragmented social ties. This tension between the displaced people and the host community is well documented. The degradation of institutional performance, the absence of legal authority, along the severe violation of rights, discrimination, and systematic looting are among the main factors that forced people to evacuate their cities and towns. Governance levels and institutional performance were found to be positively associated with displacement rates showing that people move to areas with lower rates of discrimination, corruption, and lawlessness. Living Conditions were found to be the next significant factor, indicating that displaced persons seek places that have better services such as communications, transportation, electricity, water, and employment. Another important factor was Human Development, as people are attracted to areas with higher levels of human development like good education infrastructure with higher-quality teaching staff and higher rates of enrolment. social variables with rates of forced displacement and migration. Understanding the determinants of displacement is important so as to predict future displacements.
Instead of regarding violence as a homogenous event, this article deconstructs the violence in Syria through Galtung’s concept of structural violence in order to understand the impact it has on the decision to move at a disaggregated level. It outlines the determinants of migration processes in Syria, relying on semi-structured interviews. By doing so, this research aims at enhancing the understanding of the determinants of forced displacement and migration patterns in response to violence. The research shows that enduring structural violence profoundly affects individuals` decision to leave their homes and become refugees. Beyond actual violence per se, refugee movements from Syria to neighbouring countries are linked to the gradual increase in structural violence, as well as proximate conditions and intervening factors. While pointing direct and actual violence as a determinant of internal displacement, this research also highlights that individuals forced to abandon their homes are not passive victims of the conflict.
Human migration involving the movement of persons or groups of people from one geographic location to another has always been a feature in human civilization. By and large, such migrations are often voluntary, involving people making a conscious decision to move from one place to another for economic and other reasons. The past couple of decades has witnessed the massive involuntary movement and dislocation of people within and between national borders. This has given rise to a new classification of groups or persons within the migration lexicon called internally displaced persons (IDPs). IDPs are persons or groups of persons who have been forced to move away from their permanent place of abode to temporary settlements within their national boundaries. This movement is often caused by a variety of factors including political instability, environmental disasters, ethnic and inter-tribal wars, and economic factors that affect them directly or to escape their effects without crossing recognized international borders.
This article develops a spatial model of internal and external forced migration. We propose a model reminiscent of Hotelling’s spatial model in economics and Schelling’s model of segregation. Conflict is modeled as a shock that hits a country at certain location and generates displacement of people located near the shock’s location. Some displaced people cross a border, thus becoming refugees, while others remain as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The model delivers predictions about how the fractions of a country’s population that become refugees and IDPs ought to be related with the intensity of the shock, country size, terrain ruggedness and the degree of geographical proximity of the country with respect to the rest of the world. The predictions of the model are then tested against real data using a panel of 161 countries covering the period 1995-2016. The empirical evidence is mostly in line with the predictions of the model.
Based on data from 18 Central and East European countries collected between 1991 and 1996, this article tests informational assumptions underlying strategic interaction and collective action models of goverment repression and dissent. Specifically, we investigate whether citizens' perceptions of human rights conditions in a country are systematically related to that country's actual conditions of government repression. The analysis suggests that there is a significant relationship between evalutions of human rights conditions and levels of government repression. Moreover, it shows that other political and economic conditions affect human rights evaluations, but that these relations do not lead to a weaening in the relationship between repressive conditions and public perceptions of human rights.
Coherent democracies and harshly authoritarian states have few civil wars, and intermediate regimes are the most conflict-prone. Domestic violence also seems to be associated with political change, whether toward greater democracy or greater autocracy. Is the greater violence of intermediate regimes equivalent to the finding that states in political transition experience more violence? If both level of democracy and political change are relevant, to what extent is civil violence related to each? Based on an analysis of the period 1816-1992, we conclude that intermediate regimes are most prone to civil war, even when they have had time to stabilize from a regime change. In the long run, since intermediate regimes are less stable than autocracies, which in turn are less stable than democracies, durable democracy is the most probable end-point of the democratization process. The democratic civil peace is not only more just than the autocratic peace but also more stable.
ABSTRACT The first part of the paper uses the Minorities at Risk data set to address the following puzzle: What relatively exogenous factors dierentiate,the small number of groups that have experienced large-scale ethnic and communal violence since 1945 from the much larger number that have not? We find that in this period large-scale ethnic violence has taken two major forms ‐ separatist wars and contests between groups to control an internationally authorized “state.” Such wars have been much more likely the poorer and more slow growing the country’s economy in the years prior to onset of violence. Minorities appear more likely to experience such wars if they have some regional base, are not primarily urban, are relatively large groups, live in rough terrain, and have ethnic brethren who dominate a neighboring state. Cultural dierences,from the dominant group, such as language and religion, are not associated with higher probabilities of rebellion. Nor is the level of democracy of the state (after controlling for wealth), or measures of economic and cultural discrimination. The second part of the paper shows how most of these findings can be explained in a
The paper tests informational assumptions underlying strategic interaction and collective action models of government repression and dissent. Based on directly comparable data from 18 Central and East European countries collected between 1991 and 1996, this paper investigates whether citizens' perceptions of human rights conditions in a country are systematically related to that country's conditions of government repression. The analysis suggests that there is a significant relationship between negative evaluations of human rights conditions and levels of government repression. Moreover, it shows that political and economic conditions affect human rights evaluations, but that these relations do not lead to a weakening in the relationship between repressive conditions and public perceptions of human rights. Acknowledgments: An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Hinman Symposium on Democratization and Human Rights, Binghamton University (SUNY), 25-26 September, 1998. We thank Ian Budge, Christian Davenport, Rick Hofferbert, Kathleen O'Connor, Steve Poe, Leonard Ray, and the symposium participants for their insightful comments on earlier drafts. We are indebted to Mark Gibney for sharing with us the repression data used in this research.
A central theoretical question in the literature on state-sanctioned terror is whether, and under what conditions, repressive violence deters or stimulates a shift in popular support away from the regime and toward the opposition. By combining a rational choice model of the nonelite response to escalating levels of death squad violence with a structural analysis of the global and domestic conditions under which the escalation of state-sanctioned terror can be expected, we demonstrate theoretically that carefully targeted repressive violence may in fact reduce the level of active popular support for the opposition, at least temporarily. However, as the level of repressive violence escalates and its application becomes more indiscriminate, it may in fact produce increases in active support for the opposition because nonelites can no longer assure themselves of immunity from repression by simply remaining politically inert. Thus, they turn to the rebels in search of protection from indiscriminate violence by the state. Why, then, would a regime, itself composed of supposedly rational individuals, pursue a policy of escalating repression if such measures are ultimately counterproductive? We argue that the conditions of structural dependence characterizing these regimes leave them without the institutional machinery, economic resources, or political will to address opposition challenges through more accommodative programs of reform. Thus, escalating repression is perpetrated not because it has a high probability of success but because the weakness of the state precludes its resort to less violent alternatives. The utility of this approach is illustrated with a case study of reform, repression, and revolution in El Salvador.
Why would people abandon their homes in favor of an uncertain life elsewhere? The short answer, of course, is violence. More specifically, the authors contend that people monitor the violent behavior of both the government and dissidents and assess the threat such behavior poses to their lives, physical person, and liberty. The greater the threat posed by the behavior of the government and dissidents, the larger the number of forced migrants a country will produce. To test hypotheses drawn from this argument the authors use a global sample of countries over more than forty years. Their findings are held to be consistent with their argument, showing that violent behavior has a substantially larger impact on forced migration than variables such as the type of political institution or the average size of the economy.
A simple two-stage game-theoretic model of conflict is analysed, where the government can send raiders for terrorising the population to flee before the fighting proper begins. The resulting displacement of population reduces the efficiency of the guerrilla in the fight against the government. Conditions are spelled out for a sub-game perfect equilibrium to exist where terror substitutes for fighting, when the government can afford it. The model's predictions are tested using data on refugees in Africa, showing that, after controlling for war, ODA has a positive impact on the outflow of refugees, as predicted.
An influential conventional wisdom holds that civil wars proliferated rapidly with the end of the Cold War and that the root cause of many or most of these has been ethnic nationalism. We show that the current prevalence of internal war is mainly the result of a steady accumulation of protracted conflicts since the 50s and 60s rather than a sudden change associated with a new, post-Cold War international system. We also find that after controlling for per capita income, more ethnically or religiously diverse countries have been no more likely to experience significant civil violence in this period. We argue for understanding civil war in this period in terms of insurgency or rural guerrilla warfare, a particular form of military practice that can be harnessed to diverse political agendas, including but not limited to ethnic nationalism. The factors that explain which countries have been at risk for civil war are not their ethnic or religious characteristics but rather the conditions that favor insurgency. These include poverty, which marks financially and bureaucratically weak states and also favors rebel recruitment, political instability, rough terrain, and large populations.
Objective. This paper (1) develops a theoretical model of refugee migration that builds on existing research in early warning and preventive diplomacy, and (2) empirically tests this model in order to assess the role played by generalized structural factors in the formation of forced migration. Methods. I regress the number of refugees on several political, economic, and intervening variables, using pooled time-series analysis over a twenty-year period (1971-1990). Refugee data come from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR). Results. The results suggest that, first, measures of institutional human rights violations have weaker predictive power than do measures of generalized violence. Second, civil wars with foreign military interventions are more important in producing large refugee populations and prolonged migrations than are civil wars without outside influence. Third, ethnic rebellion is important as a cause of small refugee migrations, but cannot significantly predict mass exodus. Finally, economic and intervening variables have little impact on predicting refugee migration. Conclusions. These findings contradict the argument that economic hardship is a very important cause of refugee migration. In addition, they support the argument that the level and type of violence determine the likelihood and size of refugee displacement.
The shifting nature of international conflict has prompted a rethinking of the Correlates of War Project's classification of wars. This research note describes the new expanded war typology and the resultant three war data sets. Lists of the qualifying wars in the inter-state, extra-state, and intra-state categories during the 1816-1997 period are appended.
Myron Weiner is Ford International Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Acting Director of the MIT Center for International Studies. He is the author of The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (HarperCollins, 1995), co-editor of Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders: World Migration and U.S. Policy (Norton, 1995), and editor, International Migration and Security (Westview Press, 1993).
I would like to acknowledge support for this study from the German American Academic Council, which funded the Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences on German-American Migration and Refugee Policies. This paper was prepared for the Project's Working Group on Policies toward Countries of Origin. I benefited from the comments of members of the Working Group at its meetings at the House of the American Academy in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and in Ladenburg, Germany, and from participants of the Inter-University Seminar on International Migration held at M.I.T. My thanks for research assistance to Steven Wilkinson, and for suggestions and comments to Klaus Bade, David Martin, Philip Martin, Rainer Munz, Barry Posen, Rosemarie Rogers, and Peter Schuck as well as suggestions from the anonymous reviewers for International Security.
1. John Salt, Ann Singleton, Jennifer Hogarth, Europe's International Migrants (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office [HMSO], 1994), p. 209. See chapter 9, "Migration in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union," pp. 195-206, and chapter 10, "Asylum Seekers and Refugees," pp. 207-216.
2. Jonas Widgren, A Comparative Analysis of Entry and Asylum Policies in Selected Western Countries (Vienna: International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 1994), p. 59.
3. For a particularly useful analysis of refugee flows in relation to ethnic conflicts see the essays in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), chapter 1, "Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict," pp. 1-25; Kathleen Newland,"Ethnic Conflict and Refugees," pp. 143-163; and Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," pp. 103-124. Also see Gil Loescher and Laila Monahan, eds., Refugees and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). For an attempt to specify some of the determinants of ethnic conflict, see Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 5-39.
4. Rosemarie Rogers and Emily Copeland, Forced Migration: Policy Issues in the Post-Cold War World (Medford, Mass.: Tufts University, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1993).
5. These include the demand by Eritreans for secession from Ethiopia; the war between Nigeria and the Ibos in the province of Biafra; the demand by East Pakistan (Bangladesh) for independence from Pakistan; the rebellion of Tibetans against Chinese rule; the Kachin, Shan and Karen rebellions in Burma; the civil war between Christian Black Africans in southern Sudan and the Arab-dominated government; the conflicts between the Kurds and the governments of Iraq and Turkey; the demand by Somalis in Djibouti and Ethiopia for separation and then unification with the Somali Republic; the demand by Tuaregs in northern Mali for autonomy; the secessionist movements against India in Kashmir, Punjab, Nagaland and Manipur; the conflict between Tamils in northern Sri Lanka and the Sinhalese-dominated government; the conflict between Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs in Bosnia; and the secessionist war by the Chechens against the Russian government.
6. Examples of present or past secessionist conflicts include Eritrea, Chechnya, Kashmir, Biafra, Abkhazia, Ossetia, Western Sahara, Southern Sudan, Mali (Tauregs), Bangladesh, Tibet, Tamil Sri Lanka, and India (Punjab as well as Kashmir). Several of these conflicts have produced some of the largest refugee flows of the past decade.
7. Non-secessionist violent conflicts among ethnic groups include clashes between Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi, Serb-Muslim warfare in Bosnia, and Nepali-Tibetan conflicts in Bhutan.
8. In 1969 large numbers of people fled China, Cuba, Eastern Europe, and several Latin American regimes, including Chile, Bolivia and Paraguay, and in the late 1970s and early 1980s many people fled Iran after the Islamic revolution. None of these countries produced a significant new refugee flow in the 1990s.
9. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, Laura W. Reed...
I use a rationalist framework to explore an issue typically framed and understood as irrational: large-scale violence against civilians in the context of civil wars. More specifically, I focus on the massacres of civilians in Algeria and seek to uncover the logic that drives such actions. The main thesis is that these massacres are not irrational instances of random violence motivated by extremist Islamist ideology, as they are typically described in the media; they can be understood instead as part of a rational strategy initiated by the Islamist rebels aiming to maximize civilian support under a particular set of con- straints. Mass, yet mostly targeted and selective, terror is used to punish and deter defection by civilians in the context of a particular strategic conjuncture characterized by (a) fragmented and unstable rule, (b) mass civilian defections toward the incumbents and (c) escalation of viol- ence. I check this thesis against the available evidence, address puzzles such as the identity of the victims and the behavior of the army, extend it to similar massacres in other countries, draw a number of implica- tions and discuss a research agenda. KEY WORDSpolitical violencecivil warcivilian massacres • insurgencyAlgeria
Though the inclusion of multiplicative terms in multiple regression equations is often prescribed as a method for assessing interaction in multivariate relationships, the technique has been criticized for yielding results that are hard to interpret, unreliable (as a result of multicollinearity between the multiplicative term and its constituent variables), and even meaningless. An interpretation of a multiple regression equation with a multiplicative term in conditional terms reveals all these criticisms to be unfounded. In fact, it is better analytic strategy to include a multiplicative term than to exclude one. Complicated as quantitative political analysis may seem to the uninitiated, one of the most telling criticisms made against it is that it often oversimplifies an exceedingly complicated political reality. The penchant for simplicity and generality of explanation is, of course, one of the driving forces of science, and unfortunately, it sometimes drives too far. But oversimplification sometimes also occurs because political researchers do not know about or hesitate to use techniques that would allow them to detect more complicated patterns of relationship in data. A prime example of this is the technique considered in the following pages: the inclusion of multiplicative terms in multiple regression equations. Perhaps the most common simplification in quantitative analysis is the assumption of additivity-the assumption that the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable is always the same, regardless of the level of other variables. The familiar multiple regression equation
Political scientists are making increasing use of the Tobit and Heckit models. This paper addresses some common problems in
the application and interpretation of these models. Through numerical experiments and reanalysis of data from a study by Romer
and Snyder (1994), we illustrate the consequences of using the standard Tobit model, which assumes a censoring point at zero,
when the zeros are not due to censoring mechanisms or when actual censoring is not at zero. In the latter case, we also show
that Greene's (1981) well-known results on the direction and size of the bias of the OLS estimator in the standard Tobit model
do not necessarily hold. Because the Heckit model is often used as an alternative to Tobit, we examine its assumptions and
discuss the proper interpretation of the Heckit/Tobit estimation results using Grier and co-workers' (1994) Heckit model of
campaign contribution data. Sensitivity analyses of the Heckit estimation results suggest some conclusions rather different
from those reached by Grier et al.
This paper examines the conditions under which refugee flows cause conflict to spread across borders. In order to develop propositions, the paper studies a group of Bosnian Muslim refugees who formed an army to retake their hometown. The situation of those refugees suggests that external political conditions, especially support from the refugee receiving state, determined the ability of the refugees to mobilize militarily. The presence of non-civilian elements among the refugees and the influence of powerful refugee leaders acted as necessary, but not sufficient, conditions that led to violence. The Bosnian Muslim case confirms that the actions of humanitarian agencies are constrained by the level of available resources and the attitude of the receiving state. Within those constraints, UNHCR and NGOs may attempt to prevent, reduce, or ignore political violence that involves refugees. If asked about the activities of refugees during the war in former Yugoslavia, most observers quickly assert that Bosnia is not the right place to study militant refugees. Other observers counter, with an equally broad sweep, that all male refugees were militarized due to forced conscription into one or another state army. 3 By studying a group of Bosnian refugees, this paper seeks to clarify the conditions under which refugee flows cause conflict to spread across borders. In order to develop propositions, the paper examines a group of Bosnian Muslim refugees who formed an army to retake their hometown. The situation of those refugees suggests that external political conditions, especially support from the refugee receiving state, determined the ability of the refugees to mobilize. The presence of non-civilian elements among the refugees and the influence of powerful refugee leaders acted as necessary, but not sufficient, conditions that led to violence. This research also asks what role the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian actors can play in preventing the spread of violence. 1
In this study we explore why persons flee their homes to become refugees and inter-nally displaced persons. We contend that individuals will tend to flee when the in-tegrity of their person is threatened. Further, we argue that they will flee toward countries where they expect conditions to be better. We conduct statistical analyses using fixed effects least squares, on a pooled cross-sectional time-series data set, consisting of data from 129 countries for the years 1964–1989. Our findings support the conclusion that threats to personal integrity are of primary importance in leading people to abandon their homes. Measures of state threats to personal integrity, dis-sident threats to personal integrity, and joint state–dissident threats each have statis-tically significant and substantively important effects on migrant production. We also find that countries making moves toward democracy tend to have greater num-ber of forced migrants, once other factors are considered. We conclude the analysis by identifying several lucrative areas for further investigation.
This article reports a test of a structural model of the antecedents of genocide and politicide (political mass murder). A case-control research design is used to test alternative specifications of a multivariate model that identifies preconditions of geno-/politicide. The universe of analysis consists of 126 instances of internal war and regime collapse that began between 1955 and 1997, as identified by the State Failure project. Geno-/politicides began during 35 of these episodes of state failure. The analytic question is which factors distinguish the 35 episodes that led to geno-/politicides from those that did not. The case-control method is used to estimate the effects of theoretically specified domestic and international risk factors measured one year prior to the onset of geno-/politicide. The optimal model includes six factors that jointly make it possible to distinguish with 74% accuracy between internal wars and regime collapses that do and those that do not lead to geno-/politicide. The conclusion uses the model to assess the risks of future episodes in 25 countries.
The Quest for Accuracy in the Estimation of Forced Migration Humanitarian Action: Social Science Connections
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Global directed dyad geographic borders database, 1964- 1999, available online at: <http://faculty
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Shellman, Stephen M. (2001). Global directed dyad geographic borders database, 1964-
1999, available online at: <http://faculty.wm.edu/smshel/Data/Data.html>.
Comparative Trends in Forced Displacement: IDPs and Refugees, 1964-96 Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey
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Schmeidl, Susanne. (1998). Comparative Trends in Forced Displacement: IDPs and
Refugees, 1964-96, in J. Hampton (Ed.) Internally Displaced People: A Global
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Institute for International Studies
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J. Watson, Jr. Institute for International Studies.
Refugee Involvement in Political Violence: Quantitiative Evidence from 1987-1998. Working Paper #26, New Issues in Refugee Research
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Lischer, Sarah Kenyon. (2000). Refugee Involvement in Political Violence: Quantitiative
Evidence from 1987-1998. Working Paper #26, New Issues in Refugee Research,
<http://www.jha.ac/articles/u026.pdf>.
The Quest for Accuracy in the Estimation of Forced Migration
- Susanne Schmeidl
Schmeidl, Susanne. (2000). The Quest for Accuracy in the Estimation of Forced
Migration, in S.C. Lubkemann, L. Minear and T.G. Weis (Eds.) Humanitarian
Global Refugee Migration Project
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Schmeidl, Susanne and J. Craig Jenkins. (1999). Global Refugee Migration Project,
<http://www.soc.sbs.ohio-state.edu/jcj/research.htm> (2002, March).
Whither Will They Go? Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association
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