Corporate governance (CG) has recently received much attention because of the wave of
financial scandals in the early 2000s and the more recent global financial crisis. CG
reforms, including laws, codes and listing rules have been established to protect
shareholders’ rights and restore investors’ confidence in the capital market. These
reforms have largely contributed to the evolution of internal and external governance
mechanisms that are aimed at mitigating agency conflicts between managers and
shareholders. However, overemphasis has been placed on the monitoring and control
dimensions of governance, which may hinder entrepreneurial activities, obscure business
prosperity and contribute to a narrow perspective on CG.
It has been argued that there is a need to broaden CG beyond compliance (conformance)
to a set of rules and laws, to include the performance aspects of governance that focus on
strategy and value creation. In other words, governance should not only focus on
monitoring managerial performance to ensure accountability to shareholders, but also on
mechanisms that motivate management to optimise shareholders’ wealth. Enterprise
governance (EG) framework has been introduced to keep the balance between the
conformance and performance dimensions of governance. However, few studies address
the possible tension between conformance and performance. Moreover, there is no
agreement among these studies on the relationship between conformance and
performance in the governance context.
Arguably, Value-based Management (VBM) is an appropriate approach to address the
issue of EG. VBM adopts value creation as an overall objective, develops a strategy that
contributes to value creation and integrates it into decision-making. In this way, VBM
can act as an effective mechanism for motivating management to maximise shareholder
wealth, which works in parallel with other CG mechanisms, to mitigate agency conflicts
resulting from the separation between ownership and management.
This study aims to develop a contingency framework of EG through operationalising the
conformance using CG and performance using corporate entrepreneurship (CE). This
framework examines the inter-relationships between VBM, compliance with the
Combined Code on Corporate Governance (CCCG), CE and the ultimate effect on
organisational performance. More specifically, the study empirically examines the effect
of compliance with the CCCG on CE, and whether VBM can achieve a balance between
compliance with the CCCG and CE, should a conflict exist. The study also examines
whether a fit between contingency variables (company size, agency conflicts, uncertainty,
strategy and decentralisation), VBM, compliance with the CCCG codes and CE is
associated with organisational performance.
To achieve the aim of this study a cross-sectional survey, based on a questionnaire, is
conducted to identify the level of VBM implementation, contextual and organisational
factors in the large and medium quoted companies in the UK. The questionnaire targets
the Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in these companies as key informants. In addition, a
content analysis of the annual reports of the sampled companies is undertaken to measure
the level of compliance with the CCCG. Financial data (e.g. organisational performance)
have been obtained from the DataStream, Fame and Thomson One Banker databases.
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Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) is adopted for data
analysis and hypotheses testing.
The results suggest that VBM implementation is positively associated with agency
conflicts, low cost strategies and decentralisation. Compliance with the CCCG is
positively associated with agency conflicts and company size. CE is positively associated
with company size, uncertainty and differentiation strategies. In addition, the fit between
compliance with the CCCG and contingency factors significantly predicts the marketbased performance. The fit between CE and the contingency factors significantly predict
the perceived performance. However, the results regarding the effect of VBM on
organisational performance are mixed. While VBM has no significant direct effect on the
market-based performance, VBM has indirect positive effect on the market-based
performance acting through compliance with the CCCG as an intervening variable. VBM
is significantly associated with compliance with the CCCG but not with CE. No evidence
is found for negative association between compliance with the CCCG and CE.
The results support a large number of the proposed relationships between the contingency
factors, VBM, compliance with the CCCG and CE. The results also suggest that using
both compliance with the CCCG and CE as intervening variables in the relationship
between VBM and organisational performance contributes to explaining the mixed results
in the VBM literature. In terms of the EG framework, VBM does not keep a balance
between conformance and performance. VBM emphasises the compliance with the CCCG
(conformance) at the expense of CE (performance). The results did not provide significant
evidence of a conflict between compliance with the CCCG and CE, the area which lacks
empirical evidence.
This study contributes to the literature at different levels. At the theoretical level, this
study develops a theoretical model that links a performance management system (PMS),
i.e. VBM, to CG practices and CE. This model attempts to bridge the gap between
different disciplines, including management accounting, CG and entrepreneurship.
Furthermore, combining both the contingency theory and the agency theory lenses
contributes to the development of a comprehensive model of EG. At the methodological
level, unlike previous studies, this study measures VBM practices on a continuum, rather
than categories. Multiple data collection methods are used, and a powerful statistical
technique (PLS-SEM) is adopted for data analysis. At the empirical level, the study is
conducted in the UK. Though it is different from the US in many aspects, very few studies
have been conducted in this context in many research areas such as VBM, CG and CE.