Eugene F. Fama Sr’s research while affiliated with University of Chicago and other places

Financing decisions seem to violate the central predictions of the pecking order model about how often and under what circumstances firms issue equity. Specifically, most firms issue or retire equity each year, and the issues are on average large and not typically done by firms under duress. We estimate that during 1973–2002, the year-by-year equity decisions of more than half of our sample firms violate the pecking order.

The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of William Sharpe (1964) and John Lintner (1965) marks the birth of asset pricing theory (resulting in a Nobel Prize for Sharpe in 1990). Before their breakthrough, there were no asset pricing models built from first principles about the nature of tastes and investment opportunities and with clear testable predictions about risk and return. Four decades later, the CAPM is still widely used in applications, such as estimating the cost of equity capital for firms and evaluating the performance of managed portfolios. And it is the centerpiece, indeed often the only asset pricing model taught in MBA level investment courses. The attraction of the CAPM is its powerfully simple logic and intuitively pleasing predictions about how to measure risk and about the relation between expected return and risk. Unfortunately, perhaps because of its simplicity, the empirical record of the model is poor - poor enough to invalidate the way it is used in applications. The model's empirical problems may reflect true failings. (It is, after all, just a model.) But they may also be due to shortcomings of the empirical tests, most notably, poor proxies for the market portfolio of invested wealth, which plays a central role in the model's predictions. We argue, however, that if the market proxy problem invalidates tests of the model, it also invalidates most applications, which typically borrow the market proxies used in empirical tests. For perspective on the CAPM's predictions about risk and expected return, we begin with a brief summary of its logic. We then review the history of empirical work on the model and what it says about shortcomings of the CAPM that pose challenges to be explained by more complicated models.

Confirming predictions shared by the trade-off and pecking order models, more profitable firms and firms with fewer investments have higher dividend payouts. Confirming the pecking order model but contradicting the trade-off model, more profitable firms are less levered. Firms with more investments have less market leverage, which is consistent with the trade-off model and a complex pecking order model. Firms with more investments have lower long-term dividend payouts, but dividends do not vary to accommodate short-term variation in investment. As the pecking order model predicts, short-term variation in [oplus ]investment and earnings is mostly absorbed by debt. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

The proportion of U.S. firms paying dividends drops sharply during the 1980s and 1990s. Among NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq firms, the proportion of dividend payers falls from 66.5% in 1978 to only 20.8% in 1999. The decline is due in part to an avalanche of new listings that tilts the population of publicly traded firms toward small firms with low profitability and strong growth opportunities—the timeworn characteristics of firms that typically do not pay dividends. But this is not the whole story. The authors' more striking finding is that, no matter what their characteristics, firms in general have become less likely to pay dividends. The authors use two different methods to disentangle the effects of changing firm characteristics and changing propensity to pay on the percent of dividend payers. They find that, of the total decline in the proportion of dividend payers since 1978, roughly one-third is due to the changing characteristics of publicly traded firms and two-thirds is due to a reduced propensity to pay dividends. This lower propensity to pay is quite general—dividends have become less common among even large, profitable firms. Share repurchases jump in the 1980s, and the authors investigate whether repurchases contribute to the declining incidence of dividend payments. It turns out that repurchases are mainly the province of dividend payers, thus leaving the decline in the percent of payers largely unexplained. Instead, the primary effect of repurchases is to increase the already high payouts of cash dividend payers.

There is a strong presumption in economics that, in a competitive environment, profitability is mean reverting. We provide corroborating evidence. In a simple partial adjustment model, the estimated rate of mean reversion is about 38% per year. But a simple partial adjustment model with a uniform rate of mean reversion misses rich nonlinear patterns in he behavior of profitability. Specifically, we find that mean reversion is faster when profitability is below its mean and when it is further from its mean in either direction. We also show that the mean reversion in profitability produces predictable variation in earnings. Copyright 2000 by University of Chicago Press.

We estimate the internal rates of return earned by nonfinancial firms on (i) the initial market values of their securities and (ii) the cost of their investments. The return on value is an estimate of the overall corporate cost of capital. The estimate of the real cost of capital for 1950-96 is 5.95 percent. The real return on cost is larger, 7.38 percent, so on average corporate investment seems to be profitable. A by-product of calculating these returns is information about the history of corporate earnings, investment, and financing decisions that is perhaps more interesting than the returns. Copyright The American Finance Association 1999.

Value stocks have higher returns than growth stocks in markets around the world. For the period 1975 through 1995, the difference between the average returns on global portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks is 7.68 percent per year, and value stocks outperform growth stocks in twelve of thirteen major markets. An international capital asset pricing model cannot explain the value premium, but a two-factor model that includes a risk factor for relative distress captures the value premium in international returns. Copyright The American Finance Association 1998.

Market eƒciency survives the challenge from the literature on long-term return anomalies. Consistent with the market eƒciency hypothesis that the anomalies are chance results, apparent overreaction to information is about as common as underreac- tion, and post-event continuation of pre-event abnormal returns is about as frequent as post-event reversal. Most important, consistent with the market eƒciency prediction that apparent anomalies can be due to methodology, most long-term return anomalies tend to disappear with reasonable changes in technique. ( 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

We use cross-sectional regressions to study how a firm's value is related to dividends and debt. With a good control for profitability, the regressions can measure how the taxation of dividends and debt affects firm value. Simple tax hypotheses say that value is negatively related to dividends and positively related to debt. We find the opposite. We infer that dividends and debt convey information about profitability (expected net cash flows) missed by a wide range of control variables. This information about profitability obscures any tax effects of financing decisions. Copyright The American Finance Association 1998.

Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995) claim that betas from annual returns produce a stronger positive relation between beta and average return than betas from monthly returns. They also contend that the relation between average return and book-to-market equity (BE/ME) is seriously exaggerated by survivor bias. We argue that survivor bias does not explain the relation between BE/ME and average return. We also show that annual and monthly betas produce the same inferences about the beta premium. Our main point on the beta premium is, however, more basic. It cannot save the Capital asset pricing model (CAPM), given the evidence that beta alone cannot explain expected return. Copyright 1996 by American Finance Association.