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Sperry, R. Consciousness, personal identity and the divided brain. Neuropsychologia 22, 661-673
... When a picture of an object is presented in the right visual hemifield, the patient responds correctly with the right hand and verbally. However, when the object is presented in the left hemifield the patient verbally states that he/she saw nothing but nevertheless identifies the object accurately with the left hand only, for instance, by making a drawing of the object (Gazzaniga et al., 1962;Gazzaniga, 1967Gazzaniga, , 1998Sperry, 1968Sperry, , 1984Wolman, 2012). This is in agreement with the human anatomy; the right hemisphere receives visual input from the left hemifield and controls the left hand, and vice versa (Penfield and Boldrey, 1937;Cowey, 1979;Sakata and Taira, 1994). ...
... Moreover, the left hemisphere is generally the site of language processing (Ojemann et al., 1989;Vigneau et al., 2006). Thus, it seems that resection of the corpus callosum causes each hemisphere to gain its own conscious awareness (Sperry, 1984). The left hemisphere is only aware of the right hemifield and can demonstrate this through its control of the right hand and verbal capacities, while the right hemisphere is only aware of the left hemifield, which it expresses through its control of the left hand. ...
The classic view holds that when “split-brain” patients are presented with an object in the right visual field, they will correctly identify it verbally and with the right hand. However, when the object is presented in the left visual field, the patient verbally states that he saw nothing but nevertheless identifies it accurately with the left hand. This interaction suggests that perception, recognition and responding are separated in the two isolated hemispheres. However, there is now accumulating evidence that this interaction is not absolute; for instance, split-brain patients are able to detect and localise stimuli anywhere in the visual field verbally and with either hand. In this study we set out to explore this cross-hemifield interaction in more detail with the split-brain patient DDC and carried out two experiments. The aim of these experiments is to unveil the unity of deliberate and automatic processing in the context of visual integration across hemispheres. Experiment 1 suggests that automatic processing is split in this context. In contrast, when the patient is forced to adopt a conscious, deliberate, approach, processing seemed to be unified across visual fields (and thus across hemispheres). First, we looked at the confidence that DDC has in his responses. The experiment involved a simultaneous “same” versus “different” matching task with two shapes presented either within one hemifield or across fixation. The results showed that we replicated the observation that split brain patients cannot match across fixation, but more interesting, that DDC was very confident in the across-fixation condition while performing at chance-level. On the basis of this result, we hypothesised a two-route explanation. In healthy subjects, the visual information from the two hemifields is integrated in an automatic, unconscious fashion via the intact splenium, and this route has been severed in DDC. However, we know from previous experiments that some transfer of information remains possible. We proposed that this second route (perhaps less visual; more symbolic) may become apparent when he is forced to use a deliberate, consciously controlled approach. In an experiment where he is informed, by a second stimulus presented in one hemifield, what to do with the first stimulus that was presented in the same or the opposite hemifield, we showed that there was indeed interhemispheric transfer of information. We suggest that this two-route model may help in clarifying some of the controversial issues in split-brain research.
... That is, awareness is the translation of information from sensory detection and memory into a format that ensures communication between people. This view is consistent with the results of experiments by R. Sperry and his colleagues on epilepsy patients who underwent a dissection of the corpus callosum (Gazzaniga, 2000;Sperry, 1984). People with split hemispheres can correctly select with the left hand an object that was presented by itself or the word denoting it in the left visual field, but are unable to name the selected object. ...
... Thus, on the one hand, a person is able to analyze the words presented to him without awareness and perform actions related to the detection of this word (Sperry, 1984), on the other hand, he can speak without awareness. These facts point to the need for a thorough study of the amount of language information that a person is able to analyze and generate without realizing it (Gaal et al., 2014), as well as how the practice of unconsciously receiving language information can affect conscious processing and cognitive bias (Hinton, 2017). ...
Since the middle of the 20th century, more and more data have appeared on the limited role of consciousness in determining human behavior. In this opinion paper, we hypothesize that the basis of consciousness is precisely the communicative function, and discuss relations of consciousness to other cognitive processes such sensory detection, decision-making and emotions. Within the framework of the hypothesis, consciousness is considered as a highly specialized function of the brain, which ensures encoding of personal information as communication messages. On a subjective level, mental representation just means the state of information to be shared in a human group. Accordingly, consciousness affects only those components of human behavior that are associated with the transmission of messages. Sensory detection, decision-making, emotions and other processes are only projected into consciousness during the encoding of information of them. The communication hypothesis assumes that consciousness is an adaptation that increases the efficiency of a collective way of life, and the emergence of consciousness is inextricably linked with the development of language in human culture. In the future, our view of consciousness provides an opportunity for an objective analysis of subjective phenomena by means of a directed study of the formation of messages both at the level of brain processes and at the level of interactions between individuals.
... Music builds bonding by inducing joint emotional experience, and also, as I now discuss, induces emotional experience more broadly. Often neglected by psychology and brain research, brain development of subjective awareness and its functional significance is now receiving fresh attention (Damasio, 2010;Dehaene & Changeux, 2011;Edelman & Seth, 2009;Fuster, 2015;Griffin, 2000;Jaynes, 1990;Lamme, 2006;Mashour, Roelsfsema, Changeux, & Dehaene, 2020;Nieder, Wagener, & Rinnert, 2020;Sperry, 1983Sperry, , 1984. Jerison (1973Jerison ( , 1989 has proposed that the nature of human awareness has evolved in ways that as now discussed may have been critical to the evolution of music. ...
... Jerison (1989) proposes that the need to keep straight these different components of awareness required development of "self" which I interpret as a metaphor for awareness related to executive function (Damasio, 2010;Freeman, 1995;Fuster, 2015;Luria, 1980). Sperry (1984) in his analysis of non-verbal function implies need for such awareness, as well. Notably, our awareness concerning development of verbal messaging (Libet, 1985) allows awareness not of formation, but rather of consequences of intentional actions such as messaging. ...
We compare and contrast the 60 commentaries by 109 authors on the pair of target articles by Mehr et al. and ourselves. The commentators largely reject Mehr et al.'s fundamental definition of music and their attempts to refute (1) our social bonding hypothesis, (2) byproduct hypotheses, and (3) sexual selection hypotheses for the evolution of musicality. Instead, the commentators generally support our more inclusive proposal that social bonding and credible signaling mechanisms complement one another in explaining cooperation within and competition between groups in a coevolutionary framework (albeit with some confusion regarding terminologies such as “byproduct” and “exaptation”). We discuss the proposed criticisms and extensions, with a focus on moving beyond adaptation/byproduct dichotomies and toward testing of cross-species, cross-cultural, and other empirical predictions.
... Music builds bonding by inducing joint emotional experience, and also, as I now discuss, induces emotional experience more broadly. Often neglected by psychology and brain research, brain development of subjective awareness and its functional significance is now receiving fresh attention (Damasio, 2010;Dehaene & Changeux, 2011;Edelman & Seth, 2009;Fuster, 2015;Griffin, 2000;Jaynes, 1990;Lamme, 2006;Mashour, Roelsfsema, Changeux, & Dehaene, 2020;Nieder, Wagener, & Rinnert, 2020;Sperry, 1983Sperry, , 1984. Jerison (1973Jerison ( , 1989 has proposed that the nature of human awareness has evolved in ways that as now discussed may have been critical to the evolution of music. ...
... Jerison (1989) proposes that the need to keep straight these different components of awareness required development of "self" which I interpret as a metaphor for awareness related to executive function (Damasio, 2010;Freeman, 1995;Fuster, 2015;Luria, 1980). Sperry (1984) in his analysis of non-verbal function implies need for such awareness, as well. Notably, our awareness concerning development of verbal messaging (Libet, 1985) allows awareness not of formation, but rather of consequences of intentional actions such as messaging. ...
Savage et al. argue for musicality as having evolved for the overarching purpose of social bonding. By way of contrast, we highlight contemporary predictive processing models of human cognitive functioning in which the production and enjoyment of music follows directly from the principle of prediction error minimization.
... Music builds bonding by inducing joint emotional experience, and also, as I now discuss, induces emotional experience more broadly. Often neglected by psychology and brain research, brain development of subjective awareness and its functional significance is now receiving fresh attention (Damasio, 2010;Dehaene & Changeux, 2011;Edelman & Seth, 2009;Fuster, 2015;Griffin, 2000;Jaynes, 1990;Lamme, 2006;Mashour, Roelsfsema, Changeux, & Dehaene, 2020;Nieder, Wagener, & Rinnert, 2020;Sperry, 1983Sperry, , 1984. Jerison (1973Jerison ( , 1989 has proposed that the nature of human awareness has evolved in ways that as now discussed may have been critical to the evolution of music. ...
... Jerison (1989) proposes that the need to keep straight these different components of awareness required development of "self" which I interpret as a metaphor for awareness related to executive function (Damasio, 2010;Freeman, 1995;Fuster, 2015;Luria, 1980). Sperry (1984) in his analysis of non-verbal function implies need for such awareness, as well. Notably, our awareness concerning development of verbal messaging (Libet, 1985) allows awareness not of formation, but rather of consequences of intentional actions such as messaging. ...
We propose that not social bonding, but rather a different mechanism underlies the development of musicality: being unable to survive alone. The evolutionary constraint of being dependent on other humans for survival provides the ultimate driving force for acquiring human faculties such as sociality and musicality, through mechanisms of learning and neural plasticity. This evolutionary mechanism maximizes adaptation to a dynamic environment.
... Space considerations prevent me from elaborating on the importance of functional asymmetry. It is sufficient to state, that, as clearly illustrated by experiments performed at Caltech in "split brain patients," this asymmetry is of crucial importance for the proper functioning of the brain (17). ...
The transformative achievements of deep learning have led several scholars to raise the question of whether artificial intelligence (AI) can reach and then surpass the level of human thought. Here, after addressing methodological problems regarding the possible answer to this question, it is argued that the definition of intelligence proposed by proponents of the AI as “the ability to accomplish complex goals,” is appropriate for machines but does not capture the essence of human thought. After discussing the differences regarding understanding between machines and the brain, as well as the importance of subjective experiences, it is emphasized that most proponents of the eventual superiority of AI ignore the importance of the body proper on the brain, the laterization of the brain, and the vital role of the glia cells. By appealing to the incompleteness theorem of Gödel’s and to the analogous result of Turing regarding computations, it is noted that consciousness is much richer than both mathematics and computations. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is stressed that artificial algorithms attempt to mimic only the conscious function of parts of the cerebral cortex, ignoring the fact that, not only every conscious experience is preceded by an unconscious process but also that the passage from the unconscious to consciousness is accompanied by loss of information.
... This would be the point at which Φmax for the whole brain would fall below the value of Φmax for the left and for the right hemisphere taken by themselves". Early studies [94][95][96] concluded that the severance of the corpus callosum left patient with two consciousnesses, one for each hemisphere, and consistent with IIT's exclusion axiom and Tononi and Koch's prediction; however, more recent re-examination of these data, together with new studies [97][98][99], has demonstrated that although visual fields are indeed split in these patients, their consciousness remains intact and unified. Patients respond with either hand to stimuli presented to the right or to the left of fixation in their visual field. ...
The quest to comprehend the nature of consciousness has spurred the development of many theories that seek to explain its underlying mechanisms and account for its neural correlates. In this paper, I compare my own conscious electromagnetic information field (cemi field) theory with integrated information theory (IIT) and global workspace theory (GWT) for their ability to ‘carve nature at its joints’ in the sense of predicting the entities, structures, states and dynamics that are conventionally recognized as being conscious or nonconscious. I go on to argue that, though the cemi field theory shares features of both integrated information theory and global workspace theory, it is more successful at carving nature at its conventionally accepted joints between conscious and nonconscious systems, and is thereby a more successful theory of consciousness.
... He writes: 'the general behavior and conversation during the course of a casual social encounter without special tests typically reveals nothing to suggest that these people are not essentially the same persons that they were before the surgery with the same inner selves and personalities'. He notes, however, that 'despite the outwardly seeming normality … and the apparent unity and coherence of the behavior and personality of these individuals, controlled lateralized testing for the function of each hemisphere independently indicates that in reality these people live with two largely separate left and right domains of inner conscious awareness' and that ' … each surgical disconnected hemisphere appears to have a mind of its own, each capable of controlling the behavior of the body but each cut off from, and oblivious of, conscious events in the partner hemisphere' (Sperry, 1984). ...
Inspired by the pioneering work of Eran Zaidel beginning in the early 1970's on the role of the two cerebral hemispheres of the human brain in self-related cognition, we review research on self-face recognition from a laterality perspective. The self-face is an important proxy of the self, and self-face recognition has been used as an indicator of self-awareness more broadly. Over the last half century, behavioral and neurological data, along with over two decades of neuroimaging research evidence have accumulated on this topic, generally concluding a right-hemisphere dominance for self-face recognition. In this review, we briefly revisit the pioneering roots of this work by Sperry, Zaidel & Zaidel, and focus on the important body of neuroimaging literature on self-face recognition it has inspired. We conclude with a brief discussion of current models of self-related processing and future directions for research in this area.
... Finally, we note that contrary to IIT's predictions, surgical severance of the principal connection between the two cerebral hemispheres (the corpus callosum) appears to leave the unity of consciousness intact (Pinto, de Haan, & Lamme, 2017a;Pinto et al., 2017b). Sperry (1968Sperry ( , 1984 and Gazzaniga (1967) based their conclusion that split-brain patients have two separate consciousnesses, one for each hemisphere, on partly inconsistent, non-quantitative assessment of the laterality of patient response mode (left vs. right hand, or verbal response, the latter leftlateralized) relative to which hemisphere "saw" the laterally presented visual stimuli. As far as cortico-cortical anatomy after callosotomy is concerned, a visual stimulus which because of its presentation to the right of fixation is represented in the left hemisphere should be reportable both through the right hand (controlled by the left hemisphere) and verbally (left lateralized language), whereas one presented to the left of fixation should be reportable only through the left hand and not verbally. ...
Consciousness directs the actions of the agent for its own purposive gains. It re-organises a stimulus-response linear causality to deliver generative, creative agent action that evaluates the subsequent experience prospectively. This inversion of causality affords special properties of control that are not accounted for in integrated information theory (IIT), which is predicated on a linear, deterministic cause-effect model. IIT remains an incomplete, abstract, and disembodied theory without explanation of the psychobiology of consciousness that serves the vital agency the organism.
... Finally, we note that contrary to IIT's predictions, surgical severance of the principal connection between the two cerebral hemispheres (the corpus callosum) appears to leave the unity of consciousness intact (Pinto, de Haan, & Lamme, 2017a;Pinto et al., 2017b). Sperry (1968Sperry ( , 1984 and Gazzaniga (1967) based their conclusion that split-brain patients have two separate consciousnesses, one for each hemisphere, on partly inconsistent, non-quantitative assessment of the laterality of patient response mode (left vs. right hand, or verbal response, the latter leftlateralized) relative to which hemisphere "saw" the laterally presented visual stimuli. As far as cortico-cortical anatomy after callosotomy is concerned, a visual stimulus which because of its presentation to the right of fixation is represented in the left hemisphere should be reportable both through the right hand (controlled by the left hemisphere) and verbally (left lateralized language), whereas one presented to the left of fixation should be reportable only through the left hand and not verbally. ...
In our response to a truly diverse set of commentaries, we first summarize the principal topical themes around which they cluster, then address two “outlier” positions (the problem of consciousness has been solved vs. is intractable). Next, we address ways in which commentaries by non-integrated information theory (IIT) authors engage with the specifics of our IIT critique, turning finally to the four commentaries by IIT authors.
The authors tested the theory that hemispheric specialization evolved as a consequence of reduced interhemispheric connectivity by examining whether neuroanatomical asymmetries were associated with variation in the ratio of corpus callosum size to brain volume (CC:VOL) and to neocortical surface area (CC:NEO) in human and nonhuman primates. Magnetic resonance images were collected in a sample of 45 primates including 8 New World monkeys, 10 Old World monkeys, 4 lesser apes, 17 great apes, and 6 humans. CC:VOL and CC:NEO were determined and correlated with measures of brain asymmetry. The results indicate that brain asymmetry significantly predicted CC:VOL and CC:NEO. Subsequent analyses revealed that species variation in functional asymmetries in the form of handedness are also inversely related to CC:NEO. Taken together, these results support the hypothesis that leftward brain asymmetries may have evolved as a consequence of reduced interhemispheric connectivity.
Genelde insanın mahiyeti özelde ise ruhun varlığı ve mahiyeti konusu, düşünce tarihi boyunca tartışılagelmiştir. İnsan, bilen özne olarak önce kendini tanımaya çalışmıştır. Bu sorgulamayı yaparken sadece fenomenal varlığını (bedenini) değil, orada bir yerde olduğundan şüphe etmediği manevi kimliğini de merak etmiştir. Bu merak; anatomiden fizyolojiye, ilm-i ruhtan felsefeye, tıptan sosyolojiye, biyolojiden nörobiyolojiye, psikolojiden nöropsikolojiye, kimyadan nörokimyaya kadar uzanan bilimsel bir yolculuğun tahrik gücünü meydana getirmiştir. Sonunda her uygarlığın kendi bilimsel ve felsefi birikimine uygun olarak çeşitli insan tasavvurları geliştirilmiştir. İnsanlığa mâl olmuş kadim düşünce geleneği, insanı kahir ekseriyette düalist bir tanıma dahil etmiştir. Modern bilimle birlikte insanı fizik olarak incelemek için geliştirilen pek çok aygıtın sağladığı imkanlarla sayısız veriye ulaşılmış, bu veriler insanın fizik ve metafizik veçhesiyle nasıl bir varlık olduğunu anlamada büyük yararlılıklar sağlamıştır. Bununla birlikte doğal dünyaya ve onun bir parçası olan insana dair bilgimiz artıkça bakış açıları paradigmatik değişimlere zorlanmıştır. Bilimsel bilgiyle koşut bir şekilde gelişen ve değişen felsefi akımlar, dinin özellikle Batı dünyasında gerilemesi, bilginin yorumlanmasındaki hâkim modelleri geriletmiştir. İnsan nosyonları da bu büyük tagayyürden payını kaçınılmaz olarak almıştır. Eylemlerin arkasındaki özne, bedenden/beyinden ayrı/bağımsız ve bütünüyle otonom ve rasyonel midir? Yoksa çağdaş sinir bilimin öne sürdüğü gibi bedenden/beyinden ya da onun işlevselliğinden mi ibarettir? Bu uyumlu işlevsellik bütünüyle ya da kısmen doğal nedenselliğe bağlı olarak mı gerçekleşmektedir? İnsanı insan yapan bir öz veya ayırt edici bir özellik var mıdır? Varsa bu öz/özellik fiziksel midir yoksa fizik ötesi bir töz müdür? Bu sorulara ilk dönem kelâmcılarının hangi çerçevede ne cevap verdiği; daha çok dinî bilgi, kısmen dönemin tıp bilgisi ve büyük oranda mantıksal akıl yürütme ekseninde geliştirilen hipotezlerin çağdaş bilimin ileri sürdüğü insan ve ruh tarifleriyle ne oranda örtüştüğü meselesi, makalenin ana konusunu oluşturmaktadır. Özetle bu çalışma; süregelen kadim soruşturmanın iki önemli evresi olarak gördüğümüz, ilk dönem kelâmcılarının ruh teorileriyle güncel bilimsel veriler arasındaki paralellikleri ve yaklaşım benzerliklerini tespit etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Zira akültürasyon sürecine bağlı dönüşümün düşünce üzerinde belirleyici güç hâline gelmediği kelâmın ilk döneminde (mütekaddimûn) serdedilen fikirlerin daha orijinal ve değerli olduğu düşünülmektedir. Problemin temel kavramları arasında yer alan ruh, nefs, zihin, benlik ve bilincin tanımları hakkında kısa bilgiler verildikten sonra erken dönem Mu‘tezilî ve Ehl-i Sünnet mütefekkirlerinin konuya ilişkin düşünceleri güncel verilerle karşılaştırmalı olarak aktarılmıştır. Araştırma boyunca elde edilen veriler, analitik ve semantik tahlillere tabi tutularak sağlıklı bir tasvirî çıkarım yapılmaya gayret edilmiştir.
The human cerebral cortex is one of the most evolved regions of the brain, responsible for most higher-order neural functions. Since nerve cells (together with synapses) are the processing units underlying cortical physiology and morphology, we studied how the human neocortex is composed regarding the number of cells as a function of sex and age. We used the isotropic fractionator for cell quantification of immunocytochemically labeled nuclei from the cerebral cortex donated by 43 cognitively healthy subjects aged 25-87 years old. In addition to previously reported sexual dimorphism in the medial temporal lobe, we found more neurons in the occipital lobe of men, higher neuronal density in women's frontal lobe, but no sex differences in the number and density of cells in the other lobes and the whole neocortex. On average, the neocortex has ~10.2 billion neurons, 34% in the frontal lobe and the remaining 66% uniformly distributed among the other 3 lobes. Along typical aging, there is a loss of non-neuronal cells in the frontal lobe and the preservation of the number of neurons in the cortex. Our study made possible to determine the different degrees of modulation that sex and age evoke on cortical cellularity.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
By fostering bonding (Mehr et al.; Savage et al.), music illustrates marvelously its ability to induce emotional experience. But, music can induce emotion more generally as well. To help explain how music fosters bonding and induces other emotions, I propose that music derives this power from the evolution of what I term “gestural messaging.”
This paper will present a survey of the views of Sacks, Ramachandran, Goldberg, and Gazzaniga on the interrelated concepts of mind and self as presented in the reading required for the course. Each author has put forth his or her own characterization of these concepts and each has presented a specific emphasis on the relationship of these to the larger question of the nature of consciousness. Each concept will be taken up in turn and then related to consciousness. Finally, their respective views of consciousness will be critically discussed as with an emphasis on some of the issues concerning the ongoing project of defining what consciousness is and the role of mind and self in its manifestation.
Experimental data and theoretical work on the inheritance of handedness and cerebral dominance are reviewed. A two-gene, four-allele model, one locus pertaining to left or right hemispheric dominance and the other to contralateral or ipsilateral hand control relative to the dominant hemisphere, is constructed. It is in excellent agreement with all quantitative information regarding this problem. Refinements designed to explain relevant qualitative facts are proposed and discussed.
[Introduction] Until a few years ago, prevailing views regarding the syndrome of the corpus callosum in man were based very largely on the studies of Akelaitis and his co-workers (Akelaitis et al. 1942; Akelaitis 1944). Using a wide variety of tests Akelaitis examined a series of more than two dozen patients with partial and complete surgical sections of the corpus callosum and anterior commissure and was unable to find any consistent neurological or psychological dysfunctions that could be reliably attributed to the commissural sections. Symptoms such as unilateral astereognosis, alexia, agraphia, ideo-motor apraxia (Sweet 1941), as well as apathy, amnesia, personality changes and related effects, that earlier had been ascribed to callosal lesions (Alpers and Grant 1931) seemed accordingly to be more properly explained in terms of the extracallosal cerebral damage that commonly accompanies lesions in the commissures. These Akelaitis reports in combination with confirmatory observations on absence of symptoms after callosum section in animals established the general doctrine of the 1940's and 1950's in which it was believed that behavioral deficits seen in connection with callosal lesions are best ascribed to associated brain damage (Bremer et al. 1956). Meanwhile, the discrepancy between the enormous size and strategic position of the corpus callosum on the one hand and the observed lack of any important functional disturbance following its complete surgical section on the other remained during this period one of the more puzzling enigmas of neurology.
The central concepts concerning consciousness that I shall try to defend have already been presented in some detail (Sperry, 1952, 1964, 1965). Accordingly, I shall review them only in brief outline, devoting the bulk of the discussion to various peripheral aspects and implications that previously have had less emphasis. At the outset let me make it clear that when I refer to consciousness I mean that kind of experience that is lost when one faints or sinks into a coma. It is the subjective experience that is lacking during dreamless sleep, that may be obliterated by a blow on the head, by anoxia, or by pressure on the inner walls of the third ventricle during brain surgery. On the positive side we can include as conscious events the various sensations elicitable by a local electric current applied to the unanesthetized brain, or the pain of a phantom amputated limb, as well as most of our waking subjective experience, including self-consciousness.
The split brain behaves in many respects like two separate brains, providing new research possibilities.
I have chosen the expression “conscious experience’’ in preference to the simple term consciousness in order to stress the experienced character of consciousness in all its aspects. I prefer this expression to the term experienced integration or EI that was employed by Fessard [1954] in his distinguished contribution to the symposium Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness. Nevertheless, “experienced integration” has the advantage of stressing the integrative character of brain action in the synthesis of conscious experiences from the most diverse sensory inputs. Fessard builds his contribution around the answers to three fundamental questions: “What neuronal activity is most likely to correspond to the existence of EI? How can we conceive of the integrative process that transforms an assembly of separately active neurone pools in the brain into a unified pattern? Where are all these processes likely to take place?” And much of our discussion at this symposium will relate to these three questions.
Discusses 3 major research findings from recent laboratory work which seem to have relevance for social change: (a) The theory that the plasticity of the brain is almost limitless and that neural circuits are interchangeable is no longer valid. Behavior is determined by genetic and other factors, and the brain has a high degree of innate individuality. (b) Our educational system, and society in general, discriminates against the right, or minor, hemisphere of the brain which is nonverbal and nonmathematical and has its own perceptual, mechanical and spatial mode of apprehension and reasoning, in favor of the left, or major, hemisphere which performs with computer-like logic. (c) There is a revised interpretation of consciousness which no longer sees the human mind in materialistic and behavioristic terms but as part of the causal system of human decision making. This changing concept of the mind brings value systems back into the domain of science and gives it a vital role in man's choice of social priorities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Two patients with cerebral commissurotomy were tested with visual input lateralized to left or right half of the visual field by an opaque hemifield screen set in the focal plane of an optical system mounted on a scleral contact lens which allowed prolonged exposure and ocular scanning of complex visual arrays. Key personal and affect-laden stimuli along with items for assessing general social knowledgability were presented among neutral unknowns in visual arrays with 4–9 choices. Selective manual and associated emotional responses obtained from the minor hemisphere to pictures of subject's self, relatives, pets and belongings, and of public, historical and religious figures and personalities from the entertainment world revealed a characteristic social, political, personal and self-awareness comparable roughly to that of the major hemisphere of the same subject.
A 54-item cross-modal visuo-tactile test involving geometrical discriminations in Euclidean, affine, projective and topological space (plane and 3-dimensional) was administered to 7 subjects with commissurotomy, 2 with hemispherectomy, 1 with agenesis of corpus callosum, and to 5 normal controls. Using blind manual stereognosis subjects selected one of a choice of three shapes, screened from sight, that best fitted a set of five different geometrical forms presented together on a panel in free vision. An intuitive apprehension of geometrical relations was involved that did not require formal training in geometry. Findings support a consistent minor hemisphere superiority and disclose orderly differences in left hemisphere capabilities correlated with the different types of geometry.
Unilateral scores of two commissurotomy and three (one left and two right) hemispherectomy patients were obtained on standardized auditory language comprehension tests which use pointing responses to a pictorial array. Unilateral performance by the commissurotomy patients was achieved by restricting the pictorial array to one visual half field, using a novel contact lens system which permits ocular scanning of the lateralized stimulus and self-monitoring of task performance. Using the Peabody and Ammons Picture Vocabulary Tests, the auditory vocabulary in the disconnected or isolated right hemispheres was found to be equivalent to that of normal subjects of ages 8:1 to 16:3 with a mean of 11:7 (eleven years and 7 months old). At the same time, standardized aphasia tests showed that the picture vocabulary in the right hemispheres is similar to that of a heterogeneous population of aphasics, even though the right hemispheres did not behave quite like any classical aphasic diagnostic group. No significant differences were found between right hemisphere comprehension of object vs. action names. Results indicated that vocabulary as a function of word frequency followed the same pattern in the right and left hemisphere although the right hemisphere was consistently lower. This parallel between the two hemispheres was conjectured to reflect some similar or even shared lexical structures in the two hemispheres. Together with other data on the performance of the right hemisphere on the Token Test (Zaidel, 1976), the results suggest a complex model of the development of language laterality in the brain, in which some, but not all, auditory language functions continue to develop in the right hemisphere past what is generally regarded as the critical period for language acquistion. In general, auditory language comprehension is better characterized as that of an "average aphasic" than that of a child of a specific age.
Morphological asymmetry of the frontal operculum and temporal planum becomes measurable at the 29th week of gestation. There is evidence of subsequent differential development of the planum in favor of the left, with the left planum larger than the right. While both the frontal operculum and left planum were always present, the right planum ranged in size from absent (10%)to larger than the left (about 10%). Females predominated (P less than .05) in the latter group. The findings suggest that (1) a higher percentage of persons may have right-sided cerebral representation for speech than has been assumed previously; (2) a predetermined morphological asymmetry contributes to establishing the ultimate pattern of cerebral speech representation following an early insult to a predisposed hemisphere; and (3) it is necessary to scrutinize clinical material for the differential organization of hemispheric development between sexes.
A new technique is described for occluding selective regions of the visual field while permitting ocular scanning. The method has been applied in the present case to lateralizing complex stimuli to one visual half field of patients whose cerebral hemispheres have been disconnected. Other possible applications with normal subjects include lateralizing complex visual input and simulating scotomas or tunnel vision.The subject scans a reduced stimulus image close to his eye through a short focus collimator attached to a scleral contact lens. The image of an occluding screen which is supported at the focal plane of the collimator then follows the subject's eye movements faithfully while superimposed on the unstabilized stimulus image.
The ability to discriminate the meaning of spoken statements varying in syntactic form was compared in infantile hemiplegics after right or left hemidecortication. Right hemidecorticates, relative to the left operated group matched for Verbal IQ, showed superior comprehension of passive negative, but equivalent comprehension of active affirmative and active negative, sentences. After perinatal cerebral pathology and subsequent decortication, syntactic skills are not mediated equivalently by left and right remaining hemispheres.
Frequencies of three cerebral dominance genotypes who show right or left ear superiority on a verbal dichotic listening test and left or right field superiority on a tachistoscopic lateral field test of perceptual dominance are deduced. A hypothesis is offered relating direction of cerebral dominance, as defined by genotype, to degree of lateral specialization and perceptual ability, and a theoretical distribution of subjects according to spatial-perceptual ability and lateralization is derived. This distribution corresponds almost exactly with empirical data, thus confirming the proposed correlation between lateralization and spatial-perceptual capacity.
Consciousness and the cerebral hemispheres In Hemisphere Function of the Human Brain
- R W Serry
SERRY, R. W. Consciousness and the cerebral hemispheres. In Hemisphere Function of the Human Brain, S. DIMOND and J. BEAUMONT (Editors). Paul Elek, London, 1974.
Self-recognition in primates
- Gallup
GALLUP, G. G. Self-recognition in primates. Am. Psycho/. 32, 329-338, 1977.
Information processing and higher psychological functions in the disconnected hemispheres of human commissurotomy patients
- Levy
LEVY, J. Information processing and higher psychological functions in the disconnected hemispheres of human commissurotomy patients. Ph.D thesis, California Institute of Technology, 1969.
Mind, brain and humanist values In New Views of the Nature of Man
- R W Sperry
SPERRY, R. W. Mind, brain and humanist values. In New Views of the Nature of Man, J. R. PLATT (Editor), pp. 71-92. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1965.
Conscious, mind and self
- Dewitt
Brain mechanisms in behavior
- Sperry
Consciousness and the cerebral hemispheres
- Serry