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Child Development, January/February 2000, Volume 71, Number 1, Pages 107Ð 118
An Integrated Model of Emotion Processes and Cognition
in Social Information Processing
Elizabeth A. Lemerise and William F. Arsenio
Literature on the contributions of social cognitive and emotion processes to childrenÕs social competence is
reviewed and interpreted in the context of an integrated model of emotion processes and cognition in social
information processing. Neurophysiological and functional evidence for the centrality of emotion processes in
personalÐsocial decision making is reviewed. Crick and DodgeÕs model is presented as a cognitive model of so-
cial decision making, and a revised model is proposed into which emotion processes are integrated. Hypothe-
ses derived from the proposed model are described.
INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have witnessed rapid progress
in research and theory regarding the contributions of
social information processing (e.g., Crick & Dodge,
1994; Dodge, 1986) and emotionality and regulation
(e.g., Eisenberg & Fabes, 1992; Eisenberg et al., 1997;
Hubbard & Coie, 1994; Saarni, 1999) to childrenÕs so-
cial competence. Although both research traditions
share a focus on social competence, integration across
the domains of social information processing and
emotionality and regulation has been minimal. We
argue here that (1) it is vitally important for develop-
mental psychologists to take a broader view of chil-
drenÕs social and cognitive development, and (2) an
essential aspect of this broader view involves consid-
ering, both theoretically and empirically, how emo-
tional and cognitive processes can be integrated in
models of social competence.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
There is a long-standing theoretical interest in under-
standing the multiple ways affect and cognition inter-
act. Cognitive psychologists have been interested in
the critical role of emotions in prioritizing and weight-
ing multiple goals and objectives in real-time human
information processing (e.g., Simon, 1967). Attach-
ment and emotion researchers have been interested in
working models (e.g., Bowlby, 1988; Bretherton, Ridge-
way, & Cassidy, 1990) and emotionÐ event represen-
tations (e.g., Arsenio & Lover, 1995) of affectively
charged relationships and events. Despite this inter-
est, and a journal devoted to the topic (
Cognition and
Emotion
), progress has been slower than expected.
An early reßection of the interest and difÞculties in
integrating emotion and cognition was PiagetÕs (1981)
Intelligence and Affectivity.
Piaget described affect and
cognition as being indissociably linked (Òtwo sides of
the same coin,Ó Cowan, 1981, p. xiv), where affect
plays a role Ò. . . like gasoline, which activates the
motor of an automobile but does not modify its struc-
tureÓ (Piaget, 1981, p. 5). Although this book sparked
considerable interest (Bearison & Zimiles, 1986; Brown,
1996; Cowan, 1981), the analogy of affect as gasoline
and intelligence as the motor of human functioning
reßects a key limitation found in various attempts to
include emotion within cognitive models of develop-
ment. For example, both Piaget (1981) and Crick and
Dodge (1994) acknowledge the central importance of
emotion, but provide a detailed and elaborated de-
scription of cognition without providing a compara-
bly differentiated account of emotions.
In this paper, we deÞne the domain of emotion
broadly to include processes that vary in duration
from brießy experienced feelings resulting from con-
scious or unconscious appraisal to more enduring
affective styles (see, e.g., Ekman & Davidson, 1994;
Oatley & Jenkins, 1996). Therefore, we deliberately
use the term
emotion processes.
Delineating the differ-
ence between emotion and cognition is a difÞcult task
for which there is little consensus. To some extent,
whether one sees emotion and cognition as separate
or as one process depends on how broadly cognition
is deÞned (Dodge, 1991; Ekman & Davidson, 1994).
Moreover, both emotion and cognitive processes de-
velop, and the nature of their relations changes (e.g.,
Denham, 1998; Saarni, 1999).
At a very general level, both emotion and cogni-
tion are types of information processing, but the func-
tions they serve are distinct. Izard (1994, p. 204) stated
ÒEmotion is about motivation, cognition about knowl-
edge.Ó This view is shared by functionalist theorists,
neurophysiologists, and some cognitive theorists who
see the function of emotion as alerting individuals to
© 2000 by the Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.
All rights reserved. 0009-3920/2000/7101-0013
108 Child Development
important features of the environment and providing
direction for cognitive processes and behavior in ways
that are mostly adaptive (e.g., Campos, Mumme, Ker-
moian, & Campos, 1994; Damasio, 1994; Oatley & Jen-
kins, 1996). Recent neurophysiological evidence (e.g.,
LeDoux, 1995) suggests that emotion processes and
cognitive processes inßuence one another, making it
difÞcult to isolate cases of pure emotion or pure cog-
nition,
except
where brain damage has severed this
connection (e.g., Damasio, 1994, and see below). We
argue that emotion processes serve motivational, com-
municative, and regulatory functions within and be-
tween individuals that are distinct from the contribu-
tions of cognitive processes (attention, learning,
memory, logic) to social competence. Regardless of
how broadly or narrowly cognition is deÞned, in our
view the inclusion of emotion processes in models of
personalÐsocial decision making will expand their
explanatory power.
Our primary goal is to offer a model of social infor-
mation processing that (1) brings together affective
and cognitive contributions without distorting or min-
imizing the literatures from which these contributions
are drawn, and (2) is theoretically coherent enough to
spur empirical examination of many of these proposed
connections. To accomplish this goal, three basic top-
ics will be covered. First, a brief overview is presented
of Crick and DodgeÕs (1994) information processing
model of social competence. The model was chosen
both because it is well articulated and has received
considerable empirical support, and because Crick
and Dodge themselves acknowledge the need to con-
sider emotion-related processes more fully. Next,
there is a brief summary of the types of emotion pro-
cesses that are relevant to social competence and are
likely to be inßuential in social information process-
ing. The Þnal section illustrates the speciÞc ways
emotion processes can be integrated into a social in-
formation processing model.
SOCIAL INFORMATION PROCESSING
A basic premise of social information processing (and
of other social cognitive models, e.g., Piaget 1932/1965;
Turiel, 1998) is that childrenÕs understanding and in-
terpretation of situations inßuences their related be-
haviors. Social information processing theory offers a
detailed model of how children process and interpret
cues in a social situation and arrive at a decision that
is more or less competent (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Dodge,
1986). Crick and Dodge assume children enter a social
situation with past experiences and biologically de-
termined capabilities which they may access during
the encounter. The processing steps they describe are
hypothesized to occur relatively rapidly and in par-
allel, with numerous feedback loops (see Figure 1),
but for clarity, we describe them sequentially (see
Crick & Dodge, 1994; Dodge, 1986, 1991, for more
details).
Brießy, social information processing begins when
the child attends to, encodes, and interprets social
cues (steps one and two in the model). Imagine a
child who gets hit by a ball while walking across the
playground. The child must Þgure out what hap-
pened (attention, encoding) and why it happened (in-
terpretation: an accident or on purpose?). In the third
step of the model, the childÕs goals for the situation
are clariÞed. Possible goals might be to maintain
friendly relations with classmates, or to show others
you wonÕt tolerate this intrusion of your personal
space. In steps four and Þve of the model, possible re-
sponses to the situation are generated and evaluated
in terms of anticipated outcomes, relations to goal(s),
and self-efÞcacy for performing the response. The
child may consider retaliating in kind, but rejects that
alternative because of a fear the conßict will escalate
or a recognition that he/she canÕt throw the ball
hard enough. Finally, the most positively evaluated
response with respect to goals, anticipated out-
comes, and self-efÞcacy is selected and behaviorally
enacted (Crick & Dodge, 1994).
Although Crick and Dodge explicitly assert that
emotion is an important component of social infor-
mation processing, they also acknowledge that emo-
tionÕs role is not well articulated in their model. In
what follows, we describe the kinds of emotion pro-
cesses that need to be integrated into cognitive mod-
els of behavior. Finally, we illustrate how emotion
processes can be integrated into Crick and DodgeÕs
(1994) model.
EMOTION PROCESSES
Some aspects of emotional functioning apply more
generally, whereas others vary across individuals. Ac-
cordingly, we begin by describing normative emotion
processes and then consider individual variations.
Normative Aspects of Emotions
Functionalist theories.
Functionalist theories of emo-
tion emphasize the biologically adaptive role of
emotions in person/environment transactions (Laz-
arus, 1991; Malatesta, 1990). Although there are impor-
tant differences in various versions of these theories
(Saarni, Mumme, & Campos, 1998), many emphasize
both the innate communicative and motivational as-
pects of emotion. Some theories (Ekman 1984, 1993;
Lemerise and Arsenio 109
Izard, 1977, 1991; Plutchik, 1980) propose a limited
number of discrete emotions that are associated with
more or less universal emotion expressions and re-
lated recognition abilities. These emotions are seen as
serving a vital interpsychological function by provid-
ing information about intended or likely behaviors
and underlying mental states of others, although the
emergence of emotion display rules (Saarni, 1999)
makes these links less transparent.
Emotions also are seen as having an intrapsycho-
logical function of organizing and motivating behav-
iors and cognition to facilitate adaptive goal-directed
behaviors. Given the numerous reviews available on
such theories (e.g., Magai & McFadden, 1995; Mala-
Figure 1 Crick and DodgeÕs social information processing model of childrenÕs social adjustment. Note: From ÒA review and re-
formulation of social-information-processing mechanisms of childrenÕs social adjustment,Ó by N. R. Crick & K. A. Dodge (1994),
Psychological Bulletin, 115, p. 74. Copyright 1994 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission.
110 Child Development
testa, 1990; Saarni et al., 1998), little more will be said
other than although there is a biologically based sub-
strate of adaptive emotional functioning, learning,
experience, and the active socialization of emotions
(Denham, 1998) all signiÞcantly inßuence this biolog-
ical substrate (Malatesta, 1990). Similarly, emotions
may be adaptive in general, but biological and social
stressors can distort emotional functioning, resulting
in psychopathology and the disruptive picture of emo-
tions typically emphasized in clinical psychology
(Malatesta & Wilson, 1988; Plutchik, 1993).
Neurophysiology and functionalist theories.
The func-
tionalist focus on the adaptive role of emotions is re-
ceiving increasing attention and support from neuro-
physiologists. Work by LeDoux (1993, 1995) and others
(e.g., Kandel & Kupferman, 1995) has documented
the complex interconnections between parts of the brain
that address emotional responsiveness and a variety
of cognitive functions. The Damasios, in particular,
have documented how disruptions in the connections
between emotional and rational substrates of the brain
can disrupt competent human functioning (Damasio,
1994; Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda, & Da-
masio, 1994). They acknowledge that emotions can
sometimes disrupt reason but also note that ÒReduc-
tion in emotion may constitute an equally important
source of irrational behaviorÓ (Damasio, 1994, p. 53).
The Damasios have examined the consequences
for decision making of damage to ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex that leaves patients with motor and
cognitive functions intact but with impaired emo-
tional functioning. Unlike participants with no brain
damage and those with other kinds of brain damage,
when patients with prefrontal lesions were shown
disturbing images, they showed no skin conductance
response. These patients could report the content of
the slides and were aware of the emotional signiÞ-
cance of the images, but they did not
feel
the emotions
they
knew
they should (Damasio, 1994; Damasio,
Tranel, & Damasio, 1991). The practical effects of this
deÞcit are seen most clearly for decision making where
outcomes are uncertain or for which there is no clear
correct answer (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Ander-
son, 1994; Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1993).
In one telling example, a patient who was asked to
choose between two dates for his next appointment
spent over thirty minutes calmly listing pros and cons
for each date until it was suggested that he come on
the second date (Damasio, 1994).
Emotional prioritizing and somatic markers.
A criti-
cal issue in the interaction of affect and cognition in-
volves how the nearly unlimited considerations that
enter into any choice are reduced to a manageable
number. Extrapolating from SimonÕs (1967) discus-
sion, Damasio (1994), Brown (1996), Oatley and Jen-
kins (1996), and others have argued that emotions not
only help to prioritize among different plans and op-
tions; they also help to narrow the search space dur-
ing Òon-lineÓ information processing. In a summary
of PughÕs (1977) inßuential book, Brown (1996, p.
154) noted that Òrigorously logical decisions are im-
possible in most of the situations adapting organ-
isms face. . . . affectivity provides a method for in-
venting provisional or Ôgood enoughÕ knowledge
structures.Ó
A mechanism for emotional prioritizing is the for-
mation of somatic markers (Damasio, 1994). Brießy,
when a negative outcome becomes linked with a spe-
ciÞc behavior or cognition, a negative somatic or gut
feeling is experienced which Ò. . . protects you against
future losses, . . . and then allows you
to choose from
fewer alternatives
Ó (Damasio, 1994, p. 173). Once the
Þeld of alternatives has been narrowed, the individ-
ual can still use higher-level cognitive processes, but
with greater efÞciency. Damasio acknowledges that
somatic markers are a form of bias that can contribute
to maladaptive behavior (see below), but for the most
part, somatic markers support adaptive behavior.
Secondary emotions/affect-event links.
Damasio
(1994) made an important distinction between primary
and secondary emotions. Primary emotions are innate,
preorganized, and relatively inßexible responses to
certain combinations of stimuli. They are the sorts of
emotions described by functionalists where certain
classes of events (e.g., loss of a loved one, being at-
tacked by a wild animal) are likely to be linked with
speciÞc emotions and their associated motivational
tendencies. Although these primary emotions pro-
vide a quick and efÞcient set of responses, Òthe next
step is the
feeling of emotion
in connection to the object
that excited itÓ (i.e., secondary emotion, Damasio, 1994,
p. 132; see also Piaget, 1981).
Awareness of the connections between object X and
certain emotions serves several adaptive purposes
(Damasio, 1994). For example, knowing about the con-
nection between seeing a large animal running nearby
and fear allows one to plan ahead (ÒWhere and when
did I see it?Ó), and to make more Þne-tuned discrimi-
nations (ÒDoes it run toward me or away?Ó). Thus,
the more automatic eventÐemotion connections can
be loosened somewhat, and conscious understanding
of eventÐemotion links provides adaptive behavioral
ßexibility. Damasio sees experience as important in
Þne-tuning secondary emotions, with adaptive func-
tioning the product of a normal brain and a normal
set of experiences. Brain damage and/or experience
that inßuences secondary emotions, however, can
produce maladaptive functioning.
Lemerise and Arsenio 111
Individual Variations in Emotional Functioning
Although functionalists stress the normative, adap-
tive role emotions serve, there is a growing interest in
individual variations in affective systems (Thompson,
1994). Just as psychologists have realized that basic
similarities and constraints on human cognition do
not preclude meaningful individual differences in
cognitive functioning, emotion theorists have begun
to expand their understanding of emotions to include
individual differences. Two somewhat separable lines
of research focus on temperament/emotionality and
the regulation of emotions.
Temperament/emotionality.
Rothbart and Bates (1998,
p. 109) deÞne temperament as Òconstitutionally based
individual differences in emotional, motor, and atten-
tional reactivity and self-regulation. . . . Reactive pa-
rameters of temperament can be measured in terms
of the onset, duration, and intensity of expression
of affective reaction. . . . variability in arousability,
and distress to overstimulation, activity and atten-
tion.Ó Although temperament includes more than
emotions, variations in emotionality, which are at least
partially biologically based, are central to modern
conceptualizations of temperament.
Eisenberg and colleagues have conducted a sys-
tematic program of research focusing on the contribu-
tions of emotionality and emotion regulation to social
competence. They deÞne emotionality as Òstable indi-
vidual differences in the typical intensity with which
individuals experience their emotions . . . and in
threshold to relatively intense levels of emotional re-
spondingÓ (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1992, p. 122) and in-
clude both positive and negative emotionality in this
temperament-based deÞnition. Eisenberg and col-
leagues developed methods to measure emotionality
and found individual differences to be reasonably
stable from preschool to elementary school (Eisenberg
et al., 1997). EmotionalityÕs impact on social function-
ing, however, depends on skill at regulating emotion.
Emotion regulation.
Along with the focus on tem-
peramental aspects of emotionality, there has been
much interest in childrenÕs abilities to regulate emo-
tions, that is, to control, modify, and manage aspects
of their emotional reactivity and expressivity (e.g.,
Eisenberg & Fabes, 1992; Thompson, 1990, 1994). It
should be noted that children who vary in tempera-
ment face quite different tasks in regulating their
emotions (Thompson, 1990, 1994). A child with a pos-
itive, even-tempered disposition has a very different
set of regulatory tasks than one prone to intense,
long-lasting negative emotions.
Although the more innate aspects of emotionality
clearly interact with socialization patterns in ways
that may even alter the underlying physiology of
emotional reactivity (Gottman, Katz, & Hooven, 1997),
it seems important to distinguish between the more
innate aspects of emotionality and attempts to manage/
regulate whatever those biological substrates provide.
For example, in their extensive, ongoing research on
childrenÕs social and emotional competence, Eisen-
berg and colleagues include separate assessments of
emotionality and emotion regulation. Emotions may
be regulated with attentional mechanisms, through
approach or avoidance, or by cognitive or behavioral
coping (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1992). Eisenberg and col-
leagues found that a combination of regulatory abili-
ties and low emotionality predicted social compe-
tence concurrently and longitudinally (e.g., Eisenberg,
Fabes, Nyman, Bernzweig, & Pinuelas, 1994; Eisen-
berg et al., 1997). High emotionality combined with
poor regulation skills predicted poorer social func-
tioning and problem behaviors, whereas children
with high emotionality and good regulation skills
were
not
at risk for behavior problems (Eisenberg et
al., 1996).
Mood state/background emotions.
Mood states (Clark &
Isen, 1981) or background emotions (Damasio, 1994)
also are likely to inßuence social information process-
ing. There is an extensive social psychology literature
on how experimentally induced moods inßuence a
wide variety of behaviors and cognitions (e.g., Berko-
witz, 1990; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; Moore,
Underwood, & Rosenhan, 1984). More recently, Lemer-
ise, Harper, Caverly, and Hobgood (1998) found that
induced moods inßuence childrenÕs goals for hypo-
thetical provocation situations.
Little is known about how or whether ongoing
emotions or moods serve an adaptive role or whether
they are ÒunintendedÓ consequences of the larger
functional organization of human emotions. Another
unresolved issue is whether ongoing emotions act as
short-term inßuences or in more long-term, trait-like
ways (e.g., Arsenio, Cooperman, & Lover, in press; Ar-
senio & Lover, 1997; Denham, 1986; Denham, McKin-
ley, Couchoud, & Holt, 1990). Regardless of their pre-
sumed functions or duration, it is clear that more
empirical attention should be directed to the inßuence
of ongoing emotions on social information processing.
INTEGRATING EMOTION PROCESSES
AND SOCIAL INFORMATION PROCESSING
An important way in which thinking about people is
different from thinking about things is that social in-
teraction is likely to be associated with a variety of
strong emotions (Hoffman, 1981). The peer entry and
provocation situations examined by social informa-
112 Child Development
tion processing theory (e.g., being excluded from play
or teased in front of others) are especially likely to be
emotionally arousing for children. Moreover, in these
situations, children are unlikely to know all relevant
information which would assist problem solving, and
the outcomes of these situations are uncertain. Despite
these limitations, the child still needs to do something.
Emotion theorists have argued that conditions of
uncertainty and incomplete knowledge are the very
contexts in which emotion processes can play an adap-
tive (or maladaptive) role by reducing information
processing demands so the individual can arrive at
some course of action (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Oatley &
Jenkins, 1996). Crick and Dodge (1994) also acknowl-
edge that emotion processes play important roles in
social information processing, but suggest that the
cognitive nature of their model may prevent a full ex-
amination of the contribution of emotion. We argue
that it is possible to integrate emotion processes into
Crick and DodgeÕs model (see Figure 2), and the inte-
gration of emotion and social information processing
expands the modelÕs explanatory power.
We agree that the child enters a given social situa-
tion with a combination of Òbiologically limited capa-
bilities and a database of memories of past experi-
encesÓ (Crick & Dodge, 1994, p. 76), and that selective
attention, perception, memory, and processing speed
set limits on what children notice and process about a
situation. In addition, we suggest that emotion pro-
cesses are part of these givens. An important compo-
nent of the childÕs biological predispositions is his/
her emotion style or emotionality (Eisenberg & Fabes,
1992; Rothbart & Derryberry, 1981). Children vary in
the intensity with which they experience and express
emotions and in their skills for regulating emotions.
These individual differences in emotionality and reg-
ulatory abilities are related to social competence (e.g.,
Eisenberg et al., 1997). We hypothesize that emotion-
ality and regulatory ability will affect both processing
of social (and emotional) information and decision
making in challenging social situations (see Figure 2).
In Crick and DodgeÕs (1994) model of social infor-
mation processing, childrenÕs database includes a mem-
ory store of acquired rules, social knowledge, and social
schemas. Based on current models of the neurophys-
iology of emotion and cognition (Damasio, 1994;
LeDoux, 1995), we argue that the childÕs representa-
tions of past experience include affective as well as cog-
nitive components, similar to what Arsenio and Lover
(1995, p. 90) termed ÒaffectÐevent linksÓ (see Figure 2).
Thus, childrenÕs social knowledge can be cued by events
and/or by emotion cues, and events may cue emotions.
Finally, children enter a social situation with a gen-
eral level of physiological arousal and/or mood (see
Figure 2) which may not necessarily be related to that
situation. For example, feelings of anxiety in a peer
entry situation may be related to the terrible Þght your
parents had this morning
or
to past experiences of re-
buff by peers. Children also differ in their skill at reg-
ulating arousal or mood (Eisenberg et al., 1997). Be-
cause children who are poor regulators have a higher
risk for maladjustment (Eisenberg et al., 1996), we
hypothesize that poor regulators also will show social
information processing deÞcits.
Encoding and Interpreting Cues
The Þrst two steps of the Crick and Dodge (1994)
model involve encoding and interpreting social cues.
Crick and Dodge point out that oneÕs own internal
emotion cues must be encoded and interpreted along
with other situational cues. They also suggest that the
process of encoding and interpreting cues can result
in a change in the discrete emotion experienced or in
the intensity of a pre-existing emotion (see Crick &
Ladd, 1993).
We would add that othersÕ affective cues are an im-
portant source of information and must be encoded
and interpreted (Saarni, 1999). For example, provoca-
teursÕ anger cues in the context of ambiguous provo-
cation facilitate hostile attributions (Lemerise, Gregory,
Leitner, & Hobgood, 1999; see also Dodge & Somberg,
1987). Functionalist theories of emotion stress the mu-
tual regulatory function of affective signals (Magai &
McFadden, 1995). OneÕs own and othersÕ affective
signals provide ongoing information about how the
encounter is proceeding, allowing for sensitive ad-
justments to behavior. The mutual regulatory func-
tion of affective signals may work especially well
with familiar, well-liked interaction partners (at Þrst
parents, and later friends) whose signals may be easier
to read and interpret and with whom the child is
more likely to feel empathy (Hoffman, 1981; Parker &
Gottman, 1989). The nature of emotional ties with an
interaction partner also may inßuence encoding and
interpretation. Being teased by a friend is quite differ-
ent from being teased by the class bully. Children
with conduct disorder have difÞculty reading their
own and othersÕ affective signals and have deÞcits
in their expressive behavior (Casey, 1996; Casey &
Schlosser, 1994) and in empathy (Cohen & Strayer,
1996). These deÞcits are thought to contribute to be-
havior problems.
Finally, encoding and interpretation can be inßu-
enced by mood, level of arousal, or by discrete emo-
tions (whether pre-existing or the result of appraisal).
Mood, emotions, and/or arousal can affect what is
noticed about a social encounter and make the recol-
Lemerise and Arsenio 113
lection of mood-congruent information more likely,
thus inßuencing interpretation of social cues. More-
over, the effects of a happy mood may be quite dis-
tinct from those of a sad or angry mood (Oatley &
Jenkins, 1996). The intensity with which children ex-
perience emotions and their skill at regulating emo-
tion also will inßuence what is noticed and the mean-
ing attributed to the situation.
Figure 2 An integrated model of emotion processes and cognition in social information processing. Items marked with Þlled circles
are from Crick and DodgeÕs model; those marked with Þlled diamonds represent emotion processes added to the model. Note: From
ÒA review and reformulation of social-information-processing mechanisms of childrenÕs social adjustment,Ó N. R. Crick & K. A.
Dodge, Psychological Bulletin, 115, p. 74. Copyright 1994 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission.
114 Child Development
ClariÞcation of Goals
Crick and Dodge (1994) consider the role of emotion
processes in a more explicit fashion for step 3 of their
model, clariÞcation of goals. They deÞne goals as
Òfocused arousal states that function toward produc-
ing (or wanting to produce) particular outcomesÓ
(p. 87). Goals are conceptualized as either internal
(maintaining or regulating emotion) or external (e.g.,
instrumental goals, such as getting the swing, or so-
cial relational goals, like getting another to play with
you). According to Crick and Dodge, emotions can
act to energize particular goals. For example, being in
an angry mood makes it more likely that a child
will focus on instrumental goals (Lemerise et al.,
1998), whereas children in positive moods may
choose goals that maintain their pleasant moods. Fi-
nally, Crick and Dodge assert that goal selection and/
or attainment may modify mood or emotion.
We suggest that peersÕ affective cues also can inßu-
ence childrenÕs goals. Positive affective signals may
promote afÞliative goals, whereas negative cues
may discourage afÞliation (Sroufe, Schork, Motti,
Lawroski, & LaFreniere, 1984). Moreover, the intensity
with which children experience emotions and their ef-
Þcacy for regulating emotions will inßuence the types
of goals pursued in social encounters (Eisenberg &
Fabes, 1992; Eisenberg et al., 1994; Saarni, 1999). Chil-
dren who are overwhelmed by their own and/or
othersÕ emotions may choose avoidant or hostile goals
to reduce their own arousal. Children with deÞcits in
affective cue detection and empathy may Þnd it easier
to pursue goals that are destructive to relationships
because they literally do not Òfeel other childrenÕs
painÓ (Cohen & Strayer, 1996). Poor regulatory abili-
ties may interfere with assessing the situation from
different cognitive and affective perspectives and
prevent a ßexible approach to goal selection which
takes into account contextual factors (Saarni, 1999). In-
stead, childrenÕs goals may be rigid because they re-
sult from Òpreemptive processingÓ (Costanzo & Dix,
1983; Crick & Dodge, 1994).
Finally, the nature of the emotional ties between a
child and others involved in an encounter may bias
goal selection. Social relational goals may be facili-
tated by friendship ties, whereas less positive rela-
tionships elicit quite different goals (e.g., avoidance,
revenge). Social relational goals are both cognitively
and emotionally more complex because they require
consideration and coordination of multiple cogni-
tive and affective perspectives. Friendship ties may
motivate children to engage in this more effortful
processing, partly because of the negative emotional
consequences associated with hurting a friend and
partly because of the desire to maintain enjoyable
play activities (Arsenio & Lover, 1995; Parker &
Gottman, 1989).
Response Generation, Evaluation, and Decision
In steps 4 and 5 of the Crick and Dodge model,
children access possible responses to the situation
and evaluate these in terms of likely outcomes, goals,
and self-efÞcacy for performing the response; the most
positively evaluated response with respect to the childÕs
goals is selected. They also suggest that childrenÕs ac-
cessing of responses could be inßuenced by an emo-
tion they are experiencing, and that accessing partic-
ular responses may modify an emotion. Both of these
possibilities are consistent with the idea that repre-
sentations of past experiences include an affective
component (e.g., Damasio, 1994). Thus, feeling angry,
frightened, or happy may cue different response types.
Given that representations of these responses include
an affective component, retrieval of particular strate-
gies should cue certain emotions. For example, if ex-
periences of avoidance are associated with a reduction
in anxiety, accessing avoidant responses may moderate
feelings of fear.
Other emotion processes that can inßuence access-
ing and evaluation of responses are the intensity with
which emotions are experienced and the capacity to
regulate emotion. Children who experience strong
emotions may be too overwhelmed and self-focused
to generate a variety of responses and evaluate them
from all partiesÕ perspectives. Such children may be
likely to engage in Òpreemptive processingÓ (Crick &
Dodge, 1994) which can result in a response that is
unlikely to further social interaction (e.g., running
away, angrily retaliating, or venting; see Eisenberg et
al., 1994). Skill at regulating emotions in challenging
situations makes possible the more effortful process-
ing involved in accessing and evaluating several re-
sponses. Good regulators may be more likely to con-
sider the situation from multiple cognitive and affective
perspectives which should facilitate selecting a more
competent response (Saarni, 1999).
We agree with Crick and Dodge (1994) that chil-
drenÕs expectations about the emotional consequences
of various responses constitute an important compo-
nent of the response evaluation process, and have
argued elsewhere that emotion expectations con-
tribute importantly to socio-moral reasoning and
behavior (Arsenio, 1988; Arsenio & Lover, 1995). Fi-
nally, we add that childrenÕs emotional ties (or lack
thereof) to others involved in the encounter and/or
the reputations of the other children (Perry, Willard, &
Perry, 1990) may motivate the child to engage in the
Lemerise and Arsenio 115
effortful processing involved in considering various
perspectives and response options. In other words,
a child may be more likely to consider anotherÕs re-
action if he/she cares about and wants that person
to like him/her.
Response Enactment
In the Þnal step of Crick and DodgeÕs (1994) model,
the child enacts the chosen response. Several emotion-
related processes can inßuence response enactment.
The intensity with which emotions are experienced
and the childÕs regulatory capacities can inßuence re-
sponse enactment. For example, under calm condi-
tions, even maladjusted children are well aware of
display rules for challenging situations (Underwood,
1997), but under highly arousing conditions, this
knowledge may not be put into practice (Parker &
Hubbard, 1998). The ability to ßexibly display emo-
tions appropriate to the situation requires both con-
trol over oneÕs expressivity and sensitivity to the sit-
uation from multiple perspectives (Saarni, 1999).
Moreover, the childÕs and othersÕ emotion cues pro-
vide an ongoing source of information concerning
how the encounter is proceeding, allowing the child
to make adjustments to his/her response enactment.
Children with deÞcits in reading and sending emo-
tion cues may resort to relatively rigid approaches to
situations (Casey, 1996; Casey & Schlosser, 1994; Saarni,
1999). Emotion cues also can inform the child about
the ultimate success or failure of his/her response en-
actment. Finally, emotion cues are part of the repre-
sentation of the encounter stored in the childÕs data-
base of social knowledge. Consider a situation in which
a child wants to play with a peerÕs toy. An affectively
positive offer to trade toys may be successful in that
the child not only gets the desired toy but both chil-
dren feel positive about the encounter and may even
play together. An angry demand that the peer hand
over the toy, however, may elicit anger and resistance,
with the result that the child has neither the toy nor a
playmate. In these examples, the affective cues that
were part of the childÕs enactment inßuenced the
peerÕs reaction and ultimately the outcome of the en-
counter, including associated emotions.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
A number of hypotheses can be derived from the pro-
posed model. At a general level, we hypothesize that
individual differences in emotionality and emotion
regulation can inßuence each step of social informa-
tion processing. SpeciÞcally, children who are high in
emotionality and poor at regulating emotion will show
deÞcits in social information processing (e.g., Murphy &
Eisenberg, 1997). Also, because emotions within the
person and in others function to mutually regulate
encounters, we hypothesize that manipulating these
cues can affect each social information processing
step and that the effects of different discrete emotions
may be distinct. SpeciÞcally, manipulation of emotion
or mood in the child via mood induction or situa-
tional manipulations (see Lemerise & Dodge, 2000, for
a review) will inßuence social information process-
ing. Also, manipulation of emotion cues or the nature
of emotional ties to targets (peers about whom judg-
ments are made) will inßuence social information
processing. Research on target effects on social infor-
mation processing has been especially rare (Crick &
Dodge, 1994). Given our hypothesis that emotionality
and emotion regulation skills inßuence social infor-
mation processing, we hypothesize that the above de-
scribed emotion manipulations will have a greater ef-
fect on children who are high in emotionality and
poor in regulatory abilities. In addition, we suggest
that there is a need to explore the emotion content of
childrenÕs database of knowledge about social situa-
tions (e.g., Arsenio, 1988). Recent research has shown
that childrenÕs knowledge structures predict aggres-
sive behavior (Burks, Laird, Dodge, Pettit, & Bates,
1999), but the emotion content of childrenÕs knowl-
edge structures has received little empirical attention.
Beyond these speciÞc hypotheses, we hope the
present model will encourage other systematic attempts
to integrate affect and cognition. These efforts should
prove fruitful for a fuller understanding not only of chil-
drenÕs social competence, but also of other areas in
which motivation and reasoning combine in essential
ways, including socio-moral development, academic
achievement, and developmental psychopathology.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The contributions of the authors were equal; order
of authorship was determined by a coin toss. Eliza-
beth Lemerise was supported by a Western Ken-
tucky University Faculty Summer Research Fellow-
ship during the preparation of this article. We thank
K. Barnes, J. Bilotta, P. Garner, and J. Hubbard for
assistance.
ADDRESSES AND AFFILIATIONS
Corresponding authors: Elizabeth A. Lemerise,
Department of Psychology, Western Kentucky Univer-
sity, 1 Big Red Way, Bowling Green, KY 42101; e-mail:
elizabeth.lemerise@wku.edu; or to William F. Arsenio,
Ferkauf Graduate School of Psychology, Yeshiva Uni-
116 Child Development
versity, Rousso Building, 1300 Morris Park Avenue,
Bronx, NY 10461; e-mail: warsenio@wesleyan.edu.
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