Matthew D. Hill's research while affiliated with Arkansas State University - Beebe and other places

Evidence from multivariate regression models suggests market share and demand uncertainty influence the value to shareholders of advertising expenditures. Shareholder returns to advertising are lower for firms with greater market share over the full sample period; however, this market share effect dissipates during non-recession years. Results also show higher returns to advertising for sellers with more volatile revenues. From these results we infer that low market share firms with less predictable customer demand may be better positioned to unlock the full strategic value of advertising.

This study examines the determinants of direct costs for real estate investment trust (REIT) seasoned equity offerings. These costs are not related to information asymmetries, unlike non- REIT firms. Gross spreads vary inversely with stock liquidity, price, and industry activity. Concerning REIT-specific heterogeneity, gross spreads are generally insensitive to property type and operating partnership structure. Still, the findings suggest managers can influence costs as higher fees are directly related to the use of underwriting syndicates and more reputable investment banks. Finally, a test for differences in direct costs across REIT and comparable industrials shows significantly lower direct issuance costs for REITs.

Trade credit financing has usually been assumed to be an expensive source of funds. Recent studies, however, suggested that it can be available at either low or no cost. Using an international panel of firms, we provide an empirical answer to this matter. We analyze the type of firms and financial environments that are associated with a relatively more intense use of financial credit and, consistent with the mainstream literature, we find that trade credit financing is chosen by firms that have more restricted access to financial credit. These results appear to be stronger for firms located in emerging markets.

We examine the relation between excess returns and corporate trade credit policy. Robust results suggest a lower market value of receivables for firms with higher lagged receivables levels, consistent with diminishing returns from extending trade credit. Further findings indicate that the diminishing return to trade credit varies with industry affiliation, market share, and financial constraint. Our results emphasize the importance of actively monitoring trade credit levels. © 2015 The Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association.

Shareholder wealth effects associated with inventory are examined. Initial results indicate a positive and significant relation between shareholder wealth and inventory. Additional findings suggest that operating conditions, financial constraints, and working capital behavior influence the value of inventory. These findings are consistent with tactical and strategic decisions influencing managers to hold inventory. Overall, the results suggest that shareholders price the strategic advantages accompanying inventory.

We examine differences in price delay for a sample of real estate investment trust (REIT) and non-REIT matched pairs. Results suggest an economically and statistically higher level of price delay for REIT securities, which implies heightened frictions that increase the time needed for new information to be impounded into the prices of REIT shares. The primary drivers for the observed delay differential include differences in idiosyncratic volatility, market risk, and the number of days traded. Within-REIT determinants of delay confirm findings for the pooled sample of matched pairs. Importantly, we infer find that REIT investors are not compensated for restricted information flow, as excess returns are unrelated to the price delay.

We examine market value implications of managing liquidity via supplier financing. Results suggest a direct link between shareholder wealth and use of trade credit, and the relation exhibits significant cross-sectional variation. In particular, the market value of trade credit varies with the liquidity of goods sold and competition in product markets. Evidence also indicates the value-supplier financing association strengthens with financial constraint, which supports the financing motive for trade credit. Further findings are consistent with the transaction cost motive. Overall, we conclude that shareholders value the strategic benefits associated with supplier financing and that downstream firms’ characteristics influence this value.

We examine market value implications of managing liquidity via supplier financing. Results suggest a direct and significant link between shareholder wealth and use of trade credit, and the relation exhibits significant cross-sectional variation. In particular, the market value of trade credit varies with the liquidity of goods sold and competition in product markets. Evidence also indicates the value-supplier financing association strengthens with financial constraint, which supports the financing motive for trade credit. Further findings support the transactions cost motive. Overall, we conclude that shareholders value the strategic benefits associated with supplier financing and that downstream firms’ characteristics influence this value.

We examine the determinants and value effects of corporate lobbying, controlling for corporate political action committee (PAC) campaign contributions. We find evidence that firms with greater potential payoffs from favorable policy and regulations lobby most actively, and that managers often utilize both lobbying and campaign contribution channels to influence the political climate affecting the firm. We also find that shareholders value the lobbying activities pursued by management on their behalf, particularly if the firm does not have a PAC that contributed to an election campaign. The results are robust to a number of tests designed to mitigate potential omitted-variable and self-selection bias.

We find evidence suggesting that corporate lobbying for tax purposes over the period 1999–2009 is one method by which firms managed corporate taxes. Furthermore, tax management strategies employed by these politically active firms were valued by shareholders. Firms lobbying on tax issues have lower book effective taxes and greater discretionary permanent differences in GAAP and IRS taxable income. Investors place a premium on lobbying activities for tax purposes unless the firm already has a low effective tax rate or very high book-tax differences. We conclude that lobbying political officials is one method by which firms manage risks attendant an aggressive tax strategy.