Andrea Staiti's research while affiliated with Boston College and other places

Publications (19)

Article
In this paper I discuss the significance of Simmel’s conception of death as presented in his capstone work Lebensanschauung (1918). I argue for Simmel death is the form of all cultural forms and that it has a transcendental, form-giving function for life in its concrete unfolding. I conclude with a brief examination of the thought of immortality an...
Article
In this paper I argue that in Husserl’s Ideas I (1913) there is a seeming contradiction between the characterization of pure consciousness as the residue of the performance of the phenomenological reduction and the claim that in the natural attitude consciousness is taken to be an entity is the world. This creates a puzzle regarding the positional...
Article
In this paper I present Max Frischeisen-Köhler’s philosophy of science, which he developed as a critical response to the Neo-Kantians. Frischeisen-Köhler drew on insights from both his teacher Wilhelm Dilthey and Edmund Husserl. In the first four sections I examine Frischeisen-Köhler’s criticism of Marburg and Southwestern Neo-Kantianism. This crit...
Article
In this paper I present and assess a controversy between Edmund Husserl and Heinrich Rickert on the nature of judgment, in order to bring to light the originality of Husserl's proposal concerning this important issue. In the first section I provide some context for Rickert's theory of judgment by sketching a reconstruction of nineteenth century log...
Chapter
In this paper I take issue with Wittgenstein’s characterization of phenomenology in his Remarks on Colors (1950). Wittgenstein argues that “there is no such thing as phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological problems”, and that if there were such thing as phenomenology it would be “something midway between logic and natural science.” Phe...
Article
In this paper I criticize Claude Romano’s recent characterization of Husserl’s phenomenology as a form of Cartesianism. Contra Romano, Husserl is not committed to the view that since individual things in the world are dubitable, then the world as a whole is dubitable. On the contrary, for Husserl doubt is a merely transitional phenomenon which can...
Chapter
After the demise of German Idealism, Neo-Kantianism flourished as the defining philosophical movement of Continental Europe from the 1860s until the Weimar Republic. This collection of new essays by distinguished scholars offers a fresh examination of the many and enduring contributions that Neo-Kantianism has made to a diverse range of philosophic...
Chapter
After the demise of German Idealism, Neo-Kantianism flourished as the defining philosophical movement of Continental Europe from the 1860s until the Weimar Republic. This collection of new essays by distinguished scholars offers a fresh examination of the many and enduring contributions that Neo-Kantianism has made to a diverse range of philosophic...
Book
After the demise of German Idealism, Neo-Kantianism flourished as the defining philosophical movement of Continental Europe from the 1860s until the Weimar Republic. This collection of new essays by distinguished scholars offers a fresh examination of the many and enduring contributions that Neo-Kantianism has made to a diverse range of philosophic...
Book
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) is regarded as the founder of transcendental phenomenology, one of the major traditions to emerge in twentieth-century philosophy. In this book Andrea Staiti unearths and examines the deep theoretical links between Husserl’s phenomenology and the philosophical debates of his time, showing how his thought developed in resp...
Chapter
In this paper I intend to appraise the meaning of naiveté in Husserl’s phenomenology against the backdrop of Hegel’s philosophy. I will take my cue from an insightful remark by James Dodd in his recent book Crisis and Reflection. Commenting on Husserl’s famous statement that empirical science is intrinsically naïve, Dodd underscores that: “‘Naiveté...
Article
In this article I argue that new light can be shed on the analytic/Continental divide by looking at the controversy on the nature of philosophy in late 19th-century/early-20th-century Germany. The controversy is between those thinkers who understand philosophy primarily as a worldview [Weltanschauung] and those who insist that it should be understo...
Article
In this paper I explore the issue of how our personal life is given to us in experience as a whole to be actively shaped and determined. I examine in detail Husserl’s analysis of the kind of experience responsible for this achievement, which he terms Überschau and which thus far has never been addressed by scholars of phenomenology. First, I locate...
Article
This paper explores some recently published materials from Husserl's Nachlass. The author argues that they offer resources for a better understanding of Husserl's view of history. In particular, they prove that Husserl's reflections on history and the historical world are intended to be radical responses to the schools of Neo-Kantianism and Lebensp...
Chapter
This chapter examines the criticism of Husserl’s Ideen articulated by the Neo-Kantians Rickert and Natorp. Both lament that Husserl’s method of eidetic seeing is an intuitionistic shortcut that does not justify the knowledge it claims to provide. Natorp also raises doubts about the appropriateness of the eidetic method and phenomenological reflecti...

Citations

... Dewalque, 2016), the status of philosophy (e.g. Staiti, 2015), issues of ethics (e.g. Centi, 2015), and religion (e.g. ...
... It leads to abundance of life among those left behind. Staiti [24] has argued that death is the shaper of life as it liberates life from its otherwise inextricable entanglement with the contexts, in which it unfolds. In other words, the body is perceived as a prison for life, for which upon death life is discharged. ...
... 6 "Existing world, as substrate of properties, is already in time" (Husserl 2014a, p. 68). 7 For the positional status of the ego, see (Staiti 2016), who shows consciousness in the natural attitude as unsettled-which corresponds with my argument for the absence of ontological homogeneity in the structure of the transcendental ego. 8 For more on the dialectics of reality, see (Brenner and Igamberdiev 2021). ...
... By referring here to this group of manuscripts, then, my ambition is to shed further light on phenomenology, understood from a methodological viewpoint. In addition, I suggest that we put to one side the historical questions pertaining to Husserl's static-genetic differentiation in the context of his discussion with Natorp (Welton 2003;Luft 2004;Staiti 2013). Instead, the general question I shall be considering here is as follows: does the duality of static and genetic analysis justify the thesis that there are two phenomenological methods? ...
... The medieval, and then Berkeleyan, doctrine, that what exceeds our individual existence is a universal spirit or consciousness (God), then paves the way towards an alternative concept of reality. It paves the way towards a concept of reality that indeed "transcends the fragmentary experiences of empirical human subjects, (but is not) impervious to consciousness in general" (Staiti 2016). Accordingly, to constitute a strong concept of reality, one that fits the requirements of the science of nature, we do not have to find a way to get out of consciousness. ...
... In the following, a basic outline of the general distinction is provided, which allows to address the difficulty in rigorously separating the plains of analysis. A detailed description of Husserl's development concerning the terminology and his relation to psychology can be found, for example, in Davidson (2021), Drüe (1963), or Staiti (2014). ...
... That is to say, philosophers blurred the line between "p" and higher-order subjects. Given this, the traditional logicians seldom concern with whether the constitutions of judgment have a self-sufficient knowledge basis or not (DeLay, 2019;Staiti, 2015). Many philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, and Kant have widely discussed the foundation for testifying the self-evidence of knowledge but it was not articulated until Husserl, who grounded the concept in the frame of pre-predicative experience (Staiti, 2018). ...
... Mundt) in the late 1990s which stated that 'regarding all practical and therapeutic consequences the mental condition of a human being can never be based on a mere phenomenological analysis' (Kick/ Diehl 1998). The much-quoted phenomenological method of Edmund Husserl (Staiti 2012) is of limited value to psychopathology and psychiatry (Andersch 2013). 8. Autochthon symbolic spaces -seen from Goodman's 'ways of world making' -(and: using the Heisenberg-cut as a conceptual instrument, separating an ontic system from its background/ environment) can be seen as a decision for a very specific perspective on the system in observation/under research which (at least temporarily) excludes all other perspectives (whereby only all of them can produce totality). ...
... This only is a quick review of the literature, however. For instance, other authors contend that Husserl's position about perception is unique and cannot be neatly subsumed under either of these two labels (see Drummond, 2012, Staiti, 2015, Zahavi, 2017. Furthermore, it has also been maintained that Husserl's theory develops within a conceptual framework that is not commensurable to the one at stake in contemporary debates on perception because it proceeds from the perspective of the phenomenological reduction (see Cimino, 2021, Doyon, 2022; for a discussion of this view, see Bower, 2023). 2 The variant of disjunctivism under discussion hence is metaphysical disjunctivism. ...
... Talvez nenhum outro século na história do ocidente tenha levantado tanto a questão sobre o que é a filosofia e qual o seu papel tão vigorosamente quanto o século XIX (STAITI, 2013). O que a filosofia teria a oferecer para uma pessoa educada que a ciência empírica não poderia, a princípio, responder? ...