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Vol 11 No 1
Research
Managing burn victims of suicide bombing attacks: outcomes,
lessons learnt, and changes made from three attacks in Indonesia
Harvey Chim
1
, Woon Si Yew
2
and Colin Song
1
1
Department of Plastic Surgery and Burns, Singapore General Hospital, Block 4, Level 6, Outram Road, Singapore 169608, Singapore
2
Department of Anaesthesia and Surgical Intensive Care, Singapore General Hospital, Block 5, Level 2, Outram Road, Singapore 169608, Singapore
Corresponding author: Harvey Chim, harveychim@yahoo.com
Received: 27 Nov 2006 Revisions requested: 19 Dec 2006 Revisions received: 27 Dec 2006 Accepted: 2 Feb 2007 Published: 2 Feb 2007
Critical Care 2007, 11:R15 (doi:10.1186/cc5681)
This article is online at: http://ccforum.com/content/11/1/R15
© 2007 Chim et al.; licensee BioMed Central Ltd
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0
),
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract
Introduction Terror attacks in Southeast Asia were almost
nonexistent until the 2002 Bali bomb blast, considered the
deadliest attack in Indonesian history. Further attacks in 2003
(Jakarta), 2004 (Jakarta), and 2005 (Bali) have turned terrorist
attacks into an ever-present reality.
Methods The authors reviewed medical charts of victims
evacuated to the Singapore General Hospital (SGH) Burns
Centre during three suicide attacks involving Bali (2002 and
2005) and the Jakarta Marriott hotel (2003). Problems faced,
lessons learnt, and costs incurred are discussed. A burns
disaster plan drawing on lessons learnt from these attacks is
presented.
Results Thirty-one patients were treated at the SGH Burns
Centre in three attacks (2002 Bali attack [n = 15], 2003 Jakarta
attack [n = 14], and 2005 Bali attack [n = 2]). For the 2002 Bali
attack, median age was 29 years (range 20 to 50 years), median
percentage of total burn surface area (TBSA) was 29% (range
5% to 55%), and median abbreviated burn severity index (ABSI)
was 6 (range 3 to 10). Eight of 15 patients were admitted to the
intensive care unit. For the 2003 Jakarta attack, median age was
35 years (range 24 to 56 years), median percentage of TBSA
was 10% (range 2% to 46%), and median ABSI was 4 (range 3
to 9). A large number of patients had other injuries. Problems
faced included manpower issues, lack of bed space, shortage
of blood products, and lack of cadaver skin.
Conclusion The changing nature of terror attacks mandates
continued vigilance and disaster preparedness. The
multidimensional burns patient, complicated by other injuries, is
likely to become increasingly common. A burns disaster plan
with emphasis on effective command, control, and
communication as well as organisation of health care personnel
following a 'team concept' will do much to ensure that the
sudden onset of a crisis situation at an unexpected time does
not overwhelm hospital manpower and resources.
Introduction
Urban terrorism has been called the scourge of our times [1].
Indeed, the number and scale of terrorist attacks occurring in
the past few years have been unprecedented, with devastating
consequences and massive loss of life. The increasing preva-
lence of suicide bombing attacks, striking at unexpected times
and places and oftentimes causing multidimensional injuries
with components of penetrating trauma, blast injury, and burns
[2], has made treating victims of these attacks a difficult and
pressing concern. In addition, because victims of suicide
bombing attacks are more severely injured compared with
other trauma victims [3], with a large proportion requiring
intensive care, hospital preparedness and formal protocols for
dealing with mass casualty incidents (MCIs) are paramount.
In Southeast Asia, terrorist attacks were almost nonexistent
until the 2002 bombing at Kuta Beach on the island of Bali.
After this attack, considered the deadliest act of terrorism in
Indonesian history, further attacks targeting the Jakarta Marri-
ott hotel (Indonesia) in 2003 and the Australian embassy in
Jakarta in 2004 and further Bali bombings in 2005 have turned
terrorist attacks into an ever-present reality. Although those
responsible for the attacks have been arrested and charged
(the Jemaah Islamiah, an organisation allegedly affiliated with
al-Qaeda, was held liable for the attacks), the victims and
ED = emergency department; ICU = intensive care unit; MCI = mass casualty incident; SGH = Singapore General Hospital; TBSA = total burn sur-
face area.
Critical Care Vol 11 No 1 Chim et al.
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relatives involved on those fateful days will forever bear the
scars of terrorism.
In three of these attacks, the Singapore General Hospital
(SGH) Burns Centre served as a receiving facility for some of
the most severely burned victims in the immediate aftermath of
the blasts. SGH is a level I trauma centre, and the SGH Burns
Centre, the only dedicated burn facility serving Singapore,
receives 93% of total burns cases in Singapore, a city-state
with a population of 4.18 million [4]. In addition, the SGH
Burns Centre routinely receives severely burned patients
throughout Southeast Asia requiring specialised burn care.
This report describes the characteristics of patients received
in the aftermath of the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings as well
as the 2003 Jakarta Marriott hotel bombing, along with prob-
lems faced, the manner of response, lessons learnt, and costs
incurred. In addition, a disaster plan for management of future
terrorist incidents in Southeast Asia involving large numbers of
burn victims is presented, drawn up from the experience of
these three devastating attacks.
Materials and methods
Terror bomb incidents
The 2002 Bali bombing
On 12 October 2002 at 11:05 p.m. at Kuta, a town in southern
Bali, a suicide bomber triggered a device hidden in a back-
pack, causing an explosion to tear through Paddy's Bar. Fif-
teen seconds later, in front of the Sari Club, a much larger car
bomb of close to 1,000 kg concealed in a white van was det-
onated by remote control. The blast left a one meter-deep cra-
ter, and the shock wave blew out windows throughout the
town. Scores of victims were killed and many more suffered
severe trauma and burns. A third bomb had been detonated in
front of the American consulate in Bali shortly before, causing
only slight injury to one person. When all bodies were
accounted for, it was found that 202 people had lost their lives
[5]. Two hundred and nine people were injured, 15 with severe
burns, and were evacuated to our centre.
The 2003 Jakarta Marriott bombing
On 5 August 2003, near the lunch hour in Jakarta, a car bomb
exploded in the driveway of the Marriott hotel, killing 12 people
and injuring another 150 [6]. The force of the explosion shat-
tered windows 30 floors up, and the attack left bodies lying
among shattered debris and wrecked cars in the street.
Although this attack was smaller in scale than the preceding
Bali blast, the psychological effect on the Indonesian people
was no less marked, with terrorists striking with impunity in the
heart of the capital city. Fourteen burn patients were evacu-
ated to our centre.
The 2005 Bali bombing
On 1 October 2005 at 6:50 p.m. in Bali, two explosions
caused by suicide bombers ripped through a Jimbaran Beach
food court, and a third bomber struck at 7 p.m. in the main
square of central Kuta. Unlike in previous attacks, many of the
casualties sustained shrapnel injuries as well as injuries due to
ball bearings, suggesting a different modus operandi for the
bombers. The final death toll was 20, and another 129 were
injured [7]. Most of the injured were sent to Bali's Sanglah
General Hospital and treated largely for injuries caused by bro-
ken glass. Many of the casualties were foreign nationals. The
two most severely injured victims, a father and daughter, were
evacuated by air on 2 and 3 October to SGH for further
management.
SGH Burns Centre
The SGH Burns Centre is less than two hours by air from
much of Indonesia and is located 1,050 miles from Denpasar,
Bali, and 555 miles from Jakarta and therefore was ideally
placed to receive casualties after these attacks. It is a 29-bed
facility divided into a 4-bed intensive care unit (ICU), 6-bed
high-dependency unit, and 19-bed general ward. After the
2002 Bali attack, the facility was renovated and the ICU is now
able to nurse eight patients in a crisis situation as each of the
cubicles is double-spaced (with patients housed as such only
in a crisis with insufficient bed space). The mean annual
admission to the Burns Centre is 288 patients [4]. The mean
number of ICU admissions was 9 (3% of total admissions)
(range 8 to 10) between 2003 and 2005. However, 16
patients were admitted in 2002 in the wake of the 2002 Bali
attack. Patients were evacuated by air to our centre by the
International SOS (a non-for-profit first-aid organisation) after
initial stabilisation at Indonesian hospitals. Prior to evacuation,
the International SOS corresponded with staff at the Burns
Centre to ensure that the most severely injured victims were
evacuated first. Upon arrival, patients were admitted directly to
the Burns Centre for further management.
Data collection
Data on patients were obtained from a retrospective review of
medical records. Information on demographic data, injuries
sustained, complications, surgeries, and outcome was
obtained. Information on costs incurred in the wake of the ter-
rorist attacks was obtained from records that were kept by the
finance office of SGH and based on hospital bills incurred by
individual patients. Data on cadaver skin obtained and skin-
banking protocols were obtained from the skin bank at the
SGH Burns Centre. Information regarding the events sur-
rounding previous terrorist attacks was obtained from the
news media.
Results
Characteristics of burn patients treated
From October 2002 to October 2005, the SGH Burns Centre
was involved in the management of 31 patients evacuated
from three separate suicide bombing attacks in Indonesia.
Table 1 presents the characteristics of patients evacuated to
our centre. For the 12 October 2002 Bali bomb blast, 15
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patients were evacuated to Singapore on 14 October after
stabilisation and triage at local hospitals. Many of these
patients were severely burned (median percentage of total
burn surface area [TBSA] of 29%) and eight patients were
admitted to the ICU. Patients admitted to the ICU either had
inhalational burns or required intubation due to severe burns.
All patients with suspected inhalational injury had a diagnostic
bronchoscopy. One patient died of multiorgan failure with sep-
ticaemia and pneumonia following a protracted ICU stay (24
days after admission), but the others survived. Eleven patients
required surgery; a total of 36 burn surgeries and 3 non-burn
surgeries were performed.
In contrast, for the 5 August 2003 Jakarta Marriott hotel bomb-
ing, patients evacuated to our centre were less severely
burned (median percentage of TBSA of 10%) and only two
patients were admitted to the ICU. All patients survived. Thir-
teen patients required surgery; 29 burn surgeries and 7 non-
burn surgeries were performed. Patients were evacuated to
Singapore in waves from 6 August to 9 August, and the two
most severely injured requiring ICU care arrived first. This likely
reflects the smaller scale of the 2003 Jakarta bombing as
opposed to the three bombs detonated in the 2002 Bali
bombing.
Interestingly, all the patients from the 2002 Bali bombing
treated at the SGH Burns Centre were non-Indonesian (com-
prising a mix of American, British, Swiss, French, Irish, Cana-
dian, Singaporean, and Japanese nationals) and of relatively
young age (median 29 years). The terrorists targeted crowded
areas frequented by tourists, and this likely explains why many
foreign nationals sustained severe burn injuries. At the request
of patients and national authorities, six of these patients were
evacuated to their home countries after a two to eight day hos-
pitalisation in Singapore (where essential surgery and resusci-
tation were performed). In contrast, for the 2003 Jakarta
bombing, all the patients seen were either Indonesian or Sin-
gaporean, perhaps due to lesser numbers of foreign tourists
visiting Indonesia.
Table 1
Characteristics of burn patients treated in the three attacks
All attacks Bali 2002 Jakarta 2003 Bali 2005
Number of victims 31 15 14 2
Age in years
a
32 (13–56) 29 (20–50) 35 (24–56) 28 (13–43)
Gender (male/female) 17:14 6:9 10:4 1:1
Percentage of TBSA
a
15 (2–55) 29 (5–55) 10 (2–46) 11.5 (7–16)
ABSI
a
5 (2–10) 6 (3–10) 4 (3–9) 3.5 (2–5)
Inhalational injury
b
2 (6%) 0 (0%) 2 (14%) 0 (0%)
Admitted to the ICU
b
10 (32%) 8 (53%) 2 (14%) 0 (0%)
Number of burn surgeries
a
2 (0–10) 2 (0–10) 2 (0–6) 1 (1–1)
Length of hospital stay in days
a
11 (2–58) 6 (2–42) 16.5 (7–58) 10 (9–11)
Mortality
b
1 (3%) 1 (7%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
a
Data presented as median (range).
b
Data presented as number (percentage of total). ABSI, abbreviated burn severity index; TBSA, total burn
surface area.
Table 2
Characteristics of burn patients admitted to the ICU
All attacks Bali 2002 Jakarta 2003
Number 10 8 2
Age in years
a
29.5 (23–56) 28.5 (23–35) 45.5 (35–56)
Gender (male/female) 3:7 1:7 2:0
Percentage of TBSA
a
37.5 (23–55) 37.5 (23–55) 39.5 (33–46)
ABSI
a
8 (6–10) 7.5 (6–10) 8.5 (8–9)
Ventilator days
a
3.5 (1–40) 3 (1–18) 24 (8–40)
Length of ICU stay in days
a
6 (2–40) 4.5 (2–24) 24.5 (9–40)
a
Data presented as median (range). ABSI, abbreviated burn severity index; ICU, intensive care unit; TBSA, total burn surface area.
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Table 2 shows characteristics of patients admitted to the ICU.
Although a direct comparison cannot be made with other ter-
ror attacks (because select patients were evacuated to our
centre), it is useful to make a comparison. In the Israeli experi-
ence [8], 55% of patients with burns or penetrating injuries
required ICU care and median length of stay was 4 days. Our
experience was similar for the 2002 Bali bomb blast; 53% of
patients were admitted to the ICU and median length of ICU
stay was 4.5 days. The median length of stay for ICU patients
was the same (at 4.5 days) for patients admitted to Gregario
Maranon University General Hospital after the Madrid (Spain)
train attack in March 2004 [9]. This is in accordance with pre-
vious studies showing that terror victims stayed in the ICU
considerably longer than other ICU patients [3]. The severity
of burn injury for patients admitted to the ICU in the 2002 Bali
attack (average percentage of TBSA of 39%) was similar to
that observed for burn patients requiring critical care in the 9/
11 Pentagon attack [10] (average percentage of TBSA of
34%). Of the two patients admitted to the ICU after the 2003
Jakarta attack, one had a protracted ICU stay with prolonged
ventilation as he developed acute respiratory distress syn-
drome with pneumonia and septicaemia.
A large number of the patients seen at the SGH Burns Centre
had other injuries as shown in Table 3. The most common con-
comitant injury seen was ear barotrauma. Eight patients (53%)
from the 2002 Bali attack and both from the 2005 Bali attack
(100%) had ear barotrauma. In contrast, only one patient from
the 2003 Jakarta attack (7%) had barotrauma. This could be
explained by the different settings of the attacks. In the Bali
attacks, victims were directly exposed to the full force of the
blasts. However, in the Jakarta Marriott attack, which involved
the detonation of a car bomb in the driveway of the hotel, vic-
tims were likely shielded from the blasts by the hotel walls. Of
patients presenting with ear barotrauma, one from the 2002
Bali attack (7%) had other primary blast injuries as well, includ-
ing a pneumothorax of the left lung. The most severely injured
victim of the 2005 Bali bombing, a 43-year-old man who was
evacuated to Singapore, had ear barotraumas and also sus-
tained secondary blast injuries, including a ruptured spleen
and fractures as well as injuries from multiple ball bearings
lodged in his thorax, abdomen, and spine, causing Brown-
Séquard syndrome.
Problems encountered and solutions used
Throughout the three terrorist attacks, the SGH Burns Centre
continued to function normally, admitting burn patients from
Singapore and abroad. This was unavoidable given that we are
the only regional burns centre in this part of Southeast Asia.
The main problems faced were those of manpower, lack of
bed space, shortage of blood products, and lack of cadaver
skin. With the sudden influx of 15 patients in one day after the
2002 Bali bomb blast, the usual staff complement of the Burns
Centre was insufficient to manage the situation. As a result,
off-duty staff were recalled, additional critical care trained
nurses were recruited from the surgical and medical ICUs, and
surgical residents who had previously done a burns rotation
were seconded to assist in managing patients in the week fol-
lowing the incident. The nine plastic surgeons in the unit with
teams of surgical residents worked 12-hour shifts in the days
following the attack, operating on the patients. Additional
operating theatres were allocated for use in the management
of victims of the Bali bomb blast. The estimated number of
cancelled elective surgeries, particularly those requiring ICU
care, was 20 to 30.
Of the eight patients requiring ICU care after the 2002 Bali
attack, four were housed in the surgical ICU, managed with the
aid of additional surgical intensivists recruited during this
period. Patients judged fit enough for step-down care were
discharged from the surgical ICU prior to the arrival of the first
patients from Bali. The 2003 Jakarta and 2005 Bali attacks did
Table 3
Number of patients with other injuries admitted to the Singapore General Hospital Burns Centre
All attacks Bali 2002 Jakarta 2003 Bali 2005
Number 31 15 14 2
Ear barotrauma 11 (35%) 8 (53%) 1 (7%) 2 (100%)
Fractures/Dislocations 7 (23%) 4 (27%) 2 (14%) 1 (50%)
Pneumothorax 3 (10%) 2 (13%) 1 (7%) 0 (0%)
Ruptured spleen 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (50%)
Neurological injury 2 (6%) 0 (0%) 1 (7%) 1 (50%)
PTSD 3 (10%) 2 (13%) 0 (0%) 1 (50%)
Shrapnel wounds 4 (13%) 1 (7%) 2 (14%) 1 (50%)
Lacerations 3 (10%) 2 (13%) 7 (50%) 1 (50%)
Tendon injuries 3 (10%) 0 (0%) 3 (21%) 0 (0%)
All data are presented as number (percentage of total). PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder.
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not pose such a major manpower and resource problem; this
was due to a smaller number of patients requiring critical care
and surgery as well as better disaster preparedness resulting
from the experience of managing patients from the 2002
attack.
In our burns centre, we practice early massive excision of
burns and temporary coverage by skin substitutes followed by
definitive wound closure with autologous skin grafts in staged
surgeries. As a result, a significant problem encountered after
the 2002 Bali bombing was an acute shortage of blood prod-
ucts following the many surgeries performed for victims of that
attack. Fortunately, the National Blood Bank was able to
obtain more blood at short notice through blood donation
drives and recalling regular blood donors during this period.
However, to conserve blood products, many elective surgeries
were also cancelled in the immediate aftermath of the attack.
The lack of cadaver skin was another major issue after the
2002 Bali bomb blast. Prior to this attack, no contingency had
ever called for the massive amounts of cadaver skin required.
On 14 October 2002, when the patients arrived from Bali,
there was 9,100 cm
2
of cadaver skin in our skin bank. By 18
October, only 5,450 cm
2
was left. Fortunately, a prior request
for substitute skin had been made to the University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center at Galveston (TX, USA), which
responded by sending 22,968 cm
2
of skin to Singapore. The
shipment arrived on 18 October 2002, forestalling the antici-
pated shortage of cadaver skin. Better prepared for the 2003
Jakarta and 2005 Bali attacks, the SGH Burns Centre did not
face any further shortages of skin substitutes.
Cost of the terrorist attacks
The cost of these consecutive suicide bombing attacks, at reg-
ular intervals in Indonesia, to the victims and families involved
cannot be quantified. Numerous people lost their lives, and
many more were injured. In addition, the previous absence of
terror attacks was replaced by an almost annual bomb blast in
Indonesia, changing the region forever. The psychological
effect has been no less, with a pervading sense of danger
among the local populace and marked decrease in tourism to
the region seen after these attacks.
In terms of costs incurred by patients during their stay, the
2002 Bali bombing cost SGD $765,702 (USD $450,412).
The 2003 Jakarta bombing cost SGD $603,008 (USD
$354,710), and the cost of the 2005 Bali bombing was SGD
$38,535 (USD $22,667).
Discussion
The number of patients suffering burns as a result of the 2002
Bali bombing was extremely high; 15 patients were treated at
the SGH Burns Centre, and a further 48 were evacuated from
the Royal Darwin Hospital (Tiwi, NT, Australia) to Australian
burns centres [11]. We will never know of the many more
patients who were not evacuated from Bali. In contrast, only
18 burn patients were transferred to the Cornell Burn Center
(New York, NY, USA) [12] after the September 11 attacks in
New York and 9 patients were admitted to the Washington
Hospital Center Burn Center (Washington, DC, USA) after the
9/11 attack on the Pentagon [10]. The scale of the 2002 Bali
attack may best be appreciated by the fact that in Israel, over
a period of two years, only 91 burn patients (out of a total of
623 victims injured by terror-related explosions) [8] in multiple
terror attacks were hospitalised. The 2003 Jakarta Marriott
bombing was of smaller scale (only 14 patients were evacu-
ated) but was still significant in relation to other terror attacks
of these times.
Burns centres are never the first responders in terrorist
attacks. However, they almost invariably play a pivotal role in
the subsequent management of burn patients. A formalised
protocol for MCIs and limited MCIs is therefore essential to
ensure proper workflow during a crisis situation as well as the
ability to cope with a massive surge in patients transferred at
short notice. The experience of previous terrorist attacks
would suggest that the number of burn patients to be
expected is significant. In Israel, of patients hospitalised after
injury by terror-related explosions, 15% suffered burns [8].
After 9/11 in New York City, 14% of patients admitted to Bel-
levue Hospital and New York University Downtown Hospital
were burn patients [12]. Similar figures were reported at St.
Vincent's Hospital, where 19% of those hospitalised were
burn patients [13].
Due to Singapore's location at the crossroads of air and sea
traffic, as well as the presence of a petrochemical industry and
high-density urban sprawl, burns preparedness has always
been a priority. The SGH Burns Centre Burns Disaster Plan
was conceptualised and designed in light of lessons learnt
after the recent terror attacks in Indonesia. It emphasises
effective command, control, and communication as well as a
'team concept' in which medical and nursing personnel are
organised into teams for better management of burns patients.
Yearly drills ensure that staff are kept up to date on processes
and procedures. Future validation of the disaster plan is
planned. The major problems faced during the Indonesian ter-
ror attacks – such as manpower issues, lack of bed space, and
resource shortage – were analysed and solutions proposed.
Cross-training of personnel to provide additional manpower in
a crisis situation and provision for opening of additional ICUs
and wards were instituted. In addition, a directive from the Min-
istry of Health, Singapore, stipulated requirements for a mini-
mum supply of cadaver skin to be banked at the Burns Centre
at all times.
In a crisis situation, a Burns Disaster Command is formed with
the director of the Burns Centre serving as the director of
operations. He is assisted by a team comprised of senior nurs-
ing staff and administrative and communications officers. The
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Burns Disaster Command is housed in a specialised room
serving as an operations centre and provides command and
control of all Burns Centre personnel (Figure 1). Medical staff
are organised into teams comprised of one attending physi-
cian (team leader), one senior resident, one junior resident,
and one staff nurse attached directly to the medical team.
Nursing staff are also organised into individual teams under
the direction of each medical team. Each team, when acti-
vated, is responsible for a specific task in the initial phase of
the crisis (for example, resuscitation, performing investiga-
tions, or clerking patients). Subsequently, when the situation
has stabilised somewhat, each team takes on responsibility for
the care of a specific group of patients and takes turns admit-
ting patients to prevent the same group of doctors or nurses
from being overwhelmed by a sudden surge of casualties.
When activated, the team leader is stationed at the emergency
department (ED) to triage patients while the rest of the team is
stationed in the ward.
Contingency plans also allow for the opening of additional
temporary ICUs during an MCI in areas such as the operating
theatre recovery rooms, endoscopy suite, and day surgery
suite. Intensivists are organised into teams comprised of four
attending physicians and four residents, with one team cover-
ing each ICU.
A dedicated briefing and communications room for press con-
ferences and communication with family members is manned
by a communications officer, who has easy access to social
workers, psychologists, nurses, and doctors. To ensure that
effective channels of communication are maintained, dedi-
cated phone lines are maintained between the operations cen-
tre, communications room, ED, disaster site command, and
the rest of the hospital. The operations centre serves as the
nerve centre of the communications network. A plan for activa-
tion and recall of medical and nursing staff is in place with var-
ying levels of activation, and the level of activation of personnel
is decided by the director of the Burns Centre. The role of local
authorities in a mass casualty situation is also vital for preserv-
ing lines of communication and transport. Civil defence and
emergency services contingency plans are in place to prepare
for such a situation.
Unidirectional flow of casualties is a priority and is formalised
into a protocol for reference of medical and nursing personnel
(Figure 2). In addition, admissions are staggered to prevent
Figure 1
Organisation of personnel in the Singapore General Hospital Burns Centre during a crisis situationOrganisation of personnel in the Singapore General Hospital Burns Centre during a crisis situation. Emphasis is placed on effective command, con-
trol, and communication and a 'team concept.'
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staff in the burns ward from being overwhelmed, and the
observation ward in the ED serves as a holding area for
patients. Debriefings are conducted regularly, and all medical
and nursing teams meet regularly and at daily intervals when
the situation has stabilised to prioritise patients for surgery and
discuss allocation of hospital resources and other pressing
issues. Although the immediate aftermath of an MCI will prove
a strain to hospital resources, a formalised disaster plan will do
much in the midst of a crisis to ensure that good care is pro-
vided to all victims and that medical and nursing staff are well
looked after. At the national level, in a further effort to ensure
that sufficiently trained staff are available in the event of a mass
casualty situation, cross-training of nursing staff was insti-
tuted; surgical and critical care nurses in particular are
required to rotate through the Burns Centre. A burns course
targeted at surgical residents was also instituted to ensure
that all surgical residents would be equipped to manage burn
patients if called upon.
Despite all possible preparative measures and a formalised
burns disaster plan to forestall chaos, in a true mass casualty
scenario, manpower and hospital resources may still be insuf-
ficient to cope with the situation. The concept of 'minimal
acceptable care' in terror attacks, in which effort is
concentrated on a maximal number of salvageable patients
[8,14,15], has been proposed to optimise evacuation prefer-
ences and guide triage as well as determine to which patients
critical hospital resources are allocated. A modification of this
concept may be applicable in burns patients. Because most
burns centres now practice early massive burns excision with
Figure 2
Unidirectional flow of casualties is essential to ensure that health care personnel are able to cope with the flood of patients and that adequate care is provided to all victims in a mass casualty situationUnidirectional flow of casualties is essential to ensure that health care personnel are able to cope with the flood of patients and that adequate care
is provided to all victims in a mass casualty situation. ED, emergency department; OPD, outpatient department; SGH, Singapore General Hospital.
Critical Care Vol 11 No 1 Chim et al.
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immediate cover by autologous skin and skin substitutes
within 72 hours of the initial burn injury [4,16], the strain on
staff and resources such as cadaver skin in a true MCI may
force burn surgeons to select patients to be operated on.
Those with the maximal chance of survival – patients who are
moderate in the severity of their burns, who require early burns
excision to optimise recovery, and who are not so severely
burned that they are likely to develop other complications –
would be the natural candidates for surgical priority. In the
event of a severe shortage of cadaver skin, temporary skin sub-
stitutes such as Silon-TSR (STAT Pharmaceuticals, Inc., San-
tee, CA, USA), a semi-occlusive non-adherent dressing, or
Biobrane (Mylan Laboratories Inc., Canonsburg, PA, USA) can
be used to cover the burn wound and promote epithelisation
until autologous skin from the patient can be harvested.
There appears to be a clear difference between normal burn
patients and victims of terror attacks requiring admission to a
burns centre. In our experience, a large proportion of victims of
terror attacks have had multidimensional injury with other inju-
ries besides burns. Similarly, in the Israeli experience, 68% of
patients with burn injuries had penetrating and blunt injuries
[8]. This is exemplified by the 43-year-old man previously
described, injured in the 2005 Bali bombing, who also sus-
tained spinal cord injury, fractures, and penetrating injuries to
the thorax and abdomen caused by multiple ball bearings. If
the changing nature of suicide bombing attacks in Indonesia is
an indication of tidings to come, with increasing use of ball
bearings and heavy shrapnel in bombs, future victims of terror
attacks with burns are increasingly likely to present with
multiple injuries besides the burn injury. The multidimensional
burns patient, particularly one requiring critical care, presents
a particular therapeutic challenge. He has an increased oper-
ative risk due to multiple injuries but requires surgery more
than others to forestall problems related to delayed burns exci-
sion. To compound the problem, after burns excision, he is at
increased risk of metabolic derangements and multiorgan fail-
ure due to other injuries and therefore will likely require pro-
longed ICU support. Burns centres should be prepared for
managing such difficult and unstable patients as part of disas-
ter preparedness.
For patients with burn injuries sustained in bomb blasts, it
must be appreciated that the blast wave caused by heavy
explosives results in an additional element of soft tissue
destruction. This is especially true for those victims closest to
the blasts. These wounds cannot be treated primarily as burn
wounds but require repeated reassessment in the subsequent
48 hours for progression to deeper tissue destruction. Therein
lies the problem for MCIs in which facilities and staff are over-
whelmed and the resultant level of care is therefore
suboptimal.
Conclusion
The changing nature of terror attacks mandates continuing
vigilance and disaster preparedness. The multidimensional
burns patient, complicated by other injuries, is a particular
challenge to manage but is likely to become increasingly com-
mon. A structured burns disaster plan with emphasis on con-
trol, command, and communication will do much to ensure that
the sudden onset of a crisis situation at an unexpected time
does not overwhelm hospital manpower and resources. In
extreme circumstances, 'minimal acceptable care' with the
selective treatment of burn patients to conserve hospital
resources and maximise manpower may offer an alternative to
an overwhelmed health care system.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors' contributions
HC conceived the study, carried out the research, and wrote
the manuscript. WSY and CS participated in care of patients
and helped to draft the manuscript. All authors read and
approved the final manuscript.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Alvin Chua from the SGH Burns Centre Skin Bank for
invaluable information and advice and to all those who were involved in
the management of patients during the Bali and Jakarta bomb blasts.
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• After a terror attack, the multidimensional burns patient,
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