Religion and Brazilian Democracy: Mobilizing the People of God
Abstract
Cambridge Core - Latin American Government, Politics and Policy - Religion and Brazilian Democracy - by Amy Erica Smith
... Evangelicals and Pentecostals have played a prominent electoral role in some Latin American countries since the 1980s (Boas 2023) yet, as recently as 2012, they were not consistently voting to the right (Boas and Smith 2015). Social pressures may induce members of evangelical churches to cohere in vote choice (Smith 2019), but those choices have not been uniformly rightist in Latin America. The same is true of issue attitudes. ...
... On some issues, they may even outflank devout Catholics. Recent work shows that Brazilian evangelicals are generally more conservative than Catholics on homosexuality and gender, whereas religiously devout Christians from both traditions are similarly opposed to abortion (Smith 2019). In the Supplementary Materials, we show that, after accounting for inter-group differences in church attendance, there is no difference between Catholics and evangelicals in abortion attitudes. ...
... However, we expect that when sexuality politics increases in salience, religion will influence voters' decisions in multiple ways beyond the effect mediated by issue attitudes. First, social pressure within religious communities often leads to high levels of political cohesion as churches orient vote choice through social and identity-based processes (Djupe and Gilbert 2009;Smith 2019). Even church members who are personally unconvinced on the issues may end up voting with their fellow congregants. ...
Right-wing candidates have rallied against same-sex marriage, abortion, and ‘gender ideology’ in several recent Latin American elections, attracting socially conservative voters. Yet, these issues are largely irrelevant to voting decisions in other parts of the region. Drawing on theories explaining partisan shifts in the US and Europe, we argue that elite and social movement debates on sexuality politics create conditions for electoral realignment. When politicians take polarized positions on newly salient ‘culture war’ issues, the masses’ voting behaviour shifts. Using region-wide multilevel analysis of the AmericasBarometer and Latinobarómetro and a conjoint experiment in Brazil, Chile, and Peru, we demonstrate that the rising salience of sexuality politics creates new electoral cleavages, magnifying the electoral impact of religion and sexuality politics attitudes and shrinking the impact of economic views. Whereas scholarship on advanced democracies posits the centrality of partisanship, our findings indicate that sexuality politics prompts realignments even in weak party systems.
... Les évangéliques se sont activement mobilisés contre certaines mesures, en particulier la légalisation de l'avortement, le mariage homosexuel et les changements de la législation de biosécurité. Adoptant un agenda "provie" et "pro-famille", ses actions politiques alimentent une "guerre culturelle" (Smith 2019), dont l'objectif principal est de freiner l'avancée des idées libérales en matière de moralité. ...
... En termes de moralité et de coutumes, de nombreuses études et recherches montrent qu'une part significative des électeurs évangéliques sont en accord avec les positions "pro-vie" et "pro-famille" défendues par le front parlementaire évangélique (Bohn 2004 ;Nishimura 2004 ;Boas et Smith 2019 ;Smith 2019). Par exemple, une enquête d'opinion réalisée par l'Institut DataFolha en 2016 indique un rejet beaucoup plus grand du mariage homosexuel entre évangéliques que l'opinion médiane de la population : 68 % y sont opposés, 18 % l'acceptent et 10 % y sont indifférents. ...
... En ce qui concerne la religion, on constate que le plus grand clivage se produit entre, d'une part, les catholiques et les évangéliques et, d'autre part, les "sans religion" et les adeptes de religions afrobrésiliennes. Ainsi que plusieurs études l'ont noté dans le cas de la "guerre culturelle" (Boas and Smith 2015 ;Prandi et Dos Santos 2017 ;Smith 2019), en ce qui concernent la morale et les valeurs sociales, les évangéliques ont une opinion médiane assez similaire à celle des catholiques. Comme on peut s'y attendre, les métis et, surtout, ceux qui s'identifient comme "noirs" sont plus favorables à ce type de politiques que les "blancs". ...
RÉSUMÉ
Sur la base d’une enquête réalisée dans la périphérie de Rio de Janeiro, l’article analyse les relations entre dénomination religieuse et conception de la justice dans un espace social inégal et profondément religieux, mais insuffisamment étudié. L’article réaffirme l’importance de la religion dans la conception de la bonne société et souligne certaines valeurs propres aux évangéliques. D’autre part, l’article signale que l’expérience de ces inégalités est généralisée et que la religion, même si elle peut être un élément central des attitudes politiques de la périphérie des grandes villes du Brésil (et d’Amérique latine), n’est pas la seule.
... One reason sexuality politics has become a magnetic core for the right is that these issues have unique power to mobilize religious conservatives-both Catholics and the growing body of conservative Evangelicals (Smith 2019a;Smith and Boas 2020). ...
... Gold and Peña (this issue), for instance, reveal that the networks organizing protests via social media in Argentina and Brazil incubated the next generation of young, social media-savvy rightist politicians. Similarly, church leadership has proven an important platform for running for office on the right in Latin America (Boas 2014(Boas , 2021Smith 2019a). ...
... The rise of Evangelical Christianity has bolstered new mobilizing structures on the right. Evangelical converts attend church more frequently than they did as Catholics; one recent study conservatively estimated that Evangelicals and Pentecostals spend at least twice as many hours in church per year as do Catholics (Smith 2019b). Members of Evangelical and Pentecostal churches may be particularly prone to adopt shared political views, due to regular socialization, shared identities, and the salience of moralistic frames (Smith 2019a). ...
... This distinctive aspect of conservatism, also found in other Latin American countries (Vaggione & Machado, 2020), defends the life and values of Brazilians against gender ideology. Clearly, this entails a highly discriminatory 'culture war' through which diverse conservative and religiously oriented social groups attempt to influence decision-making processes, especially on policies relating to themes such as sexuality and the family (Smith, 2019). The constant attacks on indigenous and quilombola communities can also be conceived along the same lines and are ostensibly made in the name of progress and development, although they evoke racial and ethnic dimensions, revealing how ethnonationalism can be hidden in the language of civic nationalism (Fozdar & Low, 2015;Simonsen & Bonikowski, 2020). ...
... In Brazil, it is clear that populism -associated with antipetismo and a more widespread aversion to parties and politicians -appeals strongly to voters, although the same cannot be said of nationalism. Anti-LGBTQIA+ discourse may be relevant for some demographic groups such as religious voters (Smith, 2019) but not for others. Simultaneously, questions on sovereignty are unimportant for most Brazilian voters, Bolsonaristas in particular. ...
Recent studies have warned about the close relationship between populism and nationalism. This article offers an empirical contribution to the examination of this relationship by analysing the presence of populist and nationalist elements in the official speeches of the outgoing Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro. We make two contributions to this expanding literature. First, we show that the supposed ambiguity between populism and nationalism can be resolved by an approach that clearly separates the two concepts. Second, we find that Bolsonaro is more populist
than nationalist. His populism has elements in common with other European populist leaders (attacking political parties and the political class), but he distances himself from them by presenting authoritarian traits. Nativism is completely absent (unlike in Europe), but ‘sovereignism’ (‘us’ vs. ‘other nations or institutions’) and ‘civilisationism’ (‘us’ vs. ‘minorities’) sometimes overlap with populism. We conclude that a tension exists between populism and nationalism that can endanger the ‘good’ relationship between the populist leader and their supporters. This is something that future
research on populism should consider.
... Policy goals have varied in time, space, and across denominations and are based on different interpretations of doctrine. Issues of concern have included the defense of human rights (Gill, 1998), social justice (Rodriguez, 2009;Kirkpatrick, 2019), sexuality politics, gender, and the family (Grzymala-Busse, 2015;Smith, 2019;Smith and Boas, 2020), and the regulation of religion (Cerqueira and Tuñón, 2019;Boas, Forthcoming). In these cases, structural changes and/or new issues brought onto the agenda motivate religious actors to organize as they sense a core belief is under threat. ...
... Religious competition arguments, particularly in Latin America, highlight how the growth of evangelicals in the last decades of the 20 th century has motivated the Catholic Church to organize in defense of human rights (Gill, 1998), indigenous mobilization (Trejo, 2009), and to shift away from social justice to gender and sexuality issues (Smith, 2019). Secularization and the growth of the non-religious have also sparked a reaction and increased political engagement from both Catholic and evangelical clergy, and in the opposite direction, movements of secularists responding to the association between religion and politics, particularly as a backlash to the religious right (Campbell et al., 2020). ...
Over the last decade, and throughout the Americas, evangelicals have strongly mobilized in defense of socially conservative agendas or against so-called “gender ideology,” sparking general and academic interest. Much less is known about progressive evangelicals. Using the unique juncture presented by the constitutional process in Chile, we study the politicization of a progressive evangelical identity and ask when these religious groups mobilize. We argue that intra-denominational competition for evangelical identity has played an important role in progressive evangelical mobilization, and more specifically the wish to differentiate themselves from conservative evangelicals, introduce a distance from the political right, and show the internal diversity of the community. This process occurs in response to an initial (conservative) politicization of religion. Drawing on campaign materials, surveys, and interviews, we provide evidence for this argument highlighting that policy preferences and theological interpretations are core differences among both groups, sparking countermobilization.
... Religion and religious values are another source of division in Latin American societies that are unrelated to class cleavages and redistributive issues. In the last two decades, secularization and progressive changes in issues such as LGBT rights, abortion, sexual education and traditional gender roles have led to the growing involvement of religious groups in electoral politics all over the region (Boas, 2020;Ortega, 2018;Smith, 2019;Villazón, 2014) Although these trends are most clearly associated with the rapid expansion of evangelical churches, Catholic conservatives have also played a role in the conservative reaction against secularization and progressive value changes (Smith, 2019;Corrales, 2020). ...
... Religion and religious values are another source of division in Latin American societies that are unrelated to class cleavages and redistributive issues. In the last two decades, secularization and progressive changes in issues such as LGBT rights, abortion, sexual education and traditional gender roles have led to the growing involvement of religious groups in electoral politics all over the region (Boas, 2020;Ortega, 2018;Smith, 2019;Villazón, 2014) Although these trends are most clearly associated with the rapid expansion of evangelical churches, Catholic conservatives have also played a role in the conservative reaction against secularization and progressive value changes (Smith, 2019;Corrales, 2020). ...
The left turn in Latin American countries in the 2000s and 2010s demonstrated the political right’s historical difficulties building competitive and enduring party alternatives in democracies with high levels of socioeconomic inequality. This chapter provides an explanation for the varying degrees of success for right-wing strategies of adaptation and survival during and after this wave of leftist governments. It argues that right-wing parties were most likely to survive and remain competitive in national elections when they relied on strong party organizations and party brands which, in turn, depended on the timing of parties’ foundation, the inheritance of valuable resources from previous authoritarian regimes and on the saliency of two key noneconomic cleavages – the secular-religious cleavage and the authoritarian-democratic cleavage.
... Trata-se de um ativismo político de viés majoritarista 3 e antipluralista 4 , pautado por pelejas morais, que combate projetos de promoção de direitos humanos e políticas antidiscriminatórias contra minorias sexuais. Além disso, faz uso eleitoral de notícias falsas e alarmantes sobre supostos riscos e ameaças, como "comunismo", "ideologia de gênero", "destruição da família tradicional", "perseguição aos cristãos", "erotização e homossexualização de crianças" e afins (Almeida 2019(Almeida , 2020Cowan 2018;Mariano & Gerardi 2019;Smith 2019). Sacralizando o direito à liberdade religiosa (Mariano 2006), líderes evangélicos de direita reclamam a prerrogativa de destilar publicamente suas convicções, mesmo que demonstrem aversão a modos de vida e identidades subalternas. ...
O artigo apresenta a reemergência pública do ativismo político da esquerda evangélica e a situa na conjuntura de recrudescimento da polarização política nacional e da radicalização ideológica da direita evangélica. Essa reemergência, como demonstrado, precede a ascensão bolsonarista. Tais atores evangélicos “progressistas” ou de “esquerda” competem com a direita evangélica por visibilidade e legitimidade, distinguem-se de seus pares conservadores, desautorizam seus líderes como representantes dos evangélicos e promovem valores progressistas nesse meio religioso por meio de um repertório ordenado com elementos organizativos e argumentativos.
... Since that year, a limited amount of sociodemographic "sorting" between petistas and antipetistas has occurred (Amaral 2020;Nicolau 2020;Smith 2019). For example, Layton and colleagues (2021) note that although demographics have not historically predicted positive or negative partisanship, Bolsonaro's 2018 campaign divided voters to some degree on race, religion, and gender. ...
In recent decades, Brazilian voters have grown polarized between supporters of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party, PT), known as petistas , and its opponents, known as antipetistas . What explains this animosity? One potential source of polarization is partisan stereotyping, a tendency for partisans to misperceive the social composition of both their own side’s bases of support as well as their opponents’. We show that most Brazilians overestimate the extent to which petistas and antipetistas belong to party-stereotypical groups such as Afro-Brazilians, evangelical Christians, or poor or rich people. We then show that stereotyping is associated with polarization: the greater the bias in perceived partisan group composition, the greater the perceptions of partisan political extremism and feelings of social distance toward the partisan out-group.
... A disputa travada em questões culturais, econômicas e políticas, com grupos e mesmo denominações religiosas, inseriram-se diretamente na política, como a exemplo da Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus, que possui partido próprio, ou pastores e outros líderes evangélicos buscando cargos, em sua maioria legislativos (Smith, 2019;Faith, 2020;Cunha, 2020). ...
... Uma série de mudanças progressistas, como a aprovação do casamento entre pessoas do mesmo sexo pelo STF nos anos 2010 motivou uma reação cultural conservadora liderada pelo clero evangélico. Na falta de partidos de direita consolidados, os religiosos conservadores se apoiaram em estratégias não-partidárias para promover uma guerra cultural contra os valores progressistas (SMITH, 2019).. Em segundo lugar, a reorganização da direita está diretamente ligada à ascensão de movimentos sociais liberais e conservadores que surgiram na esteira dos protestos em favor do impeachment de Dilma Rousseff entre 2015-2016 (SOLANO; DE OLIVEIRA ROCHA, 2019; SOLANO; ORTELLADO; MORETTO, 2017;TATAGIBA, 2018). Muitos desses movimentos foram criados por jovens ativistas de direita que sentiam que as suas ideias não eram adequadamente representadas em razão da hegemonia cultural da esquerda na academia e na mídia. ...
Este livro tem por objetivo explorar questões relativas às mudanças no sistema partidário e no comportamento dos eleitores em função da reorganização da direita e da ascensão de atores políticos e movimentos extremistas e/ou antissistema. São quatro as questões que motivam esse volume e que são exploradas ao longo dos capítulos:
● Em primeiro lugar, quem são os eleitores que constituem a base de apoio do presidente Bolsonaro e das novas forças de direita emergentes? Até que ponto as eleições de 2018 e 2022 representam um realinhamento eleitoral, indicando uma mudança nas lealdades dos eleitores?
● Em segundo lugar, até que ponto é possível dizer que vivemos uma nova onda de polarização, tanto ao nível das elites quanto das massas?
● Quais as principais estratégias de mobilização utilizadas pelas novas forças de direita para obter o apoio dos cidadãos nas ruas, nas redes e nas urnas? Qual a importância dos apelos populistas e da chamada “pauta de costumes” para explicar o comportamento dos eleitores e ativistas de direita?
● Por fim, até que ponto a ascensão da nova direita reflete um deslocamento do eixo da competição política, passando das questões econômicas para valores religiosos e tradicionais? É possível falar em uma reação cultural de segmentos conservadores do eleitorado insatisfeitos com mudanças progressistas na legislação e nos costumes, a exemplo da legalização do casamento gay?
... That is, rather than the mere distance between parties regarding their preferences on macroeconomic policies, the legislative polarisation should be measured on 1 This can be exemplified by the Brazilian case, wherein the Ministry of Foreign Affairs consistently does not rank amongst the most important portfolios in the country, either by expert and elite assessments or by objective measures of portfolio salience (Batista, 2017;Mauerberg e Pereira, 2020;Zucco et al., 2019). 2 Notwithstanding the increasing number of evangelicals in Latin America (Boas, 2021), the average Latin American party system has not seen a corresponding rise in political parties rooted in religious constituencies. Moreover, religious themes have not been pervasive in party systems even if congregants and clergy have increasingly engaged in political activities (Smith, 2019). 3 It would be wrong to state that ethnicity is irrelevant to Latin American politics whatsoever. ...
This dissertation assesses which conditions enable the transition of pre-electoral coalitions into coalition governments in Latin American presidential regimes through a multimethod research design. Even though most literature praises the fact that pre-electoral coalitions exert a non-negligible impact on government formation in presidentialism, I present a nuance to this relationship by arguing that pre-electoral coalitions are not automatically transformed into coalition cabinets in presidentialism. This is so because of the nature of presidential institutions, which grants presidents the opportunity to revise the pre-electoral agreement once they hold office at the same time that diminishes the extent to which pre-electoral coalition members can punish them. Against this backdrop, the first empirical paper puts forward and tests the claim that pre-electoral pacts should be more binding to the extent that legislative polarisation is more pervasive in the party system. The reason is that an increased ideological dividedness at the party system level reduces presidents’ margins to build coalition cabinets not based on the pre-electoral pact, as complexity bargaining hampers the presidential ability to assemble parties with conflicting policy preferences in the same cabinet. In addition, based on a configurational rationale, the second empirical paper investigates what makes pre-electoral coalitions serve as the foundations of post-electoral coalition cabinets, given that pre-electoral commitments can be enlarged, maintained or shrunk until the government’s inauguration day. The results highlight the importance of five conditions, albeit with more prominence for the pre-electoral coalition majority status, the low polarisation between pre-electoral coalition members and the high legislative polarisation. Taken together, the findings of this dissertation enlarge our knowledge of the relationship between pre-electoral coalitions and government formation in presidentialism by showing its entanglement with legislative polarisation.
... This article contributes to the literature on public opinion and legislative politics, even beyond those interested in SSM. First, we extend literature that evaluates the effect of religion (and other factors) on the public's views about policy or democracy (Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche 2015;Bishin and Smith 2013;Boas and Smith 2019;Smith 2019) by showing that religious beliefs outweigh ideological cleavages, emphasizing legislators' views rather than public opinion, and using religion as a contextual variable rather than solely at the individual level. Second, our interest in the religious environment, plus the legislators' intensive interactions with one another (Fowler 2006;Kirkland 2011), ties this study to the literature on networks and intergroup contact theory (Alemán and Calvo 2013;Allport 1954;Dion and Díez 2020;Pettigrew 1998), as well as the role of context or culture in shaping opinions Robinson 2012, 2022;Craig and Cornelius 1989;Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993). ...
Same-sex marriage has risen to the top of political agendas across Latin America, but it is still illegal in many countries. Public support about the issue varies greatly, and the roles of the courts, presidents, and legislatures have also differed. This article focuses on legislators because they are charged with representing the public and converting demands into policy. Although many legislatures have now voted on the issue, the literature has not intensively examined the policy makers’ attitudes toward same-sex marriage. This study applies a theoretical framework that extends theories considering context and social contact and uses a survey of the region’s legislators to study the correlates of support for same-sex marriage. Although the study also tests for individual-level variables (e.g., gender and ideology), the models focus on the contextual role of religiosity. The results show that having more secular colleagues encourages even pious legislators to support same-sex marriage.
... Um recente debate na literatura acrescentou à lista de posicionamentos ideológicos a categoria da nova direita, que combinaria ultraliberalismo econômico com uma reação conservadora contra o liberalismo nos costumes e contra o avanço de pautas progressistas (Câmara et al. 2020;Cowan, 2014;Cruz;Kaysel;Codas, 2015;Löwy, 2015;Mayka;Smith, 2021;Santos, 2020;Pierucci, 1987;Madeira, 2018;Madeira, 2020;Rocha, 2021;Moddelmog, 2019;Smith, 2019). ...
The article analyzes data from electoral programs for presidential elections in Brazil from 1994 to 2018 to describe how candidates stand on the ideological scale. The data produced and made available by the Manifesto Project allow measuring their leftist and rightist content and its variation over time. The analysis shows that leftist and rightist content coexist side by side in the platforms while confirming the ideological distinction among the alternatives. In addition, it applies ideology measures to compute and compare the polarization index in each election and shows its sudden increase in 2018.
KEYWORDS:
Ideology; Electoral competition; Manifestos; Presidential elections
... In 2018, the triumph of the far-right candidate Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil's presidential elections opened a niche for a more polarized, ideologically intense policy space, including diplomacy (Rennó, 2020). It also signaled the rise of religiously motivated conflict, or "culture wars" (Smith, 2019). Spektor (2022) notes, "The election in 2018 of Jair Bolsonaro further contributed to the general perception that Brazil is growing more isolated, weaker, and less influential in world politics" (p. ...
In recent decades, the relationship between Argentina and Brazil was understood as an alliance sustained by common interests and shared values. We argue that this assumption no longer holds, and that the relationship is going through a growing divide. In this article, we examine the evolution of Argentina–Brazil relations and carry out a plausibility probe to test three explanations of their rise and decline. To do so, we look at the shifting patterns of preferences (i.e., domestic coalitions and the electoral cycle), interests (i.e., business actors and trade patterns), and the shadow of the future (i.e., prospects for future interactions). We find that each of the three explanations contributes significantly to our understanding of the relationship's development and the challenges that lie ahead. En décadas recientes, las relaciones entre Argentina y Brasil se entendían como una alianza sostenida por intereses y valores comunes. Argumentamos que esta idea ya no es válida y que la relación está experimentando una división. En este artículo, analizamos la evolución de las relaciones entre Argentina y Brasil y ofrecemos tres tipos de explicaciones plausibles sobre el crecimiento y declive de la relación. Para este fin, consideramos los patrones cambiantes en las preferencias (es decir, las coaliciones domésticas y el ciclo electoral), los intereses (i.e., empresarios y patrones de comercio) y la perspectiva del futuro (i.e., posibilidades de interacciones a futuro). Hallamos que cada una de las tres explicaciones contribuye de manera significante a nuestra comprensión del desarrollo de la relación y de los retos por venir. 近几十年来，阿根廷和巴西之间的关系被理解为由共同利益和共同价值观维持的联盟。我们论证认为，这种假设不再成立，并且这种关系正在经历越来越大的分歧。本文中，我们分析了阿根廷与巴西关系的演变，并进行了合理性调查，以检验关于其兴衰的三种解释。为此，我们研究了偏好（即国内联盟和选举周期）、利益（即商业行动者和贸易模式）以及未来的预期（即未来互动的前景）的变化模式。我们发现，这三种解释都十分有助于我们理解这种关系的发展和未来的挑战。
... Studies document a number of ways in which religionan important source of social identityinfluences individual attitudes and behavior. Examples include the impact of church attendance on voting behavior (Smith 2019, Green 2010, the acquisition of civic skills (Djupe and Gilbert 2006), and political participation (Djupe and Grant 2001;McClendon and Riedl 2019). The literature also 1 World Economic Forum, "covid-19: What you need to know about the coronavirus pandemic;" accessed online on 10 May 2022. ...
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the CDC and the WHO have recommended face masks as key to reducing viral transmission. Yet, in the USA, as the first wave erupted in the Summer of 2020, one-fifth of individuals said they wore masks at most “some of the time”, and a majority said that people in their community wore masks at most “some of the time”. What strategies most effectively encourage compliance with this critical COVID-19 prevention measure? Relying on social identity theory, we experimentally assess two possible mechanisms of compliance, elite endorsement, and social norms, among a representative sample of white US-born Evangelicals, a group that has shown resistance to prevention measures. We find evidence for both mechanisms, but social norms play a remarkably important role – increasing support for mask-wearing by 6% with spillover effects on other prevention guidelines. Our findings confirm the role that appeals to norms and elite endorsements play in shaping individual behavior and offer lessons for public health messaging.
... Political parties have seldom tried to convey group-based appeals and have been largely unsuccessful when they did try, resulting in rather heterogeneous social bases of support without clear linkages with specific social groups (Mainwaring 1999). However, relevant exceptions could be made with regards to the PT's association with the Northeast (Hunter and Power 2007), the recent alignment of conservative Evangelicals with the right-wing (Quadros and Madeira 2018;Smith 2019), and the effect of gender and race on presidential vote in the 2018 election (Layton et al. 2021). In spite of these examples, the fact that social identities are generally 'only weakly politicised at best' (Zucco and Power 2020, 2) means that, even if some social groups are aligned with a particular partisan camp, the social sorting mechanism is unlikely to be a substantive driver of out-group hostility in Brazil. ...
High levels of hostility between those on opposing sides of politics have led to a burgeoning literature on the concept of affective polarization. Though a globally widespread phenomenon, extant literature has generated theoretical expectations and empirical findings mostly inspired by the United States and Western Europe. By studying the case of Brazil, I argue and show that traditional explanations do not provide satisfactory accounts of affective polarization in contexts where politics is only weakly structured by ideology or partisan attachments. I argue and show that in such contexts the concept of negative political identities can provide a much better explanation for why politics is so divisive. Using both the 2014 and 2018 waves of the Brazilian Electoral Studies (BES) and independently collected survey data (N = 1732), I provide robust empirical findings supporting the primacy of negative political identities over traditional explanations. Negative identification with the out-party/leader has a strong effect on dislike towards out-voters even when controlling for instrumental evaluations of political elites. This paper contributes to the comparative research agenda on affective polarization outside Western contexts, as well as to the study of negative political identities.
... Thus religion has once again become a potent political force in Brazilian elections. Evangelicals display distinct electoral behavior when compared to other voters in past elections (Smith 2019). For example, past presidential candidates Anthony Garotinho and Marina Silva received a great deal of support from this voting bloc in 2002 and 2006, respectively (Borges and Vidigal 2018). ...
Mounting evidence shows that authoritarian orientations exert a powerful influence on public opinion attitudes and candidate support. The 2018 Brazilian elections brought to power Jair Bolsonaro, a candidate with an open disregard for democracy and democratic institutions. This study examines Brazilian voters’ differences in authoritarianism and electoral support for a right-wing authoritarian candidate. It employs the AmericasBarometer national survey data to demonstrate that authoritarianism is politically important in Brazil because of its association with attitudes toward the use of force as well as with conservative social and political attitudes. The effect of authoritarianism on the probability of voting for Bolsonaro is as large as that of other relevant political behavior variables such as ideology, negative partisanship, or religiosity, whereas nonauthoritarian voters spread their votes across other candidates. Although these other variables are also relevant to Bolsonaro’s victory, his candidacy was uniquely able to mobilize a coalition of authoritarian voters. Whether or not authoritarianism remains a salient cleavage in the electorate is considered along with the consequences of this potential divide for political competition in Brazilian politics.
... Religious leaders frequently intervene in political issues to influence the worldly beliefs and behaviors of their followers (Boas and Smith 2015;Conda, Isaqzadeh, and Linardi 2019;Djupe and Gilbert 2009;Genovese 2019;Margolis 2018a;Smith 2019;Wallsten and Nteta 2016;Warner 2000). When religious actors engage with politics, what are the consequences for religion? ...
A growing body of research demonstrates that political involvement by Christian religious leaders can undermine the religion's social influence. Do these negative consequences of politicization also extend to Islam? Contrary to scholarly and popular accounts that describe Islam as inherently political, we argue that Muslim religious leaders will weaken their religious authority when they engage with politics. We test this argument with a conjoint experiment implemented on a survey of more than 12,000 Sunni Muslim respondents in eleven Middle Eastern countries. The results show that connections to political issues or politically active religious movements decrease the perceived religious authority of Muslim clerics, including among respondents who approve of the clerics' political views. The article's findings shed light on how Muslims in the Middle East understand the relationship between religion and politics, and they contribute more broadly to understanding of how politicized religious leaders can have negative repercussions for religion.
... The same is true for immigration, which has been far more polarizing outside Latin America. Support for issues of gender and sexuality has come, sometimes hesitantly, from parties of the left (Friedman 2019) and been opposed by conservative parties and the rising evangelical movement (Boas and Smith 2015;Smith 2019). In sum, socio-cultural demands have generally mapped well onto the existing socioeconomic cleavage. ...
The degree to which party systems are ideologically and programmatically structured is central to democracy. This article analyzes differences in the extent and nature of programmatic structuration in Latin America and Europe, using a new original data source, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey-Latin America (CHES-LA), in combination with the long-standing CHES-Europe. First, we demonstrate the reliability of CHES-LA in relation to CHES-Europe, and substantiate its validity by comparing it to other expert, elite and party manifesto surveys in Latin America. Using confirmatory factor analysis, we then show that while party system structuration in Latin America is somewhat lower than in Europe, it is also of a decisively different nature. In Latin America economic and socio-cultural policy positions are largely captured in a single overlapping dimension; in Europe, by contrast, competition occurs overwhelmingly along two dimensions, each with distinct clusters of policy positions.
... Doctrinally, at least, the Catholic Church has at times been "more accepting" of LGBTQ people than other Christian faiths, creating, for instance, same-sex communities (monasteries and nunneries) and making a distinction between homosexual desire (acceptable) and homosexual acts (unacceptable) (Summers 2004). Evangelicals are not only more dogmatic on LGBTQ issues, but also more organized and have deep roots across society (Malamud 2018, Zilla 2018, Corrales and Sagarzazu 2019, Smith 2019, Boas 2021). Corrales (2020) examines Evangelical churches using analytical tools designed to evaluate the relative political strength of NGOs, and concludes that in terms of unity, ability to raise funds, reach across classes and sectors, ability to expand, and connectedness to constituents (church goers), there is no other NGO (and possibly institution) in Latin America that can rival Evangelicals. ...
The first section of this Element reviews the history of LGBTQ rights in the region since the 1960s. The second section reviews explanations for the expansion of rights and setbacks, especially since the mid 2000s. Explanations are organized according to three themes: (1) the (re-)emergence of a religious cleavage; (2) the role of political institutions such as presidential leadership, political parties, federalism, courts, and transnational forces; and (3) the role of social movement strategies, and especially, unity. The last section compares the progress on LGBTQ rights (significant) with reproductive rights (insignificant). This Element concludes with an overview of the causes and possible future direction of the current backlash against LGBTQ rights.
... A despeito da enorme desigualdade social, agravada pelas diferenças racial, regional e de gênero, não há, porém, fortes indícios de que a clivagem social seja um fenômeno relevante no Brasil (Samuels, 2006;Morgan, 2015;Smith, 2019;Telles, 2004). ...
Esse artigo investiga a origem da polarização política entre diversos grupos sociais e a intenção de voto do PT, usando como base a opinião pública sobre temas relacionados à agenda econômica e moral, de 1989 a 2019. Os resultados mostraram que a polarização política de clivagens sociais é fraca no Brasil e a dimensão econômica tem um peso maior do que a dimensão moral para a decisão do voto. Além disso, os resultados mostraram que o brasileiro é mais conservador para os assuntos da dimensão moral e mais estadista para a dimensão econômica.
... There are, today, important overlaps cutting across different denominations, affecting the way they seek to influence values and policies. Evangelicals and Catholics share similar views on many social and moral subjects, such as abortion (Bohn, 2004;Smith, 2019). They have gradually become a more explicit and stronger political force, mobilizing voters and forming fronts in national, state and municipal parliaments, hence advancing Christianiity as a public religion 2 (Burity, 2016(Burity, , 2020Zúquete, 2017). 1 In 2018, Rio de Janeiro's Civil Police transferred to the Museu da República (Museum of the Republic) religious artifacts from religions of African origin that were confiscated in the previous century due to religious persecution conducted by the state. ...
This chapter discusses the religious dimension of political discourse in contemporary Brazil. Christianity (in different traditions) is a central element of Brazilian culture, shaping practice, behavior, discourse and institutions. Taken-for-granted as part of the lifeworld, Christian religiosity has always been important to the comprehension of what can be said and, more importantly, what shouldn’t be said in the public sphere. As part of their environment, political candidates and political representatives often return—strategically or unintentionally—to established beliefs and rooted practices in order to make sense to their audiences. This study presents a case study of the current Brazilian President, Jair Bolsonaro, whose forms of expression are deeply and profusely marked by religious elements. Combining Catholic symbols, Pentecostal narratives and deference to Judaism, Bolsonaro’s discourse touches on messianic promises of salvation, order and struggle against persecution. The chapter analyzes his weekly live appearances on YouTube, where he presents his achievements and plans, restating his campaign motto: “Brazil above everything, God above everyone.” Full of biblical references and religious symbols, his performances show the vapidity of the country’s alleged secularism, pointing to the acceptance of majoritarian beliefs against the constitutional laicité.
... Speeches laden with religious content influence the nature and extent of participation in ethnically divided democracies (McClendon and Riedl 2019). Catholic clergy have been influential spokespeople for political ideas in Brazil and Hungary (Smith 2019;Tuñón 2017;Wittenberg 2006). Islamist parties appear to enjoy an electoral head start owing to their perceived "sacred" ties (Grewal et al 2019). ...
Mass ritualized gatherings like pilgrimages are central to religious practice globally. Do they generate votes for religious parties? The events may heighten religiosity, enlarging support for parties seen as owning religious policy issues. Such parties might also co-opt the events to organize and campaign. We evaluate the electoral impact of India's Kumbh Mela, a Hindu festival considered the world's biggest human assembly, leveraging its astrologically determined timing combined with districts' proximity by rail to the festival sites. The Kumbh Mela boosts Hindu nationalists' vote share. Mechanisms tests suggest it does so by increasing religious orthodoxy—seen in the adoption of Brahminical dietary practices—and by strengthening party capacity. There are mixed effects on communal conflict. The events are electorally polarizing; they cause India's main secular-leaning party to perform better in regions with denser concentrations of religious minorities. Our study offers a new account of how confessional parties make inroads in multiethnic democracies.
This article explores how in Peru, where a close union between the state and the Catholic Church endured until the mid-twentieth century, and where the latter exerted a strong influence in the public sphere, various developments in society and within Catholicism during the second half of the century brought an end, on both the legal and public levels, to this state of affairs. Events and processes are analyzed based on the source material and arguments proposed in order to understand the process of change. The study can contribute to a discussion about the significance of the processes of change whereby societies, amid multiple transformations, can shift from contexts of state-backed and protected faith to institutional separations. It can also enrich the debate around the characteristics of secularization in Latin America.
In 2011, Jair Bolsonaro initiated a fight against the federal program proposal School without Homophobia (2009), which aimed to educate children, school staff, and parents on the respect to sexual diversity and prevention of violence against LGBTQIA + students. Bolsonaro's Gay Kit unleashed an anti-gender campaign in Brazil. The fight against "gender ideology" that follows Jair Bolsonaro initial campaign indicates a turn in the articulation and the discourse of conservative and right-wing actors. This anti-gender campaign brough together groups that historically have been divided along class, race and gender lines, such as radical Catholic, middle- and upper-class white conservative Brazilians, and Neo-Pentecostals. In this paper, I analyze the power of the anti-gender campaign unleashed since the 2010s to find a common enemy, a common language and a common interest among conservative sectors of Brazilian society. I argue that gender works as the main symbolic glue that helps right-wing actors to forge a common identity in opposition to a new common Other, namely leftists. The main factor bridging them together is the preservation of the masculinist national identity that denies any form of structural inequality and critical thinking.
La violencia política contra las mujeres se ha agudizado en el contexto de polarización respecto al avance de los derechos políticos y sociales de las mujeres. Esta situación no solo impacta en las mujeres como sujetos políticos, sino también en el funcionamiento del régimen político en su conjunto y, por lo tanto, debe ser atendida en la reflexión sobre la regresión democrática. La profundidad y relevancia de este problema todavía no se refleja de manera adecuada en la reflexión académica. Por ello, este número de la Revista Elecciones se propone abrir un espacio para reflexionar sobre estos problemas en la región.
The past decade has seen sweeping changes in terms of reproductive rights in Latin America. Argentina and Uruguay have fully legalized abortion in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. Some countries, like Chile, have loosened restrictions; others like El Salvador, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic have maintained or even tightened some of the most punitive abortion laws in the world. Abortion rights even vary within countries—in Mexico, the practice has been fully legal in certain states, and punishable with jail time in others. This Element explains how feminist social movements have transformed the politics of abortion in Latin America.
This study looks at the relationships between religion, democracy, and peace. It is based on this premise that this article examines how religion is used to consolidate democracy and promote peace in societies, using Nigeria as its framework of analysis. Using the qualitative method of analysis where emphasis is placed on primary and secondary documents, which involve articles, reports, and newspaper articles triangulating with key informant interviews (KIIs) and stakeholder analysis, the findings of this article suggest that religion plays a significant role in the consolidation of democracy and peace given its important place in advocating some principles and ideals of democracy, which involve equity, fairness, freedom, pluralism, respect for diversities, and defending minority rights, amongst others. However, challenges associated with the weaponization of religion to pursue selfish political agenda and interests by both religious and political elites in Nigeria has become more of a norm than what is expected between both variables. This has helped in the creation of a hostile and unstable political environment, and in the pervasion of democratic and political institutions and agencies responsible for promoting accountable leadership, good governance, representative governance, political interference, and repressive policies, limiting the rights and freedoms of citizens who continue to impede the enhancement of a strongly consolidated democratic culture and peace in transition democracies such as Nigeria. This article suggests the need for relevant actors to ensure that institutions of the state are strengthened to provide the dividends of democracy. This can be achieved by addressing the challenge of the negative use of religion by the elites to advance unholy political interests and agenda. It is also important to create machinery to address the structural problems that breed poverty; political, economic, and social exclusion; and human rights abuses, limiting political and electoral freedoms. Addressing these challenges also requires relevant stakeholders and actors to understand that the process is multi-pronged, which also requires acknowledging, accommodating, and accepting individual and group diversities and, above all, requires the patience and the political will of these actors to ensure its actualization. Addressing these concerns will significantly strengthen and enhance the consolidation of democracy and peace in fragile and transition societies.
O objetivo do artigo é examinar a interação entre religião, sexo e cor/raça num modelo que investiga o voto em Bolsonaro. Almeja-se compreender o que acontece com o efeito da identidade evangélica quando se considera outras características sociais do eleitor, que foram identificadas como variáveis negativamente associadas ao voto em Bolsonaro. Utilizando dados do ESEB 2018, a escolha dessas variáveis foi orientada tanto pela literatura sobre efeitos heterogêneos, quanto pelo contexto eleitoral de 2018. Os resultados do trabalho, alcançados por meio de regressões logísticas binomiais (glm), rejeitam a hipótese de que a identidade evangélica blinda o fiel das influências que vem de outras fontes sociais, como sexo e cor. Conclui-se que entre as evangélicas pretas houve a menor probabilidade de votar em Bolsonaro em 2018. Como os modelos controlam pelo efeito de variáveis econômicas, uma das explicações para o resultado apontado é que há mecanismos relacionados à cor e ao sexo (identidade de gênero e raça) dos fiéis que mitigam o voto naquele candidato. [https://www.agendapolitica.ufscar.br/index.php/agendapolitica/article/view/799]
Durante a sindemia do novo coronavírus, parlamentares cristãos, nas redes sociais e nas tribunas legislativas, se mobilizaram em torno de projetos e pregações que defendiam que os templos permanecessem abertos, ainda que isso contribuísse para o agravamento da crise sanitária, gerando mais mortes. Neste artigo, indagamos como atores do campo religioso evangélico se utilizaram da sindemia de covid-19 para reconfigurar o campo do poder político no Brasil a partir da legitimação dos serviços prestados por suas instituições na vida social. Partimos da ideia da constituição, no interior da crise socialeconômica neoliberal, de um reacionarismo político-religioso cristão, que conjuga a ideia de liberdade individual (de ir e vir, de opinião) ao imaginário de “perseguição à fé cristã”, “ditadura do judiciário” e “comunismo” supostamente em curso no mundo e no Brasil. O lema ambivalente “Falar de Cristo, hoje, para não ser impedido de falar amanhã”, alimenta bolhas autoimunes e ação libertária, lastreadas na celebração identitária (nação cristã) e na confusão entre coisa pública e moral particular. Por meio de metodologia quanti-qualitativa, coletamos dados da mobilização (legislativa, digital e sociorreligiosa) de parlamentares ligados à diversas igrejas nas cinco regiões geopolíticas brasileiras.
The article explores the impact of agribusiness on the politics of legislative elections in Brazil. The central argument is that social contexts dominated by agribusiness tend to amplify the number of right‐wing micro‐parties, due firstly to the economic interests prevalent in such regions and secondly given the ‘catch all’ nature of Brazil's traditional right and centre‐right political parties. By showing how agribusiness favours the proliferation of small parties, we may also reveal one of the main reasons behind the ‘hyperfragmentation’ of Brazil's party system.
Com o objetivo de identificar tanto espaços quanto momentos de atuação que sejam, de fato, promissores no enfrentamento das desigualdades de representação eleitoral e promover a representação política dos grupos marginalizados, este estudo se concentra sobretudo nas etapas de recrutamento de candidatos/as e campanhas eleitorais. Ao fazer isso, ele fornece uma análise focada dos principais fatores que dificultam o acesso e as chances de eleição das pessoas de grupos marginalizados no Brasil.
Economic development has been linked to a declining importance of religion. But alongside secularization, there has been an increased salience of religion in electoral politics. These seemingly contradictory trends can be understood by distinguishing between two dimensions of religiosity: religious belief and church attendance. We show that religious voting cleavages are strongest in democracies where there is religious cohesion, which means belief and practice go hand in hand. Voting cleavages require group members to have distinctive policy preferences and be politically engaged. Strong religious beliefs are associated with distinctive policy preferences (but not with political engagement), and church attendance is associated with political engagement. Thus, religious cohesion provides the key ingredients for a religious political cleavage. But what explains variation in religious cohesion in democracies? We find that religious cohesion increases with economic security. Thus, economic security can promote secularization, but also facilitate the religious cohesion associated with strong religious voting cleavages.
In contemporary Latin America, deep-seated social discontent with political elites and institutions has been, paradoxically, the counterpart of democratic stability and resilience. This paradox suggests that scholarly assessments of democracy are, at least partially, at odds with citizens’ own views of democracy. This article thus develops a framework to describe citizens’ everyday experience with civil, political, and social entitlements associated with democracy. It introduces the framework by analyzing the structural underpinnings of democratic discontent in Chile and then applying it to the analysis of perceived citizenship entitlements in 18 countries, using the AmericasBarometer data. Significant variance is observed across time and both across and within countries. The descriptive findings also imply that only a (declining) minority of Latin American citizens feel fully entitled to civil, political, and social citizenship rights. We advocate the need to bring the demand side of democracy back to the analysis of democratic shortcomings and crises.
An analysis of more than 2,000 speeches and social media posts on foreign policy issues from four members of Jair Bolsonaro’s government from January 2019 to December 2020 suggests that a conspiracy theory called “globalism,” which explains current events using a series of intrigues and stratagems carried out by fictitious enemies to undermine the national order, has not only taken root in Brazil’s foreign policy narrative but consistently been used over time by the cabinet members responsible for that policy. It also indicates that the use of “globalism” is not just a political strategy to persuade voters but a worldview embedded in Bolsonaro’s far-right cabinet.
Uma análise de mais de 2.000 discursos e posts provenientes de redes sociais sobre questões da política externa do Brasil por quatro membros do gabinete do governo de Jair Bolsonaro de janeiro de 2019 a dezembro de 2020 indica que a teoria de conspiração denominada “globalismo,” que explica atualidades em termos de uma série de intrigas e estratégias implementadas por inimigos fictícios para minar a ordem nacional, não se arreigou apenas na narrativa exibida na política exterior brasileira mas também se utilizou há anos pelos mesmos membros do gabinete que são responsáveis por sua elaboração. Isso significa que o uso do “globalismo” não é só uma estratégia política para convencer eleitores mas é também uma visão do mundo que é enraizada no gabinete de Bolsonaro cuja origem reside na extreme direita.
This article explores the impact conservative criticism has had on companies’ behaviour in Brazil. We investigate whether Natura and Boticário − the two largest Brazilian cosmetics companies − have maintained or reversed LGBTQ-oriented marketing and advertising when confronted with criticism from conservative groups. We draw on interviews with stakeholders, company investors and LGBTQ activists, in addition to complaints filed with the Conselho Nacional de Autorregulamentação Publicitária (National Council for Advertising Self-Regulation, CONAR), and companies’ documents on finance and social responsibility. Overall, even when faced with a negative backlash from conservative opinion, companies have persisted in their commitment to diversity issues and LGBTQ inclusion in marketing. However, firms have also employed evasive strategies, such as targeted communication and less controversial forms of retail design, signalling compromises with conservative stakeholders and customers.
Evangelical Christians and especially Neo-Pentecostals in Brazil have gone from accepting a position as junior partners in a broad governing coalition led by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party—PT) to asserting themselves as an indispensable pillar of the Jair Bolsonaro administration. A close examination of the career of the prominent Bolsonarist pastor Silas Malafaia suggests that if progressives want to improve their political relationship with evangelical voters they must first find discursive and material ways to neutralize or at least work around the most prominent and virulently conservative faith leaders.
Os cristãos evangélicos (em particular os neo-pentecostais) no Brasil passaram de aceitar uma posição de ser parceiros menores numa coligação governamental abrangente dirigida pelo Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) para impor-se como pilar imprescindível do governo de Jair Bolsonaro. Uma análise exhaustiva da trajetória do renomado pastor bolsonarista, Silas Malafaia constata que se os progessistas quiserem melhorar a sua relação política com eleitores evangélicos, eles devem por primeiro descobrir meios discursivos e materiais para neutralizar ou, no mínimo, evitar os líderes religiosos que são os mais preeminentes e fortemente conservadores nesses grupos sociais.
Gender and sexuality have become a focal point of the political divide in Latin America. In many countries, religious actors, political leaders, pro-life and pro-family nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), among others, have come together to promote a neoconservative shift in contemporary regional politics. Despite the constant public presence of religious actors and their long-standing influence on public policies in the region, recent challenges to sexual and reproductive rights have come from a field in transformation. The anti-abortion mobilization shows important signs of adaptation and mutation on different fronts – networks, alliances, strategies, and frameworks. Finally, this process of renovation has led to the expansion of this dispute towards a broader anti-gender alliance, and the increasing importance of legal strategies and tools by anti-abortion actors is remarkable. The transformations in the anti-abortion field were globally put into action after the conservatives’ defeat in the UN Conference in Cairo, and they also interacted with different local processes, in response to the relational dynamics between movement and countermovement. However, we can see important convergences among Latin-American cases. Drawing on evidence from case studies of countries in the region, this article analyses the main characteristics of contemporary anti-abortion activism in Latin America. It identifies significant commonalities among the cases and raises the hypotheses that shifts in the composition of the anti-abortion networks, in mobilization strategies and frames are inserted in a trend that has been transnationally diffused and subject to different processes of vernacularization. This article ultimately calls attention to the need for more empirical research to address the regional dynamics of transnational actors, diffusion processes, and local adaptations.
Why does the evangelical political representation in Latin American parliaments vary so much? Based on a study of the cases of Brazil, Colombia and Chile, I argue that the growth of the evangelical population, per se, does not necessarily translate into a greater number of elected evangelicals. The transformation of evangelical growth into political representation is mediated by political institutions and the internal structure of the churches.
The religious communication approach concerns the identification of causal explanations of political behavior through the explicit measurement of exposure to communication and the variable reception and adoption of the messages in a religious context. The approach requires more questions or different research designs than those on omnibus surveys, which focus on religious affiliation and religiosity. It is particularly amenable to experimentation, where exposure is manipulated by the researcher and adoption can be measured precisely. However, experimental research, such as about religious elite influence, often returns different results than those from observational research wherein histories between clergy and congregants may overwhelm the delicate mechanisms of persuasion. Research from congregations points toward credibility and salience as important conditions for religious influence, which help reconcile experimental and observational results. This review article covers how organizational forces shape communication strategies, especially concerning when and how politics and democratic norms are engaged by clergy. Contrary to simple survey evidence that Americans oppose politics in churches, this approach suggests that politics is an important piece of congregational affairs that attracts and retains people, though there are clearly conditions when it repels. In this way, the religious communication approach is essential to understanding religious engagement with politics.
Conventional wisdom among scholars of Latin American politics holds that informal workers are less participatory and less left-leaning than formal workers. Relevant empirical findings, however, are mixed and in need of synthesis. This article provides that synthesis by conducting meta-analyses on the universe of previous quantitative studies of informality and the vote. It finds that informal workers are indeed less likely to vote than formal workers, but the effect of informality is small—just four to seven percentage points. It further finds that informal workers are more likely to vote for the left, not the right, but here the effect size is even smaller. Meta-regression analyses reveal that in countries where organized professional activity among informal workers is high, gaps in turnout between the two sectors are minimal. The article concludes that the conventional wisdom over-states the individual-level political consequences of labor informality in Latin America.
Jair Messias Bolsonaro venceu as eleições presidenciais de 2018 no Brasil com o apoio de quase 70% dos evangélicos e cerca de 50% dos católicos do país. Este artigo tem como objetivo explorar algumas das teologias políticas e influentes que são disseminadas por alguns dos aliados religiosos de Bolsonaro, construindo três tipologias teológicas: Sobrenaturalismo neoliberal, dualismo apocalíptico e neoconservadorismo católico. Sobrenaturalismo neoliberal, dualismo apocalíptico e neoconservadorismo católico. Além disso, argumentamos que a Nova Direita Cristã no Brasil é comparável ao fenômeno ‘the Christian Right’, típico dos Estados Unidos, devido às condições políticas e bandeiras morais semelhantes. A ascensão de Bolsonaro e a virada para a direita na política brasileira podem ser em parte entendidas como um efeito dessa nova aliança política legitimado de três forças cristãs politicamente conservadoras e suas teologias: o pentecostalismo tradicional, o neopentecostalismo e o catolicismo neoconservador. Embora haja traços autoritários dentro do que pode ser chamado a Nova Direita Cristã do Brasil, também se pode reconhecer esse fenômeno políti- co como uma contribuição à democracia brasileira.
The adoption of SOGI policies depends on the strategies activists choose to support or oppose them. Nevertheless, the conditions that explain why some strategies are prioritised over others are not evident. In Peru, the 2013 debate over civil unions prompted a strategic shift in which the conservative wing started to benefit from intensive street mobilisation strategies. Why did this change occur? We argue that a deeply divided electoral competition and the decay of the Catholic Church's moral authority favoured this outcome. This article analyses the trajectory of these strategies over time to identify the conditions that contributed to the shift.
Populists often demonize outgroups while undermining institutions that protect citizens against the abuse of state power. Under these conditions, how can vulnerable communities protect themselves? We argue that actors coupling a normative commitment to human rights with the local organizational capacity to intervene can systematically reduce victimization. Focusing on the Philippine Catholic Church in the country's ongoing “drug war,” we identify five potential mechanisms producing protection. Directly, these actors can raise attention, offer sanctuary, or disrupt enforcement, while indirectly they can shrink vulnerable populations and build local solidarity. We evaluate this argument with a mixed‐method research design. A new dataset of over 2,000 drug war killings throughout Metro Manila shows that neighborhoods with a Catholic parish experience approximately 30% fewer killings than those without. Original interviews with clergy and laity in these parishes support both direct and indirect mechanisms, with strongest evidence for attention raising and building community solidarity.
Populist politicians surrounded by military allies are a frequent sight in countries that have experienced democratic backsliding. Populists sometimes seek protection in the military, who in turn leverage the relationship to advance their own interests. Despite the recent wave of populism, the burgeoning literature on it has not devoted due attention to analysing the populist-military relationship; its origins, outcomes, and tensions. This article analyses the Brazilian military’s re-appearance under President Jair Bolsonaro. Absent the usual institutional support bases on which Brazilian presidents rely, Bolsonaro has cultivated military support with resources and positions that allow officers expanded political power and privilege. An equilibrium held for the government’s first two years. Thereafter, growing reservations about propping up an increasingly unpopular president, especially by heeding orders that would threaten their professional integrity, put in question the future of the armed forces as a pillar of the Bolsonaro administration. At the same time, the military’s substantial expansion in government and state positions under Bolsonaro raises the specter of elevated military autonomy under future administrations. This would be problematic for popular sovereignty, a cornerstone of democracy, even if uniformed officers are not saber-rattling, mounting coups or occupying presidential office.
This article analyzes novel patterns of interaction between right-wing parties and protest movements during major contentious cycles in Argentina (2012–13) and Brazil (2013–16), which preceded the advent of the Cambiemos coalition in the former and the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in the latter. Drawing on a dual process-tracing strategy and a wide range of data sources, this study shows that these interactions are central to understanding why and how right-wing parties leverage novel repertoires and resources from digital activists during contemporary protest cycles, a dynamic conceptualized as a new party linkage strategy through digital intermediation. The study traces its three-phase development in both countries, revealing how differences in institutional contexts and the strength of activist groups contributed to divergent trajectories of partisan opposition toward the end of the cycles, regarding both the subsequent reconfiguration of the right and the entry of digital activists into institutional arenas.
This article argues that descriptive representation, or demographic similarities between legislators and the public, can provide effective substantive representation of citizens’ concerns. We examine representation through the lens of opinion congruence or alignment in the policy preferences of legislators and citizens sharing various identities. Congruence may result from shared material interests or from self-selection into an identity group on the basis of policy views, but it can also be a product of networks and organizations that socialize masses and elites into a common worldview. Though political parties were historically the most important agents of political socialization, we argue that religious organizations constitute a more powerful socializing force in many new democracies. Examining the case of Brazil, we draw on three legislative surveys and fifteen mass surveys to analyze congruence across seven issue areas. Legislators and voters from underrepresented groups—women, Afro-Brazilians, evangelical Christians, and those of lower social class—are generally closer in their opinions than those sharing a party or electoral district. Evangelicals are often the most congruent. Analyzing original surveys of congregations and clergy, we argue that this finding results from the socializing role of churches.
Traditional scholarship approaches religious history from the demand side, attributing developments to the shifting desires, perceptions, and circumstances of religious consumers. This article advocates an alternative, supply-side approach that emphasizes the opportunities and restrictions confronting religious organizations and their leaders. Supply shifts lie at the root of major religious changes in America. Colonial revivalists, Asian cult leaders, and contemporary televangelists all prospered when regulatory changes gave them freer access to America's religious marketplace. The article concludes with a discussion of recent judicial decisions that threaten to restrict the future supply of religious innovation in America.
The relation between religious organizations and political authority is notoriously tense. Max Weber argued that this is because both compete over the same resource: human commitment. This article revisits Weber’s hypothesis. Specifically, we explore two psychological mechanisms through which Protestant missionaries affect political authority: obedience and persuadability. Exploiting exogenous variation in missionary activity in Peru, we demonstrate that missionaries make converts more obedient, which we attribute to a theological and a social mechanism. Yet, we also find that missionaries make converts less susceptible to persuasion by political authorities because they shift attention from secular topics to questions of theological importance, and endorse a skeptical stance toward the government. Exploiting variation in treatment intensity, we argue that the degree to which political authority is affected depends on a given mission’s theological strictness. We arrive at these findings by combining experimental outcomes and process-tracing evidence using Bayesian integration.
The objective of this article is to discuss the theory of popularization of the social profile of Brazilian parliamentarians, emphasizing that the literature on the subject, by ignoring the asymmetric relations of institutional power among legislators, may be biased in its diagnosis of the characteristics of political representation in Brazil. Based on an analysis of the temporal distribution of educational, occupational and gender profiles of deputies and senators between 1995 and 2010, it concludes that popularization occurs at different levels in the profiles of individual parliamentarians, parliamentary groups and legislative bodies. Furthermore, it suggests that in some situations it would be more appropriate to qualify these processes as a diversification of the social profile of legislators, rather than a popularization as such.
This article analyses the June 2013 wave of political protests in Brazil, highlighting student movement participation. We make three arguments. First, this was not a single student movement, but a cycle of protest, consisting of many different actors, issues, and forms of demonstration. Second, protesters built what we call hybrid performances, drawing on three repertoires of contention: socialist, autonomist and patriotic. Third, the protests presented a strong rejection of political parties, problematising the relationship between social movements, political parties, and institutional politics.
Though the degree of influence that US bishops have over Catholic parishioners is inconsistent, the institutional power bishops have over parish priests suggests that bishops enjoy reliable influence over their local subordinates. However, there are an array of competing influences over parish priests that, when made salient, might make priest reliance on bishop instructions for political behavior less reliable. Using data from the first ever survey experiment on a national sample of US Catholic priests, we assess the effects of randomly priming priests with varying considerations of their professional responsibilities and relevant constituencies (including parishioner expectations). Results suggest that priests opt to rely on bishop cues when primed to consider institutional responsibilities as part of their professional identity, but that bishop influence over priest political behavior is, at best, indirect.
This book analyzes the place and influence of religion in European politics. François Foret presents the first data ever collected on the religious beliefs of European decision makers and what they do with these beliefs. Discussing popular assumptions such as the return of religion, aggressive European secularism, and religious lobbying, Foret offers objective data and non-normative conceptual frameworks to clarify some major issues in the contemporary political debate.
In October 2009, a private member introduced the Anti-Homosexuality Bill to Uganda's Parliament for consideration. This article analyzes the Bill within a broader context of transnational antigay activism, specifically the diverse ways that antigay activism in Uganda is shaped by global dynamics (such as the U.S. Christian Right's pro-family agenda) and local forms of knowledge and concerns over culture, national identity, and political and socio-economic issues/interests. This article lends insight into how transnational antigay activism connects to and reinforces colonialinspired scripts about "African" sexuality and the deepening power inequalities between the global North and South under global neoliberalism, and raises some important questions about how the racial and gender politics of the U.S. Christian Right's pro-family agenda travel and manifest within the Ugandan context.
The Price of Freedom Denied shows that, contrary to popular opinion, ensuring religious freedom for all reduces violent religious persecution and conflict. Others have suggested that restrictions on religion are necessary to maintain order or preserve a peaceful religious homogeneity. Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke show that restricting religious freedoms is associated with higher levels of violent persecution. Relying on a new source of coded data for nearly 200 countries and case studies of six countries, the book offers a global profile of religious freedom and religious persecution. Grim and Finke report that persecution is evident in all regions and is standard fare for many. They also find that religious freedoms are routinely denied and that government and the society at large serve to restrict these freedoms. They conclude that the price of freedom denied is high indeed.
The issue of religious liberty has gained ever-increasing attention among policy makers and the public. Whereas politicians have long championed the idea of religious freedom and tolerance, the actual achievement of these goals has been an arduous battle for religious minorities. What motivates political leaders to create laws providing for greater religious liberty? In contrast to scholars who argue that religious liberty results from the spread of secularization and modern ideas, Anthony Gill argues that religious liberty results from interest-based calculations of secular rulers. Using insights from political economists, Gill develops a theory of the origins of religious liberty based upon the political and economic interests of governing officials. Political leaders are most likely to permit religious freedom when it enhances their own political survival, tax revenue, and the economic welfare of their country. He explores his theory using cases from British America, Latin America, Russia, and the Baltic states.
Why has protest participation seemingly exploded across much of Latin America in recent years? How do individual- and country-level characteristics interact to explain the rise of contentious politics in countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela? I contend that the recent wave of protests in Latin America is the result of trends in community engagement and institutional development across the region’s young democracies. Specifically, I argue that low-quality institutions in democratic regimes push an increasingly large number of civically active Latin Americans toward more radical modes of political participation, as governments’ abilities to deliver on citizens’ expectations fail to match the capacity for mobilization of active democrats. Drawing on cross-national surveys of Latin America, I test this argument, finding that an interactive relationship between community engagement and ineffective political institutions helps explain the recent spike in protest activity in certain cases and the vast differences in protest participation observed throughout the region.
There are numerous studies of the effects of partisan cues in established party systems, but almost none on how they affect voting in new party systems. This lacuna might stem from untested assumptions that partisan cues are un-influential where parties lack multigenerational psychological bonds with citizens and long-standing records. Alternatively, we theorize that even in new party systems, voters use partisan cues to assess candidates’ capabilities, preferences, and electoral viability. We test this theory through an experiment in which we varied inclusion of party identifiers on mock ballots in Uganda, where the multiparty system was only 5 years old. We find that partisan cues increased selection of major-party candidates over independents, casting of straight-ticket ballots, and votes for copartisans. Our results challenge the common assumption that partisan labels are irrelevant in new party systems. Partisan cues can influence political decision making, even when party systems are young.
The well-known “culture wars” clash in the United States between civil society actors has now gone transnational. Political
science scholarship has long detailed how liberal human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engage in extensive national
and transnational activity in support of their ideals. More recently, US conservative groups (including faith-based NGOs)
have begun to emulate these strategies, in particular promoting their convictions by engaging in transnational advocacy. NGOs
thus face off against each other politically across the globe. Less well known is the extent to which these culture wars are
conducted in courts, using conflicting interpretations of human rights law. Many of the same protag onists, particularly NGOs
that find themselves against each other in US courts, now find new litigation opportunities abroad in which to fight their
battles. These developments, and their implications, are the focus of this article. In particular, the extent to which US
faith-based NGOs have leveraged the experience gained transnationally to use international and foreign jurisprudence in interventions
before the US Supreme Court is assessed.
Somewhat paradoxically, numerous scholars in various disciplines have found that religion induces negative attitudes towards immigrants, while others find that it fuels feelings of compassion. We offer a framework that accounts for this discrepancy. Using two priming experiments conducted among American Catholics, Turkish Muslims, and Israeli Jews, we disentangle the role of religious social identity and religious belief, and differentiate among types of immigrants based on their ethnic and religious similarity to, or difference from, members of the host society. We find that religious social identity increases opposition to immigrants who are dissimilar to in-group members in religion or ethnicity, while religious belief engenders welcoming attitudes toward immigrants of the same religion and ethnicity, particularly among the less conservative devout. These results suggest that different elements of the religious experience exert distinct and even contrasting effects on immigration attitudes, manifested in both the citizenry's considerations of beliefs and identity and its sensitivity to cues regarding the religion of the target group.
Este texto resulta de uma pesquisa efetuada nos últimos anos no Rio Grande do Sul e de observações realizadas em nível nacional. Nele sugiro que o crescente êxito político da Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus está diretamente relacionado como modelo eclesial adotado por esta Igreja e com a eficácia do seu carisma institucional.
The paper examines, summarily, the sociological debate about concept of secularization and compares it to the concept of laicity. It analyses the limits of Brazilian laicity and focuses on the relationship between religion and politics in Brazil. It shows that the competition between Catholics and Pentecostals extrapolated the religious field and migrated to the spheres midiatic and politics. And highlights the occurrence of intenses clashes in Brazilian public sphere between Christian and laics groups about the place and role of religion, laicity of State, human rights, social, sexual and reproductive rights of minorities.
Religious freedom is a foundational value of the United States, but not all religious minorities have been shielded from religious persecution in America. This book examines why the state has acted to protect some religious minorities while allowing others to be persecuted or actively persecuting them. It details the persecution experiences of Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, Catholics, Jews, the Nation of Islam, and orthodox Muslims in America, developing a theory for why the state intervened to protect some but not others. The book argues that the state will persecute religious minorities if state actors consider them a threat to political order, but they will protect religious minorities if they believe persecution is a greater threat to political order. From the beginning of the republic to after 9/11, religious freedom in America has depended on the state's perception of political threats.
The Foundations of American Jewish Liberalism - by Kenneth D. Wald January 2019
Latin America contains roughly half of the world's countries that use compulsory voting, but this electoral institution has received only limited attention from researchers. This article examines the determinants of voter turnout in the world's largest electorate subject to mandatory voting, that of Brazil. In analyzing data from six national legislative elections held in Brazil between 1986 and 2006, the study finds that the impact of compulsory laws varies across social and economic groups. From a methodological perspective, the article argues that “compulsoriness” of mandatory voting legislation can be modeled by taking into account both exemptions to the law and the relevance of potential sanctions against non-voters. The issue of enforcement must be considered if we are to develop comprehensive models of electoral participation under conditions of compulsory voting.
In low-information elections, voters are likely to rely on heuristics when choosing candidates. Based on survey experiments conducted prior to Brazil's 2012 municipal elections, I examine the effect of candidates’ professional titles, such as “doctor” and “pastor,” on voting behavior. Using the “pastor” title in one's electoral name tends to decrease vote intention, although evangelical Christians respond positively while members of other religious groups are repelled. The broader atmosphere of political competition between Brazilian evangelicals and Catholics helps explain the presence of both out-group and in-group cueing effects. The “doctor” title has a positive effect on vote intention that appears to be mediated by the positive stereotypes, such as intelligence and competence, associated with members of this profession.
Cambridge Core - Sociology of Religion - Religion and Nationalism in Global Perspective - by J. Christopher Soper
The movement away from secularist practices and toward political Islam is a prominent trend across Muslim polities. Yet this shift remains under-theorized. Why do modern Muslim polities adopt policies that explicitly cater to religious sensibilities? How are these encoded in law and with what effects? Sadia Saeed addresses these questions through examining shifts in Pakistan’s official state policies toward the rights of religious minorities, in particular the controversial Ahmadiyya community. Looking closely at the ‘Ahmadi question’, Saeed develops a framework for conceptualizing and explaining modern desecularization processes that emphasizes the critical role of nation-state formation, political majoritarianism, and struggles between ‘secularist’ and ‘religious’ ideologues in evolving political and legal fields. The book demonstrates that desecularization entails instituting new understandings of religion through processes and justifications that are quintessentially modern.
The Rights Turn in Conservative Christian Politics documents a recent, fundamental change in American politics with the waning of Christian America. Rather than conservatives emphasizing morality and liberals emphasizing rights, both sides now wield rights arguments as potent weapons to win political and legal battles and build grassroots support. Lewis documents this change on the right, focusing primarily on evangelical politics. Using extensive historical and survey data that compares evangelical advocacy and evangelical public opinion, Lewis explains how the prototypical culture war issue - abortion - motivated the conservative rights turn over the past half century, serving as a springboard for rights learning and increased conservative advocacy in other arenas. Challenging the way we think about the culture wars, Lewis documents how rights claims are used to thwart liberal rights claims, as well as to provide protection for evangelicals, whose cultural positions are increasingly in the minority; they have also allowed evangelical elites to justify controversial advocacy positions to their base and to engage more easily in broad rights claiming in new or expanded political arenas, from health care to capital punishment. Identifies and explains the conservative Christian shift toward the politics of rights over the past half-century, both in political/legal advocacy and in mass political opinion. Explains how abortion politics motivated this shift, serving as a springboard for broader conservative rights advocacy, and traces the consequences of this across a range of other prominent arenas: free speech, religious liberty, health care, death penalty, and gay rights. Draws on extensive historical and survey data that compares evangelical advocacy and evangelical public opinion.
Hout and Fischer have made the repeated, controversial claim that the dramatic rise of “religious nones” in the United States is due to the prominence of the politics of the Christian Right. As the argument goes, the movement’s extreme stands on gay rights and abortion make religion inhospitable to those who take more moderate and liberal positions. We take another look at this proposition with novel data drawing on expert reports and interest group counts that capture the prominence of the movement in each American state from 2000 to 2010. We attach these data to decennial religious census data on the unchurched, as well as estimates of the nones from Cooperative Congressional Election Study data. At stake is whether religion is independent of political influence and whether American religion is sowing its own fate by failing to limit taking extreme stands. Rising none rates are more common in Republican states in this period. Moreover, when the Christian Right comes into more public conflict, such as over same-sex marriage bans, the rate of religious nones climbs.
The Catholic Church often plays a policy and mobilization role in American politics. We assess the degree to which the Catholic Church hierarchy — including national and state conferences of bishops — can provide uniform information to parishioners about political participation. Using a textual analysis of information distributed to parishioners in Florida in the 2012 election, we evaluate how much political information is conveyed to parishioners, the sources of this information, and the factors associated with higher or lower levels of information. While we find that most parishes provided information related to the election, there is wide diversity in the types and sources of information. And, while the Catholic hierarchy attempted to provide messaging about the importance of political participation, not all parishes complied with these efforts. Our findings are consistent with the ideas that the local community and hierarchical structure combine to shape the behavior of the parishes.
Why do religious organizations facilitate secular political activism in some settings but not others? I contend that where religious institutions are characterized by decentralized local governance, they are more likely to facilitate political activism. Drawing on nine months of field research and 60 interviews, I conduct a qualitative comparison between the Mexican states of Chiapas and Yucatán. I argue Chiapas exhibits highly decentralized governance by the Catholic Church whereas Yucatán exhibits centralized clerical management. This difference accounts for why Chiapas experiences high levels of indigenous political activism while Yucatán experiences very little political activism.
In new and developing democracies, levels of education are often low and many citizens lack experience with democratic processes. How do citizens in such political systems learn about elections and develop participatory orientations? Civil society organizations can promote political socialization, yet often fail to reach those lowest in resources. This article proposes that churches constitute an often overlooked instance of civil society, one that is highly inclusive and provides frequent opportunities for interaction. Such socialization can be especially important in low-income and low-education neighborhoods, where access to media and political information through everyday social networks is more limited. A case study of a municipal election campaign in a single Brazilian city reveals that exposure to political information in church is common, especially in evangelical churches and in low-education neighborhoods. Even more frequent than partisan discussion is promotion of non-partisan civic norms encouraging citizens to cast informed votes based on non-clientelistic criteria. Those exposed to civic and partisan messages know significantly more about the local campaign and are more likely to turn out. Messages encouraging a “conscientious vote” boost knowledge most strongly in low-education neighborhoods, helping to equalize political information across the urban environment. This suggests that development professionals take churches seriously as sites of civic education.
Democratic and Republican partisans dislike the opposing party and its leaders far more than in the past. However, recent studies have argued that the rise of affective polarization in the electorate does not reflect growing policy or ideological differences between supporters of the two parties. According to this view, though Democratic and Republican elites are sharply divided along ideological lines, differences between the policy preferences of rank-and-file partisans remain modest. In this article, we show that there is a close connection between ideological and affective polarization. We present evidence from American National Election Studies surveys that opinions on social welfare issues have become increasingly consistent and divided along party lines and that social welfare ideology is now strongly related to feelings about the opposing party and its leaders. In addition, we present results from a survey experiment showing that ideological distance strongly influences feelings toward opposing party candidates and the party as a whole.
Party-driven and religion-driven models of opinion change posit that individuals revise their positions on culture war issues to ensure consonance with political and religious predispositions. By contrast, models of issue-driven change propose that public opinion on cultural controversies lead people to revise their partisan and religious orientations. Using data from four panel studies covering the period 1992–2012, we pit the party- and religion-based theories of opinion change against the issue-based model of change. Consistent with the standard view, party and religion constrain culture war opinion. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, but consistent with our novel theory, opinions on culture war issues lead people to revise their partisan affinities and religious orientations. Our results imply that culture war attitudes function as foundational elements in the political and religious belief systems of ordinary citizens that match and sometimes exceed partisan and religious predispositions in terms of motivating power.
This paper studies how individual religiosity affects people's behaviour. In particular here I study the behaviour of the second players in a standard trust game. While the extant literature has looked for religiosity to increase the stakes passed by the subjects, the results presented here show that more religious people tend to choose an even allocation of these resources, whilst the less religious participants are either opportunistic or generous.
In many contemporary urban spaces, political information accrues to high status neighborhoods. This might exacerbate political inequality as the information-rich and information-poor each talk primarily with others like themselves. When information is specific and broadly diffused through the media, however, the convenience and low cognitive costs of everyday conversation could be especially helpful for the disadvantaged. This article shows how political conversations intensify or ameliorate spatial knowledge gaps, using a six-wave panel survey in fifty Brazilian neighborhoods between 2002 and 2006. Multilevel models demonstrate that conversation was more
frequent
in high education neighborhoods, but had a greater
impact
on specific, factual knowledge in low-education neighborhoods, leading to shrinking knowledge gaps. However, conversation slightly widened spatial gaps in socially perceived general knowledge.
How do elections affect citizens? This paper shows that elections can have an impact in an area where researchers least expect
it: an individual’s religious life. It does so by drawing on psychologists’ theory of compensatory control and testing whether
individuals’ reported religious behaviors and beliefs fluctuate with their chosen political party’s fortunes. Both an originally
collected panel data set and over-time cross-sectional data reveal that Democrats (Republicans) are more likely to report
attending religious services and praying when Republicans (Democrats) control the White House. Rates of reported religious
behaviors then decline when a copartisan is president. The results demonstrate political identities’ strength and ability
to influence nonpolitical behaviors, even those thought to be stable and impervious to politics.
This book examines 111 types of state religion policy in 177 countries between 1990and 2008. Jonathan Fox argues that policy is largely a result of the competition between political secular actors and religious actors, both of which try to influence state religion policy. While there are other factors that influence state religion policy and both the secular and religious camps are divided, Fox offers that the secular-religious competition perspective provides critical insight into the nature of religious politics across the globe. Whilemany states have both increased and decreased their involvement in religion, Fox demonstrates that states which have become more involved in religion are far more common.
Through an analysis of Christian communities in the United States, Canada, and Costa Rica, this book analyzes how religious groups talk about the politics surrounding economic life. Amy Reynolds examines how these Christian organizations speak about trade and the economy as moral and value-laden spaces, deserving ethical reflection and requiring political action. She reveals the ways in which religious communities have asked people to engage in new approaches to thinking about the market and how they have worked to create alternative networks and policies governing economic and social life.
Djupe and Gilbert investigate the political influence of church and how membership in organized religious bodies shapes the political life of members. Djupe and Gilbert's goal in this inquiry is to re-center scholarly attention on the voluntary association as an essential element of American civic and political life. They develop a theoretical framework that captures the multifaceted elements of church life that affect individual political attitudes and actions. Political information from clergy, small groups, and social networks flows plentifully in churches, but individuals process that information differently depending on their motivations related to their status in the church. Articulating a more fully specified model of how associations expose individuals to political information and norms will help us understand the political opinions and behavior of citizens and the contribution of that pattern to sustaining democracy.
This book delves into the extent of government involvement in religion between 1990 and 2002 using both quantitative and qualitative methodology. The study is based on the Religion and State dataset, which includes 175 governments across the globe, all of which are addressed individually in this book. The forms of involvement examined in this study include whether the government has an official religion, whether some religions are given preferential treatment, religious discrimination against minority religion, government regulation of the majority religion, and religious legislation. The study shows that government involvement in religion is ubiquitous, that it increased significantly during this period, and that only a minority of states, including a minority of democracies, have separation of religion and state. These findings contradict the predictions of religion’s reduced public significance found in modernization and secularization theory. The findings also demonstrate that state religious monopolies are linked to reduced religious participation.
Why do secular states pursue different policies toward religion? This book provides a generalizable argument about the impact of ideological struggles on the public policy making process, as well as a state-religion regimes index of 197 countries. More specifically, it analyzes why American state policies are largely tolerant of religion, whereas French and Turkish policies generally prohibit its public visibility, as seen in their bans on Muslim headscarves. In the United States, the dominant ideology is “passive secularism,” which requires the state to play a passive role, by allowing public visibility of religion. Dominant ideology in France and Turkey is “assertive secularism,” which demands that the state play an assertive role in excluding religion from the public sphere. Passive and assertive secularism became dominant in these cases through certain historical processes, particularly the presence or absence of an ancien régime based on the marriage between monarchy and hegemonic religion during state-building periods.
This book provides a rare window into the micropolitics of contemporary authoritarian rule through a comparison of religious-state relations in Russia and China - two countries with long histories of religious repression, and even longer experiences with authoritarian politics. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in multiple sites in these countries, this book explores what religious and political authority want from one another, how they negotiate the terms of their relationship, and how cooperative or conflicting their interactions are. This comparison reveals that while tensions exist between the two sides, there is also ample room for mutually beneficial interaction. Religious communities and their authoritarian overseers are cooperating around the core issue of politics - namely, the struggle for money, power, and prestige - and becoming unexpected allies in the process.
Whether lauded and encouraged or criticized and maligned, action in solidarity with culturally and geographically distant strangers has been an integral part of European modernity. Traversing the complex political landscape of early modern European empires, this book locates the historical origins of modern global humanitarianism in the recurrent conflict over the ethical treatment of non-Europeans that pitted religious reformers against secular imperial networks. Since the sixteenth-century beginnings of European expansion overseas and in marked opposition to the exploitative logic of predatory imperialism, these reformers – members of Catholic orders and, later, Quakers and other reformist Protestants – developed an ideology and a political practice in defense of the rights and interests of distant “others.” They also increasingly made the question of imperial injustice relevant to growing “domestic” publics in Europe. A distinctive institutional model of long-distance advocacy crystallized out of these persistent struggles, becoming the standard weapon of transnational activists.
This article explores the paradox between local and global moral values in sexual politics in Sub-Saharan Africa. It shares the thesis that various forces of globalization—the web, media, social, economic, political, and religious––influence and to some extent shape sexual politics in Sub-Saharan Africa. Globalization has made it easy for anti-gay and pro-gay rights groups to connect globally, and share ideas and strategies, but it has also complicated the study of sexual politics in Sub-Saharan Africa. While anti-gay and pro-gay groups accuse each other of being “influenced by foreign interests,” both sides have global groups that provide the ideological framework for the struggle. To some extent, the growing opposition to gay rights should be understood from the perspective of conservative global Christianity on one hand and the globalization on the other. The article concludes that global anti-gay activism invites global pro-gay activism, thereby leading to unintended consequences on sexual minorities.
In this article we explore how certain religious messages may spur or constrain political participation. Specifically, we test whether religious messages that provide individuals a positive self-image can act as stimulants, giving people a sense of internal efficacy to participate in politics. We explore this hypothesis through a novel experimental design in Nairobi, Kenya. We find that exposure to self-affirmation messages typical of Pentecostal and Charismatic churches motivated participation in a political text message campaign. We discuss implications of these findings for politics in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as for the study of religion and politics more generally.
Recently, Uganda has made international headlines for the controversial Anti-homosexuality Bill and for a set of tight measures that have limited the freedom of sexual minorities. This article argues that Uganda's growth of Pentecostal-charismatic churches (PCCs) is playing a major role in influencing and defining the Ugandan public sphere, including (but not limited to) the ways in which sex and sexuality are conceptualized by and within Uganda's print media. This article suggests that the socially conservative nature of PCCs is highly influential in shaping the way print media write about sex and sexuality. This is because Pentecostal-charismatic (PC) constituencies constitute a considerable numerical market that print media cannot ignore. Second, PCs actively work toward influencing and shaping public policies, politics, and public spaces, like newspapers, that discuss and address public morality and decency in the country. As this article will show, within a highly “Pentecostalized” public sphere, alternative public discourses on sexuality are not allowed.
This study analyses the historically significant shifts in the diffusion and reception of the bible in Brazilian Christianity. It questions whether Brazil is turning Protestant, given the marginalisation in Brazilian neo- Pentecostalism of scripture, which is the fundamental pillar of Protestant faith. While scripture has traditionally been marginal to Brazil's popular Catholicism, it was regarded as the primary medium for access to the sacred in classical Pentecostalism. Whilst Brazilian Catholicism rediscovered the bible through the liberation theology movement, a contrary trend of marginalisation of scripture is evident in the Brazilian neo-Pentecostal church Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus (IURD). Although there is a performative use of the bible in IURD, the original meaning of the biblical texts is given little weight within this performance. Based on this evaluation of the bible's position, the article suggests that neo-Pentecostalism stands in continuity with popular Catholicism and discontinuity with classical Pentecostalism in relation to the biblical canon.
This article examines the “culture war” hypothesis by focusing on American citizens’ choices among a set of core values. A geometric model is developed to represent differences in the ways that individuals rank-order seven important values: freedom, equality, economic security, social order, morality, individualism, and patriotism. The model is fitted to data on value choices from the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. The empirical results show that there is an enormous amount of heterogeneity among individual value choices; the model estimates contradict any notion that there is a consensus on fundamental principles within the mass public. Further, the differences break down along political lines, providing strong evidence that there is a culture war generating fundamental divisions within twenty-first century American society.
This paper presents the results of a field research among Roman Catholic Charismatics and (Protestant) Pentecostals on their faith experiences, carried through in the region of Ecuador’s capital, Quito. The outcomes of this research sustain the thesis that there is substantial theological convergence between Roman Catholic Charismatic and Classical Pentecostal faith experiences that justifies the assumption of a shared theological identity. The joint theological characteristics and their interconnection facilitate a critical and fruitful dialogue between theology and social sciences on Latin American Pentecostalism.
Employing two theories of morality policy, Policy Types and the "Two Worlds" of religious/secular party systems, we describe and attempt to explain the empirical patterns for five morality policy issues (abortion, capital punishment, euthanasia, assisted reproductive technology/stem cell research, and same-sex marriage) across 24 Western democracies since World War II. What is the content of policy adoption? Are some countries consistently more permissive or restrictive on morality issues? How long do these issues stay on the political agenda? These issues have been on the agendas of all of the countries for varying time periods, with some being older in vintage (death penalty, abortion, euthanasia) than others (ART/stem cells and same-sex marriage). The general tendency has been toward greater permissiveness, but there still remains considerable policy diversity. While there has been substantial change on morality policies in Western democracies since World War II, the change is more thorough in some jurisdictions and in some regions more than others.
RESUMO:
O objetivo do texto é estudar de forma comparativa a programação e a identidade político-institucional das emissoras de rádio do poder legislativo brasileiro (Rádio Senado e Rádio Câmara), sob a perspectiva da comunicação política em interface com a cultura e a democracia. A hipótese que orienta o estudo é de que, apesar de terem sido criadas em 1998, essas emissoras são herdeiras da tradição de rádio educativo no Brasil, projeto iniciado na década de 1920. Conclui que tal herança persiste, mas com uma nova abordagem, cujo foco é a educação para a democracia e a cidadania. Permanece, porém, o modelo tradicional de comunicação política, baseado no poder unilateral do Estado de decidir o que o cidadão deve saber e de que forma a educação e a cultura devem ser tratadas.
ABSTRACT:
This article discusses the programming and political-institutional identity of radio stations maintained by the Brazilian legislative branch (Rádio Senado and Rádio Câmara) from a perspective of public communication as an interface between culture and democracy. The hypothesis that inspired the study is that these stations, despite being created in 1998, are heirs of a tradition of educational radio in Brazil that started in 1920. It concludes that this heritage persists with a new approach focusing on education for democracy and citizenship. However, the traditional standard of political communication continues to be based on the unilateral power of the state to decide what citizens must know and how education and culture should be treated in society.