Overcoming socio-psychological barriers: The influence of beliefs about losses.

Abstract

Overcoming socio-psychological barriers entails a long process of persuasion and cognitive change. In other words, society members and leaders must implement a process of mobilization for peacemaking in the same way the process of mobilization for supporting and participating in the conflict was implemented at the conflict’s onset. In both cases, society members matter. The society members themselves initially developed the ideas that led to the conflict’s onset, and they can also develop ideas about the necessity of peacemaking. In both cases they must persuade fellow society members in the “justness” of the proposed path. Thus any analysis of intractable conflicts necessitates the use of a socio-psychological perspective alongside other
perspectives. Humans are the decision makers; therefore, the psychological aspects embedded in human characteristics must be addressed in order to change the social context. Addressing the socio-psychological repertoire can assist in the creation of various socialization and mobilization mechanisms for peacemaking and peacebuilding. It is thus of crucial importance to advance knowledge that will shed light on the conditions, contents, and processes that not only lead society members to embark on peacebuilding processes in times of conflicts, but also socialize them to actively prevent the outbreak and maintenance of vicious and destructive conflicts and costly hate cycles.

Full text

193
Overcoming Socio-Psychological
Barriers: The Inuence of Beliefs
about Losses
Ruthie Pliskin, Eran Halperin, and Daniel Bar-Tal
Overcoming socio-psychological barriers entails a long process of persuasion
and cognitive change. In other words, society members and leaders must
implement a process of mobilization for peacemaking in the same way the
process of mobilization for supporting and participating in the conict was
implemented at the conict’s onset. In both cases, society members matter.
The society members themselves initially developed the ideas that led to
the conict’s onset, and they can also develop ideas about the necessity of
peacemaking. In both cases they must persuade fellow society members in
the “justness” of the proposed path. Thus any analysis of intractable conicts
necessitates the use of a socio-psychological perspective alongside other
perspectives. Humans are the decision makers; therefore, the psychological
aspects embedded in human characteristics must be addressed in order to
change the social context. Addressing the socio-psychological repertoire can
assist in the creation of various socialization and mobilization mechanisms for
peacemaking and peacebuilding. It is thus of crucial importance to advance
knowledge that will shed light on the conditions, contents, and processes
that not only lead society members to embark on peacebuilding processes
in times of conicts, but also socialize them to actively prevent the outbreak
and maintenance of vicious and destructive conicts and costly hate cycles.
Peacemaking focuses on societal actions towards reaching an ofcial
settlement of an intergroup conict, in the form of a formal agreement

Ruthie Pliskin, Eran Halperin, and Daniel Bar-Tal
194
between the rival sides to end the confrontation.1 Such actions are real and
concrete, but the essence of peacemaking is psychological, as it requires
changing the societal repertoire that has fueled the conict, into a repertoire
that is in line with the new goal of peacefully resolving the conict. The
new peace-supporting repertoire should include an approach to peaceful
resolution, as well as humanization and legitimization of the rival. It should
also involve changing previous views of the conict as being of zero sum
nature and unsolvable, changing the goals that fueled the conict, accepting
compromises, building trust, constructing beliefs that the agreement can be
implemented, and developing new goals related to peaceful relations with
the rival. Eventually, this process should lead to recognition of the need to
reconcile and the construction of a new climate that promotes these new
ideas about peacemaking and peacebuilding.2
Peacemaking usually involves “bottom-up” processes in which groups,
grassroots organizations, and civil society members support the ideas of
peacebuilding and act to disseminate them among leaders. On the other
hand, peacemaking requires “top-down” processes in which emerging
leaders join such efforts, initiate a peacemaking process, act to persuade the
society members of the necessity of resolving the conict peacefully, and
carry it out. In both cases, unfreezing is the key process leading to change
in the conict-supporting repertoire.
The Unfreezing Process
According to the classical conception offered by Lewin in 1947,
3
every
process of societal change must begin with cognitive change. In individuals
and groups, this indicates “unfreezing.” Hence, a precondition for the
acceptance and internalization of any alternative beliefs about the conict
or peacebuilding depends on the ability to destabilize the rigid structure
of the aforementioned dominant socio-psychological repertoire about the
conict. This endeavor is especially challenging because in many conict
situations, the unfreezing process begins with a minority that must have the
courage to present the alternative ideas to fellow society members, as well
as to decision makers that may eventually effect change on the political
level. Indeed, all steps described below must occur among opinion leaders
and other individuals in positions of leadership. Such top-down processes

Overcoming Socio-Psychological Barriers
195
must join societal level processes, so as to support and accelerate shifts in
public opinion, while also directly inuencing changes in policymaking
relevant to the conict.
Step 1: An Instigating Belief
In such a social climate, peacemaking requires a new perspective on the
necessity of a peace process. Indeed, on the individual psychological level, the
process of unfreezing usually begins pursuant to the appearance of a new idea
(or ideas) inconsistent with held beliefs and attitudes, thus causing tension, a
dilemma, or even an internal conict, which may stimulate a reexamination of
one’s basic position.
4
This new idea is termed “an instigating belief,” because
it motivates a reevaluation of held societal beliefs regarding the culture of
conict. Consequently, it may lead to the unfreezing of these beliefs.5 The
content of the instigating belief may come from different domains, and
may pertain to the image of the rival, the history of the conict, the group’s
goals, new threats to the group, and so on. Regardless of its content, the
belief must contradict existing beliefs.
The instigating belief must also be of high validity and/or coming from
a credible source, otherwise it may be easily rejected. Additionally, it must
be strong enough to cause dissonance, as described by Festinger.6 In other
words, this belief must force an individual to pause and think before he or
she can reconcile between the colliding beliefs. This may not mean that
every society member will consider the instigating belief once it emerges,
but it is possible that at least a few will be motivated to reconsider. The belief
may emerge from personal experience or from external sources, but once
it is acknowledged and considered it can eventually lead to an unfreezing
process, in which at least some of the held beliefs are rejected.
Step 2: A Mediating Belief
This process paves the way for a new “mediating belief” that calls for
changing the context of intractable conict. The mediating belief is the
logical outcome of dissonance, if it is resolved in the direction of accepting
the instigating belief as valid.7 Mediating beliefs are usually stated in the
form of arguments, such as “we must change strategies or we are going
to suffer further losses,” “some kind of change is inevitable,” “we have

Ruthie Pliskin, Eran Halperin, and Daniel Bar-Tal
196
been going down a self-destructive path, so we must alter our goals and
strategies,” and “the proposed change is clearly in the national interest, it
is necessary for national security.”8 These statements prompt a discussion
of alternatives and thereby deepen the process of unfreezing initiated by
the instigating beliefs.
Step 3: A Peaceful Alternative
At least one alternative that may emerge at the end of this process is the
suggestion that the peaceful settlement of the conict may change the
direction in which society is heading. The emergence of this idea marks
the beginning of the journey towards peacemaking. For instance, in South
Africa, a number of unequivocal indicators (internal violence, deterioration
of the South African economy, demographic growth of the Blacks, South
African isolation, and so on, all of which have served as instigating beliefs)
led Pieter Willem Botha, the conservative leader of the South African
National Party who came to power in 1978, to realize as early as the 1980s
that the situation cannot continue and that the leadership must implement
reforms and initiate negotiation with the African National Congress. This
logic indicated the appearance of mediating beliefs.9
Conditions for Change
While unfreezing is an individual process that may transpire in different
individuals at different times, the likelihood of this process beginning and
fully developing is increased when certain societal conditions are met.
Some scholars of conict resolution argue that the success of peacemaking
processes and consequential conict resolution depend on specic conditions
that make the conict ripe for a peaceful resolution. For example, Zartman
proposed that “if the parties to a conict (a) perceive themselves to be in a
hurting stalemate and (b) perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution
(a way out), the conict is ripe for resolution (i.e., for negotiations toward
resolution to begin).”
10
Furthermore, ideas about terminating the conict
peacefully often emerge and are successfully disseminated when changes
in the context of the conict are observed. These changes pertain to major
events and/or information that may facilitate the process of peacemaking, and

Overcoming Socio-Psychological Barriers
197
this stage can therefore be termed “the emergence of facilitating conditions.”
This may happen at any point during the peacemaking process.
Among the most salient facilitating conditions, trust-building actions by
the rival lead to a perceived change in the opponents’ character, intentions,
and goals. Another facilitating condition pertains to information about
the state of society. A realization of the costs to society in continuing the
conict may lead to the crystallization of beliefs in the need to change the
views of the conict and the rival, reconsider the intransigent policy, and
even adopt conciliatory positions that could allow a peaceful resolution of
the conict. Sometimes the intervention of a powerful third party pushing
for a peaceful resolution of the conict may also serve as a determining
condition in changing these views about the conict. In some cases, such
an intervention may include a proposed mega-incentive by a third party. If
this incentive is highly valued by at least one party to the conict, it may
affect its views on the conict and move it towards more conciliatory views.
Changed conict-related beliefs may also result from global geopolitical
processes and events that are not directly related to the conict (for example,
the collapse of a superpower or new global realignments). In such cases,
global change may affect a party in conict and move it to adopt more
conciliatory positions, thus acting as a facilitating condition.
The noted conditions are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. Each condition,
as well as possible combinations of conditions, may generate new needs and
new goals that become more important than the goals that led to the conict’s
eruption. As a result, a set of beliefs may emerge that can contribute to the
unfreezing of the long-held conict-supporting repertoires. As we have
discussed above, different beliefs can lead to unfreezing, but the main idea
inuencing unfreezing is probably the recognition that the losses incurred if
the conict continues are greater than the losses incurred with the acceptance
of a particular opportunity for peaceful solution.
11
This recognition is a
potent idea that may push the peacemaking process forward to its successful
conclusion, and can therefore be a highly effective condition for change.
In essence, such recognition refocuses the individual on the losses that the
society may incur should it not resolve the conict peacefully under the
present conditions.

Ruthie Pliskin, Eran Halperin, and Daniel Bar-Tal
198
Effects of Information about Losses as a Facilitating
Condition
Information about losses is a uniquely important condition, as individuals living
in conict zones are usually focused only on fear of loss, and may therefore
underestimate or overlook losses incurred as a result of the continued conict.
Such information is of even greater importance when considering unfreezing
processes among decision makers, since a miscalculation of possible losses
may inhibit them from actively advancing conict resolution. Our view on
the importance of these considerations is partly based on Kahneman and
Tversky’s prospect theory,
12
which has been adapted to apply to conict
situations.13 According to prospect theory, people are more reluctant to lose
what they already have than they are motivated to gain what they do not
have.14 In the language of prospect theory, the value function is steeper on
the loss side than on the gain side.
Reframing the Point of Reference
One way to emphasize the potential losses associated with continuing a conict
and to reduce the emphasis on possible losses associated with a peaceful
settlement is to reframe the reference point. Prospect theory proposes that
people react more strongly to changes in existing assets than to net asset
levels; that is, they react to gains and losses from their subjective reference
point rather than referring to the absolute values of gains or losses.
15
In
most cases, the reference point is the status quo, but in some situations it
can be an “aspiration level”
16
or a desired goal.
17
Often, individuals residing
in conict zones are socialized to believe in the feasibility of future gains
from the conict or even their group’s possible victory over the rival.18 The
alternative possibility of paying a heavy price for continuing the conict or
being defeated is often ignored. As a result, when the compromises demanded
in the context of a peaceful settlement of the conict are compared with
the society’s aspirations, or even the status quo (mostly for the stronger
party in the conict), they are perceived as involving an enormous loss. In
other words, the motivation to reevaluate rmly-held beliefs and consider
alternatives depends on a new realization that continuing the conict will
not lead to a better or desired future, but may in fact drastically reduce the
chances of achieving it.
19
Moreover, as noted, the conict’s continuation may

Overcoming Socio-Psychological Barriers
199
lead to losses that are greater than the sacrices needed in order to achieve
a peaceful resolution to the conict via compromises.
Real-World Transformations Driven by Beliefs about Losses
Two noteworthy examples of changes driven, at least to some extent, by the
described processes can be found in the peacemaking efforts in Northern
Ireland and South Africa. In Northern Ireland, MacGinty and Darby20 have
recently argued that in the early 1990s, the understanding that future change
is inevitable and that such change might consist of fundamental losses
to the unionist side of the conict was one of the central motivations for
reconsidering their intransigent position, and nally joining the negotiations
in order to gain inuence when formulating a future agreement. The writers
quote a statement by a senior Orangeman, which they believe reected
a common view shared by the unionists: “Every time something comes
along it is worse than what came before.”21 Within the context of the South
African conict, Mufson
22
has pointed to a similar example of the unfreezing
process, suggesting that de Klerk and his people realized that “white South
Africans’ bargaining position would only grow weaker with time,” leading
them to launch negotiations and make every effort to move towards a viable
agreement as soon as possible.
The Israeli-Palestinian conict, while yet unresolved, also offers ample
examples for the importance of beliefs about losses to unfreezing processes
among leaders. In fact, Israeli leaders whose positions on the conict moved
towards support for conict resolution, cited instrumental cost-benet
considerations, that is, information about potential losses should the conict
continue, rather than moral or ideological considerations. In fact, when heading
into the Oslo peace process, the only strategic goal voiced by then-Israeli
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was his fear of continued Israeli sovereignty
“over a large number of Arabs, which could lead to a binational state.” For
many Jewish Israelis, this meant the loss of a Jewish state. Rabin’s former
Foreign Minister Shimon Peres often echoed this sentiment, adding that “Rabin
knew that the absence of decisiveness was likely to bring about a situation
in which events would lead us, instead of us leading them.”23 Several right
wing Israeli leaders underwent a similar process, bringing them closer to a
realization of the importance of peacefully resolving the conict. Former

Ruthie Pliskin, Eran Halperin, and Daniel Bar-Tal
200
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, for instance, decided to evacuate settlements
out of a desire to avoid the loss of a Jewish majority in the State of Israel,
and the next leader of the Likud Party, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,
also stated the end goal for a peace agreement would be avoiding a binational
state,24 not mentioning any moral or ideological goals alongside this fear of
a loss of Jewish sovereignty.
Empirical evidence of this process can be found in work conducted
together with other colleagues,
25
in which the perception of the proposed
process was examined among Jews in Israel. The investigation found that
instigating beliefs that include information about future losses in various
aspects of life (e.g., economic aspects, demographic aspects, as well as Israel’s
future position in potential negotiations with Palestinians) may help unfreeze
Israelis’ predispositions about the peace process with the Palestinians.
The ultimate outcome of unfreezing is detachment from the repertoire
that supports the continuation of the conict, its reevaluation, and a new-
found readiness to entertain alternative beliefs.26 The repertoire can then be
replaced by alternative societal beliefs that promote a peaceful resolution
to the conict.27 Nonetheless, the examples described illustrate more than
unfreezing. In most of these examples, the leaders arrived at the point of
being able to formulate a coherent set of compromising beliefs, and these
served as a holistic plan acceptable to the rival party. Indeed, the ultimate
objective is to go beyond an agreement that settles the conict peacefully, to
the formulation, acceptance, and internalization of a new ethos of peace. This
ethos must act to counter the conict-supporting repertoire in terms of both
content and structure. However, in the absence of peace and reconciliation,
the attempt to form the new socio-psychological repertoire that will fulll
these needs and aspirations is a great challenge for every society that strives
to end the conict peacefully. Fullling these needs in each of two clear-cut
situations – intractable violent conict or a viable peace – is much easier than
doing so in the “transitional” period between violent conict and peace, rife
with uncertainty and often with continuing violence and active opposition
by some groups within society.

Overcoming Socio-Psychological Barriers
201
Conclusion
Disagreements over tangible and non-tangible commodities inuence harsh
and violent conicts that engage society members and cause continuous
suffering and hardship, as well as considerable losses in human lives. Such
conicts inict serious problems and challenges upon the involved societies
and the international community. A resolution requires not only addressing the
tangible issues that lie at the heart of the disagreements, but also necessitates
nding ways of overcoming the socio-psychological barriers that underlie
and magnify the disparities. Moreover, these barriers often become the
major obstacles to resolving intractable conicts. They reject new ideas
and prevent the possibility of alternative views. These are essential steps
in embarking on the road to peace, possessing the potential to unfreeze the
highly-entrenched conict-supporting societal beliefs.
One cannot underestimate the fact that at the foundation of these barriers
lie ideological beliefs supporting the conict that were formed on the societal
level and then imparted to society members via societal institutions and
major communication channels. Such ideological beliefs play a major
role in maintaining the conict, feeding its continuation, and preventing
its peaceful resolution. Socio-psychological barriers and the mechanisms
employed by society to maintain the above views are potent inhibitors of
any potential peace process. Only a determined group employing activism
and innovative ideas can lay the groundwork for overcoming the human
tendency to adhere to known patterns of thought and action, and overcoming
inherent reactions to threat and danger in order to build a better world,
free of violence, suffering, and destruction. Overcoming these barriers is a
major challenge for every society involved in harsh and violent conict, if
it aspires to embark on the road to peace.
The present paper suggests that overcoming these socio-psychological
barriers is not beyond reach, but it is a long process of persuasion and
cognitive change. In other words, society members and leaders must
implement a process of mobilization for peacemaking in the same way the
process of mobilization for supporting and participating in the conict was
implemented at the conict’s onset. Sadly, while it often takes a very short
time to mobilize society members for participation in a conict under the
umbrella of patriotism, it usually takes a very long time to mobilize society

Ruthie Pliskin, Eran Halperin, and Daniel Bar-Tal
202
members to reject the way of conict and replace it with new ways of
peacemaking. In both cases, society members matter. The society members
themselves initially developed the ideas that led to the conict’s onset, and
they can also develop ideas about the necessity of peacemaking. In both
cases they must persuade fellow society members in the “justness” of the
proposed path.
From these observations we can learn that any analysis of intractable
conicts necessitates the use of a socio-psychological perspective alongside
other perspectives. Human beings perceive, evaluate, infer, and act; they are
active participants in events taking place around them. Human psychological
processes are an integral part of conict interactions, as human beings
are the only real actors on the conict stage. Humans make the decisions
regarding the dissemination of information about the conict’s necessity,
the mobilization of society members, and their children’s socialization to
maintain the conict, violently persist in it, and reject its peaceful resolution.
In essence, humans are the decision makers; therefore, the psychological
aspects embedded in human characteristics must be addressed in order to
change the social context. Later, if people begin to view the conict situation
differently, they may make the decision to disseminate ideas about the necessity
of peacemaking and to mobilize society members at large to act to achieve
this goal. Hopefully, addressing the socio-psychological repertoire can assist
in the creation of various socialization and mobilization mechanisms for
peacemaking and peacebuilding. It is thus of crucial importance to advance
knowledge that will shed light on the conditions, contents, and processes
that not only lead society members to embark on peacebuilding processes
in times of conicts, but also socialize them to actively prevent the outbreak
and maintenance of vicious and destructive conicts and costly hate cycles.
Notes
1 I. William Zartman, ed., Peacemaking in International Conict: Methods and
Techniques (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007).
2 Michelle I. Gawerc, “Peace-building: Theoretical and Concrete Perspectives,”
Peace & Change 31 (2006): 435-78.
3 Kurt Lewin, “Frontier in Group Dynamics: I,” Human Relations 1 (1947): 5-41.
4 Robert P. Abelson, ed., Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1968); Jean M. Bartunek, “The Multiple Cognitions and Conict

Overcoming Socio-Psychological Barriers
203
Associated with Second Order Organizational Change,” in Social Psychology
in Organizations: Advances in Theory and Research, ed. John Keith Murnighan
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), pp. 322-49; and Arie W. Kruglanski,
ed., Lay Epistemics and Human Knowledge (New York: Plenum, 1989).
5 Daniel Bar-Tal and Eran Halperin, “Overcoming Psychological Barriers to
Peacemaking: The Inuence of Beliefs about Losses,” in Prosocial Motives,
Emotions, and Behavior: The Better Angels of Our Nature, eds. M. Mikulincer
and P. R. Shaver (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Press,
2009), pp. 431-48.
6 Leon A. Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson,
1957).
7 Kruglanski, Lay Epistemics.
8 Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, “Value-Complexity in Shifting from War to Peace: The
Israeli Peace-Making Experience with Egypt,” Political Psychology 16 (1995):
545-65.
9 William Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001).
10 I. William Zartman, “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond,” in International
Conict Resolution After the Cold War, eds. P. C. Stern and D. Druckman (Washington
DC: National Academy Press, 2000), pp. 228-29.
11 Bar-Tal and Halperin, “Overcoming Psychological Barriers.”
12 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
under Risk,” Econometrica 47 (1979): 263-91.
13 William A. Boettcher III, “The Prospects for Prospect Theory: An Empirical
Evaluation of International Relations Applications of Framing and Loss Aversion,”
Political Psychology 25 (2004): 331-62; Jack S. Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing,
and Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for International Conict,”
International Political Science Review 17 (1996): 179-95; and Nehemia Geva and
Alex Mintz, eds., Decision-Making on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational
Debate (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997).
14 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Rational Choice and the Framing of
Decisions,” Journal of Business 59, no. 4 (1986): 251-78.
15 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk”;
and Tversky and Kahneman, “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions.”
16 John W. Payne, Dan J. Laughhunn, and Roy Crum, “Further Tests of Aspiration
Level Effects in Risky Choice,” Management Science 27 (1981): 953-58.
17 Chip Heath, Richard P. Larrick, and George Wu, “Goals as Reference Points,”
Cognitive Psychology 38 (1999): 79-109.

Ruthie Pliskin, Eran Halperin, and Daniel Bar-Tal
204
18 Daniel Bar-Tal, “Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable Conicts,” American
Behavioral Scientist 50 (2007): 1430-53.
19 Bartunek, “The Multiple Cognitions.”
20 Roger MacGinty and John Darby, Guns and Government: The Management of the
Northern Ireland Peace Process (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
21 Ibid., p. 23.
22 Steven Mufson, “South Africa, 1990,” Foreign Affairs 70 (1991): 120-41.
23 Quoted by JPost.com staff, “PM, Peres Remember Rabin’s Legacy of )eace,” Jpost.
com, October 28, 2012, http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/PM-Peres-
remember-Rabins-legacy-of-peace.
24 Aaron Kalman, “Netanyahu Calls for Peace Deal to Avert Binational State,” Times
of Israel, May 1, 2013, http://www.timesosrael.com/netanyahu-calls-for-peace-
deal-to-avert-binational-state/.
25 Corinna Carmen Gayer, Shiri Landman, Eran Halperin, and Daniel Bar-Tal,
“Overcoming Psychological Barriers to Peaceful Conict Resolution: The Role
of Arguments about Losses,” Journal of Conict Resolution 53 (2009): 951-75.
26 Bar-Tal and Halperin, “Overcoming Psychological Barriers.”
27 Arie W. Kruglanski and Donna M. Webster, “Motivated Closing of the Mind:
‘Seizing’ and ‘Freezing,’” Psychological Review 103, no. 2 (1996): 263-83.