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The Subjective Side of Science
... As important as the proposals by Siponen and Iivari (2006) are, they need a more interdisciplinary underpinning. To their research must be added knowledge gained from earlier studies of inquiry systems, especially those of Churchman (1971), Mitroff (1974) and Courtney, Croasdell and Paradice (1998). They represent different academic fields, but ones that are relevant for understanding end users. ...
... According to Ian Mitroff (1974), the Leibnizian inquiry system is characteristic of formaldeductive systems. It is purely theoretical and emphasizes the formal, mathematical, logical, and rational aspects of human thought. ...
... According to Ian Mitroff (1974), the Lockean inquiry system perpetuates the purely sensory and empirical aspects of human knowledge. The primary strength of the Lockean inquiring system is the potential for great amounts of experiential data to be included from a group. ...
... How can people be irrational hypothesis testers given the scientific and technological advancement they are capable of achieving? For example, how can we put a man on the moon if our thinking is inherently flawed (Mitroff, 1974)? One explanation is that people may be more capable of falsification than experimental studies have so far shown. ...
... Experts must generate and test hypotheses to advance understanding in many domains. For example, scientists generate hypotheses to discover new knowledge (Gorman, 1995a;Mitroff, 1974;Tweney, 1989), and must subject these hypotheses to experimentation in order to discriminate between hypotheses as the best explanations of the data (e.g., Fugelsang, Stein, Green & Dunbar, 2004;Kuhn, 1993). Legal experts such as criminal psychologists and the police must generate hypotheses to detect motives and suspects for acts of crime (e.g., Britton, 1997), and subsequently evaluate the evidence to ascertain criminal responsibility (e.g., Wagenaar, Van Koppen & Crombag, 1993). ...
... Refutations are generated by rival theorists (e.g., Mitroff, 1974;Kuhn, 1993), and to safeguard against many refutations being labelled anomalies by scientists who disagree with one another it is important to test hypotheses with specific alternatives in mind (e.g, Platt, 1964). For example, successful hypothesis testers who use falsification to overcome hypotheses which are untrue, consider at least one alternative hypothesis in rule discovery tasks (e.g., Klayman & Ha, 1989). ...
[Findings on how ownership affects competitive reasoning in Wason's 2-4-6 Rule Discovery Task from Ch.2 and Ch.3 appear in latest edition of Michael Eysenck’s world-leading psychology textbook 'Cognitive Psychology: A Student’s Handbook 2020'; Select findings from Ch. 4 appeared in Nature News Aug 2004, the 'Cambridge Handbook of Expertise & Expert Performance 2018 and Experimental Psychology Oxford Seminar Series 2010. Funded by IRCHSS and Oxford Law Faculty Fund]. Each day people are presented with circumstances that may require speculation. Scientists may ponder questions such as why a star is born or how rainbows are made, psychologists may ask social questions such as why people are prejudiced, and military strategists may imagine what the consequences of their actions might be. Speculations may lead to the generation of putative explanations called hypotheses. But it is by checking if hypotheses accurately reflect the encountered facts that lead to sensible behaviour demonstrating a true understanding. If evidence shows a hypothesis to be false, then people should rationally abandon it, especially if there are negative consequences. The aim of this thesis is to examine how effectively people search for evidence in their hypothesis testing to test whether or not their hypotheses are true or false in competitive games.
Research findings from six studies of hypothesis testing behaviour in competitive deductive tasks are explored. Chapter by chapter the thesis tests how everyday people, and master chess players, tackle hypothesis testing in mathematical tasks, such as how to solve sequential number sequence puzzles when thinking about an opponent, or how to solve chess problems in a variety of contexts. The implications of the results are discussed in light of aspects of general cognition: such as reasoning, social hypothesis testing and planning.
... In practice, policy is necessarily imperfect since we all know that problems are rarely solved; rather problems are tamed temporarily only, due to the flux of the real world, environmental context or problem situation. This typical dynamic setting therefore generates different kinds of error types in problem structuring (Kimball, 1957;Mitroff, 1974;Dunn, 2017), for instance, errors of the third kind, or type-III errors (formulating and solving the wrong problem). ...
... This is contrasted with type-I (false positive), and type-II (false negative) errors (Kimball, 1957;Mitroff, 1974;Dunn, 2017). ...
The book serves as basic text to an Applied Complexity Science course offered at the University of Cape Town. It provides insights on the systems sciences, how we practice it to a degree, and the reflexivity that compels ongoing improvement
... However, while scientists may be seeking recognition through publication, research suggests they are also motivated by a desire to do, and be recognized for, excellent science (Merton, 1973;Mitroff, 1974). Thus, it appears that scientists' judgments about what data to present to others are not just determined by expectations of scientific scrutiny in peer review and by the wider audience, but also by their own views of acceptable conduct. ...
... Ethical considerations come into play here because scientists' motives for such practices can range from a gut feeling based on expertise to a desire to support a particular view. When deciding not to publish a data point or result, scientists may be doing so because they believe it is the "right" course of action, one that will benefit the progression of their field and the construction of new knowledge (Mitroff, 1974;Waller, 2002). This decision, however, may arise because of unconscious bias or beliefs (Munafò et al., 2017), resulting in what others might see as the unethical manipulation of data. ...
Scientists use judgment in deciding what and how much data to present in publications but science degrees rarely address this issue. Instead, scientific knowledge is presented as certain and students have limited opportunities to use their own judgment in the laboratory. A consequence of this may be that students approach science with a moral absolutist mindset, believing that science is about learning facts and scientists have little need to exercise ethical judgments in relation to data. Students may also hold different ethical standards for themselves and professional scientists. We draw on data from a first-year science module to show that these views can be challenged by encouraging students to reflect on their own behavior and that of famous scientists in situations with varying degrees of professional ethical ambiguity. We provide evidence of significant transitions in students’ thinking, suggesting that reflection on these issues may lead to substantial epistemological and ethical development. By the end of the module, many students had moved from an initial position of certainty to the acceptance of multiple viewpoints or to a more mature understanding of the evidence-based nature of science, as well as gaining the ability to critique decisions and make ethical judgments.
... A pesar de que tradicionalmente se había considerado que los/as científicos/as eran emocionalmente neutros y sin sesgos en sus observaciones e interpretaciones (Merton, 1942(Merton, , 1973Scheffler, 1967), nuevas evidencias suggieren que están emocionalmente implicados con su trabajo (Mitroff, 1977(Mitroff, , 1983, lo cual llevará a varios estudiosos a cuestionar esta objetividad en relación con sus creencias previas. ...
... Así, Nissani (1989ba;1989b), Hoefler-Nissani (1992) y Koheler (1993) llevarán a cabo una serie de experimentos en los que evidencian que las creencias previas ejercen un efecto normativo sobre los juicios sobre la calidad de evidencias empíricas, tal y como ya habían cuestionado otros antes (Kuhn, 1974;Mahoney, 1977Mahoney, , 1976Mahoney, , 1979Mahoney & DeMonbreun, 1978;Mitroff, 1983;Oskamp, 1965;Kuhn, Amsel & O'Loughlin, 1988;Baron & Hershey, 1988;y Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979). ...
... I think there is a case to be made that in the "modern" era, Harold Urey's series of publications in the 1950s (Urey, 1951(Urey, , 1952a(Urey, , 1952b(Urey, , 1955 arguing that Moon is an undifferentiated carbonaceous chondrite provided a template for applying sheer speculation based on physical principles to deep time processes. His "ruling hypothesis" did not long survive the return of lunar highland samples, which provided evidence of an early magma ocean (see Mitroff, 1974 for a sense of how high feelings were then running against an unnamed senior scientist that was almost certainly Urey). But ironically, given Urey's influence in persuading post-Sputnik American governments that a sample return mission to Moon held the key to the origin of the Solar System and perhaps life (Brush, 1982), it's arguable that his poorly constrained conjecture ultimately fueled our current understanding of lunar origin. ...
I came to geology through a metaphoric back door and was gifted a series of visionary mentors who imbued me with an outside‐the‐box view of Earth history. Coupled with remarkable advances in microscale analytical capabilities that arose just as I was graduating into the field, that unorthodox view permitted my research group to explore an alternate conception of the longstanding paradigm of earliest Earth history. As I look back on how the field has evolved in my 40 year career, I see a mixed record of significant advances in our understanding alongside a persistent groupthink that discourages creativity and individual responsibility. I've come to understand this as reflecting different intellectual requirements of deep time geology relative to the study of modern processes. This difference between the general understanding of the scientific method and our needs has given cover to an unconstructive habit. My field is ripe for a fundamental change in the way we address the meager and almost certainly biased geologic record. This disruption could lead younger scientists and future generations away from poorly justified consensus models toward a more complete understanding of the darkest age of our planet's history.
... Later social analysts questioned whether Merton's norms actually described the practice of science [Barnes and Dolby, 1970;Mulkay, 1976]. Ian Mitroff [1974] carried out a study of moon scientists and concluded that a series of "counter-norms" were just as important as Merton's norms. The counter-norm to organised scepticism is, according to Mitroff, "organised dogmatism." ...
Wikipedia has been accused of being biased against challengers to scientific orthodoxy due to efforts by editors having affinities with the Skeptics movement. Examination of Wikipedia, including entries on fluoridation, the origin of AIDS and vaccination, reveals several characteristics typical of a Skeptics sensibility, including the definition of scepticism, lists of deviant ideas, derogatory labelling of heterodox viewpoints, and categories established without reference to reliable sources.
... Despite Luhmann's programmatic intention to "de-ontologize" sociology (e.g., Luhmann, 1990, p. 67), one can find in his texts remainders of a tendency to reification. Differentiation, for example, is labeled "functional," whereas differentiation can also be dysfunctional (Mitroff, 1974). As noted, Künzler (1987, p. 323) argued that Luhmann understood code as a binary duplication rule much like DNA. 2 Statements do not have to be wholly true or false, but can be true to variable extents. ...
In the sociology of scientific knowledge and the sociology of translation, heterogeneous networks have been studied in terms of practices and so-called actor-networks . However, scientific practices are intellectually structured by codes. Cognitive structures interact and co-construct the organization of scholars and discourses into research programs, specialties, and disciplines. The intellectual organization of the sciences adds to and feeds back on the configurations of authors and texts. The social, textual, and cognitive sub-dynamics select upon each other asymmetrically . Selections can further be selected for stabilization along trajectories and then also be globalized—symbolically generalized—into regimes of expectations.
... It is up to the Sociology of Science, in this perspective, to explain only what is "social" (in the Durkheimian sense), leaving the content of science (nature) out of such an explanation. Following the comments of Latour and Woolgar (1997), we can mention, for example, the work on competition among researchers (Bourdieu, 1976;Lemaine, & Matalon, 1969), on the evolution of disciplines (Lemaine et al. 1976), or on their psychology (Mitroff, 1974). ...
The term post truth was chosen as the word of the year by the Oxford dictionary in 2016. Today we see the proliferation of the term fake news as well as the dissemination of alternative views to science, such as “flat Earth”, integrative therapies, and anthropogenic global warming denial. Usually, postmodernism is blamed for subsidizing such movements theoretically. In the present article, we defend the thesis that both, the official discourse of science (modernist discourse) and its main criticisms (including postmodernism) seem to be propositions that sustain the contemporary scenarios of production and proliferation of post-truths. From Bruno Latour’s Science Studies, we reflect on the metaphysical basis of such perspectives and present an explanation to the formation of the “post-truth” through two different mechanisms, i.e, the presentation of a reduced vision of nature of science and the erasure of the network that sustains scientific propositions. We also defend that Science Education can adopt an alternative metaphysical basis, developed by Latour and collaborators in dialogue with different philosophical and sociological currents, contributing to the formation of citizens able to have a critical position in the contemporary socioscientific scenario.
... Legal conventions, rather than scientific norms or empirical research, prevent experts from proffering their opinion and the strength of their conviction (Merton 1973:266-278;Mitroff 1974;Mulkay 1980). Ironically, these legal constraints, by imposing a veneer of caution and qualification, may make prosecution expert witnesses appear more rigorous and more credible than they actually are. ...
... Argumenta ainda Mitroff (1974) que é errado afirmar que as atividades científicas não possam se valer de aspectos emocionais e por isso sugere contranormas a Robert Merton elencadas no quadro 3. Barbosa (2016) complementa que as pesquisas possuem relevâncias sociais que necessitam um olhar atento dentro de uma proposta que viria a se configurar um ethos, já que deixar de fazê-lo é afastar-se das responsabilidades éticas e profissionais que o cientista possui. ...
Admittedly, as one of the main products of scientific communication, open access journals are the Information sources that provide advances, transformations, paradigms and propose new questions within foruns of the fields of knowledge in which they are inserted. To continue fulfilling this role, editors have sought to improve them in different aspects (technical, technological, social, political and economic), one of them being marketing. This thesis aimed to present the theoretical evidences for an open access science marketing, having as analysis and product development the scientific journals. It was highlighted from the systematic literature review, especially the national one over the last forty years of Information Science publications, that the practice and understanding of marketing has been limited to the concepts of
dissemination and promotion; with information and communication technologies, especially social media, this bias has become stronger. It is characterized by a qualitative, descriptive and bibliographical research, fundamentally of a theoretical and reflexive nature, since it appropriates, firstly, the literature of the sociology of science, the economy of information and scientific communication, and then of marketing, to
build the panorama of understanding of the open access science market. The journal is understood as product, presenting all it stages of development from the perspective of marketing in order to contribute to the elucidation of the concept itself and the tasks that the editor needs to take it preparing for this process The thesis concludes with a proposal for open access science marketing thinking, inspired by the schools of
thought of Sheth, Gardner and Garrett, leading theorists in the field, to contribute to the consolidation of the concept within Information Science and science communication.
... Cabe à Sociologia da Ciência, nessa perspectiva, explicar apenas o que é "social" (no sentido durkheiniano), deixando o conteúdo da ciência (a natureza) fora de tal explicação. Seguindo os comentários de Latour e Woolgar (1997), podemos mencionar como exemplo, os trabalhos sobre concorrência entre pesquisadores (Bourdieu, 1976;Lemaine, & Matalon, 1969), sobre a evolução das disciplinas (Lemaine et al. 1976), ou sobre sua psicologia (Mitroff, 1974). ...
O termo pós-verdade foi escolhido como palavra do ano pelo dicionário Oxford em 2016. Hoje, vemos a proliferação do termo fake news bem como a divulgação de visões alternativas à ciência, como o terraplanismo, terapias integrativas, e negação do aquecimento global antropogênico. Não raramente, o pós-modernismo é responsabilizado por subsidiar teoricamente tais movimentos. No presente artigo, defendemos a tese de que tanto o discurso oficial da ciência (discurso modernista) bem como algumas de suas principais críticas (inclusive o pós-modernismo) parecem ser proposições que sustentam o atual cenário de produção e proliferação de pós-verdades. A partir dos Estudos das Ciências de Bruno Latour, fazemos uma reflexão sobre as bases metafísicas de tais perspectivas e apresentamos uma explicação de como se dá a formação da “pós-verdade” através de dois mecanismos distintos, a dizer, a apresentação de uma visão reduzida da natureza da ciência e o apagamento da rede que sustenta proposições científicas. Defendemos, também, como a Educação em Ciências pode se valer de uma base metafísica alternativa, desenvolvida por Latour e colaboradores em dialogia com diferentes vertentes filosóficas e sociológicas, contribuindo para a formação de cidadãos capazes de se posicionar criticamente no cenário sociocientífico contemporâneo.
... These propositions can then be used to develop a contingency matrix to reveal four fundamental modes of inquiry. The matrix below contains the name of the epistemological school, a philosopher classically identified with the school, and Mitroff's [1974] description of the school. This matrix may be used as a kind of road map for reading the Courtney team's exposition and application to KMS. ...
... The metaphor prevalent in the quantitative paradigm is that of natural science. As Mitroff (1974) indicates, this view of the scientific method leads its proponents to believe the natural science model is "good science" while any alternative necessarily must suffer by comparison. In criticizing this "storybook view of science" Mitroff develops another metaphor, that of anthropology, which is adopted into the qualitative paradigm. ...
Only recently have marketing scientists become concerned with issues in the philosophy of science. This paper points to one neglected area—the implications of a theoretical tradition for the selection of research methods (design, data collection, and data analysis). It is argued that marketing has been relying primarily on only one theoretical tradition. The dominance of this philosophy has led to marketing science growing more rapidly in the area of hypothesis testing than in the development of new, rich explanatory theories. Several suggestions are made to achieve a balance in theory construction and testing, with implications for reducing methods bias by a process of triangulating methodologies.
... No campo da epistemologia, especificamente, a proposição de visões não absolutistas, como a defendida em A Estrutura das Revoluções Científicas (Mitroff, 1974 . ...
Apresentamos, nesta tese,uma investigação sobre a estabilização ontológicado fóton,um actanteinicialmentearticulado no contexto da primeira revolução da Física Quântica. Partindo dos Estudos da Ciência de Bruno Latour, entendemos a ciência como uma rede que se estende por diferentes setores da sociedade e que, portanto, lida com diferentes gêneros do discurso. Além deidentificara importância do gênero científico (artigos seminais)no processo de autonomização dos fatos científicos, tambémreconhecemosque, na comunidade da Física, os livros didáticos, ou manuais de instrução, tem papel crucial no estabelecimento dosproblemas exemplares bem como das teorias hegemônicas, tanto que, hoje, é possível um físico se formar sem estudaros artigos originais sobre Física Quântica. Ademais, os livros didáticos de ciências da Educação Básica são, atualmente,responsáveis pela extensão da rede científica para além dos laboratórios, autonomizando actantes como o fóton em esferas mais amplas da sociedade, papel que Latour poderia chamar de representação pública.O objetivo desta pesquisa éinvestigar a interação entres esses três gêneros do discurso (artigos seminais, livros didáticos de ensino superior e livros didáticos de ensino médio) e interpretar como que a estabilização ontológica do fóton é mediadaporcada um deles. Ao fazer isso, estamos estendendo o programa de pesquisa de Latour em, pelo menos, três sentidos. Primeiramente, incluímos o papel do contexto didático na rede da ciência. Segundo,nossos objetosde investigaçãoestão separados por um intervalotemporal maior do que o usual (aproximadamente cem anos). E, por fim, enquanto Latour dedica-se, principalmente, ao estudo de ciências empíricas, nosso trabalho volta-se para assim chamada Física Teórica, levantando questões ontológicas não discutidas originalmente por Latour. Para dar conta dessa extensão, o presente trabalho está dividido em duas partes. A parte I (Referencial Teórico) traz três artigos sobre as ideias de Bruno Latour e as possibilidades de sua aplicação na pesquisa em Educação em Ciências, o que temos chamado de Sociologia Simétrica da Educação em Ciências ou Estudos da Educação em Ciência. A parte II (Estudos Empíricos) traz quatro artigos (dois sobre as relações entre artigos seminais e livros de ensino superior e dois sobre as relações entre artigos seminais, livros de ensino superior e livros de ensino médio).O primeiro estudo empíricotraz uma análise metalinguística do artigo original de Einstein de 1905 em que o quantum é articulado pela primeira vez sem queseprecisasse recorrera nenhum laboratório. No segundo artigo, apresentamos uma análise conceitual e matemática dos artigos de de Broglie eusamos as ideias de Latour para discutir o papel dos livros didáticos na autonomização de sua teoria. No terceiro artigo, analisamos visões epistemológicas em livros didáticos de Física aprovados no Plano Nacional do Livro Didático do Ensino Médio de 2015. E, no quarto artigo,discutimos a narrativa sobre o fóton nesses livros a partir deuma articulação teórica entre ideias de Latour e Bakhtin.Nossos principais resultados apontam o papel articulador da matemática na estabilizaçãode actantes físicos e o papelativo dos autores delivros didáticosna estabilização do fótona partir da hibridização de diferentes visões e do usode mecanismos de causação reversa
... The technical competence of workers in laboratories results from the little systems of desire, resistance and consumption created between them and natural or technical objects. These object systems absorb and generate the emotional energy (Mitroff, 1974) and motivation that sustain expert work. For knowledge workers, the Heideggerian distinction between taking care of things (besorgen) and care for human beings (Fürsorgen) might be seen as problematic, if not reversed. ...
... There are immediate consequences of committing an error: you will lose the game. Science too is a competitive enterprise and refutations may often come from competing scientists and laboratories (Kuhn, 1993;Mitroff, 1974;Gorman, 1995a A hypothesis testing model implies that masters sometimes consider move sequences that lead to error. The idea that expert knowledge sometimes contains errors, or that the retrieval of knowledge sometimes results in errors implies that experts must be able to detect errors that could result from such inaccurate knowledge or inaccurate retrieval. ...
[See coverage by world-leading Ericsson et al's Cambridge Handbook of Expertise & Expert Performance 2018, p.702]. The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed technical protocol analysis of chess masters' evaluative expertise, paying particular attention to the analysis of the structure of their memory process in evaluating foreseen possibilities in games of dynamic equilibrium.
The paper has two purposes. First, to publish a results chapter from my DPhil thesis (in revised journal article form) attending to the measurement of foresight in chess masters' evaluation process, testing alternative theories of cognitive expertise in the domain of chess; and second to provide the technical graphical analysis that corresponds to that measurement in order to preserve this protocol analysis for access in the academic domain for future studies of expert memory and foresight (e.g., Ericsson & Simon, 1993). The step-by-step protocol analysis consists of: (i) an introduction to foresight cognition as hypothesis testing, (ii) a theoretical review in the domain of chess masters' expertise according to the theoretical frameworks in that field purporting hypotheses relevant to chess masters' evaluative skill processes, and (iii) summary tables and non-parametric statistical analysis corroborating chunking theory frameworks of expert cognition (e.g., DeGroot, 1965; Newell & Simon, 1972; Gobet, 1998; Gobet et al., 2004) and refuting the alternative search-evaluation models (e.g., Holding & Reynolds, 1982). Moreover, the journal article espouses the preservation of the traditional protocol analysis method core to the field of expert cognition’s conception (DeGroot, 1969; Kotov, 1971).
The protocol analysis takes the form of a specialist population study (e.g., detailed case study work; Luria, 1987). Thus the outline consists of a short introduction, a theoretical methodological review discussing protocol analysis methods for specialist population studies in cognition (with particular attention to the preservation protocol analysis methods for chess studies in cognition and expert memory with a fresh angle on the foresight process), and the full set of protocol analyses with corresponding problem behaviour graphs. A subset of the main results has been published elsewhere (e.g., Cowley & Byrne, 2004; Cowley 2006), receiving scientific and scientific journalistic acclaim (e.g., Nature Online News 2004).
... Most scientists committed to a theory are aware of the possibility that new evidence might prove them wrong. But the amount of effort required to develop and test a theory requires a level of commitment that makes it difficult to keep an open mind to alternative theories (Mitroff, 1974). However, what scientists work toward is a plausible basis for further research, and this may involve abandoning one hypothesis in favor a more plausible one. ...
Distributed information technologies developed at the NAS of Ukraine and routinely
used (since 2015), with tens of thousands of users, requests and reports in real time, practically prove their ability to meet the needs of building resilient infrastructures. Cloud architectures with similar technologies simultaneously increase the resilience of cyberinfrastructures.
Gestalt fundamentals provide advantageous training for researchers utilizing qualitative methodology in order to better use themselves as their own instrument. The person of the researcher in the social sciences, as interviewer, participant observer, and analyzer of data, is central and therefore crucial in determining the quality of a study. Although the qualitative research literature emphasizes the necessity for such skills as awareness, dealing with complexity, and staying with process, there is silence about how to acquire these strengths. People with Gestalt training have much to offer those involved in qualitative research.
Four individual dimensions (soul, heart, mind, body) determine Who we are as individuals. Collectively speaking, the same four-dimensional logic is repeated in a social environment, which is equally shaped by four dimensions (micro, meso, macro, and meta). The links within and between these dimensions impact our individual and collective existence through the direct and indirect influence that we have on the entities that we are part of (families, communities and institutions, countries and economies, Planet Earth), and inversely the impact they have on us (For further details on either of these eight dimensionsDimension please refer to Walther 2020). Moving along the dimensions that shape our individual lives and our collective existence, we will look in this chapter at the consequences that COVID-19 and the measures to contain it had on human behavior and attitude.
In a recent paper, Hirsch (hα: an index to quantify an individual’s scientific leadership, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-018-2994-1) proposes to attribute the credit for a co-authored paper to the α-author—the authors with the highest h-index—regardless of his or her actual contribution, effectively reducing the role of the other co-authors to zero. The indicator hα inherits most of the disadvantages of the h-index from which it is derived, but adds the normative element of reinforcing the Matthew effect in science. Using an example, we show that hα can be extremely unstable. The empirical attribution of credit among co-authors is not captured by abstract models such as h, \(\bar{h}\), or hα.
The author discusses methods used in other social sciences and in marketing in terms of two key criteria defining “good research.” It is argued that the simultaneous research desiderata of data integrity and high currency or generalizability often place conflicting operational demands on researchers. Thus, tradeoffs must be made in employing any method to investigate a research problem. As a consequence of these inevitable tradeoffs, a broader rather than narrower method set becomes appropriate for marketing investigations. Case research is explored as one useful alternative research method for marketers. The nature of case research in contrast to case teaching or prescientific case culling is discussed, the appropriateness of case-based versus more conventional deductive methods is considered by researcher objective and type of problem investigated, and a four-stage case research process is described. General guidelines and caveats for the conduct of marketing case research are given. The author concludes that case research may be viewed as a metaphor for the general utility of the varied inductive research methods in expanding our perspectives on marketing research problems.
In a recent paper, Hirsch (2018) proposes to attribute the credit for a co-authored paper to the {\alpha}-author--the author with the highest h-index--regardless of his or her actual contribution, effectively reducing the role of the other co-authors to zero. The indicator h{\alpha} inherits most of the disadvantages of the h-index from which it is derived, but adds the normative element of reinforcing the Matthew effect in science. Using an example, we show that h{\alpha} can be extremely unstable. The empirical attribution of credit among co-authors is not captured by abstract models such as h, h_bar , or h{\alpha}.
Статья направлена на выявление принципов динамического коллективного порождения знания в ходе пространственно локализованной социальной интеракции. Знание рассматривается как результат структурного сопряжения третьего порядка, обеспечивающего группе адаптивную способность и способность к действию. Создание знания определяется как формирование оригинальных комбинаций (сетей) индивидуально и контекстуально укорененных смыслов. Проводится анализ взаимосвязи знания с коммуникативными и эмоционально-энергетическими аспектами межличностного взаимодействия. Демонстрируется, что процесс знаниепорождения всегда локализован в некотором общем пространстве опыта, создавая и изменяя которое индивиды осуществляют совместную трансформацию знания. Предлагается модель ритуала создания знания — ключевого механизма коллективной интеллектуальной работы, который обеспечивает динамическое сопряжение индивидов в общем пространстве опыта.
This paper argues that knowledge and strategies of inquiry for producing knowledge are not gender-neutral. Bias in existing academic disciplines goes deeper than simply ignoring the existence of women as scholarly contributors or as a category for study. Bias extends to the very philosophical foundations of how inquiry is conceptualized. It extends to theories about how we think and to judgments about what constitutes “good” thinking. As a result, women in graduate school are often constrained to inquire in ways that are male-oriented and discontinuous with their life experience—to the detriment of their persistence in graduate programs. The paper discusses the relationships between feminist scholarship, science, feminist epistemology, and developments in the philosophy of science. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these relationships for the education of women.
Es wird der Frage nachgegangen, ob es in der Psychotherapie eine Geschichtsvergessenheit gibt, die sich u. a. daran zeigt, dass viele Befunde aus der Geschichte der Psychotherapieforschung in Vergessenheit geraten sind bzw. Erkenntnisse immer wieder neu generiert und unter anderen Labels „vermarktet“ werden. Thesen zu potenziellen Hintergründen dieser Beobachtung werden dargestellt. Hierzu gehört, dass die Stellung der Psychotherapie innerhalb der Wissenschaften nach wie vor nicht ganz geklärt ist. Wird Psychotherapieforschung der psychologischen Forschung zugeordnet, ist zu konstatieren, dass dort (wie auch in den Naturwissenschaften) zwar eine Fülle von Forschungsbefunden generiert wird, diese aber aus methodischen und wissenschaftstheoretischen Gründen oft auf sehr wackligen Beinen stehen. Dazu kommen sehr viele disparate Befunde innerhalb der Psychologie (und der Psychotherapiewissenschaft), die schwer integrierbar sind und dazu beitragen, dass es innerhalb der Psychotherapie immer noch keine Einigkeit über ein „Kernwissen“ gibt. Als Hintergründe für das Problem der Geschichtsvergessenheit in der Psychotherapie werden in Anlehnung an Goldfried (2000) 6 Themen reflektiert, nämlich die Lücke zwischen Forschung und Praxis, die Unterschiedlichkeit der theoretischen Ansätze zum Verständnis von Psychotherapie in Verbindung mit diesbezüglichen Sprachbarrieren. Des Weiteren tragen zur Geschichtsvergessenheit ein steter Wandel in der Forschungsmethodologie bei, die Wertigkeit vermeintlich neuer Befunde und generelle Spielregeln innerhalb der Wissenschaft (und der Psychotherapie) bei, die mehr und mehr den Gesetzen des Marktes folgt und gehorchen. Nur ein intensivierter offener Dialog zwischen Forschung und Praxis kann zur Generierung eines psychotherapeutischen Kernwissens beitragen.
An ever-increasing number of policy problems have come to be interpreted as representing a particular type of intractable, ill-structured or wicked policy problem. Much of this debate is concerned with the challenges wicked problems pose for program management rather than policy analysis. This article, in contrast, argues that the key challenge in addressing this type of policy problems is in fact analytical. Wicked policy problems are difficult to identify and interpret. The knowledge base for analysing wicked policy problem is typically fragmented and contested. Available evidence is incomplete, inconclusive and incommensurable. In this situation, the evidentiary and the interpretative elements of policy analysis become increasingly indistinguishable and inseparably intertwined. The article reveals the problems this poses for policy analysis and explores the extent to which the consolidation, consensualization and contestation of evidence in policy analysis offer alternative procedural paths to resolve these problems.
In this paper, the author describes the process of developing a doctoral curriculum in Organizational Psychology involving the participation of a team comprising administrators, faculty, and students which combined seemingly opposing elements. In order to define a curriculum for the future, the members had to resolve conflicts amongst themselves at the personal, philosophic/ideological, and organizational/structural levels.
At the personal level, they learned to reconcile: content and ‘hard’ quantitative skills with process and ‘soft’ personal skills short-term individualistic approaches with long-term strategic thinking monoculturalism with one dominant culture and multiculturalism with pluralistic thinking.
At the philosophical levels, they learned to: combine content and process traditional and experiential approaches diversity awareness and the management of cross-cultural differences.
At the organizational/structural levels, they were able to: combine hierarchical and collegial or consensus-based approaches develop an identity that is unique combined with identity of the larger university culture create resources for empirically-based and experientially-based scholarship.
After these differences were reconciled, the members were able to develop synergistic approaches that allowed them to evolve from their ethnocentric biases to more multicultural approaches. They learned that multiple bases of power would allow them to influence their colleagues to accept the approaches they could potentially offer the university even though they would not have the formal authority to do so.
By practising what was preached, the team was able to define a mission and a vision that was considerably broader than the one it would have if it were to work individualistically. Their mission was to: develop curricular sequences that focus on seminal works in organizational theories, values, research, and practice have an interdisciplinary focus that draws on the fields of psychology, sociology, systems thinking, experimental, and quasi-experimental design emphasize on integrating and differentiating knowledge simultaneously emphasize on theory-in-action and reflective practice.
The aim of this essay is to briefly review the past 20 years of work in the philosophy of social science and to suggest-worthwhile areas for further research. Since others have been assigned the task of reviewing psychology, linguistics and statistics, I have tried to keep my remarks on these disciplines to a minimum. For reasons that will be made clear later, psychology got more attention than originally planned.
Nurses, as other life science students, have been prejudiced against politics, imagining that it only contaminates techno-scientific enterprises. However, the new, professional nurse is aware of the need for political understanding and political skills. The transformation of the socio-economic status of the health care industry from a social service to a business provides an excellent opportunity for introducing the nursing student to political thought in a positive conjunction with practical analysis.
To generate a credible metapolitical framework, I embrace rather than avoid the current problems about the nature of the subject matter of politics. An aggressive, philosophically informed attack on the myth of autonomous, objective science opens the student's intellectual map of reality, and lays the groundwork for a proposed (paradoxical) complementarity of the two traditional models: politics as a science and politics as a humanity. This uncomfortable, middle ground position, abandoning any global Rationalism, again makes historical and contemporary case studies a relevant—in fact essential—part of political education. This is an effective approach to introducing the nursing student, whose education is dominated by classical, rationalistic, scientific images, to political studies.
Threats to Freedom from a Tyranny of the Minority - Volume 3 Issue 1 - Malcolm L. Goggin
The problem of demarcating science from non- or pseudo-science has serious ethical and political implications for science itself and, indeed, for all societies in which science is practised. The conflicts and controversies surrounding the views of Copernicus, Galileo, Darwin or Lysenko make this abundantly clear. Sometimes these controversies involve what are generally regarded as non-scientific or political considerations. Examples of this are the banning of Copernicus’s theory by the Catholic Church, and the support of Lysenko’s position by the authorities in Russia in opposition to the neo-Darwinists. At other times, however, it is not the church, the state or the party that is involved in disputes about what is to be seen as science, but rather the scientific community itself. Much of the debate today concerning race and intelligence is regarded in some scientific circles as a debate concerning pseudo-scientific claims. The analyses and conclusions of those who claim a link between heredity and intelligence are viewed by some scientists as ‘pseudo-scientific’ and, consequently, these men are often defined as fakes, charlatans or pretenders by organised segments of the scientific community.
The problem we are concerned with here is just this: How should we understand science? Are we to account for scientific knowledge1 by appeal to the various social factors which may have been prevalent when the theory was being formulated? Should we, that is, appeal to the “interests” which a group of scientists may have had? Undoubtedly, social factors play some role, but are social causes totally responsible for the production of belief? Or should we take a different approach and account for scientific knowledge in a fashion which largely mirrors the very accounts that rational scientists themselves would have given to justify their theory choices? Perhaps we should be citing the “evidence” for the belief in question; perhaps we should be providing “good reasons” as part of the explanation for holding the belief. Which approach to understanding science is right?
The Ethical Principles of Psychologists (APA, 1990), consistent with previous versions and other professional standards, recognizes that ethical dilemmas sometimes involve complex sets of balancing considerations that may give rise to varying ethical resolutions. In this article it is argued that ethical decisions, in part, may be linked to identifiable background characteristics of the individual(s) who must make the decisions. The results of an exploratory study pertaining to predictable biases in ethical decision making involving human subject research are briefly described. Despite a presumed increase in ethical sensitivities among psychologists during recent decades, results suggest that differences among psychologists persist in the ways they evaluate ethically questionable situations. The article concludes with a call for further research on the factors that influence judgments pertinent to ethical decision making and on the practical implications for ethical review.
Business schools split reality and favor one aspect of reality over another. They overemphasize the economical drivers of human behavior but they either ignore or are unaware of the effects of unconscious forces on human behavior. In this chapter, we concentrate on psychoanalysis almost exclusively because it still does not receive the recognition it deserves, and one cannot get to the heart of and hence treat complex social messes unless one can analyze and understand the immense and largely unconscious fears, anxieties, and paranoia that unfortunately are an important aspect of many messes. Dealing with messes fundamentally demands that we question why we have split the world into different disciplines, factors, professions, variables, the arts versus the sciences, etc. It demands that we question the ways in which we have divided up the world, and that we come up with ways to put them back together.
One of the most important philosophical assumptions of the Machine Age is that the true (epistemology), the good (ethics), and the beautiful (aesthetics) are separable. Business schools not only accepted but promulgated further the division between the true, the good, and the beautiful. In the Systems Age, however, truth is that which makes an ethical difference in the quality of one’s life. The most general question we want to pursue in this chapter is, “What kinds of systems of inquiry (knowledge systems) are appropriate for studying and managing messes?” The general topic of Inquiry Systems is central to answering this question. We argue that truth, goodness and beauty are the results of the Management of Inquiry.
As suggested in the Introduction and Chapter 1, concern about what science is like as an activity have been central to recent discussions about the relation between research and biothreats as well as the origins and scope of dual-use concerns. This chapter further considers the nature of ‘science’ to develop a fuller understanding of the security implications of research and possible responses.
The fiftieth anniversary of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) and the opening of a fourth International Polar Year (IPY) in 2007 provided historians and other students of science and technology a unique opportunity to assess the origins and influence of past IPYs as organized international research efforts. An interdisciplinary conference at the Smithsonian Institution in the fall of 2007, in conjunction with the annual meeting of the History of Science Society, explored ways in which these collaborative scientific activities supported the growth of professionalism (both disciplinary and interdisciplinary) in science, and how they promoted international relations of science and of governments. Participation in polar collaborative research efforts left a marked impact on the state of scientific investigation beginning in the late nineteenth century, when the first IPY took place, and more recent efforts from the 1930s to 1950s have extended its effect. They have fostered a new structure for the conduct of investigations, for the analysis of scientific data, and for the incorporation of what has been learned into the corpus of world knowledge. At the same time, these international scientific efforts evoked a healthy dose of nationalism, imperialism, and diplomatic necessity. The merger of national interest with scientific curiosity represented one of the most significant outgrowths of these collaborations. As historian Allan A.
We are living in a new economy driven by knowledge. According to Kendrick (1994), the stock of gross real capital in the US from 1929 to 1990 reflects the increase of intangible over tangible capital: 6,075 billion dollars of tangible capital in 1929 and 28,525 in 1990 vs. 3,251 billion dollars of intangible capital in 1929 and 32,819 in 1990. Tangible capital comprises facilities, machinery, stocks and natural resources. Intangible capital comprises education, R&D and services. The importance of knowledge expressed by R&D and innovation also emerges from other data. According to McCloskey (1985), annual productivity in the UK increased by 1.33 % between 1780 and 1860. Only 0.14 % was derived from greater capital intensity, while the remaining 1.19 % was generated by innovations in processes and products. Solow (1971) provides similar data regarding the US from 1909 to 1949: only a 12.5 % increase in productivity was caused by greater capital intensity, while the remaining 87.5 % was generated by process and product innovation.
The social epistemology delineated, in the previous chapter, with the features 1–8, that I label Cognitive Realism, aims at analyzing the social production of scientific knowledge according to the criterion of the cognitive and methodological justification of truth. What are the normative implications of this epistemology regarding social institutions and practices? What are the institutions, forms of communication, modes of collaboration and of co-ordination in science that may satisfy features 6–7 (ceteris paribus the satisfaction of features 1–5) of this epistemological model? I will introduced some of them that I consider crucial for the pursuit of truth. These institutions constitute part of the content of feature (8), social reliability.
The project entitled the naturalisation of epistemology which was launched by Quine in 1969 opened Pandora’s box in terms of naturalistic fallacy. The most disparate attempts to merge the normative with the descriptive have emerged over the past few years. In the theory of knowledge, in metaphysics, in ethics and in the philosophy of science an attempt has been made to transfer empirical knowledge, above all of psychological and neuropsychological models of perception, memory, reasoning and decision, to the construction of normative theories. In the philosophy of science, this attempt goes by the name of “cognitive philosophy of science” which in Italy has been translated, not without some ambiguity, as “cognitive theory of science”. Traditionally, like any theory from the philosophy of science, it should be able to respond to a number of fundamental questions regarding the status of scientific knowledge. In particular, it should be able to justify or otherwise why science is different to other human activities and why it increased man’s knowledge of nature. In short, it should be able to propound a theory of scientific rationality that highlights the methodological specificities underlying the conceptual change of science and that sets it apart from man’s other cognitive activities.
Uniformitarian models for the early Earth take little or no account of repeated impacts of asteroid clusters and their effects on crust and mantle. However a large body of evidence exists for multiple impacts by bodies on the scale of tens of kilometer during ~3.47–2.48 Ga (Lowe et al. Astrobiology 3:7–48, 2003; Lowe and Byerly, Did the LHB end not with a bang but with a whimper? 41st Lunar Planet Science conference 2563pdf, 2010; Glikson and Vickers. Aust J Earth Sci 57:79–95, 2010; Glikson The asteroid impact connection of planetary evolution. Springer-Briefs, Dordrecht, 150 pp, 2013), likely accounting at least in part for mafic-ultramafic volcanism produced by mantle rebound and melting events, consistent with original suggestion by Green (Earth Planet Sci Lett 15:263–270, 1972; Green DH Petrogenesis of Archaean ultramafic magmas and implications for Archaean tectonics. In: Kroner A (ed) Precambrian plate tectonics. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 469–489, 1981). Further, the juxtaposition of at least four impact ejecta units with the fundamental unconformity between granite-greenstone terrains and semi-continental deposits in both the Barberton Greenstone Belt and the Pilbara Craton about ~3.26–3.227 Ga constitutes a primary example for the tectonic and magmatic effects of asteroid impact clusters in the Archaean, supporting Lowe and Byerly’s (Did the LHB end not with a bang but with a whimper? 41st Lunar Planet Science conference 2563pdf, 2010) suggested extension of the late heavy bombardment (LHB).
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