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Regional Climate Service
Hans von Storch
12
, Insa Meinke
12
, Nico Stehr
3
, Beate Ratter
12
, Werner Krauss
4
,
Roger A. Pielke jr.
5
Marcus Reckermann
16
, Ralf Weisse
12
1 Institute of Coastal Research, GKSS, Geesthacht, Germany; 2 KlimaCampus, University of Hamburg, Germany; 3 Zeppelin
University, Friedrichshafen, Germany; 4Center for Mediterranean Studies, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany; 5 Center for
Science and Technology Policy Research, Boulder, USA; 6 International BALTEX Secretariat, GKSS, Germany
Abstract: In this article, we discuss the advisory capacity of climate science for political and societal
decisions. To provide options, open up perspectives and enhance the understanding for the dynamics
of climate is a task we name climate service. After a general discussion, experiences of providing this
service on a regional and local scale – Northern Germany, the metropolitan area of Hamburg and the
Baltic Sea Basin -- during the last few years is reviewed. Key components of this regional climate ser-
vice is the establishment of a regional climate office, of regional IPCC-like assessments of knowledge
about regional and local climate change, and detailed homogeneous data sets describing changing
weather statistics (i.e., climate) in past decades and in perspectives for the next several decades.
Our climate and ecology are changing; societies are changing as well. The speed with
which each is being transformed appears to accelerate. Necessary political and economic de-
cisions are about ways of dealing with uncertain future events and its multitude of contentious
challenges and pathways. Uncertainty resides in nature and society. In society uncertainty is
rooted in the unpredictability of social life, that is, in human agency. The collective con-
sciousness of the risks faced from nature and by society has reached an unprecedented level.
The representation of the risks we face, our conception of what uncertainty happens to be, is
to a large part a matter of social construction.
The different societal challenges, far from being driven only by ecological changes, in-
clude transformations in the foundations of the economy, changing values and perceptions,
technological advances, and the rearrangement of geopolitical and global economic structures.
These transformations take place on different time and spatial scales. The dilemma is that the
likely consequences of political and economic actions taken today may be judged unfavorably
just a few years later - even if they are based on a broad societal and international consensus.
Specific contemporary strategies may be judged to be mistaken at a future time, when they do
not comprise flexibility enabling future generations and societies to adapt attitudes and path-
ways consistent with their own values and perceptions. This might happen even when these
strategies are based on what appear to be timeless universal ideals such as international and
intergenerational justice and equity as criteria for political decisions.
The climate issue is often communicated as a fundamentally different political problem or,
better, it is framed as a non-political issue. The climate problem is presented as an existential
threat that is far worse than anything else humankind has ever been confronted with; even
more, it is considered as different from other political issues in being associated with a domi-
nant calculative and rationalist conception of uncertainty. This also accounts for the domi-
nance of economist among social scientists engaged in climate research. In economics a ra-
tionalist model of uncertainty has long been dominant. The future uncertainty constitutive for
political issues has been removed. In this mindset, only a single pathway is acceptable, for
example, the reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions until the year 2100 to a level cor-
responding to an increase of global mean temperatures of 2
o
C. Consequently, this is consid-
ered the only way to avoid the serious societal repercussions of global warming. Political as-
sessments and judgments are virtually pre-empted and not required; instead, they are replaced
by the findings of a climate science that clearly excludes any alternatives. Politics has been
eliminated by science.
2
Even in times of globalization, people still live in different cultures. This diverse world-
wide public is aware of the profound changes underway. In the case of the currently dominant
discussion of climate change, people are confronted with a socio-political order that is less
conscious of the values, visions and diverse aspirations such as the desire of the poor to gain
access to affordable energy, to economic well-being, to education, to human rights and to live
in harmony with their environment.
In the past, at high-level scientific and political meetings agreement on the principle of 2
o
C
was easily reached, whereas in practice hardly any progress is made – current atmospheric
CO2 concentrations are increasing unabatedly (Butler, 2009). Only recently, the international
conference COP-15 in Copenhagen failed, and the US Senate has once again failed to pass its
climate bill on cap and trade. It is highly unlikely that another effort will succeed. Increas-
ingly, different groups of scientists, politicians, social movements and the public are puzzled
on how to adopt the international political agenda to the diverse realities we live in (Geden,
2010a,b). Even worse, the insistence on only a single solution is counterproductive in that it
discourages societies to examine alternative pathways of dealing with climate change (Prins
and Rayner, 2007), such as exploiting the ubiquitous process of modernization (Grossmann,
2001) and regionally or sectoral specific approaches (Prins et al., 2010).
1 The role of climate science in planning for the future
As Roger Pielke jr. (2007), Luhmann (1997) and Grundmann and Stehr (2011) have ar-
gued, shifting the responsibility for a societal problem to the scientific community is based on
a "linear model" or instrumental model of the science-policy interaction. Such a model banks
on a technocratic solution and thereby both depoliticizes policymaking and politicizes sci-
ence. Depoliticizing policymaking leads to a lack of political debate with a disclosure of eco-
nomic interests, ideological commitments and cultural values. It can also lead to deepening of
opposing views (clad as scientific conflict), and eventually to a lack of broad social accep-
tance (see also Sarewitz, 2004). In turn, the politicization of science leads to an exaggerated
encroachment of political, economic and social utility into the scientific research and the in-
terpretation of scientific findings. Science and civil society commitments converge to some
extent, as exemplified by the unopposed references to politically motivated grey literature in
the WG-II report of the IPCC.
In both instances, societal systems, science and policymaking are suffering. It is recom-
mendable to reconstitute a reasonable division of labor between science and society, which
will have advantages for both systems. A new societal contract between society and climate
science is needed, based for instance on a renewal and adaptation of traditional concepts
(Mooney, 2010). Such an agreement should acknowledge the post-normal state of contempo-
rary science (Funtovicz and Ravetz, 1985; Ravetz, 2006) and reconsider the potential utility of
the general norms of science as presented by Merton (1973; see also Stehr, 1978; Grundmann,
2010; von Storch and Stehr, 2010).
Postnormality describes a situation, in which the uncertainty of scientific knowledge is in-
herently large, the societal demand for answers is urgent and – at the same time – the implica-
tion of any conclusions drawn from such science are costly and societally of great signifi-
cance. Climate science is clearly in a postnormal phase (Bray and von Storch, 1999). Fur-
thermore, interest-driven forces act upon science, and try to make it a supportive tool for pre-
conceived agendas and political agendas.
In this situation, it is imperative to reconsider Merton's four scientific norms as summa-
rized by Grundmann (2010):
"Universalism: Truth claims are to be subjected to pre-established impersonal criteria.
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Communism: is the nontechnical and extended sense of common ownership of goods; the
products of competition are communized („public domain“); there is an imperative for com-
munication of data and research findings.
Disinterestedness: The virtual absence of fraud in the annals of science has to be attributed
to a distinctive pattern of institutional control; it is in the interest of scientists to conform on
pain of sanctions.
Organized Skepticism: Research is checked by rigorous, structured scrutiny of peers. This
principle pervades into other spheres of society, unfolding its critical powers."
Such an agreement would imply that science is not a priori taking into account the political
(or more generally: societal) utility of scientific answers but only the political utility of the
questions. Even though there are diverse views on Merton’s writings, his ethos of science is a
useful contribution to a guideline of social conduct; even if these norms are not strictly met in
practice, this does not constitute sufficient reason to give them up, According to Pielke jr.
(2007), one role for scientists is acting as ‘honest brokers’ – primarily through authoritative
institutions -- in the exchange with society and politics, instead of acting as (stealth) advocates
or pure ‘ivory tower’ scientists. This implies that science recognizes the always-existing pos-
sibility of new future findings that may lead to revisions of the current body of knowledge and
an expansion of policy options. Science answers with the current knowledge questions about
the dynamics of climate, the effect of certain societal activities on climate (emissions, land
use change), and the effect of the present and possible future climate on societal activities
(impacts). Science helps to work out response options enabling societies to choose solutions
consistent with its values and goals. Instead of imposing an abstract order on society, climate
science finally helps to localize and to root climate change and its effects in society in order to
enable adequate regional and local responses (Krauss 2009, 2010).
In this sense, science is playing an important but supportive role; the decisive role is still
with policymakers and society at large. Thus, science offers a knowledge-based service; sci-
ence offers knowledge about climate dynamics, change and impact; while recognizing the
possibility for revision, it both contributes to the societal contextualization of such knowl-
edge, and accepts feedback into the scientific arena of socio-politically significant issues. We
call this bundle of tasks and competencies Climate Service.
The societal conceptualization of climate change takes the form of possible response
strategies – which could incorporate efforts to avoid climate change (mitigation; abatement),
or to adapt to climate risks (adaptation) by reducing vulnerability to extreme weather events
such as rain storms, flooding, wind storms, hail, or droughts (Hasselmann, 1990). Abatement
can be accomplished by limiting the agent of change, i.e., the emissions, or by geo-
engineering. Both approaches need political consensus and will only be effective on the inter-
national scale. Adaptation is dominantly a regional or local challenge, since climate risks
manifest themselves mostly on a scale corresponding to individual landscapes, extending
rarely across more than a few hundred kilometers.
Addressing the former, abatement, its potentials, options and perspectives, is mostly sub-
ject of Global Climate Service, whereas the science-society interaction revolving around at
local and regional adaptation and mitigation is what we call Regional Climate Service. In the
following we will deal with how such a service can be implemented.
2 Regional Climate Service
The following presentation of regional climate service activities is based on several years
of climate service practice, done at the Institute of Coastal Research of the GKSS Research
Center (http://coast.gkss.de) together with the Center of Excellence "Integrated Climate Sys-
4
tem Analysis and Prediction" (CliSAP; http://www.clisap.de/index.php?id=151&L=1). A
short summary of the concept behind these activities is provided by von Storch and Meinke
(2008).
These activities comprises
1) a "North German Climate Office" (http://www.norddeutsches-klimabuero.de/), which
establishes a dialogue with stakeholders in the region of Northern Germany including the
metropolitan region of Hamburg (this office has by now been complemented by a series of
three other regional climate offices – see http://www.klimabuero.de/index_en.html and
Schipper et al., 2009)
1
.
2) an assessment about the current knowledge about regional climate dynamics, change
and impacts – as a kind of mini-IPCC; so far one report has been prepared for the Baltic
Sea basin (BACC author team, 2007, or Reckermann et al., 2008); a report on the know-
ledge about climate, climate change and impact in the metropolitan region of Hamburg (see
http://www.gkss.de/institute/coastal_research/projects/klimabuero/reports/index.html) is in
press, and second BACC report has just be launched (http://www.baltex-
research.eu/BACC2/index.html).
3) a data base describing the regional weather stream, including the sea weather (storm
surges, waves) in the past 60 years, as well as scenarios of possible future climate until
2100 (coastDat, see http://www.coastdat.de/index_home.html.en and Weisse et al., 2009).
In the following we will discuss these activities in some more detail.
2.1 Regional Dialog through Regional Climate Offices
When establishing a dialog between science and the public, the effort should be based on
elements like these listed in Mooney (2010):
1) Heterogeneity. It is important to remember that both the “public” and the “scien-
tists/technologists” are heterogeneous. ·
2) Trust. The scientific community must build and maintain the public’s trust.
3) Education. Just as the public must be educated on scientific topics, so must the scientific
community be educated on public attitudes and opinions.
4) Communication. There is a need to improve the forums for public communication.
In this spirit, the Institute of Coastal Research of the GKSS Research Center, as a scientific
institution with competence in the field of regional climate research, has set up the North
German Climate Office as an interface between science and practice. The intention was to
allow for communication and discussion about climate change impacts and risks for Northern
Germany. In this region risks are especially related to storms, storm surges and ocean waves,
but also to flooding, droughts and heat waves as consequence of a changed energy and water
cycle. These issues are part of the competence field of the Institute of Coastal Research, so
that public need and part of the work done at the institute match well. Additionally, a group at
the institute is monitoring regional perceptions, and is engaged in Integrated Coastal Man-
agement research.
An example for this work is shown in Figure 1. It shows the result of two surveys con-
ducted among people living at the coast and in Hamburg about their concerns. Both popula-
tions share the perception that the major risk of climate and climate change is represented by
1
For obvious reasons, most of the literature and the references about the regional climate offices are in German.
5
storm surges (related to increased sea level and intensified storms), but surprisingly people in
Hamburg, who are less threatened by storm surges, are more concerned about climate change
than those living along the coast.
The communication between science, on the one side, and the public and stakeholders, on
the other side, needs to base on the current scientific knowledge. Besides communicating re-
sults of current climate change and perspective for the future also the limitations and uncer-
tainties associated with this scientific knowledge are to be conveyed. At the same time, sci-
ence has insufficient insight in the type of questions and concerns raised in the public and
relevant for stakeholders. Thus, there are two main tasks of the dialogue between science and
the public – which is accomplished by the knowledge broker "North German Climate Office".
One is to explore the range of perceptions, views, questions, needs, concerns and knowledge
in the public and among stakeholders about climate, climate change and climate risks. The
other task is to convey the content of scientific knowledge into the public, to media and to
stakeholders. This includes communicating the limitations of such knowledge, the known
uncertainties and the unknowable, as well as the limited role of science in complex social de-
cision processes.
Figure 1: Perceived risk along the North Sea coast and in the city of Hamburg related to climate change
in 2008. (After Ratter et al. (2009), and Ratter and Kruse (2010))
Figure 2: Range of changes in daily mean temperature (left,
o
C), of the number of summer days (a day
with maximum temperature of 25
o
C or more) according to a series of scenarios, run with different mod-
els – for 2071-2100 relative to 1960-1990. (After Meinke and Gerstner, 2009)
Conceptual precision was found to be an important dimension of this dialogue. Concepts,
which are particularly important, but often misunderstood, refer to forecasts and scenarios
6
(which is even among scientists often mixed up; cf. Bray and von Storch, 2010), time and
space scales, data inhomogeneity, change of statistics, detection and attribution of anthropo-
genic climate change, role of single extreme events.
An important internet tool, which became operational in 2009, is the regional climate atlas
for Northern Germany (see http://www.norddeutscher-klimaatlas.de), which allows users an
interactive access of regionalized changes of various climate variables at different time win-
dows in the future for the North German region. The change is presented as average across all
incorporated scenarios as well as maximum and minimum changes. Averaged across the re-
gion, changes are shown in Figure 2 as an example.
2.2 Regional Climate Knowledge Basis –Climate Reports
While the fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
provided much needed knowledge about climate, climate change and impact, the need for
such knowledge about regional and local conditions are generally missing. Such knowledge
about regional results and scenarios are asked for by local decision-makers and stakeholders
(Visbeck, 2008; von Storch and Meinke, 2008). Mimicking the IPCC, an outstanding example
of a regional assessment is the BALTEX Assessment of Climate Change for the Baltic Sea
Basin (BACC; Reckermann et al., 2008), which was compiled by a consortium of 84 scien-
tists from 13 countries around the Baltic Sea (BACC Author Team, 2008 – see Figure 3). The
assessment covers various disciplines related to climate research and related impacts.
The Baltic Sea Basin represents an old cultural landscape, and the Baltic Sea itself is
among the most studied sea areas of the world. Thus, there is a wealth of information, in thou-
sands of publications, concerning past climate conditions in the region. A large part of the
information is not in English and also had not been available for western researchers, as the
eastern part of the Baltic Sea basin had been behind the iron curtain until the early 1990s. The
challenge was to install a writing team that could do “paper mining” in their home countries
and compile the material into a comprehensive, well-written assessment book. Besides look-
ing at past and current climate change, the BACC report presents climate projections until the
year 2100 using regional climate models, and an assessment of climate change impacts on
terrestrial, freshwater, and marine ecosystems of the Baltic Sea basin.
The results of the BACC assessment process were not biased by political or economic in-
terest groups, and it relies exclusively on published scientific evidence. The BACC report
brings together consolidated knowledge which has broad consensus in the scientific commu-
nity. At times, though, this consensus takes the form of “consensus on dissensus”, meaning
that for certain points contradicting opinions could not be resolved, as for instance in case of
the degree of the past warming of Baltic Sea surface waters.
The BACC report made no recommendations for how to deal with the ongoing and ex-
pected future changes. Instead the BACC project liaised with the intergovernmental Baltic
Marine Environment Protection Commission (Helsinki Commission, HELCOM), which used
the BACC report as the basis for the “HELCOM Thematic Assessment 2007” on Climate
Change in the Baltic Sea area which was officially adopted by representatives of Baltic Sea
riparian states in March 2007.
The BACC assessment report has led to the launch of other, similar initiatives, for exam-
ple, a climate report for the greater Hamburg area, Germany, which will be published in No-
vember 2010, and on the climate of the North Sea (NOSCCA). A 2
nd
BACC climate report,
again compiled under the auspices of BALTEX, is due in 2014.
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Figure 3: Cover of the BACC report (left; BACC Author Team, 2008) and HELCOM Thematic Assessment
"Climate Change in the Baltic Sea Area" compiled on the basis of the BACC report.
2.3 Regional Climate Knowledge Basis – Detailed Data Sets
Various stakeholders, ranging from governmental agencies to companies and representa-
tives of economic sectors, as well as regional scientific institutions are regularly asking not
only for perspectives of future development but also about recent and current risks and poten-
tials (e.g., concerning off-shore wind energy or other large-scale constructions). As a response
to these inquiries, a data set named coastDat with coastal weather analyses and climate change
scenarios for the future for Northern Europe has been compiled.
Figure 4. Layout of the consistent metocean hindcast 1948–2007 for the southern North Sea. From the
(middle) regional atmosphere hindcast hourly wind fields were used to force a (right) tide surge and a
(left) wave model hindcast. The figure shows an example of consistent metocean conditions obtained
from the hindcast for 1200 UT C 21 Feb 1993. (middle) Near-surface (10-m height) marine wind fields (m
s
−1
), and corresponding wind direction obtained from the regional atmospheric reconstruction. (left) Cor-
responding significant wave height fields (m) and mean wave direction from the coarse and the fine grid
wave model hindcast. (right) Tide surge levels (m) from the corresponding tide surge hindcast (from
Weisse et al., 2009)
This data set contains no direct measurements but results from numerical models that have
been driven either by observed data in order to achieve the best possible representation of
observed recent and current conditions (typically 60 years) or by climate change scenarios for
the near future (typically 100 years). The model system used features a regional atmospheric
model, a model of the hydrodynamics of continental shelf seas (North Sea) and two nested
wave models – see for a sketch Figure 4. The key part of the coastDat data set comprises re-
8
gional wind, wave and storm surge hindcasts and scenarios mainly for the North Sea. A com-
parison with the limited number of observational data points to the good quality of the model
data in terms of long-term statistics such as multi-year return values of wind speed and wave
heights.
These model data provide a unique combination of consistent atmospheric, oceanic, sea
state and other parameters at high spatial and temporal detail, even for places and variables
for which no measurements have been made. In addition, coastal scenarios for the near-future
complement the numerical analyses of past conditions in a consistent way.
A variety of coastal and offshore applications have taken advantage of these data sets. Exam-
ples comprise applications in ship design, oil risk modeling and assessment, or the construc-
tion and operation of offshore wind farms, marine energy use, coastal protection, water qual-
ity studies and navigation safety (Weisse, 2010).
3 Epilogue
Establishing climate service on regional and local levels implies that science might play a
role as provider of scientific knowledge but also as an honest broker of action alternatives and
thus a facilitator between politics, stakeholders and society. The climate problem is associated
with a conception of uncertainty and has to be regionally embedded in different cultures. The
different values, visions and diverse aspirations are crucial for the development of regional
adaptation and mitigation strategies. In the context of the reconstitution of the reasonable di-
vision of labour between science and society, science has a more supportive role. Science can
not provide answers in the sense of what to do and how to do it. As Merton puts it, the ethos
of science is to be “the guideline of social conduct” (see Grundmann 2010).
For scientific knowledge about climate change to become part of society’s perception of
risk and uncertainty, the regional experiences, memories and values have to be understood
and analyzed. The information provided by science should be presented in an understandable
way and be focused on the specific relevant regional impacts. Science can provide scientific
insights on a regional level without pretending that the delivered information are static and
fixed truths, but as part of the basis for political and societal action. In dialogue with regional
politics and stakeholders, science becomes part of the negotiation process of how to adapt to
climate change and to foster mitigation strategies. In doing so, climate change and its effects
enter the political arena, with interdisciplinary climate science being a valuable contributor
among others in the democratic process. In the realm of regional climate politics, science can
provide scenarios and possible outcomes of societal decisions and ambitions. Climate Service
is not restricted to greenhouse gas emissions; instead, climate change as a regional challenge
entails also the social actors and their cultures.
In conclusion, regional climate service requires the understanding not only of the dynamics
of the regional geo-system but also of the socio-cultural dynamics of the respective areas. The
linear model, according to which the natural science analysis is sufficient to determine the
"right" way of action vis-à-vis the specter of anthropogenic climate change, does not ade-
quately describe the complexities of the problem. Instead, the application of this model de-
politicizes the societal problem "Global Warming" and inhibits an openly value-based debate
and decision process. At the same time, this model leads to a science constrained by its cli-
ent's interests.
As we have shown in this article, Climate Service has to be based on a trans-disciplinary
approach involving both natural and socio-cultural scientists. Our examples of the Climate
Services in Northern Germany during the past few years provide insights how this challenge
can be met.
9
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