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Measuring Party Support: Leaners Are Not Independents
Abstract
Many Americans, especially middle class and better educated ones, call themselves independent and citizens who choose the better candidate regardless of party affiliation. Their numbers seem to have increased in recent decades to nearly 40% of the electorate. The description and estimate are misleading. Very few Americans lack a party preference. Our largely unchanged high levels of party voting and the willingness of most “independents” to acknowledge a party preference after a bit of probing indicates that independence is more a matter of self-presentation than an accurate statement about our approach to elections, candidates, the parties, and politics in general. Most of the independents in national surveys and most of the increase in their numbers are contributed by “leaners” (those who initially describe themselves as independents but then acknowledge a preference for either the Democrats or Republicans). Leaners are partisans. Characterizing them as independents underestimates the partisanship of Americans and leads to inaccurate estimates of party effects and the responsiveness of the electorate to short-term electoral forces. The frequent treatment of leaners as independents in The American Voter Revisited contributes to this all-too-common misconception.The data used in this analysis were provided by the Interuniversity Consortium for Social and Political Research. Neither the Consortium nor the principle investigators of the various national election studies used here are responsible for the analysis or interpretation.
... Self-defined independent voters now number between 40% and 46% of the U.S. electorate (Gallup, 2022) and currently constitute either the largest or second-largest group of registered voters in half the states (Gruber & Opdycke, 2020). Despite the historical increase in independent voter identification, many political strategists still view independents as partisans (Magleby et al., 2011;Petrocik, 2009) and contend that the overwhelming majority of Americans who say they are "independent" really lean toward one party or the other. However, other scholars have disputed the findings that most independents are leaners and suggest that there is no conclusive evidence for this position (Abrams & Fiorina, 2011). ...
... Viewing the majority of independents as partisans originates from the formative research popularized in The Myth of the Independent Voter (Keith et al., 1992), which claimed that the ANES' "Seven-Point Scale" should only include three actual categories (Democrat, Republican, and Independent). After the Petrocik (2009) and Keith and others' (1992) articles, it became more common to use a five-point or three-point measure with leaners classified as independents. ...
... This was the case when analyzing data across all three ANES scales. Our analysis of the ANES Seven-Point Scale showed that Independent-Republicans and Weak-Republicans resembled each other's voting patterns on straight/split ticket and voting change over time analyses (Mayer, 2008;Petrocik, 2009;Smith et al., 1995); however, this was not the case with Independent-Democrats and Weak-Democrats. Independent-Democrats, who did not affiliate with any party in the Initial Party Response ID question, were more likely to vote only for Democrats than Weak-Democrats that specifically identified as Democrat. ...
Independents remain hard to categorize because they are, by their choice of self‐identification, resisting the standard categories of political classification. Despite the growth in independent voter identity, many political strategists still view independents as partisans. In this article, we contribute to the academic literature on independent voting behavior by exploring whether those who identify as politically independent function as true independents by accounting for their voting patterns over time. We do this by analyzing data produced by the American National Election Studies (ANES) on political identification and voting choices from 1972 to 2020 on each of the three ANES measures of party affiliation. Our findings show when tracking independent voting behavior over more than one election, there is a significant volatility in voting loyalty and independents as a group are distinct from partisans. This volatility was observed in all three measures of party affiliation used by the ANES survey data. The research also finds evidence that a sizeable number of independents move in and out of independent status from one election to another.
Related Articles
Grossmann, Matt. 2014. “The Varied Effects of Policy Cues on Partisan Opinions.” Politics & Policy 42(6): 881–904. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12102 .
Reilly, Thom, and E. C. Hedberg. 2022. “Social Networks of Independents and Partisans: Are Independents a Moderating Forcer?” Politics & Policy 50(2): 225–43. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12460 .
Saeki, Manabu. 2019. “Anatomy of Party Sorting: Partisan Polarization of Voters and Party Switching.” Politics & Policy 47(4): 699–747. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12318 .
... Prior literature differentiates between two subgroups of independents: those who prefer one side in relative terms (independent "leaners") and those who report having no preference ("true independents; " Petrocik, 2009). The majority of self-categorized independents are leaners (Skelley, 2021) and they receive the most research attention that is paid to independents. ...
... We asked raters to indicate if they were Democrat, leaning Democratic, Republican, leaning Republican, Independent, leaning Independent, Libertarian, leaning Libertarian, Green, leaning Green, or other. We added the categories of "leaning" (e.g., leaning Republican) because many individuals might feel somewhat disaffected from all political parties though most individuals who lean toward a party have fairly strong ties to the party, as documented in the polling (Pew Research Center, 2019) and political science literatures (Petrocik, 2009). We combined individuals who identified themselves with a party with individuals who leaned toward a party (e.g., Libertarian and lean Libertarian were both analyzed as Libertarian; Magleby et al., 2011). ...
Researchers have begun to focus on the influence of political affiliation in organizations. In this context, we investigated how doxing (i.e., using social media to post information online with malintent) influences hiring-related decisions. Based on the integration of a political affiliation and state suspicion model, we investigated how a dox containing different types of information (affirming a political party affiliation vs. providing derogatory/negative information about an opposing party) and political party affiliation similarity influenced hiring-related perceptions of job applicants. Given doxing’s characteristics, we expanded the “decision space” to include effects about expected organizational image and expected retaliation. In Study 1, we found that the type of information and party similarity influenced suspicion of the applicant and perceived similarity with the applicant, whereas doxing only influenced suspicion. In turn, suspicion and perceived similarity predicted expected task performance and organizational image, and exploratory analyses suggested an interactive effect of these variables. Suspicion also predicted expected retaliation from individuals outside the organization. In Study 2, we confirmed that doxing was related to suspicion as well as the interactive effect of information type and party similarity. We explain that interaction using the notion of symbolic threat. In both studies, the effects of type of information and party similarity were pervasive. Our results support the similarity–attraction paradigm and a model of political affiliation. Expanding relevant theories to include suspicion helps better understand politically related judgments and the additional outcomes of expected organizational image and retaliation.
... In the US, elections are a zero-sum game. This is also demonstrated by the fact that those who do not like Democrats, are likely to be Republicans and vice versa, as in the US, 85-90% of voters feel close to or identify with one of these two parties (Petrocik, 2009). ...
In the last decade, affective polarization (AP) has become an increasingly salient topic in both public discourse and political science. Several different measurement instruments have been developed to empirically capture this phenomenon. With the rising interest that affective polarization is now also enjoying in Europe, it has become of the utmost importance to assess what these different measures capture, and to what extent their application travels to different contexts. In this study we test several AP measures on a student population with various European nationalities. We assess their overlap and effectiveness in mapping AP, to help future research working towards greater empirical clarity, and making informed choices on which kind of measures to include in questionnaires and data collections. The results indicate that, while different items usually produce different point estimates and sometimes different answer patterns, the measurement of affective polarization appears relatively indifferent to the choice of items.
... We then asked respondents who initially identified as independents if they "leaned" toward one party or the other. Consistent with research showing that "leaners" have similar opinions and behaviors to other partisans (Petrocik, 2009), we code leaners as partisans. 10 We measure support for President Trump using the standard Gallup presidential approval question; our indicator variable was coded 1 for those who approve of President Trump and 0 otherwise. ...
Misinformation is ubiquitous; however, the extent and heterogeneity in public uptake of it remains a matter of debate. We address these questions by exploring Americans’ ability to recall prominent misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic and the factors associated with accuracy perceptions of these claims. Comparing reported recall rates of real and “placebo” headlines, we estimate “true” recall of misinformation is lower than self-reporting suggests, but still troubling. Supporters of President Trump, particularly strong news consumers, were most likely to believe misinformation, including ideologically dissonant claims. These findings point to the importance of tailoring corrections to address key correlates of misinformation uptake.
... To measure PID, we make use of the CSES survey item that asks the respondents whether they are close to one political party, as compared to others. The questionnaire also includes a follow-up question to identify partisan "leaners" (Petrocik 2009;Reiljan 2020). We count as partisans only those who answered affirmatively already to the first PID question, thus excluding the leaners. ...
Research indicates that affective polarization pervades contemporary democracies worldwide. Although some studies identify party leaders as polarizing agents, affective polarization has been predominantly conceptualized as a product of in-/out-party feelings. This study compares levels of party affective polarization (PAP) and leader affective polarization (LAP) cross-nationally, using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Applying like–dislike scales and an identical index to both concepts, we reveal that while the two strongly correlate, LAP is systematically lower than PAP. The United States emerges as an exceptional case, being the only country where LAP significantly exceeds PAP. Drawing on regime input/output and institutions as theoretical building blocks, we explore cross-national variations and show that the relative strength of LAP vis-à-vis PAP is increased by presidential regime type, poor government performance, and low party system fragmentation. The findings of this study contribute to the thriving research on affective polarization and personalization of politics.
... The (Petrocik, 2009). A power analysis found that this sample size was sufficient to detect small to moderate effect sizes with alpha = .05 ...
Partisanship, polarization, and platforms are foundational to how people perceive contentious issues. Using a probability sample ( n = 825), we examine these factors in tandem across four political claims concerning US presidential elections and the COVID-19 pandemic. We find Democrats and Republicans differ in their belief in true and false claims, with each party believing more in pro-attitudinal claims than in counter-attitudinal claims. These results are especially pronounced for affectively polarized partisans. We also find interactions between partisanship and platform use where Republicans who use Google or Twitter are more likely to believe in false claims about COVID-19 than Republicans who do not use these platforms. Our findings highlight that Americans’ beliefs in political claims are associated with their political identity through both partisanship and polarization, and the use of search and social platforms appears critical to these relationships. These findings have implications for understanding why realities are malleable to voter preferences in liberal democracies.
... All I do is win, no matter what? What matters in gaining electoral support from televised debates One may argue that the relation between party ID and voting intention has been advanced for a long time since the seminal work by Campbell et al. (1960) in election campaign literature (e.g., Lewis-Beck et al., 2008;Petrocik, 2009). While it seems clear that party identity conditions the likelihood of voting intention change, it is less clear, however, how strong the barrier remains on different levels of party identity strength. ...
How much do the performances of top candidates in televised debates affect vote intentions in parliamentary democracies? The article addresses this question and disentangles the effects of predisposition and performance in televised debate reception. Drawing on a large-N field study of the 2017 chancellor duel in Germany, which contains survey and real-time response data for 5660 participants, we identify debate-induced determinants of shifts in voting intention and assess their relative effect sizes on such changes. Our analysis shows, first, that out-party identification is an effective barrier against shifts in voting intentions. However, we find that viewers’ real-time performance perceptions of the candidates show strong effects. Third, we demonstrate that these real-time evaluations can breach the predisposition’s barrier particularly when the intensity of out-party identification is less than very strong. Fourth, we find verdicts on the debate winner as an additional short-term factor that can foster shifts in voting intentions in the course of debate reception. Overall, our results indicate that pre-dispositions may hinder rational updating of electoral behaviour but that debate performance can actually make a difference by altering the formation of voting intentions.
... Independent political identity is often a symptom of frustration or disengagement (Klar and Krupnikov, 2016) and the uptick in Independent self-identification may represent a reaction to the present state of partisan politics. It is also worth noting however, that many self-proclaimed Independents are partisan 'leaners' who reject party labels but tend to favor one political party and often behave similarly to partisans (see Dennis, 1992;Petrocik, 2009) I was unable to find any studies on polarization that account for cohort differences in civic education experiences. While civic education is often reputed to retain traditional understandings and instruction, civics classrooms have hardly remained completely stagnant over the years. ...
Civic education is often touted as a counterweight to the contentiousness of American politics. Yet, civic education’s relationship to dislike and distrust of opposing partisans (affective polarization) remains largely untested. Simultaneously, there are calls for educators to promote more civic informed action, taking civic education beyond the walls of the classroom. This study utilizes data from a survey of the 2016 election to examine the relationship between individuals’ recalled civic education experiences (classroom pedagogy and community service) and affective polarization. In addition, this study explores two potential moderators of the relationship between civic education and affective polarization, partisan social identity strength and age. Analysis of the sample shows a significant relationship between both types of civic education experience and affective polarization, though the nature of that relationship may depend on respondents’ partisan social identity and age.
... The primary survey included several sections. We recorded participant self-reported political orientation on a 7-point Likert-type scale from very conservative to very liberal with a midpoint of neither conservative nor liberal (Petrocik, 2009). We estimated transportation using an 11-item scale (adapted for film) comprised of questions from Green and Brock (2000), Busselle andBilandzic (2009), andde Graaf et al. (2009) scales (Table 1). ...
We conducted an experiment to determine whether a conservation film increased support for conservation and whether transportation and emotion were correlated with shifts in conservation support. Viewers of short and feature-length versions of the conservation film exhibited greater alignment with story-centric beliefs and conservation behavior interest than individuals who viewed a control film. Transportation was correlated with conservation belief alignment and behavior interest; emotion was correlated with behavior interest. This study indicates that even short conservation films can be engaging and persuasive and are potentially powerful tools for generating conservation support among audiences not previously aligned with this topic.
... Later work came to similar conclusions-independent voters are less politically active and involved than partisans and often do not hold attitudes that are truly "independent" (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). This line of research has led many scholars to refer to the "myth of the independent voter" (Keith et al. 1992;Petrocik 2009). ...
Objective
We examine the size, characteristics, and attitudes of Unaffiliated party registrants as they compare to registrants from the two major parties.
Methods
We analyze voter registration files, voter history files, and public opinion data from North Carolina.
Results
Unaffiliated registrants are not simply shadow partisans but, on average, are distinct from two major parties in terms of demographics, political behavior, and political attitudes.
Conclusion
Voters who eschew party labels are best understood as unmoored voters—often hovering close to their ideological docks but with no institutional constraint to keep them from drifting as the political tides shift.
... B. If question A was answered with "Independent", the following question B. was asked: "As of today, do you lean more toward the Democratic Party or the Republican Party?" Because those who "lean" toward a political party often have opinions and exhibit behaviors that closely resemble those of self-identified partisans (Petrocik, 2009), the Democratic and Republican indicator variables combine those who identified with either party in question A with those who "leaned" toward the party in question B. ...
Objective
Evidence shows that booster shots offer strong protection against the Omicron variant of COVID-19. However, we know little about why individuals would receive a booster compared to the initial decision to vaccinate. We investigate and assess the factors that affect individuals' reported willingness to receive the COVID-19 vaccine booster. This information can aid in tailoring public health messaging to communicate attributes that are associated with individuals’ attitudes toward the COVID-19 booster.
Rationale
Existing research provides little insight into whether the same factors that affect Americans’ likelihood of accepting initial vaccination against COVID-19 also affect booster uptake. Our experiment also examines the influence of contextual information about a novel variant on willingness to receive a booster.
Methods
We administered a conjoint experiment (N = 2740 trials) in a survey of fully vaccinated US adults that had not yet received a COVID-19 booster (N = 548) to assess the impact of varied vaccine attributes on willingness to receive a booster.
Results
The most important factors associated with higher willingness to receive a booster were efficacy, manufacturer, and the size of a financial incentive. Protection duration and protection against future variants vs. only current variants had modest influence. A contextual prime reporting that some public health experts believe the Omicron variant is more contagious, but less lethal than those previously seen, significantly increased favorability toward boosters. This provides potential motivation and guidance for vaccination campaigns to emphasize these variant-specific traits.
Conclusion
With several vaccines with varying degrees of efficacy available to consumers, emphasizing boosters with a high efficacy would likely improve attitudes toward boosters. Financial incentives and predispositions toward manufacturers also matter. Concerns about more contagious variants may spur uptake, even if such variants are less lethal.
... Of the 95 participants that did complete the experiment, 7 were leaning towards the Democratic Party (leaning scores ranging from 5 to 7) and 17 were leaning towards the Republican Party (leaning scores ranging from 1 to 3). These participants were treated as Democrats/Republicans, as previous work suggests that leaners tend to behave more like partisans than independents (Petrocik, 2009). We also note that post-hoc analyses indicated that excluding the 24 leaners did not change the observed pattern of results (see section 1.2 of the Supplementary Materials). ...
Social group identity plays a central role in political polarization and inter-party conflict. Here, we use ambiguously valenced faces to measure bias in the processing of political ingroup and outgroup faces, while also accounting for inter-party differences in judgments of emotion at baseline. Participants identifying as Democrats and Republicans judged happy, angry, and surprised faces as positive or negative. Whereas happy and angry faces convey positive and negative valence respectively, surprised faces are ambiguous in that they readily convey positive and negative valence. Thus, surprise is a useful tool for characterizing valence bias (i.e., the tendency to judge ambiguous stimuli as negative). Face stimuli were assigned to the participants' political ingroup or outgroup, or a third group with an unspecified affiliation (baseline). We found a significant interaction of facial expression and group membership, such that outgroup faces were judged more negatively than ingroup and baseline, but only for surprise. There was also an interaction of facial expression and political affiliation, with Republicans judging surprise more negatively than Democrats across all group conditions. However, we did not find evidence for party differences in outgroup negativity. Our findings demonstrate the utility of judgments of surprised faces as a measure of intergroup bias, and reinforce the importance of outgroup negativity (relative to ingroup positivity) for explaining inter-party biases.
... However, this difference may be the result of our model using partisanship as a measure of alignment with Trump's policies, whereas their model used a linear continuum to measure policy alignments with a candidate. Furthermore, measurement of partisanship may not be a sufficient proxy for analyzing alignment with Trump's policies, particularly because Independents and "leaners" typically are actual partisans in their policy preferences (Petrocik 2009). No significant relationship was discovered between respondents' interest in news and current events or their acknowledgment of racism and supporting Trump's resistance. ...
Using survey data collected less than two weeks before the 2020 presidential election, we investigated why likely Trump voters would support Trump resisting the election results if he lost. We first used an experiment with randomized hypothetical popular-vote margins to test whether support for resistance was contingent on the results of the election. We also directly asked respondents who stated that they would support resistance to explain their reasoning in an open-ended response. In doing so, we gained insight into one of the most turbulent elections in American history and examined how support for resistance existed before the election due to both misinformation about voter fraud and hyperpartisanship that made Trump voters view the electoral process itself as illegitimate.
... For the August 2020 wave, we relied on a previously-collected measure of party affiliation from profile data that AmeriSpeak maintains. We created three categories: Democrats (including those who "lean" Democrat), Independents, and Republicans (including those who "lean" Republican), given research on party affiliation that suggests that those who identify as "leaning" are more similar to that partisan group than to true Independents (Petrocik, 2009). We also used other AmeriSpeak profile data available, including gender, age, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, annual household income, and region of residence, as potential predictors of agreement with the disparities statements. ...
COVID-19 has illuminated health inequity in the United States. The burdens of disease are much higher among Black and Indigenous people and other people of color. Disparities by income are also profound, as lower-wage workers were less able to adopt mitigating behaviors compared to higher-income counterparts. These disparities became part of public health discourse in 2020, with commentators frequently highlighting the connection between racism, socioeconomic position, and COVID-19. But what proportion of the public-and among key subgroups-recognized these social group disparities, relative to disparities associated with age and chronic illness, and did public recognition change over the first year of the pandemic? To address these questions, we analyzed data from three nationally-representative cross-sectional public opinion surveys, collected using the NORC AmeriSpeak panel in April 2020 (N = 1007), August 2020 (N = 2716), and April 2021 (N = 1020). The key outcomes were respondents' agreement with statements about disparities in COVID-19 mortality by age, chronic illness, income, and race. We found little change from 2020 to 2021 in Americans' recognition of disparities. At all three time points, most respondents acknowledged age and chronic illness disparities, while no more than half at any time point recognized income- and race-based disparities. Partisanship was not statistically associated with agreement with age or illness-related disparities, but was strongly associated with views about income- and race-based disparities. Efforts to promote recognition of racial and socioeconomic health disparities in the United States need to be mindful of the ways in which public understanding of health inequities is linked to partisanship.
... The concept of political ideology is often captured with liberal-conservative or left-right scales in quantitative analysis (Mayer and O'Connor Shelley, 2018). This study examines political ideological identification along the scale ranging from liberal to conservative (Petrocik, 2009). Our use of the terms "liberal" and "conservative" is consistent with the operationalization of political ideology in the United States, and our results are specific to that national context. ...
Social identity theory offers a means to understand attitudes about wolves, with consequences for management support. Using data from a mail survey about wolves, we explored relationships among seven identities (i.e., wolf advocate, hunter, environmentalist, nature enthusiast, farmer, trapper, conservationist) using multidimensional scaling (MDS) and principal components analysis (PCA). We examined how identities correlated with political ideology, trust in a wildlife management agency, wildlife value orientations (WVOs) and attitudes about wolves, and we evaluated whether WVOs mediated the relationship between identities and attitudes. PCA suggested two factors in identifying relationships among stakeholders, while MDS and correlations found diversity among stakeholders beyond these factors. Hunter identity was most strongly associated with a domination WVO and conservative political ideology. Farmer identity was most strongly associated with agency distrust and negative wolf attitudes. Wolf advocate was most strongly associated with a mutualism WVO (i.e., beliefs that humans are meant to coexist in harmonious relationships with wildlife), agency trust, and positive wolf attitudes. Conservationist identity was positively correlated with all other identities. WVOs partially mediated the relationship between identities and attitudes.
... However, this difference may be the result of our model using partisanship as a measure of alignment with Trump's policies, while their model used a linear continuum to measure one's policy alignments with a candidate. Furthermore, measurement of partisanship may not be a sufficient proxy for analyzing alignment with Trump's policies, particularly as independents and "leaners" are found to usually be actual partisans in their policy preferences (Petrocik 2009). No significant relationship was discovered between respondents' interest in news and current events, nor their acknowledgement of racism, on supporting Trump's resistance. ...
Using survey data collected less than two weeks prior to the 2020 Presidential Election, we investigate why likely Trump voters would support Trump resisting the results of the election if he lost. We first do this using an experiment with randomized hypothetical popular vote margins to test if support for resistance is contingent upon the results of the election itself. We also directly ask respondents who said they would support resistance to explain their reasoning in an open-ended response. In doing so, we gain insight into one of the most turbulent elections in American history and examine how support for resistance existed prior to the election itself due to both misinformation about voter fraud and hyper-partisanship which made Trump voters view the electoral process itself as illegitimate.
Can corruption scandals trigger citizens to punish a poor‐performing government? Citizens often fail to punish governments with subpar policy outcomes because they tend to isolate politics from their personal life and avoid blaming one's own party. Challenging these popular beliefs, our findings from a survey experiment in South Korea indicate that corruption scandals accusing elected officials of nepotism trigger people to blame the government as the cause of their personal grievances. This effect is prominent among individuals who are highly worried about their own education, employment, and retirement, highlighting anxiety as a driving factor. Surprisingly, the effect of nepotism spills across domains; for example, college admission nepotism increases government blame for concerns on not only education but also employment and retirement. Moreover, nepotism may prompt partisans whose party is in power, who are otherwise less likely to blame the incumbent government, to attribute greater blame to the government. These findings imply that corruption scandals can alter perceptions of how government performance affects personal lives. Overall, the study suggests that nepotism in areas critical to personal well‐being may generate an effective opposition against poor‐performing government, as seen in the 2016–17 South Korean presidential corruption scandal.
How does rhetoric about the filibuster inform people's views of political figures? We argue that support or opposition to eliminating the filibuster conveys information to citizens that they can use to assess a politician's ideological position. This information can also be used when citizens form affective evaluations of politicians, but its effects depend on people's partisan identities. We use a preregistered survey experiment—along with a secondary analysis of cross‐sectional survey data—to show that a candidate who says that the filibuster should be eliminated is viewed as being more liberal than a candidate who says that it should be protected or who says nothing. We further show that Democrats like candidates who use elimination rhetoric more than protection or no rhetoric while Republicans react in the opposite way. These results suggest that elite messaging about salient political institutions can fundamentally shape people's views of political figures.
A US experiment ( n = 1506) demonstrated how a new approach to writing protest stories challenges press patterns in the United States of underrepresented groups. News stories that explain the goals and background of a protest—a concept called legitimizing—and that humanize—rather than criminalize—a person whose death sparked a protest led news audiences to better understand the protest and those involved in the social movement. We also found that those with conservative political beliefs perceived these stories as less credible than those written following journalistic norms typical in the United States that tend to cast protesters and their causes in a negative light, although the opposite was true for those with liberal views. Results are discussed in relation to the protest paradigm.
Media scholars have long recognized the potential for falsely balanced reporting to distort public opinion, but existing empirical evidence is inconclusive. In this study, we examine the effect of falsely balanced reporting and explicit journalistic intervention on perceptions of voter fraud in U.S. elections through original internet survey experiments conducted in the United States shortly before and after the 2020 U.S. presidential election held on November 3, 2020. The results show that exposure to falsely balanced reporting largely has a null effect on perceptions of voter fraud, though we also find evidence of partisan-based heterogeneity in its effect. The results of the study also show that explicit journalistic intervention equally decreases belief in voter fraud among both Democrats and Republicans before the election, but among Republicans the corrective effect of intervention disappears in the post-election period, suggesting that there are sharp contextual limits on the effect of explicit journalistic intervention.
American Gridlock brings together the country's preeminent experts on the causes, characteristics, and consequences of partisan polarization in US politics and government, with each chapter presenting original scholarship and novel data. This book is the first to combine research on all facets of polarization, among the public (both voters and activists), in our federal institutions (Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court), at the state level, and in the media. Each chapter includes a bullet-point summary of its main argument and conclusions, and is written in clear prose that highlights the substantive implications of polarization for representation and policy-making. Authors examine polarization with an array of current and historical data, including public opinion surveys, electoral and legislative and congressional data, experimental data, and content analyses of media outlets. American Gridlock's theoretical and empirical depth distinguishes it from any other volume on polarization.
American Gridlock brings together the country's preeminent experts on the causes, characteristics, and consequences of partisan polarization in US politics and government, with each chapter presenting original scholarship and novel data. This book is the first to combine research on all facets of polarization, among the public (both voters and activists), in our federal institutions (Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court), at the state level, and in the media. Each chapter includes a bullet-point summary of its main argument and conclusions, and is written in clear prose that highlights the substantive implications of polarization for representation and policy-making. Authors examine polarization with an array of current and historical data, including public opinion surveys, electoral and legislative and congressional data, experimental data, and content analyses of media outlets. American Gridlock's theoretical and empirical depth distinguishes it from any other volume on polarization.
American Gridlock brings together the country's preeminent experts on the causes, characteristics, and consequences of partisan polarization in US politics and government, with each chapter presenting original scholarship and novel data. This book is the first to combine research on all facets of polarization, among the public (both voters and activists), in our federal institutions (Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court), at the state level, and in the media. Each chapter includes a bullet-point summary of its main argument and conclusions, and is written in clear prose that highlights the substantive implications of polarization for representation and policy-making. Authors examine polarization with an array of current and historical data, including public opinion surveys, electoral and legislative and congressional data, experimental data, and content analyses of media outlets. American Gridlock's theoretical and empirical depth distinguishes it from any other volume on polarization.
American Gridlock brings together the country's preeminent experts on the causes, characteristics, and consequences of partisan polarization in US politics and government, with each chapter presenting original scholarship and novel data. This book is the first to combine research on all facets of polarization, among the public (both voters and activists), in our federal institutions (Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court), at the state level, and in the media. Each chapter includes a bullet-point summary of its main argument and conclusions, and is written in clear prose that highlights the substantive implications of polarization for representation and policy-making. Authors examine polarization with an array of current and historical data, including public opinion surveys, electoral and legislative and congressional data, experimental data, and content analyses of media outlets. American Gridlock's theoretical and empirical depth distinguishes it from any other volume on polarization.
American Gridlock brings together the country's preeminent experts on the causes, characteristics, and consequences of partisan polarization in US politics and government, with each chapter presenting original scholarship and novel data. This book is the first to combine research on all facets of polarization, among the public (both voters and activists), in our federal institutions (Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court), at the state level, and in the media. Each chapter includes a bullet-point summary of its main argument and conclusions, and is written in clear prose that highlights the substantive implications of polarization for representation and policy-making. Authors examine polarization with an array of current and historical data, including public opinion surveys, electoral and legislative and congressional data, experimental data, and content analyses of media outlets. American Gridlock's theoretical and empirical depth distinguishes it from any other volume on polarization.
American Gridlock brings together the country's preeminent experts on the causes, characteristics, and consequences of partisan polarization in US politics and government, with each chapter presenting original scholarship and novel data. This book is the first to combine research on all facets of polarization, among the public (both voters and activists), in our federal institutions (Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court), at the state level, and in the media. Each chapter includes a bullet-point summary of its main argument and conclusions, and is written in clear prose that highlights the substantive implications of polarization for representation and policy-making. Authors examine polarization with an array of current and historical data, including public opinion surveys, electoral and legislative and congressional data, experimental data, and content analyses of media outlets. American Gridlock's theoretical and empirical depth distinguishes it from any other volume on polarization.
American Gridlock brings together the country's preeminent experts on the causes, characteristics, and consequences of partisan polarization in US politics and government, with each chapter presenting original scholarship and novel data. This book is the first to combine research on all facets of polarization, among the public (both voters and activists), in our federal institutions (Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court), at the state level, and in the media. Each chapter includes a bullet-point summary of its main argument and conclusions, and is written in clear prose that highlights the substantive implications of polarization for representation and policy-making. Authors examine polarization with an array of current and historical data, including public opinion surveys, electoral and legislative and congressional data, experimental data, and content analyses of media outlets. American Gridlock's theoretical and empirical depth distinguishes it from any other volume on polarization.
American Gridlock brings together the country's preeminent experts on the causes, characteristics, and consequences of partisan polarization in US politics and government, with each chapter presenting original scholarship and novel data. This book is the first to combine research on all facets of polarization, among the public (both voters and activists), in our federal institutions (Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court), at the state level, and in the media. Each chapter includes a bullet-point summary of its main argument and conclusions, and is written in clear prose that highlights the substantive implications of polarization for representation and policy-making. Authors examine polarization with an array of current and historical data, including public opinion surveys, electoral and legislative and congressional data, experimental data, and content analyses of media outlets. American Gridlock's theoretical and empirical depth distinguishes it from any other volume on polarization.
American Gridlock brings together the country's preeminent experts on the causes, characteristics, and consequences of partisan polarization in US politics and government, with each chapter presenting original scholarship and novel data. This book is the first to combine research on all facets of polarization, among the public (both voters and activists), in our federal institutions (Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court), at the state level, and in the media. Each chapter includes a bullet-point summary of its main argument and conclusions, and is written in clear prose that highlights the substantive implications of polarization for representation and policy-making. Authors examine polarization with an array of current and historical data, including public opinion surveys, electoral and legislative and congressional data, experimental data, and content analyses of media outlets. American Gridlock's theoretical and empirical depth distinguishes it from any other volume on polarization.
American Gridlock brings together the country's preeminent experts on the causes, characteristics, and consequences of partisan polarization in US politics and government, with each chapter presenting original scholarship and novel data. This book is the first to combine research on all facets of polarization, among the public (both voters and activists), in our federal institutions (Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court), at the state level, and in the media. Each chapter includes a bullet-point summary of its main argument and conclusions, and is written in clear prose that highlights the substantive implications of polarization for representation and policy-making. Authors examine polarization with an array of current and historical data, including public opinion surveys, electoral and legislative and congressional data, experimental data, and content analyses of media outlets. American Gridlock's theoretical and empirical depth distinguishes it from any other volume on polarization.
American Gridlock brings together the country's preeminent experts on the causes, characteristics, and consequences of partisan polarization in US politics and government, with each chapter presenting original scholarship and novel data. This book is the first to combine research on all facets of polarization, among the public (both voters and activists), in our federal institutions (Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court), at the state level, and in the media. Each chapter includes a bullet-point summary of its main argument and conclusions, and is written in clear prose that highlights the substantive implications of polarization for representation and policy-making. Authors examine polarization with an array of current and historical data, including public opinion surveys, electoral and legislative and congressional data, experimental data, and content analyses of media outlets. American Gridlock's theoretical and empirical depth distinguishes it from any other volume on polarization.
American Gridlock brings together the country's preeminent experts on the causes, characteristics, and consequences of partisan polarization in US politics and government, with each chapter presenting original scholarship and novel data. This book is the first to combine research on all facets of polarization, among the public (both voters and activists), in our federal institutions (Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court), at the state level, and in the media. Each chapter includes a bullet-point summary of its main argument and conclusions, and is written in clear prose that highlights the substantive implications of polarization for representation and policy-making. Authors examine polarization with an array of current and historical data, including public opinion surveys, electoral and legislative and congressional data, experimental data, and content analyses of media outlets. American Gridlock's theoretical and empirical depth distinguishes it from any other volume on polarization.
• • Party control of Congress is the strongest determinant of presidential success – majority party presidents win more roll call votes than do minority party presidents.
• • Until recently, the effects of party control were similar in both chambers. Rising party polarization in Congress affects presidential success differently in the House and Senate.
• • In the House, party polarization amplifies the effects of party control – as party polarization increases, majority party presidents win more and minority presidents win less.
• • In the Senate, party polarization suppresses success rates – majority presidents still win more on average, but as party voting increases, success rates decline for both majority and minority presidents.
• • The rise in cloture votes and the emergence of the minority party filibuster during the Bush and Obama presidencies is responsible for the changes in how party polarization conditions the effects of party control in the Senate.
• • Since cloture votes are unique to the Senate, excluding cloture votes provides a mix of Senate votes similar to the House – as party polarization increases on non-cloture votes, majority presidents win more and minority presidents win less, though the relationships are weaker than in the House.
• • On cloture votes, polarization magnifies the effects of party control, but the pattern of success is a mirror image of the House – as party polarization increases, minority presidents win more and majority presidents win less.
• • The simple arithmetic of which side of cloture the president is on explains why the relationships flip. Majority presidents usually favor invoking cloture, which requires 60 votes to win. Minority presidents usually oppose invoking cloture, which requires only 41 votes to win.
To achieve his goals, the president must persuade Congress to support his positions. Ite's a hard sell. The American system of “separated institutions sharing powers” (Neustadt 1960: 33) makes it difficult for any president to win support from Congress. Presidential success in Congress varies – some presidents win more than others – but President Obama seems to be having an especially hard time. In 2012, for example, Obama won only 15.5 percent of House roll call votes on which he expressed a position. Thate's pretty low, but not quite a record – President Bush barely holds on to this dubious distinction, winning only 15.4 percent of House roll calls in 2008.
American Gridlock brings together the country's preeminent experts on the causes, characteristics, and consequences of partisan polarization in US politics and government, with each chapter presenting original scholarship and novel data. This book is the first to combine research on all facets of polarization, among the public (both voters and activists), in our federal institutions (Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court), at the state level, and in the media. Each chapter includes a bullet-point summary of its main argument and conclusions, and is written in clear prose that highlights the substantive implications of polarization for representation and policy-making. Authors examine polarization with an array of current and historical data, including public opinion surveys, electoral and legislative and congressional data, experimental data, and content analyses of media outlets. American Gridlock's theoretical and empirical depth distinguishes it from any other volume on polarization.
American Gridlock brings together the country's preeminent experts on the causes, characteristics, and consequences of partisan polarization in US politics and government, with each chapter presenting original scholarship and novel data. This book is the first to combine research on all facets of polarization, among the public (both voters and activists), in our federal institutions (Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court), at the state level, and in the media. Each chapter includes a bullet-point summary of its main argument and conclusions, and is written in clear prose that highlights the substantive implications of polarization for representation and policy-making. Authors examine polarization with an array of current and historical data, including public opinion surveys, electoral and legislative and congressional data, experimental data, and content analyses of media outlets. American Gridlock's theoretical and empirical depth distinguishes it from any other volume on polarization.
American Gridlock brings together the country's preeminent experts on the causes, characteristics, and consequences of partisan polarization in US politics and government, with each chapter presenting original scholarship and novel data. This book is the first to combine research on all facets of polarization, among the public (both voters and activists), in our federal institutions (Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court), at the state level, and in the media. Each chapter includes a bullet-point summary of its main argument and conclusions, and is written in clear prose that highlights the substantive implications of polarization for representation and policy-making. Authors examine polarization with an array of current and historical data, including public opinion surveys, electoral and legislative and congressional data, experimental data, and content analyses of media outlets. American Gridlock's theoretical and empirical depth distinguishes it from any other volume on polarization.
What does the decline in paradigmatic self-identification mean for how international relations (IR) scholars think about the world? We answer this question with a 2020 survey among nearly two thousand IR scholars. We uncover a two-dimensional latent theoretical belief space based on scholarly agreement with conjectures about the state, ideas, international institutions, domestic politics, globalization, and racism. The first dimension separates status quo–oriented scholars from more critical scholars. The second dimension captures the realist–institutionalist divide. We have three key findings. First, non-paradigmatic scholars vary greatly in their theoretical beliefs. Second, measurement invariance tests show that there is a similar structure underlying the beliefs of paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic scholars. Third, we find no evidence that non-paradigmatic scholars rely less on their theoretical beliefs in making predictions about conflict, institutions, political economy, democracy, and human rights. Instead, the positions of scholars in the two-dimensional theoretical belief space rather than self-assigned paradigmatic labels correlate with predictions about the world. Our findings suggest that non-paradigmatic scholars are not so different from self-identified Liberals, Constructivists, and Realists, although the decline of paradigmatic self-identification may still matter for how scholars organize debates and disciplinary divides.
Conspiracy theories have accrued around recent world events, and many of them have been endorsed by leaders seeking to garner support. Drawing from compensatory control theory, we argue a reduced sense of control will increase support for leaders who use conspiratorial rhetoric. Moreover, we posit that the congruence between one's political identity and a leader's conspiratorial rhetoric is an important consideration with regard to when this effect will emerge. Studies 1a and 1b established causality by directly manipulating sense of control and finding greater support for conspiratorial leaders in the lacking vs. having control condition. Studies 2 and 3 examined the effects of real-world events that are posited to reduce a sense of control, along with the moderating effect of political identity. Study 2 showed, in two waves collected before and during COVID-19 lockdowns, that the lockdowns reduced a sense of control. Congruently, individuals supported leaders espousing a COVID-19 conspiracy theory more during the lockdowns than before. In addition, for leaders espousing conspiratorial rhetoric related to paid protests, Republicans exhibited greater support during than before the lockdown; however, the lockdown did not affect Democrats' support. Study 3 showed, in two waves collected before and after the 2020 U.S. Presidential election, that Biden supporters felt greater control after the election and decreased their support for conspiratorial leaders. Trump supporters' sense of control did not change, and concurrently they did not change their support for conspiratorial leaders. Implications are discussed for leadership during times of crisis and beyond.
Americans today are affectively polarized: they dislike and distrust those from the opposing political party more than they did in the past, with damaging consequences for their democracy. This Element tests one strategy for ameliorating such animus: having ordinary Democrats and Republicans come together for cross-party political discussions. Building on intergroup contact theory, the authors argue that such discussions will mitigate partisan animosity. Using an original experiment, they find strong support for this hypothesis – affective polarization falls substantially among subjects who participate in heterogeneous discussion (relative to those who participate in either homogeneous political discussion or an apolitical control). This Element also provides evidence for several of the mechanisms underlying these effects, and shows that they persist for at least one week after the initial experiment. These findings have considerable importance for efforts to ameliorate animus in the mass public, and for understanding American politics more broadly.
Independents who lean toward a party constitute a plurality of Americans. Despite their reluctance to identify as partisans, scholars find that “leaners” look much like partisans with respect to their voting behavior, civic engagement, and policy preferences. Yet, existing literature does not consider the possibility that different factors lead Democrats and Republicans to opt for an independent label. We consider heterogeneity in what leads people to report that they are “leaners” and we identify important partisan differences. By introducing a novel survey measure administered on a large adult sample, we identify both the motivation for, and consequence of, identifying as a leaner. Our results reveal that modern-day Republican leaners are largely motivated by a dissatisfaction with their own party. They are ideologically more moderate and are subsequently less willing to support their party’s candidate. Democratic leaners, on the other hand, appear satisfied with their party’s ideology and candidates, but nevertheless value an independent label. Our work suggests that partisan identification is both expressive and politically contextual. Our study provides an important step in identifying distinct motivations and electoral consequences within this large and growing segment of Americans.
“It's the economy stupid”—is the phrase that captures the ubiquity of economics in determining election outcomes. Nevertheless, while several studies support the premise of economic voting, a constant critique of valence economic models is that partisan bias contaminates voters' economic perceptions, thus invaliding any independent effect of economic opinions on the vote. Here, we test whether partisanship may itself be endogenous to the macroeconomy. Aggregating data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), supplemented with European Social Survey (ESS) data to bolster the time analysis, we focus on macropartisanship and find a drop‐off of party identifiers for governing parties in tandem with the economic downturn, specifically from rising unemployment. More generally, macropartisanship responds to economic conditions, suggesting that the endogeneity concern between party attachment and valence economic conditions is not unidirectional. That is, while economic perceptions may be influenced by party identification, party identification can be influenced by economic conditions.
Related Articles
Dettrey, Bryan J. 2013. “Relative Losses and Economic Voting: Sociotropic Considerations or ‘Keeping up with the Joneses?’” Politics & Policy 41(5): 788–806. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12038 .
Fernandes, Ivan Filipe, Gustavo Andrey De Almeida Lopes Fernandes, and Artur Zimerman. 2022. “For Whom the Bell Tolls: Party Mediation Effects on Economic Voting in a Large Democratic Federation.” Politics & Policy 50(2): 324–62. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12453 .
Stegmaier, Mary, and Michael S. Lewis‐Beck. 2009. “Learning the Economic Vote: Hungarian Forecasts, 1998–2010.” Politics & Policy 37(4): 769–80. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2009.00197.x .
In 2020, the Trump administration issued new guidance concerning Title IX proceedings; one controversial change was the emphasis on greater confrontation between complainants and respondents during the grievance process. Little is known concerning public perceptions of these reforms, which diverge from previous federal guidance. To that end, we explore three questions. First, to what extent was the public aware of changes to Title IX? Second, does the public think colleges can safely implement confrontational grievance procedures, or do they view such proceedings skeptically? Last, what factors are associated with beliefs about confrontational features of Title IX? Analysis indicates that there are conditional effects of political ideology on levels of knowledge about the Title IX changes on attitudes toward grievance proceedings. Additionally, other demographic correlates – age, sex, and educational attainment – are associated with perceptions. Implications are discussed.
How does the US public evaluate claims attributing responsibility for a cyberattack? It seems plausible that political factors complicate how the US public judges attribution claims. In this article, we collect original survey data and use two survey experiments to explore this subject. Specifically, we analyze how cues and endorsements from partisan, intelligence, and independent non-governmental actors affect public confidence in attribution claims regarding the identity of cyberaggressors and support for retribution. We find evidence of polarization, particularly regarding perceptions of Russia's threat in cyberspace. To uncover whether this polarization results from partisan cheerleading or more sincere motivations, we conduct two experiments regarding political factors and attribution claims. In the first experiment, we find that respondents respond similarly to independent observers’ endorsements of attribution claims but that Democrats appear to respond strategically in a test of the link between attribution and retribution rather than endorse a proposal by then-President Trump. In the second experiment, we find that partisans respond similarly to intelligence and independent experts' evaluations of attribution claims, and that both respond much more favorably to independent experts than the intelligence community. Superficial polarization thus turns out to look more like partisan cheerleading.
What does it mean to be a veteran, and how does serving in the armed forces condition how veterans view their sense of identity? In a national survey sample with an oversample of veterans, I find that veterans have a stronger sense of identity as a veteran, measured in terms of self-identification as both a veteran and a feeling of closeness to the veteran group, compared to civilians. I also find that, among military veterans, combat experience and valuing time in the military leads to higher veteran identity. Moreover, I find that even some non-military members report a greater sense of identity with veterans than others. I compare the effect of this “veteran” identity to that of partisan identity and find that, for most veterans, there is a greater sense of attachment to the veteran identity than to their partisan identity. Finally, I find that veteran identity has an important, independent influence on veterans’ and civilians’ views on military spending. These findings suggest that there is a veteran identity that military members and civilians attach themselves to that is stronger than partisanship for some individuals and is associated with certain policy positions.
p>Se analiza el papel de los electores sin identidad partidaria en la elección de Diputados Federales de 2021, acentuando de manera novedosa que las características ideológicas de los independientes repercutieron en el apoyo y rechazo a cada una de las principales opciones. Los resultados muestran que los independientes sin ubicación ideológica y los independientes de izquierda apoyaron a la coalición Juntos Hacemos Historia, mientras que los independientes de derecha a la coalición Va por México. Los independientes de centro dividieron su apoyo entre ambas coaliciones. En la decisión de voto, los independientes de derecha y de centro dieron mayor importancia a la evaluación de la economía y de la seguridad, mientras que, los independientes de izquierda y sin ubicación ideológica a la evaluación sobre la vacunación contra Covid-19. Esto representa una contribución teórica y empírica al estudio de la independencia partidista en México.</p
At its introduction the normal vote was a powerful concept and a useful tool. Within the last decade it has become a suspect idea and a flawed measurement. This paper uses a new and extensive data set to reoperationalize the concept. The specification by which it is derived avoids most of the problems inherent in the initial formulation. The paper illustrates the useful analytic insights provided by the concept, and it documents its utility as an analytic tool.
I assess the extent of "partisan voting" in American national elections since 1952 using a series of simple probit analyses. My measure of partisan voting is sensitive both to changes in the distribution of partisanship and to changes in the electoral relevance of partisanship. I find that the impact of partisan loyalties on voting behavior has increased in each of the last six presidential elections, reaching a level in 1996 almost 80 percent higher than in 1972-and significantly higher than in any presidential election in at least 50 years. The impact of partisanship on voting behavior in congressional elections has also increased markedly, albeit more recently and to a level still well below that of the 1950s. I conclude that the conventional wisdom among scholars and commentators regarding the "decline of parties" in American politics is badly outdated.
For the most part, scholars who study American political parties in the electorate continue to characterize them as weak and in decline. Parties on the elite level, however, have experienced a resurgence over the last two decades. Such a divergence between elite behavior and mass opinion is curious, given that most models of public opinion place the behavior of elites at their core. In fact, I find that parties in the electorate have experienced a noteworthy resurgence over the last two decades. Greater partisan polarization in Congress has clarified the parties' ideological positions for ordinary Americans, which in turn has increased party importance and salience on the mass level. Although parties in the 1990s are not as central to Americans as they were in the 1950s, they are far more important today than in the 1970s and 1980s. The party decline thesis is in need of revision.
This article is a synthetic effort. It attempts to mold the issue voter of traditional democratic theory and rational choice models with the "nature of the times" and partisan voters of empirical voting studies. The vehicle for this attempted synthesis is a voter decision rule more complex, more inclusive, and perhaps less "rational" than others previously suggested. After motivating and developing the formal representation of the decision rule, a variety of empirical findings about voting behavior are reexamined in light of the rule. Some reinterpretations result, particularly in the case of party identification.
Party Identification and Beyond Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice
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Constituency service, reputation, and the incumbency advantage
- M P Fiorina
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The polarization of American parties and mistrust of government Why People Don't Trust Government The American Voter Revisited
- D C King
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Congress: the Electoral Connection Polarized America: the Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches The Changing American Voter An analysis of intransitivities in the index of party identification
- D R Mayhew
- Ct
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