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IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 1
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN AND AROUND
INSTITUTIONAL VOIDS:
A CASE STUDY FROM BANGLADESH
Johanna Mair
Ignasi Martí
IESE Business School – University of Navarra
Avda. Pearson, 21 – 08034 Barcelona, Spain. Tel.: (+34) 93 253 42 00 Fax: (+34) 93 253 43 43
Camino del Cerro del Águila, 3 (Ctra. de Castilla, km 5,180) – 28023 Madrid, Spain. Tel.: (+34) 91 357 08 09 Fax: (+34) 91 357 29 13
Copyright © 2006 IESE Business School.
Working Paper
WP no 636
June, 2006
IESE Business School-University of Navarra
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN AND AROUND
INSTITUTIONAL VOIDS:
A CASE STUDY FROM BANGLADESH
Johanna Mair*
Ignasi Martí**
Abstract
In many developing countries those living in poverty are unable to participate in markets due
to the weakness or complete absence of supportive institutions. This study examines in
microcosm such an institutional void and illustrates the activities of an entrepreneurial actor in
rural Bangladesh aimed at addressing it. The context enables us to examine processes where
resources are scarce and the institutional fabric inchoate. We depict the crafting of new
institutional arrangements as a process of resource and institutional “bricolage” occurring in
parallel and thereby facilitating the creation of platforms for participation in markets and
broader society, by those previously excluded.
* Professor, General Management, IESE
** PhD Candidate, IESE
Keywords: institutional entrepreneurship, institutional voids, bricolage, development.
This manuscript is currently under review. Please do not quote without permission.
IESE Business School-University of Navarra
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN AND AROUND
INSTITUTIONAL VOIDS:
A CASE STUDY FROM BANGLADESH*
Recent studies, as well as early authors on the subject, have pointed towards a positive
relationship between entrepreneurial activity, economic growth, prosperity and wealth creation
(Baumol, 1996; Global Economic Monitor, 2005; Schumpeter, 1934). Markets play an important
role in driving this process. Markets, viewed as specialized social structures and important
exchange mechanisms, require specific institutions and rules in order to come into existence
and to function well (Fligstein, 1996; North, 1990). One of the most prominent factors that
prevent many developing countries from advancing along the road towards a market economy,
lies in the inchoate nature of their institutional fabric. What we observe in developing countries
is that institutional arrangements that support markets are either absent or weak and often the
pervasiveness of constraining informal institutions impedes full market participation (Easterly,
2001).
The effect of institutions on economic activity and wealth creation has been studied by
institutional economists (Coase, 1984; North, 1990), development economists (Easterly, 2006;
Sachs, 2005), economic sociologists (Beckert, 2002; Fligstein, 1996) and organization theorists
and sociologists (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Although these scholars
have based their analyses on different dimensions and definitions of institutions (Scott, 1995),
the main message is the same: institutions constrain and determine action and behavior (Nee,
1996).
In an effort to emphasize the role of agency and interest in research on institutions, DiMaggio
introduced the concept of institutional entrepreneurship in a seminal article in 1988.
According to DiMaggio institutional entrepreneurship is a process by which organized actors
with sufficient resources create institutions when they see in them an opportunity to realize
*This paper has been prepared with the support of the European Academy of Business in Society (EABIS),
as part of its Research, Education and Training Partnership Programme on Corporate Responsibility. This
Programme has been made possible due to the financial support of EABIS’ founding corporate partners,
IBM, Johnson & Johnson, Microsoft, Shell and Unilever. Additional support was received from the
Anselmo Rubiralta Center for Globalization and Strategy at IESE Business School and the Center for
Business in Society.
2 - IESE Business School-University of Navarra
their interests (DiMaggio, 1988). Almost two decades later, significant advances have been
made in understanding how institutions are created, transformed, de-institutionalized and
replaced by new ones. Yet most research to date has looked at institutional entrepreneurship in
the developed world; that is, in a context characterized by a relatively mature institutional
fabric (see Lawrence, Hardy & Phillips, 2002, for a notable exception). As a result, we still know
relatively little about why and how entrepreneurial actors build new institutions, and transform
existing ones, in developing countries where amorphous institutional arrangements shape social
and economic reality.
This paper introduces and "makes sense" of the activities of a new type of actor who, driven by
a holistic approach to development, creates, transforms and de-institutionalizes rules and norms
and thereby allows the impoverished in developing countries to enter the virtuous circle of
economic and social development. This phenomenon has recently been described as social
entrepreneurship (Alvord, Brown, & Letts, 2004; Mair & Martí, 2006) or community-based
enterprising (Peredo & Chrisman, 2006). For the purpose of this paper we discuss the
phenomenon primarily from the perspective of institutional entrepreneurship and therefore use
the terms social and institutional entrepreneur interchangeably.
The main objective of this paper is to extend existing theory on institutions and to contribute
to a more robust theoretical view of entrepreneurship. First, we use the notion of an
institutional void to describe a situation where absent and/or weak institutional arrangements
prevent those excluded by poverty from participating in market activities. Institutional scholars
assume that institutions are everywhere, and they are right. What many developing countries
have in common however, is that, although institutions may exist, they do not allow for and
often even hinder economic and social development. In this paper we conceptualize
institutional voids as opportunity spaces for motivated entrepreneurial actors and study how
entrepreneurial actors address such voids. The focus on developing countries allows us to
examine entrepreneurial processes in an environment that is scarce in resources and supportive
institutions. This characterization is important because it permits us to conceptualize the
entrepreneurial processes around the concept of “bricolage”, which connotes making do with
“whatever is at hand” (Douglas, 1986; Garud & Karnøe, 2003; Lévi-Strauss, 1966).
We describe institutional voids in the context of Bangladesh and illustrate the institutional
entrepreneurship processes with data derived from a qualitative case study of the activities of
BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee), one of the world’s largest non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). BRAC was founded and is managed and staffed by
Bangladeshis. Its pioneering work in developing new approaches and ideas to foster the growth
of one of the world’s poorest countries offers an opportunity to study entrepreneurship
processes aimed at building institutions in order to facilitate economic and social development.
Entrepreneurship and Institutional Voids
Markets, institutions, and opportunities
Over the last decade development efforts have increasingly focused on developing and
transforming the institutions needed for engaging the poor in market activities. The assumption
that underlies such efforts is that markets are an effective mechanism to attain sustained
increases in living standards around the world (World Bank, 2002).
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 3
In this paper, institutions are broadly seen as «multifaceted, durable social structures, made of
symbolic elements, social activities, and material resources» (Scott, 2001: 49) that stem from
«historical accretions of past practices and understandings» (Barley & Tolbert, 1997: 99). They
can be either formal (e.g., constitutions, laws, property rights, public and private organizations)
or informal (e.g., traditions, sanctions, taboos and codes of conduct) and constitute "rules of the
game" as they set conditions on and enable action (Giddens, 1979). Defined this way,
institutions are omnipresent, and institutional vacuums hardly exist. In developing countries
social and economic reality is shaped by a complex set of informal and formal institutional
shapes. Yet we observe that specific institutions, which would support a modern economy based
on market principles, are missing.
Scholars from different disciplines have studied extensively how to create markets and how to make
them more efficient. These authors have elaborated on institutions as preconditions for markets to
exist. Neil Fligstein, for example, identified social institutions such as property rights, governance
structures, conceptions of control and rules of exchange as institutional requirements for markets
(Fligstein, 1996). In the context of developing countries, La Porta and colleagues discussed weak
disclosure requirements, ineffective governance mechanisms and poorly developed markets for
corporate control as impediments to the economically efficient action taking and decision making
of market participants, referring here primarily to business groups (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, &
Shleifer, 1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998).
It is widely agreed that the state, and therefore the government, is responsible for the creation
and development of such social institutions (Fligstein, 1990; Hooks, 1990). However, what
happens if government structures are weak or corrupt –or both, as it is often the case in
developing countries– and the rules of the game and the conditions under which economic
actors organize, compete or cooperate, tend to favour some actors over others (Khanna &
Palepu, 1997, 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993).
A growing body of research on developing countries suggests that when the government fails
to assume its role in creating and strengthening those social institutions needed for markets to
exist and to function properly, business groups step in. Thus, business groups are portrayed as
intrafirm mechanisms for dealing with market deficiencies (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Leff, 1976,
1978). What has been less emphasized however is the fact that the activities of business groups
are constrained by what is their primary objective: creating economic value. Business groups
would embark on opportunities to fill «voids left by the missing institutions that normally
underpin the efficient functioning of product, capital and labor markets» (Khanna & Rivkin,
2001: 46-47) only as long as it is profitable. The example of Tata Group in the 1980s and 1990s
illustrates this point. By creating a strong brand name across the different businesses Tata was
able to fill an existing institutional void: it addressed the lack of consumer protection
institutions in India. By creating a net of interlocking equity holdings and directories Tata
addressed the weakness of capital markets as well as weak or even absent corporate governance
regulation. In all these cases Tata was able to generate an economic advantage out of its
activities. But what happens if no immediate or direct economic returns are involved? Who
steps in and builds missing institutions or corrects for an inchoate institutional arrangement if
the government and business groups fail to act or are too weak to act? In many developing
countries we now see a new breed of actors entering the game at this stage: a hybrid type of
entrepreneurial actor for whom the ultimate objective is the sustainable development of their
countries based on both social and economic progress (Peredo Chrisman, 2006; Seelos & Mair,
2005a, 2005b). While for business entrepreneurs social value creation is often a by-product of
the economic value created (Venkataraman, 1997), for these actors –often referred to as social
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or community entrepreneurs– creating social value is the primary objective, while creating
economic value is a necessary condition to ensure financial viability (Mair & Martí, 2006). For
these entrepreneurs markets are not an end in itself or a means to appropriate value; they view
markets as an important social structure and a mechanism to foster social and economic
development. Thus, promoting market participation by building, transforming and decomposing
institutions becomes an important objective.
While existing literature has mainly focused on the role of institutions for the creation and efficient
functioning of markets, professionals in the field of development have suggested that the creation
of markets might not be enough and what is really needed is to enable the poor to participate in
markets (Narayan, 2002; Sachs, 2005; Yunus, 1999). In particular, the strong influence of informal
institutions in many developing countries impedes comprehensive participation in many aspects of
public and economic life. In various parts of Cameroon, for example, existing traditions and rules of
behavior require women to get a husband’s, father’s or brother’s permission to leave the house
(Easterly, 2001); in Ecuador the average duration of a commercial case in the formal legal system is
almost eight years, an investment of time which is too “expensive” for poor people (World Bank,
2002: 120); and similarly, in Bangladesh, the informal legal system (or shalish) is often preferred by
the poor to the formal state-sponsored system for its low cost, speed and accessibility (Alim & Rafi,
2003). As a result, too many are excluded from participating in markets.
We argue that the distinction between building institutions for the creation and efficient
functioning of markets and building institutions to enable people to participate in those
markets, is both theoretically and normatively relevant and contributes to a more nuanced
understanding of the interplay between institutions and markets. This bears important
implications for development practice. In this paper we describe situations of absent or weak
institutional arrangements that support markets –as institutional voids– and we view these
voids as opportunity spaces for entrepreneurs willing to «infuse new beliefs, norms and values
into social structures» (Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000).
The concept of opportunities is central to the entrepreneurship literature (Eckhardt & Shane,
2003; Shane, 2000). Building on recent studies (Garud & Karnøe, 2003; Hwang & Powell, 2005),
we believe that opportunities are not simply pre-existing and hence discovered or recognized
by alert individuals (Knight, 1921; Shane, 2000) but rather, are constructed “on the fly”.
Institutional entrepreneurs usually start with a clear objective, but how they set about achieving
it will be defined through continuous interaction with the wider environment that both defines
and creates opportunities (Hwang & Powell, 2005). As we will argue in the next section,
entrepreneurial actors craft new institutional arrangements by recombining the different
resources (Schumpeter, 1934), institutions (Douglas, 1986), as well as ambiguous and contested
macro-cultural discourses (Lawrence & Phillips, 2003; Swidler, 1986), that they have “at hand”
(Lévi-Strauss, 1967). By a continuous process of going back-and-forth, institutional
entrepreneurs may discover, create and enact “opportunities” to force changes on the existing
order (Tarrow, 1998). In this back-and-forth process, the entrepreneur’s initial objective will
likely be «formed and revised in the action process itself and become more precise with the
better understanding of the problem and the means for its solution» (Beckert, 2002: 280).
Institutional entrepreneurship in developing countries as bricolage
Since DiMaggio’s seminal paper, scholarly discussion on institutional entrepreneurship has focused
mainly on «the activities of powerful actors, such as state organizations and professional
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 5
associations» (Lawrence, Hardy & Phillips, 2002: 289). Given that «creating new institutions is
expensive» (DiMaggio, 1988: 14), institutional entrepreneurship scholars have stressed the
importance of having abundant resources. In developing countries social and economic resources
are typically concentrated in the hands of a few who have limited interest in changing the
institutional statu quo. Therefore, how is then institutional entrepreneurship possible in such a
context? Are motivated actors who are poorly resourced able to build new institutions or start the
process of changing existing institutions? A number of institutional scholars have pointed out that,
under some circumstances, actors without resources can «use existing rules in unintended ways to
create new institutions» (Fligstein, 2001: 107), and can «overcome size or resource limitations and
begin to shape their institutional fields» (Lawrence, Hardy & Phillips, 2002: 289). What these
authors argue is that, in order to overcome resource limitations, entrepreneurs should leverage and
be able to mobilize resources from very different actors and constituencies.
Paralleling this work, an important body of research in the field of entrepreneurship has studied how
entrepreneurs both face and act upon severe resource constraints (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Baumol,
1996; Schumpeter, 1934). Applied to our research context, the question is: How is entrepreneurship
possible in a penurious environment, which is the norm rather than the exception in developing
countries? Complementing traditional views that conceive entrepreneurship as the discovery of pre-
existing opportunities by alert individuals (Kirzner, 1997; Shane, 2000), and building on
Schumpeter’s original insights, a growing number of entrepreneurship researchers have argued that
entrepreneurship also involves the “creation” of new opportunities through the recombination and
transformation of existing resources (Garud & Karnøe, 2003; Venkataraman, 1997).
Entrepreneurship and institutionalist scholars have recently adopted the term bricolage (Lévi-
Strauss, 1967) to describe the process of “making do” by recombining the resources (Baker &
Nelson, 2005) and institutions at hand (Campbell, 2004), and using inputs by actors from different
domains (Garud & Karnøe, 2003). We explicitly refer to bricolage as ‘making do with resources and
institutions at hand’. In doing so, we aim at bridging entrepreneurship and institutional theory
arguments. Lévi-Strauss offered no specific definition of bricolage and scholars have highlighted
different elements and dimensions characterizing the process. In this study we particularly focus on
three characteristics of bricolage that have been discussed in previous work. First, bricolage involves
the recombination of already existing resources or institutions for new purposes (Garud & Karnøe,
2003; Lanzara, 1999). Second, it is based on resources or institutions at hand, that is, bricoleurs
play with what they have at hand, taking what the system offers at any given moment (Campbell,
2004; Fligstein, 2001). And third, bricolage represents the continuous testing and enactment of
limitations (Weick, 1979), whereby entrepreneurial actors «disregard the limitations of commonly
accepted definitions of material inputs, practices, and definitions and standards insisting instead on
trying out solutions» (Baker & Nelson, 2005: 334).
The resource poor environment and amorphous institutional fabric characterizing a developing
country, such as our empirical setting, make it difficult to face the massive scale and
interrelated nature of social problems. It has been argued that, in organizational fields where
problems are too complex for any one individual or organization to handle (Emery & Trist,
1965; Trist, 1983) but change is imperative, the necessary change can be jumpstarted by
interorganizational collaboration (Dorado, 2005; Lawrence, Hardy & Phillips, 2002).
Interorganizational collaboration however, requires a platform for distributed agency.
Especially in many of the least developed countries these platforms for collaboration, which
represent important institutions to spur development, are missing and constitute institutional
voids as defined in this paper. We agree with Lawrence, Hardy and Phillips (2002) that
cooperation is needed to solve or ameliorate complex social problems (Dorado, 2005). Yet we
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think that it is important to explore how entrepreneurial actors make cooperation possible in
the first place.
In the previous section we distinguished between the institutions needed for markets to exist
and to function efficiently and those needed for enabling people to participate in markets. This
paper focuses on the latter, that is, on institutions that enable market participation. We will
argue that, where the absent or weak institutional arrangements impede people’s effective
participation in markets and society, entrepreneurial actors step in and fill these voids by
building platforms for participation. Once built, such platforms become arenas where new
entrepreneurial opportunities can be created and enacted by distributed actors (Garud & Karnøe,
2003; Tsoukas, 1996) and where organizations may cooperate (Lawrence, Hardy & Phillips,
2002). We will use the concept of bricolage to illustrate this process.
Research Methods
Empirical studies on institutional entrepreneurship have primarily focused on the developed
world; there is very little research on institutional entrepreneurship in developing countries.
More specifically, we still know relatively little about the opportunity spaces for and activities
of institutional entrepreneurs in the inchoate institutional environment characterizing
developing countries.
Our study draws on an instrumental case study based on qualitative inductive techniques. The
decision on our research design went beyond choosing a methodology; it was driven by “what is to
be studied” (Stake, 1994) and reflects the particularities of the phenomenon, the theory under study
and the specific objective of the study. An in-depth instrumental case study allowed us to capture
the social, human and situational dimension of a phenomenon “in the making”. Various scholars
have emphasized that the study of institutional entrepreneurship demands a rich, detailed
interpretive analysis of the particular context where it occurs (Garud, Jain & Kumaraswamy, 2002;
Maguire, Hardy & Lawrence, 2004). The objective of this paper is not to test theory or to establish a
causal determination of events. Our objective is to advance theory on institutional entrepreneurship
by refining and extending our understanding of when, where and how institutional entrepreneurs
act. Using a case study was appropriate and instrumental for several reasons. First, qualitative case
studies are well suited to support and facilitate understanding of phenomena that are not well
understood (Eisenhardt, 1989). Second, single case studies are appropriate to tease out the specific
mechanisms underlying the institutional entrepreneurship process. And finally, qualitative and
inductive techniques permit one to capture historical processes and illustrate the complexity
involved in the phenomenon in order to guide and stimulate future research.
Research Context
The selection of context and the specific case was guided by the phenomenon, themes and
issues we address in this paper. We chose Bangladesh as our research context for two reasons:
First, indicators on poverty and the inchoate institutional fabric in Bangladesh suggest that
institutions which enable the poor to participate in the market economy are missing and
therefore an institutional void as defined in this paper exists (World Bank, 2002). And second,
anecdotal evidence suggests that a number of local entrepreneurial actors have taken on the
task of filling this void (Bornstein, 2004; Sachs, 2005).
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 7
Bangladesh gained its independence from Pakistan in 1971. After independence, millions of
refugees returned to Bangladesh, mostly from India. The result was a war-torn country plagued by
social misery where violence was prevalent and the government lacked the funds and expertise for
reconstruction. Bangladesh was, and still is, characterized by extensive landlessness, fragmentation
of land holdings and the inability of other sectors to absorb the significant amount of
underemployed surplus labour in the economy (Lovell, 1992; Sachs, 2005).
Although Bangladesh has made significant progress in reducing poverty and improving the lives of
its people, nearly half of its population of 140 million still lives below the poverty line (as measured
by income, consumption and ability to meet basic human needs), making Bangladesh one of the
poorest countries in the world. Thirty-six percent of Bangladesh’s population lives on less than $1 a
day; 55% of children under five are malnourished and the maternal mortality rate is the highest in
South Asia (World Bank, 2002). The remedies put forward by international policy makers and
international organizations are echoing one theme: Bangladesh needs to make greater efforts to
enable the poor to participate in the economy (World Bank, 2005; Sachs, 2005).
The political, economic and social heritage of the war partly explains the lack of action on
behalf of the government and business groups to build institutions that facilitate participation
in markets; which in turn opened up opportunities for motivated entrepreneurs to bring about
social and institutional change (Lewis, 2004). Not surprisingly Bangladesh’s nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) are among the most active in the world. BRAC, our main research setting,
has been one of the most, if not the most, active organization in this endeavour (Sachs, 2005).
Sources and Collection of Data
The data gathering for this study involved several sources and multiple rounds. Data stem from
field interviews and observations as well as from archival sources. Data collection lasted for
over two years and included multiple fieldtrips.
A primary source of data was field-interviews. These interviews were conducted in two steps.
One of the authors conducted interviews and observation in Bangladesh in March 2005, while
the other visited the field ten months later. As suggested by the literature this approach
enhances confidence in the findings and increases the likelihood of insightful findings
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Forty semi-structured interviews were conducted with BRAC representatives
at the headquarters and at the regional and field levels. We were careful to interview a
representative sample covering the different areas, programs and hierarchical levels within
BRAC. Interviews were conducted in English; they lasted between thirty minutes and two hours
and were recorded and transcribed. The interviews focused on the history of BRAC, its
programmes and major activities, their implications for the context, and their impact.
To reduce the likelihood of misinterpretation we triangulated the data from BRAC with
interviews of ten members of other NGOs or development agencies acting in Bangladesh,
government representatives as well as managers of multinational business organizations.
Triangulation served to clarify meaning (Stake, 1994) and enhance external validity
(Eisenhardt, 1989). For the same purpose, we collected a range of documents from BRAC
(annual reports, committee reports, research documents and audiovisual material) and from
independent NGOs, international development agencies and governmental institutions.
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A second important source of data was field observation, in this case “development in action”. We
attended several microcredit meetings and classes in the legal education programme, visited several
schools, interviewed shopkeepers that had been recipients of BRAC microloans for several years and
also interviewed managers of BRAC business companies. Interviews in the field (and here we mean
rural areas) were conducted with the help of local translators. Field observation and direct contact
with the target group of BRAC’s programmes helped us to grasp the cultural and situational
specificities of the phenomenon necessary to capture its holistic and complex nature.
Data Analysis
The data analysis was carried out in two main stages. In the first stage we created a narrative
account (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Langley, 1999) to establish a chronology of the key
events and facts in order to understand BRAC and its role in the social and economic
development of Bangladesh. Archival materials, annual and committee reports, and interview
data, were used to understand how BRAC and the institutional fabric of Bangladesh had
evolved since the country became independent in 1971 (See Appendix 1). We corroborated our
understanding of the events by checking the accounts with BRAC managers and independent
experts. This first stage was important for assessing whether, at what point in time, and in
which form, an institutional void existed. As argued above, our first intended contribution is to
make the notion of institutional voids tangible in the context of a developing country and to
illustrate how such a void, that is, the absence of specific institutions, constitutes an
opportunity space for motivated institutional entrepreneurs.
The second stage of data analysis focused on how BRAC, the entrepreneurial actor, enacted such an
opportunity. In other words the analysis at this stage centred on the activities and mechanisms
underlying the institutional entrepreneurship process in the context of a developing country. The
main objective was to offer insights and observations on the challenges BRAC faced and the
processes involved. We adopted a “naturalistic inquiry” mode (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) and used
inductive logic to illustrate the unfolding of these processes by taking into account the historical,
cultural and situational roots (Garud, Jain & Kumaraswamy, 2002). We iterated between data and
theoretical constructs (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), added new rounds of data gathering until we felt
comfortable in achieving our objective to refine and inform theory, and adhered to the procedural
steps to analyze data emphasized by Miles and Huberman (1984).
Case Analysis
The objective of this paper is to refine theory and exemplify complexities to guide future
research. The following case discussion on BRAC, our research setting, is therefore based on
“thick descriptions” so that the case’s own issues contexts, and interpretations can emerge and
guide our understanding rather than the researcher’s intrinsic interest (Stake, 1994). In a first
step we describe social and institutional structures prevailing in rural Bangladesh. We show
how these, often informal structures impede many to participate in markets, and suggest that
the absence of enabling institutions indicates an institutional void. We then illustrate how
BRAC addresses such an institutional void by creating a platform for market participation by
those living in poverty: namely the Village Organization. Finally, we demonstrate how BRAC´s
“makes do” with the institutions and resources it has at hand, to create a program for the
chronically poor and an institution whose aim is to empower them.
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 9
BRAC
BRAC was initiated in 1972 by Fazle Hasan Abed as a small scale relief and rehabilitation
project aimed at repairing some of the devastation caused by Bangladesh’s war of liberation.
Initially working to resettle refugees in Sulla, a remote rural area in the north which had
suffered particular damage, Abed and his colleagues thought that their efforts would be needed
for two or three years only. By 1974 however, they realised that relief and reconstruction-
oriented activities were only provisional solutions and that long term investment in
development was necessary to affect substantial change. The multitude of social problems on a
national scale and the government’s failure to provide sufficient relief, led BRAC to adopt a
new strategy of integrated development based on the twin objectives of poverty alleviation and
empowerment of the poor, and focusing on institution building to bring the rural poor into the
mainstream of development.1
Three decades later, BRAC’s outreach covered all 64 districts of Bangladesh and 78% of the
country’s villages (BRAC, 2004). In 2005, BRAC employed a total of 88,833 people (35,244 of
them full-time and 61,750 teachers), making it the nation’s second-largest employer after the
government. BRAC has created over 6.35 million jobs in various economic sectors and its core
programmes span four basic areas: economic development; education; health; and social
development, human rights and legal services. BRAC’s Economic Development Programme has
so far incorporated 5.08 million poor and landless people, mostly women, into 155,065 village
organizations. These village organizations play a key role in enabling the poor to collectively
address some of the principal impediments to their economic and social development.
Impediments for market participation in rural Bangladesh
As BRAC acts predominately in the rural areas of Bangladesh, it is our objective in this section
to briefly highlight some of the most important constraints that many people in rural areas
confront in order to participate in markets and in public life. While acknowledging that a full
account of the complex structure of relationships, institutions, customs and traditions that
reproduce and sustain poverty is beyond the scope of this paper, we do wish to draw attention
to the following.
A defining characteristic of the rural areas in Bangladesh is the asymmetrical relationship that
exists between different members of the community (Chen, 1983; Lovell, 1992) with elites at
one extreme and the powerless and excluded at the other. The local power structure is generally
formed by the wealthiest households, businessmen, elected local government officials, chairmen
and members of the local administrative units (union parishads), religious leaders (imams), and
primary school teachers among others. By using different mechanisms (ranging from outright
violence to bribery, manipulation or prestige), the local elites are able to extend their control
over private and public land; over local government resources (such as capital, government
agricultural land, health infrastructure and government primary schools); or over who is
employed in particular jobs (e.g., police positions or government clerkships). They make use of
their control over liquid capital as well, by lending money at very high rates of interest.
1 When it started out, the acronym BRAC referred to the “Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee”, however
in 1974 the name was changed to “Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee” to reflect the new focus on rural
development.
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In this context, survival for the powerless poor rests very much on their ability to ensure
support from the community elite. This support typically comes at the price of losing their
autonomy and independence. These relations of dependence, often referred to as patronage, are
based on an «interchange of non-comparable goods and services between actors of unequal
socio-economic rank» (Powell, 1970: 412). For instance, many sell their land so they can afford
bribes to get jobs. Those who have nothing to offer to the elite –the so-called extreme or ultra
poor– are even excluded from these ‘dependent-security’ relations. As development
professionals highlight, poverty has multiple dimensions; in addition to material poverty, it
involves gender inequalities, powerlessness and injustice.
The formal legal system of Bangladesh is perceived as highly corrupt (North, 1986;
Transparency International of Bangladesh, 2005) and extremely slow. The majority of poor
people cannot rely on the formal system because they cannot afford to pay bribes nor wait
eternally for dispute settlements. As a result, it is biased toward the affluent and the politically
powerful. The weakness of the state legal system explains why in rural areas informal means of
resolving disputes are preferred. The informal legal system –called shalish, which means
mediation– is generally favoured for its lower cost, speed, accessibility, cultural relevance, and
responsiveness to poor people’s concerns (Alim & Rafi, 2003). However, the traditional shalish is
dominated by the male elite and also presents high levels of corruption (Siddiqui, 2000). Hence,
the formal law enforcement machinery and the informal mediation system are equally useless
to protect the weak. In fact, both are used to perpetuate relationships of dominance.
The power structure interacts with and is reinforced by the ideological system of norms,
traditions and values. Particularly indigent in rural Bangladesh are the women; the most
disadvantaged and deprived sector of society. Social and cultural norms associated with
purdah2, patriarchy and the still very common occurrence of (extremely) early marriages,
restrict women’s mobility and participation in public life. A strict separation between the public
and the private sphere confines women to the latter, thus restricting their involvement in
market transactions and income generating activities.3 Although the situation is slowly
changing and women are now trading in bazaars or working in the fields, very often this
occurs either: a) because the severity of their destitution does not allow them to comply with
social norms; or b) due to the influence of NGOs in the area. An additional issue has to do with
ownership of resources: sociocultural norms dictate that men control the resources even if
women are able to own them. For this reason, many mainstream development programs
targeted at women (including microfinance) actually bypass the intended recipients (women
and girls) in favour of more culturally acceptable ones (men and boys): therefore, access to
resources does not necessarily equate with their utilization (Walker & Matin, 2006).
To sum up, the complex power structure of rural Bangladesh, based on relationships of
dependence and perpetuated through existing sociocultural norms, along with the weakness
and corruption of the legal and political systems, restricts the involvement of the poor and
powerless in market based activities. In the next section we shall describe BRAC’s strategy to
cope with such deep seated impediments.
2 Purdah literally means ‘curtain’. It refers to the obligation –for women only– to stay close to their family groups,
visit primarily with female friends, and to forgo public places such as the village market where they might purchase
food or clothing (Chen, 1983).
3 For example, it is not socially acceptable for women to go alone to places where men are present (village bazaars,
fields being cultivated, buses, roadsides, etc.).
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 11
The Village Organization: Building an arena for participation
The development strategy pursued by BRAC has two major objectives: alleviation of poverty
and empowerment of the poor. Early in its history, BRAC recognized the need to build a solid
economic, social and human foundation that would allow it to overcome poverty in a
sustainable manner. More than 30 years of development experience has taught BRAC that the
social dependence structure in rural areas of Bangladesh make it almost impossible to reach the
poorest of villagers. Programmes designed for the whole community tended to deliver most of
their benefits to the elite, bypassing the poor and ultra-poor (Walker & Matin, 2006). BRAC
therefore makes great efforts to give a public voice to those who have been excluded because of
their dependence on the wealthiest villagers. Its solution was to build arenas in which the poor
could participate all over the country. BRAC calls these arenas “Village Organizations” (VOs)
and they provide both the starting point and the cornerstone of the BRAC development model.
The VO is an association of poor landless people (mostly women) who come together with the
help of BRAC to improve their socio-economic position. Itself an institution, the VO becomes the
arena in which the traditionally powerless are able to explain their problems, participate in the
community and receive services. As such, it plays a pivotal role in fostering the emergence of
new solutions, practices and rules: it is the intermediary and link between rural people and BRAC.
VOs are formed with 20 to 55 members and from the beginning particular attention is paid to
discipline (e.g., regular attendance at weekly meetings and monthly issue-based discussions). The
members are also encouraged to participate in local affairs and community decision making.
As we have briefly described, women in rural Bangladesh have been traditionally confined
within their houses. Therefore they tend to be very shy and reluctant about appearing in front
of strangers (Yunus, 1999). However, as one woman stated during a field visit, «now we have
gained confidence in our words and actions. We can talk to you without any shyness». Indeed,
a BRAC staff member we interviewed reported that this has been one of the major changes they
have observed:
«25 years ago we used to have a meeting with a woman using a partition in between. I used
to sit on one side and the women used to sit on the other side of the partition (like a fence) so
that I could listen to them, they could listen to me, but we could not see each other. […] If
they came at all, they would come with the face completely covered; they used to sit with
their backs to me, and they used to speak like this: “yes sir, yes sir, yes sir I need this”. But
now they come to your office and wake you up: “you need to come, we need this …»
Among many other changes that occur after joining VOs, women highlight increases in: self-
confidence, community wide awareness of social issues, credit-worthiness, mobility,
communication with the outside world, community acceptance, personal savings and a sense of
economic security. They also cite reduced economic dependency on their husbands, an
improved ability to manage household affairs, increased importance to their husbands and
involvement in familial decision-making (Chen, 1983; Lovell, 1992).
Development professionals suggest that a weak social network may be a determining obstacle to
escaping poverty (World Bank, 2002). In this sense VOs develop the social capital of BRAC members
and allow them to create their own networks, thus breaking the cycle of exclusion and/or
dependence previously experienced in daily life. At the same time, the VO is the delivery point for
BRAC’s main strategies to achieve social and economic development. Once a VO has been formed,
12 - IESE Business School-University of Navarra
BRAC begins to combine the different resources it has at hand to develop and implement
programmes such as microcredit, income generation, community health and education.
Given the multidimensional nature of poverty, in this case rooted in a complex rural social
structure, the development and implementation of such programmes often requires
collaboration with other actors (e.g., the Government, other NGOs or development
organizations, firms, etc.). Table 1 shows some of the collaborations BRAC is currently engaged
in, along with a short description of their rationale and objectives.
Table 1
Collaboration between BRAC and other agents in rural Bangladesh
Collaboration BRAC Program Rationale and objectives
With the Government of
Bangladesh and the World
Food Programme.
Income Generation for
Vulnerable Group
Development (IGVGD).
The poor are denied access to formal banking
systems and so are deprived of the means to
borrow, save and invest in productive activities.
With the Government of
Bangladesh (in some areas). Education for Children
with Disabilities (CWD). More than a million primary school age children
with assorted disabilities and disadvantages have
no access to basic education, mainly because
teachers are not trained to cater to their special
needs, but also because of the lack of suitable
classrooms, teaching materials and methods.
With Ain O Shalish Kendra
(ASK) and Bangladesh
National Women’s Lawyers
Association (BNWLA).
Legal Aid Clinics. Legal assistance to community members: the
traditional arbitration system discriminates
against the poor, and particularly against
women. Clinics offer advice and help on issues
such as dowry, polygamy, divorce, physical
torture, land and money-related matters, rape,
acid throwing, kidnapping, trafficking and fraud.
Collaboration with the
Hortex Foundation. Vegetable Export. Bridges small agricultural producers and
international markets and guarantees farmers a
fair price.
With the Danish
International Development
Agency (DANIDA).
Dairy Food Project. To forward-integrate and build bridges between
the poor and urban markets.
With several NGOs. Education Support
Programme (ESP). To provide education to poor, rural students in
remote areas: many children, particularly girls,
have dropped out, or are left out, of the formal
education system.
With the Government of
Bangladesh, the Global Fund
to Fight Aids, TB and
Malaria (GFATM) and other
NGOs and development
actors.
Tuberculosis Control
Programme.
Following the national guidelines for treatment
the objective is to control for new cases and also
to make sure patients complete the treatment.
With the Government of
Bangladesh and other
NGOs.
National Nutrition
Programme. Aims to improve the nutritional status of women
and children.
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 13
These collaborations are usually built upon the social networks previously created by BRAC. For
instance, the nationwide extension of some of the health programmes relies on the key role
played by Shastho Shebikas (SSs) and Shastho Karmis (SKs). SSs are BRAC’s community health
volunteers. SKs are community health paramedics who supervise SSs. Both play a key role in
health, nutrition and family planning education. They helped to distribute vitamin A capsules
and de-worming tablets to children during the government’s national vitamin A plus campaign,
and they play a critical role in other government initiatives including the expanded
immunisation programme, the tuberculosis programme and the malaria prevention and control
programme. Both SKs and SSs are members of VOs (almost always women) and so have direct
knowledge of the most rampant local health issues and their impact.
While collaborations with the government and other development agencies point to the fact
that some issues cannot be tackled by a single organization, this example reveals something
very important: collaboration builds upon an infrastructure of pre-existing networks, social
relations, and organizations. What BRAC aimed to do with the VOs was to build such
infrastructure.
Recombining resources and institutions: The Example of the “Challenging the
Frontiers of Poverty Reduction – Targeting the Ultra Poor Programme”
One important segment of those living in poverty –the extreme or ultra poor– has been
bypassed by most development programs and also by mainstream development research. It has
been suggested recently that part of the problem has to do with a failure to recognize that the
poor are not a homogeneous group (Seelos & Mair, 2006). For example, although
acknowledging the potential of microfinance, many concede that while traditional microcredit
based interventions have a demonstrated effect on the moderate poor, they may not be well
suited for the ultra poor (Walker & Matin, 2006). Some studies even caution against potential
negative consequences: «for those trapped in chronic food insecurity with no asset base to
protect themselves from the myriad web of shocks, microfinance can be ineffective and
sometimes counter productive» (Matin & Halder, 2004: 6).
Estimates indicate that over a quarter of Bangladesh’s people live in extreme poverty and
cannot meet even their most basic needs. For this group, BRAC has been experimenting with
more holistic approaches. Its “Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction – Targeting the
Ultra Poor Programme” (CFPR-TUP) is one attempt. The objective of the CFPR-TUP programme
is to create opportunity ladders to help the extreme poor climb to the level at which they can
benefit from mainstream development initiatives. An interesting feature of this programme is
the use and combination of different elements (e.g., physical assets, training and institutions) to
reach the ultra poor and contribute to building a more enabling environment for them.
The program has two main sub-objectives: pushing down and pushing out the frontiers of
poverty reduction. By “pushing down” the poverty frontier BRAC means the development of
new instruments relevant for the ultra poor. To do this it recombines some of the elements used
in other programs and devises new tools. Unlike other programmes, in implementing CFPR-TUP
BRAC initially transfers some basic assets to begin an income generating activity such as
poultry or livestock rearing, agriculture, and other non-farm activities. It also provides a
subsistence stipend (about Tk. 300), as well as enterprise development training. At the same
time, recognizing the strong correlation between ill-health and poverty, the programme offers
14 - IESE Business School-University of Navarra
specialized health care services for the ultra poor (e.g., installation of sanitary latrines and
tubewells free of cost, and ID cards for facilitated access to health services).
However, BRAC’s experience has shown that even the combination of these various elements is
not enough; one must also challenge the socio-cultural and political norms that constrain the
ultra poor from benefiting from these basic assets. Hence, the second element of the CFPR-TUP
programme strives to “push out” poverty by doing just that. The intention is to provide a social
network for the ultra poor which begins to offer an alternative to the existing networks that
promote exploitative yet secure forms of dependency as outlined above.
The socio-structural context in rural Bangladesh makes this task a difficult one since breaking
from existing relationships of dependence often involves a more visible participation of women
in public life. To this end, BRAC has both created new institutions and played with old ones.
The interplay between each of these types of institutions –new and existing– becomes
fundamental. For instance, BRAC encourages members of the VOs to contest for local
government elections so that their voices and opinions can be heard and so they have a say in
“shalish” processes and can better defend their own interests and those of the other VO
members. Of particular interest is an institution called the Gram Shahayak Committee (GSC) or
Village Assistance Committee. By building GSCs, BRAC aims to mobilize the local elite to create
an enabling environment for the ultra poor. The idea of engaging the local elite emerged after
BRAC staff found out that many extremely poor women in the CFPR-TUP programme were at
risk from theft or damage of the assets they received. Their lack of connections with more
powerful actors and lack of support from their rural communities meant that these women were
unable to protect their newly attained assets. The question of how to cope with this problem
has been addressed in several ways ranging from education to institution building. In order to
create a linkage between these two extremes of the power continuum in rural communities and
thus protect assets that it has transferred to the ultra poor, BRAC has drawn on customs
regarding the traditional responsibilities of village elites with respect to the poor. In other
words, while the programme addresses extreme poverty and the social causes that underlie that
poverty, BRAC also builds institutions that are inclusive of, and acceptable to, the wider
framework of the socio-cultural milieu of rural Bangladesh. A programme that directly
confronted customs and traditions would have failed and most probably would have been
rejected from the beginning.
The CFPR-TUP program offers an excellent illustration of how development initiatives can
address the impediments that some members of rural communities face when trying to engage
in market-based activities. Asset transfer is necessary but not enough. Building a more enabling
environment is necessary as well, but again, not sufficient. What is very often needed is a
continuous effort to combine the two.
Rethinking entrepreneurship and institutional voids
BRAC's experience after thirty years of development work in Bangladesh echoes the findings of
many other development experts (Easterly, 2006; Sachs, 2005): most mainstream development
initiatives still fail to reach an important section of the poor. Researchers across various
disciplines have suggested that the inchoate institutional fabric in developing countries blocks
social and economic development and accounts for what in this paper we term institutional
voids: situations in which the absence or the weakness of certain institutions inhibits
participation in markets for the poor.
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 15
We used the example of BRAC to illustrate how a motivated entrepreneur can play a direct role
in creating, transforming and reconfiguring institutional arrangements. The power dynamics in
rural Bangladesh required BRAC to build new platforms of participation to break free from
existing patterns of dominance. The Village Organizations BRAC created filled an institutional
void by enabling the previously excluded to participate in markets and in broader society.
Institutionalists and development scholars have argued that, in contexts where social problems
are too complex for an organization to handle the necessary change, it can often be
jumpstarted by interorganizational collaboration (Dorado, 2005; Emery & Trist, 1965; Lawrence,
Hardy & Phillips, 2002). BRAC’s collaboration with multiple actors (see Table 1) explicitly
highlights that there are issues a single organization cannot address and therefore collaboration
becomes imperative. However, resource mobilization approaches have shown that such efforts
crucially depend upon an infrastructure of pre-existing networks and organizations that
facilitate collective action (Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003; McAdam, 1982; McCarthy &
Zald, 1977). As BRAC has demonstrated with its VOs, the first and fundamental task of
entrepreneurs aiming at social change should therefore be to build such an infrastructure. Thus,
our first proposition is:
Proposition 1: Institutional entrepreneurship in and around the institutional void that
impedes people to participate in market-based activities requires building platforms for
participation and breaking relations of dependence.
These platforms, once built, in turn become elements of a broader repertoire of resources and
institutions used by the entrepreneurs. The CFPR-TUP programme demonstrated how BRAC, the
entrepreneurial actor, played with the limited resources and institutions it had at hand to
develop a programme especially designed to benefit the extreme poor. Institutional theorists,
following DiMaggio’s (1988) early insights, have generally assumed the importance of having
abundant resources to create new institutions. However, a growing number of scholars have
pointed out that entrepreneurship is often characterized by severe resource constraints (Baker &
Nelson, 2005; Lawrence, Hardy & Phillips, 2002). In such circumstances, entrepreneurship
scholars have shown how new options can be created through the recombination and
transformation of the resources at hand (Schumpeter, 1934; Venkataraman, 1997). In turn,
institutional theorists have argued that new institutions are created out of and with the “ruins
of existing institutions” (Campbell, 2004; Stark, 1996) The term “bricolage” has been used to
depict both of these processes. While the two “types” of bricolage –resource bricolage and
institutional bricolage– have been studied separately, our illustration of BRAC's CFRP-TUP
initiative suggests that institutional entrepreneurs tend to engage in both types of bricolage in
parallel. Bricolage in the case of BRAC resembles a needs-led, pragmatic approach in which the
actor takes what the system gives at any given moment (Fligstein, 2001) without any overly
rational, pre-planned approach driving the process (Garud & Karnøe, 2003; March, 1994), and
with a strong element of improvisation (Miner, Bassoff, & Moorman, 2001; Weick, 1998). Thus
we propose:
Proposition 2: The process of institutional entrepreneurship in and around the
institutional void that impedes people to participate in market-based activities involves
both resource and institutional bricolage in parallel.
16 - IESE Business School-University of Navarra
Concluding Remarks
Over 30 years of experimentation and expansion, BRAC has been able to build a raft of
institutions by innovatively combining the resources it had at hand and thus enabling social
and economic inclusion for the poorest of Bangladesh. By examining in detail, specific
processes initiated by BRAC, the main contributions of this paper are to: 1) advance theory by
bridging institutional theory and entrepreneurship; 2) generate momentum for organizational
scholarship on the eradication of poverty; and 3) inform development practice.
Firstly, our study establishes bridges between the entrepreneurship literature and institutional
theory. Entrepreneurship scholars have pointed out that more attention should be paid to how
rules and institutions, which vary across contexts, shape entrepreneurial activity (Baumol,
2004). Despite this recognition, little entrepreneurship research has been conducted on the issue
of how actors attempt to change these rules (institutions) and introduce new ones. On the other
hand, it has been pointed out that one of the major drawbacks of institutional theory is the lack
of a theory of action (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997), which might help in providing an answer to
the questions of why and how institutions come into existence and are de-institutionalized.
Integrating entrepreneurship and institutionalist arguments, this paper represents a first attempt
to unpack these processes. Our analysis of BRAC illustrates how a motivated entrepreneurial
actor transformed the institutional void that impedes people to participate in market-based
activities by engaging in resource bricolage and institutional bricolage in parallel. From this we
infer that actors interested in fostering economic and social development should pay attention
to both the resources at their disposal and the institutional context. Those that focus solely on
resources may find that the social structure impedes the target group from benefiting, and those
that focus only on institution building may find it difficult to do so if they cannot mobilize the
appropriate assets.
Moreover, this paper provides new insights for studying institutional change. While
entrepreneurship scholars and organization theorists have long distinguished between
incremental and radical change (Campbell, 2004), empirical studies of incremental institutional
change remain few. Our study illustrates a situation where the incremental nature of change is
extremely important: the sociocultural institutions that BRAC aims at changing are so pervasive
and long-established that any attempt to break with them directly is condemned to failure.
Decades of fruitless development efforts have shown that radical and for-all-contexts solutions
simply do not work (Easterly, 2006). Therefore, we must deepen our understanding of how
entrepreneurs create institutions that can gradually enhance processes of transformation –and
ultimately also de-institutionalization– of the sociocultural norms and rules that impede
participation in market-based activities.
Finally, we see several areas where future research could build on the analyses presented here.
While this paper illustrates some of the strategies that entrepreneurs use to begin the processes
of social change, social movement literature has the potential to further inform the study of
entrepreneurship processes in and around institutional voids, particularly the process of frame
alignment and micromobilization of participants (Snow & Rochford, 1986; McCarthy & Zald,
1977). For example, by convincing the elite to give support to its Gram Shahayak Committees
(GSCs), BRAC aimed to convince pre-existing legitimate entities to lend their support (Suchman,
1995), thus reducing audience heterogeneity and lessening the risk that its CFPR-TUP
programme might be considered illegitimate (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Suchman,
1995). The findings of this study corroborate recent research suggesting that institutional
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 17
entrepreneurs are able to view and select among diverse and contradictory institutional logics
and frames (Seo & Creed, 2002).
An important aspect of this paper is that it responds to recent calls for more organization
studies to understand mechanisms and processes of reducing poverty (Margolis & Walsh, 2005).
In a world where almost 3 billion people live on less than two dollars per day4 (Easterly, 2006),
global poverty is one of the most important challenges of our time. Discussions about
overcoming the poverty trap that exists in many developing countries have mostly centred on
macro level variables such as geography, trade policy, property rights, economic growth and
cultural values (Pearce, 2005). Similarly, research has focused on the role of powerful actors, for
example governments as builders and guarantors of the institutions needed for markets to exist
and function well (Fligstein, 1996), or the subsidiary role that business groups play in some
emerging economies (Leff, 1976; Khanna and Palepu, 2000). This focus on macro solutions
might have precluded the attention to and enhancement of micro (or grassroots) solutions. In
contrast, the ways in which less powerful actors with limited resources have attempted to
transform and de-institutionalize rules that impede social and economic development have thus
far received little attention. We believe that this is fertile area for future research and our
intention in this paper was bring to the forefront a new type of actor in the development arena
– the social entrepreneur – and to study the interactions between the micro actions of such
entrepreneurs and existing macro institutional structures. It is our hope that this study will not
only stimulate future research, but will also offer insights for development agencies, policy
makers and companies on how to combat poverty.
4 After adjusting for purchasing power.
18 - IESE Business School-University of Navarra
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Appendix 1
BRAC chronology detailing the institutions, partnerships and organizations it built over time*
1972 BRAC is formed as a relief organization in Sulla, north Bangladesh
1973 Transition to a development organization
1974 First microcredit offered; BRAC decides to focus almost exclusively on women as potential change agents
1975 Research and Evaluation Division set up
1976 BRAC extends to other areas of Bangladesh; early health, education and income generation programmes tested
1977 First Village Organizations (VOs) set up; first volunteer village health workers (Shastho Shebikas) trained
1978 Training and Resource Centre (TARC) set up; pilot sericulture project initiated; Aarong commercial and marketing arm
for handicrafts established
1979 Pilot programmes initiated for Oral Rehydration Therapy and Poultry Rearing; Rural Credit and Training Programme
(RCTP) launched; Outreach Programme (women’s social awareness training) launched
1980 Oral Therapy Extension Programme launched (covering all of Bangladesh over 10 years)
1983 Poultry Programme extended to include vaccination with government cooperation; Livestock Programme launched and
paraprofessional village veterinarians trained
1985 Non Formal Primary Education Programme (NFEP) launched; BRAC collaborates with government on National
Immunization Programme; Tuberculosis project initiated; Income Generation for Vulnerable Group Development
(IGVGD) project launched; Rural Enterprise Programme (REP) or non-farming income generating activities launched
1986 Rural Development Programme (RDP) formed by combining the activities of the RCTP and Outreach Programmes;
Human Rights and Legal Service Programme introduced
1988 BRAC Monitoring Department set up; first fish hatchery established
1990 RDP Phase II scales BRAC programmes out to new areas; BRAC donor profile changes from NGOs to Governments;
Sericulture Programme is scaled up
1991 Women’s Health Development Programme (WHDP) commenced; Women’s Advisory Committee set up; Agroforestry
Programme launched; BRAC imports hybrid maize seed
1992 Centre for Development Management (CDM) established; BRAC sets up first schools in urban slums
1993 RDP Phase III initiates further scale out; Reading Centres for adolescent girls established; joint venture with Australian
company to locally produce hybrid maize seed
1994 Replication of BRAC Non Formal Education Programme in Africa; BRAC joins government’s National Tuberculosis
Control Programme
1995 Focus on secondary and continuing education: Adult Literacy Centres established; Continuing Education Programme
started; NGO Cooperation Unit (NCU) established to train and support other NGOs; BRAC Plant Nursery Programme
commenced
1996 RDP Phase IV scaled out; Microenterprise Lending Assistance (MELA) programme initiated (lending to the non-poor);
BRAC BDMail Ltd (internet service provider) established; first commercial seed production; Global Partnership for NGO
studies established
1997 Urban Development Programme initiated; Gender Policy launched; Delta BRAC Housing Corporation established;
Vegetable Export Programme launched
1998 BRAC Dairy established; Popular Theatre Programme launched; BRAC Concord Lands created; Social Forestry
Programme launched; Poli Shomaj initiative commenced (aiming at women’s empowerment through lobbying of local
government)
1999 BRAC Information Technology Institute established; first BRAC pasteurized milk brought to market; poultry disease
diagnosis lab and animal and human food analysis labs set up
2000 Evolution of Reading Centres for girls into Adolescent Peer Network (APON) Centres (Kishori Kendro) aimed at social
education for both boys and girls
2001 BRAC University established; BRAC Bank established; Post Primary Basic Education Programme (training of secondary
school teachers and curriculum development in cooperation with the government) set up; Education programmes for
Ethnic Minorities and Children with Disabilities launched; Iodized Salt Processing Plant established; joint venture with
China to produce hybrid rice seed in Bangladesh
2002 Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty -Targeting the Ultra Poor (CFPR-TUP) programme launched including
establishment of Gram Shahayak Committees; BRAC Afghanistan established; BRAC Advocacy and Human Rights Unit
set up; Legal Aid programme with Ain O Shalish Kendra (ASK) and Bangladesh National Women’s Lawyers Association
(BNWLA) launched
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2003 BRAC University Institute of Education and Development (BU-IED) launched; BRAC Tea Companies established;
Documenta TM Ltd (a software development company) launched; Union Shomaj project commenced (aimed at extending
the Poli Shomaj by helping women to contest local government seats)
2004 Office of the Ombudsperson established; Salma Sobhan Fellowship in Journalism for Women launched
*This Appendix was compiled from various sources including the BRAC website (http://www.brac.org, Accessed18
May 2006) and interviews with Fazle Hasan Abed, Ashoka Social Entrepreneurship Series DVDs, 2005 (available
http://www.dvd.ashoka.org/, Accessed 5 May 2006).
