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New Estimates of the Jumbo-Conforming Mortgage Spread
Abstract
We use Monthly Interest Rate Survey (MIRS) data for April 1997 through May 2003 to estimate the effect of conforming status on the effective interest rate for 30-year fixed-rate mortgages. We show that plausible econometric refinements materially affect the jumbo-conforming spread as measured in the existing literature, and that the treatment of loan size is particularly important. We borrow from the discrimination literature to derive a new way to estimate this effect and conclude that the jumbo-conforming spread is about 25 basis points, with some evidence of decline since late 2001.
... There is widespread agreement that conforming mortgages have lower interest rates, providing a strong incentive for borrowers to adjust their borrowing to fit into the GSE guidelines. Ambrose et al. (2004) estimate that conforming loans have yield spreads about 5.5 percent lower than non-conforming loans, after adjusting for risk. Blinder et al. (2006) estimate the jumbo-conforming interest rate spread at 25 basis points. Because of the two-pronged standard for being conforming, I argue that the implicit guarantee acts as a subsidy for conservative underwriting standards for loans under the conforming loan limit. Carlton et al. (2001) show that borrowers clearly make choices between c ...
In this paper, I examine the effects of the accounting scandals surrounding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the GSEs) in the summer of 2003. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the scandals make this period a good natural experiment to examine how their market presence affects mortgage lending, both in terms of volume and underwriting standards. I present three novel findings. First, the scandal did have an immediate and dramatic effect on the number of mortgage loans privately securitized as opposed to sold to the GSEs. Second, I find that this had an impact on the mortgage characteristics of mortgages taken out by prime borrowers. Beginning almost simultaneously with the GSE pullback, there was a rapid increase in risky mortgages taken out by prime borrowers, measured by characteristics like poor documentation and the use of adjustable-rates and interest-only mortgages. Finally, I find that the GSE pullback did not appear to have a substantial effect on level of subprime mortgage lending or its underwriting characteristics. Rather, the level of subprime lending was steadily increasing during this period and does not seem to have been affected by the GSE scandal. * The views in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views
We show that jumbo mortgage rates were above conforming rates before the financial crisis, consistent with previous studies, and that the spread between them widened during the crisis. However, the spread turned negative in 2013 and remained so through 2019, with jumbo rates about a quarter percentage point below conforming rates. A rise in the government‐sponsored enterprise (GSE) guarantee fees appears to be the main reason for the change. Increased bank supply of jumbo loans also may have played some role, though the evidence is weak. With the onset of the Covid‐19 pandemic, we estimate that the jumbo‐conforming spread increased enough to move slightly above zero.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that securitize mortgages and issue mortgage-backed securities (MBS). In addition, the GSEs are active participants in the secondary mortgage market on behalf of their own investment portfolios. Because these portfolios have grown quite large, portfolio purchases (in addition to MBS issuance) are often thought to be an important force in the mortgage market. Using monthly data from 1993 to 2005 we estimate a VAR model of the relationship between GSE secondary market activities and mortgage interest rate spreads. We find that GSE portfolio purchases have no significant effects on either primary or secondary mortgage rate spreads. Further, we examine GSE activities and mortgage rate spreads in the wake of the 1998 debt crisis, and find that GSE portfolio purchases did little to affect interest rates paid by new mortgage borrowers. This empirical finding is robust to alternative identification assumptions and to alternative model and variable specifications.
This paper reviews the evolution of the major credit and insurance programs undertaken by the U.S. government in support of urban housing. As the review makes clear, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Veterans Administration, Federal National Mortgage Association, and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation have played major roles in the development of liberal and efficient primary and secondary mortgage markets in the United States. The development of capacity in mortgage lending and securitization in the private sector does suggest, however, that federally subsidizing mortgage market activities can be restrained with little effect on homeownership-the principal goal of this federal activity. In particular, the orderly reduction in the mortgage investment activities of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and the imposition of guarantee fees on mortgage-backed securities insured by the GSEs are first steps in restraining federal activity. More generally, a concentration of FHA and GSE activity on first-time homebuyers would reduce federal risk exposure while preserving the economic rationale for government activity.
Our paper compares mortgage securitization undertaken by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) with that undertaken by private firms, with an emphasis on how each type of mortgage securitization affects mortgage rates. We build a model illustrating that market structure, government sponsorship, and the characteristics of the mortgages securitized are all important determinants of mortgage rates. We find that GSEs generally--but not always--lower mortgage rates, particularly when the GSEs behave competitively, because the GSEs' implicit government backing allows them to sell securities without the credit enhancements needed in the private sector. Using our simulation model, we demonstrate that when mortgages eligible for purchase by the GSEs have characteristics similar to other mortgages, the GSEs' implicit government-backing generates differences in mortgage rates similar to those currently observed in the mortgage market (which range between zero and fifty basis points). However, if the mortgages purchased by GSEs are less costly to originate and securitize, and if the GSEs behave competitively, then the simulated spread in mortgage rates can be much larger than that observed in the data. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Between the early 1980s and 1986, the share of new conforming (under $153,000 in 1986) conventional fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) that went into Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage pools increased from under 5% to over 50%. The impact of these agencies moving from negligible participants to dominant players in this market is investigated in this study by an analysis of yields on 4,900 loans closed in California during May–June 1978 and 1,800 closed in May–June 1986.
Our analysis indicates that the loan rate depends on the loan-to-value ratio, the loan size, and, in 1986, whether the loan is far above, just above, or below the conforming loan limit. Rates on loans far above the conforming loan limit exceed those on otherwise comparable loans below the limit by 30 basis points and those on loans destined to exceed the limit within a year by 15 basis points. That is, the expanded agency securitization of conforming FRMs has significantly lowered the rates on both conforming loans and loans somewhat above the conforming limit (27% of nonconforming loans in 1986) relative to what they would otherwise have been.
This paper evaluates a current policy proposal to limit the size of the retained mortgage portfolios held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (hereafter F&F). The proposal is a response to the growing concerns that the interest rate risks contained in the F&F portfolios create a serious threat to the US financial system. The analysis begins with a review of data on how F&F operate and on the role they play within the US mortgage market. Special attention is paid to the manner in which the firms hedge their interest rate risk. Key questions regarding the policy proposal include (1) what fund sources will replace F&F as mortgage investors, how will the interest rate risk be covered after it is removed from the F&F portfolios, and (3) what is the likely impact of the change on US mortgage interest rates. The conclusion is to endorse legislation that will limit the F&F retained mortgage portfolios.
Regressions explaining the wage rates of white males, black males, and white females are used to analyze the white-black wage differential among men and the male-female wage differential among whites. A distinction is drawn between reduced form and structural wage equations, and both are estimated. They are shown to have very different implications for analyzing the white-black and male-female wage differentials. When the two sets of estimates are synthesized, they jointly imply that 70 percent of the overall race differential and 100 percent of the overall sex differential are ultimately attributable to discrimination of various sorts.
This Congressional Budget Office (CBO) paper estimates the difference between interest rates on two types of mortgage loans: conforming loans, which are for amounts of $275,000 or less, most of which are ultimately purchased by one of the three government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that deal with housing finance (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks); and jumbo loans, which are larger than $275,000 and may not be purchased by the GSEs. The degree to which interest rates on conforming loans are lower than rates on jumbo loans serves as a rough measure of the benefits that the housing GSEs pass on to borrowers in the mortgage market. This paper explains in more detail some of the estimates contained in CBO's new study Federal Subsidies and the Housing GSEs, prepared at the request of the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government-Sponsored Enterprises of the House Committee on Financial Services.
The housing-related government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have an ambiguous relationship with the federal government. Most purchasers of the GSEs' debt securities believe that this debt is implicitly backed by the U.S. government despite the lack of a legal basis for such a belief. In this article, I estimate how much GSE shareholders gain from this ambiguous government relationship. I find that (i) the government's ambiguous relationship with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac imparts a substantial implicit subsidy to GSE shareholders, (ii) the implicit government subsidy accounts for much of the GSEs' market value and (iii) the GSEs would hold far fewer of their mortgage-backed securities in portfolio and their capital-to-asset ratios would be higher if they were purely private.
Consistent with a series of recent papers, the interest-rate differential between mortgages eligible for purchase based on loan size by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and larger loans is estimated to be 22 basis points over the 1986-2000 period. This differential averaged 19 basis points for the 1996-2000 period. Other significant effects include: loans slightly above the conforming loan limit and originated late in a calendar year often have a lower rate that nearly fully anticipates their likely characterization as a non-jumbo loan after the conforming loan limit is indexed effective each January; loan-to-value ratios affect jumbo loan rates much more than they affect non-jumbo loan rates; loans located in non-metropolitan areas have a 3 basis point differential versus loans in metropolitan areas that is surprisingly small given the likely higher cost to service non-metropolitan loans and the higher degree of uncertainty about non-metropolitan collateral values; and estimated regional mortgage rate differentials have narrowed through time. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
In this paper, we investigate the effects of GSE (government sponsored enterprise) activities on mortgage yield spreads and volatility. Using various regression procedures (i.e., vector error correction (VEC) and GARCH models) and controlling for default and prepayment risk, we find that securitizations and purchases of mortgages by GSEs reduce mortgage yield spreads and volatility. In particular, we find that the yield spread between conforming and 10-year constant maturity treasury (CMT) rates decreases by 8.0 bp per $1 billion increase in the level of GSE securitizations. Similarly, if GSEs increase mortgage purchases, the yield spread decreases 10.5 bp per $1 billion increase of purchases. In addition, we hypothesize and find that GSE activities have a spillover effect to the non-conforming mortgage market; via investor substitutions, GSE purchases and securitizations of conforming loans reduce non-conforming loan rates. Thus, the measured influence of GSE activities is biased downward when measured using the spread of non-conforming loans over conforming loan rates. We also find that purchases of mortgages by GSEs significantly reduce mortgage yield volatility. In sum, our findings show that GSE activities reduce and stabilize mortgage market rates. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Time and value are related concepts that influence human behaviour. Although classical topics in human thinking throughout the ages, few environmental economic non-market valuation studies have attempted to link the two concepts. Economists have estimated non-market environmental values in monetary terms for over 30 years. This history of valuation provides an opportunity to compare value estimates and how valuation techniques have changed over time. This research aims to compare value estimates of benefits of a protected natural area. In 1978, Nadgee Nature Reserve on the far south coast of New South Wales was the focus of the first application of the contingent valuation method in Australia. This research aims to replicate that study using both the original 1978 contingent valuation method questionnaire and sampling technique, as well as state of the art non-market valuation tools. This replication will provide insights into the extent and direction of changes in environmental values over time. It will also highlight the impact on value estimates of methodological evolution. These insights will help make allocating resources more efficient.
This article uses house-price transaction data to estimate volatility in house prices. The volatility parameter is an input into a mortgage-pricing model that is used to simulate the contract interest rate that balances the mortgage contract. By segmenting the house-price transaction into high- and low-valued homes, we are able to estimate a theoretical jumbo/conforming loan rate differential. Simulation results demonstrate that the differences in volatility between high- and low-priced homes can produce a contract loan rate differential, holding all else constant. The article also presents a discussion of the problems inherent to estimating volatilities form assets with infrequent trades and long holding periods. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
This paper evaluates the interest rate risk of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (F&F) and develops related public policy proposals. F&F merit special attention due to (1) their potentially very large interest rate risk, and (2) their status as U.S. government sponsored enterprises. The analysis focuses on the dynamic hedging strategy and extensive use of interest rate derivatives employed by F&F to control their interest rate risk. While dynamic hedging is highly cost effective for F&F, it creates imperfect hedges and thus could impose significant costs on U.S. taxpayers in a potential future F&F bailout. The policy discussion includes proposals to modify the F&F interest rate disclosures and the OFHEO stress test, and to create rate interest risk standards for F&F.
We derive a theoretical model of how jumbo and conforming mortgage rates are determined and how the jumbo-conforming spread might arise. We show that mortgage rates reflect the cost of funding mortgages and that this cost of funding can drive a wedge between jumbo and conforming rates. Further, we show how the jumbo-conforming spread widens when mortgage demand is high or core deposits are not sufficient to fund mortgage demand, and tightens as the mortgage market becomes more liquid and realizes economies of scale. Using Mortgage Interest Rate Survey data for April 1997 through May 2003, we estimate that the government-sponsored enterprise funding advantage accounts for about 7 basis points of the 15-18 basis point jumbo-conforming spread. Copyright 2005 by the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association
The magnitude of the effect of government-sponsored enterprise purchases on primary mortgage market rates has been a difficult research question with differing data and competing methodologies producing varying results. Here we present a new approach using loan level data and controlling for credit risk differentials between conforming and nonconforming loans. Our method also addresses econometric problems of endogeneity and sample selection bias. We find that conforming loans have yield spreads about 5.5% lower compared to other loans on a risk-adjusted basis. This is lower than previous estimates appearing in the literature. Copyright 2004 by the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association
The Value of Housing Related Government Sponsored Enterprises: A Review of a Preliminary Draft Paper by Wayne Passmore
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- Kamihachi
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Effects of the Conforming Loan Limit on Mortgage Markets Report prepared for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
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Commentary on 'The GSE Implicit Subsidy and Value of Government Ambiguity
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