Philip K. Porter's research while affiliated with University of South Florida and other places

Using public choice analysis, we determine how government subsidies affect location and pricing decisions of sports teams. We explain how voter referendums can create suboptimal outcomes for local communities and identify winners and losers in sport team subsidies. Subsidy bidding leads to higher subsidies and fewer sport franchises but does not alter team location. Sport subsidies generate additional revenue for owners and players at taxpayer expense, and non-fan taxpayers subsidize both the team and fans. To increase political support for subsidies, teams lower ticket prices below the apparent profit-maximizing level, which may cause inelastic ticket prices and ticket shortages.

This article uses data from the 1996 Summer Olympic Games and the 2002 Olympic Winter Games to test the predictions of regional input-output models. Real changes associated with these events are insignificant. Nominal measures of demand overstate demand increases and factor price increases absorb the impact of real increases in demand. Nominal changes appear to be limited to hotel prices. Input-output models of a regional economy are often used to predict the impact of short-duration sporting events. Because 1-0 models assume constant factor prices and technical coefficients between sectors are calibrated from long-run steadystate relations in the regional economy, the predictions greatly overstate the true impact. Because the predictions of these models are increasingly used, to justify public subsidies, understanding these deficiencies is crucial.

Rodney Fort's (2004) article in Managerial and Decision Economics attempts to explain the recurrent phenomenon of inelastic ticket pricing in professional sports. In his explanation, Fort mistakenly substitutes the marginal revenue generated by the acquisition of talent for the marginal revenue generated by lowering the gate ticket price. This article corrects the mistake, pointing out that inelastic ticket pricing is still inconsistent with profit maximization. In addition, it is demonstrated that the marginal revenue generated by additional talent cannot be negative. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.