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Pacific Sociological Association
The Ambivalence of Technology
Author(s): Andrew Feenberg
Source:
Sociological Perspectives,
Vol. 33, No. 1, Critical Theory (Spring, 1990), pp. 35-50
Published by: University of California Press
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Sociological Perspectives Vol.
33,
No.
1,
pp.
35-50
Copyright
? 1990 Pacific
Sociological
Association ISSN
0731-1214
THE AMBIVALENCE OF TECHNOLOGY
ANDREW FEENBERG
San Diego State University
ABSTRACT:
Marx
is at his most
persuasive
when he
shows
that
technol-
ogy
is not
an
autonomous
thing
one can
be
for
or
against,
but that
techno-
logical
design is
relative to
political
forces
which
depend
in
turn on
social
interests. Thus,
technology
is
an ambivalent
dimension
of
the
social
proc-
ess
and,
like
education, law,
the
military,
and
the
corporate
structure,
it
is
involved
in
social
struggles
wphich
determine
what
it
is
and will
become.
This
position implies
the
necessity
of
a
democratic
technical
politics,
con-
trary
to the
prevailing practice of
the
existing
commu(nist and
socialist
societies
which
treat
technology
as
a sociopolitical
invlariant.
THREE CRITIQUES OF TECHNOLOGY
Must
human
beings
submit
to
the
harsh
logic
of
machinery,
or
can technol-
ogy
be fundamentally
redesigned
to
better
serve its
creators?
This is the
ultimate
question
on which the
future of
industrial
civilization
depends.
Marxism addresses
this
question
in a
powerful
and
cogent
analysis
of
the
ills
of industrialism.
A
great
deal
can
still be
learned from the
Marxist
approach,
but
only
if its
many
ambiguities
and
problems
are first
resolved. That
is
the
purpose
of this
article,'
which
offers
a preliminary
sketch
of
a critical
theory
of
technology
based on
a critique
of Marxist
premises.
Marx was neither a naive
technological
enthusiast nor was
he
a romantic
critic of technical
progress.
He carefully
limited his
criticism to
the "bad
use"
of
machinery.
But the middle
position
is
difficult to
defend, as theorists of
technology
have
found down
to the
present
day; there is
a risk that
even the
most
modest
challenge
to
the virtues
of progress
may be
seen as
evidence of
a disposition
to
machine
breaking.
Anticipating such
reactions, Marx
com-
plained
in advance about
the
critic who
"implicitly
declares his
opponent to
be stupid
enough
to contend
against, not the
capitalistic
employment of
machinery,
but
machinery
itself"
(Marx
1906:1,
482).
It is
easy
to understand
why
Marx did not
wish
to
be
tarred
with
the same
brush as the infamous
Nedd
Ludd, but
the
distinction
between
"employment"
Direct all
correspondence
to:
Andrew
Feenberg, Department
of
Philosophy,
San Diego
State University,
San Diego,
CA 92182
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36 SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES Volume 33, Number 1, 1990
and technology
"in
itself" is not
very helpful
in
clarifying
his
position. Indeed,
every significant
dimension
of
technology
can be
considered a "use" of some
sort.
For
example,
we consider such different
things as war, electric lighting,
and the assembly
line to be "uses" of technology
in different senses.
Furthermore,
terms such as "technology"
and "machinery"
are
ambiguous
and
may
refer either to
particular technologies
used for
this
or that
substan-
tive end,
or to
technology
as a general
field
containing various possibilities,
each
of
which
may
be considered a "use."
To say that
technology
is "badly employed" may
refer
to problems
as
different
as what
purpose particular technologies
are
employed
to
accomplish,
how
they
are
employed whatever
the
purpose,
or
the
way
in
which technical
principles are employed
in
putting them together in the first place. A critique
of
the
uses
to which
technology
is
put may
thus mean at
least the following
three
things,
none of which is
mutually
exclusive:
1. technology is used for bad ends, such as killing people;
2. it is applied without reasonable precaution despite the hazards it repre-
sents for those affected
by
its
operation;
3. its design is not optimal from the standpoint of protecting or furthering
the values of
workers, consumers,
or other affected
groups.
It is
not easy
to know which
view Marx
actually
held
because he seems to
have believed
elements
of all three without
ever clearly distinguishing
between
them.
Thus, by omitting references,
which
are
sometimes obscure
in
any case,
one
easily
arrives
at
the Marx one wishes to find.
I
briefly review
these various
positions
as they appear
in
Marx's work
or
are attributed to
him.
However, my purpose
is less
to
produce
an account of
Marx's views
than to arrive
at a
persuasive
formulation of a critical
position
on
technology.
Such
a position
must
take
into account
what
we have learned
in the
past
seventy years
from
observing
the
communist
world,
as
well
as
the
lessons
of
recent environmental
movements.
According
to
a widespread
view of
Marx,
he intended the
first
and only
the first of
the
three
positions
outlined
above.
Marx's
critique
would then be
a banal
objection
to the wastefulness of
employing technology
for
private
purposes
rather than to serve human needs
in
general.
Marx
would
have
attacked
the ends technology
serves
under
capitalism,
while
suspending
judgment
on the
means.
This is a theory
of the "innocence" of
technology
which,
as an ensemble of tools available for
any
use
whatsoever,
cannot be
blamed for
the
particular
uses to
which
it
is
put.
This neutrality theory
of
technology has many applications
I
have discussed
elsewhere, only
one of
which is relevant here
(Feenberg 1987).
I
will call this
application
the
product critique
of
technology
because it
focuses
exclusively
on the worth of the
products
for which
technology
is used and regards
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THE AMBIVALENCE OF TECHOLOGY 37
technology
"in
itself" as unsullied
by
its role in
producing
them.
Here
is
a
plausible
formulation of this
critique
with
which Marx
was undoubtedly
in
agreement:
1. Although the
advance of
technology
has the
potential
to serve the
human
race as a whole,
under
capitalism
its
contribution
to
human
welfare
is
largely
squandered
on the
production of
luxuries
and
war.
Because
support
for
this view can be found in
Marx,
certain
parties
and
theorists
argue
that he
endorsed the
neutrality
theory
as a whole.
One also
hears
from the same
sources
that
only
such a critique
of
technology
is
com-
patible
with
Marxist
materialism,
according
to
which
technology
is an ele-
ment of the base and not relative to
class interests as are the
superstructures.
Yet
this is
certainly
not
a full account of
Marx's
position,
for
it
leaves out
his
theory
of
the
shaping
of
technology
and the
division of labor
by
the
require-
ments
of
capitalist
control
(Thompson
1983).
The
claim or
charge
that
Marx
was an uncritical
enthusiast
of
technology
thus
rests
on a highly
selective
reading
of the
texts,
and will not
be considered further
here.
There
is plenty
of
evidence
that,
in addition
to
criticizing
the
products
capitalists
choose
to
make,
Marx
also believed that the
application
of
technol-
ogy is fundamentally
flawed
under
capitalism.
The widespread abuses
resulting
from "the
capitalistic
employment
of
machinery"
include
such
things
as harming
the soil to
extract
maximum
agricultural
yields,
and failing
to
safeguard
the health and
welfare of
workers
in the
factories.
According
to
this
view,
the
problems
caused
by
capitalist
technology
are
due to factors such
as the
length
of the
workday,
the
pace of
work,
the
provision
of
inadequate
safety
equipment and training,
and so on. These
problems
are
so
very
significant
because the
production
process
is
not
merely
a means to an end,
but
shapes
the mental
and
physical
activity
of
workers
and constitutes
an environment for a significant
portion
of
the
population
during
much
of
the
day.
Subserved
to
the
requirements of
class
power,
this
environment
becomes
a menace to
those who
must
live within
it.
Here
is
a
brief
statement
of
this
process
critique
of
technology:
2. Under
capitalism,
technology
is
applied in
ways that
are
destructive
of
man and
nature
because the
pursuit
of
maximum
profit
and the
mainte-
nance of
capitalist
power
on the
workplace
are
incompatible
with
the
protection
of the
workers
and the
environment
from
the
hazards
of
industrial
production.
This
theory
represents
a
second
dimension of
Marx's
critique of
technology.
While
compatible
with the
product
critique,
the
process
critique
does not
describe
technology as "innocent"
but
asserts,
on the
contrary,
that
indus-
trial
tools are a constant
source of
dangers
that
must be avoided
through
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38 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES Volume
33,
Number
1,
1990
scientific study
and humane and rational
planning
unbiased by the drive for
power and profit. This theory
combined with the first
adds up to a product
and process critique,
which
is
truer
to Marx's
approach
to
technology than the
first theory taken alone.
This view is exemplified by
the
traditional
Marxist
theory of the transition
to socialism,
which
calls for
relatively simple
technical modifications
in
the
foreseeable
future,
and
preaches resignation
to
many
of the inevitable evils
of machine industry
until the distant
"higher phase"
in
which fundamental
design changes
will
finally
occur. For
example,
Kautsky's
The Class
Struggle
([1892] 1971) discusses the capitalist division of
labor and authoritarian man-
agement
under the
general heading
of
the
consequences
of
technological
advance,
and promises
workers a reduction
in
labor time under socialism,
but
no reform
in their condition as workers
(Kautsky
[1892] 1971:155-160).
Similarly,
Bebel's classic
Woman Under Socialism
(1904) treats the reforms
required
to avoid
wasteful, unpleasant,
and hazardous production in consid-
erable
detail,
but when it comes to
discussing
technological innovation we
are
promised
advances such as the
automation of stone
breaking and the
artificial
production
of
food rather than fundamental
changes
in
the design
of
production technology
and
the
labor
process
(Bebel 1904:283-298).
Thus, despite the presence of a critical appreciation
of technology, this
second formulation
of
Marxism,
like the first view taken
alone, is often
associated
with
the "technicist" or
"productivist" belief that
the
main
flaw
in
capitalism
is the obstacles it
places
in the
path
of the
growth
of the
produc-
tive forces. Whether these obstacles are a
wasteful choice
of ends or
a waste-
ful
application
of
means,
the
technology
developed
under
capitalism
is
seen
here as immediately
available without
major
transformation for a different
and more
humane
application.
There
is
yet
a third
critique
of
technology
in
Marx. While he never states
this third
theory explicitly,
it is a plausible implication
of several
strands
of
his
argument concerning
the
organization
of labor and innovation. Accord-
ing
to this
design critique,
the
very
construction of capitalist technology
is
distorted
by
the hierarchical
organization
of
capitalist
production (Gorz 1978;
Slater
1980).
This
is
a much
more
difficult
position
to
explain
than the
prod-
uct
and process critiques
discussed above. To
begin,
I show
briefly
how I
relate this
theory
of
technological design
to more familiar aspects of Marx's
views,
such
as his
critique
of
the
capitalist
control
of
economic
life.
According
to Marx, capitalist management
is based on two defining
"moments,"
a technical
moment,
concerned with
efficiency,
and a social
moment related to the
reproduction
of
capitalist
power.
For
Marx, capitalist
control
of
the
labor
process
crosses
the line between these two moments. On
the one
hand,
it has a clear technical
necessity,
demanded
by
the conditions
for the
successful
cooperation
of
large
numbers of
people:
this is the work of
supervision inseparable
from
large-scale production.
On
the other
hand,
this
same
system
of control
is
designed
to
produce
an income for the
capitalist,
a
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THE AMBIVALENCE OF TECHOLOGY 39
goal
that flows from
no technical
necessity
and
that
is
not served
voluntarily
by
the workers.3
This
conceptual
distinction underlies Marx 's demonstra-
tion that
some
of the worst
aspects
of
capitalism,
such as its
dehumanizing
division
of
labor, depend
not on the
efficiency
criterion
alone,
but on the
requirements
of
system reproduction.4
The relation
between these distinct social and technical functions
is not
entirely
clear.
If
they
are related
only externally,
then Marx's
complaint
would
be that
capitalists
meddle
in
technical
affairs, violating
technical
norms
in
pursuit
of
power
and wealth. On these
terms,
the
product
and process
critique
of
technology
would
ultimately
suffice to
incorporate
this new
aspect
of Marx's
theory.
But there is some evidence that Marx did
not conceive
the
social
and technical
dimensions of
production
as two
"things" standing
in
conflict
under
capitalism. Rather,
they
are condensed
in
the
imperative
criteria
of
capitalist development.
These criteria can be explained sociologically
in
terms of
the
capitalist's position
in the
economy.
Capitalists
and their
managerial
representatives possess
an
unusual
degree
of
operational autonomy
in the control of
production
as compared
with
politi-
cal
and economic
leaders of earlier
societies,
and they
use that
freedom
to
manage
and mechanize
the
workplace
in such a way
as to extract
profits
from the
firm. The
preservation
and enlargement
of
the
capitalist's opera-
tional
autonomy,
as the
very
essence of his social
position,
is
the invariant
requirement
of all successful
activity
undertaken from
that
position
in the
social
system.
So powerful
and self-evident is the
pressure
to
reproduce
the
capitalist's operational autonomy
that
it
becomes a constant factor in the
construction
of
technologies,
work
rules, job descriptions, accounting sys-
tems, and, indeed,
it is eventually
incorporated
into the standard
proce-
dures
in
every domain, prejudging
the
solution to
every practical problem
in
terms of
certain
types
of
technical
responses.
As
Marcuse
writes
in
his
critique
of
Weber,
the
"technological rationality" of
capitalism presupposes
the
separation
of
the
workers from
the
means
of
production
... (as)
a
technical
necessity requiring
the individual and
private direction
and
control of the
means of
production. . . The highly material,
historical
fact
of
the
private-
capitalist enterprise
thus
becomes
... a
formal
structural element
of capitalism
and of rational
economic
activity
itself
(Marcuse 1968:212).
In
sum,
the
very principles
underlying technical decisions embody the social
assumptions of
the
capitalist system.
This technological rationality
can be shown to consist in a specific code
which governs the
construction and interpretation
of
technical
systems and
languages. I
follow here Guillaume's definition of social codes "as the ensem-
ble of
associations between signifiers
(objects, services, acts . . .) and that
which
they signify
in
society,
associations
created or
controlled by organiza-
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40 SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES Volume
33,
Number
1,
1990
tions as a basis
of their existence
and if
possible
their
development"
(Guil-
laume
1975:64).
On these
terms,the
condensation
of
capitalist
social and technical
require-
ments Marcuse describes
could
be called the technical code
of
capitalism.
This
code presides
over the destruction of all the traditional
contexts of labor
and
gives the capitalist
control
of
work organization
and innovation,
insuring
that the
firm will
operate
to
maximize
his
power
over
the labor force. It is
this
technical
code which is the underlying basis of
the
social
technology of
capitalism.
This interpretation
of Marx's distinction between
the social and technical
dimensions
of
production
explains his claim
that innovation under
capital-
ism is responsive to
class interests in the pursuit
of increased power
over
the
labor
force and not just to the generic interest
in the pursuit of increased
power
over
nature.
Progress is governed simultaneously
by at least
these
two criteria,
both
of which
must
be satisfied
if
an innovation is to be
introduced.
Thus, Marx
says of science that
it "is the most powerful weapon for
repressing strikes,
those periodical revolts of
the working class against
the
autocracy
of
capital"
(Marx 1906:1, 475).
And he claims that "it would be
possible
to write
quite
a history
of
inventions,
made since
1830, for
the
sole
purpose
of
supplying
capital
with
weapons
against
the
revolts of the
work-
ing class" (Marx
1906:1, 476).5 Technology
is shaped in its design
and de-
velopment by the social
purposes
of
capital,
particularly by the
need to
maintain
and further
a division of labor
that
keeps the labor force
safely
under control.
To summarize,
this design critique argues
that:
3. Technological
progress
achieves advances of
general utility,
but the
form
in which these advances
are
realized is
through
and
through
determined
by
the
social power
under which they are made and insures that they
also
serve
the interests of
that
power.
According
to this
view, technology
is a dependent
variable
in the social
system, shaped
to
a
purpose by
the
dominant
class,
and
subject
to
reshaping
to
new
purposes
under a new
power.6
Marx believed that the
possession
and exercise of class
power
determines
the
general
course
of
technological
advance over
long periods.
An undemo-
cratic class
power (that
of the
capitalist class,
Marx would
argue),
eliminates
technologies
that threaten its
interests,
while
a democratic
power
would
similarly emphasize
developments
favorable
to
it.
Since,
under
socialism,
workers
would control not
only day-to-day
production
but also the
long-
term
reproduction
of
society, they
could use that control to
change
the
very
nature of
technology
and work
which,
for the first time
in
history,
would
concern
a ruling
class
with a motive to alter
them. The
application
of
these
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THE
AMBIVALENCE
OF
TECHOLOGY 41
new social
criteria
of
development
would eventually
yield
an alternative
industrial
system, adapted
to
different
class interests and
based on a differ-
ent culture.
TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSITION
Each
of these
interpretations
of
Marx's
position
has
its
advocates.
The
prod-
uct
and
process
critique
is
routinely
attributed
to Marx
by
"orthodox" com-
munist
interpretations
of
Marxism and
by
much of recent critical
theory.
It
is
the
basis,
for
example,
of the Soviet
"theory
of the
scientific
and
technologi-
cal
revolution."
Wellmer,
representing
critical
theory,
would
agree,
although
he expresses
the
point
negatively
when he
accuses Marx
of "latent
positiv-
ism," which becomes
the
dominant
trend in
later orthodox
Marxism
(Wellmer
1974:chap. 2).
Reduced
to
its
lowest common
denominator,
this
"positivist"
Marxism derives historical
development
from the
technologically
determined
sequence
of modes of
production.
On the
other
hand,
labor
process
theory
implies a design critique,
according
to which the
very
form
of
technological
development
depends
on social
as well as technical
factors.
I do not
wish to contribute
a chapter to this debate
about Marx's
views,
especially
since
I
doubt
if he ever
distinguished
the
various
theories
in
ques-
tion
clearly
enough
in
his own mind
to notice their
very
different
political
implications.
The more
important problem
that
concerns us here is
to
address
the different
implications
of
the
various theories. If
the
product
and
process
critique
is correct,
the
abolition of
the
capitalist
form of
property
would
suffice to
resolve the social
problems
caused
by
technology.
But the
design
critique implies
the need for
significant
changes
to
adapt
technology
to
a
new
social power.
Following
the
former
approach,
the
victorious
Russian
revolutionaries
assumed that the industrial
apparatus inherited
from
capitalism
could be
operated
unchanged by
a workers'
state.
Thus,
when
they
found that
early
experiments
in
workers' control
reduced
efficiency,
they
did not consider
attempting
to
adapt
the
conditions
of
production to new
social
requirements
but rather
quickly
reintroduced
one-man
management
and the
most
rigor-
ous control from above
(Azrael
1966;
Bailes
1978;
Gvishiani
1972).
No doubt
these
measures were
motivated
originally
by an emergency
situation. But soon the
leading
German
theoretician
of
social
ownership,
Eduard
Heimann,
could
write
that
"The
introduction
of
factory
councils has
conceptually
nothing
to do with
socialization"
(Kellner
1971:132;
Rusconi
1975).
Communist leaders
believed in the
imperative
requirements
of the
existing
technology
and
division of
labor,
which
they
judged
to
be
neutral as
between social
systems.
If,
as
the
"base" of
modern
production, the
technol-
ogy created
under
capitalism
is common
to all industrial
societies, then
democracy
must in
fact remain
behind at
the
factory
gate just as the capital-
ists
had always
claimed.
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42 SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES Volume
33,
Number 1, 1990
The product
and
process
critique
is
compatible
with this
conclusion,
and
also
with the
traditional
theory
of the
transition
to socialism. But the
design
critique
also
suggests
that the transfer
of
power
over the
apparatus
will pose
much more
complex problems
than
those
communist
revolutionaries
gener-
ally believed
themselves to
be
facing.
The technical inheritance of capitalism
is peculiarly
adapted to hierarchical organization,
whether or not it is
oper-
ated
by capitalist
owners. This
hierarchical
structure,
rooted
in the
technical
code
of capitalism,
is available in
any
social
system
as a basis for
an
alienated
power. The
democratization of industrial
society
would
not therefore be a
merely
formal
matter
of
changing
the
form
of
ownership
and the
procedures
for recruiting
and
selecting
those
in
charge.
In
addition,
it
would
be neces-
sary
to
identify
and to transform
aspects
of
capitalist technology
and the
related division of labor
which
conflict
with the
principle
of
democratic
control.
The
design critique
thus leads
to the
conclusion
that the
classical distinc-
tion
between base
and
superstructure
offers no
guidance
to
transitional
policy,
and that after
a socialist revolution technology
would have to
be recon-
structed
much like the
state,
law,
and
other
institutions inherited from
capi-
talist society. Correspondingly,
if
the
establishment
of a workers'
power
requires
fundamental
technological
change,
then
perhaps the
failure of the
existing
communist societies
to
engage
in such a reconstructive technical
politics may
be one of the reasons for the
powerlessness
of workers
in
those
societies.
This
reconstructive task would be
extremely
difficult. We cannot know in
advance
exactly
what technical
changes
would be
required
to
create
a suita-
ble environment
for
building
socialism. That must be learned from
experi-
ment
and struggle.
Nor can poor socialist countries
buy "appropriate"
technology
from rich
capitalist
ones. Despite
these
difficulties,
the idea of
socialism
is more
plausible
in
this
conception
than in the traditional
one,
according
to
which the
"assembled
producers"
need only
seize the state
through
their
representatives
to
transform
society.
At
least
here,
the claim
that
socialism can
organize
a
real
transfer of
power
rests on an understanding
of
the obstacles presented by the high
level of
systemic integration
between such different
aspects
of
capitalist
society
as
the
design
of
technology,
the
division
of
labor and
the distribution
of
social
power. Overcoming
these obstacles
will
require
a more radical
"deep demo-
cratization"
of
capitalist society,
extending
down to its
technological
basis,
to
transform its inheritance
into a suitable
foundation for
a freer
society
(Fleron
1977; Feenberg 1979).
THE AMBIVALENT HERITAGE
The design critique
of
technology
is incompatible
with some of the most
important implications
of the
neutrality theory, including
the
view that tech-
nology developed
under
capitalism
is
immediately
available
as the
basis
of
a
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THE AMBIVALENCE OF TECHOLOGY 43
socialist society. Indeed,
on Marx's
account, capitalist technology
is
intrin-
sically political;
an alienated
apparatus designed
to be operated by
a dis-
qualified
labor force under the control
of an autocratic
management.
But
is
socialism possible
at
all on these terms?
In
Marxist
theory,
the
transformation
of technology and work
are not
preconditions
for workers
organizing
them-
selves as a ruling class,
but rather results of
working
class rule. And yet
technology is through
and
through
marked
by
its
origins
and function
in
the
political strategies
of
capitalism:
the
very
existence
of
capitalist technology
thus
appears
to
threaten
the achievement
of the socialist
society
it is also
supposed
to
make
possible.
One strand
of
Marx's
theory
of the transition can be interpreted
as an
attempt
to
solve this
problem by identifying
a
heritage
of mediations
between
capitalism
and
socialism
that
would
supply
elements
of
continuity
in
change.
Interestingly,
Marx does
not treat
these
mediating
elements as
neutral,
which
would have been one way of
explaining
the
possibility
of
using
them to
make the
transition.
Instead,
he
works
from an original position
for
which
he never
develops adequate concepts,
the
ambivalence of
means
with
respect
to civilizational projects.
Marx's
conception
of
the transition to socialism is
intended to avoid both
conventional
political
realism
and utopianism by identifying among the
inheritances of capitalism
the ambivalent
raw materials needed
to
create a
socialist
society.
Like
Archimedes,
the
revolutionary
class can move the
world
if
only
it
has a place
to
stand. This
"place" is the
institutional
and
technological
base which
socialism
takes over from the
capitalist society it
replaces. Here
are
the most important examples of ambivalent inheritances:
1. Fundamental
political
institutions such
as voting would be taken over
from
capitalist democracy
and
developed as the
basis for
a still more
democratic
socialist
state.
This socialist state is not an end in
itself but
merely
a means to the end
of
abolishing
the
state
altogether.
2. Similarly,
even
such
a basic
capitalist institution as the wage system
would be reformed
and retained
during
the
transition, as a step toward
the socialist
goal
of distribution
according to need.
3. Capitalist management,
subordinated to the
will
of
the
"assembled
producers,"
is
available
to
run industry during the transition to a new
type
of
industrial
society
that
transcends the
division of mental and man-
ual labor.
4. The
technology
of
alienation taken over
from capitalism would be neither
accepted
nor
abolished
but
used as a means for the production of a
different
technological apparatus, a technology of liberation in which
work
becomes "life's
prime want."
This Marxist
conception
of
transition
might be called
noninoral
because of
its
realistic
treatment
of the problem of means and ends. Bukharin expresses
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44 SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES Volume 33,
Number
1, 1990
this
position
very abstractly
in writing
that "the
functional
oppositionality
of
formally similar
phenomena
is
totally
determined
by
a functional
opposition-
ality
of systems
of organization,
by
their opposed
class
character"
(Bukharin
1971:118).
Thus,the
payment
of wages
as a permanent
and essential
feature
of capitalism
can be
distinguished
from
the
temporary
employment
of
wages
to motivate
work in
the transition
to
socialism.
Similarly,
capitalist
technol-
ogy designed
to deskill
the labor
force
can be
used
temporarily
under
social-
ism
to build
a new
generation
of
production
technology
better
adapted
to the
reskilled
labor force
of
an advanced socialist
society.
The initiation of
the
process
leading
to
socialism
depends
on the
inherent
possibility
of
using
the existing technology
in the framework
of
different
civilizational
projects.
Socialism
would
be the result of technological
repro-
duction
under
a new class
power.
This conception
differs from
the
idea of
"neutrality"
of
the means
with
respect
to
the various
possible
goals
that fall
under
the
goal-horizon
the means
is
designed
to serve.
The
thesis
of ambiva-
lence on which this
concept
of
the
transition
to socialism is based is far
broader
in
scope
and refers to
the
possibility
of
transforming
the
goal-horizon
itself,
that is
to say,
generating
a framework
for
the
realization
of new
types
of
purposes
not
supported
by
the
existing
means
in their
present
form.
It
can
be summed
up in the
following
three
propositions:
1. In
the
short run, workers
can and indeed
must use
many
inherited
(or
transferred)
elements
while
consolidating
their power.
2. Workers can transform
these elements in
the course
of using
them over
an extended
period,
until
finally
they
have built a radically
different social
and
technological
base,
one adjusted
to
their needs
as a class.
3. What
ultimately
determines which of
the ambivalent potentialities
of
the
heritage
is
developed
most completely
is the class power
under
which
the
system
operates
and which sets the standards and goals of
progress
for
society.
This realistic
approach
serves
as a defense
against
charges
of
impracti-
cability,
but
it involves
a "pact
with the
devil"
that
exposes
it to attack
from
another
quarter.
Both
liberal
and anarchist critics
of
Marxism criticize
the
reliance
on forms
of
organization
and repressive
means chosen
for their
"realistic"
usefulness
rather
than
for
their
conformity
with
the
"ideal" of
socialism.
If,
as these critics
argue,
the end
is
"contained"
in the
means,
then
indeed
Marxism
is
fatally
flawed because
it is based
on
the
contrary proposi-
tion,
according
to
which the
future
is born
of
the
dialectic of
means and
ends
in
history.
This
approach
seems to
involve
Marxism
in ominous conflicts
of
methods
and
goals.
Marx's critics
see the evolution of
the Soviet
Union
as proof
that
these conflicts
are fatal to
the Marxist
theory.
Certainly
the
theory
of
ambiva-
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THE AMBIVALENCE OF TECHOLOGY 45
lence
has
been reduced
to Orwellian
"Newspeak" where activities
such
as
forced
labor
are evaluated
as either
"building
socialism" or
as "capitalist
exploitation"
depending
on
whether
they
take
place
in
a
socialist
or a
capital-
ist
society. The state which
supposedly
grants
a socialist
significance
to
massive
abuses as inhumane
as anything
known under
capitalism
consists
essentially
of these
very
abuses,
and cannot claim
to
transcend
them and
to
designate
them
as being
in
the service
of a higher goal.
In
light
of this
history,
it is necessary
to insist that
insofar
as something
like
the
theory
of ambivalence
can
be
attributed
to
Marx,
it is
concerned
with
building
on the flawed but
very
real
achievements
of
capitalism
and not with
justifying
horrible means
in
the
present
by
reference to
admirable but still
imaginary
future
goals.
The
aim of the
theory
is not
apologetic
but
strategic
and consists
in
guiding
the
application
of
institutions,
equipment,
and
tech-
niques
developed
under
capitalism
through
an
evolution
toward the corres-
ponding
socialist
ones. This is
an
empirically
verifiable
process,
the
reality
of
which needs
to be judged by
appropriate
criteria,
not
a ritual affirmation.
As far as
technology
is
concerned,
it
is difficult to
imagine
an
alternative to
an ambivalent
process
of
change.
A whole
new technology
cannot
spring
pure
from the
sweaty
brow of the
proletariat
as Athena did from
Zeus's
forehead.
Against
the liberal thesis of
the
identity
of
means and ends,
the
theory
of ambivalence
asserts the
possibility
of
bootstrapping
from
capitalism
to
socialism.
The
reshaping
of the inherited
technology
is
a process
in
which
machines developed
under
capitalism
would not
simply
be
put
to
new
uses
in a different social
context,
but,
more
importantly,
would be employed
to
produce
new
technological
means, fully
adapted
to the
culture of
socialism.
This developmental
approach
is quite
different from
the notion
that the
same
neutral means can be
used for a variety
of ends. It
suggests
the further
relationship:
not
what different
ends
technology may
directly
serve, but what
new
technological
means
it
may produce,
in a technically
and
culturally feasi-
ble
sequence
leading
from
one
type
of industrial
society to
a quite different
type.
TECHNICAL
POLITICS
The traditional
Marxist
theory of
the
transition admits
the social
determination
of
"product"
and "process"
only, and treats the
design of
technology "in
itself" as neutral. Yet
Marx's own
critique
of the
capitalist
division of labor
reveals the
power
interests
that
hide
behind the mask
of technical
neutrality,
interests
which we
would
identify today
with both the
possessors
of material
and cultural
capital.7 These
interests do not
merely
distort the
choice of goals
for
production
or
the
application of
technology but,
as we have seen, are
installed
in
the
very
code on
the basis of
which
technology is
designed. The
ambivalence of
technology
thus
reflects
the
ambiguity of a design process
which
condenses
both
social
and technical
goals.
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46 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES Volume 33, Number 1, 1990
This
critique
of
technology explains
the limitations of the
technological
and administrative
inheritances
of
capitalism.
Since they
derive originally
from the structure
of the capitalist collective
laborer, they
are designed
to
establish
the broadest
operational
autonomy
of leadership functions. Even
after the disappearance
of
the class
in the
interests of
which this constella-
tion first
arose, its
administrative
forms and
technological
achievements char-
acterize
a
type
of
civilization which
can continue under bureaucratic
surrogates
for
capitalism.
Socialism
must
approach
these
forms
and technologies
as
ambivalent
points
of
passage
toward
a new
society by systematically
reduc-
ing the operational
autonomy
they support,
and introducing
new forms
of
control from
below and technological
innovations adapted to these new
forms.
This strategy is subtly
different
from the
one implied
in
Engels'
famous
description
of socialism
as
a system
the
goal
of
which
is "to restrict
authority
solely
to the
limits within
which
the conditions of production
render
it
inevitable"
(Engels
1959:484).
It is
easy
to
approve generally
of this principle
of restricted
authority,
but
Engels fails
to explain how
the
limits
to which
he
refers
are to be determined.
The
"conditions
of
production"
are ambiguous,
subject to
rational
ordering
under two different technical codes, a capitalist
and
a socialist
code. These codes
are
distinguished precisely
by
their answer
to the question
of where the limits of technical
authority
lie. Thus, from the
standpoint
of
organizational
dynamics,
who
defines the
boundary between
technique
and
the
rest
will
have a great deal
to do
with
where
the boundary
is
drawn.
If it
is
up to the
technical experts
themselves, predictably
they
will
set
virtually
no
limits on their
authority
at
all
(Larson
1984).
Lenin
suspected
that
things
were more
complicated
than Engels' simple
formula.
His remarks
on
bureaucracy
show that he was aware that
experts
extend
their
power beyond
the
technical
domain
they
master on the basis
of
their
specialized
knowledge,
and
that,
therefore, drawing
the lines between
the
technical
and social
aspects
of
institutional
processes
is a
political
and
not
a technical
affair.
Had Lenin understood
the
design critique
of
technology,
he might
have
grasped
the necessity
of
technical
politics
as a dimension
of a social
revolution
affecting
the
deepest
foundations of
capitalist
civilization.
But,
because
he
shared
the
widespread
belief
in
the
neutrality
of
technology,
he was never
able
to work
out
the theoretical
implications
of this
organizational
problem,
and tended
to attribute it to the class
origins
of
the
individual
experts.
As
a
result,
Lenin
and the
other
Bolsheviks came to expect
miracles
from the
substitution
of
managers
of
proletarian
origin
for
the
inherited
personnel
of
the
old
regime.
The transition to socialism, according
to traditional
Marxism,
is a two-
phase process,
characterized
by
an early
phase of
deep changes
in non-
technical
matters such as state
policy,
law, and ownership
of
productive
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THE AMBIVALENCE OF TECHOLOGY 47
means,
and a later
phase of technical
change.
In practice,
this
two-phase
conception
has less to do
with
predictions
about
the
distant
future than
with
political
styles
in the present,
where
it serves to normalize
Marxism's
apparently
contradictory
reliance
both
on
political
mobilization
and on
tech-
nical
expertise.
It
thus
justifies
treating politico-administrative work
differ-
ently
from technical
work,
in order
to quickly
transform
the
one while
sheltering
the
other from
interference
(Lenin
1943:II,
344).
But
Marxist
the-
ory
shows, that
as far as the
state is
concerned, it is
not
enough to
change
the
leading
personnel,
but
that the
operational
autonomy
of the
bureaucracies
must be reduced
by
changing
the
codes,
rules,
procedures,
and practices
under which
they
work.
Why
are
these
principles
not
applied
in
some
form,
however
modest,
to
technology
as well?
The
widespread
assumption
that the
technical limits of
rational
political
action are self-evident
obstructs clear
thinking
about the status
of
technology
and
expertise
under socialism.
Social
change
is
undoubtedly
limited
by
tech-
nical
considerations;
to
that
extent,
the
two-phase
conception
of
the transi-
tion
is realistic
in suggesting
the
need to
assess what
is and what
is not
technically
feasible at
different
stages.
But the
real
technical
limitations
are
much less confining
than
Marxists
have generally
assumed and lie deep
within
the technical
sphere,
which
therefore cannot
be distinguished
insti-
tutionally
as a "realm of
necessity"
from a sociopolitical
domain
to
which
action is confined.8
Because social
interests
play
a role
in
the most
basic
technical
decisions,
the
boundary
of
technique
is never
clear,
and the
struggle
for
and against
alienated
power
therefore
takes
place through
the
very
definition
of
the
technical
sphere.
The
discovery
of
this
boundary
is
extraordinarily difficult
since
the ultimate
ideological
appeal
of
hierarchical
power
in
industrial
soci-
ety
consists in masking
social
requirements
as technical
imperatives.
Just
because this confusion is
routine,
opposition
to
established
power
inevitably
transgresses
supposedly
technical
limits
in unmasking
the
interests
they
protect,
and mistakes
are
likely
to
be made
in
the
probing
struggle
to dis-
cover the real technical
limits on
change.
In
ignoring
the
ambiguous realities of
modern
technical
politics,
the classi-
cal
theory
of the transition
legitimates
the
existing
technological
apparatus
and associated management
practices
at least in the first
phase of the
transition.
In the
conception
of the
transition
proposed
here, the
gradual
abolition of
the
operational
autonomy
of
leadership
in
the
political
organiza-
tion of
society
and the
division of
labor
would
not
occur
in
sequenced
phases
but would
go
hand in
hand and
would
quickly have an
impact
on
technologi-
cal
developments.
Traditional
Marxism
always
dismissed
this
approach
as
utopian,
but the
realities of
industrial
societies
have
finally
refuted
the
cri-
tique
by
banalizing
technical
struggle
itself.
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48 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES Volume
33,
Number
1,
1990
In fact, democratic
struggles
for
technical
change
have become routine
in
all types
of
contemporary
industrial societies. Few
important problems
arise
in either the political or economic
domain without raising technical issues
and requiring the expertise
of
highly
trained
personnel.
But
it
is
rare
that
the
issues come packaged in such a way
that
political
and technical considera-
tions are
clearly distinct;
most social
problems point
to
a multitude of
possi-
ble technical
solutions,
and the choice
between available alternatives has
undeniable political implications.
Generally,
where there are
important politi-
cal
stakes,
the
experts
themselves
are
unable
to
achieve consensus
on
techni-
cal
grounds
but can
only
employ
their
knowledge
to
inform
public
discussion
or
use their authority
to
suppress
it.
The
intermingling
of
political
and
techni-
cal issues
characteristic of the
public process
of
industrial societies
appears
clearly
in
such
struggles (Winner
1972).
Today
these
struggles
are confined
to
particular issues,
such
as problems
of
work
design, pollution,
urban
growth,
or
nuclear hazards, but
in
a demo-
cratic socialist
society,
as a byproduct
of
accomplishing
such
concrete ends,
technical politics
could work
toward the
general
reconstruction of
technol-
ogy
and administration. Under
these
new
circumstances,
technical
develop-
ment
would move on a very
different
path
from that
followed by industrial
societies
today.
New
social
criteria
of innovation
responding
to the
interests
of the
underlying population
would
prevail
over
capitalist
values
embodied
in inherited technology,
providing
the
basis for fundamental civilizational
change.
In
sum,
I
would
argue
for
abandoning the traditional Marxist emphasis on
the
state as economic
planner,
and instead
emphasize
the
role
that
public
participation
in technical
decisions can potentially play
in social change.
"Capitalism"
and "socialism" are not
mutually
exclusive
"modes of
pro-
duction," but, rather, they
are
ideal-types lying
at the extremes
of a contin-
uum
of
changes
in
the technical
codes
of
advanced
societies and
the
related
social
organization. Thus,
they
are
constantly
at
issue
in
social
struggles over
such
problems
as labor
organization, education,
and
ecology.
This
position
offers a way of
understanding
the
continuing struggle
for socialism
in a
world
that
no longer
believes
system changes
can be legislated,
or geo-
graphically
localized
in
this or that
country
or
block.
That a "higher phase" of
socialism
might grow
out of
the
struggles
of the
"lower
phase" remains
an interesting hypothesis,
but it
acquires
a rather
different
significance
in
view of this
approach
to
technical
politics.
The actual
technical limits of
change
discovered
in
the course
of
struggle appear
as the
other side
of
the
coin of
technical
politics.
These limits
comprehend
blocked
potentialities
which
might
eventually
motivate
a
process
of innovation driven
by
new social demands. The concrete
significance
of the notion
of
disalienation
is to be found
here,
and
not in a general plan
for
humanity's
future.
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THE AMBIVALENCE OF TECHOLOGY 49
Acknowledgments: I would like
to thank
Frederick
Fleron
Jr.
and
Gerald
Doppelt
for their
help
in
de-
veloping
the ideas presented
here.
NOTES
1. This article is drawn from
my
forth-
coming
book
entitled The Critical
Theory of
Technology.
2.. Does anyone actually
hold such an
interpretation
of Marx? The answer is
"yes." Consider,
for
example, Hans Jonas's
choice of the following significant
subtitle
for a discussion
of
Marx:
"'Reconstruction
of the Planet
Earth'
Through
Untrammeled
Technology" (Jonas 1984:186;
Cf. Baudril-
lard 1975).
3. "The control exercised by
the
capitalist
is not only a special function,
due to the
nature of the social labour-process, and
peculiar
to that
process,
but it
is, at the
same time,
a function of the
exploitation
of a social labour-process, and is conse-
quently
rooted
in the
unavoidable
antag-
onism
between the
exploiter
and the
living
and labouring
raw material he exploits"
(Marx 1906:J, 363).
4. For an application
of
this distinction
between social and
technical
determinants
of
technology
in another
domain, see
Wil-
liams (1975).
5. It is interesting to find
Marx's view
on capitalist
innovation echoed a century
later
by
Robert K. Merton. For his evalu-
ation of this
position, see
Merton
(1968:619
ff).
6. This
view
contrasts
with
that
of
critics
of
technology such as Jacques Ellul,
who
believe that the
essence of
technology
in
itself
is the
source
of the
problems
treated
by Marxists
as socially relative. For a Marx-
ist response
to
Ellul and others who
share
his view, see McMurtry
(1978:222-239).
7. One of
the
advantages of the
frame-
work introduced here is that it makes
possible a unified account
of the way in
which material and cultural capital are
organized against
workers
and other
sub-
ordinate members of society through
technical codes that
maximize operational
autonomy (cf.
Gouldner 1979).
8. The role of technical
politics
in the
workplace is illustrated
by two recent stud-
ies: Shaiken (1984),
and Rosner and Mark-
owitz, (1987). The participation of
mem-
bers of the middle strata in revising the
technical codes
of their professions under
the
impact
of a revolutionary crisis is docu-
mented in Feenberg
(1978).
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