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Developmental
Psychology
1983, Vol.
19, No. 2,
225-230
Copyright 1983
by the
American Psychological
Association,
Inc.
0012-1649/S3/1902-0225S00.75
Mental Capacity
and
Cognitive Functioning:
Developmental
and
Social
Class
Differences
Tamar
Globerson
School
of
Education,
Tel
Aviv
University,
Ramat-Aviv,
Israel
The
present study investigates various developmental trends
in two
social class
populations.
The
study
is
anchored
in a
neo-Piagetian theory
of
cognitive
de-
velopment
(Pascual-Leone,
1970), which
gives
a
central role
to an
attentional
mechanism
of
limited capacity (called mental capacity
or M
capacity) that grows
monotonically
with age.
The
present study shows that
the M
capacity develops
similarly
in
same-age children, regardless
of
social class background (high
vs.
low).
Significant
differences
among
the
investigated populations
were
found
only
in
performing tasks
that
confound factors
of
learning
and
style.
The
same pattern
of
findings was
demonstrated
in
three
age
groups
(8, 10, 12
years). Theoretical
and
educational implications
are
discussed.
A
central notion
in
Pascual-Leone's
(1970)
neo-Piagetian
model
of
cognitive
develop-
ment
is
that people
have
a
limited capacity
in the
maximal number
of
informational
items they
can
attend
to
within
a
given time
span
and
that this capacity grows monoton-
ically
with chronological
age and in an or-
derly
manner (cf. Pascual-Leone,
Goodman,
Ammon,
&
Subelman,
1978). This mental
capacity
(M
capacity)
has
proven
to be a
pow-
erful
explanatory
and
predictive construct
with
regard
to
children's performance
in
Piagetian
and
other developmental tasks
(e.g.,
Case,
1974;
Globerson
&
Weinstein, Note
1).
Pascual-Leone's
theory
predicts that given
normal cognitive development,
M
capacity
will
be the
same
for
same-age subjects.
An
underlying
assumption
is
that
M
capacity
is
a
developmental system
not
easily
affected
by
experiential variations. Empirical evi-
A
short
version
of
this
article
was
presented
at the
meeting
of the
Society
for
Research
in
Child
Develop-
ment, Boston, April
1981.
This
article
is
based
on
Work-
ing
Paper
No. 8 of the Tel
Aviv
University Study
Group
on
Human Development.
This
study
was
funded
by a
grant
from
the
Israeli
Ministry
of
Education.
I
would like
to
thank
Shlomo
Globerson,
Iris
Levin,
and
Sidney Strauss
for
their
helpful comments
and
Yigal
Shenkman
for his
editorial
help.
During
1983-1984,
the
author's
address
is
Massachu-
setts
Institute
of
Technology, Building
20C-112,
Cam-
bridge,
Massachusetts
02139.
Requests
for
reprints
should
be
sent
to
Tamar
Glober-
son,
School
of
Education,
Tel
Aviv
University,
Ramat-
Aviv
69978,
Israel.
dence,
although limited
in
scope, supports
this assumption (Case,
1975;
Miller
&
Pas-
cual-Leone,
Note
2).
The
present study
is
addressed
to
recon-
ciling
an
apparent conflict.
On the one
hand,
we
predict
uniformity
of
M-capacity devel-
opment,
whereas
on the
other hand, empir-
ical
findings
seem
to
contradict this
predic-
tion: Various cognitive measures exhibit dif-
ferent
developmental
rates
in
different
subcultures
and
subgroups (e.g., social classes;
cf.,
Dasen, 1972;
Modgil
&
Modgil, 1976).
The
present study seeks
to
explain
the
lack
of
uniformity
in
performance
by
considering
characteristics
of the
measures themselves
and
of the
population types being tested.
We
offer
a
classification system
of
cognitive
de-
velopmental
tasks
and
cognitive character-
istics
of
certain populations.
We
then for-
mulate
predictions
of
children's performance
by
taking into account
the
measure
category
and
the
characteristics
of the
children's
pop-
ulation.
Our
basic assumption
is
that
the
more fac-
tors
a
developmental task confounds with
M
capacity,
the
greater
within-age,
between-sub-
jects performance variance
will
be
observed.
Confounding
factors
such
as
content-bound
(specific)
knowledge, content-free strategic
(general)
knowledge,
and
information pro-
cessing habits (cognitive style)
may
produce
variations
in
performance
of
same-age
sub-
jects despite similar
M
capacities.
This
may be the
case with social class dif-
225