Figure 9 - uploaded by John James
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summarizes the Battalion Commander's intent to seize objective Falkirk. The graphic constraints for this portion of the operation indicate that D Company of 3 rd Battalion, 67 th Armor will attack along Route purple, occupy Support By Fire Position 4D and provide covering fire for an element of A Company 588 th Combat Engineers to make a single-lane breech of a minefield. Company D will then conduct a passage of lines of the engineer element and continue the assault along Route Purple to seize objective Falkirk. Not shown is a diversionary supporting attack by another Company of 3/67 Armor.
Source publication
This paper provides a view of modeling the information dominance problem of military systems as representative of modeling other complex systems. The ideas are an extension of earlier efforts to base analysis of information assurance for complex systems on system partitioning into a system of systems. The approach discussed rests upon the notion th...
Contexts in source publication
Context 1
... the value chain associated with applying deadly force to achieve the commander's intent for the operation outlined in Figure 9. Currently, an Army Brigade (about 4000 soldiers) is the level at which the information systems represented by One top-level partitioning of information system components is into two sets: one set for those sub-systems associated with administration and logistics and one set for those sub-systems associated with force-level control (command and control). ...
Citations
... The Information Assurance Model of Figure 2is a modest extension of the work of Maconachy et al.. An earlier version [30] added the notion of Security Maintenance (the sense, decide, act idea of reactive control ) and the notion to explicitly consider some verification and validation mechanism to enable specification , analysis, design, implementation, test, and maintenance of Security Services in the context of system purpose which enables construction of some optimality criterion for use in deciding how to evolve the sys- tem. Figure 2extends the model of [30] and [31] to include consideration of PCS survivability and recovery services. ...
Thrust one of the Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P) project on Survivable Process Control Systems (PCS) is funded to help identify gaps between industry needs for survivable PCS and the current technical capabilities for achieving survivable PCS. The motivation for this effort is the recognition of the ongoing information system revolution which is generating constant technological changes and resultant multiple government and industry initiatives to investigate security issues relevant to these technical advances.
This report provides an assessment of the challenges associated with technical gaps identified in five areas:
1. Reduce opportunities for attack,
2. Increase likelihood of detection of a cyber attack,
3. Ensure the operators can recover from an attack,
4. Implement a risk framework for certification and accreditation, and
5. Identify the security perimeter for assessing system security.
... In this area there is a long history of composing components as design and implementation moves from software-only models to hardware-in-the-loop models to fielded implementations with sensors and actuators interacting with distributed physical and logical components, which overlaps with many challenges faced by current distributed M&S developers. Results on U.S. Army– sponsored research regarding the applicability of DoDAF in this domain are published by James [28]; the author discusses the use of the different views of the DoDAF to support partitioning of integrated architecture into components, construction of a view of information assurance processes, and subsequent online analysis to enable intrusion detection. The idea to use the platform-independent models (PIM) of MDA to manage heterogeneous solutions for M&S application has been introduced several times, e.g., in Tolk [29]. ...
... DoDAF's strength lies in the operational domain. Although the systems view already enables good analysis of potential variances in the model continuity, evaluations as published in Dryer and Berbesi [48] and James [28] show the need for extensions when applied in the domain of executable architectures complex systems. The DoDAF-independent LCIM is a simple but powerful model to cope with the interoperation challenges in the areas of composability (the modeling level), interoperability (the simulation and software level), and integratability (the technical and networking level). ...
Specification of the interoperation of components in a system-of-systems is a current research problem. Though the literature has identified several means of breaking this problem into levels, the literature also reveals that no single specification scheme can cover all levels of interoperability well. The base to be covered is broad: one needs an overarching model, such as the DoDAF for the military domain, to guide the capture of conceptual detail and at the same time provide a low-level base set of implementation specific details, such as DEVS, and protocols, like HLA, that create the study system.
This paper will describe a framework that will merge the various specification schemes and apply a methodology to define the structural variances between components. An example of multiresolution modeling will demonstrate the application of the methodology.
Government and private health agencies are being compelled by internal and external forces to integrate their electronic records and resources. Many medical systems consist of isolated, disparate implementations that are now being required to interoperate with other systems. This study reviewed the literature on healthcare and other large systems of systems (SOS) implementations and frameworks to determine common problem themes. Reports on large government systems revealed that planning frameworks had difficulty accounting for unexpected aspects of system behavior when a systems' whole exceeds the sum of its parts. System Dynamics modeling, first developed at MIT, was examined as a possible answer to comprehending large system behaviors without being overcome by implementation details.
