figure 1 - available via license: CC BY-NC
Content may be subject to copyright.
Source publication
In the laboratory of O.K. Tikhomirov, the phenomenon of the acute emotional regulation of productive thinking was justified. This regulation is realized by means of the elaboration of the axiological profile of cognition. The following definition of intellectual emotions can be given: intellectual emotions are the appraisals of specific cognitive o...
Citations
... Результат нашей способности к социальному познанию -понимание психических состояний и эмоций других людей. Благодаря тому, что мы постоянно «считываем» действия, жесты и выражения лиц друг друга, мы можем понять, что в настоящий момент чувствуют окружающие нас люди и что они собираются делать в следующий момент [28,29]. ...
Theproblemofstudyingsocialcognitionanditscontributiontothequalityofpsychologicalwell-beingandadaptation, ontheonehand, andtheproblemoftherelationofsocialandformalintelligence, ontheotherhand, definethesubjectofthisarticleandpresentedempiricalresearch. Thepaperdiscussesthecomplexityofthestudyofsocialcognition, especiallyintheaspectofdevelopmentassociatedwith a numberofmethodologicalproblemsandoffersanexperimentalstudyandevaluationofcommunicativeorientationofthinking, ortheabilitytochangepositionasoneoftheaspectsofsocialcognition, notplacinghighdemandsonverbalabilityof a person. TheproblemofdevelopmentandempiricaldataonsocialrelationsandformalintelligenceinadolescenceareconsideredfromthepointofviewoftheconceptofDysontogenesisof V.V. Lebedinskiy. Theempiricalstudyinvolvedyoungmenandwomenaged 16 to 18 years (N = 30). Ithasbeenshownthattheviolationofthecommunicativeaspectofthinkingшыassociatedwithemotionaldistress. Weformulatedhypothesesforfurtherresearchofcommunicativeandformalaspectsofthinking.
Heyes argues that human metacognitive strategies (“cognitive gadgets” or “mills”) are the products of cultural evolution based on domain‐general cognition with few simple biases. Although like Heyes, we believe that the evolution of domain‐general cognitive processes played a crucial role in the evolution of human cognition, we argue that Heyes' distinction between mills and grist is too sharp, that associative learning evolved gradually to become more complex and hierarchical, something that is not captured by the system 1/system 2 distinction, and that human cognitive plasticity required the genetic accommodation of gadget‐specific processes that led to more plasticity‐enhancing human‐specific biases.
