Table 1 - uploaded by Chris M. Bell
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Demographics of interviewees by country.
Source publication
Anecdotal evidence abounds that conflicts between two individuals can spread across networks to involve a multitude of others. We advance a cultural transmission model of intergroup conflict where conflict contagion is seen as a consequence of universal human traits (ingroup preference, outgroup hostility; i.e. parochial altruism) which give their...
Citations
... Our equations can be applied to each agent, wherein the magnitude of a given flow (e.g., forgiveness, frustration, etc.) represents the average probability of an individual converting from one state to another after interacting with someone of that state, and the stock represents their state level. The degree of heterogeneity between agents can be determined through individual differences such as broad personality traits (e.g., neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness; Ilies et al., 2011), cultural differences (e.g., individualism-collectivism, tightnesslooseness; Gelfand et al., 2012), or other individual properties relevant to conflict and its propagation. Of course, given the relative lack of research, estimating reasonable parameter values will be challenging. ...
... As such, radicalization may spread through a social contagion process, in which extremist ideologies behave like complex contagions that require multiple exposures for adoption (Guilbeault et al., 2018), which has been observed for political movements more broadly (González-Bailón et al., 2011). Previous research suggests that extremist propaganda (Ferrara, 2017), hate crimes (Braun, 2011;Braun and Koopmans, 2010), intergroup conflict (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008;Gelfand et al., 2012), and terrorism (Cherif et al., 2009;LaFree et al., 2012;Midlarsky et al., 1980;White et al., 2016) exhibit similar dynamics. ...
Increasing levels of far-right extremist violence have generated public concern about the spread of radicalization in the United States. Previous research suggests that radicalized individuals are destabilized by various environmental (or endemic) factors, exposed to extremist ideology, and subsequently reinforced by members of their community. As such, the spread of radicalization may proceed through a social contagion process, in which extremist ideologies behave like complex contagions that require multiple exposures for adoption. In this study, I applied an epidemiological method called two-component spatio-temporal intensity modeling to data from 416 far-right extremists exposed in the United States between 2005 and 2017. The results indicate that patterns of far-right radicalization in the United States are consistent with a complex contagion process, in which reinforcement is required for transmission. Both social media usage and group membership enhance the spread of extremist ideology, suggesting that online and physical organizing remain primary recruitment tools of the far-right movement. In addition, I identified several endemic factors, such as poverty, that increase the probability of radicalization in particular regions. Future research should investigate how specific interventions, such as online counter-narratives to battle propaganda, may be effectively implemented to mitigate the spread of far-right extremism in the United States.
... Although the causes of interteam conflict development are specific to external factors, like the development of intrateam conflict, the causes are ultimately associated with task, process or relationship conflict. For example, the cultural transmission model of Gelfand et al. [62] models the propagation of relationship conflict between two groups/teams due to their cultural differences, whilst Roberts et al. [63] linked the development of task conflict that arose due to overly complex tasks to issues with communication within, and between, software project teams. ...
Large technology and software engineering programmes, such as enterprise system programmes, are increasingly implemented through a mixture of customer and specialist third-party resources. These multi-partner working environments can be thought of as a complex social system, which oftentimes experience various forms of conflict. This can be due to competing objectives and priorities of the various organizations, along with incompatibilities of team members within the work-based social network of the implementation programme. If not brought under control, conflict can lead to complex emergent behaviours and dynamics within the wider social network, which can severely impact the likelihood of successful programme implementation of these software-intensive systems. Using social network analysis and thematic coding analysis within a case study, we show that the project management of complex software-intensive implementations requires considerable focus on control and communication across the programme-wide social network of team members, which we represent as a cybernetic system. A conceptual framework has been developed that extends extant literature around conflict in teams by framing the individual projects and the overall programme-wide implementation as cybernetic systems. The conceptual framework illustrates how a cybernetics approach to conflict within enterprise system implementations, can provide new insights into how conflict develops within project teams. Finally, we argue that the cybernetic approach allows us to develop project management interventions to mitigate the risk of conflict development, or control and regulate conflict once it has developed.We conclude by setting the agenda for future research on how conflict can be controlled within the implementation of software-intensive systems, such as enterprise systems.
... Higher social barriers and limited opportunities for new refugees also leads to a higher probality of turning to "their own kind" and forming diaspora communities [37]. This leads to a heightened awareness of their own cultural identity and encouragement of parochial altruism (and potentially outgroup hostility) [38]. All of these factors have been shown to lead to a social distrust, thereby indicating that for a country with a large immigrant population or a country open to welcoming refugees, multiculturism, albeit controversially, is not the best situation. ...
There is currently an increasing number of international refugees due to political warfare and natural calamities. Over the recent years, countries are shying away from assisting with the provision of healthcare to this vulnerable population either in their home country through humanitarian aid and services or in the host country by providing free healthcare coverage. World leaders and politicians have attempted to ignore the morality behind these decisions and have put forth a false narrative of scarcity and racism to appeal to the population of developed countries. As this question remains unsolved, we have attempted to look at the question from the perspective of our moral obligations as a species. We have discussed some of the popular moral theories that support providing healthcare services to global refugees and refuted theories that object to the same. We conclude with a brief look at the direction that countries could take without violating established moral code while attempting (without evidence) to prioritize the welfare of their citizens.
... As such, radicalization may spread through a social contagion process, in which extremist ideologies behave like complex contagions that require multiple exposures for adoption [20], which has been observed for political movements more broadly [21]. Previous research suggests that extremist propaganda [22], hate crimes [23,24], intergroup conflict [25,26], and terrorism [27][28][29][30][31] exhibit similar dynamics. ...
Increasing levels of far-right extremist violence have generated public concern about the spread of radicalization in the United States. Previous research suggests that radicalized individuals are destabilized by various environmental (or endemic) factors, exposed to extremist ideology, and subsequently reinforced by members of their community. As such, the spread of radicalization may proceed through a social contagion process, in which extremist ideologies behave like complex contagions that require multiple exposures for adoption. In this study, I applied an epidemiological method called two-component spatio-temporal intensity modeling to data from 416 far-right extremists exposed in the United States between 2005 and 2017. The results indicate that patterns of far-right radicalization in the United States are consistent with a complex contagion process, in which reinforcement is required for transmission. Both social media usage and group membership enhance the spread of extremist ideology, suggesting that online and physical organizing remain primary recruitment tools of the far-right movement. Additionally, I identified several endemic factors, such as poverty, that increase the probability of radicalization in particular regions. Future research should investigate how specific interventions, such as online counter-narratives to battle propaganda, may be effectively implemented to mitigate the spread of far-right extremism in the United States.
... The results of these analyses allowed us to test the association between endogenous OT and mPFC responses to ingroup pain as a neurobiological correlate of revenge propensity during intergroup conflict. To provide a broad test of the neurobiological underpinnings of revenge propensity, we also examined whether the tendency to retaliate against outgroup members who are not directly involved in the conflict, which has been termed 'vicarious retribution' (Lickel et al., 2006;Gelfand et al., 2012;Lee et al., 2013), has the same neurobiological association. ...
... The results suggest that individuals with stronger mPFC activity in response to ingroup pain tended to apply more painful shocks to outgroup members, regardless of whether they were directly involved in the conflict. This finding provides a potential neural basis for understanding how conflicts between two individuals spread across the two groups with which the two individuals are affiliated (Gelfand et al., 2012;Lee et al., 2013). In addition, the finding of the association between mPFC activity and revenge propensity provides a basis for the following mediation analysis. ...
... Our results cast a new perspective on the neural underpinnings that drive decisions to apply physical harm toward outgroups during intergroup conflict. More generally, the cross-group brain-propensity association suggests a potential neural mechanism underlying the contagion of revenge behavior, and may help us to understand why disputes between two individuals can escalate across groups and across time (Gelfand et al., 2012). ...
Revenge during intergroup conflict is a human universal, but its neurobiological underpinnings remain unclear. We address this by integrating functional MRI and measurements of endogenous oxytocin in participants who view an ingroup and an outgroup member's suffering that is caused mutually (Revenge group) or respectively by a computer (Control group). We show that intergroup conflict encountered by the Revenge group is associated with an increased level of oxytocin in saliva compared to in the Control group. Furthermore, the medial prefrontal activity in response to ingroup pain in the Revenge but not Control group mediates the association between endogenous oxytocin and the propensity to give painful electric shocks to outgroup members regardless of whether they were directly involved in the conflict. Our findings highlight an important neurobiological correlate of revenge propensity which may be implicated in conflict contagion across individuals in the context of intergroup conflict.
... Here the individual team member collects and processes information from their environment, and uses their own individual cognition to perceive conflict, which in effect makes them only loosely coupled to the wider social system [56]. With respect to group conflict, Gelfand et al. [57] have developed a cultural transmission model of intergroup conflict, and Roberts et al. [58] have highlighted the relationship between task complexity (which may lead to task conflict) and the impact on communication patterns in IS project teams. Unfortunately, this model was focused on relationship conflict only, so did not cater for task and process conflict, and was also unrelated to enterprise system implementations. ...
... We conjecture that the work of Gelfand et al. [57] has synergies to the way that relationship conflict can be developed and propagated within large multi-partner enterprise system implementations. For example, a project team made up of team members from a single organization (e.g. ...
Enterprise system implementations are increasingly outsourced to multiple third-party service providers. These multi-partner technology and software engineering programmes are usually organized through project teams that align to the functional areas of the software. Cognitive, occupational and personal differences between members of project teams increases the potential for conflict, which in extreme cases may propagate throughout the entire social network of the programme. Using social network analysis and thematic coding analysis, within a single case study, new insights are provided into the development of conflict within and between individual project teams of large technology and software programmes, such as those seen within enterprise system implementations. A conceptual framework has been developed that builds on existing literature around conflict in groups, to explore how task, process and relationship conflict can develop in large enterprise system implementations. The conceptual framework illustrates how conflict, once developed, can propagate throughout the social network of the wider programme. Finally, we argue that high-conflict organizations, such as the temporary multi-partner implementation team that forms to deliver large technology and software programmes, have a tendency to contain competing networks, which actively promotes conflict. We conclude by setting the agenda for further research on how we may contain the spread of conflict once it has developed within technology and software engineering programme environments.
... To protect their own cultural identity, the diaspora offers an alternative option (for a discussion from a psychological viewpoint see Bhatia and Ram, 2009). As pointed out by Gelfand et al. (2012), parochial altruism and outgroup hostility are strong in collectivistic cultural environments. ...
Besides effects on economic well-being, migration of people with distant cultural backgrounds may also have large effects on people’s cultural identity. In this paper, the identity economics of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) is applied to migration. Accordingly, it is assumed that the utility of both the immigrants and the native population encompasses economic well-being and cultural identity. The migration effect on cultural identity depends, among others, on the distance between cultures. In a simple immigration game it is shown that immigrants may prefer to live rather in diaspora communities than to integrate into the host countries’ culture. This subgame-perfect equilibrium choice of immigrants seems the more likely the greater the cultural distance between their country of origin and the destination country is. Among the available policy instruments, restrictions on the freedom of movement and settlement of immigrants may be the most effective way to prevent the setup of large diaspora communities. For young immigrants and later generations of immigrants, integration via compulsory schooling is the most important policy. In general, cultural, religious and social institutions may support integration.
... Both, the promises of such a warfare modality (comparatively low costs, little to no own society's 'mobilization for war' and other benefits of 'peaceful war') 7 and, broadly seen, the very nature of 'cultural contagion of conflict' (Gelfand et al. 2012), may be contributing to the spread of the hybrid war(fare) template. ...
Whereas scholarly accounts have mushroomed, especially since 2014, on what a ‘hybrid warfare’ is and is not, the phenomenon has taken a centerstage in international politics, thus confidently entering the everyday political vocabularies and practices in a growing number of states and societies worldwide. Drawing on the recent evidence of spatial and temporal diffusion of hybrid warfare theatres, this article argues that hybrid wars are highly contagious, thus prone to substantially challenge the international order, its normative and structural foundations. It therefore aims to explore the trends in the ideational spread and political uses of both hybrid warfare methods as well as the proliferating instances of hybrid wars fought across the globe. Finally, drawing on the empirical evidence and scholarly achievements in related fields of study, the article offers explanatory account of the mechanisms, conditions and dimension of hybrid war(fare) contagion. Among other featured cases, Russia’s hybrid war(fare) campaigns in Ukraine, Europe and further afield are employed as illustrative ‘archetypal’ cases.
... Yet the people involved often see their actions as morally justified and sometimes even necessary. This discrepancy might be partly due to avengers' perceptions of entitativity-the tendency to see all people in a group as part of the same unit (Campbell 1958, Gelfand et al. 2012a, Lickel et al. 2000. For example, when someone from a gang commits a crime, people will commonly attribute blame to the entire gang, since it is perceived as a single entity (Denson et al. 2006). ...
Why do people take revenge? This question can be difficult to answer. Vengeance seems interpersonally destructive and antithetical to many of the most basic human instincts. However, an emerging body of social scientific research has begun to illustrate a logic to revenge, demonstrating why revenge evolved in humans and when and how people take revenge. We review this evidence and suggest that future studies on revenge would benefit
from a multilevel perspective in which individual acts of revenge exist within higher-level cultural systems, with the potential to instigate change in these systems over time. With this framework, we can better understand the interplay between revenge’s psychological properties and its role in cultural evolution.
