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Fisher studied if there is an out-of-equilibrium process that rapidly converges to some equilibrium points. He claims that Hahn process has a Lyapounof function and therefore convergent to an equilibrium. How can we understand Fisher's result with Saari and Simon (1978) Effective price mechanisms, Econometrica 46(5), 1097-1125, which claims there is no effective method of calculation that leads to an equilibrium?
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Dear Yoshinori,
I apologize for the delay in responding to your generous comments on my previously published articles. I did not have enough time until now. I answer you now your interesting question.
Saari and Simon's criticisms focus on the adjustment processes known as Walrasian tâtonnement, where 1) there is no exchange, production, or consumption activities during disequilibrium, and 2) prices are adjusted according to the law of supply and demand or Newton's iterative process, explained as if they result from perfectly competitive mechanisms where a Walrasian auctioneer sets the prices. In these cases, the stability results depend on the shape of the excess market demand functions for each commodity. According to the SMD theorem, this presents a significant problem and a huge limitation for such stability results.
In contrast, the Hahn and Fisher adjustment processes are different: 1) they are not Walrasian tâtonnement processes (Hahn's process involves exchanges, and Fisher includes also consumption and production activities), and 2) firms or individuals set prices through more or less monopolistic competitive processes. Most importantly, their stability results do not depend on the shape of the excess market demand functions for each commodity. Therefore, they are not constrained by the SMD theorem.
It is a shame these adjustment processes are not as well known or taught in our economics courses.
Best regards,
Martin
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THE EPISTEMOLOGY PRESUPPOSED BY PHYSICS AND OTHER SCIENCES
Raphael Neelamkavil, Ph.D., Dr. phil.
((This is the second part of the series in THE LOGIC, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND ONTOLOGY OF PHYSICS AND OTHER SCIENCES.))
1. The Logic of Physics (See the previous discussion's lead-text)
2. The Epistemology behind Physics
The whole of logic, epistemology, ontology, etc. are not the exclusive property of physics, or of any other particular science, or of all the sciences together. Each of them may apply the various general logical, epistemological, and ontological principles in ways suitable to their disciplines, but cannot claim that theirs is the genuine or the possibly best logic, epistemology, ontology, etc.
There is yet another manner, beyond the sciences, wherein (1) the object range and viewpoint range become the broadest possible in epistemology, and (2) the epistemological manner in which the two are connected becomes satisfactory enough to explain both the aspects and the procedures involved between them. This is a philosophical version of epistemology. Even this manner is not complete without including the various logics, epistemologies, and ontologies of the particular sciences.
Before pointing out the special manner in which physics could use the more general aspects of epistemology in itself, let me mention a general trend in science, especially physics. I have seen many students of physics and mathematics mistaking the logical ways in which they do experiments and theories as the same as the conceptual foundations of physics and mathematics.
They do not even think of the epistemology of physics. The clear reason for this is that their epistemology is a crude correspondence theory of truth, and this is outdated. Take any of the best physicists, and we can see in their works the underlying undefined epistemology being closer to the correspondence theory of truth than anything else. I would like to suggest in the following a clear spine of epistemological rudiments for physics.
The pragmatism and scientism at the foundations of practical physics does not accept anything other than the correspondence theory as prescriptive of all the truths of science. Of course, the amount of finality achieved in truths will be the measure of tenability of their truth-probability. But this is to be reserved to the most general truths derivable from any science or philosophy. Low-level truths are much beyond the purview of correspondence between the objectual and the theoretical. Unaware of these facts, most physicists take the difference lightly.
It is a pity that the students of the sciences and also philosophy students with scientistic orientations even think of their ways of permitting truth correspondence to all their truths as the sole possession of scientists, which they suppose are being usurped from philosophy in the course of the past centuries in such a way that philosophy will have ever less reason to exist, or no more reason to exist. Imaginably, in this pride they are encouraged by their presumption of possession of the scientific temper in an exceptional manner.
More evidently, there were and there are physicists holding that their use of logic, epistemology, ontology, etc. is final and that all other details being done by other sciences, especially by philosophy, are a mere waste of time. If you want me to give an example, I suggest that you watch some of the YouTube interviews with Stephen Hawking, where he declares philosophy as a waste of time, or as an unscientific affair. The same sort of claim is to be seen being made by many mathematicians: that logic is a by-product of mathematics, and that philosophers are falsely proud of having logic as their methodology.
The reason why the whole of logic does not belong to the sciences is that the viewpoint from which sensation, thought, and feeling may be exercised in the broadest possible manner is not exhausted even by totaling all the object ranges of all the sciences. Each of them does logic in a manner limited by its object range. How then can their logic be the best possible? There is one and only one general science of which the viewpoint is the broadest. It is that science in which the viewpoint is that of the direct implications of the To Be of Reality-in-total.
Against this backdrop, although the following definition might seem queer for many physicists, mathematicians, and other scientists, there are reasons why I define here epistemology for use in physics. The following definition itself will clarify the reasons:
The epistemology behind physics is (1) the science of justifications (2) for the systemic fact, the systemic manner of achieving, the enhancement of the systemic manner of achieving, and the foundations of systems (3) of rationally derivable and explicable theoretical consequences of human efforts (4) to grasp the connection between physically existent reality and their pertinent realities of all sorts (5) in an asymptotic approach of truth-correspondence from the procedures of knowing (in terms of the pertinent realities of existent realities) onto the physically existent processes of reality, (6) in a spirally broadening and deepening manner of truth probability, (7) which serves to achieve ever better approximations of the epistemological ideal of knowing, namely, Reality-in-general, (8) starting from reality-in-particular, and (9) by use of the highest theoretical generalities pertaining to Reality-in-total and its parts, namely, reality-in-particular.
The epistemology of physics does not take the viewpoint of the To Be of Reality-in-total. But it must obey the primary implications of To Be and the viewpoint of the To Be of Reality-in-total. What these implications are, will be treated below, under “3. The Ontology of Physics”. Epistemology in philosophy may be slightly more general than the epistemology of physics, in the sense that philosophy takes the viewpoint of all physical processes that exist and attempt to view every reality from that viewpoint alone. If not, philosophy has no justification for existence.
Naturally, the epistemology of the sciences will not be so general as that of philosophy. But obedience to it is better for the epistemology of physics; and the advantages of such obedience will be seen in the results of such physics and such sciences.
The epistemology of physics, therefore, will attempt to theorize, know, and predict all that exist, but from the viewpoint exclusively of experimentally / empirically verifiable methods based on what is directly or indirectly before us, namely, the physical processes at our reach. The epistemology of systematically and systemically (i.e., systematically of systems of systems … ad libitum) moving in the use of logic from the given existent physical processes to the details of the not immediately given but ever more minute or ever more distant physical existents is the epistemology of physics. The above definition would, in my opinion, be sufficient to cover as broad and minute procedures as possible in physics. Time has come to appropriate it in physics, lest much advantage be lost for too long.
Not that philosophy does not trust this approach of physics. But philosophy looks for the Categorial presuppositions of existence behind all that is verifiable or verified empirically and empirical-theoretically. These presuppositions are the starting points and guiding principles of philosophy. There is a stark difference between a methodology of this kind and the methodology of basing everything on the truths derived from empirical and empirical-theoretical research. Now from this viewpoint you may judge the following suggestions and determine whether the epistemology of doing physical science is as broad as that of philosophizing.
Every moment, our body-brain nexus is continuously but finitely in contact with itself and with a finite extent of the environment, more or less simultaneously, but in differing intensities, no matter however elementary. The primary mode of this is through sensation, using all available and necessary aspects of it as the case may be. Thought and feeling are possible only in continuity with sensation, and never without it.
But one special characteristic of the human brain differentiating it from others is that sensation, feeling, and thought can very consciously induct into, and consequently deduce from the presuppositions of, all that exist – no matter whether they are a finite environment or infinite – and all these solely from the finite experience from the finite environment at hand. This seems to be absent in less human living beings.
Moreover, the second, but more forgotten, characteristic of the human brain differentiating it from others is that sensation, thought, and feeling are affective, tending to itself and to others, in the broadest sense of the term ‘affective’. It is the manner in which every human being tends in his/her sensation, feeling, and thought. Hence, all processes of knowing will be coloured by affection.
The manner and then the so-constructed broader background in which sensation, feeling, and thought take place is affection, which we term also love in a very general sense. Sensation, feeling, and thought are the three interconnected modes of tending of the body-brain to itself and to the environment, tend always to connect itself with the environment.
But here too the important differentiating characteristic in human body-brains is their capacity to tend to the environment beyond the immediate environments, and further beyond them, etc. ad libitum. There is nothing wrong in theoretically considering that there is the tendency in humans to converting this sort of ad libitum to ad infinitum, irrespective of whether these environments can really go ever broader at infinity in the content of matter-energy within Reality-in-total. Infinity is another term here for generalizing.
Reality consists of existent reality and realities that pertain to existent realities in their groups. Existent realities are clear enough to understand. Realities pertinent to existent realities are never to be taken as belonging to just one existent reality. They are always those generalities that belong to many existent realities in their respective natural kind. These generalities are what I call ontological universals.
All generalizations tend beyond onto the infinite perfection of the essential aspects of the concepts pertaining to the object-range. Not that the object-range must be infinite. Instead, the tending presumes an infinitization due to the idealization involved in generalizations. This is a kind of infinitization that does not need an infinite Reality-in-total in existence. All the concepts that a human being can use are based in the infinitization of the essential aspects of the concepts in their ideality. But behind these mental ideals there are the ideals, namely, the ontological universals pertaining to the groups (natural kinds) of processual entities in the environment. These are the ideals in the things and are not in us. These too are idealizations at the realm of the natural kinds that form part of Reality-in-total.
Without loving in the sense of tending to, as human do, to the inner and outer environments in their generalities there is no sensation, feeling, and thought. The tending to need not be due to the love of the objects but due to the love of something that pertains to them or to the ontologically universal ideals pertaining to the objects. From this it is clear that the relation between the processual objects and the sensing-feeling-knowing mind is set by the ontological universals in the natural kinds of existent physical processes.
At the part of the mind there should be idealized universals of conceptual quality, because the ontological universals in natural kinds cannot directly enter and form concepts. This shows that the conceptual universals (called connotative universals) are the mental reflections of ontological universals that are in the natural kinds. In short, behind the epistemology of sensation, feeling, and thought there are the ontology and epistemology of loving in the sense of tending to, due to the otherness implied between oneself and the environment.
There may be philosophers and scientists who do not like the idea of love. I say, this is due to the many psychology-related prejudices prevalent in their minds. We need to ask ourselves what the major mode of exercitation of any activity in human beings, and none can doubt the role of love in epistemology. The physical foundations of love too are commonly to be shared with the foundations of other aspects of physical existence.
Such tending by the person is mediated within the person by the connotative universals. Their expression is always in terms of symbols in various languages. These are called denotative universals. Connotative universals get concatenated in the mind in relation to their respective brain elements and form thoughts and feelings. Their expression in language is by the concatenation of denotative universals and get formulated in languages as theories and their parts.
To put in gist the latter part of “2. The Epistemology of Physics”, I suggest that the ontological, connotative, and denotative universals and the love of human agents to these and the very existent processual entities are what facilitate knowledge. The psychological question as to what happens when one has no love does not have any consequence here, because psychology differentiates between love and non-love in terms of certain presumed expressions of love and non-love.
In the case of the natural course of life of humans, the choice is not between love and non-love, but instead, between increasing or decreasing love. We do not speak here of loving other human beings as a matter of ethical action. Instead, the point is that of the natural love that humans have for everything including for sensing, feeling, knowing, etc.
One might wonder here why I did not discuss mathematics as an epistemologically valid tool of physics and other sciences. I have already dealt with this aspect in many other discussion texts in ResearchGate, and hence do not expatiate on it here.
3. The Ontology behind Physics (soon to be given as a separate RG discussion session)
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Thanks.
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Which is the best book for understanding Social Sciences Statistical analysis tools?
Hello Friends!
I have been in search of best book for understanding and applying social sciences statistical analysis tools. I am new in this field please seniors recommend some best books on the topic.
Thanks
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Research made simple by "Dr. Patrick Ndalama".
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Can we consider consciousness as a type of energy that supplies the brain with energy, given that the brain has very high resistance, up to 60 ohms, and in order to generate small currents within the brain, we would need a very high voltage? Additionally, Newton's first law states that an object at rest remains at rest unless acted upon by an external force. Is it possible that consciousness could be a source of energy for the brain? Could this be a valid possibility?
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“Is it possible to consider that consciousness is a kind of energy ?”
- really the question above looks as rather, if too, vague scientifically, since to answer to it, it is necessary before to understand – what are “consciousness” and “energy”; and, at that, it is necessary to understand what are some really fundamental phenomena/notions, first of all in this case “Matter”, “Space”, “Time”, “Information”; and “Consciousness” and “Energy”, which really fundamental phenomena/notions as well;
- whereas all these phenomena/notions are fundamentally completely transcendent/uncertain/irrational in mainstream philosophy and sciences; and for the posters in the thread.
The fundamental phenomena/notions above can be, and are, scientifically defined/understandable only in framework of the philosophical 2007 Shevchenko-Tokarevsky’s “The Information as Absolute” conception, recent version of the basic paper see
https://arxiv.org/abs/1004.3712 , more see at least a couple of dozens of pages in this link.
If briefly – “Matter” – and so any material structure, and any “Consciousness”, including human’s one, are fundamentally different informational systems, which are based on fundamentally different sets of basic laws/links/constants, and so exist and operate, i.e. change their states, say if some Matter’s particle moves, or some consciousness thinks, in fundamentally different spaces, which only a bit partially intercrossed. If Matter’s space, and a motion in the space are well instinctively observable, however nobody saw where some thought is.
Energy fundamentally isn’t something either material or relating to a consciousness, that is – really rather mystic till now even in the SS&VT conception above phenomenon, however about which it is known already that energy is absolutely fundamental phenomenon - a “Quantity”, which isn’t some concrete informational pattern/system, however it is absolutely fundamentally necessary for any pattern/system could change, including be created.
So really “consciousness on Erath” that every living being has, just so Life on Earth exists, though more correctly every, again – fundamentally non-material - consciousness – a bacterium’s of a human’s one, uses fundamentally practically material living beings’ organisms [animals, including humans – body+brain] as stable residence and power supply that provide specific energy consumption by non-material consciousness functional modules.
The practically material brain is only power supply module and an auxiliary functional module at consciousness operation, say, it is used as “mother board” and “hard disk” in the “computer+program” system “consciousness”;
- etc., more see the link above, to read the SS&VT initial functional consciousness model in https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329539892_The_Information_as_Absolute_conception_the_consciousness it is useful as well.
Cheers
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From a Critical Discourse Analysis perspective, van Dijk (2015) refers to contextual models as evidence of the interface between the knowledge (mental information) about an event and its significance in the discourse. Thus, the remembrance expressed about a "biographical event" is also a signification of episodic memory. Can we state that contextual models evidence the meaning of memory in discourse?
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episodic memory associations can be encoded and retrieved in a context-sensitive way; thus it can be evidenced.
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Dear All,
I have created a mind map of a literature review on How Ontology, Epistemology And Axiology Relate To Develop New Knowledge Through Research Methodology And Research Design.
I want critical comments on my thoughts.
The outline of the finding is as follows and you can follow the above link for a more clear image.
Thank you
Please refer following links of ideas and make critics;
· I found that any research needs to add new knowledge
· That knowledge is resulted from answering a question/s or/and finding a solution/s
· Each problem or solution has its ontology, epistemology, and axiology
· The ontology, epistemology and axiology collectively form a research philosophy while those influence developing research questions or hypotheses or a mix of both regarding the problem or solution.
· As the research philosophy and questions/hypothesis origin from the same sources to both should be conceptually related to each other.
· Then research design is formulated to answer those research questions or hypotheses or a mix of both
· same time the research methodology is underpinning the particular research’s ontology, epistemology, axiology and philosophy continues
· Then research design and research methodology both make the selection of approach in theory development. As well, research design and research methodology make and formulate the rest of the steps in the research.
· After that, the steps are clear. However, the selections of methodological choices, strategies, data collection techniques and analysis techniques are interrelated decisions.
· Finally, all these activities resulted in new knowledge
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They are interrelated somehow.
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Hi there,
as I am working in applied research, I always come across the problem that knowledge is not applied in practice (theory-practice gap). Is there a particularly good paper / book to recommend about this? :-)
Best thanks and best regards
Alexander Kwiatkowski
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There are two articles that show this gap from different perspectives and that can be complemented. One takes it from education in general and the other from education for health practice. I hope they serve you, best regards.
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What is your opinion about the impact of new information technologies on people's social behavior?
Please reply
Best wishes
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yes sure it has impact on changing social behavior
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What kind of scientific research dominate in the field of Philosophy of science and research?
Please, provide your suggestions for a question, problem or research thesis in the issues: Philosophy of science and research.
Please reply.
I invite you to the discussion
Thank you very much
Best wishes
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Problem of what counts as a good scientific explanation... Salmon, W. C. (1984). Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world. Princeton University Press.
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When developing new social science theories, we tend to rely on causal explanations so as to make sense of the reality around us. One can argue that people are natural-born storytellers and therefore we place so much emphasis on causal inferences. My question is whether you can provide any examples of social sciences theories that break this 'linearity bias'? What sort of alternatives to causal/linear/sequential explanations are available to scientists who wish to devise novel social science theories?
In advance thank you to answers.
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I have this feeling that "causal inference" and "natural-born storytellers" are so different from each other - already at the level of the underlying logic - that it is impossible to lump them both together under a single category. To use the conventional terminology at the moment: on the one hand there is 'evidence-based research' that presupposes the Western 'dualism' between facts and symbols, objectivity and subjectivity, going back at least as far as Descartes - the other is narrative, which presupposes a tale told by an individual person, of the 'this is what I have seen/experienced' type. This is after all the common heritage of the 'West', and most especially the Protestant North of Europe: this acceptance of a fundamental 'difference' between the objective here, the subjective there. From what you write, one has this feeling that what you call 'linearity bias' presupposes that this distinction between objectivity and subjectivity in the above sense no longer holds. Would you be prepared to elaborate on why you think this is so?
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For Psychology (and other aspiring sciences and for even for good established sciences): Isn't it better to speak and write in terms of "conditions-for" instead of 'causes'?
My answer: Yes. Yes. Yes. Most usually. (Most certainty for a Biological science, like Psychology; HERE I am talking about a science of behavior patterns PER SE (i.e. "just behaviors"). (What is closest to a 'cause' is what ethologists call: proximate causes.))
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For some certain persons: If you do not like negative feedback, do not read below the line, directly below.
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This present Question is especially for some certain individuals (who I read): The above Question is something useful to think about OTHER THAN philosophy and especially philosophical Questions about "Consciousness" and "philosophy-and-science". Those Questions are useless, senseless, ridiculous Questions that most certainly will lead nowhere (certainly nowhere useful). Consider my present Question instead, for "therapy".
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RE: «Isn't it better to speak & write in terms of "conditions-for" instead of 'causes'?»
Wouldn't the conditions have to be casual conditions? Sure, causal explanation is pragmatic or interest-relative, and we focus on a causal factor that's relevant to us. So to light a match I think of causing it to light by striking it, our usual practice. I suppose in a certain kind of anaerobic environment, a more salient action might be injecting oxygen at the moment and point of striking.
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Are there any systematic (method-based) ways of developing RQs in social sciences? Does the submitted RQ need to stay 'static' throughout the whole project? How do we evaluate the quality of RQ?
In advance, thank you for your reflections.
Best regards,
Lukasz
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My advice to a student who would ask such a question is:
1. Find a question for which you really want to know the answer but you can't find an answer in the current literature.
2. Discuss with your advisor and similar individuals how doable they think finding this answer is. Go from there.
Best wishes, D. Booth
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Within social science research methodology, pragmatism, as I understand it, emphasizes choosing methods based on those most well suited to answer a question without a priori epistemological and ontological stances. However, I am unclear as to how this might play out…
Take for example the topic of poverty. Various questions can be asked about poverty.
(Q1) What is the most effective way of reducing poverty in our city?
(Q2) How do the poor exit poverty on their own terms?
Both questions may best be answered by different sets of methods. Suppose research is completed and published on both questions. Within political discourse answers to Q1 are used to justify a policy of relocating the poor outside of city limits. Q2 is used to justify a policy of providing no strings attached cash transfers. This results in the revelation that we’ve failed to consider what questions should be asked. Thus, axiology is brought into play. However, this is also where I struggle to understand pragmatism.
To justify one’s research question as more important than another’s must a pragmatist must take an axiological stance?
In doing so are they taking the ontological and epistemological view that there is indeed a singular correct set of values?
Alternatively, would the pragmatist not believe their question is any better than another, suggesting multiple equally valid sets of values?
Perhaps I’ve misinterpreted something or my reasoning is flawed but guidance would be much appreciated. Thank you.
My questions came from reading the following articles:
Morgan, D. L. (2007). Paradigms lost and pragmatism regained: Methodological implications of combining qualitative and quantitative methods. Journal of mixed methods research, 1(1), 48-76. doi:10.1177/2F2345678906292462
Biddle, C., & Schafft, K. A. (2015). Axiology and anomaly in the practice of mixed methods work: Pragmatism, valuation, and the transformative paradigm. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 9(4), 320-334. doi:10.1177/2F1558689814533157
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If you define pragmatism as that articulated by Peirce, James and Dewey, then whatever helps us to achieve homeostasis or accommodation to the environment that permits us to live is the best thing. It is not so much that there is no metatheoretical commitments but rather that they are different from those of other philosophical schools. In this case, what you would do is to try various methods of alleviating poverty until you find the one that works the best. There is no single, correct approach. It will vary based on the solution. I have I'm sure grossly over simplified pragmatism but I hope that I am close.
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Although I am at the early stage of my career, I have observed that majority of the quantitative studies in social sciences show statistically significant results. If for instance, you have four hypotheses, you will see two or three significant results. This creates a perception that those studies with non-significant results are not accepted for publication. As a researcher you spend a lot of time to collect data, analyze it and then you find yourself in a miserable situation if your results are non-significant. Is this the right perception?
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There are several issues related to your question, and while people have been talking about this problem for a long time (e.g., Meehl on differences between physics and psychology, Rosenthal on the file-drawer problem), there has more recently been proposals that will likely increase the likelihood of non-significant results being published. This include pre-registration and editors telling reviewers not just to look for significance. A problem though, with both significant and non-significant results, is that many studies are under-powered. If researchers have not collected enough data to provide measurement that are precise enough for the purpose, reviewers should recommend rejection.
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I say a big "Yes" (big time, big time). And there is VERY LITTLE TO NOTHING to counter MOST of this phenomenon at all [(but, then again, you do have me)]. (For example (with some humor): Perhaps we "kan't" live without Kant because that sort of outlook is all we are given (several other philosophers' names could substitute in this statement, but then we loose the pun).)
The institutions are truly institutions in some of the very worst ways/senses. Always, and it really seems like this will be the way it is FOREVER ; e.g. look at Psychology and the history (and philosophy) OF Psychology -- a loser as any sort of science; we have not even clearly seen behavior patterns as biological functioning, which, of course they must be and ARE (<-- doing this is probably one of the very first steps in Psychology becoming anything like a real science (which I BELIEVE IT COULD !); and note: I HAVE done this for my perspective/approach -- I see the/a way for Psychology as a natural science).
Now, if the problem is so clear (at least as I see it): ask yourselves: why is there no concern for a solution?
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I think the original question was asked because the person asking it already had what they believed to be an answer. the skills developed through tertiary study are to strengthen critical thinking and expose us to as many ideas as possible and obviously they can't all be correct. (I'm a philosophy student so the approach to truth is different than in the sciences but there is still a truth which the questions asked relate to.)
It Kant be denied that there are foundational texts and concepts but there is nobody saying that Kant, or any of the dead whites, was correct. If you can find out why they aren't then that should be what motivates you. Education is a conversation, training is dogma.
Psychology is a soft science but studying neurochemistry or neurobiology is not psychology's sphere. Although it is possible to identify the brain function, it is not possible to identify the mind function (yet). The chemistry of the brain might be unbalanced and there are ways to treat that but what causes the unbalance? What biological function produces the idea of self? That is closer to what psychology is looking at. The scientific methods used in psychology don't necessarily mean it is aspiring to be a science that it can't be, just like Spinoza or Heidegger used scientific/geometric structures in their work as a way to express their notions to a scientifically literate community.
Finally, I don't know of any discipline that isn't concerned with finding answers to the questions that emerge from that discipline. And to say that one discipline can answer better than others is not to privilege any approach but to acknowledge that each discipline has different tools and methodologies. I wouldn't get a plumber to fix something electrical.
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It seems to me that working memory (involving the episodic buffer AND some -- to all the types -- of the Memories) is constantly at work and is our very experience itself.
Thus, I cannot see how the Memories (with at least some of them always active, determining and "recording" experience -- which most prominently and significantly active, dependent on circumstances) can be considered something separate from our knowledge OR our knowing OR our awareness OR our conscious being (all those: inclusively), i.e. as ANYTHING ever considerable as separate from experience itself.
Correct? Seems to me such a dualism would be a most-major problem. (This may be the biggest and perhaps primary dualism of them all, in reality (phenomenologically), though the nature/nurture dualism may seem worse -- but the latter may be somehow related to the former and even may have to be somehow related.)
Yet, we do seem to talk about "them" (the Memories, usually called "memory") at times as just one aspect of who we are (we seeing ourselves somehow as more than that "one 'aspect'")(and "memory" as sometimes something to consider, and other times not), don't we? (BUT: Wouldn't this be delusion "incarnate"?)
In short, we never "just are" (nor are we in any other way): these mechanisms having capacities and capabilities are ALWAYS at "work" since we ARE biological beings, in every way (like other animals) and at all times.
The Memories are central to good psychology understanding (or progress) and to good science in this "realm". The other major consideration (to have any generally good understanding of our reality/animal reality) is innate-guidance of behavioral development (especially throughout ontogeny); and, the question becomes : how does the innate-guidance aspects of behavior emerge along with (or, actually: "in") our other behavior patterns?; the fact of the always-present Memories can be an indication of the "acceptable" integral nature of emerging innate-guidance and why "perceptual shifts" become by far the likely candidates for what they (innately-guided behavioral aspects), along with other relevant behavior patterns, look like and ARE (<- including the "automatic" nature of our reality due to the past developments of the Memories and those "bringing forward" the very nature of what a good part of our reality looks like and IS).
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Dear Brad,
Through the lens of functionalism, we can say that memory cannot be fully appreciated without understanding the context in which it was formed. This is not an easy question to explore; nevertheless, it is an important one. The nervous system, indeed the entire body, acts as an integrated whole. Therefore, memory must play an important role in maintaining the integrity of that whole. How memory was formed may implicitly or explicitly play a role in how and when it will be used. Context, hence, must play an important role.
This will be a meaningful dialogue to engage in and I hope to hear back from you. Please take a look at the meta-analytic study by Smith and Vela (2001), which I have attached so that we can use some shared language for future conversations.
Best wishes,
Micah
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Hi RG members,
I am faced hard to distinguish between investigate and examine when write objectives of research So, please, guide me when can I use for each other ?
thanks a lot in advance.
My regards
Qais Almaamari
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First of all:
Bloom’s Taxonomy Verb Lists both verbs under "Analysis". While "Test" falls under evaluate...
Investigate .... examine...Test
Investigate: The verb investigate means carry out a systematic or formal inquiry to discover and examine the facts of (an incident, allegation, etc.) so as to establish the truth.
Example: Investigate Leadership & Gender using a specific research methodology [Quantitative, Qualitative, Mix,...]
Examine. The verb examine means to study something carefully and in great detail. You can examine a book, a painting, a person's face and so on. Right now, you are examining the meaning of examine. Examine means to look at something very closely and usually with the purpose of making a judgment.
Example: Examine Decision making [process, or other]
Test: The verb Test means a procedure intended to establish the quality, performance, or reliability of something, especially before it is taken into widespread use.
Example: Test Hypothesis Females are more meticulous in their decision making
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Most of the time, fuzzy and asbtract concepts of research philosophy become very challenging to teach to fresh MS and PhD students. Many students struggle with understanding, particularly in learning the theory of knowledge/epistemology. I would like to know the success stories from experienced colleagues about effective methods of teaching/pedagogy and books well suited for new students.
Thanks
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I try to impress upon students that in order for person P to know datum X, then (1) P must believe X; (2) X must be true; (3) P must be either justified (externalism) or warranted (internalism) in believing X. Then it's just a matter of explaining justification and warrant. That seems to be a simple recipe.
A good textbook I've used is Louis Pojman and Lewis Vaughn, Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, 10th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2016). It is a primary source reader.
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The outputs of public decision-making, please, imagine as intended and unintended results of: public discussion, selection of decision makers, selection of decision method, decision itself, implementation of decision, later effects.
How would you construct variable god_# ?
Let us call the variables god_# , where # is number.
Please, do not tell us that goodness does not exist, is too complicated, relative, etc. just do your best guess at what may work. Send me as message if you cannot. Thank you.
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Have a look at Binmore: Natural Justice.  Rawls's reflective Equilibrium or Paul Edwards The Logic of Moral Discourse are both accounts of how we can arrive at some 'objective' measure of the good.  
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Does it make sense to include a cross-level interaction term in a multilevel model without specifying a random slope for the Level-1 variable?
I am well aware that a cross-level interaction effect between variables X (level 1) and Z (level 2) can be tested, even if X has no significant random slope (see Snijders & Bosker, 1999, p. 96). However, there is clearly a difference between an insignificant random slope and not including a random slope term at all in a cross-level interaction model.
The reason I'm asking:
I have vignette data at level 1 nested within individuals at level 2. I want to test a cross-level interaction between "context" (a vignette-level variable) and "gender" (an individual-level variable). I am not interested in testing whether the effect of the vignette-level variable varies randomly across individuals (random slope model). I am only interested in testing whether the effect of the vignette-level variable varies between boys and girls (model with cross-level interaction effect). However, I'm wondering about the extent to which the effect and the significance of the cross-level interaction term in the model depends on the inclusion of the random slope term.
Many thanks in advance,
Arne
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The micro and macro specification in the manner of Raudenbush and Bryk  makes it clear that the macro variable involved in the cross-level interaction is trying to account for unexplained differences in the random 'slopes' (or random differentials in your case of gender as the level 1 predictor). Moreover there could be unexplained differentials for  the higher level unit that remain after the inclusion of a macro variable and correctly estimated standard errors need to take this into account. For both these reasons I would model the random differentials at level 2 associated with the included level 1 predictor. While I do not agree  going maximal in terms of random coefficients with each and every predictor (with concomitant problems of over specification and non-convergence)  I think  that is important that you do so here - you may be interested in this submitted paper
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Marginal revolution is understood to have occurred in 1870’s. However, Blaug (2001) shows that Germany and France were ahead of UK in topics and tools like subjective value theory and demand and supply diagram. J.R. Hicks claimed that the most important characteristic of the marginal revolution was the shift from plutology (economics of production) to catallactics (economics of exchange). The image and meaning of the so-called marginal revolution must be drastically changed. What is your opinion? What does it mean for the present-day economics?
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Dear Yoshinori,
Thanks for your kind words. I perfectly agree with you that Say never fully understood Ricardo and was perhaps even intent on not understanding him or rather misunderstanding him. I attach a paper Christian Gehrke and I published in 2001 on Say and Ricardo on value and distribution.
That utility matters in order for goods to have value was not disputed by Smith or Ricardo, but neither of them was a utilitarian. They also did not object to the view that demand and supply matter in determining market prices, but they disputed that they play a role in determining natural or normal prices. Supply in this context was taken to be a given actual offer and not a supply function. Similarly, demand was used in an everyday language and not in the sense of a definite quantitative relationship between the amount demanded and the price of a commodity. Representatives of the German use value school, who invented the concept marginal utility, did not see their ideas in conflict with Adam Smith's theory, but rather as adding some flesh to it. (See my piece on the German and Austrian schools.)
John Stuart Mill interestingly stated that due to Ricardo's achievement the theory of value was complete. However, when dealing with the problem of joint production he abandoned this view and claimed that demand plays an important role. Alas, in discussing the case of two products being produced by means of a single process (e.g. wool and mutton) he assumed that there is only one process available and the system of equations is thus short of one equation to determine all unknowns. Had he allowed for two (or several) methods of production he would have had to develop a more sophisticated argument. (I published a paper on "Early Classical and Marginalist Economists on Joint Production"  in 1986 in Metroeconomica.)
Ricardo was not well received in Germany, which was under the spell of old cameralist traditions and later of Say. People abhorred abstract reasoning and understandably had difficulties to come to grips with it. But there were notable exceptions to the rule. These included Hermann and von Thünen in the first half of the 19th century and then towards its end von Bortkiewicz, to name but a few.
Best,
Heinz
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I am looking for a good quotation that captures the essence of Southern culture.
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Are you looking for a symbolic qutation from a famous charactor, or "a" good one about your suject matter, in general? A good qutation could come from an experienced native individual, without any influence of outsiders, too.
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Through many discussions in RearchGate, I came to recognize that majority of economists are still deeply influenced by the Friedmanian methodology. An evidence is the fact that they take little care for the economic consistency and relevance of the model. They pay enormous time and efforts in "empirical studies" and discuss the result, but they rarely question if the basic theory on which their model lies is sensible. This ubiquitous tendency gives grave effects in economics: neglect of theory and indulgence in empirics. I wonder why people do not argue this state of economics. Economic science should take back a more suitable balance between theory and empirics. 
It is clear that we should distinguish two levels of Friedmanian methodology.
 (1) Friedman's methodology and thought that is written in the texts, more specifically in his article The Methodology of Positive Economics (Chapter 7 of Essays in positive economics, 1953).
(2) The methodology that is believed to be Friedan's thought.
 Apparently, (2) is much more important for this question. I see dozens of papers that examines Friedmanian methodology based on his text. Many of them detect that widely spread understanding is not correctly reflecting Friedman's original message. They may be right, but what is important is the widely spread belief in the name of Milton Friedman.
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Dear Shiozawa sensei and ResearchGate community,
I could not agree more with you when you state that all data-first theorist like Hoover, Hendry, Juselius, Johansen, Spanos are deeply influenced by F53. In the end, all of them follow a marshallian approach. According to the four aspects of scientific research, they start from (3) and end up in (1). Regarding (3), it is necessary to recall that "Data-First" theorist do not transform or curate data since they are "market processes" and, according to Hendry (2011), are subject to three kinds of unpredictabilities: intrinsic, instance and extrinsic. In other words they "let the data speak for themselves".
However, I don’t think the vast majority of economics are influenced by F53 Positivism or Popperian Falsificationism in strict sense inasmuch as RBC and DSGE models (the widespread models in Economics), whose predictive power is not good, have not being ruled out. Professor Mário Amorim Lopes explanation about popperian epistemological approach on social sciences was really clear and contundent. For instance, these models were not able to predict 2007/08 Financial Crisis, they were not able to survive falsifications, albeit they are still used for the vast majority of Central Banks in several countries. Kirman (2010) stated that “The Economic Crisis is a Crisis for Economic Theory”.
Now the question is, are DSGE models the best theory available? Are there other theories which are able to predict Economic Crisis? Kirman (2010) supports the idea that Shiozawa sensei stands for (so do I): viewing an economy as a complex adaptive system, a set of interdependent elements (agents) organized in networks (without a central control) which produce emerging aggregates and have the properties of adaptation and self-organization. In that sense, to overcome DSGE scenarios with representative agents, rational expectations, walrasian law (markets empying) and stochastic trend; it is necessary to build models that explain and predict economies with contagion, interaction, interdependence, networks and trust.
So far, we have identified that it is necessary to construct models which consider Economic Crises as inherent to the evolution of the complex system. But can we identify the evolution of the system? This responsibility lies in two different hypotheses: i) Former economic theories that have been ignored like the Financial Instability Hypothesis by Hyman Minsky; and ii) Approaches from other disciplines such as: Econophysics (see Jovanovic, F. y Schinkus, C., 2013; Rickles, D., 2008 and Sornette, D., y Zhou, W., 2007).
Allow me to discuss some ideas on Econophysics (I am deeply interested in this field). First of all it is necessary to recall that Financial Markets Data present certain stylized facts: i) Fat-tailed distributions (Instance Unpredictability, Hendry (2013) – Taleb’s Black Swan); ii) Volatility; iii) Autocorrelations (memory); iv) Leptokurtosis and v) Clustering. According to this, the normal distribution, martingales and random-walks which are the battlehorses of Eficient Market Hypothesis by Fama and therefore DSGE models, does not shed a light on Financial Market Data. On the other hand, Econophysics put forward the use of “Truncated Levy-Pareto” distributions which address all those stylized facts stated above. These distributions are bell-shaped like Gaussian distributions but unlike these ones, they assign bigger probability to the events in the center and the tails of the distribution (Economic Crises). (Jovanovic, F. y Schinkus, 2013).
In that sense, given that Econophysics view the economies as a Complex Adaptative System and provides a good explanation on Economic Crises, why DSGE models are still used? I think he answer to this question responds to interests (professor Karlsson emphasized on it above) and the arrogance of most Orthodox Economists. They are reluctant to ruling out DSGE models and accept developments coming from other disciplines outside economics. I do agree with Moisés Naím when he states that “while there may be budding intentions to appeal to other disciplines in order to enrich their theories (especially psychology and neuroscience), the reality is that economists almost exclusively study—and cite—each other”.  (http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/economists-still-think-economics-is-the-best/390063/)
To sum up, I think neither Friedmanian Positivism nor Popperian Falsificationism is followed in strict sense by the vast majority of economists. The current bulk of models do not care about predictions, they just follow the “discipline of equilibrium” (Representative Agents, Walras law and Rational Expectations). I exposed the example of Economic Crises and Financial Markets inasmuch as it is the most important falsification of DSGE models, but there are other falsifications in other fields like Economic Growth and Development (my dissertation states about it but unfortunately it is in Spanish and I have not translated it to English yet, my apologies).
Thanks a lot for sharing your valuable concepts on this related topics
Édgar    
REFERENCES
1. Hendry,D. (2011). "Unpredictability in Economic Analyis, Econometric Modelling and Forecasting," Economics Series Working Papers 551, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
2. Jovanovic, F. y Schinkus, C. (2013a). Towards a transdisciplinary econophysics, Journal of Economic Methodology. Volume 20, pp. 164-183
3. _______________________ (2013b). Econophysics: A new challenge for financial economics? Cambridge University Press, 319-352.
4. Kirman, A. (2010). The economic crisis is a crisis for economic theory. CESifo Economic Studies 56: 483-535.
5. Rickles, D. (2008). Econophysics and the complexity of financial markets, Handbook of the philosophy of science, Volume 10, pp. 133-152.
6. Sornette, D., y Zhou, W. (2007). Self-organizing ising model of financial markets. The European Physical Journal B, 55(2), 175-181
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Should hypotheses always be based on a theory? I will provide an example here without variable names. I am reading a paper where the authors argue that X (an action) should be related to Y (an emotion). In order to support this argument the authors suggest that when individuals engage in X, they are more likely to feel a sense of absorption and thus they should experience Y. There is no theory here to support the relationship between X and Y. They are also not proposing absorption as the mediator. They are just using this variable to explain why X should lead to Y. Would this argument be stronger if I used a theory to support the relationship between X and Y? Can someone refer me to a research paper that emphasizes the need for theory driven hypotheses? Thanks!
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A hypothesis is a tentative proposition or posit based on insufficient knowlege to be sure that it is factual. A hypothesis is proposed for testing.
If much testing affirms the correctness of a hypothesis, and it is generaly accepted, it then can become accepted as a theory. However, theorys can still be challenged and they may be modified or even discarded altogether, if much contrary knowledge is acquired and presented.
If a theory is rock-solid and apparently is beyond any dispute, it can be accepted as a law. There are laws in physics, for example. However laws are very scarse, or non-exsitent, in other diciplines such as biology.  
Paradigms  are also interesting, if you are keen. They are, very roughly, generaly accepted principles within which research is coducted, but they may be overthrown and replaced by a new paradigm during a scientific revolution.
Note that in non-scientific language, in common speech, even an idea or a train of thought may commonly be referred to as a 'theory', and the word hypothesis is not generaly known or used, and law is usualy used only to refer to the legal system.
I hope this helps Alex,
Regards,
Keith
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My research design involves infering the existence of a plausible causal mechanism at the theoretical level and finding evidences of its existence at the empirical one. Recently I bumped into grounded theory while studying content analysis. I found that might be useful to apply it to help me in the empirical level but am not sure.
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Glaser, Strauss and Corbin.
Grounded theory can be very useful research technique and would probably fit well with your research aim. However many of the interpretations of the original theory have been seriously disputed by its originators.  So, while it is always good practice to do so, in this case it is essential to read the original works.  Having said that I have found that Karen Lockes Grounded Theory in Management Research is a good reprise, so perhaps a starting point
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I'm currently studying the use of the traditional music during the Francoism (1939-1975) and I would like to establish links with other European Fascisms.  
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I know very little about the details of Spain under Franco other than I have read of the civil war in the literature of Laurier lee and George Orwell, however I feel if you take 'traditional music' to be the folk music of countries or regions the use of song as a way of carrying news and ideas has a very long history in human communication. 
In this I don't think you could determine any particular bias toward the political left or right, I'm sure both the incumbent regime and its opponents used traditional music within their communities as a device for both social interaction and ideological propaganda.
whether one variant of traditional Spanish music was particularly usurped by the Franco supporters you will know better than me. 
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There is a tension between those who assert that theory building process is out of the domain of methodology because it depends more on the creative mind of the theorist and those who support the idea of theory building as a skill that can be learned. opponents of Grounded Theory methodology fall into this category.
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Speaking of someone who, with Latham, has developed one of the most successful theory building projects in the history of psychology, I will say that it is a gradual, inductive process-feelings come and go like rain drops but they do not lead to a validated theory without extensive cognitive work-
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After the European Middle Ages, science was one of the liberating forces. But now, more than ever, science is part of the social world and institutionalized in nearly all countries. Some philosophers like Adorno and Feyerabend developed very critical perspectives on that topic.
There are some associated problems: e.g. scientific superiority of nations, science as a measure of suppression or science and power, liberty and technological development, social science and social technology, medical progress and personal freedom.
But on the other hand there is an international exchange of ideas in science that seems free and often liberal.
What do you think about the liberating power of science? What do you think is the current state in this discussion?
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Literal meaning of the word science: comes from the Latin SCIENTIA which means KNOWLEDGE. Therefore, the scientific method is a method to ACQUIRE KNOWLEDGE. And what is knowledge? The perception of physical reality that rational beings acquire through their senses. In the case of the human species, that would be what we see, touch, hear, smell and taste and incorporate into our neural connections and use in our interaction with the physical world to increase our odds of survival. Now, would somebody tell me when exactly the perception of reality and the pursuit of survival went out of fashion? Regardless of religious persuasion, ideological preferences or simple wishful thinking, we, as material beings, are bound to the laws of physics. That, thank Infinity, does not change.