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Fisher studied if there is an out-of-equilibrium process that rapidly converges to some equilibrium points. He claims that Hahn process has a Lyapounof function and therefore convergent to an equilibrium. How can we understand Fisher's result with Saari and Simon (1978) Effective price mechanisms, Econometrica 46(5), 1097-1125, which claims there is no effective method of calculation that leads to an equilibrium?
THE EPISTEMOLOGY PRESUPPOSED BY PHYSICS AND OTHER SCIENCES
Raphael Neelamkavil, Ph.D., Dr. phil.
((This is the second part of the series in THE LOGIC, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND ONTOLOGY OF PHYSICS AND OTHER SCIENCES.))
1. The Logic of Physics (See the previous discussion's lead-text)
2. The Epistemology behind Physics
The whole of logic, epistemology, ontology, etc. are not the exclusive property of physics, or of any other particular science, or of all the sciences together. Each of them may apply the various general logical, epistemological, and ontological principles in ways suitable to their disciplines, but cannot claim that theirs is the genuine or the possibly best logic, epistemology, ontology, etc.
There is yet another manner, beyond the sciences, wherein (1) the object range and viewpoint range become the broadest possible in epistemology, and (2) the epistemological manner in which the two are connected becomes satisfactory enough to explain both the aspects and the procedures involved between them. This is a philosophical version of epistemology. Even this manner is not complete without including the various logics, epistemologies, and ontologies of the particular sciences.
Before pointing out the special manner in which physics could use the more general aspects of epistemology in itself, let me mention a general trend in science, especially physics. I have seen many students of physics and mathematics mistaking the logical ways in which they do experiments and theories as the same as the conceptual foundations of physics and mathematics.
They do not even think of the epistemology of physics. The clear reason for this is that their epistemology is a crude correspondence theory of truth, and this is outdated. Take any of the best physicists, and we can see in their works the underlying undefined epistemology being closer to the correspondence theory of truth than anything else. I would like to suggest in the following a clear spine of epistemological rudiments for physics.
The pragmatism and scientism at the foundations of practical physics does not accept anything other than the correspondence theory as prescriptive of all the truths of science. Of course, the amount of finality achieved in truths will be the measure of tenability of their truth-probability. But this is to be reserved to the most general truths derivable from any science or philosophy. Low-level truths are much beyond the purview of correspondence between the objectual and the theoretical. Unaware of these facts, most physicists take the difference lightly.
It is a pity that the students of the sciences and also philosophy students with scientistic orientations even think of their ways of permitting truth correspondence to all their truths as the sole possession of scientists, which they suppose are being usurped from philosophy in the course of the past centuries in such a way that philosophy will have ever less reason to exist, or no more reason to exist. Imaginably, in this pride they are encouraged by their presumption of possession of the scientific temper in an exceptional manner.
More evidently, there were and there are physicists holding that their use of logic, epistemology, ontology, etc. is final and that all other details being done by other sciences, especially by philosophy, are a mere waste of time. If you want me to give an example, I suggest that you watch some of the YouTube interviews with Stephen Hawking, where he declares philosophy as a waste of time, or as an unscientific affair. The same sort of claim is to be seen being made by many mathematicians: that logic is a by-product of mathematics, and that philosophers are falsely proud of having logic as their methodology.
The reason why the whole of logic does not belong to the sciences is that the viewpoint from which sensation, thought, and feeling may be exercised in the broadest possible manner is not exhausted even by totaling all the object ranges of all the sciences. Each of them does logic in a manner limited by its object range. How then can their logic be the best possible? There is one and only one general science of which the viewpoint is the broadest. It is that science in which the viewpoint is that of the direct implications of the To Be of Reality-in-total.
Against this backdrop, although the following definition might seem queer for many physicists, mathematicians, and other scientists, there are reasons why I define here epistemology for use in physics. The following definition itself will clarify the reasons:
The epistemology behind physics is (1) the science of justifications (2) for the systemic fact, the systemic manner of achieving, the enhancement of the systemic manner of achieving, and the foundations of systems (3) of rationally derivable and explicable theoretical consequences of human efforts (4) to grasp the connection between physically existent reality and their pertinent realities of all sorts (5) in an asymptotic approach of truth-correspondence from the procedures of knowing (in terms of the pertinent realities of existent realities) onto the physically existent processes of reality, (6) in a spirally broadening and deepening manner of truth probability, (7) which serves to achieve ever better approximations of the epistemological ideal of knowing, namely, Reality-in-general, (8) starting from reality-in-particular, and (9) by use of the highest theoretical generalities pertaining to Reality-in-total and its parts, namely, reality-in-particular.
The epistemology of physics does not take the viewpoint of the To Be of Reality-in-total. But it must obey the primary implications of To Be and the viewpoint of the To Be of Reality-in-total. What these implications are, will be treated below, under “3. The Ontology of Physics”. Epistemology in philosophy may be slightly more general than the epistemology of physics, in the sense that philosophy takes the viewpoint of all physical processes that exist and attempt to view every reality from that viewpoint alone. If not, philosophy has no justification for existence.
Naturally, the epistemology of the sciences will not be so general as that of philosophy. But obedience to it is better for the epistemology of physics; and the advantages of such obedience will be seen in the results of such physics and such sciences.
The epistemology of physics, therefore, will attempt to theorize, know, and predict all that exist, but from the viewpoint exclusively of experimentally / empirically verifiable methods based on what is directly or indirectly before us, namely, the physical processes at our reach. The epistemology of systematically and systemically (i.e., systematically of systems of systems … ad libitum) moving in the use of logic from the given existent physical processes to the details of the not immediately given but ever more minute or ever more distant physical existents is the epistemology of physics. The above definition would, in my opinion, be sufficient to cover as broad and minute procedures as possible in physics. Time has come to appropriate it in physics, lest much advantage be lost for too long.
Not that philosophy does not trust this approach of physics. But philosophy looks for the Categorial presuppositions of existence behind all that is verifiable or verified empirically and empirical-theoretically. These presuppositions are the starting points and guiding principles of philosophy. There is a stark difference between a methodology of this kind and the methodology of basing everything on the truths derived from empirical and empirical-theoretical research. Now from this viewpoint you may judge the following suggestions and determine whether the epistemology of doing physical science is as broad as that of philosophizing.
Every moment, our body-brain nexus is continuously but finitely in contact with itself and with a finite extent of the environment, more or less simultaneously, but in differing intensities, no matter however elementary. The primary mode of this is through sensation, using all available and necessary aspects of it as the case may be. Thought and feeling are possible only in continuity with sensation, and never without it.
But one special characteristic of the human brain differentiating it from others is that sensation, feeling, and thought can very consciously induct into, and consequently deduce from the presuppositions of, all that exist – no matter whether they are a finite environment or infinite – and all these solely from the finite experience from the finite environment at hand. This seems to be absent in less human living beings.
Moreover, the second, but more forgotten, characteristic of the human brain differentiating it from others is that sensation, thought, and feeling are affective, tending to itself and to others, in the broadest sense of the term ‘affective’. It is the manner in which every human being tends in his/her sensation, feeling, and thought. Hence, all processes of knowing will be coloured by affection.
The manner and then the so-constructed broader background in which sensation, feeling, and thought take place is affection, which we term also love in a very general sense. Sensation, feeling, and thought are the three interconnected modes of tending of the body-brain to itself and to the environment, tend always to connect itself with the environment.
But here too the important differentiating characteristic in human body-brains is their capacity to tend to the environment beyond the immediate environments, and further beyond them, etc. ad libitum. There is nothing wrong in theoretically considering that there is the tendency in humans to converting this sort of ad libitum to ad infinitum, irrespective of whether these environments can really go ever broader at infinity in the content of matter-energy within Reality-in-total. Infinity is another term here for generalizing.
Reality consists of existent reality and realities that pertain to existent realities in their groups. Existent realities are clear enough to understand. Realities pertinent to existent realities are never to be taken as belonging to just one existent reality. They are always those generalities that belong to many existent realities in their respective natural kind. These generalities are what I call ontological universals.
All generalizations tend beyond onto the infinite perfection of the essential aspects of the concepts pertaining to the object-range. Not that the object-range must be infinite. Instead, the tending presumes an infinitization due to the idealization involved in generalizations. This is a kind of infinitization that does not need an infinite Reality-in-total in existence. All the concepts that a human being can use are based in the infinitization of the essential aspects of the concepts in their ideality. But behind these mental ideals there are the ideals, namely, the ontological universals pertaining to the groups (natural kinds) of processual entities in the environment. These are the ideals in the things and are not in us. These too are idealizations at the realm of the natural kinds that form part of Reality-in-total.
Without loving in the sense of tending to, as human do, to the inner and outer environments in their generalities there is no sensation, feeling, and thought. The tending to need not be due to the love of the objects but due to the love of something that pertains to them or to the ontologically universal ideals pertaining to the objects. From this it is clear that the relation between the processual objects and the sensing-feeling-knowing mind is set by the ontological universals in the natural kinds of existent physical processes.
At the part of the mind there should be idealized universals of conceptual quality, because the ontological universals in natural kinds cannot directly enter and form concepts. This shows that the conceptual universals (called connotative universals) are the mental reflections of ontological universals that are in the natural kinds. In short, behind the epistemology of sensation, feeling, and thought there are the ontology and epistemology of loving in the sense of tending to, due to the otherness implied between oneself and the environment.
There may be philosophers and scientists who do not like the idea of love. I say, this is due to the many psychology-related prejudices prevalent in their minds. We need to ask ourselves what the major mode of exercitation of any activity in human beings, and none can doubt the role of love in epistemology. The physical foundations of love too are commonly to be shared with the foundations of other aspects of physical existence.
Such tending by the person is mediated within the person by the connotative universals. Their expression is always in terms of symbols in various languages. These are called denotative universals. Connotative universals get concatenated in the mind in relation to their respective brain elements and form thoughts and feelings. Their expression in language is by the concatenation of denotative universals and get formulated in languages as theories and their parts.
To put in gist the latter part of “2. The Epistemology of Physics”, I suggest that the ontological, connotative, and denotative universals and the love of human agents to these and the very existent processual entities are what facilitate knowledge. The psychological question as to what happens when one has no love does not have any consequence here, because psychology differentiates between love and non-love in terms of certain presumed expressions of love and non-love.
In the case of the natural course of life of humans, the choice is not between love and non-love, but instead, between increasing or decreasing love. We do not speak here of loving other human beings as a matter of ethical action. Instead, the point is that of the natural love that humans have for everything including for sensing, feeling, knowing, etc.
One might wonder here why I did not discuss mathematics as an epistemologically valid tool of physics and other sciences. I have already dealt with this aspect in many other discussion texts in ResearchGate, and hence do not expatiate on it here.
3. The Ontology behind Physics (soon to be given as a separate RG discussion session)
Which is the best book for understanding Social Sciences Statistical analysis tools?
Hello Friends!
I have been in search of best book for understanding and applying social sciences statistical analysis tools. I am new in this field please seniors recommend some best books on the topic.
Thanks
Can we consider consciousness as a type of energy that supplies the brain with energy, given that the brain has very high resistance, up to 60 ohms, and in order to generate small currents within the brain, we would need a very high voltage? Additionally, Newton's first law states that an object at rest remains at rest unless acted upon by an external force. Is it possible that consciousness could be a source of energy for the brain? Could this be a valid possibility?
From a Critical Discourse Analysis perspective, van Dijk (2015) refers to contextual models as evidence of the interface between the knowledge (mental information) about an event and its significance in the discourse. Thus, the remembrance expressed about a "biographical event" is also a signification of episodic memory. Can we state that contextual models evidence the meaning of memory in discourse?
Dear All,
I have created a mind map of a literature review on How Ontology, Epistemology And Axiology Relate To Develop New Knowledge Through Research Methodology And Research Design.
The summary is at :
I want critical comments on my thoughts.
The outline of the finding is as follows and you can follow the above link for a more clear image.
Thank you
Please refer following links of ideas and make critics;
· I found that any research needs to add new knowledge
· That knowledge is resulted from answering a question/s or/and finding a solution/s
· Each problem or solution has its ontology, epistemology, and axiology
· The ontology, epistemology and axiology collectively form a research philosophy while those influence developing research questions or hypotheses or a mix of both regarding the problem or solution.
· As the research philosophy and questions/hypothesis origin from the same sources to both should be conceptually related to each other.
· Then research design is formulated to answer those research questions or hypotheses or a mix of both
· same time the research methodology is underpinning the particular research’s ontology, epistemology, axiology and philosophy continues
· Then research design and research methodology both make the selection of approach in theory development. As well, research design and research methodology make and formulate the rest of the steps in the research.
· After that, the steps are clear. However, the selections of methodological choices, strategies, data collection techniques and analysis techniques are interrelated decisions.
· Finally, all these activities resulted in new knowledge
Hi there,
as I am working in applied research, I always come across the problem that knowledge is not applied in practice (theory-practice gap). Is there a particularly good paper / book to recommend about this? :-)
Best thanks and best regards
Alexander Kwiatkowski
What is your opinion about the impact of new information technologies on people's social behavior?
Please reply
Best wishes
What kind of scientific research dominate in the field of Philosophy of science and research?
Please, provide your suggestions for a question, problem or research thesis in the issues: Philosophy of science and research.
Please reply.
I invite you to the discussion
Thank you very much
Best wishes
When developing new social science theories, we tend to rely on causal explanations so as to make sense of the reality around us. One can argue that people are natural-born storytellers and therefore we place so much emphasis on causal inferences. My question is whether you can provide any examples of social sciences theories that break this 'linearity bias'? What sort of alternatives to causal/linear/sequential explanations are available to scientists who wish to devise novel social science theories?
In advance thank you to answers.
For Psychology (and other aspiring sciences and for even for good established sciences): Isn't it better to speak and write in terms of "conditions-for" instead of 'causes'?
My answer: Yes. Yes. Yes. Most usually. (Most certainty for a Biological science, like Psychology; HERE I am talking about a science of behavior patterns PER SE (i.e. "just behaviors"). (What is closest to a 'cause' is what ethologists call: proximate causes.))
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For some certain persons: If you do not like negative feedback, do not read below the line, directly below.
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This present Question is especially for some certain individuals (who I read): The above Question is something useful to think about OTHER THAN philosophy and especially philosophical Questions about "Consciousness" and "philosophy-and-science". Those Questions are useless, senseless, ridiculous Questions that most certainly will lead nowhere (certainly nowhere useful). Consider my present Question instead, for "therapy".
Are there any systematic (method-based) ways of developing RQs in social sciences? Does the submitted RQ need to stay 'static' throughout the whole project? How do we evaluate the quality of RQ?
In advance, thank you for your reflections.
Best regards,
Lukasz
Within social science research methodology, pragmatism, as I understand it, emphasizes choosing methods based on those most well suited to answer a question without a priori epistemological and ontological stances. However, I am unclear as to how this might play out…
Take for example the topic of poverty. Various questions can be asked about poverty.
(Q1) What is the most effective way of reducing poverty in our city?
(Q2) How do the poor exit poverty on their own terms?
Both questions may best be answered by different sets of methods. Suppose research is completed and published on both questions. Within political discourse answers to Q1 are used to justify a policy of relocating the poor outside of city limits. Q2 is used to justify a policy of providing no strings attached cash transfers. This results in the revelation that we’ve failed to consider what questions should be asked. Thus, axiology is brought into play. However, this is also where I struggle to understand pragmatism.
To justify one’s research question as more important than another’s must a pragmatist must take an axiological stance?
In doing so are they taking the ontological and epistemological view that there is indeed a singular correct set of values?
Alternatively, would the pragmatist not believe their question is any better than another, suggesting multiple equally valid sets of values?
Perhaps I’ve misinterpreted something or my reasoning is flawed but guidance would be much appreciated. Thank you.
My questions came from reading the following articles:
Morgan, D. L. (2007). Paradigms lost and pragmatism regained: Methodological implications of combining qualitative and quantitative methods. Journal of mixed methods research, 1(1), 48-76. doi:10.1177/2F2345678906292462
Biddle, C., & Schafft, K. A. (2015). Axiology and anomaly in the practice of mixed methods work: Pragmatism, valuation, and the transformative paradigm. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 9(4), 320-334. doi:10.1177/2F1558689814533157
Although I am at the early stage of my career, I have observed that majority of the quantitative studies in social sciences show statistically significant results. If for instance, you have four hypotheses, you will see two or three significant results. This creates a perception that those studies with non-significant results are not accepted for publication. As a researcher you spend a lot of time to collect data, analyze it and then you find yourself in a miserable situation if your results are non-significant. Is this the right perception?
I say a big "Yes" (big time, big time). And there is VERY LITTLE TO NOTHING to counter MOST of this phenomenon at all [(but, then again, you do have me)]. (For example (with some humor): Perhaps we "kan't" live without Kant because that sort of outlook is all we are given (several other philosophers' names could substitute in this statement, but then we loose the pun).)
The institutions are truly institutions in some of the very worst ways/senses. Always, and it really seems like this will be the way it is FOREVER ; e.g. look at Psychology and the history (and philosophy) OF Psychology -- a loser as any sort of science; we have not even clearly seen behavior patterns as biological functioning, which, of course they must be and ARE (<-- doing this is probably one of the very first steps in Psychology becoming anything like a real science (which I BELIEVE IT COULD !); and note: I HAVE done this for my perspective/approach -- I see the/a way for Psychology as a natural science).
Now, if the problem is so clear (at least as I see it): ask yourselves: why is there no concern for a solution?
It seems to me that working memory (involving the episodic buffer AND some -- to all the types -- of the Memories) is constantly at work and is our very experience itself.
Thus, I cannot see how the Memories (with at least some of them always active, determining and "recording" experience -- which most prominently and significantly active, dependent on circumstances) can be considered something separate from our knowledge OR our knowing OR our awareness OR our conscious being (all those: inclusively), i.e. as ANYTHING ever considerable as separate from experience itself.
Correct? Seems to me such a dualism would be a most-major problem. (This may be the biggest and perhaps primary dualism of them all, in reality (phenomenologically), though the nature/nurture dualism may seem worse -- but the latter may be somehow related to the former and even may have to be somehow related.)
Yet, we do seem to talk about "them" (the Memories, usually called "memory") at times as just one aspect of who we are (we seeing ourselves somehow as more than that "one 'aspect'")(and "memory" as sometimes something to consider, and other times not), don't we? (BUT: Wouldn't this be delusion "incarnate"?)
In short, we never "just are" (nor are we in any other way): these mechanisms having capacities and capabilities are ALWAYS at "work" since we ARE biological beings, in every way (like other animals) and at all times.
The Memories are central to good psychology understanding (or progress) and to good science in this "realm". The other major consideration (to have any generally good understanding of our reality/animal reality) is innate-guidance of behavioral development (especially throughout ontogeny); and, the question becomes : how does the innate-guidance aspects of behavior emerge along with (or, actually: "in") our other behavior patterns?; the fact of the always-present Memories can be an indication of the "acceptable" integral nature of emerging innate-guidance and why "perceptual shifts" become by far the likely candidates for what they (innately-guided behavioral aspects), along with other relevant behavior patterns, look like and ARE (<- including the "automatic" nature of our reality due to the past developments of the Memories and those "bringing forward" the very nature of what a good part of our reality looks like and IS).
Hi RG members,
I am faced hard to distinguish between investigate and examine when write objectives of research So, please, guide me when can I use for each other ?
thanks a lot in advance.
My regards
Qais Almaamari
Most of the time, fuzzy and asbtract concepts of research philosophy become very challenging to teach to fresh MS and PhD students. Many students struggle with understanding, particularly in learning the theory of knowledge/epistemology. I would like to know the success stories from experienced colleagues about effective methods of teaching/pedagogy and books well suited for new students.
Thanks
The outputs of public decision-making, please, imagine as intended and unintended results of: public discussion, selection of decision makers, selection of decision method, decision itself, implementation of decision, later effects.
How would you construct variable god_# ?
Let us call the variables god_# , where # is number.
Please, do not tell us that goodness does not exist, is too complicated, relative, etc. just do your best guess at what may work. Send me as message if you cannot. Thank you.
Does it make sense to include a cross-level interaction term in a multilevel model without specifying a random slope for the Level-1 variable?
I am well aware that a cross-level interaction effect between variables X (level 1) and Z (level 2) can be tested, even if X has no significant random slope (see Snijders & Bosker, 1999, p. 96). However, there is clearly a difference between an insignificant random slope and not including a random slope term at all in a cross-level interaction model.
The reason I'm asking:
I have vignette data at level 1 nested within individuals at level 2. I want to test a cross-level interaction between "context" (a vignette-level variable) and "gender" (an individual-level variable). I am not interested in testing whether the effect of the vignette-level variable varies randomly across individuals (random slope model). I am only interested in testing whether the effect of the vignette-level variable varies between boys and girls (model with cross-level interaction effect). However, I'm wondering about the extent to which the effect and the significance of the cross-level interaction term in the model depends on the inclusion of the random slope term.
Many thanks in advance,
Arne
Marginal revolution is understood to have occurred in 1870’s. However, Blaug (2001) shows that Germany and France were ahead of UK in topics and tools like subjective value theory and demand and supply diagram. J.R. Hicks claimed that the most important characteristic of the marginal revolution was the shift from plutology (economics of production) to catallactics (economics of exchange). The image and meaning of the so-called marginal revolution must be drastically changed. What is your opinion? What does it mean for the present-day economics?
I am looking for a good quotation that captures the essence of Southern culture.
Through many discussions in RearchGate, I came to recognize that majority of economists are still deeply influenced by the Friedmanian methodology. An evidence is the fact that they take little care for the economic consistency and relevance of the model. They pay enormous time and efforts in "empirical studies" and discuss the result, but they rarely question if the basic theory on which their model lies is sensible. This ubiquitous tendency gives grave effects in economics: neglect of theory and indulgence in empirics. I wonder why people do not argue this state of economics. Economic science should take back a more suitable balance between theory and empirics.
It is clear that we should distinguish two levels of Friedmanian methodology.
(1) Friedman's methodology and thought that is written in the texts, more specifically in his article The Methodology of Positive Economics (Chapter 7 of Essays in positive economics, 1953).
(2) The methodology that is believed to be Friedan's thought.
Apparently, (2) is much more important for this question. I see dozens of papers that examines Friedmanian methodology based on his text. Many of them detect that widely spread understanding is not correctly reflecting Friedman's original message. They may be right, but what is important is the widely spread belief in the name of Milton Friedman.
Should hypotheses always be based on a theory? I will provide an example here without variable names. I am reading a paper where the authors argue that X (an action) should be related to Y (an emotion). In order to support this argument the authors suggest that when individuals engage in X, they are more likely to feel a sense of absorption and thus they should experience Y. There is no theory here to support the relationship between X and Y. They are also not proposing absorption as the mediator. They are just using this variable to explain why X should lead to Y. Would this argument be stronger if I used a theory to support the relationship between X and Y? Can someone refer me to a research paper that emphasizes the need for theory driven hypotheses? Thanks!
My research design involves infering the existence of a plausible causal mechanism at the theoretical level and finding evidences of its existence at the empirical one. Recently I bumped into grounded theory while studying content analysis. I found that might be useful to apply it to help me in the empirical level but am not sure.
I'm currently studying the use of the traditional music during the Francoism (1939-1975) and I would like to establish links with other European Fascisms.
There is a tension between those who assert that theory building process is out of the domain of methodology because it depends more on the creative mind of the theorist and those who support the idea of theory building as a skill that can be learned. opponents of Grounded Theory methodology fall into this category.
After the European Middle Ages, science was one of the liberating forces. But now, more than ever, science is part of the social world and institutionalized in nearly all countries. Some philosophers like Adorno and Feyerabend developed very critical perspectives on that topic.
There are some associated problems: e.g. scientific superiority of nations, science as a measure of suppression or science and power, liberty and technological development, social science and social technology, medical progress and personal freedom.
But on the other hand there is an international exchange of ideas in science that seems free and often liberal.
What do you think about the liberating power of science? What do you think is the current state in this discussion?