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As far as I know, these ideas have been used mainly in theological discussions. However, it seems to me that such ideas would also have application in more general discussions of Cartesian dualism and the mind–body problem, e.g. they could be used to describe what happens to the Cartesian soul or mind when one is sleeping dreamlessly or when one is unconscious.
THE EPISTEMOLOGY PRESUPPOSED BY PHYSICS AND OTHER SCIENCES
Raphael Neelamkavil, Ph.D., Dr. phil.
((This is the second part of the series in THE LOGIC, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND ONTOLOGY OF PHYSICS AND OTHER SCIENCES.))
1. The Logic of Physics (See the previous discussion's lead-text)
2. The Epistemology behind Physics
The whole of logic, epistemology, ontology, etc. are not the exclusive property of physics, or of any other particular science, or of all the sciences together. Each of them may apply the various general logical, epistemological, and ontological principles in ways suitable to their disciplines, but cannot claim that theirs is the genuine or the possibly best logic, epistemology, ontology, etc.
There is yet another manner, beyond the sciences, wherein (1) the object range and viewpoint range become the broadest possible in epistemology, and (2) the epistemological manner in which the two are connected becomes satisfactory enough to explain both the aspects and the procedures involved between them. This is a philosophical version of epistemology. Even this manner is not complete without including the various logics, epistemologies, and ontologies of the particular sciences.
Before pointing out the special manner in which physics could use the more general aspects of epistemology in itself, let me mention a general trend in science, especially physics. I have seen many students of physics and mathematics mistaking the logical ways in which they do experiments and theories as the same as the conceptual foundations of physics and mathematics.
They do not even think of the epistemology of physics. The clear reason for this is that their epistemology is a crude correspondence theory of truth, and this is outdated. Take any of the best physicists, and we can see in their works the underlying undefined epistemology being closer to the correspondence theory of truth than anything else. I would like to suggest in the following a clear spine of epistemological rudiments for physics.
The pragmatism and scientism at the foundations of practical physics does not accept anything other than the correspondence theory as prescriptive of all the truths of science. Of course, the amount of finality achieved in truths will be the measure of tenability of their truth-probability. But this is to be reserved to the most general truths derivable from any science or philosophy. Low-level truths are much beyond the purview of correspondence between the objectual and the theoretical. Unaware of these facts, most physicists take the difference lightly.
It is a pity that the students of the sciences and also philosophy students with scientistic orientations even think of their ways of permitting truth correspondence to all their truths as the sole possession of scientists, which they suppose are being usurped from philosophy in the course of the past centuries in such a way that philosophy will have ever less reason to exist, or no more reason to exist. Imaginably, in this pride they are encouraged by their presumption of possession of the scientific temper in an exceptional manner.
More evidently, there were and there are physicists holding that their use of logic, epistemology, ontology, etc. is final and that all other details being done by other sciences, especially by philosophy, are a mere waste of time. If you want me to give an example, I suggest that you watch some of the YouTube interviews with Stephen Hawking, where he declares philosophy as a waste of time, or as an unscientific affair. The same sort of claim is to be seen being made by many mathematicians: that logic is a by-product of mathematics, and that philosophers are falsely proud of having logic as their methodology.
The reason why the whole of logic does not belong to the sciences is that the viewpoint from which sensation, thought, and feeling may be exercised in the broadest possible manner is not exhausted even by totaling all the object ranges of all the sciences. Each of them does logic in a manner limited by its object range. How then can their logic be the best possible? There is one and only one general science of which the viewpoint is the broadest. It is that science in which the viewpoint is that of the direct implications of the To Be of Reality-in-total.
Against this backdrop, although the following definition might seem queer for many physicists, mathematicians, and other scientists, there are reasons why I define here epistemology for use in physics. The following definition itself will clarify the reasons:
The epistemology behind physics is (1) the science of justifications (2) for the systemic fact, the systemic manner of achieving, the enhancement of the systemic manner of achieving, and the foundations of systems (3) of rationally derivable and explicable theoretical consequences of human efforts (4) to grasp the connection between physically existent reality and their pertinent realities of all sorts (5) in an asymptotic approach of truth-correspondence from the procedures of knowing (in terms of the pertinent realities of existent realities) onto the physically existent processes of reality, (6) in a spirally broadening and deepening manner of truth probability, (7) which serves to achieve ever better approximations of the epistemological ideal of knowing, namely, Reality-in-general, (8) starting from reality-in-particular, and (9) by use of the highest theoretical generalities pertaining to Reality-in-total and its parts, namely, reality-in-particular.
The epistemology of physics does not take the viewpoint of the To Be of Reality-in-total. But it must obey the primary implications of To Be and the viewpoint of the To Be of Reality-in-total. What these implications are, will be treated below, under “3. The Ontology of Physics”. Epistemology in philosophy may be slightly more general than the epistemology of physics, in the sense that philosophy takes the viewpoint of all physical processes that exist and attempt to view every reality from that viewpoint alone. If not, philosophy has no justification for existence.
Naturally, the epistemology of the sciences will not be so general as that of philosophy. But obedience to it is better for the epistemology of physics; and the advantages of such obedience will be seen in the results of such physics and such sciences.
The epistemology of physics, therefore, will attempt to theorize, know, and predict all that exist, but from the viewpoint exclusively of experimentally / empirically verifiable methods based on what is directly or indirectly before us, namely, the physical processes at our reach. The epistemology of systematically and systemically (i.e., systematically of systems of systems … ad libitum) moving in the use of logic from the given existent physical processes to the details of the not immediately given but ever more minute or ever more distant physical existents is the epistemology of physics. The above definition would, in my opinion, be sufficient to cover as broad and minute procedures as possible in physics. Time has come to appropriate it in physics, lest much advantage be lost for too long.
Not that philosophy does not trust this approach of physics. But philosophy looks for the Categorial presuppositions of existence behind all that is verifiable or verified empirically and empirical-theoretically. These presuppositions are the starting points and guiding principles of philosophy. There is a stark difference between a methodology of this kind and the methodology of basing everything on the truths derived from empirical and empirical-theoretical research. Now from this viewpoint you may judge the following suggestions and determine whether the epistemology of doing physical science is as broad as that of philosophizing.
Every moment, our body-brain nexus is continuously but finitely in contact with itself and with a finite extent of the environment, more or less simultaneously, but in differing intensities, no matter however elementary. The primary mode of this is through sensation, using all available and necessary aspects of it as the case may be. Thought and feeling are possible only in continuity with sensation, and never without it.
But one special characteristic of the human brain differentiating it from others is that sensation, feeling, and thought can very consciously induct into, and consequently deduce from the presuppositions of, all that exist – no matter whether they are a finite environment or infinite – and all these solely from the finite experience from the finite environment at hand. This seems to be absent in less human living beings.
Moreover, the second, but more forgotten, characteristic of the human brain differentiating it from others is that sensation, thought, and feeling are affective, tending to itself and to others, in the broadest sense of the term ‘affective’. It is the manner in which every human being tends in his/her sensation, feeling, and thought. Hence, all processes of knowing will be coloured by affection.
The manner and then the so-constructed broader background in which sensation, feeling, and thought take place is affection, which we term also love in a very general sense. Sensation, feeling, and thought are the three interconnected modes of tending of the body-brain to itself and to the environment, tend always to connect itself with the environment.
But here too the important differentiating characteristic in human body-brains is their capacity to tend to the environment beyond the immediate environments, and further beyond them, etc. ad libitum. There is nothing wrong in theoretically considering that there is the tendency in humans to converting this sort of ad libitum to ad infinitum, irrespective of whether these environments can really go ever broader at infinity in the content of matter-energy within Reality-in-total. Infinity is another term here for generalizing.
Reality consists of existent reality and realities that pertain to existent realities in their groups. Existent realities are clear enough to understand. Realities pertinent to existent realities are never to be taken as belonging to just one existent reality. They are always those generalities that belong to many existent realities in their respective natural kind. These generalities are what I call ontological universals.
All generalizations tend beyond onto the infinite perfection of the essential aspects of the concepts pertaining to the object-range. Not that the object-range must be infinite. Instead, the tending presumes an infinitization due to the idealization involved in generalizations. This is a kind of infinitization that does not need an infinite Reality-in-total in existence. All the concepts that a human being can use are based in the infinitization of the essential aspects of the concepts in their ideality. But behind these mental ideals there are the ideals, namely, the ontological universals pertaining to the groups (natural kinds) of processual entities in the environment. These are the ideals in the things and are not in us. These too are idealizations at the realm of the natural kinds that form part of Reality-in-total.
Without loving in the sense of tending to, as human do, to the inner and outer environments in their generalities there is no sensation, feeling, and thought. The tending to need not be due to the love of the objects but due to the love of something that pertains to them or to the ontologically universal ideals pertaining to the objects. From this it is clear that the relation between the processual objects and the sensing-feeling-knowing mind is set by the ontological universals in the natural kinds of existent physical processes.
At the part of the mind there should be idealized universals of conceptual quality, because the ontological universals in natural kinds cannot directly enter and form concepts. This shows that the conceptual universals (called connotative universals) are the mental reflections of ontological universals that are in the natural kinds. In short, behind the epistemology of sensation, feeling, and thought there are the ontology and epistemology of loving in the sense of tending to, due to the otherness implied between oneself and the environment.
There may be philosophers and scientists who do not like the idea of love. I say, this is due to the many psychology-related prejudices prevalent in their minds. We need to ask ourselves what the major mode of exercitation of any activity in human beings, and none can doubt the role of love in epistemology. The physical foundations of love too are commonly to be shared with the foundations of other aspects of physical existence.
Such tending by the person is mediated within the person by the connotative universals. Their expression is always in terms of symbols in various languages. These are called denotative universals. Connotative universals get concatenated in the mind in relation to their respective brain elements and form thoughts and feelings. Their expression in language is by the concatenation of denotative universals and get formulated in languages as theories and their parts.
To put in gist the latter part of “2. The Epistemology of Physics”, I suggest that the ontological, connotative, and denotative universals and the love of human agents to these and the very existent processual entities are what facilitate knowledge. The psychological question as to what happens when one has no love does not have any consequence here, because psychology differentiates between love and non-love in terms of certain presumed expressions of love and non-love.
In the case of the natural course of life of humans, the choice is not between love and non-love, but instead, between increasing or decreasing love. We do not speak here of loving other human beings as a matter of ethical action. Instead, the point is that of the natural love that humans have for everything including for sensing, feeling, knowing, etc.
One might wonder here why I did not discuss mathematics as an epistemologically valid tool of physics and other sciences. I have already dealt with this aspect in many other discussion texts in ResearchGate, and hence do not expatiate on it here.
3. The Ontology behind Physics (soon to be given as a separate RG discussion session)
Can we consider consciousness as a type of energy that supplies the brain with energy, given that the brain has very high resistance, up to 60 ohms, and in order to generate small currents within the brain, we would need a very high voltage? Additionally, Newton's first law states that an object at rest remains at rest unless acted upon by an external force. Is it possible that consciousness could be a source of energy for the brain? Could this be a valid possibility?
What do you think of AI progression? Which direction should she move in?
According to the article on functionalism in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, written by Thomas Polger,
Functionalism is a theory about the nature of mental states. According to functionalism, mental states are identified by what they do rather than by what they are made of. This can be understood by thinking about artifacts like mousetraps and keys. In particular, the original motivation for functionalism comes from the helpful comparison of minds with computers. But that is only an analogy. The main arguments for functionalism depend on showing that it is superior to its primary competitors: identity theory and behaviorism. Contrasted with behaviorism, functionalism retains the traditional idea that mental states are internal states of thinking creatures. Contrasted with identity theory, functionalism introduces the idea that mental states are multiply realized.
---pause quotation---
The opening of this article places emphasis on "the helpful comparison of minds with computers." This sort of approach or version of functionalism is often formulated as "Turing machine functionalism," and has been a major focus of the criticism of functionalism, but it is also responsible for a good deal of the contemporary interest--associated as it is with the topic of strong artificial intelligence and computational conceptions of mind and intelligence. However this is an important contrasting conception of functionalism which arose in the early 20th century and in the wake of Darwinism in psychology. This version takes the biological paradigms of intelligence and consciousness as basic and, it may be argued, avoids many of the criticisms directed at strong A.I. Both versions of functionalism tend to benefit from criticisms of "identity theories" and of behaviorism.
The article continues:
Objectors to functionalism generally charge that it classifies too many things as having mental states, or at least more states than psychologists usually accept. The effectiveness of the arguments for and against functionalism depends in part on the particular variety in question, and whether it is a stronger or weaker version of the theory. This article explains the core ideas behind functionalism and surveys the primary arguments for and against functionalism.
In one version or another, functionalism remains the most widely accepted theory of the nature of mental states among contemporary theorists. Nevertheless, in view of the difficulties of working out the details of functionalist theories, some philosophers have been inclined to offer supervenience theories of mental states as alternatives to functionalism.
---End quotation---
See:
Generally, this article is quite useful for discussion of the topic, and it recognizes problems connected with stronger and weaker versions of functionalism. Although Harvard philosopher Hilary Putnam once claimed to have invented functionalism, it was something like "Turing machine functionalism which he proposed (and later rejected), and the psychological theory of functionalism, rooted in William James and his Principles of Psychology, long predated the contemporary versions which are more directly related to the advent of computers and computer technology.
I have read some journals but having trouble understanding reductionism in psychology. I understand the different stages going from behavioural, cognitive then to biological but what is the importance of this? also what are the issues within reductionism and psychology?
Much of this is quoted from elsewhere, but I think deserves its own thread:
Kuhn, who I have always seen as having a only a partial (that is: just a "some-parts" understanding) of a paradigm, still seems at least in the direction of being correct in some noteworthy ways. According to Kuhn :
An immature science is preparadigmatic -- that is, it is still in its natural history phase of competing schools. Slowly, a science matures and becomes paradigmatic. (End of short summary of some of his views.) [ It will be clear I do not fully agree with these views, in particular: the " 'natural' history" part. ]
I would say that preparadigmatic is not yet science at all and characterized by flailing and floundering UNTIL a paradigm is found (and RATHER: actually, this should be done NOW and with any necessary efforts: FORMULATED). Preparadigmatic is nothing good, clear or even "natural"; it is a state of insufficiency, failing to provide for making for clear sustained integrated progress (and even, as indicated, I would say this situation is: unnecessary -- see my delineation of the characteristics of a paradigm * to see why this situation in Psychology is unnecessary and INEXCUSABLE, because clearly you MUST be doing paradigm definition the best you can, clearly and respectably). _AND_ we are not talking about progress in one vein (sub-"area"), but some interpretable, agreeable findings for the whole field -- a necessary condition of HAVING ANY sort of general SCIENCE AT ALL; obviously Psychology does not have that and should not be considered a science just because people in that field want to say that and supposedly aspire in that way [ ("aspire" somehow -- usually essentially mythologically, irrationally, and just "hoping beyond hope" (as people say)) ] In short: that state of preparadigmatic should not be tolerated; major efforts should be clearly going on to improve from this state immediately ("if not sooner", as they say -- i.e. this SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE SOONER).
Since I think I DO KNOW at least many of the characteristics of a paradigm (presented elsewhere, for one: in the description of the "... Ethogram Theory" Project *) AND since mine is the only paradigm being "offered up", Psychology people should damn well take full note of that and fully read and come to a reasonable understanding of my perspective and approach -- all that leading to clear, testable hypotheses that, IF SHOWN CORRECT, would be of general applicability and importance and very reliable (in the formal sense) and , thus (as I say): agreeable. IN short, I OFFER THE ONLY FULL-FLEDGED GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY PARADIGM and if someone is in the Psychology field and really cares about science, they must take note (and fully assess it) (no reason for any exception): Minimally, all must "see" AND READ:
Barring any "competition", my paradigm should be studied and fully understood -- NO REASONABLE SCIENCE CHOICE ABOUT IT. It stands alone in Psychology, as a proposal for a NECESSARY "ingredient" for SCIENCE for Psychology.
* FOOTNOTE (this footnote is referenced-to twice in the essay above): The characteristics of a paradigm are presented the Project referred to: https://www.researchgate.net/project/Human-Ethology-and-Development-Ethogram-Theory-A-Full-Fledged-Paradigm-Shift-for-PSYCHOLOGY
(in particular, in its description)
Two books: Loneliness in Philosophy, Psychology, and Literature; and Feeling Lonesome: The Philosophy and Psychology of Loneliness
[ To summarize several of the basic problems with the 'moderation' of this Yahoo Group: The moderator believes it has been determined that a human ethogram cannot be done (is not possible). (And, he cites the view of a 1989 committee, as great support for this (HIS) position.) NOR, in his firm (set) view is an ethogram needed for coming to ANY OR ALL the understandings we need. (And, IF an ethogram were to be done, he insists it address all significant human behaviors at once "BY DEFINITION", as you will read about again in coming paragraphs -- ignoring very cogent and rather indisputable arguments to the contrary.)
He also insists on strict dualisms BETWEEN classes of major behaviors that DO involve or require innate patterning (and this, in his view, is mainly motor behaviors, motor behavior patterns) AND OTHER very significant behavior patterns/ behavioral systems that he says DON'T -- all this when all reasonable biological scientists would say some significant innate guidance is involved in the development of ALL major systems of adaptation.
PLUS, this moderator insists on NOT discussing what (in his view) need no more be discussed (INCLUDING AN ETHOGRAM), and insists that issues regarding an ethogram (both its definition and how it would have to be done) have already been resolved and warrant no further discussion. He quickly enforces, i.e. CENSORS, expression of views contrary to these. Plus, moreover, his view of what 'THOUGHT' is and what can be considered 'BEHAVIOR' is basically extreme Skinnerian AND he is absolutely insistent on his views here ALSO. Finally: He seems to respect nothing other than the short writings found in peer-reviewed journals -- only such authorities can present all worthy arguments and conclusions about all matters of argument. On all these latter matters he not only insists over and over but, AGAIN, HE WILL CENSOR. ]
What follows may offer more detail about what this 'moderator' accepts and what he doesn't (and what he does not accept is soon CENSORED AND NOT POSTED TO THE HUMAN ETHOLOGY YAHOO GROUP OR MAILING-LIST). :
Basically, he demands that anything that is to be considered an ethogram address ALL the species-typical behaviors of an organism (here the human) ALL AT ONCE, because that is the definition of an ethogram. He would not publish my rebuttal, which says one must start with the discovery of the development of a central ("containing") behavior system (cognitive development) FIRST, to get that major pervasive system understood first, before adding in basically associated or subsidiary systems (like emotions and language). Here is the "moderator's" assessment (NOT based on well-founded assumptions of any sort OR on fact): Quoting:
Jay R. Feierman [NEW]:
(writing to me, and NOT publishing my view. And, see my rebuttal to his rejection of my view (also NOT allowed on the 'list' by him) . ) -- and my exception to the rejection of THAT, below) [ ( Fortunately, my view/perspective expressed is at length here on RG (and elsewhere) ] :
(His objection is just the standard, memorized meaningless junk.): (now quoting Feierman) :
"The cognitive-development behavioral system as it unfolds and develops in ontogeny is important. However, it is not an ethogram, which has a very specific meaning. An ethogram is a catalog of all of the fixed action patterns of a species organized into functional groups. Most but not all of the fixed action patterns are going to be parts of coordinated motor pattern (aka fixed action pattern) instincts. This can be done but it would be very time consuming and difficult, which is why I turned down the offer to do it in the 1980s. Even I. Eibl-Ebesfeldt, who is the father of human ethology, never undertook to do this. ** The reason why it would be so difficult is contrary to all other mammals (with the higher primates partially excepted), humans have many other behaviors that are not fixed action patterns that are innervated by a different part of the nervous system. So for example, a functional category like mother-infant care, can be easily a category in the ethogram of a canine. However, it is not so easy to make an ethogram of mother-infant care for humans. I currently have a collection of Eibl's tribal films of mothers interacting with infants in many different tribal societies. There are behaviors in common but some of the instinctual behaviors are mixed with "voluntary" behaviors that are mediated by another part of the nervous system. It is a lot easier to make an ethogram of the infant's feeding behavior than the mothers' infant care behaviors. "
(end of my quote of him) (This quotation has MANY MANY VERY QUESTIONABLE, but typical, assertions: example: most behaviors with innate action patterns are motor systems; the others are just too variable to involve innate guidance; and, note the complete dualism between innate action patterns and "many other behaviors" -- defying biology, and THUS DEFYING SCIENCE, ITSELF.)
My response to this was (in large part):
Dear Jay Feierman,
You cannot chose for the definition of something (here an ethogram) SOMETHING THAT CANNOT EXIST -- at least the one you 'define' cannot exist, for some time and after a lot of peoples' efforts [(it is not simply something you can, in any way-of-discovery, just 'define' and begin with)]. Thus, to start an ethogram, and appropriately be working for it to be all we want, WHAT I OFFER IS ALL THAT CAN BE OFFERED (and I explain that -- in 500 publicly available [(and published as much as possible)] pages -- if you would only "do me the honor" of reading); my human ethogram is thereby ALL THAT CAN BE CONSIDERED, AT FIRST, AS _THE_ HUMAN ETHOGRAM. THAT'S A LONG SHOT BETTER THAN WHAT YOU OFFER: hopelessness. And, you should strive to offer something better than what is hopeless.
Apparently, you indeed fail to read me (any of my writing). Even in 1989 I knew and informed I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (my friend and associate) what more was needed in his Human Ethogram book to begin the ethogram that I DID begin. (Did you even bother to read the review, which I posted here??) I can tell you that if you do not "slow down" and really try to "smell the roses", neither of us will learn anything from each other. (AND, I WILL REMAIN not only the first and only author [of the first] [partial] human ethogram, but the only ethologist fully using the terms of, and inductive approach of, classical ethology (or at least the ONLY one doing so with human behavior).
Everything else you say in your response other than what I just addressed, is thus irrelevant (completely). You have to be real. As soon as you think in terms of definitions that simply have been "agreed upon" (perhaps, with a little conjuring on your own), you ARE OFF-TRACK. ALL IS FROM THE _SUBJECT_ ; the Subject defines all . If it starts that way and stays that way, you are building the ethogram (a more complete one) -- that is precisely what I am proposing. You should at least try to empirically describe one before "flushing" mine; you will not be able to do better.
Your response is extremely disappointing and makes outrageous impossible requirements. Your only way to argue against this last statement, IS to directly argue against it: this would involve showing/describing a clearly workable, usable COMPLETELY EMPIRICAL alternative [(like the one you ask for)].
Your definitions are foolish (pardon the word, but it only seems apt). For some good therapy: TRY JUST DESCRIPTION, and of only behavior patterns and environmental aspects _and_ associative/discriminatory learning (and with major developments involving all these things at the very same time) -- involved in ALL major behavioral developments, i.e. ontogeny.
(end of me quoting myself).
-----------------
Well, if you are in this group (on the mailing list), you will not see me or hear from me any more, because he threw me off for being too "speculative" and seeming like I am describing things that could not be tested. BUT, the truth is, my view is very much less speculative that most of psychology (with its more poorly founded and baseless assumptions; and, with ethology being similar these days). AND though I did not (in this particular post) indicate the more particular nature of hypotheses and how they could/would be discovered true (and tested and verifiable or not), I do describe this in other posts. CLEARLY MY SYSTEM IS IN EMPIRICAL TERMS AND TESTABLE and is less speculative that his write-up of what an ethogram would be like and must be like.
YET: He went on in other responses (I also did not get to rebut) to say my views are untestable (that is FALSE) and just "speculation" (that is FALSE). Again, my view can be considered LESS speculative than the standard view (and more biologically consistent) and I most certainly have clearly and empirically described the phenomenon at the inception of major cognitive developments, as perceptual shifts, and I have indicated how these could clearly be discovered with new eye-tracking technology.
TRUTH IS, IF YOU DO NOT SUPPORT THE PRESUMPTIONS AND 'DEFINITIONS' OF THE EXISTING SYSTEMS (mostly all memorized junk), YOU WILL BE THROWN OUT OF SUCH A GROUP, actually JUST FOR THOSE REASONS ONLY. Not for any empirical or science reasons.
If you would like to ask this "moderator" why he is so off-base, feel free to do so: jay.feierman84@gmail.com . Maybe if you are on this list you might ask him to better explain why I CAN'T BE ON IT.
** FOOTNOTE: A human ethogram has not been done in over 35 years since it has been deemed impossible; yet my start for a human ethogram, which may be the only way to get one, does not even deserve to be heard, according to another "authority" of the "system".
NOTE: Much of the highlighting and a few explanatory phrases, added in brackets, were added by me.
It is CLEAR why there is a need for a HUMAN ETHOGRAM group. Read about one here: https://www.researchgate.net/post/For_a_new_real_empirical_science_of_human_behavior_clearly_the_biology_of_behavior_lets_move_towards_a_human_ethogram_Might_a_Yahoo_group_help
As part of our investigations into the current state of psychiatry, I would like to ask how academics and practitioners, researchers and clinicians, and of course professors of psychiatry, see contemporary psychiatry and its future. My colleague Drozdstoj Stoyanov, MD, PhD, and I are writing a book called "Psychiatry in Crisis" (see Research Project on "Psychiatry in Crisis") in which we pose and will try to answer the following question:
Is psychiatry a social science (like psychology or anthropology), is it better understood as part of the humanities (like philosophy, history and linguistics), or is the future of psychiatry best assured as a branch of medicine (privileging genetics and neuroscience)?
Hello,
I recently read some of Ryle's reproaches of psychologist's dualist thinking and his "linguistic" definitions of thoughts, and emotions. I am now looking for relevant literature: Are there psychologists discussing the ordinary language philosophy and its implications on the programme of psychology? Have some of the philosopher's thoughts been applied to psychological problems?
I find many sources that attribute this quote to Sigmund Freud, but I can find no confirmation that he really said it: "Where does a thought go when it's forgotten?"
I searched through my Kindle copy of his collected works. I did not find it, but that could always be a translation issue. I'd like to quote him in a book but I won't use the quote if I can't confirm it.
I think Merleau-Ponty's "brute world" is a sphere similar to the phenomenology of the psychedelic experience.
Can anyone recommend sources for philosophical background on reality therapy? I'm starting with education in reality therapy and I'm interested in its philosophical background.
Is anybody aware of research, writing or thinking within psychology that has explicitly considered mereology and ontology? I would be really grateful for any assistance about these forms of understanding within the discipline. Thanks.
Recently, Prof. Max Tegmark has posted a paper on the arXiv.org website "Consciousness as a State of Matter" (see arXiv:1401.1219v1), which purports to explain consciousness as arising out of matter. This is a matter of debate for physicists, philosophers and psychologists alike, as also for people from other fields of research.
Did consciousness evolve from matter all anew? Or, was it present in some form in matter(energy) from the very beginning itself? Is it present in all forms of energy including all elementary particles as also behind space and time ?
There are anecdotes about people with a special talent who can move a slide rule (a slipstick) in their head and get a result which they had not had before.
I doubt this for a number of reasons:
Our imagination is not an objective counterpart to us. In other words the imaginary slide rule might behave in a strange way – it could be “made of rubber” and we could not be sure that it is not behaving in a strange way.
There is a difference to imaginary chess games: for chess there are rules to prevent that some constellations of the figures are sensible constellations. Rules of this kind are not available in the case of a slide rule.
Special talent: I do believe that there are people who stored an immense number of snapshots of constellations and situations. But to call up these images is not activating a process in the head that will reveal new constellations, is it?
What about thought experiments? They can be very creative indeed. But I think in this case we apply many laws of nature that limit the number of possible outcomes.
For non-historians: here’s a picture of a slide rule: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slide_rule
Galen once stated that the best physician is also a philosopher, and a physician without philosophy is like an architect without a plan.
A lot has changed since Galen. Science took over in many fields. But especially in the field of psychotherapy a lot of approaches are sill based on philosophical assumptions (e.g. psychoanalysis, humanistic therapy, cognitive therapy, also behavioral therapy). Slife (2004) stated that psychotherapy contains a lot of such philosophical assumptions (e.g. objectivism, materialism, atomism, objectivism, hedonism, universalism). On the other hand study / training programs of psychotherapy rarely integrate philosophy. This probably leads to a false naturalistic or scientistic attitude. Additionally epistemology seems to be rare in psychotherapy training programs. So the graduates often seem to have severe problems in drawing clinical conclusions from theories or evidences.
What do you think? How relevant is philosophy in psychotherapy and philosophical training for students? What do you think about the current relevance of philosophy in the field of psychotherapy?
Slife B.D. (2004): Theoretical Challenges to Therapy Practice and Research: The Constraint of Naturalism. In Lambert M.J. (ed.): Bergin and Garfield‘s Handbook of Psychotherapy and Behavior Change. 5th edition. John Wiley & Sons, New York. pp 44-83.
Mary Midgley wrote of the Ethical Primate and recently, Christian Smith has written a book entitled Moral, Believing Animals. Why is it that human beings alone seem to experience the phenomenon of guilt? When they experience it what exactly is occurring within them?
If so, what are they and why might they arise?
Is abstraction possible without perception
The impossibility of abstract thinking without the processes of perception is a highly debated issue in the literature of the philosophy of mind. Contentious arguments are galore in the research corrigendum of whether such a possibility of abstract thinking without the processes of perceptional experience, or pure perception is possible or not. I extend my theory and a complementary explanation that the issue still remains unresolved, but in terms of artificial thinking and artificial perception, the proposition holds good that there is no abstraction possible without the process of perception, and that perception is an independent process which is essential for abstract thinking, albeit in AI thinking. But what about in humans?