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Metaphysics - Science topic

Metaphysics are for discussion on the fundamental nature of the world and physical processes.
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How does the inadequate metaphysical knowledge leads to methodological bias?
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Yes, it can.
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Heidegger said that philosophy is thinking. What else is philosophy? What is the ultimate aim of philosophy? Truth? Certainty? …
Heidegger said that science is knowledge. What else is science? What is the ultimate aim of science? Knowledge? Truth? Certainty? …
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Most biologists and philosophers understand vitalism as the doctrine of the entelechy, originally proposed by the German biologist Hans Driesch in the early twentieth century. According to Driesch, entelechies were nonmaterial, bio-specific agents responsible for governing a few peculiar biological phenomena. Current attitudes towards vitalism and the doctrine of the entelechy are almost universally negative. Numerous biologists and philosophers today endorse this metaphysical refutation of vitalism. For them, since all events and processes in the world, from the metaphysical point of view, must be identical or reducible to some material (or physical) events and processes, there is no room for nonmaterial agents such as entelechies. The addition of the information instead of the concept of entelechy will change the perspective on vitalism.,
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You might dispense with entelechy or élan vital in favor of information (à la Shannon & Weaver), but wouldn't the resulting theory be a replacement of vitalism with an information-theoretic biology rather than an updated vitalism?
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As far as I know, these ideas have been used mainly in theological discussions. However, it seems to me that such ideas would also have application in more general discussions of Cartesian dualism and the mind–body problem, e.g. they could be used to describe what happens to the Cartesian soul or mind when one is sleeping dreamlessly or when one is unconscious.
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Interesting. I will search for information.
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Referential and model-theoretic semantics has wide applications in linguistics, cognitive science, philosophy and many other areas. These formal systems incorporate the notion - first introduced by the father of analytic philosophy Gottlob Frege more than a century ago - that words correspond to things. The term ‘2’ denotes or refers to the number two. The name ‘Peter’ refers to Peter, the general term ‘water’ refers to H2O and so on. This simple idea later enabled Alfred Tarski to reintroduce the notion of ‘Truth’ into formal logic in a precise way, after it had been driven out by the logical positivist. Willard van Orman Quine, one of the most important analytic philosophers of the last century devoted most of his carer to understanding this notion. Reference is central to the work of people such as Saul Kripke, David Lewis and Hilary Putnam and many others.
Furthermore, the idea of a correspondence between whole expressions between, sentences or propositions and states of the world or facts drive the recent developments in philosophy of language and metaphysics under the label of ‘Grounding’ and ‘Truthmaking’ where a state of the world or a fact is taken to “make true” a sentence or a proposition. For example, the sentence “Snow is white.” is made true (or is grounded in) the fact that snow is white obtains. [1]
Given that this humble notion is of such importance to contemporary analytic philosophy, one may wonder why the father of modern linguistics - and a driving force in the field ever since the (second) cognitive revolution in the nineteen fifties - has argued for decades that natural language has no reference. Sure, we use words to refer to things, but usage is an action. Actions involve things like intentions, believes, desires etc. And thus, actions are vastly more complicated then the semantic notion of reference suggests. On Chomsky’s view then, natural language (might) not have semantics, but only syntax and pragmatics.
On Chomsky’s account, syntax is a formal representation of physically realized processes in the mind-brain of an organism. Which allows him to explain why semantics yields such robust results (a fact that he now acknowledges). What we call ‘semantics’ is in fact a formal representation of physically realized processes in the mind-brain of an organism – us. [2]
Chomsky has argued for this for a very long time and, according to him, to no avail. In fact, I only found discussion about this by philosophers long after I learned about his work. No one in a department that sides heavily on philosophy of language, metaphysics and logic ever mentioned Chomsky’s views on this core notion to us students. To be fair, some in the field seem to begin to pay attention. For instance, Kit Fine, one of the leading figures in contemporary metaphysics, addresses Chomsky’s view in a recent article (and rejects it). [3]
The main reason why I open this thread is that I came recently across an article that provides strong independent support to Chomsky’s position. In their article Fitness Beats Truth in the Evolution of Perception, Chetan Parakash et al. use evolutionary game theory to show that the likelihood for higher organisms to have evolved to see the world as it is (to have veridical perception) is exceedingly small. [4]
Evolutionary game theory applies the formalism originally developed by John von Neumann to analyze economic behavior and applies it in the context of natural selection. Thus, an evolutionary game is a game where at least two types of organisms compete over the same resources. By comparing different possible strategies, one can compute the likelihood for a stable equilibrium. [5]
Parakash et al. apply this concept to the evolution of perception. Simplifying a bit, we can take a veridical perception to be a perceptual state x of an organism such that x corresponds to some world state w. Suppose there are two strategies. One where the organism estimates the world state that is most likely to be the true state of the world. And another where the organism estimates which perceptual state yields the highest fitness. Then, the first strategy is consistently driven into extinction.
Now, compare this with reference: Some word (here taken to be a mental state) refers to a thing or a state of the world such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the word and the world. It seems that this is an analogous situation. And thus, it should be equally unlikely that we have evolved to have reference in natural language. Any such claim needs empirical evidence and this is what Chomsky provides.
Chomsky’s main evidence comes from a test. I frame the test in terms of truthmaking. Consider the basic idea again:
  • The sentence A is made true (or grounded in) the fact that A obtains.
Now, if this is true, then one would expect that the meaning of A changes because the world changes. We take a fact to be something that our best scientific theories can identify. In other words we take the objective reality to be whatever science tells us it is. Then we systematically vary physically identifiable aspects of the world and see how the meaning of a term that is supposed to pic out these aspects changes. The hypothesis is that if there is reference or correspondence, then the changes on one side should be correlated with changes on the other side. If this is not the case, then there is no one-to-one correspondence between words and things, and thus, natural language is not related to the physical world.
I give three examples, often discussed by Chomsky, to illustrate how this works: Consider the term ‘water’, embedded in the sentence “The water flows in the river.” Then, what flows in the river should be H2O. Suppose there is a chemical plant upstream and suppose there is an accident. There may be very few H2O molecules left, but it is still a river, it’s still water. So, we have enormous change in the world, but no change in meaning.
Or suppose you put a teabag into a cup of water. The chemical change may be undetectable small, but if you order tea and you get water, you wouldn’t be amused. So, virtually no change in the physical world and clear change in meaning.
Last, consider a standard plot of a fairy tale. The evil witch turns the handsome prince into a frog, the story continuous and at the end, the beautiful princess kisses the frog and turns him back into the prince. Any child knows that the frog was the princess all along. All physical properties have changed, but no child has any difficulty to track the prince. What this suggests is that object permanence does not depend on the physical world, but on our mind-internal processes.
This test has been carried out for a large number of simple concepts, in all cases, there is no correlation between physically identifiable aspects of the world and words. Notice that the test utilizes a dynamic approach. Only if we look at changes we see what is going on.
So, counterintuitive as this may seem, the evidence from the test supports the argument from evolutionary biology that developing concepts that correspond to the world is no advantage at all. And so, we shouldn’t be surprised that this is what we find, once we look closely.
On the other hand, does this conclusively prove that there is no relation between our concepts and the physical world? Not really, after all, the logical structure of language is there, but it suggests that we should look at the mind for a connection between words and the world. If we want to show that language has reference in the technical sense.
Sven Beecken
  1. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338557376_Ground_and_Truthmaker_Semantics
  2. Chomsky, Noam (2016). What Kind of Creatures are We? Columbia Themes in Philosophy. Columbia University Press.
  3. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338549555_The_Identity_of_Social_Groups
  4. http://cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/FitnessBeatsTruth_apa_PBR
  5. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-evolutionary/
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I'm sorry I can't say anything about Chomsky's claims, but I'd like to try to add a few things to the discussion. Frege did not establish that words correspond to things but that it is possible to differentiate, within the meaning, between sense and reference; that is, "the morning star" and "the evening star" are two expressions that have different meanings (for example, because one alludes to morning situations and the other does not) but name, designate or refer to the same object or referent (the planet Venus). It must be said, however, that in order to metalinguistically affirm that these two expressions designate the same object, it is necessary to assume an ontology according to which what is seen in the morning and in the afternoon is the same thing; that is, when Cicero wrote De natura deorum, alluding to the morning star (Phosphorus, Lucero or Lucifer) and the evening star (Vesperus or Hespero) as two different entities, the Fregean distinction could have been made but not with these examples. What Tarski does - which to me has little to do with this semantic distinction - is to provide a criterion for any definition of truth in the "material" correspondence sense (in the sense of correspondence to extralinguistic reality), using a formula for expressions different level linguistic sentences (for a metalinguistic sentence and an object sentence): "X is true if and only if p", which is typically exemplified by the famous sentence "'Snow is white' is a true sentence if and only if snow is white". However, in the text itself, where he states that "truth" is a semantic term, he refers to "the truth" as if it were some kind of substance or entity and -fundamentally- as if it were the same as speaking of a term or a definition, which in my opinion rather obscures his claims. But, furthermore, since it can also be said " 'Nothing nothings' is a true sentence if and only if nothing nothings", it seems to me that the formula has much the aspect of a circular or tautological logical device and that, most importantly, which is to explain why a "material" sentence is true and what exactly it means to correspond to a fact precisely remains unexplained.
Also -and despite Chomsky's affirmations-, one must not confuse the thesis that natural language has no reference with the one that it does not describe in the material sense (that it does not describe facts that actually exist), because these affirmations are not equivalents. To speak of reference is to speak of language, and only of language. It can be said that a term or a sentence refers and that does not commit one to the affirmation that this referent exists beyond language, that it can be sustained or not. On the other hand, when it is affirmed that a thing exists or that an event occurs, we are not talking about language, but about a part of the extralinguistic reality that is assumed to exist. For example, and given the Fregean distinction, it can be said that the phlogiston theory refers, because the phlogiston theory is language and the reference is a semantic relation: the phlogiston is the object to which it alludes (its referent), and that in her the term "phlogiston" has a certain meaning, and to say at the same time that her affirmations do not describe any fact or any entity of the world (that phlogiston does not exist), and in the first case, from our metalanguage something is affirmed about a language object (the phlogiston theory) but when it is said that there is no entity in the world that is phlogiston, one is not talking about language and, therefore, nothing is being said about semantic relations. Now, the thesis that natural language does not have a descriptive function, or does not describe extralinguistic facts or entities and properties, has been confuted in various ways, fundamentally assuming different assumptions about its nature, for example, by pragmatist, neopragmatist arguments, by those who maintain that languages ​​are acts or actions, etc. In an article on the beginnings of the Vienna Circle, Carl Hempel says that the thesis that there could be a correspondence between language and facts was already rejected because they were things of a different nature between which there was an "abyss". Perhaps a quick way to express it is to say that there will always be an insurmountable metaphysical difference between the word table, with its meaning, and table, and for some authors that means that "correspondence" is impossible. If you want to complicate things further, a Kantian or neo-Kantian might say that correspondence with facts is impossible because at best there may be a correspondence with what appears to us as facts in the mind.
If we are talking about language, reference and correspondence with facts, it can be problematic to offer arguments that speak of perceptions or words as mental states, since there are several arguments that have opposed the thesis of the mental or internal nature of language natural, from the sciences considering that it is a system of (physical) signs that responds to certain rules and is intended for communication between speakers, and from philosophy authors such as Reichenbach or Carnap have considered that it is not mental, and even Karl Popper has been emphatic about it, considering that it is abstract in nature. Another way of understanding it is by thinking that natural language is a collective evolutionary product of a species of animals, that words and meanings existed before any of us, that we have simply learned to reproduce it in consciousness and use it. That is, is this a philosophy of language debate or a philosophy of mind debate? Thank you.
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The idea of energy seems to be something that I clearly do not understand yet at the same time it is all around us. It seems people react to different "energies" and react angrily or react happily and a lot of times, especially here at Landmark College in Vermont, there is a lot of people who consider others intimidating and begin to fear them. It comes to the point that how do people actually react to "energy" but not the exact physical actions of someone else? The ideas of telepathy and energy, although considered a pseudoscience, has been shown in the works of Dr. Ian Stevenson worked deeply into, should we openly accept the idea of metaphysical energy that seems to have an evidently deep impact on people?
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It cannot be ruled out, with respect to physical and spiritual evolution of the human species, in terms of advancing the scientific method towards holistic measurement in space and time.
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quote from the book "Мathematical notes on the nature of the things"
-- So, conceptually, we proceed from the fact that the real Universe is a dynamic flow on a seven-dimensional sphere, therefore, a vacuum, without taking into account the evolutionary component, is a globally minimal vector field of matter accelerations, forming on the surface of the sphere $S^{7}$ a foliation $S^{1}\times S^{3}\times S^{3}$, a typical layer of which has the shape of a Clifford torus $S^{3}\times S^{3}$, and taking into account the periodicity of the foliation in time, its dynamics it is described by a toroidal manifold $S^{1}\times S^{1}\times S^{3}\times S^{3}$. However, since the globally minimal vector field of matter accelerations evolves to its absolutely minimal state so that in the process of evolution the radius of one of the spheres of the Clifford torus increases and the radius of the other sphere decreases, then there is no periodicity of foliation in time, and the dynamics of vacuum foliation is described by a cylindrical manifold $\mathbb{R}^{4}\times S^{1}\times S^{3}$ and it is convenient for the observer to operate with the space $M\times S^{1}\times S^ {3}$, where $M$ is Minkowski spacetime, and $S^{1}\times S^{3}$ is the compact component of the vacuum foliation.
Dynamic flows on a seven-dimensional sphere that do not coincide with the globally minimal vector field, but remain locally minimal vector fields of matter accelerations, we interpret as physical fields and particles. Moreover, bosons are associated with point-like perturbations of the vacuum vector field, and fermions are associated with node-like perturbations of the vacuum vector field, that is, the current lines of fermionic vector fields have a topological feature in the form of nodes. -- (p. 16)
(19) (PDF) MATHEMATICAL NOTES ON THE NATURE OF THINGS (researchgate.net)
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About the dynamics of features
In our collapsed Finsler metric space, let the trajectories of the vector field features be helical lines, and therefore the features themselves make their own angle of rotation, and thus they have such a characteristic as angular velocity. Note also that the trajectories described by perturbations of the vector field have a regular helical shape only in vacuum, that is, in the absence of fields (distortions of the globally minimal vector field), while gravitational fields change the pitch of the helical lines, and calibration fields are responsible for twisting the helical lines.
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I propose for a discussion my study regarding some aspects of Aristotle's ontology. I am interested in all comments - apart from insults -.
The study has been published in the Revue Roumaine de Philosophie, Vol 64, Issue 1, January-June 2020, pp. 39-71.
Keywords: Aristotle, instance, Categories, Metaphysics, substance.
In my contribution, I deal with some aspects concerning the textures, which, in my opinion, represent the bearing structures of Aristotle’s ontology.
Throughout my investigation, I show that, within Aristotle’s ontology, the basic status of any individual/particular entity consists in its being an instance of a property or of a complex of properties: individual/particular entities are, constitutively, concretised properties. Neither bare entities, nor entities which could be neutral to all their properties, are admitted into Aristotle’s ontology; at least some properties represent the very framework of the individual/particular entities. Hence, essences do exist. Aristotle’s interpretation of individual/particular entities is an immediately essentialist one.
I show thereafter the presence, within Aristotle’s ontology, of features which constitutively determine the status of substance and of universal. The complex of the features related to substances and to universals implies the existence of ontological rules making up the framework of any substance as such and of any universal as such. These ontological rules precede the properties belonging to the particular concrete substances as members of a particular species or of a particular genus. Among the ontological rules which govern substances and universals, the rules stating the incompatibility between substance and universal deserve particular attention, since the transgression committed against these rules can provoke the collapse of the whole ontology.
My analysis ends with the description of some facets regarding the role of the essence within the biological field. For this purpose, the soul as essence of biological entities is described in its function as principle of development of the living entities.
I base my inquiry on passages taken from the Metaphysics Mu and Zeta, the Posterior Analytics, the De Caelo, the Categories and the De Anima.
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Dear Professor Aref Wazwaz ,
I thank you very much for your indications.
Yours sincerely,
Gianluigi Segalerba
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Can panpsychist ideas help to solve the hard problem of consciousness? Donald Hoffman’s theory of conscious realism seems to offer scope for solving the hard problem in addition to providing some fascinatingly novel insights into ethics, physics and metaphysics.
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Terry Hyland this sounds fascinating! Can you brief us a little on this theory of Hoffman's and why it may solve this problem? (Also on the problem for those unfamiliar with it?)
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salute the academicians who spread the knowledge and enrich pupil consciousness. I bow down to the researchers who sacrificed their comforts, relations and life to create inventions, theories, models, methodologies and uplifted the Creation from slumber of darkness to the luminous innovative and creative world aspiring to manifest the metaphysical realms yet veiled to the mortal sight and little earthly reason.
Bodh
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The Universe is extremely creative without us - we cannot even manifest a blade of grass! Yet, I agree with you, we are here to find the truth, but that is not the aim of science as we know it. Science builds paradigms, which then get replaced by new paradigms.
Warm regards Tina
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Dear Colleagues!
The main focus of me and the Department, i am honoured to lead at the Southern Federal University (Rostov-on-Don, Russia) is a development of the Teacher Education as well as Teacher Educators at the on-going conditions, resources and restrictions. We try to comprehend, what can a Department of Education and Educational Studies do to respond the 4 main challenges:
1. What are Education, Teacher and all the Metaphysics of European and Russian Cultures in the context of the XXI Century?
2. What should be a Teacher Education Curriculum, and moreover, what principles should be chosen to make it up?
3. What are Technologies to stimulate continuous professional advance of teachers? Are they obviously IT and AI, or should we treat this concept in a more broad way?
4. How can we treat the management system in general and teacher education to get it a factor of development, not a detention?
We will have discuss these and many other important questions at the platform "Urait" on 13th of January, (15.00 by MSK, 13.00 by CET). Registration is already open here: http://urait.ru/events/1714
ATTENTION, PLEASE: The discussion will be in Russian WITHOUT translation, but if you're not scared with this fact, HEARTFULLY WELCOME!
Sincerely Yours, Alexandre G. Bermous (Dr.of Education, Professor, Head of the Department of Education and Educational Studies at the Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, Russia)
m.tel: +7(904)503-40-18
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Greetings for 2021! I think there are two approaches to this question (1) Teacher education that is timeless (2) Specific requirements of the 21st century. I'll do the second first..
Common thoughts about the specific requirements of the 21st century include - preparing students and teachers for an unknown, constantly, rapidly changing future, characterised by technology, climate and planetary well-being, the development of creativity (creative, new solutions), perhaps a much more radical approach to schooling - changing the walls, locations, curriculum, age groups, individual differentiation.....There are also many teaching pathways - and people are not settled necessarily into these for life - preparing teachers initially for the next 5-10 years maybe as much as can now be done. It is not a 'one-off'.
The timeless requirements of teaching for which teacher education needs to help prepare are: That teachers are committed to the wellbeing and development of each child entrusted to them, that they can be flexible in their educative approaches, that they are themselves continuing learners, committed to their own development as human beings, that they are curious, thoughtful, caring, and have the personal resources to cope with a variety of students, all of whom will need versatility, patience, insight. If people are going to 'train' to teach - it is not a mechanistic, methodological matter only - it is deeply personal.
My research is about a 'holistic principle' for education and therefore teacher education in the 21st century: That children (students) and their learning, and the universe in which human beings participate are viewed from a 'whole' perspective. This perspective is fundamental to contemporary teacher education. Best. N
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Hi! I'm looking for theories, methods and approaches to study the history/evolution/conception of a given concept/term/label/topic within a given scientific discipline, mainly through the (textual) analysis of the discipline's (pivotal) writings. I'm particularly interested in approaches that would draw from ontology, terminology, conceptual analysis, conceptual history, historiography, etc., but I don't really know where to start. I'm especially interested in what the discipline's most influential writers have to say about a specific object, however they might have labelled it, and how the discipline's various theories and approaches regard that object. The approach would have to work both semasiologically (from a label to its concepts) and onomasiologically (from a concept to its labels), as there is no necessary relation between a given label and a given concept. Any ideas? Thank you very much!
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For the evolution of a mathematical conception you might look at Imre Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery.
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Rationality is itself an elusive term. There are debates on the definition and criteria of rationality. The primary assumption of the naturalized and non-naturalized rationality on normative conditions has been a puzzling issue.
Neither Naturalist nor non-naturalist able to provide universally recognized criterion like laws of physics.
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Rationality is a complex construction. Rationality includes logical inference and avoiding inconsistency, but it also involves judgements where the rational agent is trying to uncover truths or at least be sufficiently right to maximise chances of survival. It is tempting to say that rational agent will always try to follow a strategy to achieve some objectives. That may be true, but rationality requires more by requiring the rational agent to assess evidence in support of or against a judgement in a way that is verifiable by another rational agent. I think that the requirement of evidence assessment is normative; otherwise the rational agent could end up supporting a judgement that is not supported by evidence at all. But judgement is often a matter of subjective likelihood, and theories emerge when accounting for the evidence which do not meet the currently accepted norms for acceptance. Examples of this include in science include Galileo's theory of cosmology and Mendel's theory of genetics. Thus rationality is amenable to the imposition of norms, but the norms themselves need to be adaptable to revision in the light of new evidence and new theories which account for that evidence.
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i mean, i know that its classic rols and thats modern physics, but... why?
it can be metaphysics, because for example We all have to die, but something called motivation for survival takes us in the opposite direction, maybe the world has soul
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Good question. Why is there not nothing, but rather something, namely, being? One answer only: GOD.
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The knowledge claim about the possibility of Artificial Super-Intelligence in the future raised several questions for us. is it a metaphysical possibility or a philosophical jargon? Can artificial intelligence surpass human intelligence- can A.I machines (which are functionally and behaviourally identical to human agent ) builds independently without the intervention of human intelligence (the A.I machines not only can work but also think like human beings)? Can there be a singularity in the field of artificial intelligence in the future? The fastest development in the field of A.I. within two decades makes us think about future prospects of A.I and the possible threats to humanity in the future. There are several ethical issues are concerned which has to be addressed. If rationality is the criterion for the autonomy of the agency of an organism, as stated by Immanuel Kant, then can Artificial Intelligent machines qualify the criteria of rationality for the status of Autonomy which is applied to the human organism.
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Interesting thought, and still with an unexpected result.
Super-intellect is created by man through mathematical algorithms. Naturally, when the database becomes more than our consciousness, it looks amazing. Even at times it is pretty trusting that the yak is frightening at times. But that is not how it all depends on us creators, how much we trust the presented results of artificial intelligence. Of course, not all tasks can be solved with artificial intelligence because people are different from each other and it can always be that a solution cannot be solved.
Only if a new algorithm is created without human intervention, and then a super intellect can then be surprised.
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-A technical question is a question of the instrumental reasoning, and regards the 'how'.
-A metaphysical question is a question about the 'essence' of things and human beings, for instance, Husserl's question of 'Wesenschau', or Heidegger's question of the 'forgottenness of being' question.
Thanks for all answers. Marc.
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Dear Martin,
Thanks for your answer. If you view science as a cybernetic enterprise (see a.o. Radnitzky, G. ,Contemporary Schools of Metascience, (1970) Akademifoerlaget, Goeteborg, two parts in one book), then there are more points to discuss.
However, my thanks for your remarks go home. Marc.
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The question is wether we could differentiate the two procedures: a) Information sent by an transmitter/emitter and b) Information received by a receiver.
If these procedures could be distinctive, then how we could exclude the possibility that information reaches receiver simultaneously with its emission, and not that the time elapsed (according to receiver) is due to receiver's (in)ability to encode it?
Is there a possibility that information-transfer consists of two mechanisms: one simultaneous and the other with light's speed? Obviously, the later is the time-related one.
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Dear Ioannis Hadjidakis,
If we take the law of conservation of energy serious every emission of energy is at the same moment a receiver of energy, otherwise energy cannot be conserved. Unfortunately, in phenomenological physics we only pay attention to the observable phenomena, like matter. The result is that we propose there must be an amount of distance and time before one phenomenon can influence another phenomenon.
In a non-local universe – our present concept of reality – everything influences everything simultaneously. This seems “crazy” because we observe a distance and a delay of time before one phenomenon shows the influence of another phenomenon.
Therefore we have to split our ideas about observable reality into two different concepts:
  1. the mechanism of change everywhere in space (the cause behind the existence of energy);
  2. the direction of every change within space (the direction of energy transfer).
Space at the macroscopic level is homogeneous and isotropic. Therefore we have to conclude that the mechanism behind change everywhere is a basic property of space (1). We know this basic property because of the existence of fixed amounts of energy, the quanta.
But all those local changes must be synchronized otherwise there is violation of the law of conservation of energy (2). That means that the direction of the transfer of quanta is directed by the vectorization of space. A vectorization that is caused by the local differences of energy.
Quanta are propagated in space with the speed of light and vectors act instantaneous (vectors don’t transfer energy, vectors dictate the direction of the energy transfer and visa versa).
In other words, the whole problem is caused by our habitude to think with the help of the phenomenological point of view. If we accept that the whole universe is acting as a whole, the problem no longer exists.
With kind regards, Sydney
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recently, I am studying on the relation between Fichte and Pragmatists, so, I really want to read above article,can you recommend some articles?
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Pragmatism is a method for settling metaphysical questions by tracing their practical consequences. The dispute is idle if no practical issues arise in the process. The last sentence provides a clue to my thought on the subject because metaphysics is never out of business. The failure to draw positive consequences from a issue is due to the poverty of the questioning process rather than too the limitations of the answer. Thus, it seems that pragmatism as method is not metaphysical in nature.
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Green beans were infested with rhizoctonia Solani though not sure what AG is
Said this because nothing is really reliable when artificial inoculation happens and the three points triangle is really a matter of circumstances in that case
Thank you
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the koch postulate and anastomosis help a lot in diagnosing the infected beans roots
Thank you
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In his Principia, in the Motte translation, Scholium at p. 77, he writes of time, in order to remove "certain prejudices": “Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature flows equably without regard to anything external, and by another name is called duration”.
In the Motte translation, p 506, Newton says: “... for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy."
Is it possible that he set aside the issue of time in order to work out the consequences of a absolute time axiom? That absolute time was for Newton a provisional hypothesis?
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According to Aristotle, time is a register of motions: if there were no motion there would be no time; if time is eternal it is because motion is eternal, not the other way around; that which does not move, i.e. the first mover (and nothing else), is timeless, everything else exists 'in time' and if a thing existing in time is at rest it is only relatively to other things.
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1) There is some tradition in philosophy of mathematics starting at the late 19th century and culminating in the crisis of foundations at the beginning of the 20th century. Names here are Zermelo, Frege, Whitehead and Russel, Cantor, Brouwer, Hilbert, Gödel, Cavaillès, and some more. At that time mathematics was already focused on itself, separated from general rationalist philosophy and epistemology, from a philosophy of the cosmos and the spirit.
2) Stepping backwards in time we have the great “rationalist” philosophers of the 17th, 18th, 19th century: Descartes, Leibniz, Malebranche, Spinoza, Hegel proposing a global view of the universe in which the subject, trying to understand his situation, is immersed.
3) Still making a big step backwards in time, we have the philosophers of the late antiquity and the beginning of our era (Greek philosophy, Neoplatonist schools, oriental philosophies). These should not be left out from our considerations.
4) Returning to the late 20th century we see inside mathematics appears the foundation (Eilenberg, Lavwere, Grothendieck, Maclane,…) of Category theory, which is in some sense a transversal theory inside mathematics. Among its basic principles are the notions of object, arrow, functor, on which then are founded adjunctions, (co-)limits, monads, and more evolved concepts.
Do you think these principles have their signification a) for science b) the rationalist philosophies we described before, and ultimately c) for more general philosophies of the cosmos?
Examples: The existence of an adjunction of two functors could have a meaning in physics e.g.. The existence of a natural numbers - object known from topos theory could have philosophical consequences. (cf. Immanuel Kant, Antinomien der reinen Vernunft).
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There is a view that if mathematical categories are kinds of mathematical structure, then what is important mathematically are the functors from one category to another, because they provide a means of find a neat way of discovering a new property in a category by translating proofs in another category. This is a way of formalising reasoning by "analogy". Personally I find reasoning about categories as abstract algebras difficult and unintuitive, and find it much easier to look at a concrete realisation of a category than considering a category with a list of pre-defined desirable properties; but I recognise that that is a matter of learning preferences.
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Energy and force are metaphysical things to describe physical things!
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Surely no
Best Regards Haikel Ben Hamed
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  1. “Black magic” reality or myth?
  2. What is magic?
  3. What is black magic?
  4. Does it exists?
  5. Do the concept of Black magic have significant effects on Human economics, sociology and creativity?
  6. Any proven scientific references of black magic?
  7. What are “magical mysterious Spells?”
  8. Any scientific prove that magical spells works?
  9. What can be expected mechanism by which spells works?
  10. Electromagnetic field & quantum spectrum get effects by magical spells and magical products?
  11. Does acoustic-optics property of human voices can effect brain waves and neural combinations? Any proven references?
  12. Ghosts, Metaphysical products, or any Undefinable Energy Objects (UEO), "shadow shapes" etc have any link with black magic
  13. Black magic in real is a refine example of an illusionary mythologies?
  14. If it exists then what can be its treatments?
  15. Any scientific explanation for “Black magic”?
  16. Any other point you want to add
Many Thanks
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There was a time when people said that radiation from a stone was impossible, that would be magic… they could not belief... Today X-Ray is common known phenomenon…
What is magic? Special skills to elevate over the laws of matter?
Everything is Energy which can be converted so matter can be formed in this way. This is magic, because we do not know the rules of energy, we belief that consciousness is a product of matter (Darwin) so our imagination is already limited and because of that we explain some things as 'magic'. But Levitation or to control the 'chi' is just a skill which can be trained, like playing an instrument as well.
Every skill level deppends on the imagination which depends on the mind set. It is always the following cascade: 1. Conception 2. Perception 3. Action
An Exapmle: Track reading. I you are the first time in your life together with an Indian track reader he can say "...look over there, a fox-track, there the fox stopped a short time an saw a duck flying away…" An you think that this is imposible (magic) because you see nothing on the ground. But you are hungry and the ability of that Indian is important to chase an animal, because there is Nothing else to eat in this great forest. After some day yo decide to belief and you Change your conception (he can see tracks, although you can't, so the track is there). Than you follow the Indian for one year and more and more you learn to see tracks in the snow, in the dirt and within the years yo can detect every little aspect on the ground and so you change your perception. Through all the years in the forest you learned a lot about every animal living there and some day you have the ability to find any animal you want, you are able to act like the Indian... Every other would say that your action-level is magic (like you did it the first time).
To summon an individual ( a deamon or whatever) in the whide sphere of beeings (when you know the rules) is complex bit you just need to know the rules. Than you can force a beeing to do things for you (a lot of people would call that 'magic' as well). This is certainly black magic, because you force and do not respect the will of the summoned individual. This is the general definition of 'black' in this context.
When you do things not in harmony with the will of the absolute AND the will of the beeing, the person, or whoever is involved, you do not respect their free will or the will of the absolute and what you do is 'black'. In this way you can practice black magic, black healing, black regulating, black trading and so on... Black means: NOT in harmony. When you do your stuff in harmony, you do not Need 'magic', and if you need it nevertheless - you will get the magic power suddenly from the absolute. We knor examples of this magic powers when People rescued another for example...
But there are a lot of human inkarnations in the world who belief (god-averted) in "needings" and fear of having too little and sattisfite their starvation by consuming others or the planet - this is black magic as well. And sadly this plays an importand role in the direction of the mass (politics) today, because the black mind-set behind is widespread and popular…
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Franz Brentano's book On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle describes the different modalities of being. How are these related to Syllogistics and finally to modern logics and category theory?
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Ask a scientist where he got his original idea from.
Some will say a dream, others struck when walking across a park,
none knows.
So thing just seem to descend from metaphysics into the concrete. As if knowledge were there, but it is just beyond reach...something like the irrational mind, 10 times the rational.
Again, deductive logic only plays a minor role for us. You dont find something new through deduction, or only very rarely. Analogy and induction mostly apply.
Firstly you draw out something very sketchy, then you start completing it.
When you are finally done it sounds more like you deduced it, but not so.
H.G.
Sounds like philosophers converted into science writers for the general public,
your description. It may be true.
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yes, I agree. Shankara in the 10th century said the same, and Nagarjuna asked why even bother with Metaphysics. My is why is Why is there Nothing rather than someThing? You'll find the paper somewhere , on Research Gate or Academia, edu, certainly in Sophia. Best
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The subject is not related to the metaphysical term, but it is related to what they want to argue about this term and what they want to reach under the guise of the term .
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Walter Kasper and Schelling
The interest of the young Kasper, who took as his basis of reference and discussion the philosophy of the second Schelling, follows by and large the path that was opened up by Drey. The latter had drawn the lines of a theology conceived as a positive science by adapting in an original manner a number of Schelling’s ideas on the methodological and encyclopaedic plane. It was ‘a topic tied to Tübingen’ where Kasper had learned ‘to reflect more deeply on Schelling’s thought’.
As he himself writes in the Preface to his The Absolute in History, ‘the impulse to theological research on German idealism occurred to me on the basis of my familiarity with the rich theological world of the Tübingen School of the nineteenth century, into which I was introduced in my studies by my esteemed teachers, Prof. Dr. J. R. Geiselmann and Prof. Dr. F. X. Arnold.’
The commitment and the goal that Kasper set for himself were exceptional, since the literature on Schelling’s Philosophy of Revelation and on his system of positive philosophy in general were, and are still, ‘the object of contradictory judgments, mostly unfavourable’. Schelling himself, after all, in his lectures on the philosophy of revelation (Berlin 1841/42) quickly disappointed the expectations and hopes of those, above all theologians, who expected in his programme a synthesis of philosophy and religion. ‘The success of curiosity continued for some time. But the malicious campaigns of his opponents, […] the growing exhaustion among the students, the anachronism of a philosophy that went against the currents of the time […] put an end to this late glory.
For all this difficulty, the young Kasper took the task seriously and dedicated to the philosophy of the second Schelling ‘a well-researched work leading to the recognition not only of his theological value but also of his contemporary perspective.’ In particular, the thesis for his habilitation intends to respond to a dual task: 1) to offer a robust and close reconstruction of the text in the sense of historiographical faithfulness, but at the same time 2) elucidate the impulses, the stimuli, and the orientations which theology received in the Catholic Tübingen School from Schelling’s philosophy and which it can appropriate today for a renewal of theological method no longer content with the repetition of the traditional formulations of so-called baroque Scholasticism. In this way, the second Schelling came to be seen as a forerunner of the positive theology of our own time. In fact, Kasper approaches Schelling convinced that ‘problems and systems are open to each other. The question we must ask ourselves is whether the particular presentation and the form of Schelling’s thought can facilitate categories for the elucidation of aspects of Christianity which in the tradition expressed in a more scholastic manner have remained mostly obscured. This applies above all to the historicity of Christianity on which Schelling constantly insists. On this point, the possibility of an encounter with a biblically oriented theology could be greater than is generally admitted.’
The extent to which Kasper accentuates common aspects that were dear to the Tübingen School can already be seen from the title of his work: The Absolute in History according to Schelling’s late philosophy. It deals with a topic which ‘accompanies Schelling’s reflections throughout practically the entire arc of his development; it is essentially tied to the religious problematic with which the philosopher from Leonberg wrestled, in various ways, in all phases of his research. […] A profound metaphysical thinker such as Schelling, entirely captivated by the problem of the relationship between the infinite and the finite, between Absolute being and becoming in human consciousness, could not avoid being constantly confronted with the topic of history, specifically history in metaphysical perspective (first) and (subsequently) in that of positive theology.’
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Faith Bays many thanks for your reply. What I posted is only a succint statement that will be published soon on the International Journal of Philosophy and Theology.
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-Mathematics is known to every scientist: it is a synthesis of geometry and arithmetic.
-Metaphysics is generally (because here and there, there are misconceptions, e.g. with 'intuition' which remains unexplained) known as worldview.
-Abstraction is mathematically explicitly unexplained (that is the why of my question): it is generally a shorthand, an abbreviation, or compression, by which you can think about thinking itself, a sort of 'meta-level'.
-Metaphysical abstraction is only generally known as 'imagination' or 'intuition' (ascribed to humanities and arts).
Thanks for your answers! Marc.
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Marc Carvallo. What I want to expose in the first paragraphs of my answer, is what can currently be understood by conceptualism. Abstract ideas, abstractions and concepts have no real entity in the physical world, but with their mental creation cognitive tools are achieved that can change behavior a lot. For me, non-conceptualism does not exist.
Mathematics begins with the achievement of numerical abstraction, once done, they serve to better know the physical reality. Metaphysical abstractions follow the same cognitive process, but its foundation and use is different.
Ángel
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Are there any evidence or theoretical framework to explain the values of fundamental physical constants? In other words, could be the values of physical constants differents (contingency)? Or is there any physical need to be as they are? Obs.: It is not a metaphysical question.
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It is not a question of one or the other as causality based theology, philosophy and natural science thinks. For dialectics these two opposite are together! Chance (contingency) is blind only when it is not realized in a necessity! There is no determinism in the universe as physics thinks; everything in the universe is madiated not by cause and effect, but by dialectical chance and necessity. Man as a the highest developed subjective aspect (life) of blind and objective Nature (contradiction of living and non-living matter) possesses in an historical evolutionary way, freedom of the will to change objective Nature and also himself reducing his contradiction with Nature.
The following quote from Frederick Engels will make it more clear: “Hegel was the first to state correctly the relation between freedom and necessity. To him, freedom is the appreciation of necessity. “Necessity is blind only in so far as it is not understood”. Freedom does not consist in the dream of independence of natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends. This holds good in relation both to the laws of external nature and those which govern the bodily and mental existence of men themselves – two classes of laws which we can separate from each other at most only in thought, but not in reality.
Freedom of the will therefore means nothing but the capacity to make decision with real knowledge of the subject. Therefore the freer a man’s judgement is in relation to a definite question, with so much the greater necessity is the content of this judgement determined; while the uncertainty, founded on ignorance, which seems to make an arbitrary choice among many different and conflicting possible decisions, shows by this precisely that it is not free, that it is controlled by the very object it should itself control. Freedom therefore consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature which is founded on knowledge of natural necessity; it is therefore necessarily a product of historical development. The first men who separated themselves from the animal kingdom were in all essentials as unfree as the animals themselves, but each step forward in civilization was a step towards freedom.” (Anti-Dṻhring).
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In the first of the influential conferences on "Speculative realism" held in 2007, Ray Brassier stated the following problem: "If the structure of reality produces the structure of thinking, then the challenge is to avoid both transcendentalism and a kind of pragmatism which would say that evolutionary history [...] guarantees the congruence between representation and reality as a function of adaptational necessity, so that only creatures that have a cognitive apparatus that is appropriate to their kind of biophysical environment will be able to survive. And this is a claim that fuels much of naturalised epistemology, but one that I think is metaphysically problematic, because there is no reason to suppose that evolutionary adaptation would favour exhaustively accurate beliefs about the world". However, I have not found, beyond this remark, any research about the relationship between speculative realism and this evolutionary reliabilism, which is surprising given that, due to its opposition to any kind of "correlationism" such as transcendental philosophy, speculative realism seems committed to some kind of natural account of the role of human knowing capacities. Does anybody know further research in this direction?
Thanks in advance
Claudio
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Here are some sources that address the issue you mention.
Cohen, Jonathan
2015 “Perceptual representation, veridicality, and the interface theory of perception,” in Psychonomic Bulletin and Review (Psychonomic Society/Springer), vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 1512-1518 (http://link.springer.com/journal/13423/22/6/page/1, accessed: 28 March 2016).
(In the latter journal issue there is a lively discussion in several articles.)
Hoffman, Donald D.
2008 “Veridical perception,” in Edge (Edge.org) (http://edge.org/response-detail/11942, uploaded: 2008, accessed: 30 January 2015).
2016 “The interface theory of perception” (preliminary version), in Current Directions in Psychological Science (Sage Publications), vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 157-161 (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303889739, uploaded: 25 July 2017, accessed: 24 July 2017).
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I'm interested in finding out about the nature of ethical knowledge for an epistemology course. However, I am not sure how to go about doing this -- do I apply the standard test of knowledge (JTB+x) or are there other ways of relating metaethics to epistemology?
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I doubt their is ethical knowledge that is other than faith-based. They is ethical argument.
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It is expected that the next great leap forward in physics shall reconcile quantum mechanics with relativity within a single unifying mathematical construct.
Underpinning this hope lies a very fundamental assumption - specifically, that both quantum mechanics and relativity describe the same thing - the physics of that which exists - the universe!
Although, quantum mechanics and relativity are distinguished in terms of the scale at which they apply, our inability to reconcile these two distinct areas of physics mathematically poses philosophical problems within the context of a universe the existence and persistence of which strongly suggest that a reconciliation must necessarily be possible.
This may be a mistake!
In order to explain clearly what I mean I would ask the reader to indulge me whilst I use a metaphor to describe the beginning of the universe. Let us imagine that the universe does not begin from nothing - it starts as a single unified mega-massive coherent wave function! We shall represent this wave function as a car windshield. A discontinuity occurs!- a pebble hits the windscreen and a maze of cracks appear.
Now, cracks (or discontinuities) need not be static, they can evolve over time and they could, theoretically, embody rules of symmetry and conservation - thermodynamics. If this were the case and these discontinuities formed the boundary conditions of OUR existence, then there would be no reason why we would not call these unfolding discontinuities reality - the universe.
But, here we hit a problem. Although cracks or discontinuities may have effects they are not things in themselves - you cannot take a crack and wave it about. A discontinuity has absolutely no ontological status.
So, what does exist within this scenario that I am creating? What exists is what is between the cracks - the un-collapsed wave function. Of course, this flies in the face of the Copenhagen Interpretation - that the wave function is simply a mathematical construct that has no ontological status.
If we reverse this convention something quite interesting happens that might have relevance to the Relativity/QM problem.
The classical world of physics is one that we infer from our interaction with the world - our senses. If what we experience of the world is simply the unfolding of discontinuities in space and time then what classical physics describes is an implicit reality that, in fact, has no ontological status at all. Whereas, if we accept that the wave function describes an ontological state, then quantum mechanics describes is that which DOES exist!
Can the Relativity Quantum Mechanics problem be resolved by appreciating that the things that they describe have different ontological statuses?
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Christopher,
My point of view is that quantum mechanics has a kind probabilistic nature that we can get rid of if we consider every variable and parameter (different from the probabilistic nature that we are familiar with in quantum mechanics) at Planck scale. As the scale magnifies, the probabilistic nature magnifies too. I believe that they can be unified at Planck scale and I think that's how String theory works.
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Events such as... thought, freedom and consciousness are conditioned to the very structure of the Universe in its expression and possibilities. To imagine that these events so important to the human being can be known by the geometry that they exhibit, is the same as to be able to anticipate the future of the behaviors, the creativity and the inner self of each human being, except God.
If the Universe defines the space of possibilities of things, at no time did it stop creating life and galaxies. But it is up to the human being to make good use of this knowledge, which unlike the Universe, is not capable of creating life and not even the galaxies.
If true..., what intrigue you most?
Image retrieved from the link:
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I am agree with my colleague Dr. Ioan. Hadjidakis
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-By conception I mean the substantivation of to conceive which is somewhat problematic because to conceive is nearer to to think. In Germanic languages it is the substantivation of begreifen (substantivised as Begriff, in Dutch begrip) which if translated in English is nothing but to understand.
-Perception is nothing but the substantivation of to perceive. Everybody knows what it means: it is nothing but letting our senses do their job. In science it is (unfortunately) reduced to observation. In other words, it is by definition 'a posteriori'.
-Ontology stands for one of the components of metaphysics as a system.
-In science everybody knows that it is based on perception or observation. However, conception (putting aside the linguistic problem mentioned above) is innate (see the Kantian 'a priori').
-So, my question could be translated as: Is the 'a priori' ontologically earlier than the 'a posteriori'?
-Please check whether my logic is right. Thanks for your answers. Marc.
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The thanks I return for the interesting debate. All the best to you, Marc! Jean
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Hello everyone. As is well known, Heidegger's Kant and the problem of metaphysics provides a rather polemical presentation of Kant's thought, including a comparison between the three famous questions in the Critique of pure reason (What can I know?, What ought I to do? What may I hope?) and the addition of a fourth in the Logic (What is man?). Given the rather unorthodox and sometimes hasty approach taken by Heidegger, is there any other author that you may suggest that has analysed the specific problem of the relation between these two texts?
Thanks in advance
Claudio
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An Essay on Man by Cassirer
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In a study, I have used three paradigms i.e. critical, post structural and post modern in a single study. I have also selected theories to build theoretical framework accordingly, representing the all paradigms. Isn't it good or more reliable idea to view the subject as the epistemology and metaphysics of these paradigms are different?
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Approaching research using three different epistemologies will undoubtedly yield interesting results and scope for comparison. It will also yield insights into the paradigms themselves and enhance your thinking about philosophy as practice. However, great care is needed here. Are you attempting to create one method, drawing on aspects of three distinct methodological bases? or are you creating three different and distinct methods to investigate the same phenomena? If it is the former, then you may have a very confused set of results and your conclusions may be flawed - like attempting to add apples, oranges and umbrellas. You would need an additional framework with which to make sense of the combined exercise. Dangerous territory involving a great deal of work.
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I am asking this since I am dealing with Metaphysics Zeta 3, Zeta 13 and Zeta 14. Moreover, I am analysing the arguments of Metaphysics Gamma 5.
Yours sincerely,
Gianluigi Segalerba
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Dear Wulf,
yes, I am referring to Luca's Angioni project. I think we could ask him to pose something in English.
Best regards,
Gi
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-For problem soving feature of the empirical science, see Popper's life-works and publications. The same hold for his demarcation of 'true' science and 'pseudo' science (apparently: metaphysics).
-However, metaphysics regards the 1st person science (see Heinz Pagels ,Perfect Symmetry, pp. 361 ff.). Why should the 1st person science be discarded for the sake of solving the 'factual' problems?
Why are assumptions and presuppositions, (shortly: metaphysics) prejudgedly not worth inquiring?
-Thanks for your answer(s)! Marc.
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Thank you, Nabi, for reading and understanding my question! Marc.
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Hello André,
Thank you, but discussion on non-newtonian physics is off-topic here, and there's no need to reaffirm my viewpoint expressed above, the sentences seem clear. Maybe this fits in other threads at RG.
Cheers, Ed Gerck
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Dear professor Graham Oppy,
-My research regards the Christian philosophy of religion (since 14 years of lectureship) that is based upon the analytical philosophy.
-The analytical philosophy is based upon (to a great extent) the mathematics and the laws of thought.
-Well, mathematics both as arithmetic and geometry is limited, whereas the Christian philosophy of religion regards a.o. God Who is unlimited.
-Consequently, can the Christian philosophy of religion or the Christian metaphysics be computationalized? Thank you for the answer! Marc
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Thank you, Karl, for the very relevant suggestions! Marc
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In the conclusion to the attached article I have categorized SR as metaphysics based on five reasons such as 1) insisting on thinking alone by promoting thought experiment rather than real experiment 2) creating thought instruments with unknown and inconsistent characteristics to do thought experiment, etc.
Do you think if this is a fair treatment of SR? Are all five reasons acceptable criteria?
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The Principleof Relativity is the proposition that the laws of Nature are the same for all unaccelerated frames of reference. It was proposed by Galileo, not Einstein. Galileo presented it in the form of “thought experiments”.
The constancy of the speed of light in a vacuum is a conseuence of Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory. Since it is a “law of Nature” Galileo’s Principle should apply to it. Thus Einstein arrived at Special Relativity. He arrived at it and presented it, through “thought experiments”.
since then, the theory has been amply verified by real experiments. The role of “thought experiments” in Special Relativity is today only pedagogical. They are an aid to understanding, not an integral part of the theory. I cannot see how they render the theory “metaphysical”.
Vikram sees the “observer” in the theory as a “metaphysical entity”. I disagree. In the real world we all know what an “observer” is - a real human being perceiving things. When I encounter “the observer” while reading about relativity, I take that to mean a physicist equipped with any instruments he may require to recieve and send signals, to measure and record distances and times - not at all a metaphysical entity.
If the employment of “thought experiments” in formulating and understanding a physical theory renders that theory “metaphysical”, then all theoretical physics is metaphysical. Because no theory can exist in the absence of thought.
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Why or why not?
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We are by nature contingent, and merely representative of other parts of our specie, so in order to remain vital as a specie we must die. We have no greater importance than that. The problem lies when we isolate ourselves-mind and body-and thereby insist on preferential treatment demanding heaven, souls, etc, whereby to extend the existence of our egos. If we can again visualise ourselves as tiny genes in a huge pool, contributing slightly if at all, we can free ourselves of hyperbole and expectation.
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John Paul
I'm Pleased you are interested . If you want to follow a link provided on research gate you first get a dialog page where you must click to proceed and leave the researchgate site. Or Copy it in your browser.
Harry, the Phrase Science of the Angels is my own from The Way in Divine Metaphysics but relates to Aristotle "A Science such as God Alone could have or God before all others" . As the Limit of our acceptable ambitions.As best explained on the Academy of Divine Metaphysics site itself
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Interesting project; it is very far from my area of experise. Metaphysics is important to study, even if one is not familiar with.
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We consider three aspects of the thought of Bachelard with the aim of an education in the scientific thought: some epistemological obstacles more frequently met in education (La formation de l’esprit scientifique, 1938); the way the scientific reasoning concerns the whole experimental approach and effort of theorization; the complementarities between the scientific process and the literary, artistic or philosophic process in the approach of nature. Did people forget the philosophy of nature in Bachelard's works? It is convenient to present the surrounding nature as a set of realities to be approached under diverse looks: scientific, artistic, philosophic, poetic …
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Dear Olivier,
It is nice of you to bring to the forefront of discussion among RG reseachers the thought of the French epistemologist Gaston Bachelard, an epistemologist that remains largely unknown to many USA thinkers.
You say that you consider three aspects of the thought of Bachelard with the aim of an education in the scientific thought: some epistemological obstacles more frequently met in education (see his famous book, La formation de l’esprit scientifique, 1938); the way the scientific reasoning concerns the whole experimental approach and effort of theorization; the complementarities between the scientific process and the literary, artistic or philosophic process in the approach of nature. These three aspects sound good to me. As you suggest, we can think of education as  process of going beyond or overcoming evren epistemologcal obstacles.
As for Bachelard's philosophy of nature, I like his idea that facts are not given but constrcuted. It is not a mere coincidence that Piaget, known as a contructivist psychologist, epistemologist, and educator, often refers to Bachelard' thinking. Thus, Bachelard did not espouse an empiricist stance. His idea that scientists invented the microscope to prolong reason more than our senses speaks in favor of an applied rationalism, not of a naïve empiricism. I know of no attempts to apply Backelard's thinking to the field of education. So your posting is wellcome and much appreciated.
Best regards,
Orlando.
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I am trying to understand the CRITERIA to be used to assess the plausibility or otherwise of a metaphysical theory. 
To apply  "scientific method"  mutatis mutandis doesn't seem to cut it...
NB - A description of the (important!) Neoplatonistic system formulated by the 3rd Century (CE) Syrian Iamblichus can be found in Wikipedia. 
"Basically, Iamblichus greatly multiplied the ranks of being and divine entities in the universe, the number at each level relating to various mathematical proportions. The world is thus peopled by a crowd of superhuman beings influencing natural events and possessing and communicating knowledge of the future, and who are all accessible to prayers and offerings." From Wikipedia article on Iamblichus, as at 1800 hrs, April 21st, 2017. (My italics)
For "Gillian's Hoop" see my associated project here on RG.
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If you believe that you can find some "metaphysical" notions implausible, it seems that you must have some sense of what is plausible. So perhaps you need to start by trying to state what are implausible features. You will have to address, as well, the skeptical position: why believe that your sense of plausibility is itself plausible?
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I want to know mereology method applied 
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The prominent American philosopher David Lewis used mereology in some of his papers.  All David's papers are available online.  I think you can find them there.
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Flusser acknowledges many times the influence of Husserl and Heidegger on his thinking, but then he goes on to explain that, for him, phenomenology is about the disappearance of the subject-object categories and replacing them with a dual-pole relation. See for example his essay on Edmund Husserl published in the special issue of Intellect (2011) where Flusser says: ''It can be shown that it [knowledge] is a dynamic relation, a sort of arrow. It points from somewhere (a supposed subject), to somewhere (a supposed object). It is ‘intentional’. I can call the point to which it intends, from a. ‘subject’, and -the point to which it intends, to an ‘object’." {Flusser 2012 #338D: 235}
This is an explicit account of intentionality but, in his later philosophy, Flusser does not mention intentionality, yet he subtitles at least two of his books as 'a phenomenology of... gestures/ media'.
In short, what makes Flusser's media work phenomenological insofar as he does not speak of intentionalities there?
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My sincere greetings
The problem with Flusser's philosophy is that the sharp separation between privacy and generality. Yes, it is necessary to pay attention to individual privacy, but we must not sacrifice the participant between the text and the other.
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Everything is energy. Energy has its frequency. If so, there should be an optimal frequency that can stimulate consciousness. However, like music can purify one's mind. However, it still takes the time to transform a person. So, I think that moral cultivation still can not be skipped.
It's due to the best music is coming from a high moral soul.
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 People believe what they saw but the reality is something else .   
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"Kosmos" is the Greek word for order (and beauty, because order means beauty to Greeks). Contributing to order in this world means contributing to Kosmos in this sense, making yourself part of the Kosmos, co-operating with the ordering god (in Plato's sense). -- If the world is a physical world ... is an open question. You only have your perception of it. Blending in with your reason and understanding into this perceived world is all you can reach. It should be enough.
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That there is something outside of our minds is undeniable and what we see,too. But is what we see exactly what there is outside? I see a computer in front of me but is this computer a picture of a computer outside? or there is something else outside and I see this picture which we call it a computer?
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Dear Shahbazi,
I was originally thinking along the lines of how different animals have the ability to sense phenomena that other animals cannot. For example, I cannot smell things that other animals can. And how do we factor in mental illness that allows people to perceive things that others insist are not there. Or how does synesthesia fit into the mix. Each of our views is shaped by our essences. Whose view is closer to 'exactly what there is outside' and who decides?
In a quantum mechanical sense, consider the differences between an observer who measures a specific electron as spin up and its theoretical counterpart (in a different world, a different history, or with a different mind) who measures that particle as a spin down electron. At the time of the measurement these observers are physically identical so there is nothing about their essences that differentiates them except for the measurements they make. But, neither of these distinct observers is observing 'exactly what there is outside', since neither measurement is privileged over the other.
The privileged perspective belongs to the observer of the intact superposition of every possible state of every possible quanta in the universe. This perspective provides the observer with direct access to every possibility, everywhere at every point in time.
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I had been thinking that Einstein had given us the Theory of Relativity. Any thing in this world will be between time, space and matter. Is there anything which is beyond relativity. We all knows the fundamental dimesions of the world are length, breadth, height and Time. Can we formulate something in Fifth dimensions.. I am trying to figure out What??? May be academicians like you can help me into the same.
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As a layman, I suppose you can think of multiple dimensions like this.
Suppose there were only three dimensions (x, y and z), So answer this questions: Can two different things occupy the same space? No. UNLESS, there was a fourth dimension. Then there could be two objects, located at [x, y, z], but at different TIMES.
Now take it further, Can two different objects occupy the same location [x,y,z] at the SAME TIME [t]? No, UNLESS there was a fifth dimension, etc.
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 In course of developing different preparatory details for our upcoming  Conference on Science Philosophy interplay ( please visit http://indianphilosophyblog.org/2016/09/07/dialog-across-traditions-part-i/ ) , what we are experiencing  is significantly about a wide spectrum of misunderstanding about the role of metaphysics in developing Physical Theories !  People  most often discuss about the issues like Chinese Science or Indian Science .... without any proper reference to this issue . But hadn't the issue been settled long back during the 30s of the last Century after the failure of the Logical empiricists  ? Is it not a closed issue now  leaving though a lot many good understandings  about the role of Metaphysics ?
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If you read A. Koyré, Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend, it´s clear it´s impossible Physics without Philosophy
- if a physicist  read those authors and a huge number of other “eminent philosophers” that raised huge number of other own mainstream philosophical  doctrines that differ from the philosophers’ doctrines above [which are different also, though],
but, since any mainstream philosophical doctrine cannot be proved as indeed true and equally cannot be disproved and so all of them – and the above as well, of course,  well co-exist simultaneously,
and (s)he will follow as the doctrines' claims,
then poor physicist  will make in physics nothing at all…
Cheers
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Can anyone explain to me the reasoning/physics/metaphysics behind this claim  quoted below in (A) and (A1) below.
It  concerns qualiatively identical coin tosses having the same results in a universe with perfect rotational symmetry (perhaps I have not presented it exactly correct, for example the events may have to occur at the same time as well or whatever is required to allow one to convert the spatio temporal positions of one event into another). I presume it has to with about the literal indiscernability of qualitative identical events which when rotated, can be considered the same numerially identical event); as opposed to any claim specific to particular outcomes, set up, in-determinism/in-determinism and the precise chance values involved, but i do not want to speculate further for fear of being presumptious or coming off as idiotic or ignorant.
The claim is on page 384 of attached article or as below; for example does apply to any in-deterministic or chancy event or does it render every event (deterministic) or rather in some sense not deterministic, but numerically identical
(A)'A failure of this principle would leave us with an unexplainable asymmetry
between the coins. Some coins would be more informative than others: learning the
outcome of some coins would allow us to eliminate more sequences than others.
Maybe one could put this down to some asymmetry in the set-up, yet it is clear that
one can spell things out to make the coins as symmetrical as you like: the coins
could be arranged in a circle in a universe with perfect rotational symmetry and you
could know this fact, for example."
and in footnote 18 on the same page:
  (A1) "if the universe actually had perfect rotational symmetry we
would find out that every coin landed heads after learning that one of the coins landed heads, so we may
have to weaken this condition slightly. This issue doesn’t arise in the variant puzzle using blank metal"
discs. (page 384)
Can anyone explain to me the reasoning behind this claim; i am not doubting so much as wanting to know the reasoning behind its being true. I presume perfect rotational symmetry applies both to the spatial and temporal dimension as well; so that any qualiative idential event as distinct space time point, could permuted into the spatio-temporal position of any other, rendering it the same event
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The whole article is weird, and replete with confusing statements, involving among others constant confusion between small numbers and zero. I would not worry about not understanding it.
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Do quantum function is decorated with some membrane like fictional and structural aspects as well?
Only the charges, position, velocity etc. are behind such makeup of Quantum membranes?
Can the concept of “Quantum Bubble” based on specified/directed energy capsule is characterise by quantum membrane, be a good idea for many mysteries behind some of today`s un-understandable phenomenon, especially with reference to metaphysics?
Do some minimum amount of energy is requirement for creation of movement in particle along a cover like quantum membrane? Beneath it is a free energy existence? If so then what can the energy level of most basic / fundamental particle?
Only wave-function can make functional existence of quantum bubbles similar to functional charges?
What can be the pros & cons of “Quantum Bubbles” formations?
If energy can get trap into Quantum Bubble then what can be its further applications?
Thanks
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The draw back my be in that this energy use may create voids in the background energy densities and cause ripple affects that we do not know what it will mean.  This could also be good as there may be ways to send information using this kind of voids but it could also be bad as we are not sure if live is dependent on the state of the quantum energy being the way it is???
There is much to be discovered.  I would love to help with that kind of research.. 
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Every theory of everything must be so complicated that it cannot be captured by the human mind. Reality appears to possess a fundamental structure that keeps it relatively coherent and prevents that reality turns into complete chaos. This foundation acts as a kind of DNA that predestinates the evolution of the foundation into a more complicated structure. The structure of the foundation will be rather simple and it is quite probable that current mathematics already contains similar structures. These simple structures are easily comprehensible by skilled scientists. However, what is not so straightforward is the fact that these structures restrict their extension into higher level structures that preserve coherence. It is quite possible that these structures only partly achieve this target and that extra measures must be added in order to achieve sufficient coherence. If this occurs, then what mechanism installs these extra measures and why do these mechanisms exist?
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Also a unified theory must be based on a solid foundation on which all participating sub-theories can be defined. Something like gravitation must emerge from that foundation and the electric and color charges must emerge as well, together with the corresponding fields, Otherwise it will be impossible to unify these sub-models. 
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Karl Jaspers use the term cipher for the path to universal transcendence.  How does relate to the symbols of a syllogism?
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Don't use words.  Use signs, symbols or whatever is necessary to make your idea clear.  Fill out the content of C and A explicitly, and mediate.
Best,
J
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Who was the first to use the term mereotopology, and where in the literature does it appear first?
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I have been unable to find any use of the term earlier than Simons 1987. It's worth noting that he used a hyphen: mereo-topology. But certainly it was being used unhyphenated by the mid-90s.
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According to Dr. M.L. King, "The arch of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice." This very famous quotation is inscribed on the King Memorial in Washington, D.C., and President Obama had it woven into the new rug in the Oval Office in the White House. Is this true or false, and what exactly does it mean? It can be easily thought of as a doctrine of "Divine Providence" or "historical inevitability." But many are skeptical of these ideas. Does "Divine Providence" or "historical inevitability" exist? Can we be sure that the future will eventuate in desired, moral outcomes--that the universe "bends" toward justice? 
The quotation from king's speeches to widely though to derive from a sermon of the 19th-century Unitarian Minister, Theodore Parker. See the following expert account of the matter:
But in the end, the question is whether this is true or false. Does the universe bend toward justice? Can we be sure of the moral outcomes of history? Readers may wish to consider a further quotation in relation to this question, from the Persian poet, Hafiz:
'Tis written on the gates of paradise, "Wo upon him who suffers himself to be betrayed by Fate."
The suggestion here is clearly that it is possible to refuse. This appears to be a rejection of historical inevitability.
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This is the case, dear All, when I do not want to be on the side of skeptics and want to believe that “the universe bend toward justice” and to “be sure of the moral outcomes of history”.
Thinking, that it is better to be naive and trust that History will not disappoint, I understand the following position, too:
“The centuries will roll by, and schoolboys will yawn over the history of our upheavals; everything will pass, but my happiness, dear, my happiness will remain, in the moist reflection of a streetlamp, in the cautious bend of stone steps that descend into the canal's blackwaters, in the smiles of a dancing couple, in everything with which God so generously surrounds human loneliness”.
Vladimir Nabokov. A letter that never reached Russia (1976)
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As we know Heidegger in "Sein und Zeit" and in "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology" deploys a new program of human essence which is based on the mode of existence. In "Sein und Zeit" Heidegger repeats that the essence of Dasein is located in its existence, due to that fact he criticizes an understanding of essence as quidditas. I can understand why Heidegger didn't accept the Aristotelian and Thomistic reducing human essence to quidditas, but I can't understand why he thinks that both of them didn't have a strong philosophy of what he calls Dasein. Especially in case of Aquinas who had a powerful epistemology which influenced the subsequent tradition. I'll be grateful to get your opinions or links for books and articles connected with my question.
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Here's another perspective... I think the attached paper goes a long way in answering the question posed by Dmytriy.
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A problem that the antirealist wants to highlight is that, even admitted that a curve of collected data be the most plausible, it is from an empirical point of view and, at worst, conventional (what-it-looks).We can not exclude that the extra-phenomenal reality (what is) is not described by another curve actually more complex or different. Evidently, scientists have on their side some tools to refine their investigation and use it daily.
The under-determination is the first obstacle to overcome to show adherence of a theory to reality. A simple topic, but not trivial to consider the possibility of under-determination, is the adjustment of the curve.
Let us assume that some scientists have derived experimentally a number of data and have placed them on a graph. If they had to draw the curve (function) that connects two parameters, they can prepare experiments to falsify some of the competing theories, leading them to imagine incorrect data. In addition, the technical tools available to improve and the data become progressively more precise, automatically removing other available theories.
Something similar happened in decreeing the abandonment of the Ptolemaic theory: the use of telescopes made the differences observed growing and brought to light the best predictive power and precision of the Copernican theory.
However, this is not enough for the anti-realist, who can still make the argument for adjusting the curve in a stronger version, logically expressed by a ‘modus ponens’: I mean the scientific realist. (having addressed other forms of realism and anti-realism, from now on, I will use the terms "realist" and "anti-realist" only in relation to the epistemic thesis).
Talking about strong under-determination revives metaphysics. On closer examination, emerge at least two types of interference of metaphysical nature within the domain of epistemic metaphysics, but with two opposite directions. Of course, they are the two sides of the same coin but have a different significance as regards the epistemological question. We try to clarify and define the problem better. The first type of interference is ascending in the sense that it takes root directly in the domain of metaphysics and propagates, 'infecting', up to the scientific world and, more generally, of human knowledge.
It may seem odd the case examined in the Metaphysical Meditations by Rene Descartes. He does nothing but use the typical elements of under-determination.                                        What is significant is the notion of indistinguishability. If we consider more likely that behind the phenomena there is a real world and not a virtual reality is because we believe we have enough evidence to rule out the second possibility. But if the two situations were really indistinguishable, for lack of evidence or because of the complexity of virtual reality, we could not know if what we believe or what we think we know is reliable. The case of Hume's 'causal connection' is a prime example of this kind. The solution to this type of under-determination might be - as some suggest- adopting, with the same evidence available, the less extravagant hypotheses from the metaphysical point of view.
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Alfredo,
Any material that you ever encounter , you did thorugh your consciousness.  So we cannot make a divided here on one side there is some material and on the other side there is a mental.  All that exist , exist for you through its conscious encounter.  The distinctions that we can make are distinction within our conscious encounter.  The whole idea of a gap is totally fictive.  Chalmer's hard problem is a total fiction or totally wrong characterisation of the situation; there is no hard problem.  THe question of how the mental can arise out of the material is based on wrong assumption of the pre-existing of something material that is described by some of our science.   All of our sciences are just knowledge about reality; not REALITY.  The only reality you will ever know, the only reality is LIVED EXPERIENCE and all this knowledge tells something about reality but IS NOT REALITY.  So the idea of building reality out of this knowledge and then trying to see appear EXPERIENCE out of this construction is totally wrong.  Live experience, consciousness will never appear as a property of such construction as the smoke emerging out of the fire because it is what is deep deep down the fire that is constructing everything and through which we learn everything and see everything.  Trying to do just the opposite is not going to work.  We are not going to construct what is contructing. 
Into a world  scientifically/artificially/conceptually constructed there is no responsibility; things just unfolded out of necessity.  They are no ''acting'', ''no creation'' , ''no responsibility'', ''no real actor'' in such a mechanical world.  In such a world, if something happen then it had to happen as by the nature of the original creation and the random events.   If a judge would ask the scientists who is reponsible for a specific crime, the answer would necessarily be : no one.  In science , noboby really exist, no actor.  Do you belief in the world is such a  world of irresponsible happenings?  I don't for very very obvious reasons.  It is so obviously wrong that it is not even worth spending time citing examples.  So we have to realize that this artificial reconstruction is excluding some fundamental reality, the most fundamental reality whics is about making things happen other than they should.  Here we should not try to artificially construct a life form around a metabolism  out of physiological elements and try to robotize a fake responsibility of staying alife.  It won't work!    It has to be in the universe at the most fundamental level of its constructing and at all levels and as we can experience directly. It is very important that we do not convince ourself to be robots for us to be what we are. We have to have the courage to accept our experience and to transform our sciences accordingly and not the other way around. Not being afraid to be called anthropomorphic, romantic, wishfull thinking.  We have to be anthropomorphic and wishfull thinking in a responsible way. 
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There are several meanings and philosophical systems of the term idealism. The most common is that - according to Wikipedia - equates life to a dream even if this statement is not intended to reduce confusion. Idealism, in fact stands in radical contrast with respect to common sense, that would not let us realize to live in a world of fiction; paradoxically, then, just common sense would be the real "sleeper" for the illusion about the existence of a real world outside us.
In making of the Idea, that is, of thought, or the subject, the principle ‘prime’ from which the reality arises and is deduced (the being or object), idealism is opposed in particular to:
dogmatism, that, contrary to idealism, the subject derives its existence from the object and not vice versa. However, it deals of two perspectives in short complementary, based on the same immediate unity of subject and object; to realism, according to which reality exists independently of the subject.
For the idealists, this view would be still at a stage of unawareness, unable to recognize that reality is a production of the human mind. Some idealists, however, did not want to destroy the scientific-ontological system of realism, to materialism, to mechanicism, and to all those theories that are based on a reductionist or utilitarian approach to reality; to them idealism contrasts the unconscious and interior dimension of the individual, emphasizing the dream, the fantasy, the imagination, the moral and artistic sentiment as the main ways that can lead to the truth.
Then there is the case of an empiricist idealism, headed by George Berkeley, that could be considered one of the most radical idealists: his empiricism is opposed to the rationalist conception that the ideas of reason had a basis in the objective reality.
Leibniz (1646-1716) used the term ‘idealism’ to indicate the philosophy of Plato. Although in the history of philosophy the term "idealism" usually indicates a period from the late eighteenth century to the early decades of the next century, the idealist philosophy has actually an extension historically much larger. While recognizing that the German idealism of Hegel, Fichte and Schelling perhaps represents its maximum theoretical consistency, this philosophical movement can not be confined only in this period, being an epistemological vision that runs across all the history of Western philosophical thought, albeit with different nuances.
If the above is now common ‘baggage’, it is still discussed Plato's position in favor of the reality of mathematical entities. In that part of Metaphysics dedicated to the Platonic doctrine of causes, Aristotle (384-322 BC) states, after having recalled among other things that it is both like and unlike the Pythagorean theory, that for Plato, "in addition to sensitive forms and real objects exist as something in between, mathematical entities, which differ from sensible things because they are eternal and differ from the ideal forms because there is a plurality of mathematical entities that are similar, while each ideal shape is in itself unique, individual, "(Metaphysics, I, 6, 987b). For Aristotle, then, Plato admits the existence of "archetypal ideas" of numbers from which, in a similar way to other ideas, derive mathematical numbers. Indeed, in various works of Plato, the Philebus, the Republic, the Letter VII, we find an allusion to the existence of ideal numbers that are archetypes of the numbers used by mathematicians.
In Plato one can therefore assume the existence of the numbers, but with caution to remember that he speaks only as archetypal ideas, a concept of the number very different from mathematical reality that results.
The absolute idealism developed even in a period still dominated by the thought of Kant, through a discussion of his criticism: the idealists, in fact, denied the existence of the noumenon (that was for Kant the reality outside the subject, located beyond its limits to knowledge), and affirmed the existence of the sole phenomenon (reality as we know it), drawing the consequence that there can be only what is in our conscience. This primacy of knowledge of conscience became one of the most significant elements of absolute idealism.
The problem of the Kantian noumenon was due to the fact that, if it is stated that it is unknowable, there is no logical reason to postulate its existence. Admitting the presence of the thing itself independently of the subject who knows it, for example, was for Fichte a dogmatic and irrational position, leading to an inconsistent dualism between subject and object, or between the noumenon and the so-called ‘I think’. Kant considered the ‘I think’ as the summit of critical conscience that was the formal condition without which we could not even think.
It has to be considered that in opposition to materialism, realism and similar ideas, idealism considers the matter as something ontologically secondary against the Idea, as somewhat derivative and with no independent reality, that only from the Idea - that is, the spiritual substance - receives its apparent and impoverished part of reality. Obviously, the sense of idealism is not univocal, but extremely complex because, in the history of thought, it is configured in different ways according to the concept of ideas or spiritual substance dominant in different periods and in different thinkers; a preliminary distinction is necessary between an epistemological idealism, which makes of the thinking subject, understood as a spiritual entity, the focus and starting point of philosophical thought - as in Descartes - without operating a resolution of the entire external reality to thought, and a metaphysical idealism, which on the contrary operates radically unlike that resolution, up to argue that the very act of thought is the act of the creation of the outside world, thus solving the reality of the latter in the activity of thinking, or identifying the absolutely ' being and thinking’, as in the classical German idealism.
Fichte recognized to Kant the merit of having approached the idealistic conception with the doctrine of '"I think," or "transcendental apperception", which remained, however, a formal principle of reality.
Transcendental is the act by which the ego creates the world. This act can not be demonstrated by rational, but that assumption beginning with an intuitive-intellectual act in this transcendental sense: form and content, transcendent and immanent, before the creation of reality (self-consciousness) and simultaneously coincident with it.
In the system of transcendental idealism (Opera (1800) by Schelling the complete system of idealism is exposed, with the complement of the writings on Nature presents the first phase of the thought of Schelling. Philosophy itself and its parts are exposed to according to a gradual continuity within a unified design in which self-consciousness rises to the absolute, caught by an intellectual intuition. Intellectual intuition is "the means of transcendental philosophy," which moves from consciousness to consciousness, by overcoming the conflict between 'nature' and 'I' without recourse to the Kantian 'thing in itself'. Nature in its various stages of development It is but the unconscious manifestation of the spirit (it is "consciousness petrified' ), which is composed, according to a polarity, with the conscious activity exemplified by the representative thought and the demonstrative sciences.
Understanding the unity of absolute knowledge is possible only by an act of intuition universally valid, which Schelling identified with the aesthetic intuition . Absolute is revealed gradually in history. Nature and consciousness progress along a parallel development and following a mutual involvement (though unconscious) described as 'polarity' in which the occurrence of ever higher and complex forms of consciousness matches the progress of nature, by dynamic developing, toward forms ever more complex. By the impulse that pervades it, nature it is revealed as the shape and organization that exceeds the need and reveals itself as freedom, i.e. as spirit. It represents "the odyssey of the spirit" that - while seeking - "escapes himself."
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I suggest to distinguish between several types of objects and their "mapping" in our conscience. The following proposal is based on a stratified ontology.
If somebody talks about a stone in front of her eyes, obviously this proposition relates to a different object than another one about psychological states of living beings, or social facts (e.g. the result of a polling) or even abstractions (e.g. mathematical or logical notions).
I mean, the question: "What is the real thing?" will not be answerable, if we don't take these differences into account. Of course, the above mentioned strata of the universal structure of the world are not neatly separated from each other. But they seem to form layers or levels of reality. Each one evolves with its spedific types of objects and events. So they are at least distinguishable
Now, recognizing these differences it does not make much sense to say that the stone in front of my eyes is something different than as what it appears to me, nor to say "it exists only in my conscience", neither in the Platonian, the Kantian or one of the modern phenomenological meaning of "existence" (perceptional errors reserved, of course). How could we ever handle such a uncertainty in daily life? It is the common sense, which renders all such speculations to the absurd.
But things change when we talk about psychological or social facts, and they change again when talking about abstract objects. The crucial difference seems to be not the classic one between "outer" and "inner" domains of the real, but the amount of necessary normative presuppositions and ad-hoc-interpretations of any appearance in order to create the very object. Clearly, a stone has to be "deciphered", too. In order to appear to our imagination, it has to be transformed into neural information. But this is "only" a kind of translation of an elsewhere determined inner appearance, which may fail, by the way. On the contrary, social facts are exclusively what human beings make out of a pile of loosely related physical facts, adding a lot of normative stuff and interpretative methodology on the way.
Curiously, things return to the objective realm when entering the abstract layer of what I call the "universal structure" of the world. Nobody will seriously doubt the meaning of the notion "triangle" (be it an Euclidian or a non-Euclidian one). That means that although abstract objects are pure collective constructions of cognitively gifted beings, they are as real as physical objects - on their level of reality.
Maybe this approach is able to open a new path In order to overcome the old an thorny dichotomy of idealism ./. dogmatism/materialism (or whatever you call it).
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This of course is, arguably, the seminal problem -- does P=NP?  If one accepts counterfactual definetiveness in QM (and CT as true, of course), then the problem takes on a whole new dimension from the persepctive of Bell's Theorem -- perhaps, even more interestingly, different conclusions suggest themselves depending on whether inhomogeneous (IBI) and homogeneous (HBI) Bell inequalities are considered.  The epistemic, metaphysical, and foundational repurcussions of such an analysis may well prove especially profound. In this regard, how would an affirmative or negative answer to P = NP reflect on the schism between classical physics and QM that Bell's Theorem seems to suggest?
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None. P=NP (or not) is a question of classical computer science. It doesn't have anything to do with quantum mechanics.  Bell's theorem is a mathematical statement about quantum mechanics, so its assumptions are completely independent of the assumptions underlying classical computer science, also. That quantum algorithms can evade the constraints of classical computer science was shown, constructively, by the algorithms of Shor and Grover and the work that these spawned; and (some) constraints on what quantum algorithms can do ``better'' than classical algorithms were established by Farhi, Goldstone and collaborators. 
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How does this relate to causation in his work?
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The target of your question is somewhat unclear, as is indicated by the rather diverse reactions of other respondents. Are you asking for a "simple definition" of dynamis (δύναμις),: the term that Aristotle uses for potency, potentiality, capacity, power, where the translation (into English, say) depends upon the context? As you list your topic as "metaphysics", dynamis would be the most likely candidate for the thing for which you hope to find a simple definition. If so, then there is no one simple definition to be found, but there are several definitions, as is so often the case for Aristotle's key systematic terms, since these are, according to him, typically polysemous. The normal place to start looking is in Metaphysics V — Aristotle's own "dictionary" of key terms. That doesn't always provide what you want, since the dictionary is not always in accord with what Aristotle says elsewhere. Moreover, the definitions provided may be difficult to fathom without reference to the larger discussions where the terms in question are deployed. But, if you are in fact interested in "power" in the sense of dynamis, then you will find Aristotle's own definitions in Metaphysics V, beginning at 1019a15. What he says there, in Tredennick's translation, is this:
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[1019a] [15] "Potency" [δύναμις] means: (a) the source of motion or change which is in something other than the thing changed, or in it qua other. E.g., the science of building is a potency which is not present in the thing built; but the science of medicine, which is a potency, may be present in the patient, although not qua patient. Thus "potency" means the source in general of change or motion in another thing, or in the same thing qua other; [20] or the source of a thing's being moved or changed by another thing, or by itself qua other (for in virtue of that principle by which the passive thing is affected in any way we call it capable of being affected; sometimes if it is affected at all, and sometimes not in respect of every affection, but only if it is changed for the better). (b) The power of performing this well or according to intention; because sometimes we say that those who can merely take a walk, or speak, without doing it as well as they intended, cannot speak or walk. And similarly in the case of passivity. (c) All states in virtue of which things are unaffected generally, or are unchangeable, or cannot readily deteriorate, are called "potencies." For things are broken and worn out and bent and in general destroyed not through potency but through impotence and deficiency of some sort; and things are unaffected by such processes which are scarcely or slightly affected because they have a potency and are potent and are in a definite state.
Since "potency" has all these meanings, "potent" (or "capable") will mean (a) that which contains a source of motion or change (for even what is static is "potent" in a sense) which takes place in another thing, or in itself qua other.
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And there is more of interest in the immediately following text. However, if you seek really to understand Aristotle's idea of a dynamis in the sense of a power to affect (or, for that matter, to be affected ) then you will want to look at his insightful discussion in Metaphysics IX, starting at 1046a1.
If you want to connect up the notion of a "power" with larger issues of causation and agency, you might like to read (among other things) my article, "Agency and Patiency — Back to Nature?" (Philosophical Explorations 5:1 (2002) pp. 59-81). At any rate, a "simple definition" of dynamis will not, by itself, get you all that far.
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Generally perception attributes first-order properties to objects e.g. being a specific shade of red. I'm interested in whether perception might attribute second-order properties to objects: e.g. the object's second-order property of having a first-order property that is a specific shade of red. In this case perception represents the object as having some specific shade of red but doesn't represent what that shade is. Any thoughts?
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Further argument for the same:
"Where is the real, the thing independent of how we think it, to be found? There must be such a thing, for we find our opinions constrained; there is something, therefore, which influences our thoughts, and is not created by them. We have, it is true, nothing immediately present to us but thoughts. These thoughts, however, have been caused by sensations, and those sensations are constrained by something out of the mind. This thing out of the mind, which directly influences sensation, and through sensation thought, because it is out of the mind, is independent of how we think it, and is, in short, the real."  ~ Peirce
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Naturalistic fallacy is an expression found for the first time in Principia Ethica, a work published in 1903 by the English philosopher George Edward Moore. According to it, the concept of good which is at the basis of moral discourse is a simple concept and can not be further defined.
When you claim to identify it with some natural property, such as useful or pleasant, it falls into the naturalistic fallacy, which includes both the naturalistic ethical theories and the ethical metaphysical theories. The choice of a solution can not entirely exclude the other ones.
It is possible to escape this contradiction by adopting the intuitionistic solution by Moore for which the good is sensed as the yellow color: in this way, you will know what it is and there are no alternative solutions. Moore soon realized that his solution, by virtue of intuitionism, could lead to subjectivist drifts: he pleaded this risk by focusing on the fact that the good is absolute, it expresses an intrinsic and universal value.
In this way, any possible subjectivism is reset at the start. However, a new problem showed up: given that the good is universal, absolute and independent, which is its nature? Certainly, it cannot have an empirical nature, because if it did it would fall into the naturalistic fallacy; but neither can it be metaphysical, because otherwise you would re-awaken the metaphysical fallacy. The solution is then advanced  by Moore in recognizing that ‘good’ has an ontological status equal to that of Platonic ideas and numbers, which are absolute and objective without being either empirical or metaphysical: in this sense, the ‘good’ is just as number four.
In later writings, Moore would soften his position, by arguing that the good depends on the intrinsic nature of things; in this way, he will approach Aristotelianism from Platonism... ".
In the explanation of the onset of the 'naturalistic fallacy', one moves from 'having to be' which is the term used by Kant to indicate what is required by the moral law, regardless of any condition of fact and the entire order of nature. The moral law is an expression of reason in its practical use, that is, determining the will. The duty to provide what the law says to man, be reasonable but finite, exposed then to the empirical influences of  subjective motives and subjective inclinations, is expressed in the imperative form.
Therefore, the ‘need to be' indicates "the relationship between the objective laws of the will in general and the subjective imperfection of the will."
Then, since the moral imperative is not subject to any end, nor is placed by the faculty of desire, it addresses people in categorical terms, that is unconditioned, and then it is intended: "because you have to."
It is by virtue of this duty that the possibility of action properly human is deducted: not the physical possibility to act, which belongs - as Kant says – to the order of causes and effects, but it is the moral possibility to fullfil the moral law or not, that qualifies man as a moral entity. Between the world of being - that is, of what is the way it is, according to the laws of nature - and the world of 'having to be'- that is of what is required by the moral law - an absolute hiatus opens up, the same as Hume had pointed out, denouncing the naturalistic fallacy which is to take prescriptive propositions, that is related to having to be, from descriptive propositions, related to what it is .
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The precondition of learning what is good and what is not has caused a lot of problems within human reasoning. When we are born, there is no knowledge of "good" and "evil." Such concepts are learned and can apply to both truthful knowledge and untruthful knowledge. That is to say, anybody can be convinced that something harmful to them is good, at least until they experience the consequences.
Morality is an absolute when it is properly understood, and it has nothing to do with good and evil. Good and evil are judgments of the intellect, but morality is a condition of the body.
Morality is those actions and behaviors that lead to the good health and well-being of individuals and communities. Morality is also applicable to any species of life, and to any group of species.
Morality is the condition required so that life may flourish. Morality is the source of health and happiness, which is required for the living to continue to want to live and to be able to live. Without the condition of morality, life becomes unhealthy, unhappy, and eventually ceases. 
Humans are presently in an incredibly immature state of understanding and consider morality to be judgment. The mere passing of a law to say what is good and bad, acceptable and non-acceptable, is widely considered to be the establishment of morality. However, morality has no dependency on human laws and it has nothing to do with human judgment. Morality is simply those actions and behaviors that lead to the good health and well-being of individuals and communities. Morality exists exactly as the condition for life.
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Accept or reject dialectical method?
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Difficult question. Hartmann - in my view - did not reject (Hegel's) dialectic, but what he thought was its exclusively logical character, shutting out the non-logical which for Hartmann was an integral part of the world. But (cf.some famous/notorious Hegel phrases like "the real is the reasonable" etc) his notion of logic is not formal, contradiction for instance refers to the movement of the world, logic consenquently has to do with the "innermost parts of the world". Wilhelm Weischedel has - I think rightly - said - that for Hegel love is the basic figure of dialectical logic. Hegel, to be sure, is against taking each and every impulse of the individual heart and mind too seriously.
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Stanisław Leśniewski originated the term mereology as the study of part - whole relationships. Does anyone know where this term was first used by him?
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afterthought:
this one sounds more viable and relevant ?
Stanisław Leśniewski (1886–1939) was one of the principal founders and movers of the school of logic that flourished in Warsaw between the two world wars. He was the originator of an unorthodox system of the foundations of mathematics, based on three formal systems: Protothetic, a logic of propositions and their functions; Ontology: a logic of names, and functors of arbitrary order; and Mereology, a general theory of part and whole. His concern for utmost rigor in the formalization and execution of logic, coupled with a nominalistic rejection of abstract entities, led to a precise but highly unusual metalogic. His strictures on correctly distinguishing use from mention of expressions, his canons of correct definition, and his mereology, have all informed the logical mainstream, but the majority of his logical views and innovations have not been widely adopted. Despite this, his influence as a teacher and as a motor for logical innovation are widely acknowledged. He remains one of logic's most original figures.
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Does anyone know David Oderberg's book: "Classifying Reality"? Oderberg's asks: if reality is classifiable? This question is related intimately to my main area of research, that of using categories to understand human existence. He provides an interesting series of articles from leading authors. I am familiar with some of these authors' writings but I would be grateful if you could suggest other literature and ongoing research in the area. Thank you.
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Perhaps we should not immediately look for "categories" as such, but start with looking for how our minds arrive at establishing categories. and here, I think, Jon Mason has a point. Proceeding from, among others, presumed linguistic universals, I arrived at the view that we cognitively deal with reality following two cognitive programs producing respectively personalized and depersonalized representations of reality.  The basics can be found in the added 1989 article on "Person and non-person." An overview of related empirical research can be found in the theoretical and discussion sections of the added 2007 paper on "Dual self."