Logic - Science topic

ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6770-5916.

Along with other dimensions of women empowerment can I use self-esteem to measure psychological dimension of women empowerment? I have measured self-esteem by the Rosenberg scale. I know there are many more aspects to measure the psychological dimension of women empowerment. As in my study I have considered other dimensions of women's empowerment, So that I have considered only self-esteem. I am working with primary data. I have finished my data collection. So not possible to include any other measure of psychological dimensions. So they have to work with self-esteem only. I need some reference to logically explain why do I use only self-esteem to measure psychological dimensions. If it creates any controversy in the future can I change the name as to the self-esteem dimension in that case? Looking forward to your valuable answer. TIA.

In the Bible beginning it is insisted that God made the man as his image and similarity. That means that God has had eyes, nose, mouth, ears etc. long before making space, light, Earth. The question is: Why does God had eyes when there was not light? Nose when there was nothing to smell? Ears when there was no air to carry sound waves? The list can go on. Is this question not a prove that Bible is just a fairytale?

Observe how even today linguistic empiricism via direct denotative reference and sense, via linguistic-analytic philosophies, reigns supreme in philosophy. It is superfluous here to cite how Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, etc. have used the merely directly denotative sense to define sense, reference, proposition, truth value, and so forth.

The natural but extreme consequence from the Frege-Wittgenstein tendency is linguistic idealism, whereby somehow language and – for them consequently – even logic and mathematics (!) are made not only to define but also to determine the world. Berkeley would have done it better!

Justifiably enough from the necessary nature of derivation of linguistic idealism from direct linguistic and logical denotation, Richard Gaskin, a philosopher of language, aesthetics, and literature, has come upon this conclusion – presumably determined also by the necessity to bring aesthetic and literary worlds under the aegis of linguistic use and produce a language philosophy of aesthetic and literary experience.

But this motive would not suffice to posit linguistic idealism as a philosophical solution.

Physics students begin with meso-world experiments and theories. Naturally, at the young age, they get convinced that the logic thinking and research as applied to the meso-world level of physical phenomena that they follow is identical with the ideal of scientific method and hence there is nothing more general and advanced. Common social convictions on scientific temper may further confirm them in this belief. It then becomes a faith for them.

This has far-reaching consequences in the formation of the concept of science and of the logic of science, because the majority such students do not advance far forward, they fail to get the meaning of the foundations of the sciences, and thus remain spreading the elementary concept of science belonging to the meso-world logical applications. And as they get surprised at the quantum revolution, they tend to think or write books on topics like: “the whole universe is within the quanta in an atom”, because they think that the foundations of science are all questioned and set topsy-turvy by quantum physics!

But unquestionably, it is not very difficult to realize that even the quantum-physically upset sense of the logic behind the application of the scientific method is almost the same old manner of realizing (1) the ideal of scientific method and (2) the more general ideal of reason, namely, observe, hypothesize, verify, theorize, attempt to falsify for experimental and theoretical advancements, etc. upon meso-world realities, phenomena, data, etc.

Do teachers and professors of physics or of other sciences (1) instruct their students early enough on the advantages of thinking and experimenting in accordance with the above-mentioned fundamental fact of all scientific practice being founded on ever-better definable foundations of physics that are clearly based on the existence of physical objects as processes, or (2) make them capable of realizing the significance of this in the course of time? I think that they do not.

This shows that physicists (and for that matter other scientists) fail to a great extent at empowering themselves and their students in favour of the growth of science, thought, and life. The logic being followed in the above-said elementary mode of practice of scientific method at earlier stages of instruction, naturally, becomes for the students the genuine form of logic, instead of being an instantiation of the ideal of logic as reason.

This seems to be the case in most of the practices and instruction of all sciences till today. A change of the origin, justification, and significance of the use of logic in physics from the very start of instruction in the sciences is the solution for this problem. The change must be in the foundations and in the instructions on the foundations. Even at elementary stages of instruction this can be done, just like the SI units are being taught effectively very early in the school.

All humans equate (1) the physical-ontologically grounded and non-grounded forms of logic of each science, and even logic as such, with (2) reason as such. Reason as such, in fact, is more generic of all kinds of logic, and must be taken as that which must be realized in logic. But this attitude is not being followed in any science as of now. This has been my observation so far.

Practically none of the professors (of physics as well as of other sciences) terms the version of logic of their science as an instantiation of reason, which may be accessed ever better as the science eventually grows into something more elaborate and complex. Hence, a foretaste of the same given in form of the simple foundations of all sciences at the very start may go a long way to enhance the growth of science and human life. Physicist gets more and more skilled at reasoning only as and when she/he wants to grow continuously into a genuine physicist. The number of such persons is small. Increasing this number is one of the aims of the above-said kind of instruction in the sciences.

As the same students enter the study of recent developments in physics like quantum physics, relativity, nano-physics (Greek nanos, “dwarf”; in physics, @ 10-9), atto-physics (@ 10-18), cosmology, etc., they forget to make place for the strong mathematical effects that are due by reason of the conceptual and processual paradoxes which in turn are due to epistemological and physical-ontological differences between the object-sizes and the sizes of ourselves / our instruments. Some of the best examples of physicists forgetting the foundations of physics in existence are the Uncertainty Principle, the statistical interpretation of QM, cosmic singularity, quantum-cosmological multiverse from quantum vacua, counterfactual multiverse, etc.

They tend to believe that some of these and similar physics may defy our (meso-physical) manner of using logic and its source, namely, reason – but by this they mistakenly intend that all or many forms of logic and reason would have to fail if such instances of advanced physics are accepted in all of physics. As a result, again, their logic tends to continue to be that of the same meso-world level as has been taken while they did elementary levels of physics.

Does this not mean that the ad hoc make-believe interpretations of the logic of the foundations of QM, quantum cosmology, etc. are the culprits that naturally make the logic of traditional physics inadequate as the best representative of the logic of nature? In short, in order to find a common platform, the logic of traditional and recent branches of physics must improve so to adequate itself to nature’s logic. Nature’s logic is more than logic and its source, reason. Nature’s logic is the source of reason and thus of logic.

Why do I not suggest that the hitherto logic of physics be substituted by quantum logic, relativity logic, thermodynamic logic, nano-logic, atto-logic, or whatever other logic of any recent branch of physics that may be imagined? One would substitute logic in this manner only if one is overwhelmed by what purportedly is the logic of the new branches of physics.

But, in the first place, I wonder why logic should be equated directly with reason. The attempt should always be to bring the logic of physics in as much correspondence with the logic of nature as possible, so that reason in general can get closer to the latter. This must be the case not merely with physicists, but also with scientists from other disciplines and even from philosophy, mathematics, and logic itself.

Therefore, my questions are: What is the foundational reason that physicists should follow and should not lose at any occasion? Does this, how does this, and should this get transformed into forms of logic founded on a more general sort of physical reason? Wherein does such reason consist, and where does such reason exist? Can there be a form of logic in which the logical laws depend not merely on the micro- or mega- or meso-size of objects or the epistemological level available at the given object sizes, but instead, on the universal characteristics of all that exist? Or, should various logics be used at various occasions, like in the case of the suggested quantum logic, counterfactual logic, etc.?

Just like logic is not to be taken as a bad guide by citing the examples of the many logicians, scientists, and “logical” human beings doing logic non-ideally, I believe that there is a kernel of reason behind physics, justified solely on the most basic and universal characteristics of physical existents. These universals cannot belong solely to physics, but instead, to all the sciences, because they belong to all existents.

This kernel of reason in physics is to be insisted upon at every act of physics, even if many physicists (and other scientists and philosophers) may naturally not ensure that kernel in their work. I suggest that ensuring this involves not merely the constant attempt to formulation of nature’s logic in our reason and its instantiations in logic. It involves what can lead to the said results – and that is to formulate the very foundational logic of physics based on the generalities of all that exist and on the generalities of knowing all that exist.

I shall discuss these possibly highest universals and connect them to logic meant as reason, when I elaborate on: 3. The Ontology behind Physics (ALSO a discussion in RG).

The matter on which physicists do logical work is existent matter-energy in its fundamental implications and the derivative implications from the fundamental ones. It cannot be the all sorts of posited unobservables which cannot at all exist as physical processes but only as ad hoc necessities of some theoretical procedures in physics that are considered as theoretical existents.

This fact is to be kept in mind while doing any logically acceptable work physics, because existent matter-energy corpora in processuality delineate all possible forms of use of logic in physics, which logic is properly to be termed nature’s reason. Physics (and other sciences) needs to create a mode of presentation of logic where impossible theoretical entities can naturally be ostracized from the scenario of physics. This is possible only if the necessary, most general, Categorial demands of physical existence are inducted in all forms of logic of physics.

Moreover, theoretical and experimental conclusions are not drawn merely by one subject (person) in physics for use by the same subject alone. Hence, we have the following two basic requirements to note in the use of logic in physics and the sciences: (1) the intersubjectively awaited necessity of human reason in its delineation in logical methods should be upheld at least by a well-informed community, and (2) the need for such reason behind approved physics should then be spread universally with an open mind that permits and requires further scientific advancements.

These will make future generations and generations to further question the genuineness of the logic of specific realization of reason, and constantly encourage attempts to falsify theories or their parts, so that physics can bring up more genuine instantiations of human reason. But is such human reason based on the reason active in nature? How to make it base itself on the reason in nature?

Although the above arguments and the following definition of the logic being followed in mainstream and traditional physics might look queer or at least new and unclear for many physicists, for many other scientists, for many mathematicians, and even for many logicians, I attempt here to define logic for use in physics as the fundamental aspect of reason that physics should uphold constantly in every argument and conclusion due from it:

The logic behind physics is (1) the methodological science (2) of approaching the best intersubjectively rational and structural consequences (3) in what may be termed thought (not in emotions) (4) in clear terms of ever higher truth-probability achievable in statements and conclusions (5) in languages of all kinds (ordinary language, mathematics, computer algorithms, etc.) (6) based on the probabilistically methodological use, (7) namely, of the rules of all sensible logics that exemplify the Laws of Identity, Non-contradiction, and Excluded Middle, (8) which in turn must pertain to the direct and exhaustive physical implications of “to exist”.

Here I have not defined logic in physics very simply as “the discipline of the laws and rules of thought”, “the methodic discipline of attaining truths”, etc., for obvious reasons clarified by the history of the various definitions of logic during the past centuries.

But here comes up another set of questions: Is the reason pertaining to physical nature the same as the most ideal form of human reason? From within the business of physics, how to connect the reason of physical nature with that of humans? I may suggest some answers from the epistemological and ontological aspects. But, before that, I would appreciate your responses in this regard too.

The whole of logic, epistemology, ontology, etc. are not the exclusive property of physics, or of any other particular science, or of all the sciences together. Each of them may apply the various general logical, epistemological, and ontological principles in ways suitable to their disciplines, but cannot claim that theirs is the genuine or the possibly best logic, epistemology, ontology, etc.

There is yet another manner, beyond the sciences, wherein (1) the object range and viewpoint range become the broadest possible in epistemology, and (2) the epistemological manner in which the two are connected becomes satisfactory enough to explain both the aspects and the procedures involved between them. This is a philosophical version of epistemology. Even this manner is not complete without including the various logics, epistemologies, and ontologies of the particular sciences.

Before pointing out the special manner in which physics could use the more general aspects of epistemology in itself, let me mention a general trend in science, especially physics. I have seen many students of physics and mathematics mistaking the logical ways in which they do experiments and theories as the same as the conceptual foundations of physics and mathematics.

They do not even think of the epistemology of physics. The clear reason for this is that their epistemology is a crude correspondence theory of truth, and this is outdated. Take any of the best physicists, and we can see in their works the underlying undefined epistemology being closer to the correspondence theory of truth than anything else. I would like to suggest in the following a clear spine of epistemological rudiments for physics.

The pragmatism and scientism at the foundations of practical physics does not accept anything other than the correspondence theory as prescriptive of all the truths of science. Of course, the amount of finality achieved in truths will be the measure of tenability of their truth-probability. But this is to be reserved to the most general truths derivable from any science or philosophy. Low-level truths are much beyond the purview of correspondence between the objectual and the theoretical. Unaware of these facts, most physicists take the difference lightly.

It is a pity that the students of the sciences and also philosophy students with scientistic orientations even think of their ways of permitting truth correspondence to all their truths as the sole possession of scientists, which they suppose are being usurped from philosophy in the course of the past centuries in such a way that philosophy will have ever less reason to exist, or no more reason to exist. Imaginably, in this pride they are encouraged by their presumption of possession of the scientific temper in an exceptional manner.

More evidently, there were and there are physicists holding that their use of logic, epistemology, ontology, etc. is final and that all other details being done by other sciences, especially by philosophy, are a mere waste of time. If you want me to give an example, I suggest that you watch some of the YouTube interviews with Stephen Hawking, where he declares philosophy as a waste of time, or as an unscientific affair. The same sort of claim is to be seen being made by many mathematicians: that logic is a by-product of mathematics, and that philosophers are falsely proud of having logic as their methodology.

The reason why the whole of logic does not belong to the sciences is that the viewpoint from which sensation, thought, and feeling may be exercised in the broadest possible manner is not exhausted even by totaling all the object ranges of all the sciences. Each of them does logic in a manner limited by its object range. How then can their logic be the best possible? There is one and only one general science of which the viewpoint is the broadest. It is that science in which the viewpoint is that of the direct implications of the To Be of Reality-in-total.

Against this backdrop, although the following definition might seem queer for many physicists, mathematicians, and other scientists, there are reasons why I define here epistemology for use in physics. The following definition itself will clarify the reasons:

The epistemology behind physics is (1) the science of justifications (2) for the systemic fact, the systemic manner of achieving, the enhancement of the systemic manner of achieving, and the foundations of systems (3) of rationally derivable and explicable theoretical consequences of human efforts (4) to grasp the connection between physically existent reality and their pertinent realities of all sorts (5) in an asymptotic approach of truth-correspondence from the procedures of knowing (in terms of the pertinent realities of existent realities) onto the physically existent processes of reality, (6) in a spirally broadening and deepening manner of truth probability, (7) which serves to achieve ever better approximations of the epistemological ideal of knowing, namely, Reality-in-general, (8) starting from reality-in-particular, and (9) by use of the highest theoretical generalities pertaining to Reality-in-total and its parts, namely, reality-in-particular.

The epistemology of physics does not take the viewpoint of the To Be of Reality-in-total. But it must obey the primary implications of To Be and the viewpoint of the To Be of Reality-in-total. What these implications are, will be treated below, under “3. The Ontology of Physics”. Epistemology in philosophy may be slightly more general than the epistemology of physics, in the sense that philosophy takes the viewpoint of all physical processes that exist and attempt to view every reality from that viewpoint alone. If not, philosophy has no justification for existence.

Naturally, the epistemology of the sciences will not be so general as that of philosophy. But obedience to it is better for the epistemology of physics; and the advantages of such obedience will be seen in the results of such physics and such sciences.

The epistemology of physics, therefore, will attempt to theorize, know, and predict all that exist, but from the viewpoint exclusively of experimentally / empirically verifiable methods based on what is directly or indirectly before us, namely, the physical processes at our reach. The epistemology of systematically and systemically (i.e., systematically of systems of systems … ad libitum) moving in the use of logic from the given existent physical processes to the details of the not immediately given but ever more minute or ever more distant physical existents is the epistemology of physics. The above definition would, in my opinion, be sufficient to cover as broad and minute procedures as possible in physics. Time has come to appropriate it in physics, lest much advantage be lost for too long.

Not that philosophy does not trust this approach of physics. But philosophy looks for the Categorial presuppositions of existence behind all that is verifiable or verified empirically and empirical-theoretically. These presuppositions are the starting points and guiding principles of philosophy. There is a stark difference between a methodology of this kind and the methodology of basing everything on the truths derived from empirical and empirical-theoretical research. Now from this viewpoint you may judge the following suggestions and determine whether the epistemology of doing physical science is as broad as that of philosophizing.

Every moment, our body-brain nexus is continuously but finitely in contact with itself and with a finite extent of the environment, more or less simultaneously, but in differing intensities, no matter however elementary. The primary mode of this is through sensation, using all available and necessary aspects of it as the case may be. Thought and feeling are possible only in continuity with sensation, and never without it.

But one special characteristic of the human brain differentiating it from others is that sensation, feeling, and thought can very consciously induct into, and consequently deduce from the presuppositions of, all that exist – no matter whether they are a finite environment or infinite – and all these solely from the finite experience from the finite environment at hand. This seems to be absent in less human living beings.

Moreover, the second, but more forgotten, characteristic of the human brain differentiating it from others is that sensation, thought, and feeling are affective, tending to itself and to others, in the broadest sense of the term ‘affective’. It is the manner in which every human being tends in his/her sensation, feeling, and thought. Hence, all processes of knowing will be coloured by affection.

The manner and then the so-constructed broader background in which sensation, feeling, and thought take place is affection, which we term also love in a very general sense. Sensation, feeling, and thought are the three interconnected modes of tending of the body-brain to itself and to the environment, tend always to connect itself with the environment.

But here too the important differentiating characteristic in human body-brains is their capacity to tend to the environment beyond the immediate environments, and further beyond them, etc. ad libitum. There is nothing wrong in theoretically considering that there is the tendency in humans to converting this sort of ad libitum to ad infinitum, irrespective of whether these environments can really go ever broader at infinity in the content of matter-energy within Reality-in-total. Infinity is another term here for generalizing.

Reality consists of existent reality and realities that pertain to existent realities in their groups. Existent realities are clear enough to understand. Realities pertinent to existent realities are never to be taken as belonging to just one existent reality. They are always those generalities that belong to many existent realities in their respective natural kind. These generalities are what I call ontological universals.

All generalizations tend beyond onto the infinite perfection of the essential aspects of the concepts pertaining to the object-range. Not that the object-range must be infinite. Instead, the tending presumes an infinitization due to the idealization involved in generalizations. This is a kind of infinitization that does not need an infinite Reality-in-total in existence. All the concepts that a human being can use are based in the infinitization of the essential aspects of the concepts in their ideality. But behind these mental ideals there are the ideals, namely, the ontological universals pertaining to the groups (natural kinds) of processual entities in the environment. These are the ideals in the things and are not in us. These too are idealizations at the realm of the natural kinds that form part of Reality-in-total.

Without loving in the sense of tending to, as human do, to the inner and outer environments in their generalities there is no sensation, feeling, and thought. The tending to need not be due to the love of the objects but due to the love of something that pertains to them or to the ontologically universal ideals pertaining to the objects. From this it is clear that the relation between the processual objects and the sensing-feeling-knowing mind is set by the ontological universals in the natural kinds of existent physical processes.

At the part of the mind there should be idealized universals of conceptual quality, because the ontological universals in natural kinds cannot directly enter and form concepts. This shows that the conceptual universals (called connotative universals) are the mental reflections of ontological universals that are in the natural kinds. In short, behind the epistemology of sensation, feeling, and thought there are the ontology and epistemology of loving in the sense of tending to, due to the otherness implied between oneself and the environment.

There may be philosophers and scientists who do not like the idea of love. I say, this is due to the many psychology-related prejudices prevalent in their minds. We need to ask ourselves what the major mode of exercitation of any activity in human beings, and none can doubt the role of love in epistemology. The physical foundations of love too are commonly to be shared with the foundations of other aspects of physical existence.

Such tending by the person is mediated within the person by the connotative universals. Their expression is always in terms of symbols in various languages. These are called denotative universals. Connotative universals get concatenated in the mind in relation to their respective brain elements and form thoughts and feelings. Their expression in language is by the concatenation of denotative universals and get formulated in languages as theories and their parts.

To put in gist the latter part of “2. The Epistemology of Physics”, I suggest that the ontological, connotative, and denotative universals and the love of human agents to these and the very existent processual entities are what facilitate knowledge. The psychological question as to what happens when one has no love does not have any consequence here, because psychology differentiates between love and non-love in terms of certain presumed expressions of love and non-love.

In the case of the natural course of life of humans, the choice is not between love and non-love, but instead, between increasing or decreasing love. We do not speak here of loving other human beings as a matter of ethical action. Instead, the point is that of the natural love that humans have for everything including for sensing, feeling, knowing, etc.

One might wonder here why I did not discuss mathematics as an epistemologically valid tool of physics and other sciences. I have already dealt with this aspect in many other discussion texts in ResearchGate, and hence do not expatiate on it here.

There have arisen various schools of theories, mainly from within the physics community, theorizing elaborately concerning the ontological foundations of physics. Not till the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century have these notions been clear enough. Two major and common ways of approaching the foundations have been the following:

(1) Physical experiments and theories based on the notions of space, time, matter-energy, and causality. (2) Physical experiments and theories based on the four laws of conservation, namely, those of matter, energy, momentum, and charge. There may be other variations of the foundations, e.g., some include mass in the list. I believe that all such variations are based mostly on the two sets above.

The first set does not seem to be based on anything else from the viewpoints available in the long tradition of classification and the epistemic categories of space and time. The question of deriving one from the others or a few from the others within the list has not occurred. This is the foremost disadvantage of these categories.

But the second list integrates within each category the measuremental aspect of physical (scientific) activity. Interestingly, hence, the second set used to be reduced to symmetries (Hermann Weyl and others). But note that symmetries are measuremental and hence epistemic in nature. A symmetry is not a physical-ontological affair but instead the result of some epistemic operations upon already existent natural processes.

But here the existence of processes is taken for granted, and not included in the categories. That is, the nature of physical processes is not sufficiently taken notice of. This does not mean that the nature of physical processes is left aside from physics. Instead, it is not included in the categories.

Measurements are based on the epistemic concepts of space and time. A symmetry is never the result of merely one epistemic operation. A few measurements together constitute and result in any one sort of symmetry. Hence, the compositional nature of concepts assigned the categorial character in the four conservational categories renders conservational categories into less essential and less grounded for physics.

Moreover, in the above systems, causality is considered (1) either as an addition to the categories behind physical processes and the study of physical processes, (2) or as a notion being brought up in terms of the measuremental concepts of space and time, because until today a universally acceptable manner of defining causality in terms of any other primitive notions has not existed.

Hence, causality as an additional category not based on any other categories and symmetries based merely on composed measurements and not on any other fundamental categories cannot be the foundation for the study of the physical nature of existent processes. The latter needs physical-ontological Categories and these Categories should give rise to the basic notions of physics without reference to ad hoc positing of various basic notions as the foundations of physics.

Moreover, measurement systems like MKS, CGS, and SI are ipso facto mere epistemic systems. They are conventions of measurements, on which the nature of physical processes is based; and conventions of measurements are not based on the most general nature of existence of physical processes. This necessitates finding what underlies both measuremental systems and the resultant symmetries.

In the case of physics and the natural sciences as the general case, the epistemically oriented operations are for the most part measuremental. In the case of many other sciences – say, (1) some applied sciences like medicine, engineering, architecture, etc., (2) some of the human sciences, and (3) especially the fine arts, music, literature, etc. – the status of measurements is different. Exact measurements increasingly take a back seat in these three general types of sciences, although measurements exist in all of them in a more or less evident fashion.

But in the fine arts, music, literature, etc. we have sensation, experiential quality, feelings, etc. taking prominence over measurements. These procedures too are epistemically oriented procedures in such sciences, which scientists (and of course, all of us) often look down upon as sciences that obtain values calculated as less than those that the humanities obtain. Despite this fact, they too are sciences in some sense, since measurement is ubiquitously present in them at least as a minor procedure in comparison with the physical sciences and mathematics. I would hold even that the applied sciences, although active more often with procedural measurements, indulge also a lot of sensation, experiential quality, feelings, etc. in the manner of epistemic qualities.

Some important details to be noticed in the above-mentioned two major traditional school systems of physical categories are the following:

(1) Firstly, space and time are not existents or ontological attributes of existents. As is clear from above, they are the measurementally epistemic and cognitive aspects of physical existents.

(2) Secondly, matter-energy can be taken as existents provided one does not tend to take the abstract Aristotelian-Thomistic meaning of matter (as the abstract raw material which, when exemplified, is always a material object, although such a raw material is never to be found anywhere) and energy (as an abstract action-at-a-distance with no material counterpart) in order to explain material objects.

(3) Thirdly, it is a false procedure in physics, cosmology and derived physical sciences to accept the measuremental notion of energy and material objects as just the number respectively of the energy emissions and material chunks measured based on measurement conventions (e.g., quanta). Instead, the notion of energy as existent propagation from existent matter, measurable in various conventional ways, is much more tenable.

(4) On the other hand, fourthly, the laws of conservation are not simple attributes of any existent. A detailed meaning-analysis of physicists’ claims may show that many of them have taken the conservation laws as the most fundamental attributes / qualities of theories. But they are principles formulated sententially out of a few notions and verbs, and hence rendered as principles composed of many other simple attributes which then are concatenated using verbal connective notions. I call as universals the simple attributes constituting the sentential principles of symmetries.

Even the verbal notions may be set in the qualitative language and rendered universal attributes. This is because both names and verbs belong to the processes that existents are and define existents as ongoing processes. Universals are the basic contents of all basic principles, definitions, etc. But what we need as most basic sources of physics are physical-ontological Categories that work as the fundamental notions of all universals.

Merely any one or some universals cannot suffice at the foundations of physics. They need to be the direct implications of the most fundamental of all notions, namely, To Be / To Exist. But why should physics follow this manner of thinking? None insists upon this on the physical praxis of a physicist. But the suggestion is that the physicist too deals with existing physical processes, and also the philosopher of physics deals with existent stuff, and not non-existent stuff. Why then should physicists follow those Categories that physical-ontologically justify their work? For the above reasons, I follow the way of searching for the universals of all existents in their equally nominal and verbal aspect, namely, the To Be of Reality-in-total.

Physics cannot be done in a well-justified manner without possibly best-grounded universals that go beyond the above-mentioned two groups of physical-ontologically insufficiently grounded, arbitrarily introduced, and haphazardly variegated categories which are not derivable from the most fundamental ones.

The most basic grounding should always be from the To Be of Reality-in-total, and such Categories are absolutely lacking in physics even today – a fact that I have become more and more aware of while discussing matters physical and cosmological on ResearchGate as I attempted to suggest what I found to be the possibly most basic Categories of all science and philosophy.

Some may suggest that the surest possible physical (not physical-ontological) grounding that has been provided by some in the past in terms of defining time, space, mass, and energy measurementally are sufficient for physics, and perhaps it is good to add causality, but we are not sure whether everything is fully causal – and that none needs to intrude into the foundations of physics from other disciplines.

I argue that all such grounds are insufficient due to their classificational and measuremental nature, as mentioned above. Secondly, they are insufficient for physics because they are exclusively and merely from within the ambit of physics. This does not ground physics. Moreover, I shall show that Universal Causality is ubiquitous if a physical existent should exist at all, i.e., from the concept of existence is Universal Causality to be derived in a pre-scientifically ontological manner, and that the instruments of such derivation are themselves the primary Categories of physics.

The two sets of physical categories mentioned above, due to their classificational and measuremental nature, are not derivable from the To Be of all existents. To put the argument in gist, the definitions of all the said merely physical categories use simple universals as ingredients; these ingredients are not final enough; there are two most final ontological universals; and hence, the highest ontological universals should also be at the foundations of physics along with existent matter-energy, so that the classifications and measurements of existent matter-energy within physics be conceptually possible; and further, these two Categories are the very essence of Universal Causality too.

Grounding can be of various levels and grades. I speak of grounding all sorts of concepts, procedure principles, procedure methods, and theories in any system of thought and science. It is unnecessary in this context to discuss the grounding of highly derivative concepts that occur much later in theories than those that appear while founding them with best-grounded foundations. I go directly to the case of what should be called the most Categorial concepts behind physics, on which physics is grounded.

These Categorial concepts cannot be merely from within physics but should be directly related to and facilitating physics in as many of its aspects as possible. The success of foundational Categories consists in that they serve to ground as many aspects as possible of the particular science or system. Concepts strictly and exclusively physical or generally scientific cannot be as useful as notions from beyond in order to serve as Categories. Evidently, this is because no scientific discipline or system can be grounded on itself and hence on its own concepts. This is clearly also part of the epistemological and ontological implications of the work of Godel.

Grounded ontological Categories are such that they are inevitably and exhaustively grounded in the To Be of Reality-in-total as the only exhaustive implications of To Be. All other Categories, as far as possible, must be derivative of the most primary Categories. The more the number of Categories within the Categorial system that do not derive from the primary Categories the worse for the self-evidence of the science or system within it.

Grounding is exhaustive in the sense that the Categories that ground all physics need nothing else to be a concept than the To Be of Reality-in-total. To Be is the source of the Categories. It happens to be that there are two such Categories that are inevitably and exhaustively grounded. I call them Extension and Change. Clarifications of their meaning, ontological significance, and epistemological and physical implications and follow.

As I said, preferably grounding must be on the surest notion of all, which is existence. I prefer to term it To Be. As far as thought, feeling, and sensation are concerned, To Be is a notion in al of them. But principally To Be must belong to the whole of Reality, and not to a few things. If anything and/or all processes of Reality are existent, then what exist are the parts of existent Reality. The first minimum guarantee hereof should be that existence should be non-vacuous. Non-vacuous signifies that each possesses or contains whatever is possible within its existence in the given measurementally spatio-temporal context (which, as shall soon be clear, belong ontologically to the Extension-Change-wise existence of things).

Even the minimum realism in thought, feeling, and sensation has for its principal conditions (1) the ontological primacy of universal qualities / natures that belong to groups of entities (processes), where the groups are also called natural kinds in the analytic tradition, and then (2) the ultimate simplicity and indivisibility of the universal characteristics that pertain to all existents. Contrary to the infinite divisibility of existent matter-energy, universals as the characteristics of existent matter-energy conglomerations (of togethernesses of unit Processes) are ontologically ideal universals, and hence indivisible. These universals are ideal not because of our idealisation of the characteristics, but instead because they are the general characteristics of the natural kinds to which each existent belongs. Thus, it is important to keep in mind that ontological universals are not our idealizations.

The properties of things are built out of these simple ontological universals in the natural kinds. The vague reflections of simple ontological universals within our minds are conceptually connotative universals, which are conceptual ideals. And their linguistic reflections in minds and all kinds of symbolic instruments are denotative universals.

Connotative and denotative universals are epistemological universals, formed epistemically from the little contact that minds have with the phenomena (“showings-themselves”) from some layers of processual objects from out there. The properties of existent processual things (matter-energy particulars) are vaguely reflected in minds and languages through the connotative and denotative instrumentalization of concepts in order to reflect the things via phenomena in terms of the data created by minds out of them. Any theory that permits ontological primacy to epistemological universals is one of a range of theories yielding primacy to the perceiving mind over the perceived objects. This is anathema in any scientific or philosophical science, because things are not vacua.

Non-vacuous existence implies that existents are extended. This is one of the most important characteristics of existents. Extension implies having parts, compositionality. Any extended existent’s parts impart impact to some others. This is Change. Only extended existents can exert impacts on any other. As a result, the object that exerts impact gets in itself some impact within, which is nothing but the proof that an impact by one extended part implies movements and impact formation by its parts too, as a result of the overall impact formation in question which contains the inner parts’ impact formation within. The latter need not always have its effects merely within the parts but instead also outwards.

Extension and Change are the highest, deepest, and most general characteristics of all existents. Interestingly, existence in Extension-Change is itself the process that we have so far named causation. Hence, anything non-vacuously existent has Extension and Change not separately but together. This is the meaning of Universal Causality. Physics cannot dispense with this pre-scientific universal Law. No more shall quantum physicists or scientists from other disciplines tell us that quantum physics has some sort of non-causality within! Any causal unit of existents in which the causal part and the effect part may be termed a process. Processuality is yet another important characteristic of existents, but we formulate it as Process, which represents the matter-energy units that there can be.

By this have clearly been set up three physical-ontological Categories of physics: Extension, Change, Causality, and Process. Space and time are merely epistemic categories. They cannot characterize existent processes. Ontological universals, as the characteristics of existent matter-energy conglomerations, are of togethernesses of unit Processes. Ontological universals are therefore ontologically ideal universals belonging (pertaining) to some natural kinds. The Categories as ontological universals belong to Reality-in-total, and not merely some natural kinds.

In the definition of the ontology of physics, therefore, I shall posit the necessity of the highest possible grounds that I find as fundamental for physics and philosophy alike. The reason for these Categories’ being meant more or less also for philosophy is that both philosophy and physics have physical existents in common as their object range; and philosophy additionally has the pure universals of physics within the ambit of study. Hence, well-grounded physical foundations cannot do without the most suitable among these universals as its fundamental Categories, selected from among the universals forming part of the objects of philosophy.

Although many physicists and mathematicians may find the following definition queer due to their pragmatic and near-sighted concept of physics (where physical objects, and not their universals / qualities, are part of their object range) in a non-grounded manner, I define here ontology for use in physics with the purpose of elaboration of the various aspects brought forward in the definition.

The Ontology behind physics is (1) the rationally consequent science of the totality of physical existents, their parts, and their sine qua nons, namely, the pure universals as pertinents of existents and their parts, (2) prioritized as objects in terms of the To Be (Greek, Einai) of Reality-in-total and only thereafter in terms of the to be (einai) of its parts (reality-in-particular), (3) serving to achieve ever better measuremental approximations of the cosmos and its part-systems (4) in terms of the epistemological ideal of Reality-in-total, namely, the theoretically highest possible notion of Reality-in-general, (5) grounded in the unique and exhaustive implications of To Be, namely, Extension and Change, (6) in properly physical activities that let Reality and realities be measured in term of measuremental and classificational categories that facilitate both experiments and theories equally well.

I have introduced here the highest Ideals of philosophical and scientific thinking, namely, To Be, Reality-in-total, and Reality-in-general. These are not explained here well enough. I have treated them with detailed justifications in my books: Physics without Metaphysics? Categories of Second Generation Scientific Ontology, Frankfurt, 2015, and Gravitational Coalescence Paradox and Cosmogenetic Causality in Quantum Astrophysical Cosmology, 2018, Berlin.

The Background: The ultimate physical and cosmological significance of the Categories of Extension (“being extended / having parts” while in existence) and Change (“extended existents causing impacts on others and also on themselves”) must be seen in the context of warding off quantum-physical, cosmological, statistical, and other sorts of inexplicable and bizarre existence-related aberrations resulting from theories like those of (1) parallel universes, (2) extra dimensions, (3) vacuous universes, (4) total mutual disconnection of universes, (5) infinite number of positive-content physical universes taking origin like extra-fitted balloons from “technically / mathematically zero-valued” quantum vacua or quantum-vacuum universes without any iota of causal agency (because quantum vacua are merely of near-zero zero statistical expectations), (6) the presumed existence of space, time, and spacetime like physical things in mathematical fields, (7) the theoretical writing-off of time alone as unreal and unnecessary, etc.

This sort of aberrations renders some theories and their related concepts into theories about absolutely non-existent objects (in some analytic-logical philosophies, called also as “counterfactual possible worlds”) and into substitute theoretical entities that serve only to explain procedures and not to explain existent processes. These serve for physicists and cosmologists to temporarily save their face by use of irrational adherence to methods of maintenance of mere uncertainties in mathematical physics.

The Curse of Theoretical Physics: I mentioned these above in order to speak of the curse of advanced mathematical physics. This curse is the confusion between (1) physical existents, (2) non-existent theoretical constructs, (3) theories representing small or large theoretical processes required only for theory, and (4) the lack of criteria of creating theories for describing existent processes with recourse to vacuous, non-existent, virtual objects and processes, but without turning these objects and processes into existent objects lacking the criteria of existence.

Positing ad hoc explanatory theories to clarify certain theoretical inaptitudes of notions or deviations in arguments is assuredly necessary for the progress of science. But these are sooner to be overwhelmed (not to be substituted) by more adequate and existentially non-aberrational unobservables and/or theoretical terms. As of now, physics, astrophysics, and cosmology are full of theoretical entities that cannot ever be proved to be existent unobservables. This is the curse of physics today – a graver problem today than previously.

For argument’s sake, if an observer is in absolute inertia / standstill with respect to everything else in the universe, he could possess high truth-probability concerning truths about spatiotemporally closest processes. But the fact is that ourselves, our senses, our instruments, and our environments are in motion, which is one of the ingredients of instances of actualization of Change. Hence, our experimental and consequently our theoretical visualization of physical processes in our environment is comparable to our direct vision from a running train.

What should be most closely real to us is our own motion as such and not the motions and changes within or outside. Nearby objects will then be most difficult to observe because their direction of motion will always be directly comparable to our own merely as different from ours. In fact, their immediacy to us and our motion as such would only be momentary. This is a fact that pragmatism, scientism, empiricism, experimentalism, etc. forget.

Distant objects will be relatively clearer due to the part played by the low proportionality between the distances and our own motion as such. This state of affairs may be conceived as follows. If the generalities of the objects at theoretical and empirical vision are clearly in view in terms of their general foundations, our vision will be more truth-probable than when (as in the case of close vision) the comparative differences of motions is high due to (1) the momentariness of exposure obtained between ourselves and the nearest objects, and (2) the lack of general vision between the two, that should normally have been facilitated by the general Categories that apply in cases of both near vision and distant vision.

To render the Categories applicable to processes both distant and near in spacetime, the only direct feasible manner of approach is to first discover the Categories that apply to near and distant visions and objects equally well, and then put them to use at least both epistemologically and ontologically and of course in other ways.

In order to make possible a clear discussion of the necessity of physical-ontological Categories in physical and other sciences, I name some general forms of theories of the evolutionary stuff of Reality-in-total.

(1) There is a range of theories assigning existence only to minds or to the Divine as mind, the latter categorized as the fully mental being and the former partaking in the mentality of the latter.

(2) Yet another group of theories permits existence only to concepts / the conceptual, in contradistinction from minds and the Divine. This group, I believe, is a direction that existed all through the millennia and tried again and again to present themselves in various forms, at times very much mixed up with the first group so that the distinctions have become extremely difficult to understand.

(3) The third type permits in existence only physical entities as we normally conceptualize. Theories of this group are various, including physicalism, scientism, reductionism, etc. couched in their various theoretical shades.

The confusion between the first two types attests to the false identification of consciousness / mind with the conceptual / mental and the misidentification of all or any of existents with the Divine. This sort of ontological identification of the physical with the mental / spiritual and this with the divine is called pantheism. The identification may even be evolutionary. But in this case it becomes a system that accepts also the material world, but as an initial phase.

Theories which, however, find that at least a good portion of what are sensed is the physical world, permit the existence of matter-energy as part of Reality-in-total. Those that take only matter-energy as existent hold either the one or the other of the following:

(1) They reduce consciousness into matter-energy, do not grant any divine nature to consciousness, and do not find these two as originating from the Divine.

(2) They find matter-energy as the physical existent, take consciousness as emergent out of matter-energy without losing their basic physical status, and permit the origin of matter-energy and/or consciousness as unique in themselves but as created or emergent products originating from the agency of the Divine. These are mentioned here with the purpose only of a clear differentiation serving not to dismiss the existence of matter-energy.

Without entering upon a theoretical discernment over the above theoretical varieties of ontology, I attempt to concentrate on the existence conditions necessitated by ordinary science and advanced mathematical physics and cosmology, which deal primarily with physical existents. I shall show in the rudiments of a physical ontology here below the relevance of (1) the most universal Categories for all existents – i.e., physical processes, consciousnesses of all grades, and, if there is, also the Divine, which then should be an infinitely active and infinitely extended bodiliness – and (2) the reflections, of the pertinent ontological universals of existents within minds and through symbolic languages. (Please note here that I did not insist on the existence of the Divine, but only suggested how it would be if it existed.)

It is also possible to show certain cases of the ontology of Reality-in-total if minds and the Divine are absolutely distinct cases. See my discussions:

(1)https://www.researchgate.net/post/Infinite-Eternal_Multiverse_Implications_to_Physics_and_Cosmology

(2)https://www.researchgate.net/post/Gravitational_Coalescence_Paradox_GCP_Introduction_to_Gravitational_Coalescence_Cosmology_GCC

Under the section “2. The Epistemology of Physics”, I have brought into discussion the natural tendency of humans to love not merely what is present in the immediate vicinity but also the distant natural kinds (groups of gross processual entities that are not directly available for experiments due to their distances), the less evident natural kinds (existing unobservables and unobservables that are not yet proved to exist), and the abstract / pertinent kinds (universals) of all that exist. Among these objects of love are to be found also the totality of all existents and the most general pertinents of Reality-in-total.

It is unacceptable that someone here tells me that none loves such objects. I agree that all sorts of psychologically direct perception of love are almost absent herein. But the tending to them intellectually, through feelings, and through sensations, wherever whichever is possible, is already present in all of us. It IS love, too.

Any existent can tend to existents, their pertinents, and to some extent also to the mental and linguistic reflections of both these. The tending and love for the reflections of both the first two can only transpire through the tending to and love for the first two. The tending in physical processes is not love. But at least in human beings it takes the shape of love. I think this aspect must gain momentum in epistemology. In other philosophical disciplines it should be acceptable in a slightly different manner.

This is due to the primacy of the ontological (in respect of existence, existents, and their pertinents in existent systems) as against the epistemic (which is a vague and veiled conscious reflection of the former in their existent systems). The epistemic is merely the description of how knowledge takes place and should take place with the help of finite amounts of data input derived from a few layers of the phenomena issuing from a few layers of the reality in question.

Epistemology is the study of truth-occurrences, and not directly of truth derivation methods nor directly of their existence. But it presupposes these. This is also why I hold that physical ontology is the existential foundation of epistemology. But physical ontology must itself be grounded upon the very notion of the To Be of Reality-in-total.

If primacy of existence can be accorded to the ontological, then whatever exists in this world may primarily be termed physical in existence (not physical in the sense of being the object of the science of physics, because primacy is to existence, not to any discipline.

"Mathematics is logical systems formulising relationships of variable(s) with other variable(s) quantitatively &/or qualitatively as science language." (Sinan Ibaguner)

I tried to devise my best description as shortly & clearly !

I believe that it is common knowledge that mathematics and its applications cannot directly prove Causality. What are the bases of the problem of incompatibility of physical causality with mathematics and its applications in the sciences and in philosophy?

The main but very general explanation could be that mathematics and mathematical explanations are not directly about the world, but are applicable to the world to a great extent.

Hence, mathematical explanations can at the most only show the general ways of movement of the processes and not demonstrate whether the ways of the cosmos are by causation, what the internal constitution of every part of it is, etc. Even when some very minute physical process is mathematized, the results are general, and not specific of the details of the internal constitution of that process.

No science and philosophy can start without admitting that the cosmos exists. If it exists, it is not nothing, not vacuum. Non-vacuous existence means that the existents are non-vacuously extended. This means that they have parts. Every part has parts too, ad libitum, because each part is extended and non-infinitesimal. Hence, each part is relatively discrete, not mathematically discrete.

None of the parts of any physical existent is an infinitesimal. They can be near-infinitesimal. This character of existents is Extension, a Category directly implied by the To Be of Reality-in-total.

Similarly, any extended being’s parts -- however near-infinitesimal -- are active, moving. This implies that every part has so (finite) impact on some others, not on infinite others. This character of existents is Change.

No other implication of To Be is so primary as these two (Extension-Change) and directly derivable from To Be. Hence, they are exhaustive of To Be.

Existence in Extension-Change is what we call Causality. If anything is existent, it is causal – hence Universal Causality is the trans-scientific and physical-ontological Law of all existents.

By the very concept of finite Extension-Change-wise existence, it becomes clear that no finite space-time is absolutely dense with existents. Hence, existents cannot be mathematically continuous. Since there is continuous (but finite and not discrete) change (transfer of impact), no existent can be mathematically absolutely continuous or discrete in its parts or in connection with others.

Can logic show the necessity of all existents as being causal? We have already discussed how, ontologically, the very concept of To Be implies Extension-Change and thus also Universal Causality.

WHAT ABOUT THE ABILITY OR NOT OF LOGIC TO CONCLUDE TO UNIVERSAL CAUSALITY?

In my argument above and elsewhere showing Extension-Change as the very exhaustive meaning of To Be, I have used mostly only the first principles of ordinary logic, namely, Identity, Non-contradiction, and Excluded Middle, and then argued that Extension-Change-wise existence is nothing but Universal Causality, if everything existing is non-vacuous in existence.

For example, does everything exist or not? If yes, let us call it non-vacuous existence. Hence, Extension as the first major implication of To Be. Non-vacuous means extended, because if not extended, the existent is vacuous. If extended, everything has parts.

The point of addition now has been Change, which makes the description physical. It is, so to say, from experience. Thereafter I move to the meaning of Change basically as motion or impact.

Naturally, everything in Extension must effect impacts. Everything has further parts. Hence, by implication from Change, everything causes changes by impacts. Thus, we conclude that Extension-Change-wise existence is Universal Causality. It is thus natural to claim that this is a pre-scientific Law of Existence.

In such foundational questions like To Be and its implications, we need to use the first principles of logic, because these are the foundational notions of all science and no other derivative logical procedure comes in as handy. In short, logic with its fundamental principles can help derive Universal Causality. Thus, Causality is more primary to experience than the primitive notions of mathematics.

Extension-Change, Universal Causality derived by their amalgamation, are the most fundamental Metaphysical, Physical-ontological, Categories. Since these are the direction exhaustive implications of To Be, all philosophy and science are based on these.

Bibliography

(1) Gravitational Coalescence Paradox and Cosmogenetic Causality in Quantum Astrophysical Cosmology, 647 pp., Berlin, 2018.

(2) Physics without Metaphysics? Categories of Second Generation Scientific Ontology, 386 pp., Frankfurt, 2015.

(3) Causal Ubiquity in Quantum Physics: A Superluminal and Local-Causal Physical Ontology, 361 pp., Frankfurt, 2014.

(4) Essential Cosmology and Philosophy for All: Gravitational Coalescence Cosmology, 92 pp., KDP Amazon, 2022, 2nd Edition.

(5) Essenzielle Kosmologie und Philosophie für alle: Gravitational-Koaleszenz-Kosmologie, 104 pp., KDP Amazon, 2022, 1st Edition.

Some counterfactual or partially counterfactual sort of modal statements, if they imply possible worlds, imply also some really (probabilistically with high truth value) possible worlds, and some necessary worlds. In which circumstances at all can there be other counterfactually possible worlds in reality? All possible worlds need not be necessary, but some of them might be, are, and will be necessary.

To find out in which all cases these causal possible worlds are real as past, present, and future necessary worlds, we need to investigate the possibilities that the physical laws with the presently available contingently physical and ontological information will permit us to accept the existence of other worlds as causally really existing.

But it is impossible to differentiate between counterfactual or partially counterfactual sort of modal statements!

Hence, visit the basic discussion text of: https://www.researchgate.net/post/The_Irrefutable_Argument_for_Universal_Causality_Any_Opposing_Position

If induction and deduction are mutually connected, what is the framework upon which they may be connected? Will such a framework of connecting induction and deduction be a mere perspective or something fundamental?

Courses in logic, philosophy of science, etc. begin always with a detailed study of induction and deduction. Most courses tell us that these are typically different kinds of reasoning. But are they?

I would happily obtain your arguments for or against the so-called mutual exclusiveness of induction and deduction.

I believe that relativising induction and deduction and connecting them with one another under some very general framework of thought will be a grand starting point to revolutionize the foundations of the whole of philosophy and science, and of logic and linguistic analytic philosophy in particular.

How shall the regions and limits of application of the Laws of Identity, Non-contradiction, and Excluded Middle be fixed?

Scientific, philosophical, social, and aesthetic advancements have continuously been made in epochal revolutions and minor changes within epochs. What has / have been the logical background spine behind these changes in terms of logical threshold revolutions during all these millennia?

I do not think that scientific, philosophical, and aesthetic revolutions have not used the foundations of ordinary logic. In this case, the old foundations of logic, especially the Laws of Identity, Non-contradiction, and Excluded Middle, have more or less been used all through these revolutions and changes – both theoretically and practically. The revolutionary achievements in all the human institutions have used them, let alone ordinary conversations and daily thoughts and feelings in human life.

But it is also a fact that time and again the new scientific, philosophical, and aesthetic revolutions have attempted to seek and create new forms of logic. These have been created and developed. This is why we have many forms of logic today.

But have they ever been able to overcome the Laws of Identity, Non-contradiction, and Excluded Middle? Even when the specific logic is considered counterfactual, non-causal, non-classically non-ordinary, etc., their specific foundations have been borne out through the use exclusively of the Laws of Identity, Non-contradiction, and Excluded Middle. This is because any statement, even if it yields only a truth probability, must be considered as true or false before approaching the next step to moving to conclusions.

How then shall the regions and limits of application of the Laws of Identity, Non-contradiction, and Excluded Middle be fixed?

Bibliography

(1) Gravitational Coalescence Paradox and Cosmogenetic Causality in Quantum Astrophysical Cosmology, 647 pp., Berlin, 2018.

(2) Physics without Metaphysics? Categories of Second Generation Scientific Ontology, 386 pp., Frankfurt, 2015.

(3) Causal Ubiquity in Quantum Physics: A Superluminal and Local-Causal Physical Ontology, 361 pp., Frankfurt, 2014.

(4) Essential Cosmology and Philosophy for All: Gravitational Coalescence Cosmology, 92 pp., KDP Amazon, 2022, 2nd Edition.

(5) Essenzielle Kosmologie und Philosophie für alle: Gravitational-Koaleszenz-Kosmologie, 104 pp., KDP Amazon, 2022, 1st Edition.

1. The Logic of PhysicsPhysics students begin with meso-world experiments and theories. Naturally, at the young age, they get convinced that the logic they follow at that level is identical with the ideal of scientific method. Convictions on scientific temper may further confirm them in this. This has far-reaching consequences in the concept of science and of the logic of science.

But, unquestionably, the logic behind such an application of the scientific method is only one manner of realizing (1) the ideal of scientific method, namely, observe, hypothesize, verify, theorize, attempt to falsify for experimental and theoretical advancements, etc., and (2) the more general ideal of reason.

But does any teacher or professor of physics (or of other sciences) instruct their students on the advantages of thinking and experimenting in accordance with the above-mentioned fundamental fact of all scientific practice in mind, or make them capable of realizing the significance of this in the course of time? I think, no.

This is why physicists (and for that matter all scientists) fail at empowering their students and themselves in favour of the growth of science, thought, and life. The logic being followed in the above-said mode of practice of scientific method, naturally, becomes for the students the genuine form of logic, instead of being an instantiation of the ideal of logic as reason. This seems to be the case in most of the practices and instruction of all sciences till today. A change of the origin, justification, and significance of the use of logic in physics from the very start of instruction in the sciences is the solution for this problem. The change must be in the foundations.

All humans equate (1) this sort of logic of each science, and even logic as such, with (2) reason as such. Reason as such, in fact, is more generic of all kinds of logic. Practically none of the professors (of physics as well as of other sciences) terms the version of logic of their science as an instantiation of reason, which may be accessed ever better as the science eventually grows into something more elaborate and complex. Physicist gets more and more skilled at reasoning only as and when she/he wants to grow continuously into a genuine physicist.

As the same students enter the study of recent developments in physics like quantum physics, relativity, nano-physics (Greek nanos, “dwarf”; but in physics, @ 10-9), atto-physics (@ 10-18), etc., they forget to make place for the strong mathematical effects that are due by reason of the conceptual and processual paradoxes due to epistemological and physical-ontological difference between the object-sizes and the sizes of ourselves / our instruments. The best examples are the Uncertainty Principle, the Statistical Interpretation of QM, Quantum Cosmology, etc.

They tend to believe that some of these and similar physics may defy our (meso-physical) logic – but by this mistakenly intending that all forms of reasoning would have to fail if such instances of advanced physics are accepted in all of physics. As a result, again, their logic tends to continue to be of the same level as has been taken while they did elementary levels of physics.

Does this not mean that the ad hoc make-believe interpretations of the logic of the foundations of QM, Quantum Cosmology, etc. are the culprits that naturally make the logic of traditional physics inadequate as the best representative of the logic of nature? In short, in order to find a common platform, the logic of traditional and recent branches of physics must improve so to adequate itself to nature’s logic.

Why do I not suggest that the hitherto logic of physics be substituted by quantum logic, relativity logic, thermodynamic logic, nano-logic, atto-logic, or whatever other logic of any recent branch of physics that may be imagined? One would substitute logic in this manner only if one is overwhelmed by what purportedly is the logic of the new branches of physics. But, in the first place, I wonder why logic should be equated directly with reason. The attempt should always be to bring the logic of physics in as much correspondence with the logic of nature, so that reason in general can get closer to the latter. This must be the case not merely with physicists, but also with scientists from other disciplines and even from philosophy, mathematics, and logic itself.

Therefore, my questions are: What is the foundational reason that physicists should follow and should not lose at any occasion? Does this, how does this, and should this get transformed into forms of logic founded on a more general sort of physical reason? Wherein does such reason consist and where does it exist? Can there be a form of logic in which the logical laws depend not merely on the size of objects or the epistemological level available at the given object sizes, but instead, on the universal characteristics of all that exist? Or, should various logics be used at various occasions, like in the case of the suggested quantum logic, counterfactual logic, etc.?

Just like logic is not to be taken as a bad guide by citing the examples of the many logicians, scientists, and “logical” human beings doing logic non-ideally, I believe that there is a kernel of reason behind physics, justified solely on the most basic and universal characteristics of physical existents. These universals cannot belong solely to physics, but instead, to all the sciences, because they belong to all existents.

This kernel of reason in physics is to be insisted upon at every act of physics, even if many physicists (and other scientists and philosophers) may not ensure that kernel in their work. I shall discuss these possibly highest universals and connect them to logic meant as reason, when I elaborate on: 3. The Ontology of Physics (in a forthcoming discussion in RG)

The matter on which physicists do logical work is existent matter-energy in its fundamental implications and the derivative implications from the fundamental ones. This is to be kept in mind while doing any logically acceptable work physics, because existent matter-energy corpora in processuality delineate all possible forms of use of logic in physics, which logic is properly to be termed nature’s reason.

Moreover, conclusions are not drawn up by one subject (person) in physics for use by the same subject alone. Hence, we have the following two points to note in the use of logic in physics and the sciences: (1) the intersubjectively awaited necessity of human reason in its delineation in logical methods should be upheld at least by a well-informed community, and (2) the need for such reason behind approved physics should then be spread universally with an open mind that permits and requires further scientific advancements.

These will make future generations further question the genuineness of such logic / specific realization of reason, and constantly encourage attempts to falsify theories or their parts so that physics can bring up more genuine instantiations of human reason. But is such human reason based on the reason active in nature?

Although the above arguments and the following definition of logic in physics might look queer or at least new and unclear for many physicists, for many other scientists, for many mathematicians, and even for many logicians, I define here logic for use in physics as the fundamental aspect of reason that physics should uphold constantly in every argument and conclusion due from it:

Logic in physics is (1) the methodological science (2) of approaching the best intersubjectively rational and structural consequences (3) in what may be termed thought (not in emotions) (4) in clear terms of ever higher truth-probability achievable in statements and conclusions (5) in languages of all kinds (ordinary language, mathematics, computer algorithms, etc.) (6) based on the probabilistically methodological use, (7) namely, of the rules of all sensible logics that exemplify the Laws of Identity, Non-contradiction, and Excluded Middle, (8) which in turn must pertain to the direct and exhaustive physical implications of “to exist”.

Here I have not defined logic in physics very simply as “the discipline of the rules of thought”, “the discipline of the methodological approach to truths”, etc., for obvious reasons clarified by the history of the various definitions of logic.

But here comes up another question: Is the reason pertaining to physical nature the same as the most ideal form of human reason? From within the business of physics, how to connect the reason of physical nature with that of humans? I may suggest some answers from the epistemological and ontological aspects. But I would appreciate your responses in this regard too.

Paradox Etymology can be traced back to at least Plato's Parmenides [1]. Paradox comes from para ("contrary to") and doxa ("opinion"). The word appeared in Latin "paradoxum" which means "contrary to expectation," or "incredible. We propose, in this discussion thread, to debate philosophical or scientific paradoxes: their geneses, formulations, solutions, or propositions of solutions... All contributions on "Paradoxes", including paradoxical ones, are welcome.

[1] https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Paradox

The limits of logic and mathematics is that we couldn't describe a question without symbol system, but symbol system is just an abstraction of the real world not the real world itself, so there is a distance between the abstracted symbol system and the real world, therefore there is truth we can't reach by symbol system, which A-HA moment may reach. But when we thinking we always use a symbol system like words or mathematics with apriori logic, so I wonder if AI could have A-HA moment?

If we consider a standard CMOS inverter, when the input is logic 0, and the output is logic 1, the NMOS transistor is in its OFF state, and its drain junction is then the sensitive one. and it is affetcted by energetic particle and causes negative glitch vice versa for PMOS.

Why does drain is more sensitive region when transistor is in OFF state in soft error mechanism?

I would like to know when choosing a mediator variable, researchers should consider its theoretical relevance to the IV and DV? Thus, is it always the case that, the selected mediator should logically account for the relationship between the independent and dependent variables and demonstrate a significant association with both the independent variable and the outcome?

Please, check my P=NP proof for errors:

Please reply with a comment if you find any errors and if you find none, too.

The proof uses logic (incompleteness of ZFC), algorithms accepting algorithms as arguments, reducing SAT to another NP-problem, inversions of bijections.

The proof does not present a practically feasible NP-complete algorithm (so, I don't yet mine Bitcoin by it).

Humanity has built formal logic with the ineffective elements of two operations. Why? Is this the largest logic algorithm? Or is there a broader algorithm?

Right now, in 2022, we can read with perfect understanding mathematical articles and books

written a century ago. It is indeed remarkable how the way we do mathematics has stabilised.

The difference between the mathematics of 1922 and 2022 is small compared to that between the mathematics of 1922 and 1822.

Looking beyond classical ZFC-based mathematics, a tremendous amount of effort has been put

into formalising all areas of mathematics within the framework of program-language implementations (for instance Coq, Agda) of the univalent extension of dependent type theory (homotopy type theory).

But Coq and Agda are complex programs which depend on other programs (OCaml and Haskell) and frameworks (for instance operating systems and C libraries) to function. In the future if we have new CPU architectures then

Coq and Agda would have to be compiled again. OCaml and Haskell would have to be compiled again.

Both software and operating systems are rapidly changing and have always been so. What is here today is deprecated tomorrow.

My question is: what guarantee do we have that the huge libraries of the current formal mathematics projects in Agda, Coq or other languages will still be relevant or even "runnable" (for instance type-checkable) without having to resort to emulators and computer archaeology 10, 20, 50 or 100 years from now ?

10 years from now will Agda be backwards compatible enough to still recognise

current Agda files ?

Have there been any organised efforts to guarantee permanent backward compatibility for all future versions of Agda and Coq ? Or OCaml and Haskell ?

Perhaps the formal mathematics project should be carried out within a meta-programing language, a simpler more abstract framework (with a uniform syntax) comprehensible at once to logicians, mathematicians and programers and which can be converted automatically into the latest version of Agda or Coq ?

----------------------

--OFFSET PPM encoder--

----------------------

library IEEE;

use IEEE.std_logic_1164.all;

use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_UNSIGNED.all;

ENTITY OPPM_Encoder IS

port( sin : IN STD_LOGIC;

clk_3bit : IN STD_LOGIC;

clk_4bit : IN STD_LOGIC;

reset : IN STD_LOGIC;

dout : OUT STD_LOGIC

);

end OPPM_Encoder;

architecture behaviour of OPPM_Encoder IS

SIGNAL control1 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(2 downto 0); --:= "100";-- changing this value 1 position changes the op as not synced 24 bit output since taking 6 blocks of 3 instead of 5.

SIGNAL sipo : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(14 downto 0) :=

"000000000000000";

SIGNAL piso : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0);

SIGNAL reg1 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(2 downto 0) := "000";

-- SIGNAL D2 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(2 downto 0) := "000";

SIGNAL load_reg : STD_LOGIC;

SIGNAL initflag1 : STD_LOGIC := '1'; -- used to initialise/sync input stream- once detected reset to 0 under synced operation

BEGIN

coder_input: PROCESS -- loads the input data using the 3 bit clock

BEGIN

WAIT UNTIL (clk_3bit'EVENT AND clk_3bit = '1');

control1 <= (control1(0)) & (control1(2 downto 1));

IF initflag1 ='1' THEN

IF sipo = "111111111111111" THEN

-- basic sync sequence from PRBS 111111111111111

-- 100011111110111 sync sequence produced from all 1's encoded by 15/11

-- note: the sequence needs to be input in reverse order in the waveform test file

-- extra bit in reg to account for extra clocks

initflag1 <= '0';

reg1 <= "111";

control1 <= "001";

END IF;

ELSE -- ELSIF initflag1 ='0' THEN

IF control1(1) = '1' THEN

reg1 <= sipo(0) & sipo (1) & sipo(2);

END IF;

END IF;

sipo <= sin & sipo(14 downto 1);

--D2 <= reg1 ; --(3 downto 1);

--sipo <= sipo(1 downto 0) & sin;

END PROCESS;

coder_output: PROCESS -- Outputs the code data using the 4 bit clock

BEGIN

WAIT UNTIL (clk_4bit'EVENT AND clk_4bit = '1');

IF (control1(1) = '1') AND (load_reg = '1') THEN

load_reg <= '0';

--piso <= D2(0) & (D2(1) AND D2(2)) & (D2(1) AND NOT D2(2))& (NOT D2(1) AND D2(2));

--piso <= D1(2) & (D1(1) AND D1(0)) & (D1(1) AND NOT D1(0))& (NOT D1(1) AND D1(0));

-- the above coding is performed using logic, which automatically assigns a valid code for data with errors

-- a case statement i.e a look-up table could also be used, as below.

case reg1 is

when "000" => piso <= "0000";

when "001" => piso <= "0001";

when "010" => piso <= "0010";

when "011" => piso <= "0100";

when "100" => piso <= "1000";

when "101" => piso <= "1001";

when "110" => piso <= "1010";

when "111" => piso <= "1100";

when others => piso <= "0000";

end case;

ELSE

--piso <= '0' & piso(3 downto 1); -- needs order cahnging

piso <= piso(2 downto 0) & '0'; -- needs order cahnging

load_reg <= '1';

END IF;

dout <= piso (3); --serial output

END PROCESS;

END behaviour;

Statement : Normalized Difference Vegetation index (NDVI) is computed from difference between visible and near-infrared (NIR) reflectance.

Conclusions:

I. Vegetation strongly reflects in visible band and absorbs NIR radiation

II. In standard false colour composite red colour is assigned to NIR band and other colours to visible bands

1. Only I is true

2. Only II is true

3. Both I and II are true

4, Both I and II are false

in adiabatic logic , the circuit is powered by trapezoidal wave but most of the literature mentioned that cross coupled oscillator as Asynchronous power clock generator which is sinusoidal in nature.

I read the two principal epistemology textbooks in America. One says nothing about synthetic a priori knowledge and the other devotes exactly one paragraph to the subject (p. 101), despite billing itself as "comprehensive." And that paragraph is wrong. Robert Audi says the following sentence is true, and he calls it synthetic. "Nothing is red and green all over at once." But colors are just different wavelengths of light, and waves can be added to each other – see the attached graph. If he defines red and green to be monochromatic, then the sentence can be made true by analyzing his own definitions, but such analysis of arbitrary definitions makes the result analytic, not synthetic, just as analyzing definitions makes the following sentence analytic. “All vixens are female.”

The mixture of red and green is brown. Your eye cannot see what a particular shade of brown is composed of, but Fourier analysis can separate any cyclic function into a weighted sum of its constituent waves. No physicist would say, "Nothing is red and green all over at once." This is something that only an airhead psychologist would say.

Robert Audi and Jennifer Nagel (the author of the other epistemology textbook) have turned the subject into a sub-discipline of psychology, writing about people’s apprehension of isolated facts in the same way that psychologists write about people’s feelings. They know as much about math and science as the typical psychologist, which is nothing.

I think the reason that I was denied admission to both ASU and UA Philosophy is that modern philosophers have abandoned Immanuel Kant and today know nothing about synthetic a priori knowledge, which is what my writing sample is about. They are probably followers of Ayer, who boasts that he can calculate 7 + 5 = 12 in his head while 91 X 79 = 7189 “is beyond the scope of our immediate apprehension (Language, Truth and Logic, p. 48).” He is damning logic with faint praise if he really believes that 91 X 79 = 7189 is us logicians’ proudest achievement!

Bottom line: Can scientists retake epistemology? Field scientists conducting experiments and trying to learn things are not served by all that vacuous psychobabble. Talk about fake barns and zebra-striped donkeys is just silly – there is nothing in the extant literature that will help a scientist do his job.

i have generated a triangle wave in matlab and now i want to use that wave as input to my simulink model

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EkKje9TTBFY

Is sex drive about our motivation to reproduce or to experience orgasm? Is it logical to use the expression 'sexual desire' for women's less obvious amenability to sexual activity?

Is it logical for a reviewer to send different comments after R1? We recieved comments and after submitting the revised MS, all the changes were satisfactory to reviewers as they did not raise any query regarding previous comments. But, in R2 totally different comments were made on the manuscript.

Please help me to understand veracity of claims regarding legal positivism and logical positivism

The liberal view of gender ethics in the postmodern era, despite the demise of most major narratives, differs from the Islamic view or the view of anti-genderists,For reasons that seem logical to each of them, it is not permissible to resist or challenge them What led toThis endless debate lost the rights of many people, women and men alike

What is the difference between semantic consistency and logical consistency?

We used to have some project that discussed these interesting topics. I hope some of you will start this discussion going from your own perspective. How does art connect with science? My husband works in science and I am definitely one of those "mind wanderers" who get so easily distracted because in art we think associatively.

I almost daily have to think why I don't mind how my mind works. What are your thoughts in these two very different styles of cognitive activity?

The existing articles mainly used positivist logic and were at the first level of concept analysis (interpretation of the concept). Can someone explain the use of post-positivist logic in the second level of concept analysis with reference to some valuable articles?

Recently I've discussed this topic with a tautologist researcher, Quine's follower. The denial of the capacity of deductive logic to generate new knowledge implies that all deductive results in mathematics wont increase our knowledge for real.

The tautologic nature of the deduction seems to lead to this conclusion. In my opinion some sort of logic omniscience is involved in that position.

So the questions would be:

Thanks beforehand for your insights.

Does anyone know any official document or scientific publication logically explaining why I should replace for example HPLC-grade acetonitrile or methanol (pure, or with <1% formic or acetic acid) after a certain time? Device manufacturers regularly recommend days or a few weeks, but for the life of me I can't imagine anything growing in there, nor am I aware of any abiotic reactions. How are these solvents supposed to go bad? (Buffered aqueous solutions are of course a different issue.)

Insistence on mathematical continuity in nature is a mere idealization. It expects nature to obey our idealization. This is what happens in all physical and cosmological (and of course other) sciences as long as they use mathematical idealizations to represent existent objects / processes.

But mathematically following nature in whatever it is in its part-processes is a different procedure in science and philosophy (and even in the arts and humanities). This theoretical attitude accepts the existence of processual entities as what they are.

This theoretical attitude accepts in a highly generalized manner that

(1) mathematical continuity (in any theory and in terms of any amount of axiomatization of physical theories) is not totally realizable in nature as a whole and in its parts: because the necessity of mathematical approval in such a cosmology falls short miserably,

(2) absolute discreteness (even QM type, based on the Planck constant) in the physical cosmos (not in non-quantifiable “possible worlds”) and its parts is a mere commonsense compartmentalization from the "epistemology of piecemeal thinking": because the aspect of the causally processual connection between any two quanta is logically and mathematically alienated in the physical theory of Planck’s constant, and

(3) hence, the only viable and thus the most reasonably generalizable manner of being of the physical cosmos and of biological entities is that of CAUSAL CONTINUITY BETWEEN PARTIALLY DISCRETE PROCESSUAL OBJECTS.

PHYSICS and COSMOLOGY even today tend to make the cosmos mathematically either continuous or defectively discrete or statistically oriented to merely epistemically probabilistic decisions and determinations.

Can anyone suggest here the existence of a different sort of physics and cosmology that one may have witnessed until today? A topology and mereology of CAUSAL CONTINUITY BETWEEN PARTIALLY DISCRETE PROCESSUAL OBJECTS, fully free of discreteness-oriented category theory and functional analysis, is yet to be born.

Hence, causality in its deep roots in the very concept of To Be is alien to physics and cosmology till today.

Bibliography

(1) Gravitational Coalescence Paradox and Cosmogenetic Causality in Quantum Astrophysical Cosmology, 647 pp., Berlin, 2018.

(2) Physics without Metaphysics? Categories of Second Generation Scientific Ontology, 386 pp., Frankfurt, 2015.

(3) Causal Ubiquity in Quantum Physics: A Superluminal and Local-Causal Physical Ontology, 361 pp., Frankfurt, 2014.

(4) Essential Cosmology and Philosophy for All: Gravitational Coalescence Cosmology, 92 pp., KDP Amazon, 2022, 2nd Edition.

(5) Essenzielle Kosmologie und Philosophie für alle: Gravitational-Koaleszenz-Kosmologie, 104 pp., KDP Amazon, 2022, 1st Edition.

How to select materials ?

How to design an assessment?

How to create a logical sequencing between different course syllabi ?

Please feel free to ask questions about the draft paper. The attached paper is a draft of Ideas for communist socio-economic development.

Almost all scientific students in secondary schools want to learn, understand, experiment natural sciences & mathematics, rather than forced to memorise so many details of unprovable social studies !

"What is indoctrination relation in education philosophy?

The term 'indoctrination' typically means 'to instruct or to teach'. It can be understood as teaching or inculcating a particular set of beliefs, ideas or attitude on an individual or a group, without allowing any possibility of question or challenge against it."

With the advent of ChatGPT, it can be said that anyone can turn an idea into a scientific work. For example, a schoolboy can have the same idea as a researcher, but the researcher has to make for example a research proposal manually, the schoolboy can make it with ChatGPT. Although there may be no citation (The citation in the current version of ChatGPT (early 2023) is not correct), but the logic and word choice and organization of the proposal can be made well, sometimes even better than manually made. Perhaps by the end of this year, the research proposals we make today can be easily made by school children at the end of the year with the help of AI that is better than ChatGPT now. What do you think?

It is common to affirm that "One can never perform any measurement whose result is an irrational number."

This is equivalent to say the contrapositive, that anything that can be measured or produced is a rational number.

But the irrational number √2 can be produced to infinite length in finite steps, as 2×sin(45 degrees). It also exists like that in nature, as the diagonal of a unit square.

There is no logical mystery in these two apparently opposing views. Nature is not Boolean, a new logic is needed.

In this new logic, the statements 'p' and 'not p' can coexist. In the US, Pierce already said it. In Russia, Setun used it.

This opens quantum mechanics to be logical, and sheds new light into quantum computation.

One can no longer expect that a mythical quantum "analog computer" will magically solve things by annealing. Nature is also solving problems algebraically, where there is no such limitation.

Gödel’s undecidability is Boolean, and does not apply. The LEM (Law of the Excluded Middle) falls.

What is your qualified opinion?

The PRI checks for the simultaneous subset relationship of X—>Y and X —> ~Y. This is a logical contradiction and the formula for PRI is wel known:

[min(XY)-min(XY~Y)]/[X]-min(XY~Y)]

So far so good. However, there is no formula to calculate a PRI for the simultaneous superset relationship of Y<—X and Y<—~X. Or have I missed something? It‘s equally nonsensical, of course, for both X and ~X to be a subset of Y (for Y to be a simultaneous superset of X and ~X.) As far as I know, a formula for checking against a simultaneous superset relation of Y does not exist. But it can be easily deduced from the one for a simultaneous subset relationship of X. This would be:

[min(XY)-min(X~XY)]/[X-min(X~XY)]

What do you think? Does this formula make sense? Should we augment the PRI(Y) that we have now in QCA with a PRI(X) for the simultaneous subset relationship X—>Y and ~X—>Y?

Through the literature survey of reversible vs irreversible logic, I have come to the conclusion of choosing former over the later due to low power consumption. However, when trying to implement the same on the Vivado software (using VHDL language) and Cadence Virtuoso (Schematic designing), the power is reported to be high than the irreversible logic.

Can anyone explain how do I confirm that reversible logic has low power consumption?

The study of ethics (correct acting) must go hand in hand with the study of logic (correct thinking).

I was wondering whether in the Stoic theory of lekta (or 'sayables') there are some distinguished lekta which were considered more 'primitive' or basic than other lekta. Like primitive predicate symbols in first-order logic used to define others predicates or the primitive concepts or ideas found in the western philosophical tradition from Descartes to Leibniz to Kant to Russell. They are 'categories' in the sense of Kant rather than Aristotle. The so-called Stoic 'categories' seem to correspond to our modern notion of 'type'.

Did the Stoics have a theory of definition or a theory of decomposition of lekta into primitive lekta beyond the basic grammar-inspired framework expounded in the work of Bobzien and others ?

I wondered whether or not the selection of articles and documents proposed by ResearchGate was based on Boolean logic and with, more or less, the same logical operators as Google

I am working on UV-visible measuements of some powder samples (dark colored ones), the absorbance measurements gives us values higher than 1, which we think isn't logical, and when I try to calculate the Reflectance by the mean of this equation: R=1-sqrt(T.exp(A)), it gives me high values (up to 70% Reflectance) which are in contradiction with the high absorbance measured, assuming that the Trasmittance values that are under 25% are correct.

Should I go through some type of normalization for my absorbance values? or do i do the UV-Visble measurements again adding Barium Sultfate (BaSO4) to the samples?

Please refer any paper/report/thesis which gives the logic to use the different statistical distribution in different environments.

I noticed that there is a structural similarity between the syntactic operations of Bealer's logic (see my paper "Bealer's Intensional Logic" that I uploaded to Researchgate for my interpretation of these operations) and the notion of non-symmetric operad. However for the correspondence to be complete I need a diagonalisation operation.

Consider an operad P with P(n) the set of functions from the cartesian product X^n to X.

Then I need operations Dij : P(n) -> P(n-1) which identify variables xi and xj.

Has this been considered in the literature ?

Want to make a lie detector to train machine. But want to know if there's any equation, mathematical term, logics or concept to know the person is lying..

Whom use the tools or norms to investigation the facts which related to both?

Emotional logic and aesthetics have underlying values that force taste judgements and preferences. It is true that every culture has its own aesthetics. Nevertheless, there are also differences in the cultures that are based on underlying emotions.

Between the pillars of openness and control and adventure move the emotion systems: stimulus, dominance and balance.

Which artworks would fit best into which pillars and emotion systems and what values lie behind them?

One question that comes to mind is this: How do momentary moods (also emotions) change the allocation? Does this have a serious effect? Will the selection then be made via the value usually behind it or the temporary emotion?

Does anyone have any ideas about this?

================================================================

Emotionale Logik und Ästhetik hat dahinterliegende Werte die Geschmacksurteile und Vorlieben forcieren. Zwar hat auch jede Kultur ihre eigene Ästhetik. Dennoch auch in den Kulturen gibt es Unterschiede die auf dahinterliegenden Emotionen beruhen.

Zwischen den Pfeilern Offenheit und Kontrolle und Abenteuer bewegen sich die Emotionssysteme: Stimulanz, Dominanz und Balance.

Welche Kunstwerke würden am besten in welche Pfeiler und Emotionssysteme passen und welche Werte liegen dahinter?

Eine Frage die ich mir aufdrängt ist jene: Wie verändern momentane Stimmungen (auch Emotionen) die Zuordnung? Wirkt sich das gravierend aus? Wird dann die Auswahl über den üblicherweise dahinterstehenden Wert erfolgen oder der temporären Emotion?

Irgendjemand eine Idee dazu?

Ternary logic ( R =3 ) has three logical states {0, 1, 2}

Quaternary logic ( R = 4) has four logical states {0, 1, 2, 3}

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, also known as (the) linguistic relativity (hypothesis), more or less states (in one of the most specific descriptions by Whorf): users of markedly different grammars are directed by their grammars towards a different evaluation of reality ('Language, Thought and Reality' (selected writings by Benjamin Lee Whorf), 1940: 221).

To my knowledge, research into this hypothesis has to date not touched on the paradox it introduces (and please let me know when I'm mistaken). How is this hypothesis paradoxical?

When someone denies the hypothesis, it means that he or she has arrived at a different evaluation of reality than Whorf, as witnessed by his articulation of the hypothesis. Understanding that Whorf not necessarily meant 'actual wording' by 'grammar' (implying that it's not because those people don't understand the sentence that they reject it), upon asking for clarification of their rejection, they will rationalize their opinion as to why they consider the hypothesis to be wrong. In other words: although in all likeliness expressed in English, their rationalization will reflect an underlying logic different to the one they will say to have read in the hypothesis they rejected. That underlying logic (expressed in a configuration of arguments) will therefore indicate a different 'grammar' which orients the intention of the words they use.

The paradox is that, when people reject linguistic relativity, they can only attempt to make their rejection understood by creating a different grammar intended to persuade their opponents to share their evaluation of reality, not Whorf's. Two grammars, two evaluations of reality (hypothesis is wrong, hypothesis is right). They will, at that point, have paradoxically proven the hypothesis.

Or am I wrong?

I want to test the strength of a simple correlation in two groups and see whether there is a difference between these groups. Fisher's z-test is generally recommended, but I wonder whether there are other approaches towards this problem. Moderated regression might be an option by as far I understand the logic behind regression, it assumes that one is dependent and the other is independent; which I would not like to assume. Thank you!

According to the recent findings in keezhadi , there is a striking similarity between indus valley civilization and keezhadi civilization, the script included. There are claims that the indus people started the keezhadi civilization after they left indus. As there is nothing earlier than 1500 BC in adichanallur or keezhadi, such a conclusion is logical. Then, does it mean that the lemurian hypothesis which is the cradle baby theory of staunch thamizh nationalists is all wrong. ? There were no tamils or a tamil civilization before 1500 BC?

Mathematics abstracted and idealized concrete mathematics, exemplified in Euclid’s The Elements. Religion around the same time or earlier, abstracted the concrete representation of deities. Are there similarities in the problem solving approaches?

Stoic logic and in particular the work of Chrysippus (c. 279 – c. 206 BC) has only come down to us in fragments. To my knowledge the most accessible account is given in Sextus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Stoic logic certainly contained an axiomatic-deductive presentation of what we call today the 'propositional calculus'. The deductive system was based on both axioms and rules and appears to have been similar to Gentzen's sequent calculus. Certain accounts (by Cicero, if I am not mistaken) suggest that it included the analog of the 'cut rule'. There are tons of remaining questions. Was this propositional calculus classical or intuitionistic ? What type of negation did it employ ? Was it closer to relevance logics and many-valued logics or even to linear logic ? How did the Stoics treat modality ? What about the liar paradox ? How did they deal with quantification ? Was it in combinatory logic style or algebra of relations style ?

I doubt if the principles of logic can be applied universally except when the ontologies of the fields of discussion of the objects under logical treatment are clarified. In commonsense logic everything goes. But is it to be considered so when ordinary logical principles are applied in the various sciences in the various concepts levels being discussed in each of them?

Our answer is YES. This question captured the reason of change: to help us improve. We, and mathematics, need to consider that reality is quantum [1-2], ontologically.

This affects both the microscopic (e.g., atoms) and the macroscopic (e.g., collective effects, like superconductivity, waves, and lasers).

Reality is thus not continuous, incremental, or happenstance.

That is why everything blocks, goes against, a change -- until it occurs, suddenly, taking everyone to a new and better level. This is History. It is not a surprise ... We are in a long evolution ...

As a consequence, tri-state, e.g., does not have to be used in hardware, just in design. Intel Corporation can realize this, and become more competitive. This is due to many factors, including 1^n = 1, and 0^n = 0, favoring Boolean sets in calculations.

This question is now CLOSED. Focusing on the discrete Weyl-Heisenberg group, as motivated by SN, this question has been expanded in a new question, where it was answered with YES in +12 areas:

[1]

[2]

Hi,

i'm writing a quantitative paper (management field), and i have some issues about present my hypotheses.

I know usually researchers present/develop their hypotheses as below format:

( literarure review )...... therefore we propse:

H1: xxxxxxx

( literarure review )...... therefore we propse:

H2: xxxxxxx

...........................

However, because my literature review is a bit complex, so to make the logic more smooth, i only can present my hypotheses at the end of the literature review, as following:

( literature review) ........ therefore we propose:

H1: xxxxxxx

H2: xxxxxxx

H3: xxxxxxx

I've seen many papers present their hypotheses as this way, is the second format normal and good?

thanks!