Jurisprudence - Science topic

The question is what does the notion “poor” mean. To me conditions matter.

Best regards,

Kamil.

Green roof was actually use for keeping home warm during winter and cool during summer at the same time in urban areas the green roof also absorbs smogs.

Since the green roof reduces the building temperature it will help in reducing energy consumption.

Law is a set of legal rules that regulate the life of society؟؟؟

سؤال قيم كنت اتمنى الإجابة

Altough my opinion can not be but an external point of view, because I am not immersed in the culture of the South Asian countries, nor have I had experienced their history, I agree what Montserrat Gas-Aixendri wrote: «The changes should depend more on the fact that the laws are not adequate to reality, than on whether they come from a colonial government».

In Latin America, where I live and work, even when some figures (still on force) descends clearely from Roman Law, our legal systems were not precisely inherited from those ruling in the times of european empire's domination, but imported from codes, institutions and political arrangements conceived under the strong influence of liberal ideals, also brought from Europe in the times of French Revolution and intensfied with the example given by the United States' Independence. Probably, we could regard them as colonial inheritance, but they have been well assimilated in our political culture and our legal thinking.

Nowadays, after two centuries, the same basic constructs support our normative frame and, even in the recognizion of the several ammendements operated time by time, globalization is impelling us to equate legal figures and procedures to those existent in developed countries, in order to attract business and investments. So, I think, there is a worldwide phenomenon concerning legislation: its tendency to be homologated.

Am in line with Aparna Sathya Murthy

Pim Janse brought an important 'gap' into the discussion, if we move from the micro-level or personal action to the macro-evel of political decisions.

Very interesting discussion...👍.

I think it should be kept in mind that one thing is "dispensation" and another is "marriage nullity". If you refer only to the concept of "marriage consummation", I think the correct point is to delve into the essence of the concepts rather than the forms. In other words, pay more attention to the ratio legis, rather than the written formula itself. What I mean is that your proposal to deepen the concept of "marriage consummation" seems to be interesting and important because, obviously, we are body and spirit and we must get as close as possible to the truth. Whenever the reasoning be well-argued and the arguments be well-founded and well applied to the specific case.

In order to transform between self-consistent and conventional coordinate systems such as cartesian or cylindrical (polar?), no addition of any force term should ever be needed.

Here it is important to understand not only how the origin of your coordinate frame is defined (fixed to what, translating with what, assigned to what...?), but more importantly, is one frame rotating or accelerating vs. another frame.

Its all about the acceleration. A Newtonian frame is non-accelerating, and is therefore also called an "Inertial" inertial frame. Rotation of a reference frame would cause acceleration of a particle fixed in that frame (fixed to any point but the instantaneous center of rotation or ICOR), and so a rotating reference frame is accelerating or "non-inertial".

The coordinate frame transforms that generate additional terms are transforms going from a non-inertial (i.e. accelerating) to an inertial (non-accelerating) frame. A rotating frame is a classic example of an accelerating or non-inertial frame. In any Dynamics problem, or more broadly in any Physical Mechanics problem, the transform from one frame to another must account for acceleration of the non-inertial frame as expressed in terms of the inertial frame, thus the added terms typically required within the inertial frame for motion initially described in a rotating frame.

Take one generic point defined in the rotating or accelerating ("non-inertial") reference frame. Then, develop the definition of that point in terms of the reference frame that you would like to transform to. The key is that differentiation must hold for the new frame and that is how you will find the "added" terms required in whatever inertial or non-accelerating frame you are trying to transform to.

The best way to do this is graphically, with vectors representing particle position and velocity, and components of those vectors along whatever axes define the initial coordinate system. Different color chalk on the black board, or different color lines in the computer plot, are both good ways to track position vs. velocity.

In the end you should have a set of equations that transforms cleanly back and forth between one frame and the other. Most importantly, the way to know you have a good answer is by continuity and F=MA, which has to hold in both frames in order for your transform to be valid. There are many Dynamics text books that treat this coordinate frame transformation problem. Analytically the added terms come out of vector differentiation and may be derived likewise. Setting up the problem graphically will always give you a better understanding of the physical reality resulting in additional terms in one vs. another coordinate frame.

Always label your coordinate frames individually and track what frame definition applies to what case(s). This way you will never fall victim to the dreaded "rotating frame transformation error" that invalidates all subsequent solutions after it is applied. One of the biggest of such errors is the error of omission, which you have already avoided by your realization that a transform is required - good job. Now the fun begins - you get to derive the transform. Find a Dynamics textbook and soak your brain in it, then things will make more sense. Remember to carefully mind you notation and label each frame clearly, the secret to success as a Dynamicist.

There are many different questions built into your question. I will answer your direct question in 2) and 3) below, but I need to preface it with an observation in 1)

1) I think one must be very cautious when comparing normative/prescriptive vs. empirical/sociological perspectives on human rights in an attempt to decide which has more ‘truth’ value. Studying human rights as ‘norms’ is entirely different from studying them as ‘facts’. Normative claims about the universality of human rights are important because that is what their moral legitimacy is based upon, but looking for their empirical reality is difficult, except when you treat them as a social construction, as one commentator suggested. However, I emphasize that the two groups you have identified ask very different questions about human rights. Empiricists do not, and cannot, for instance, say whether human rights should exist or whether they are good or bad, they can only speak to whether certain factual claims about human rights are justified or not. Similarly, lawyer-normativists cannot tell you, for instance, whether or not human rights are, empirically, meaningful for a given society to any degree, but they will happily provide normative arguments about why they are good (or not), and can tell you what the outcome of applying human rights norms to a given social context or situation will be, and whether that outcome is desirable or not. But again, neither approach is more ‘true’ than the other. They are asking fundamentally different questions about human rights. They can inform one another, but it is illogical to use one to disprove the other because their methods and research subjects are entirely different.

2) Your question of why are there more normative perspectives rather than empirical perspectives on human rights is probably quite easy to answer empirically. If we recognize that human rights are legal constructs, it makes sense that lawyers, who are trained in understanding and analyzing normative frameworks of rules for specific social purposes, have written a lot about them. In their current juridical form they were either created or recognized (depending on your point of view) at specific moments through juridical acts like international treaties, domestic legislation and jurisprudence. These are fundamentally rule based systems, which explains why lawyers and legal scholars have written a lot about them. The dominance of the international human rights regime, may also, in part, be, as you say, because many human rights scholars either come from or have been educated in Western institutions. But it’s also because it is endorsed by the current power structure of global politics, and many ‘developing or oriental countries’ as you labelled them have signed onto and participate in that regime, and there are many scholars from those regions who are strong advocates of the international human rights regime as well.

3) While the normative nature of human rights is quite unambiguous, their empirical nature is less obvious. The comparatively fewer empirical studies of human rights, therefore, may be due to empirical scholars not being attracted to the field because it isn’t clear at all what the factual bases of human rights are. Whether or not certain people or groups agree with the values underlying the human rights legal regime is a factual question, but as one commentator said, it is irrelevant legally speaking given the philosophical argument that they are eternal and universal, ie. you don’t need to believe in them to be subject to them. On the other hand, empirical scholars might wish to use empirical research to challenge the philosophical claim to universality, but might be dissuaded from doing so given the political/normative implications of doing so (ie. do you want to live in a world where not everybody is entitled to the same fundamental rights?). Other social constructionists might argue that while human rights as norms themselves have no empirical basis other than whether or not people or societies believe in them (which, again, is different from saying they are or are not ‘true’), the global legal regimes and discourses about human rights clearly factual and are available for empirical study. Nevertheless, as you pointed out, critical scholars, and not only from the developing world, have noticed that the dominant international human rights regime does reflect a certain cultural perspective (Western, individualistic, etc.) that is not shared by members of certain societies, like the Philippine barangays you mention. This may be both an empirical or a philosophical/normative critique, depending on how one writes it. But stating that as a fact does not lead to an obvious normative conclusion. The lawyer will say, at the end of the day, "So what? That doesn't make human rights any less valid or important."

As we have all seen too many times, it is about the money and power that is linked to the money. Unfortunately few companies place the welfare of their employees above the bottom line of profit/loss. It is also so well known that employees will be one of the things impacted by down-sizing or automation.

Perhaps this question is related to yesterday's question regarding theology and philosophy? Moral obligations are frequently, but not always, based on a religious moral code. Whereas legal obligations are based on a secular "moral code," which certainly draws from religious beliefs, but is a distillation of these, and is allowed to evolve over time.

How to determine which rules are legislatable? I think maybe a short answer is, rules that reasonable people (hopefully in Congress) can agree benefit society as whole, are legislatable. Rules that depend on nothing more than faith in the precision of an ancient religious text, not so much. So, something like, "first, show me the clear benefit, then we might legislate."

Take, for instance, tithing and holy days of obligation. The secular laws do not make such practices either necessary or "moral," because they have been replaced with secular laws, independent of any religion. Tithing was replaced with "paying your taxes," and holy days of obligation were replaced with government holidays. So, reasonable people determined that the religious practices had merit, but without having to be tied to any religious rigor. For instance, taxes vary, depending on circumstances, regardless of what ancient religious texts might have prescribed. for tithing

Virtue is concerned with choice, Aristotle says. So to understand what virtue involves, we need to understand choice. But before we can do that, we need to understand the distinction between what is voluntary and what is involuntary, because we praise and blame what is voluntary, but not what is involuntary.

Aristotle discusses these issues in the first half of Bk 3 of the Nicomachean Ethics.

There are two things that render our actions involuntary – force and ignorance.

When we act voluntarily, by contrast, we know what we are doing, and we bring it about ourselves. Contrast three cases of standing on a train and stepping on

someone’s foot:

1. The train lurches, you lose your balance, and accidentally step on someone’s foot. Stepping on their foot is involuntary, caused by force.

2. You shuffle your feet to get comfortable, and put your foot down on someone’s foot without looking. Although moving your feet is voluntary, stepping on someone’s foot is involuntary, caused by ignorance (that their foot was there).

3. You deliberately and knowingly bring your foot down on top of someone else’s.

This is voluntary.

Force We can be forced to act not only by physical forces but also by psychological pressure (such as threat of pain). Where no one could withstand such pressure, we don’t blame someone for what they do. This shows it is involuntary. However, we don’t think of the prospect of something good or pleasant as ‘forcing’ us to act.

When we act involuntarily, we do so with pain and regret.

Now, some actions that we do, we don’t want to do. These might be called voluntary and involuntary. Aristotle gives the example of sailors throwing goods overboard in a storm. They want to save the boat, but they don’t want to lose the goods. Such actions should be called voluntary. First, actions which we do to avoid a greater evil or in order to secure some good end are the right actions to choose.

Second, we praise people for such actions, and we noted above that praise and blame attaches to what is voluntary.

So, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions relates to the

moment of action in the particular circumstances one is in, not whether the action is generally desirable.

ICC, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS, to my account ,its activity is linked with criminal CASES, having ramifications and two or more States/NATION'S ... which is a CITIZENSHIP person's criminal CASES having overlapping with other countries...

."...In the light of international treatment and the established jurisprudence of public international law, an individual is still not seen as a subject of public international law..."! The individual of a Nation, will be taken as SUBJECT of the ICC only the case is required to be referred to this Court, THROUGH some other Nation...In my reading,all individuals of the GLOBAL SYSTEM nations can't be made as subject of ICC, UNLESS AND UNTIL there becomes GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP ...PERSON'S of any country can move anywhere to anywhere, WHICH is is a NIGHTMARE BEFORE THE PRESENT OF POWER ,POLITICS, or in short POLITRICS play games for individuals power and authority...

Who is the arbiter of whether a law is unjust or not? There are inescapable grey zones. If civil disobedience enters the culture, it will soon be hijacked by every interest group and every disgruntled citizen towards their own ends.

History is replete with ghastly laws (such as laws mandating torture), which in the end were born from and the reflection of immature, coarse societies. The proper answer is not civil disobedience, but a culture of respect for both the law and the people - something that History shows cannot be improvised overnight but is the culmination of a long maturing process.

Perhaps the only way is to quickly build both a culture and an economy which obviate the possibility of unjust laws being passed.

This happens all the time, and the problem is your definition of "correct." The most obvious example being, of course, religiously-motivated terrorism. And religiously-motivated mutilation. Or how about arranged marriages? Many people find these practices to be morally correct. That's the problem.

to C. Lewis Kausel"

God should kill all of us - anyway - sooner or later.

Cecilia, you like to wait?

No, not in the least. I think of government like a big condominium association. It's not in the least some sort of father figure. That would be pathetic. Government is people wanting to make sure that what the majority prefers is honored, even while leaving others as free as possible to do their own thing.

People are government. We don't want our neighborhood trashed, so we establish certain basic rules that the vast majority want.

Thanks so much for your answer, Albert! I've never seen prima facie duties linked with divine command theory before the contributors to this thread :) But it raises an issue. I agree with you that divine command theory doesn't work. However, could prima facie duties be conjoined with a divine nature theory of ethics? One could posit in a philosophical vein that God is the greatest conceivable being and is therefore necessarily loving, just, fair, compassionate, and so forth by nature. These facets of God's nature could shine in our intellects in the same way as light shines from the sun, causing us to recognize them as prima facie duties. What do you or others think about this speculative conjunction?

Yes. It's the pro-property line throughout history.

Proudhon said otherwise "la propriété c'est le vol" in a zero sum game that you can only own by depriving others from owning, sometimes causing famine and death (Irish potato famine, years of wheat speculation preceding French revolution).

There was food in Ireland, it was owned by some, and needed by others.

What is allowed to be owned?

Humans, no, or rather not any more, George Washington owned slaves... The cities of Bristol, Liverpool, Nantes made fortunes from this inhumane trade. 

Where do you put the limit?

In some countries public transport is privately owned potentially overpriced, and what could seem to be private transport by car depends heavily on public subsidy (roads and bridges). In others public transport is owned by state companies and underpriced, and roads may have tolls. 

Of course this drives towards more collective means of transport and less Carbon oxides release (electrical trains, trams, etc) or more (fossil fuel vehicles). 

Nobody commented on my line of data ownership. 

Ok I'll add habeas corpus, which is mistakenly believed as everyone owns their body, whereas the meaning was in old England that a suspect could be seized by a court depending on the king to be tried, instead of the local court where he or she had been taken to initially. This resulted statistically in fairer judgment. Law applied with more independence, corruption and arbitrary judgement was counterbalanced. The consequence was that you tended to own your body, because the king could seize it... 

One could also ask the question of education and property. Can you buy education, should you be able to, and if your parents - not you- have no money, should you be made to "pay", be punished for your parents to lack money? 

There is a worldwide divide on this: education dominantly state-run vs education dominantly private. 200km apart, the rule can be almost free universities vs 22 000 GBP or 9000 GBP/year, in Europe. 

Can you buy and own education? 

Or is it acquired by study, hard intellectual work, and the cost of the teaching is covered by government? 

Some countries with dominance of private university education import well-trained people in the medical professions, from countries where such studies are funded by the tax payer. Maybe Proudhon would say again that "la propriété c'est le vol". Hijacking rare resource from those who have funded its development. OPM, other people's money. 

Well the seemingly simple definition of ownership has made us travel through human right, microeconomics, macroeconomics.

If an attorney dozed off during a trial two issues are raised.

1. Did that period of sleep affect the totalilty of the outcome of the proceedings? 

2. Does it represent an attitude of that particular attorney to the importance of the trial and the defendant's welfare?

In case one, obviously the trial must be reheard.  In case two the case should be subject to full appeal and examination of the attorney's competance in all aspects of the preparation of the defence and scrutiny of the prosecution evidence should be meticulously investigated.  It should be noted that 'falling asleep' can occur not only during the trial itself but when the crucial prosecution evidence is being analysed.

I have seen a number of cases where crucial errors in prosecution evidence have not been picked up by the defence and have subsequently not been available to the jury.  This is in fact the most common failing of autoptic evidence.  It is all very well collecting and collating it but missing its significance through incompetence can defeat any or all forensic science.     

If an attorney fell asleep during prosecution's evidence in chief and examination in chief it must lead to a conclusion of a mistrial.  If an attorney was not listening at that stage then such negligence should result in a questionable verdict.   

In all cases of attorneys falling asleep during the trial, be they prosecution or defence they should be reprimanded in court, savaged in the press, reported to the bar and removed from the roll.   

The Nuremberg trial and decisions of the German Federal Court concerning killings at the wall by police of GDR.

Plaese read the article:http://www.ilf-frankfurt.de/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/ILF_WP_017.pdf

Dear Marien, thank you for your comments. Indeed the new Argentine Code was written in colloquial language and it's shorter than the previous one, but language simplification, from a linguistic perspective at least, was not even discussed. The contrast with the so-called plain language movement in the US, UK, Australia, NZ, etc., is stark. Countries like Mexico, Spain and Chile, to name a few, have official programs to simplify legal language and avoid unnecessary "legalese" in Spanish. I think we should do more.

Hi, I agreed to what you have discussed so far. In addition, you can have a look at useful services online that will help you to find similar ontologies or terms that you might reuse in your ontology. http://lov.okfn.org/dataset/lov/, or tips to build it, http://eis-bonn.github.io/vdbc/.

As for the ODPs, you can look into the Content Ontology Design patterns, that are small ontology solving specific and generic modeling problems.

You can also look into Agile methodologies, i.e., http://oa.upm.es/14479/1/ESWC2012-DS-Camera_Ready_v05.pdf, or Just enough Ontology Engineering, etc.

I hope this helps,

The question relies on the deep basis of the distinction, not on the specific legal situation of one and other set of damages. In that field, the difference can be exposed as follows: the actual damage is the monetary valuation of a disadvantage derived from a fact considered as true, and the damages for expected benefits are the monetary valuation of a disadvantage and a fact considered as probable.Shortly: there is an epistemological difference. Obviously, the determination of an event as "true" or "prbable" do not keep on, within the legal practice, the rules of the scientific knowledge which are familiar to standard epistemology, since the legal practice operates within a institutional framework. But, philosophically speaking, that is the essential difference between one and other set of damages. 

Dear Professor,

Undoubtedly, 'judicial conscience' word has often been using by the Judges. We should try to find its roots in word 'Common conscience". The Conscience is associated with the eternal feeling but we find sometime something which shocks our conscience. When it is associated with the common man it become 'Common Conscience" . When the matters is deeply related with the law and more particularly with the legal principles, which can affect the conscience of a person having knowledge or understanding of the principles of law, it become 'Judicial Conscience'.

So we may define it as "the conscience of a person of judicial mind'.

The word nowhere create anything beyond the  domain of law.

Sir, unfortunately it is not the subjectmatter of any specific law, but in my opinion may be the subject matter of "Law Lexicon"

It is a factor indeed while considering the application of judicial principles in practice.

Prof. Srinivasan, I am very much obliged to give me a new sight for viewing the law from a new angle. 

Hi all,

There won't be a homonymous answer for all legal systems. Mark these questions.

 1. What difference is there between euthanasia and murder with consent? Is there anybody who would consent without sufficient reason(s)? 

2. This first remark is only helpful if euthanasia is more or less accepted in a legal order.

3. Even if accepted, still 3 questions should be regerded. (a) what are the legally permissable grounds for the will to die (euthanasia)? (b) should one or more professionals judge these grounds? and (c) is legally permissable help or acting itself limited to a certain group of persons, like professionals? 

Succes,

Niels

You may also find it useful to consult the following two books on the implementation of EU directives, both of which discuss criminal sanctions and the requirements of effectiveness, equivalence and proportionality that flow from the CJEU caselaw.

Sacha Prechal, Directives in EC Law (OUP, 2005), pp 90-91.  

Richard Brent, Directives: Rights and Remedies in English and Community Law (LLP/Informa Law, 2001), pp. 115-119.

The Human Right to Health is protected in:

Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Articel 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child

Article 5 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

Articles 12 & 14 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

Article XI (11) of the American Declaration on Rights and Duties of Man

Article 25 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

In Pakistan the relevant provisions are contained in section 338, 338-A, 338-B and 338- C and section 338-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. 

Section 338. Isqat-i-Haml (اسقاط حمل) .Whoever causes a woman with child whose organs have not been formed, to miscarry, if such miscarriage is not aused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the3 women or providing necessary treartment to her, is said to cause isqat-i-haml. 

Explanation:- A woman who causes herself to miscarry, is within the meaning of this section.

Section 338-A. Punishment for Isqat-i-Haml. whoever causes Isqati-Haml shall be liable to punishment as ta`zir

(a) with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, if isqat-i-haml is caused with the consent of the woman or

(b) with imprisonment of either description for term which may extend to ten years if isqat-i-haml is caused without the consent of the woman;

Provided that , if as a result of  isqat haml any hurt is caused to the woman or she dies, the convict shall also be liable to the punishment provided for such hurt or death, as the case may be.

Section Section 338-B. Isqat-i-Janin (اسقاط جنين)ز Whoever, causes a woman with aq child someof whose limbs or organs have been formed, to miscarry, if such miscarriage is not in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman, is said to cause Isqat--Janin.

Explanation. a woman who causes herself tro miscarry is within the meaning of this section..

Punishment for Isqat-i-Janin. whoever causes isqat Janin shall be liable to:

(a) one twewntieth of the diyat if the c hild is boprn dead;

(b) full diyat if the child is born alive but dies as a result of any act of the offender; and

(c) imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years as ta`zir.

Provided that if there are more than one child in the womb of th e woman, the offender shall be liable to separate, duiyat or ta`zir, as the case may be, for every such child:

Provided further that if, as a resultof Isqat-i-Janin, any hurt is caused to the mwoman or she dies, the ofender shall also  be liable to the punishment provided for such hurt or death, as the case may be.

Section 338-D. Confirmation of sentence of death by way of qisas or ta`zir etc.- A sentence of death awarded by way of Qisas or Ta`zir, or a sentence of qisas awarded for  causing hurt, shall not be executed, unless it is confirmed by the HIgh Court.:

Section 338-E. Waiver or compounding of offences. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter and section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898), all offences under this Chapter may be waived or compounded and the provisions of section 309 and 310 shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to the waiver or compounding of such offences:

Provided that , where an offence has been waived or compounded, the court may, in his discretion having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case, acquit or award ta`zir tot he offender according to the nature of the offence.

(2) All questions relating to waiver or compounding of an offence or awarding of punishment under section 310 whether before or after the passing of any sentence, shall be determined byTrial Court;

Provided that where the sentence of qisas or any otfher sentence is waived or compounded during the pendency of an appeal, such question may be determined by the Appellate Court.

338-F. Interpretation. In the interpretation and application of the provisions  of  this Chapter , and in respect of matters ancillary or akin thereto, the Court shall be guided by the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.

Great but elusive question. Depends on what is meant with a homo behavioralis. See e.g. http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-01/a-dose-of-psychology-does-economics-field-some-good and follow the in-text hyperlink to http://www.psychologicalscience.org/index.php/publications/observer/2009/february-09/surrogates-for-theory.html by my favorite cognitive psychologist. Building on Gigerenzer I would say that homo behavioralis (just like homo economicus) does not exist. It is the latest straw man used to push whatever agenda you want, depending on the bias you select and the bias you ignore.

The best model of a human being for the law maker is no model.

While taking into account the outcome of different relevant models in big data analysis and simulations, the law maker should address pressing issues based on taking people seriously as underdetermined individuals that change course despite the statistics.

Instead of modeling the humans that should be the vanishing point of the analysis, check - for instance - the capability approach as a means to guide lawmaking. 

Hi, Hans. I just read a few works of Radbruch, and he tries to achieve the concept of legal dogmatics. Is a concept used by the german school of legal theory. But, analytical jurisprudence (here I include RD, LF, H. L. A. Hart, Joseph Raz and others; only people that uses common law system to make an analysis) is my main topic. I'm trying to erase limits; analytical jurisprudence is restrictive to a common law system, and there is not possible to conclude the functions of legal dogmatics and the professional opinions. In chilean law system, legislator and judges to make/apply the law commonly consider professional opinions and solved cases. But there are not a source of law.

Let's revisit my predicament with this question: "what is legal dogmatics?"

Autority Governmat of legislation bazed Constitution of Timor Leste

Abstract

From my point of view, It is very difficult to study the sources of law without giving any relevance to the human culture and the human history. The law is usually linked to the problems of the society of any moment.

Here in the United States the Statutory Sexual Seduction (aka Stautory Rape) varies between state to state.

In Nevada, the Statutory Sexual Seduction law fits your question the best. Statutory Sexual Seduction only requires the "victim" to be under 16 years old and the "suspect" is required to be over 18 (regardless of gender). Any other consensual sexual encounter cannot be criminally prosecuted.

There are a number of other states that follow this model.  

I am currently a member of a pan European expert witness organisation advising the European Commission on the regulation of experts across the EU. The general observation is that experts operating in European Courts will have some formal training in the role of the expert witness and be registered as an expert in at least one of the EU States. This is not the same as being a 'professional expert' and I agree with all that such a 'vocation/profession' would be to some extent a contradiction in terms.

The idea is that experts operating in EU state courts are verified as expert and operate to a code of ethics while giving evidence. I have seen some utterly peculiar behaviour from experts in trials both in the civil and criminal courts and the status of some has often been questionable.

Confidentiality assumes full protection of any information relating to a person. Data protection legislation intended to ensure the integrity of the exclusive list of personal information about a person who strictly listed in a specific legislative act.

Refer two issues - the SC judgment in the spectrum case and the exercise of eminent domain powers by the state to privatise waterways, especially the shivvnath river exclusive usage in Madhya Pradesh