Judgment and Decision Making - Science topic

Hello Michelle! I'm from Ukraine. I am engaged in the development of socio-psychological technologies in the field of management. If you are interested in my approaches, we can discuss this in more detail: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Anatoliy-Ovcharov/research

Acredito que as confissões públicas de erros de todos os profissionais são importantes, inclusive, intelectuais. Mas como historiador é preciso ter cautela. Existem tipos variados de erros, e nem sempre a conjuntura histórica é favorável ao reconhecimento do erro. Tem coisa que numa época é errada e outra não. E não estou falando de relativismo histórico. A escravidão, a submissão das mulheres, a exclusão de deficientes, a discriminação de negros já foram defendidas no passado, noutras conjunturas que depois mudaram. Os parâmetros aplicáveis devem ser bem pensados. É precisa saber se havia no dito momento do erro arsenal teórico para caracterizá-lo como erro ou como um paradigma de época. Nem todo erro implica má-fé. Mas, erros criminosos.

On the one hand, judges decide by interpreting and applying the law, but much more affects judicial decision-making: psychological effects, group dynamics, numerical reasoning, biases, court processes, influences from political and other institutions, and technological advancement. Citizens look to the judiciary to uphold their rights and governments look to the courts to interpret laws. The judiciary must act without fear of powerful interests, and without favouring individual parties.

Read my thesis titled Systematic Modeling of Whitenoise with Financial Time Series in Decision Making and find out if it will be helpful by following the link below http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/72931/Shileche_Systematic?sequence=3.

I believe to answer the question that it would depend upon the state that you live in and whether it was a Public Law 83-280 state. Recently SCOTUS reached a unanimous decision in United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021) where the Court addressed a public right-of-way within the Crow Reservation in the State of Montana that addressed detention.

I'm suggesting none of your examples. You can call the question a mental exercise by "entertaining an idea without embracing it" which is the sign of an educated mind. Please don't put words in my mouth. You could have thought of proverbs like for example "Like father like son", or "Easy come easy go".

Here is another question that might interest you: "What has the world lost by abolishing slavery?". Again, my intention is FAR from suggesting the premise that slavery is good, but can we deny the historical fact that at some point of history parts of American southern economy depended on it?

Dear Md. Mokshedur Rahman

In fact it is an interesting question. I agreed with David Morse, Morever, you can check the article published by Sim J et al. in the following URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324042278_Can_sample_size_in_qualitative_research_be_determined_a_priori

Run the binary logistic regression with categorical predictors (e.g maths coded as one and humans coded as two), you can then compare which one was the better predictor from the output

Great contributions!

Thank you so much for your feedback, Sigi!

I checked your Frontiers paper and your data (Sporer & Walther, 2004) look very interesting. From the description, I infer RTs were measured during a face to face interview? For the current meta-analyses, following the Verschuere et al., 2015 Wiley chapter and Suchotzki et al 2017 Psych Bull, we only included computerized RT paradigms with at least 20 lie and 20 truth trials, arguing this is needed to reliably pick up RT costs of lying.

I fully agree that rehearsal is an interesting moderator. Our reliance on computerized paradigms complicates coding in terms of rehearsal. Using the criteria above, by definition all studies include some form of rehearsal (all participants have several lie trials and several truth trials). Then again, I think few, perhaps none, will have had rehearsal time before the lie test. Moreover, while there are clear expectations for the effect of rehearsal on the cognitive costs of lying (i.e., rehearsal may diminish the lie - truth RT difference), it is less clear how rehearsal would change the effect of load on lying?

I am glad to say that we have half published and half unpublished studies; and that we have only one third (k=7) 'in-house' studies (me as co-author) and 14 studies from other labs. Moreover, we do not test an 'in-house' theory. So publication bias and developer bias are less likely to be at play.

Finally, lying was manipulated within subjects for all studies (=inclusion criterion), but you are right that for load we have both within and between subject manipulations. On p9 we describe how we dealt with that - would you say its insufficient? Could you please send us a copy of your chapter Sporer, S. L., & Cohn, L. D. (2011). Meta-analysis. In B. D. Rosenfeld, & S. D. Penrod (Eds.), Research methods in forensic psychology(pp. 43–62). New York: Wiley.?

Thank you!

Bruno

ps Wiley chapter I refer to is Verschuere, B., Suchotzki, K., & Debey, E. (2015). Detecting deception through reaction times. In P. A. Granhag, A. Vrij, & B. Verschuere (Eds.), Deception detection: Current challenges and new approaches. Chichester, UK: Wiley, Ltd.

I would be interested in the paper (as it stands).  This might be very important in areas like career theory - when are we willing to step into a new identity?

Bounded rationality by Herbert Simon

You can also look at neuroscience and psychology literature

Hi Hassan:

You say that you  want to investigate the relationship between physicians perspective around euthanasia on the one hand and their moral judgment in medical job on the other hand. Let me say that this theme of research is timely and worthy of being investigated. Timely, because euthanasia is nowadays a heated and highly debated topic in many countries around the world. Worthy of being investigated because there are few, in any study relating physicians' ideas and practice of euthanasia and their level of moral judgment and development.

Are you acquainted with Kohlberg's theory of moral development, namely with his three levels (pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional) and six stages of moral (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) judgment and development?

As far as I see, you can profit a lot from seeing what you want to investigate from a Kohlbergian viewpoint.  

Is should be noted that Kohlberg created a hypothetical dilemma on euthanasia [see Colby, A., Kohlberg, L. (1987). The measurement of moral judgment. Vol. 2 (p. 279). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. This dilemma follows:

"There was a woman who had a very bad cancer, and there was no treatment known to medicine that would save her. Her doctor, Dr. Jefferson, knew that she had only about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of a painkiller like ether or morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods she would ask Dr. Jefferson to give her enough ether to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain and she was going to die in a few days anyway. Although he knows that mercy killing is against the law, the doctor thinks about granting her request".

Several questions could be raised about this dilemma. The most important is the following: "Should Dr. Jefferson to give the drug that would make her die. Why/why not?".

Consider the case of a physician who says, for example, that the doctor should not give the woman the drug because it would be murder and, if he were caught up would be put in jail. This response (and this physician) would be a stage 1- oriented physician. With all likelihood he would not give the woman the drug.

Think now of a physician who says, for instance, that the doctor should not give the woman the drug because her husband needs her and wants her to live. This response (and this physician) would be a stage 2- oriented physician. With all likelihood he would not give the woman the drug either.

Stage 1 and 2 are in Kohlberg's theory pre-conventional stages because people at these stages only take into account egocentric, individualist, and personal wants, needs, and desires.

Consider now the case  of a physician who says, for instance, that the doctor should not give the woman the drug because  doctors are supposed to help people live or salve lives, not help people die. This physician would be a stage 3- oriented physician. Probably  he would not give the woman the drug.

Think now of a physician who, for instance, says that the doctor should not give the woman the drug because respect for the law will be destroyed if citizens feel that they break the law anytime they disagree with it or because taking the law into one's hands breeds disrespect for the law. This physician would be a stage 4- oriented physician.  Probably he would not give the woman the drug either.

In Kohlberg's theory, Stages 3 and 4 are conventional stages for at these stages people go well beyond egocentric reasons and take into account others' expectations as well as legitimate social rules and widespread  moral norms such as the  golden rule.

Think now of a physician who believes, for example, that the doctor should give the woman the drug because autonomy in making life decisions ought to be respected or guaranteed  as a fundamental right, or because true appreciation of the value of human life must include respect for the right of the individual to autonomy in making life decisions. This physician would be a stage 5 or stage 6- oriented physician. I say stage 5 or 6, because  the late Kohlberg gave up his stage 6 from a factual perspective, even though he has maintained it from an ideal perspective. Stages  5 and 6 are post-conventional  stages because  individuals at these stages saw existing moral norms and social rule as relative and, hence they must be violated when they do not protect  individual, not individualist,  fundamental rights. Because  of this, post-conventional  physicians would give the woman  the drug and would be  likely to accept the legal consequences of their apparently immoral acts.

As Kohlberg's theory is  structural, this means that his stages do not depend on the content or course of action advocated (i.e., Dr. Jefferson should/should not give the woman the drug), but on the reasons invoked to justify the chosen  course of action.

I hope that I have  got your question and that this helps.

Best regards.

PS. It would  be wonderful that  you could perform the research you intend to. Kohlberg' s theory is, in my humble opinion, a theoretical  framework on which you could base  your project.

One way to approach this question is to note that most developing countries, which were former colonies, inherited their institutional arrangements from their colonizers. Those institutional arrangements, given the nature and purposes of colonialism, were not democratic and did not guarantee judicial independence. In fact, in most colonies, there usually were two sets of judicial and legal systems--one applied to the colonialists/colonists and the other, applied to the people classified by the colonial government as indigenes. Although such a practice was quite magnified in the former French, Portuguese and Spanish colonies, it was also present, to a certain extent, in the colonies of other European countries. John D. Hargreaves, West Africa: The former French States (Prentice-Hall, 1967) & France and West Africa: An Anthology of Historical Documents (Macmillan, 1969) provides an excellent review of the maintenance of two distinct legal systems in the French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. 

In 1958, then French President, Gen. Charles de Gaulle, offered France's colonies in sub-Saharan Africa a proposal for attaining independence--these colonies would become autonomous entities/polities within the French Community and in doing so, they would base their institutions on the French Constitution of October 4, 1958. Except for Guinea, the French colonies accepted the offer and adopted institutions that were characterized by an imperial presidency, a relatively weak legislature, and a supreme court that was simply an organ within the Department of Justice and hence, was controlled by the President of the Republic. In addition, the constitution granted the President of the Republic the responsibility to guarantee independence of the judiciary! Unfortunately for these countries, they lacked at least two qualities that could have enhanced their ability to secure independence for the judiciary: (i) unlike their former colonizers, they did not have a long tradition of democratic governance, with separation of powers--if such a system ever existed, it was abrogated during colonial rule; and (ii) virtually all post-independence political elites engaged in various forms of opportunism to maximize their personal interests and hence, were not interested in engaging  in the types of institutional reforms that would have strengthened judicial independence. For more in depth analysis, see John Mukum Mbaku, "Judicial Independence, Constitutionalism and Governance in Cameroon: Lessons from French Constitutional Practice," European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance," Vol. 1, No. 4 (2014): 357-391. Also see Philip Aka, "Judicial Independence under Nigeria's Fourth Republic: Problems and Prospects," California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1 (2015): 1-79.

Hello Mr Plasenica,

I want to follow up on my above comment.

One of the subjects I have been teaching is economics. But, I am a scientist/engineer at heart and so I have included experimental economics (sometimes also called behavioral economics, the latest development or offshoot of it being neuroeconomics) in my economics course in which my students participate in experiments  where real money is involved, often out of my own pocket, as the university thinks students should not gain from participation. Rather silly of  the person to whom I report.

In these variants of economics, there is a game called the ultimatum game wherein players or participants have to make decisions. To replicate the real world, decisions are made with real money being involved  -- participants  in the experiments are offered money and they have to make decisions and they get to keep the money they win or what is left of that if they lost. The measurement in the experiment involves  amongst other things, totaling  up  how much of money was kept or given way. But to get a better insight economists like Colin Camerer have relied on fMRI. But, these economists  having no knowledge of brain anatomy/physiology  have had to rely on  neurophysiologists. A neurophysiologist who has indeed worked with economists is Read Montague of the Baylor College of Medicine, in the USA.   It is OK for you to rely on others -- you are using a tool, so it is perfectly legitimate for you to invoke the help of experts with knowledge of  physiological tools/instruments such as EEG, ECoG**, ECG, fMRI, etc. I would urge you to use whichever tool(s) you can have access to. fMRI is easier to use than analyzing EEG signals –remember the number of electrodes that have to be placed on the scalp. These days they have caps which make for easier electrode placement.

I understand that you do not have  access to fMRI... why not contact Professor Camerer?  He is at the California Institute of Technology I am pretty sure he will have a listening ear for you. I  had a Brazilian girl as my student on the economics course -- she had previously finished a Master's degree in proteonomics in Brazil, and I heard from her that there are some very good research facilities  in Brazil. You might want  to try your luck in that country. But a  knowledge of Portuguese is required, I would think.

Today being Monday, I have been able to access my papers and to get you started on fMRI, here is a site that gives you a very quick introduction:

http://www.ndcn.ox.ac.uk/divisions/fmrib/what-is-fmri/mri-explained-1.

It is at Oxford University in the UK, one of the best universities in the world and the oldest in the UK.

To encourage you to pursue the fMRI route, -- I believe that it will prove useful--  I now provide these references and I hope very much you can gain access to them:

Breiter HC, Aharon I, Kahneman D, Dale A, Shizgal P (2001) . Functional imaging of neural responses to expectancy and experience of monetary gains and losses. Neuron 2001; 30:619-630

Thut G, Schultz W, Roelcke et al.(1997):  Activation of the human brain by monetary reward. Neuroreport 1997;8:1225-1228

Elliott R., Newman JL, Longe OA, Deakin JF (2003) . Differential response patterns in the striatum and orbito frontal cortex to financial reward in humans: a parametric functional  magnetic resonance imaging study. J Neurosci 2003;23: 303-307.

A quick read of the references will show that all the studies I cite above involve money!  And whether  we hold on to /save the money  or  spend the money it  is really  decision-making. I hope you will agree.

You will  recall that these days, researchers use both EEG and fMRI. These researchers  used EEG during fMRI scanning:

Babiloni, F., Mattia, D., Babiloni, C., Astolfi, L., Salinari, S., Basilisco, A., Rossini, P. M., Marciani, M. G., and Cincotti, F. (2004). Multimodal integration of EEG, MEG and fMRI data for thesolution of the neuroimage puzzle. Magn. Reson. Imaging 22, 1471–1476.

To close, I  come more or less full circle by referring you to the paper of Read Montague, which I have read and feel it provides a  very nice introduction to neuroeconomics/ neuroscience illustrated with good diagrams:

P Read Montague(2007)  Neuroeconomics: a view from neuroscience. Functional Neurology 2007; 22(4): 219-234.

I really hope the above is useful and that I have not be pushing you into the fMRI route…

Please feel free to contact me directly if I can be of help to you – so do feel free to contact me on my personal email address.

I would be pleased if you would update me on your progress, by writing to me. I shall provide you with more information later.

Best wishes.

** often used in surgical theatres – you are unlikely  to use this, I imagine

Maceij

You don't need to create weights for criteria. You can use Shannon's entropy method that gives exact weights based on  information contained in the problem, that is, without subjectivity. Zavadskas has an example of this

Dear Hana,

You can real tais classic from Bearden and Etzel (1982): Consumer perceptions of reference group influence on product and brand decisions were examined using 645 members of a consumer panel and 151 respondents in a followup study. Differences for 16 products in informational, value expressive, and utilitarian influence were investigated in a nested repeated measures design. The results support hypothesized differences in reference group influence between publicly and privately consumed products and luxuries and necessities.

Maybe  help vou.

Sucess!

STRENGTHS OF CHARACTER AND WELL–BEING

NANSOOK PARK

CHRISTOPHER PETERSON

MARTIN E. P. SELIGMAN

Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 23, No. 5, 2004, pp. 603-619

On sex differences in moral judgement it seems interesting that the meta-analyses by Stam et al (van Stam, M.A. ; van der Schuur, W.A. ; Tserkezis, S. ; van Vugt, E.S. ; Asscher, J.J. ; Gibbs, J.C. ; Stams, G.J.J.M.

Children and Youth Services Review, 2014, Vol.38, pp.44-51) indicates a different effect  on moral reasoning of boys and girls of the Equip training program.

Hi Meri

Welcome to the world of Factorial Surveys

Ususally we use randomised numbers to select levels of each variable

Spss can produce the numbers and then mail merg variables into a paragraph of text producing thousand of unique vignettes. Does this make sense?

I can send a more detailed description if necessary

Is it because "fairness" can be observable and measureable? And moral judgments are highly subjective; come from a person's world view?

Role ambiguity refers to the lack of clarity in the roles an employee is expected to fulfill. Since a worker needs to understand clearly what his or her role is, not clearly knowing what one’s role is may result in negative situations. In organizations, management should ensure that authority and responsibility should be clearly defined.

I'd have to agree with Eric's initial sentiments here - the core problem lies in defining and operationalizing intuition. Certainly, evidence from behavioral economics tends to suggest a key distinction between cognitive and affective processing modes where "better" decisions are typically found with cognitive bases but only for relatively simple tasks. Where tasks become complex, emotions-based reasoning appears to be more useful. Whether either of these could be considered intuitive I am unsure and it is certainly true that emotional and intuitive are treated synonymously by many.