Science topic

International Political Economy - Science topic

Explore the latest questions and answers in International Political Economy, and find International Political Economy experts.
Questions related to International Political Economy
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
3 answers
For my Master's thesis work, I am trying to create research focused on FDI, FDI Policies and Middle-Income Trap in Turkey.
Main goal is to research how FDI patterns and sectoral distribution (will be classified as "high quality FDI" [have positive effects on the GNI per capita through productivity, innovation gains etc.] and "low quality FDI" [have negative or no effects on GNI per capita and might even result in dependency]) as a result of government FDI policies may impact Turkey's position in the middle-income trap.
At the end it is like a chicken and egg problem. Does middle-income trap status of the country results in "low quality FDI" inflow, or "low quality FDI" forces the country in the middle-income trap status. Also, there will be the governments FDI policy in the equation here.
I am not sure if I should be going with a deductive research or inductive research. Also having problem on how to plan my research and create the framework after collecting the necessary data (fdi related data, economic indicators, policies, documents).
I would appreciate any kind of feedback on the topic, approach, method, possible research framework for my work.
The goal of my question is to have more ideas and have a brainstorm, while learning which way I should be taking in this very first research of mine.
Relevant answer
Answer
I'm not fully convinced about some of your implicit assumptions.
Why the growth should be dependent in the long run on FDI?
I mean let's imagine a country that looks perfect for some high tech industry - educated labor force, strong institutions (good protection of investment, stability), reasonable infrastructure. Let's say in spite of those advantages international business clearly overlooks this opportunity for a tempting high tech greenfield investment. In short run it should indeed make a difference, but in long run one would expect local business to take advantage of that. If after a while you still don't see that, then I would start to wonder whether local business climate is really that good and so conductive for high tech business.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
2 answers
Dear colleagues,
MGIMO University is conducting the International Hierarchy Expert Survey-2022 (IHES-2022). The survey is aimed at tracking how the status and roles of states have changed since last year. We invite International Relations scholars, as well as practitioners and experts in IR and related fields to join.
To complete the questionnaire, please access the following link:
It will take an estimated 20-25 minutes to fill out the form.
This the second expert survey on international hierarchy conducted by our research team. Results of IHES-2021 have been published in an open access research paper and are attached to this discussion. However, to avoid the anchoring effect, we kindly ask participants to complete this year's survey before reading the previous results.
We guarantee confidentiality of all participants, only aggregated results will be published.
We gratefully thank you,
Research Team on International Hierarchy
Institute for International Studies,
MGIMO University
Relevant answer
Answer
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
2 answers
The History of Reserve Currencies
Lets begin with understanding money as liquid, which is how CHINESE describes MONEY as WATER.
MONEY as WATER & LIQUIDITY
The expression "money is like water" is often attributed to Chinese culture, and it reflects a particular mindset about wealth and its fluid nature. While not everyone in China may use this expression, it does capture a common attitude towards money. Here are some reasons why money is sometimes metaphorically equated with water in Chinese culture:
  1. Fluidity and Circulation: Water is fluid and can flow easily. Similarly, the idea is that money should not be stagnant but should circulate and flow smoothly through various channels of the economy. This concept emphasizes the importance of keeping money in motion to generate economic activity.
  2. Adaptability: Water can take the shape of its container and adapt to different forms. Money, too, is seen as something that should be adaptable and flexible. The ability to adapt to different financial situations is valued, and the metaphor highlights the importance of being nimble in financial matters.
  3. Renewal and Growth: Water is essential for the growth of plants and sustaining life. Money, in a similar sense, is considered crucial for economic growth and development. The metaphor emphasizes the idea that money, like water, is essential for sustaining and fostering prosperity.
  4. Symbol of Abundance: In Chinese culture, water is often associated with abundance and prosperity. The metaphor of money being like water might convey the idea that there is an abundance of financial opportunities and resources available, and one should tap into them wisely.
  5. Flowing Fortunes: The phrase could also imply that fortunes, like water, are ever-changing. What may be plentiful today might be scarce tomorrow, emphasizing the importance of being mindful of financial fluctuations and making sound financial decisions.
CO2 as LIQUIDITY
If we conceptualize CO2 as liquidity rather than a gas or vapor, we are essentially considering carbon dioxide as a form of tradable liquid asset that represents environmental impact. This approach adds an additional layer to the integration of CO2 into a financial system. Here's how this could be incorporated into the concept:
  1. CO2 Liquidity Units: Instead of carbon credits, introduce the concept of CO2 liquidity units. These units would represent a standardized measure of carbon emissions that can be bought, sold, or traded in the market.
  2. Liquid Carbon Market: Establish a liquid carbon market where entities, including businesses, governments, and individuals, can buy and sell CO2 liquidity units. This market would function similarly to financial markets where liquidity is traded.
  3. Carbon Liquidity Exchanges: Create specialized carbon liquidity exchanges where participants can engage in the buying and selling of CO2 liquidity units. These exchanges would operate alongside traditional financial exchanges.
  4. Liquidity Providers: Designate entities, such as environmental organizations or sustainable initiatives, as liquidity providers. These entities would contribute to the market by removing excess CO2 liquidity units from circulation through activities like carbon sequestration or environmental projects.
  5. Centralized Liquidity Authority: Establish a centralized authority responsible for regulating and overseeing the CO2 liquidity market. This authority would manage the overall liquidity supply, adjusting it based on environmental goals and targets.
  6. Carbon-backed Liquidity Reserves: Implement carbon-backed liquidity reserves to stabilize the value of CO2 liquidity units. These reserves would function similarly to central bank reserves in traditional financial systems.
  7. Carbon Liquidity-backed Financial Instruments: Develop financial instruments, such as bonds or loans, that are backed by CO2 liquidity units. This would provide a way for financial markets to support sustainable projects, similar to green bonds.
  8. Liquidity-based Incentives: Introduce incentives for entities to maintain or increase their liquidity levels. Those who reduce their carbon emissions and maintain a surplus of CO2 liquidity units could benefit financially, while those with deficits would face higher costs.
  9. Real-time Liquidity Monitoring: Implement advanced monitoring systems for real-time tracking of carbon liquidity levels. This transparency would enable better decision-making and responsiveness to changes in environmental conditions.
  10. Education and Adoption: Promote education and awareness about the CO2 liquidity system to ensure widespread understanding and adoption. Stakeholders, including businesses and individuals, need to grasp the concept of CO2 as a form of liquid asset.
This conceptualization aims to integrate the idea of liquidity into the carbon economy, treating CO2 as a tradable liquid asset with a value that can be influenced by market forces. It introduces the dynamics of supply, demand, and liquidity management into the broader context of environmental sustainability. As with any innovative financial system, careful planning, regulation, and adaptation are crucial for its successful implementation. Additionally, it's essential to consider potential unintended consequences and continually assess the system's effectiveness in achieving environmental goals.
MONEY & CURRENCIES PEGGED to CO2 as LIQUID SUPPLY & DEMAND
Here's a conceptual approach to a real-world system where money is pegged to CO2 supply and demand:
  1. Carbon Credits as Tradable Assets: Implement a system where carbon credits become tradable assets, similar to stocks or bonds in financial markets. These carbon credits would represent the right to emit a certain amount of CO2.
  2. Carbon Pricing Mechanism: Introduce a carbon pricing mechanism, such as a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system. This places a cost on carbon emissions, creating a direct economic incentive for businesses and individuals to reduce their carbon footprint.
  3. Centralized Carbon Authority: Establish a centralized carbon authority responsible for issuing and regulating carbon credits. This authority would control the overall supply of carbon credits in circulation, adjusting it based on environmental goals and targets.
  4. Currency Pegged to Carbon Credits: Create a new form of currency that is directly pegged to the supply of carbon credits. The value of this currency would be tied to the overall carbon emissions allowed within a specified period.
  5. Carbon Reserve System: Implement a carbon reserve system, similar to a central bank's reserve system, to manage fluctuations in carbon credit supply and demand. The reserve would be used to stabilize the value of the carbon-backed currency.
  6. Incentives for Carbon Reduction: Offer financial incentives for businesses and individuals to reduce their carbon emissions. Those who emit less than their allocated carbon credits could sell their excess credits, while those exceeding their limit would need to buy additional credits.
  7. International Carbon Exchange: Facilitate an international carbon exchange where countries can trade carbon credits, fostering global cooperation in addressing climate change. This exchange would allow nations to balance their emissions by buying and selling credits on the international market.
  8. Carbon-backed Financial Instruments: Develop financial instruments such as bonds or loans that are backed by carbon credits. This could encourage investments in sustainable projects and provide a way for financial markets to support environmentally friendly initiatives.
  9. Carbon Auditing and Verification: Implement rigorous carbon auditing and verification processes to ensure the accuracy and legitimacy of carbon credit transactions. This would prevent fraud and maintain the integrity of the carbon-backed currency.
  10. Transition Period and Education: Recognize that transitioning to a carbon-backed currency would require careful planning and education. Governments, businesses, and the public would need to understand the new system and its implications.
It's important to note that while this concept provides a real-world approach, it is highly complex and would face numerous challenges, including international cooperation, regulatory frameworks, and the need for a robust infrastructure to manage the carbon credit system.
The CARBON COIN/ DOLLAR
Pegging an international currency to a conception of CO2 reduction involves linking the value of the currency to the success and progress of global efforts in reducing carbon emissions. Here's a conceptual framework for how this might be achieved:
  1. Creation of a Carbon-Backed International Currency: Develop a new international currency, let's call it "CarbonCoin" for illustration purposes, directly pegged to the global reduction of carbon emissions. The value of CarbonCoin would be tied to the success in achieving predetermined global CO2 reduction targets.
  2. Global Carbon Reduction Targets: Establish ambitious and scientifically informed global carbon reduction targets. These targets would serve as the benchmark against which the value of CarbonCoin is pegged. The more successful the world is in meeting these targets, the stronger the value of CarbonCoin.
  3. Carbon Reduction Verification Mechanism: Implement a robust and transparent global mechanism for verifying carbon reduction efforts. This could involve international organizations, technological solutions, and agreements that ensure accurate reporting and accountability for CO2 reductions.
  4. CarbonCoin Reserve System: Create a global CarbonCoin reserve system that stores CarbonCoins in proportion to the cumulative global CO2 reductions achieved. This reserve would act as a backing for the international currency, similar to gold backing traditional currencies in the past.
  5. International CarbonCoin Authority: Establish an international authority responsible for managing the CarbonCoin system. This authority would oversee the pegging process, verify carbon reductions, and adjust the supply of CarbonCoins in circulation based on global progress toward emission reduction goals.
  6. CarbonCoin Exchange Mechanism: Develop a global exchange mechanism for CarbonCoins, where countries and entities can buy, sell, and trade CarbonCoins based on their individual and collective contributions to CO2 reduction. This exchange would influence the value of CarbonCoin in the international market.
  7. CarbonCoin as a Reserve Currency: Promote the use of CarbonCoin as a reserve currency alongside traditional fiat currencies like the U.S. dollar or the euro. Countries could hold CarbonCoins in their reserves as a way to demonstrate and support their commitment to environmental sustainability.
  8. Incentives for Carbon Reduction: Offer financial incentives for countries and entities that contribute significantly to global CO2 reductions. This could involve rewarding nations with additional CarbonCoins based on their achievements in emission reduction.
  9. CarbonCoin-Backed Bonds and Financial Instruments: Introduce financial instruments, such as bonds, loans, or investment products, that are backed by CarbonCoins. This would create a market for sustainable investments and encourage the allocation of funds to projects contributing to CO2 reduction.
  10. International Cooperation and Agreements: Encourage international cooperation through agreements and treaties that support the CarbonCoin system. Cooperation would be vital to the success of this currency peg, requiring commitments from nations to pursue and maintain effective carbon reduction policies.
Implementing such a system would require significant coordination, cooperation, and commitment from the international community. It would also involve addressing challenges such as varying levels of economic development, differing national priorities, and potential resistance to adopting a new international currency system. Additionally, technological advancements in monitoring and verification of carbon reduction efforts would play a crucial role in the success of this conceptual framework.
How Pegging CO2 as LIQUIDITIES to CURRENCY EXCHANGES can OVERCOME EXISTING INERTIA to CO2 REDUCTION
Pegging CO2 as liquidities to currency exchanges could potentially introduce innovative financial mechanisms to overcome hurdles in CO2 reduction efforts. Here are ways in which this approach might help address challenges:
Market-Driven Incentives:
How it Helps: By pegging CO2 as liquidities to currency exchanges, you create a market for trading carbon assets. This introduces market-driven incentives for businesses and nations to reduce emissions, as they can profit from selling excess carbon liquidities or face costs for exceeding their allocated limits.
Flexibility and Adaptability:
How it Helps: Liquid markets are often more flexible. This flexibility can be harnessed to adapt to varying circumstances, allowing entities to buy or sell carbon liquidities based on changing economic conditions or technological advancements. It provides a dynamic system that can adjust to evolving emission reduction challenges.
Global Collaboration through Trading:
How it Helps: A liquid carbon market could facilitate global collaboration. Countries with a surplus of carbon liquidities can trade with those facing challenges, promoting a more efficient allocation of resources for emissions reduction. This approach encourages a collaborative, international effort to achieve overall reduction targets.
Liquidity-Backed Investments:
How it Helps: The concept of CO2 liquidities as a tradable asset could attract investments in sustainable and low-carbon projects. Financial instruments backed by carbon liquidities, such as bonds or green funds, may become attractive to investors, funneling capital into initiatives that contribute to emission reduction.
Transparent Market Mechanism:
How it Helps: Liquid markets often operate with a high degree of transparency. This transparency could help overcome challenges related to verification and trust. It ensures that the buying and selling of carbon liquidities are conducted with integrity, minimizing the risk of fraudulent activities.
Carbon Liquidity Reserves:
How it Helps: Establishing reserves of carbon liquidities can act as a stabilizing mechanism. During economic downturns or unexpected challenges, entities can tap into these reserves to meet emission reduction targets without facing excessive financial burdens, promoting long-term stability in carbon markets.
Economic Growth with Emission Reduction:How it Helps: Liquid carbon markets could provide a mechanism for balancing economic growth with emission reduction. As economies grow, they may need additional carbon liquidities, which can be acquired through the market. This allows for economic development while ensuring adherence to overall carbon reduction goals.
Private Sector Participation:
How it Helps: Liquid carbon markets could attract greater participation from the private sector. Businesses can actively engage in emissions reduction efforts by buying and selling carbon liquidities, aligning their financial interests with environmental goals and contributing to a more sustainable economy.
Carbon-Backed Financial Instruments:
How it Helps: The creation of financial instruments backed by carbon liquidities, such as carbon futures or options, could provide businesses and investors with tools to manage and mitigate risks associated with emissions. This can enhance financial planning and encourage long-term sustainability.
Public Awareness and Engagement:
How it Helps: A liquid carbon market could be designed to include public participation, allowing individuals to buy and sell carbon liquidities. This engagement can increase public awareness and encourage environmentally conscious behavior, as individuals see a direct link between their actions and the carbon market.
While pegging CO2 as liquidities to currency exchanges introduces potential benefits, it's crucial to recognize that implementing such a system would still require careful design, international cooperation, and ongoing monitoring to ensure its effectiveness in promoting meaningful CO2 reduction. Additionally, considerations for potential market manipulation, regulatory frameworks, and social equity issues should be addressed in the development and implementation of this approach.
The POLITICAL ECONOMY of CARBONCOIN
A political economist would likely analyze the concept of pegging CO2 to currency exchanges from a multidimensional perspective, considering the economic, political, and social implications of such an approach. Here are some aspects a political economist might consider:
Economic Efficiency:
Analysis: A political economist would assess whether pegging CO2 to currency exchanges promotes economic efficiency by creating market-driven incentives for emissions reduction. They might evaluate the efficiency of the proposed carbon market in allocating resources and encouraging innovation in low-carbon technologies.
Distributional Effects:
Analysis: Political economists would scrutinize the distributional effects of the proposed system. They might investigate how the costs and benefits are distributed among different socioeconomic groups, regions, and nations. Consideration would be given to whether the approach exacerbates or mitigates existing inequalities.
International Cooperation:
Analysis: Political economists would study the feasibility of achieving international cooperation through a liquid carbon market. They might analyze the political dynamics and power structures among nations, assessing whether the proposed system provides sufficient incentives for countries to collaborate on emission reduction efforts.
Policy Instruments and Instruments Choice:
Analysis: Political economists would examine the choice of policy instruments within the proposed framework. They might consider the use of market-based mechanisms, regulatory approaches, and the role of government intervention. The analysis would explore how different policy instruments align with political and economic ideologies.
Political Will and Implementation Challenges:
Analysis: Political economists would assess the political will required to implement and sustain such a system. They might analyze potential political resistance, lobbying efforts, and the ability of governments to commit to long-term emission reduction targets, considering the political economy of climate change policies.
Environmental Justice:
Analysis: Political economists would scrutinize the environmental justice implications of the proposed approach. They might assess whether the system disproportionately affects vulnerable communities or if it addresses historical disparities in environmental burdens.
Role of Private Sector and Corporate Influence:
Analysis: Political economists would consider the role of the private sector within the proposed framework. They might analyze how corporations influence policy decisions, whether the approach aligns with corporate interests, and how the involvement of the private sector may impact the effectiveness of emission reduction efforts.
Policy Stability and Long-Term Commitments:
Analysis: Political economists would evaluate the stability of the proposed system over the long term. They might consider the potential for policy reversals with changes in government or economic conditions, assessing the resilience of the system to political volatility.
Global Governance and Institutions:
Analysis: Political economists would examine the global governance structures and institutions needed to support the proposed system. They might explore the role of international organizations, the effectiveness of existing institutions, and the need for new forms of global governance in managing a liquid carbon market.
Public Perception and Democratic Legitimacy:
Analysis: Political economists would consider how the public perceives the proposed approach and whether it aligns with democratic principles. They might assess the level of public engagement, participation, and the legitimacy of decision-making processes in shaping climate policies.
In essence, a political economist would analyze the proposed approach within the broader context of political and economic systems, considering its implications for power dynamics, social equity, and the overall political economy of climate change mitigation. This multidimensional analysis would provide insights into the feasibility, effectiveness, and potential challenges associated with pegging CO2 to currency exchanges.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
4 answers
I want to focus upon the external dimension of European Green Deal. Since I am a student of International Economics, I would prefer working within the field of International Relations/ International Political Economy.
Relevant answer
Answer
Energy security of European countries and the influence of geopolitical economic factors on energy dependence.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
82 answers
COVID-19 exposed many divisions among countries and prevented the formation of a united front to combat this pandemic. Even the very closely networked blocs such as ASEAN and EU failed to coordinate their efforts to combat COVID-19 because of national interest. Undermining the world organizations such as WHO, ICOJ, and the United nation various agencies are not painting a very good picture of what to come in the future. Can globalization survive?
Relevant answer
Answer
Due to the SARS-CoV-2 (Covid-19) coronavirus pandemic, a lot will change in terms of economic globalization. International, intermodal logistics chains of supply and distribution are shortened.
Regards,
Dariusz Prokopowicz
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
16 answers
This is a theoretical question that endeavors to address contemporary issues. My frame of reference is that world peace is the ideal. In conflict situations, what form of geopolitical combat might be the best or the most effective pathway to peace and national and international security?
Relevant answer
Answer
"To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the height of excellence. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the height of excellence."
- Sun Tzu, The Art of War
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
9 answers
How this coopration may change the regional balance of power and if the Persians deciding to such variant of cooperation will be able to protect themselves from the political protectorate?
Relevant answer
Answer
After American economic sanctioned on Iran, there is huge opportunity for china to sympathize Iran. No doubt, Iran- China relation will be more strengthen after American action. Israel, Saudi Arab and America have thrown Iran into China's court and China will never miss this golden chance to cash.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
40 answers
Covid-19 provided the added fuel needed by the fire of nationalism/regionalism to gain further strength. Many countries believe that they have to protect the national interest by relying on local resources and expertise. This is leading to a race for the development of a vaccine by many countries. Is this helpful in the long run? Can we find the cure/vaccine faster or we are wasting time and resources.
Relevant answer
Answer
When they cannot achieve their goals, the rational parties unite to achieve common results. When they do not achieve what they want, associations lose their meaning, become a burden and often fall apart. But along the common path, they build relationships that transcend the boundaries of the rational and build limited rational and even irrational relationships. In conditions of uncertainty and high risk, the role of irrational ideas for establishing aspirations and ambitions prevails. They build the ideas of selfishness and altruism. Nationalism is a kind of selfishness, the fruit of limited rational and, in extreme cases, irrational ideas for exceeding the assessments of one's own image and role. Entering this zone does nothing good for solving specific security cases, as well as for humanity as a whole.
The term nationalism is not acceptable for the case of developing a vaccine for COVID-19, if the competition of the countries leads to a successful result in the fight against the virus.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
9 answers
Does terrorism in the world have any impact on International Oil Prices
Relevant answer
Answer
The current terrorism of the 21st century has a greatly effect on oil production and prices, contributed to the loss of billions of dollars for oil-producing countries, and contributed to oil deals& contracts for certain regions of the world. The sale of weapons has been unprecedented, and it has served certain countries by selling their old expired conventional weapons rather than destroying them. It has also contributed to increasing the poor and misery in quantity and quality. This is to say the least for terrorism.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
7 answers
Help needed.
I am currently looking to come up with a research questions for my bachelor thesis. I study International Relations but I wanted to narrow down my profile towards economic because of my plans for my postgraduate education.
We agreed with my supervisor in this topic : "Forms of Capitalism and EU governance"
I am reading an enormous amount of papers and academic works for days now but I cannot come up with a research questions that successfully creates a bridge between forms of capitalism and EU.
Any ideas on the questions would be welcome. Any suggestion of papers I can read would be welcome.
Thank you
Relevant answer
Answer
Rej Kasi feel free to check my bachlor thesis on RG. I made a relatively comprehensive analysis of the economic conceptions rooted in the process of codifying European treaties. Even if the work is in French and applies mainly to Western and Southern Europe, the fundamentals are present. For information purposes, the work corresponds quite amply to the traditional requirements of a Bachelor thesis so it can serve as a structuring framework. To go even further in different forms of capitalism and work in European political economy, I recommend the work of Bruno Amable (2017) and Stafano Palombarini.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
8 answers
When we talk about conflict contagion and diffusion mechanisms, what happens when in one country the fighting stops, would it also stop across the border? I am planning at looking at mechanisms of conflict diffusion and look at how the halt or possible reversal of said mechanism actually affects the conflict propensity in the other country. Basically a supply side argument.Would you suggest a different angle?
Relevant answer
Answer
So a couple things to offer.
Demonstration effects (as you note) - work when a novel solution is shown to be workable and credible. The surge of power sharing and new peacekeeping in the 1990s may have been self perpetuating. There might be traces of this in peace agreement provisions. Ideally you could find some element that would be theoretically irrelevant but keeps coming up for a couple years and then fades. . . suggesting a demonstration effect.
Interlocking conflict - conflicts often warp incentives and ramp up intervention. The end of the cold war had cascading effects across the international system. On a smaller level, the peace agreement in 2006 in Sudan led to Sudan cutting off support for LRA which pushed LRA to the table. Similarly the abandonment of apartheid in South Africa had cascading effects across all of Southern Africa.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
1 answer
I wish to determine the main sub-events on a traces. However, They are usually overlapped and some simple method like finding local maximum is easily defaulted by a small noise added on a main pulse. I think maybe I should get the envelop first and then find the main sub-events orderly. Do you have better idea about how to do it automatically and efficiently?
Relevant answer
Answer
You might apply some filtering (eg. Median - or low-pass) prior searching for local maximums. Depending on the amount of noise present the filter might do the trick.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
11 answers
Last general election result in Britain was not as expected by the PM May: How will it impact Brexit negotiations? Will Brexit be reversed or another election called???
Relevant answer
Answer
When she announced the snap election, it seemed to be a sensible strategy. A stronger majority would have helped her take a stronger stance against Brussels in what will be very complex negotiations to take the UK out of the EU. Right now her minority government will have little wiggle room and Brussels should have the upper hand in the negotiations. But, BREXIT will continue. Even the Labour Party has agreed that the UK will be out of the EU.
The question is whether the UK will still be under the European Court of Justice's authority. PM May is not willing to recognize the Court while the EU believes it is necessary to protect the rights of EU citizens living in the UK after its exit and more importantly to settle economic related conflicts that will arise in the next years. Exiting the EU will create many legal problems and an impartial judiciary will be needed to address these disputes. The ECJ has a strong reputation for independence and fairness and the EU is right to make this contingent to the talks. And while May and Tory MPs have been wary of the Court's powers, it is in their interest to have a third party mediate future disputes. Of course, the UK and the EU could create an international tribunal to address potential legal problems but such a body will be very political and may create more conflicts between the UK and the EU.
The other issue, and the ECJ is a connected issue, is how much access the Brits will have to the European single market. Labour is demanding a strong connection to this market but this will come at a cost. Access to this market will not be cheap and the EU will want some big concessions. For instance, Corbyn favors Brexit because the UK will once again have an independent industrial policy that will prop British industry, specially steel. May wants access to the single market of course. But the issue is that the EU wants to preserve freedom of movement for its citizens and guarantees that their citizens will be able to compete for jobs in the UK. Remember that over 3 million EU nationals live in the UK and that close to 1 million of these EU nationals are Polish citizens. EU nationals represent close to 5% of the UK population -- and most of these people are employed, paying taxes, etc.... In comparison, around 1 million UK nationals live in the EU, over 1/3 are retired people living in the Mediterranean - mostly in Spain.
Finally, one of the surprising results was the weakening of the Scottish Nationalists at the expense of the Conservatives. We will not see another Scottish referendum in the near future and dreams that Scotland could negotiate a separate deal with the EU - which was unlikely - are not going to materialize. This does help May, but these Conservative MPs may also complicate things as their views on  a hard BREXIT do not seem to be as strong as their English counterparts. This could be interesting.
Anyhow.... these are my 3 cents.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
95 answers
Given the recent political developments in several European countries and the US, we could expect increasing policy efforts toward economic protectionism, barriers to immigration, and perhaps, in some cases, a growing emphasis on local, traditional values in contrast to cultural liberalization and diversity.
It has been argued for some time now that there is a backlash against globalization underway in many Western countries, even if international trade and finance, and to a lesser extent immigration, have come mostly to a halt since the crisis of 2008.
In your opinion, how far could this growing trend go? What effects could we expect on the economy, politics, and society?       
How could it affect science?
Relevant answer
Answer
Dear, thank you for sharing. I think a little retraction is something like a correction of course. There is no turning back, as markets have advanced to levels that do not allow returns, and technological tools allow for all kinds of deals in this "global village." Greetings!.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
11 answers
This is the very important project worked by two scholars of great erudition. Many people may hesitate to add any comments on this well prepared research project. As the project workers are pointing that "[t]his project sits at the intersection of economics, politics, law, and history," let me add a comment from an economist who mainly work on international trade theory.
The project workers are more interested in the internal legal and political aspects, but the international relations in economic domains affect the domestic policy thinking tremendously and economic performance. Without a deep analysis on the economic conditions that the developing countries are confined and what kind of possibility they have, the project would not be a sufficient examination.
The trouble with economics is the dominance of neoclassical economics backed by neoliberal economic policy thought. This mode of thinking is enforced upon developing countries through IMF and World Bank and others. On the other hand, anti-mainstream economic theories in developing countries are/were deeply influenced by Marxian economics and it had/has a strong tendency to emphasize an exploitation of developing countries by developed countries. A typical argument is the unequal exchange theory of A. Emmanuel and of the dependency theory.
We need a plausible theory on the economic development of developing countries. Unfortunately, there was a strong schism between growth theory and development economics in the past. Now this schism seems to be bridged a bit but it is rather an appearance caused by the intellectual dominance of the growth theory. The latter has serious problems as a theory of economic growth and development. In this regard, let me cite three survey papers:
Shiozawa, Y. 2016 Growth Theory As It Ought to Be: Comments on Kurz and Salvadori's Two Survey Papers on Old and New Growth Theory
Kohn, M. 2009 Economic Development and Growth: A Survey
Vivarelli, M. 2015 The middle income trap: a way out based on technological and structural change. Economic Change and Restructuring.
Mine is a general criticism on the existing growth theories. Two others treat questions which were not treated in my and Kurz and Salvadori's survey papers.
In order to understand and estimate rightly the condition that the developing countries are confined, the theory of international trade is important. In this regard, please read my paper below. At the end of this paper, I mentioned on the relationships between this general theory and development economics and international political economy. The main lesson of this paper is this: Whatever happens in the institutions and political system, it is through the mediation of production techniques that the income per capita of a country is determined. Of course, institutions and legal and political systems give great influences on the development of production techniques.  
The New Theory of International Values: An Overview
Let me also inform you that I have posed three questions below on the relations between international political economy and trade theory. I have also posted several answers to the Julio César Cepeda Ladino's question.
How do International Political Economy and International Trade Theory explain the strong opposition to free-trade agreement?
Trump and Sanders are opposed to the TPP. How the International Trade theory and International Political Economy explain this?
Is conflict in international trade an illusion?
Julio César Cepeda Ladino's question:
Can International Political Economy (IPE) be considered as a field of International Relations (IR) or an autonomous discipline of the social sciences?
Relevant answer
Answer
Dear Krzysztof, Haluk, and Sebastiano,
thank you for your intervention. As this question is addressed to the Weingast and Cox's project Political-Economics of Development below, please read their project and soem of their papers and give your comments or opinions on them.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
15 answers
I need to measure net product physical labour productivity within a world industry by using World Input Output Tables. Can I use PPP exchange rates for this purpose?
Relevant answer
Answer
Dear Andrea,
I have been using another approach to problems like this. It involves valuing the international market value of a country. See
Clark, E. and K. Kassimatis, “An alternative measure of the ‘world market portfolio’: determinants, efficiency, and information content”, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL MONEY AND FINANCE, Vol 30, n° 5, (2011) pp 724-748.
We use the methodology to generate  the "Market Index" in Financial theory, but the values are generated for each country. We use the USD as the base currency. If you are interested and the demo seels long and irritating, just go to the numerical example in the appendix. You can find country values and rates of return from 1980 to 2012 at https://countrymetrics.wordpress.com/blog/
The advantage of this approach is that it gives the values (and returns in international relative prices.
Best,
Ephraim
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
4 answers
I am looking for recent articles (2015/2016) that contain a very good literature review of the subject.
Relevant answer
Answer
Scott, J. M., & Carter, R. G. (2016). Promoting democracy in Latin America: foreign policy change and US democracy assistance, 1975–2010. Third World Quarterly, 37(2), 299-320.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
86 answers
TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) before effectuation is the latest multi-national trade agreement and its ratification is now a big political issue for almost all participating countries.
In the recent republican national convention, Trump declared its opposition to TPP. Senator Sanders, who was a closely competing candidate for democratic party nomination, has expressed his opposition to TPP as well.
How do International Political Economy and International Trade Theory explain the strong opposition among people to free-trade agreement in general and to TPP in particular?
Relevant answer
Answer
Trump articulated the discontent that those dispossessed of jobs and prospects that is experienced as a result of the after-effects of globalization.  It was the policies of the elite, both Republican and Democrat, that produced those after-effects.  The dispossessed wanted someone to blame, and Trump offered immigrants, refugees, outsourcing companies, foreign investors, etc.  The results of the election prove that the dispossessed accepted Trump's "blame mongering!"  BUT, the economic reality is that the factory jobs have gone forever,  THAT is why Trump offered "infrastructure building jobs" as the source of "recovery employment."  BUT, once the infrastructure is built, those jobs will disappear.  This is a short-term solution.  Regrettably, at the moment this is the only time-frame that most people use.  The problem here is not economics but rather social psychology - the public just wants to "re-activate the American Dream," not to change it.  BUT, fundamental change is what is really needed.  What can be done?
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
12 answers
Graham occupies a singular position in the history of the theory of international trade. He oppose to the neoclassical theory since John S. Mill, which is based on the reciprocal demand. He claimed that the neoclassical approach contains “the vital defects” (Graham 1932 The Theory of International Values, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 46(4): 581-316.) I wonder if there are recent studies on F. D. Fraham’s theory of international values.
Relevant answer
Answer
I have checked four documents hinted by Jetty Ramadevi. I could read three of them. This post is my comment on the first document:
            Frank D. Graham, 1890-1949.
Jetty linked this to a website in Japan, which is run by a famous columnist and translator Hiroo Yamagata. The original article was written by Gonçalo L. Fonseca and made open in the History of Economic Thought Website, which had been sponsored by the New School for Social Research, of which Fonseca was a graduate student. The website once disappeared but revived under the sponsorship of the Institute for New Economic Thinking. Actual URL:
In the Wikipedia (English), we have an article Frank D. Graham but it is an article on a successful writer with the same name (middle names are different with the same capital D.). I sincerely hope that someone will create an article Frank D. Graham (economist) in Wikipedia.
Gonçalo’s article is concise and exact except for two points. The first point concerns the circumstance of Graham’s death. Fonseca writes that Graham was professor at the Princeton University “until his retirement.” In fact, Graham died from a fall at Palmer Stadium at eh close of the Princeton-Lafayette football game, when he was still an active professor at the Princeton. (See Richard A. Lester, In Memoriam, American Economic Review 40(2): 585-587, May 1950)
The second point is more controversial. Graham criticized the use of two-sector, two-country models adopted by majority of trade theorists. This is true but it is doubtful if his intention was simply to question the validity of a two-sector, two country model in more general many-commodity, many-country case. Graham criticized the well established tradition since John Stuart Mill to determine the terms of trade by the workings of reciprocal demands. Graham argued instead that, in a general case, there are common goods (link commodities) that are produced by more-than-one countries. The existence of commonly produced goods determines relative wages of linked countries, and by consequence, the product prices that are produced in those countries. He in fact claimed that the international values are determined by the same logic as the classical theory of domestic values. His criticism was not a simple existence of an equilibrium solution for a many-commodity, many-country model.
Fonseca writes also that
  • “It was in solving to 'Graham's Model' that Lionel McKenzie (1954) introduced the first proof of existence of a general equilibrium via a fixed-point theorem.”
It is true that McKenzie (1954) thought that he had provided a proof of existence of a general equilibrium, but this is a half truth because what Graham wanted was not such a solution in general equilibrium framework à la John Stuart Mill.
I cannot blame Fonseca, because his comment is widely accepted one. However, this common understanding reveals how Graham has been long misinterpreted. For the reason of this misunderstanding, I ask readers to read my paper (still in a form of working paper) An Origin of the Neoclassical Economics: Mill’s “Reversion” and its Consequences (the second draft of “Mill’s Reversion and an Origin of Neoclassical Revolution”), which I will upload soon.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
31 answers
A chapter of Paul Krugman's book Pop Internationalism (1997) is titled The Illusion of Conflict in International Trade. In this chapter, Krugman contends that trade problems between low and high waged nations are an illusion and there is nothing to worry from the globalization in trade. He even analyzes why many eminent writers (including Lester Thurow and Robert Reich) make such ridiculous arguments when they begin to discuss international trade. Krugman contends that they should learn the international trade theory that is taught in undergraduate economics class before they begin to argue on these questions, because it is the matter which requires special knowledge of a special field of economics.
Now, this is my question. Are the contents of the standard international trade theory sane in the sense that they reflect the reality of economies that are influenced by the rapid change of international trade? Is it true that the trouble attributed to trade is an illusion and the international trade theory is fundamentally right? Are the problems that international political economy argues under the subject of trade conflict all illusion? If yes, this must be a true charge against international political economy.
My opinion is that the standard international trade theory has some serious defects and Krugman is not aware of this grave fact.
Relevant answer
Answer
Good morning.
Interesting debate, indeed. First, I would say it is important to separate theories from empirics and perceptions.
National politics in developed countries has followed opinions and turned against trade after the 2008-2009 global crisis because of unemployment. Blaming trade was the easiest way and made it easy for politicians to blame unfair competition from developing countries. This may probably not resist a closer analysis, but it is another debate.
I take a theoretical perspective here and will focus on the following part: "Is it true that the trouble attributed to trade is an illusion and the international trade theory is fundamentally right"
First,  we cannot know for sure that a theory (be it on trade or on elementary particles) is fundamentally right. Theories evolve with time, revised and falsified by new data and new evidences (here, I am definitely Popperian . 
Second, even from the neo-classic perspective close to Krugman, the fact that trade is welfare enhancing should not lead to the conclusion that it is without troubles, at least if we take a dynamic perspective and look at transitions between "steady-states".  
Transitions can be long and painful. Besides the traditional gains from trade, trade in long term growth model is expected to boost technological progress (total factor productivity). And economists should know (thanks to Schumpeter, not a neo-classic, but certainly not a protectionist) that progress is also painful: creation is destructive.
My opinion (not backed with data, so it is of very limited value) is that because a series of structural and institutional changes in the world economy, space and time have started collapsing after the late 1980s. The emergence of global supply chains, the convergence of consumption models or the spread of international travel are just one of the indices of this smaller and faster world.
This had positive impacts (faster convergence between developing and developed economies during the 15 glorious 1990-2005 years and sharp reduction in poverty indicators) and negative ones (societies and workers had little time to adjust to the fast transitions, income distribution within countries worsen and structural unemployment --open like in some European countries or hidden through a larger informal economy, like in Latin America).
As physicists know, the damage caused by frictions increases with speed. But theory should not be blamed for the adjustment frictions.
Best regards,
Hubert
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
10 answers
is it true Oil's Fall Led to ISIS's Rise or vice versa.
Relevant answer
Answer
If you read Daniel Yergin's book "The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power" you will see that wars and struggle in the oil field rich areas lead either unexpected rise or fall in the crude oil prices because of the nature of speculative activities in those periods. However, even if we cannot prove it empirically, it is a known fact that the terrorist group ISIS have financed their organization through the sale of crude oil under the market price in black market, especially after they seised the Syrian oil fields thus leading an increase in oil supply in the market. Therefore, they played some role in the fall of crude oil prices even if it is minimal.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
29 answers
One of the main debates that have existed around the International Political Economy (IPE) has been the definition of the object of research regarding International Economics (IE) and International Relations (IR). It would be very valuable to know in depth the positions that have developed about topic in regions such as Latin America, East Asia, North America, Western Europe, among others.
Relevant answer
Answer
Dear Glenn,
when we consider IPE, the sciences on which it is based are political science and economics. However, economics is divided into many fields and economics or political economy within a country is not sufficient, because IPE is mainly concerned conflicts between countries and economic conflicts are among them. We should have at least minimum knowledge of international economics.
International economics is normally divided into tow: international trade theory and international finance. One people call the first "micro" and the latter "macro" but I do not think they are good terminology.  Now the trouble with the theory of international trade is there are at least two strands of theories and conclusions are  quite different. Economic conflicts that the mainstream theory (Heckscher-Ohlin, Krugman, etc.)  admits are change of relative prices of production factors. This means, in a simple case,  ratio between wage rate and profit rate of a country may change when trade is liberated (conflict type I). However, this mainstream  theory does not admit unemployment  by its starting hypothesis and theoretically there are no trade conflicts such as export flood or job loss because of  trade liberalization (conflict type II). In the past, it is rare to observe any type I conflicts. Almost all trade conflicts are type II.  
Then, in my opinion, IPE cannot rely on the mainstream trade theory, because it does not admit theoretical existence of major trade conflicts, i.e. conflicts type II. Fortunately, there are another strand of trade theory called theory of international values. This theory can treat the emergence of unemployment.
When you consider a combination of two disciplines: political science and economics, you should choose a good combination. If not, your theory will be confused, because you risk to argue trade conflicts of type II basing your argument on the mainstream trade theory.  In this argument, there is no metaphysics. 
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
4 answers
I am looking for books , articles , or any supporting materiel where we can know how translation be considered as a facilitator in the political and economic exchange.  
 
 
 
Relevant answer
Answer
Dear Abou Oussama Mohammed Chouchani,
It is logical to assume that translation opens an aperture into unpredictable horizons where  foreign cultural and ideological differences can be introduced to specific target recipients with clearly different sociocultural norms. The whole issue has been extensively portrayed by professor Lawrence Venuti the founder of domestication and foreignization strategies in translation.
Best regards,
R. Biria
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
3 answers
Because Eurasia is rich in energy resources but there is absence of direct connection between India and the region.  
Relevant answer
Answer
In my opinion, the answer is yes. Eurasia, including the Pacific rim, is the suitable destination for the India's energy diplomacy at least during the coming decades.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
3 answers
I am writing a paper on Russia’s inclusion in financial internationalization. Which definition of financial internationalization can be regarded as commonly accepted within the IPE literature?
Relevant answer
It would be useful to overhaul the state of the art on studies of international political economy (IPE) in Russia. It is possible to find conceptual approaches on financial internationalization.
It is worth remembering that the mainstream of international political economy (IPE) is concentrated in the US and UK, and Russia is a country with its peculiarities in the international system.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
17 answers
I need to critically discuss the basis on which Germany, Sweden and France are similar to each other and different from the US and Japan. Which theoretical framework shall I use? In fact, I need to understand the importance of using the framework too. Please guide. And suggest, any reading material too.
Relevant answer
Answer
I believe that the person asking the question should be more specific in what he or she is seeking to measure. For example, do you want to compare the European countries (which ones?), Japan, and the United States on, say, economic performance, political governance, economic freedom, income inequality, levels of human development, educational attainment, management of diversity, receptivity to refugees/migrants, civil and political rights, etc.? 
You may want to look at existing comparative studies of these countries, such as those undertaken by Transparency International (corruption perceptions); The Fraser Institute, Vancouver, Canada & The Cato Institute, Washington, D.C.  (economic freedom); Freedom House, New York (civil and political rights); World Bank (Worldwide Governance Indicators); and so on. By consulting the documents published by these organizations, you can determine the methodology that they use.
I would be able to suggest a theoretical framework for analysis if you were more specific. 
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
12 answers
My case study is the U.S and I'll be assessing how conflict scenarios can have an impact on economic indicators and the extent to which economic performance is affected (whether adversely or positively). I was just wondering whether running a regression model using Military expenditure as the independent variable and GDP growth as the dependent variable would lead to viable results. 
It's either that or I may opt for a panel data analysis. I just wanted some opinions on the methodology that I've opted to use here and it's viability. 
Notes: I'm using the U.S as my primary source of investigation and I'd be looking mostly at the Iraq war as my primary source of conflict. If I were to opt for a panel data analysis, I'd look at the entire world and relate it back to varying conflicts in those geographical locations.  Attached is a general consensus of my research work (which isn't necessary to read ).
Thanks in advance for all your opinions.
Relevant answer
Answer
Methodologically, I believe that the connection between military expenses and GDP growth is very weak if you are looking at the effects of armed conflicts and economic performance. First, as some already pointed out, using military expenses as proxy for armed conflicts is not a good selection. Besides, the U.S. do not face an armed conflict as many other countries actually do. These conflicts are beyojnd their borders. So, it would be very interesting to develop a theoretical model that shows this connection and see if theoretically this effect is significant. And second, you need to define what armed conflicts are. For instance, there are several countries in Latin America and Africa with extreme violence and many thousands of people killed per year; so are these events counted as armed conflicts? Besides, some countries do not spend much money on arms. So, it would be very important to have first a precise definition of armed conflict and try to model it theoretically to have a look at your hypotheses.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
9 answers
I have trouble finding data on bank bailout in the period 2007-2009 (could also be possibly be longer).
Preferably I would have a measure of tax money spend as a % of GDP on bank bailouts. Alternatively, I would just like to have dummies of countries that have had bank bailouts during this periods, and countries that have not. 
Relevant answer
Answer
You may want to try Mercer Capital in the U.S.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
6 answers
Can anyone help with data regardin Russian hydrocarbon extraction/production industry for the last 10-20 years?
I can work with data in Russian language, should the links be provided in Russian.
Thank your
Relevant answer
Answer
British Petrolium statistical report (see for 2015 http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/Energy-economics/statistical-review-2015/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2015-full-report.pdf ) provides detailed data about reserves, extraction, consumption, export for oil and gas producing countries.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
3 answers
Why did Chavan Model declined In Maharashtra?
Relevant answer
Answer
It declined because of the limited scope and narrowed vision. While, formulating the policies they should have taken various stakeholders, not only the beneficiaries. May be they forgot the slogan "Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas".
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
5 answers
I'm looking for a Europe-wide surveys that are similar to what we see in the Latinobarometer, Afrobarometer. In other words, questions on economic perceptions, vote intention and partisan id. The Eurobarometer is largely a EU-wide survey that lacks any national component. The EES is largely a survey on second-order EP elections that dont measure voting in first order elections. The CSES lacks proper questions on economic perception. They include a retrospective sociotropic question and a "improvement of standard of living question." I'm look for a cross-national survey in Europe that asks such questions as
1. If Presidential elections or (parliamentary election) were held this sunday for whom would you vote for?
2. In the last election, did you vote for the opposition or the incumbent?
3. In the last 12 months, how has your household economic situation changed?
4. In the last 12 months, how has the country's economic situation changed?
5. In the next 12 month, do you expect your household's economic situation to get...? (better, worse, etc)
6. In the next 12 months, do you expect the country's economic situation to get?
Relevant answer
Answer
My hunch is that the European Social Survey is probably indeed the best bet for you. You might also want to have a look at the World Values Survey. These are the only other major comparative surveys of this nature apart from Eurobarometer, EES and CSES that I am aware of.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
3 answers
I am trying to research the interaction between electoral systems and campaign finance rules, in search of fair and accountable political competition. But it is becoming clear that a "race to the bottom" competition among jurisdictions is globally driving countries toward lax financial regulations and deeper secrecy, adding a higher level of complexity to the problem.
Relevant answer
Answer
It seems to me that the answer to your question may lie in corporatist systems. In Small States and World Markets, Katzenstein argues fairly strongly that the small states of Europe (Switzerland among them) were able to navigate economic crises and come out stronger because of their corporatist systems, which allowed them to adapt well in a situation where capital and labor had different incentives. These incentives should have pulled in different directions but, according to Katzenstein, corporatist institutions allowed the states of Europe to balance the needs of all the groups around the table. It seems to me that by providing a clear path to influence, as well as generating a legitimate sense among the wealthy and business classes that they have a direct stake in policy-making, corporatism may be a way to mitigate the influence of dark money from offshore sources.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
46 answers
Without forming a national central bank of its own, and thus reestablishing its own currency, how can Greece escape neo-liberal structural adjustment?
Relevant answer
Answer
Yes it is an ethical poblem, but not exactly in the sense expressed by Peter Prischi. Capitalism cannot exist without debts: it is a monetary economy of production, Money-Commodity-Money' (where Money'>Money).
As Keynes wrote: "Planned investment—i.e. investment ex-ante—may have to secure its “financial provision” before the investment takes place; that is to say, before the corresponding saving has taken place… There has, therefore, to be a technique to bridge this gap between the time when the decision to invest is taken and the time when the correlative investment and saving actually occur. (Keynes 1937b: 246)"
Public debt is just the way in which public planned investments may be funded, and in a recession public investments do not crowd out private investments. It is true instead that they may reduce radical uncertainty in favour of private sector too. Here is the ethical problem!
What are the conditions in which public debt is sustainable? The public debt is defined as sustainable when the ratio D/Y decreases or, at least, remains constant. (Conversely it is defined as unsustainable when the ratio D/Y is increasing). It may well happen that the financial markets interpret a high (D/Y) ratio as a risk factor and impose an even higher (i-g) differential. It is by this route that a high (D/Y) ratio may contribute (even without objective reasons) to generate fragility in the public financial sector. Consequently to have a fiscal policy that curbs unemployment (also in the long run) we should have that the rate of growth (g) is higher than the rate of interest (i) and well regualetd financial markets .
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
13 answers
Or is a world-historical paradigmatic lens more appropriate?
Relevant answer
Answer
I am rather doubtful if VOC approach (Hall and Soskice type) has anything concrete to analyse global financialization. I will explain in the subsequent post that VOC approach has a serious theory defect that prevents it analyse and examine globalization phenomenon.
Financialization has been a big topic for Regulationists since 1980's, for they considered finacialization as successor to Fordist regime of accumulation.  They have many books and papers on this theme.
It will be helpful and informative for you to read a review paper like van der Zwan's  
STATE OF THE ART: Making sense of financialization. Socio-Economic Review (2014) 12: 99–129. (see the link below)
It contains major survey on three major approaches: accumulation approach, share value approach and everyday life approach.  
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
5 answers
How can we unpack the heterogeneity of interests and preferences
across and within various types of corporate structures?
Relevant answer
Answer
The word-society literature, spearheaded by sociologist John W. Meyer, tries to quantify the diffusion of models via global civil society, yet the neo-institutionalism is ad-hoc and too phenomenological, ignoring not only the effects of cultural imperialism (in the Gramscian sense), but the material structural contradictions of power, social inequality, and geopolitical/socioeconomic conflict...which are certainly not mutually exclusive...
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
11 answers
What are the current debates within the heterodox economic literature?
Relevant answer
Answer
 David,
I would suggest a conceptual approach: profit is related to an economic concept, while interest is linked to a financial one.
You have a profit (or margin) by making the difference between the price of the product or service you sell and the cost  related to the production, and transaction, you make.
When you do it, there is the creation of "economic value".
You have an interest when you refer to the financial side of your balance sheet..
If you borrow money you have negative interest in favour of your Bank or financial system.
If you have excess money and you borrow it to others (e.g. bonds) then you get a positive interest. 
In both cases (positive or negative interest situation) there is not  a creation of economic value but only of financial one. 
I wonder, in the case of a Company, if the shareholders would be satisfied of having the excess money utilized by the Company to generate financial "profits" in absence of a clear and well structured investment plan and strategy!
I deem not!
In fact, the excess value created (in excess to the one related to the necessary or planned investments) should be returned to the shareholders in my opinion. Financially "fat" Companies are not necessarily healthy or safe,  from the competitive and strategic point of view.
Ending my answer to the question, I would see a contraddiction  then, only if there is confusion between the two concepts: economic and financial.
Finance is related to funding a business (assets - liabilities equilibrium), while profit (and loss) is the dinamic result of a business.
The gross profit  should be capable of financing the Company development, the interest  cost on liabilities and (after Tax) , hopefully, the shareholders equity.
These are the relations I see and the contraddictions would materialize, in my opinion, only neglecting,  or failing to satisfy properly, the need of  :
Structuring competitive Company development and related  Investments
Leveraging wisely the investments (risk factors on Company financial structure)
Rewarding the equity investment of the Company Shareholders
My kind regards
Alberto
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
32 answers
What I am pondering with this question is whether nation-states enter into extraterritorial pacts (WTO, NAFTA, EU, MERCOSUR, etc.) solely on the basis of perhaps deriving economic benefit  from these liaisons; i.e., without giving consideration to the social and political implications of becoming inter-connected with other sovereign states, all of whom relinquish some of their autonomy to a supranational body.
This would, for instance, explain why Norway refuses to join the European Union citing the possibility of (a) loss of national sovereignty and (b) a diminishment of the quality of citizenship secured by Norway's Constitution (which establishes a 'horizontal union of free and equal citizens'); and yet Norway had no qualms about signing onto the European Economic Area (EEA) which, according to Erik Erikson ("Norway's Rejection of EU Membership has given the country less self-determination, not more" - http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/04/22/) weds Norway to the EU economically by granting it access to  Europe's internal market on an equal basis with EU member states.  Seemingly, Norway is willing to accept an economic union, but stops short of a political and social union with the EU member states.  In fact, the inability of EU members to agree on a European Constitution may be a reflection of other EU members having the same hesitance as Norway to become bound  politically and socially to each other.
In fact, one might view the "Margin of Appreciation" rule applied by the European Court of Human Rights wherein the Court bows to local customs (no matter how discriminatory these local practices may be) as the Court's recognition that member states are only fully committed to the economic benefits that can be derived from a union creating a market of over 450 million people.  Therefore, it is best for the Court to allow member states some wiggling room -- 'to cut them some slack'.
Gwen
Relevant answer
Answer
Gwen, I think one of the important factors to consider in this respect is the possibility of majority voting or, differently stated, the possibility that a sub-group of members of an organization imposes its will on all members. This is very much a feature of the EU, both via (qualified) majority voting in the legislative procedures at the Council, the decisions taken by the Commission, for example in anti-trust or state aid cases, and the judgments of the European Court of Justice. All of these are binding on the Member States whether or not they agree to a particular case. One term of art used to describe this feature of the EU is its "supranationality", i.e. the EU has powers ABOVE the state level.
By contrast, most other organizations either do not have such powers at all and have to take any and all decisions by unanimous vote or by consensus (for example the EFTA) or they have only very narrow powers that could bind a state against its wishes, for example via judgments of the European Court of Human Rights or in the context of decisions taken by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter.
The next question in this context is the enforceability of the decisions. Even if an international organization does have some supranational powers, it is not very "scary" for the (potential) members, if the enforcement powers are weak. As you surely know, public international law has very few options at enforcement, chiefly among them the naming and shaming of perpetrators/violators and the idea of tit-for-tat, i.e. retaliation in kind. For example, if a country is found by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to be in violation of the rules, it has to rectify this breach (for the future only, no retroactive obligations to pay damages or the like). If it does not do so, the worst thing that can happen to it is pretty much retaliation in kind, i.e. the complaining or injured country can get permission from the WTO to suspend trade concessions roughly equal to the losses incurred because of the initial breach. This is not very scare for a country and they can make a cold calculation whether a certain breach is worthwhile maintaining. It is also not affecting countries equally because, for example, a trade embargo from the US against New Zealand will be much more damaging than the other way around.
Similarly, in the ECHR system, the worst thing that can happen to a country found in breach of the Convention by the Court is that it will be named and shamed (not very effective if it happens a lot, since public and international opinion tires easily, see Russia) and that it is convicted to pay damages. Since member states of the Council of Europe have been reluctant to pay large amounts in damages - they simply won't comply - the EuCtHR is nowadays imposing very modest amounts that countries will pay without much hesitation. For example, Italy has been convicted many many times over many years for undue length of criminal trials. Instead of fixing the problem, the country just pays a few thousand Euros to every complainant who makes it all the way to a judgment in Strasbourg.
However, the EU is a very different animal altogether. First, it administers a large budget and more than half of the Member States are net recipients and they can simply see their allocations withheld if they do not follow the rules (example Greece). This is more powerful than another tool, suspending voting rights. Second, and most important, the European Court of Justice, via the procedure of Article 267, has a tool of ensuring compliance with its judgments that no other court on the planet comes even close to. In the end, Member States of the EU have to follow EU law in very nearly every case, whether they voted for it or against, and whether they like it or not. This is unique and not comparable to other international organizations.
You may not like this proposal but I think that it would be too simplistic to look merely whether something is economic integration or not. You should also look whether it is purely international (between states) or whether it has at least some supranational elements and real enforcement powers.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
5 answers
I am trying to estimate the effect of economic sanctions on the target country's economy. For that I need the cost of sanctions on the target country.
I have been searching for a database that might contain this information, but no such thing exists. Most papers have estimated the cost of sanctions themselves, but it is not clear how.
If you have any information or suggestions regarding this matter, please let me know.
Relevant answer
Answer
Hi Hamideh,
Actually, it could be seen much easier. Not to forget that all (numerical) values in economics are calculated using a basic equation of P*Q.
In this case,  you should first calculate what the real GDP might be if there was no sanction at all in place. It is actually calculated through a simple projection of the previous trend of real GDP (before the sanctions).
Then you need to calculate the impact that the sanctions have had on the general consumer price index. The final step consists of calculating how much more the consumers have to pay (with the sanctions) to achieve the real GDP estimated with the assumption of no sanction.
Good chance,
J.A.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
3 answers
In 1873, Germany decided to switch from the universally accepted silver standard to gold standard, following Britain that had changed to gold standard in 1816. Scholarly works suggest that this was a decision that drained economies of colonies and made them perennially poor. Will a reversal (presuming that it ever took place) contribute to the developing of economies of the third world?
Relevant answer
Answer
Dear Giovanni,
Thanks for the correction. It was Britain that officially adopted gold standard first in 1816. Germany adopted it in 1873. The last country to follow silver standard was China, till 1935.
You are also right that we should rather think about the dollar than gold/silver. There are two reasons for the question: one, I was trying to re-imagine history, something like traveling back in the time machine. Two, more important, is actually the lessons that history teaches are marvelous. We may have discontinued gold/silver but the forces of free market economy works on the same principle - the more foreign investments, the more goes abroad. Unless the bedrock of domestic economy are strengthened parallely, we will find growing unemployment and lowering of per capita incomes in real terms among the mass of people who subsist on domestic economic activities.
Having generally stated my reasons, I do hope you would appreciate that re-imagining history helps in learning lessons for the future.
Have a great day!!
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
7 answers
In developmental state theories (of post-war Japan, S. Korea, Taiwan and Singapore), industrial policies took an important role in generating rapid economic growth. Good industrial policies are, at most, guiding a national economy in a good direction for development. Yet, would they be really successful without the visible hand's steering of financial resources in the market towards them?
Relevant answer
Answer
Although each country has its own unique developmental trajectory, the historical record suggests there is indeed an appropriate time and place for temporary periods of financial repression. Restrictions and controls on capital flows (esp. outflows) can help countries preserve scarce foreign exchange and use it only for needed capital inputs (machinery, technology, etc.) for priority sectors in the course of early industrialization stages. Restrictions and controls on inward FDI can steer investment capital to priority sectors. And technology-transfer requirements on FDI can facilitate industrial development in developing countries. There is a long and rich tradition of the strategic use of such policies over time by almost every country that has successfully industrialized. Unfortunately, in the last 30 years, the dominant logic of free markets has deemed such policies as bad state intervention. The new idea is that consumers ought to be free to use their foreign exchange on whatever they and whenever (in the course of a country's national economic development) despite all other considerations. Additionally, although research shows what actually attracts FDI (skilled, healthy and literate workforce, good infrastructure) the myth persist that requirements on technology transfer from foreign investors would scare away potential FDI. The term "financial repression" was the derogatory rallying cry for those who favoured financial deregulation and liberalization, and who supported Reagan and Thatcher and IMF loan conditions to enforce this in borrowing countries. With growing income and wealth inequality and increased frequency of financial crises in the last 30 years (compared to the previous 30-year period under financial repression), it ought to be self-evident that there is an important role for adequately regulating finance. As inequality and financial crises continue to become more acute and damaging, this ought to become even more self-evident (as it did both in pre-French Revolution and across Europe in the 1840s - when financial liberalization ultimately crashed and burned). If that means "repression" of financiers then so be it. Finance is supposed to serve the real economy, not the other way around as we have now, yet under financial liberalization finance has become an end in itself, divorced from the health of the real sector, in which speculative activity is incentivized over investing in actual jobs, goods and services. This used to be considered a bad thing, but alas it appears we will need even worse financial crises than we had in 2008 before we are forced to re-learn these lessons again -- the hard way.
  • asked a question related to International Political Economy
Question
2 answers
The Egyptian spring revolution (January 25, 2011) has not progressed well, and resulted in many problems, and did not resolve democratic or economic problems.
Relevant answer
Answer
Dear Zoheir,
Three things, in my opinion, are fundamental to resolving the Egyptian situation: Objective, Reconciliation and Compromise.
Objective: what do people of Egypt want? Irrespective of the agenda of the elite and high political class, is there any thing that the so called common people of Egypt want? Are they seeing this as an opportunity to make for themselves a new future with clear objectives? Bringing down a dictatorial rule was a good objective but that is not an end by itself. A path needs to be chalked out from chaos to clarity through participation and leadership.
Reconciliation: MB and various other groups came together, split again and are coming together again in spurts and spits. Nation building, particularly from that of a forcibly created vacuum needs reconciliation of the differences for the time being till an established government born of people's will is firmly established. The lesser the strength of reconciliation, the more differences will arise making reconciliation impossible at a certain stage. How much are the 'powerful' groups in Egypt willing to set aside their differences and build a nation on consensus?
Compromise: No society, like Egypt, that has multifarious cultural and contextual issues can build consensus unless there is a will on the part of the powerful groups to accept and abide by certain compromises in power sharing. The future of Egypt will depend on how its political parties, MB and the Armed Forces workout compromise formulas keeping Egypt and its people in their mind. If they keep identity, ideology or hunger for power non-negotiable, it would take a long long time before we can hope for peace and stability in Egypt.
Borrowing and expanding from what noted Indian Sociologist Dan A Chekki said in one of his books, I would like to say: Nations are not like plants. They do not grow by themselves. You need to nurture them, strengthen their roots and protect them from predation; then only they grow to be nations.
I hope my answer at least propels some thoughts!