Science topics: Game TheoryGame Theory and Decision Theory

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# Game Theory and Decision Theory - Science topic

Game Theory and Decision Theory is a game theory, decision theory, probability.

Questions related to Game Theory and Decision Theory

Based on the literature review we get idea of moderators. But what we if want to introduce a new moderator in the literature.

1) What are the criteria for new moderator ?

2) How to theoretically support moderating variable ?

3) Is is necessary to adopt new moderating variable from same theory ?

Game theory is a very promising technique to achieve optimal outcomes and can be applied to almost all concepts. I am trying to explore game theory for future purposes. However, as a beginner, I couldn't get very good resources regarding game theory.

Please share your resources (i.e., video or blog tutorial, research paper) regarding game theory, which covers the following things.

1. How to apply game theory?

2. How to prove optimal gain after applying game theory, (e.g., proving Nash equilibrium).

3. What are the state-of-the-art game theory techniques?

Thanks in advance.

what procedure and data should I use ?

how to structure the empirical study ?

Hello,

Can anyone share an article specifically on telehealth theory development and/or applications? Thank you!

Best,

Brooke

Dear colleagues, friends, and professors,

As we know, we have very strong analytical approaches to control theory. Any dynamic decision-making process that its variables change in time could be characterized by state-space and/or state-action representations. However, we see very few control viewpoints for solving electricity market problems. I would like to invite you to share your thoughts about the opportunities, and limitations of such a viewpoint.

Thank you and kind regards,

Reza.

I am currently doing my MBA dissertation on Coopetition within the Public sector.

Appreciate your expertise and opinion on how can Coopetition in the Public sector be successful and what are the main strategies to help it succeed (game theory, design thinking, innovation...etc). Coopetition is hands on in the Private sector and have been successful for years but not fully within the Public sector.

How can coopetition help governments be more Customer-centric?

is there a logical approach for an answer to the non-conformance of Pareto optimal to Nash equilibrium ?

in-game theory context answer is: because of double-cross in Nash equilibrium which that not in Pareto optimal .

but can we find a logical language to Answering this question? for example with preferece modality, hybrid logic , epistemic logic,etc...?

**Game theory**is the study of mathematical models of strategic interaction between rational decision-makers.[1] It has applications in all fields of social science, as well as in logic and computer science. Originally, it addressed zero-sum games, in which one person's gains result in losses for the other participants. Today, game theory applies to a wide range of behavioral relations, and is now an umbrella term for the science of logical decision making in humans, animals, and computers.

Modern game theory began with the idea regarding the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria in two-person zero-sum games and its proof by John von Neumann. Von Neumann's original proof used the Brouwer fixed-point theorem on continuous mappings into compact convex sets, which became a standard method in game theory and mathematical economics. His paper was followed by the 1944 book

*Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, co-written with Oskar Morgenstern, which considered cooperative games of several players. The second edition of this book provided an axiomatic theory of expected utility, which allowed mathematical statisticians and economists to treat decision-making under uncertainty.Game theory was developed extensively in the 1950s by many scholars. It was later explicitly applied to biology in the 1970s, although similar developments go back at least as far as the 1930s. Game theory has been widely recognized as an important tool in many fields. As of 2014, with the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences going to game theorist Jean Tirole, eleven game theorists have won the economics Nobel Prize. John Maynard Smith was awarded the Crafoord Prize for his application of game theory to biology.

Intellectually and psychologically, it is important to motivate architectural students in design studio. I propose to use ‘’Game theory’’ as a mechanism for practicing the formation of architectural composition. If you agree, how?

In addition to this, I want to know which one of these two is better in terms of computational complexity and with respect to the game.

Thank you.

How do you know that from the almost infinite action (toolbox), which action you need to choose (which is A , B etc..) to get the next step within the progress toward the target. (Starting point (like sitting in the armchair) -> A -> B -> C -> Cooked a Pizza or Went out of the room through the door )

What algorith/method the most effective when the task is NEW, so you need planning, don't just solve this with previous experience.

And this method should be universally applicable because the animals can solve problems with a very high diversity interval.

I hope you get is what the question is.

I want to compare two populations, but we can only measure 6 participants at a time at most (the total sample is larger of course). Therefore running the task classically is difficult.

A possible solution is having participants play against an algorithm (tit-for-tat, or adaptive pavlov). However, I can't find any literature of humans vs. algorithm in the prisoner's dilemma.

Am I missing something?

Suppose we have a set of players, i.e., {

*p*_{1},*p*_{2}, ...,*p*} and each player has three different strategies, i.e., {_{n}*s*_{1},*s*_{2},*s*_{3}}. They play*m*number of games. In each game, each player seeks to maximize its profit by selecting a strategy with highest playoff. The profit associated with each strategy is as follows.1) Payoff for selecting strategy

*s*_{1}is zero2) Payoff for selecting strategy

*s*_{2}is a real number, which is calculated using some formula*f*_{1}3) Payoff for selecting strategy

*s*_{3}is also a real number, however, it is calculated using another formula*f*_{2}I want to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium when all the players select one of the available strategies.

I have searched on web and found several documents, however, I couldn't get a clear idea to prove it mathematically.

Any help is deeply appreciated. Please let me know if I have missed any information. Thank you in advance.

Is there a distinction between strong or complete qualitative probability orders which are considered to be strong representation or total probability relations neither of which involve in-com parables events, use the stronger form of Scott axiom (not cases of weak, partial or intermediate agreements) and both of whose representation is considered 'strong '

of type (1)P>=Q iff P(x)>= P(y)

versus type

(2) x=y iff P(x)=P(x)

y>x iff P(y)>Pr(x) and

y<x iff P(y)<Pr(x)

The last link speaks about by worry about some total orders that only use

totallity A<=B or B<=A without a trichotomy https://antimeta.wordpress.com/category

/probability/page/3/

where they refer to:

f≥g, but we don’t know whether f>g or f≈g. S

However, as it stands, this dominance principle leaves some preference relations among actions underspecified. That is, if f and g are actions such that f strictly dominates g in some states, but they have the same (or equipreferable) outcomes in the others, then we know that f≥g, but we don’t know whether f>g or f≈g. So the axioms for a partial ordering on the outcomes, together with the dominance principle, don’t suffice to uniquely specify an induced partial ordering on the acti

.

The both uses a total order over

**totality**

**A <=B or B >=A**

**l definition of equality and anti-symmetry, A=B iff A<=B and B>=A**

**A<= B iff [A< B or A=B] iff not A>B**

**A>=B iff [A>B or A=B]iff not A<B**

**where A>B equiv B<A,and**

**A>=B equiv B<=A iff (A<B)**

**where = is an equivalence relation, symmetric, transitive and reflexive**

**<=.=> are reflexive transitive, negative transitive,complementary and total**

**, whilst <, > are irreflexive and ass-ymetric,**

**transitive**

**A<B , B<C implies A>C**

**A<B B=C implies A>C**

**A<B, A<=B implies A>C**

**and negatively transitive**

**and complementary**

**A>B iff ~A<~B**

**<|=|>, are mutually exclusive.**

and where equality s, is an equivalence class not denoting identity or in-comparability but generally equality in rank (in probability) whilst the second kind uses negatively transitive weakly connected strict weak orders,r <|=|>,

**weak connected-ness not (A=B) then A<B or A> B**

whilst the second kind uses both trichotomous strongly connected strict total orders, for <|=|>,.

**(2) trichotomoy A<B or A=B or A>B are made explicit, where the relations are mutually exclusive and exhaustive in (2(**

**(3) strong connectected. not (A=B) iff A<B or A> B, and**

**and satisfy the axioms of A>= emptyset, \Omega > emptyset , \Omega >= A**

**scotts conditions and the separability and archimedean axioms and monotone continuity if required**

In the first kind <= |>= is primitive which makes me suspect, whilst in the second <|=|> are primitive.

Please see the attached document.And whether trich-otomoy fails

in the first type, which appears a bit fuzzier yet totality holds in both case A>=B or B<=B where

What is unclear is whether there is any canonical meaning to weak orders (as opposed total pre-orders, or strict weak orders) .

In the context of qualitative probability this is sometimes seen as synonymous with a complete or total order. , as opposed to a partial order which allows for incomparable s, its generally a partial order, which allows for comparable equalities but between non identical events usually put in the same equivalence class (ie A is as probable as B, when A=B, as opposed, one and the same event, or 'who knows/ for in-comparability) Fihsburn hints at a second distinction where A may not be as likely as B, and it must be the case

not A>B and not A< B yet not A=B is possible in the second yet

A>= B or A<=B must hold

which appears to say that you can quasi -compare the events (can say that A less then or more probable, than B ,but not which of the two A<B, A=B, , that is which relation it specifically stands in

but yet one cannot say that A>B or A<B

)

and satisfy definitions

and A<=B iff A<B or A=B iff B>=A, iff ~A>=~B, where this mutually exclusive to A<B equiv ~B>~A

A>=B iff A>B or A<=B

iff iff B>=A where this mutually exclusive to A>B equiv ~B<~A

and both (1) and (2) using as a total ordering over >= |<=

(1)totalityA<= B or B<=A

(2)equality in rank and anti-symmetric biconditional A=B iff A<=B and B>=A where = is an equivalence relation, symmetric, transitive and reflexive

(2) A<=B iff A<B or A=B, A>=B iff A>B or A<=B

(3) and satisfy the criterion that >|<|>=|<=, are

complementary, A>B iff ~B<~A

transitive and negatively transitive,

where A<B iff B<A and where , =, <|> are mutually exclusive,

The difference between the two seem to be whether A>=B and A<= B is equivalent to A=B; or where in the first kind, it counts as strongly respresenting the structure even if A>=B comes out A>B because one could not specify whether A>B or A=B yet you could compare them in the sense that under <= one can say that its either less or equal in probability or more than or equal, but not precisely which of the two it is.

either some weakening of anti-symmetry of the both and the fact that the first kind use

whilst the less ambiguous orders trich-otomous orders use not (A=B) iff A<B or A> B; generally trichotomy is not considered, when it comes to using satisfying scotts axiom , in its strongest sense, for strict aggreement

and I am wondering whether the trich-otomous forms which appear to be required for real valued or strictly increasing probability functions are slightly stronger, when it comes to dense order but require a stronger form of scotts axiom, that involves <. > and not just <=.

but where in (1) these <=|>= relation is primitive and trich-otomoy is not explicit, nor is strong connected-ness whilst in (2)A neq B iff A>B or A<B

>|=|< is primitive and both

(1) totality A<= B or B<=A

(2) A<B or A=B or A>B are made explicit, where the relations are mutually exclusive and exhaustive in (2(

and (2) trichotomy hold and are modelled as strict total trichotomous orders,

as opposed to a weakly connected strict weak order, with an associated total pre-order, or what may be a total order,

, or at least are made explicit. I get the impression that the first kind as deccribed by FIshburn 1970 considers a weird relation that does not involve incomparables, and is consided total but A>=B and B<=A but one cannot that A is as likely as B, or that its fuzzy in the sense

that one can say that B is either less than or equal in probability to A, or conversely, but if B<= A one cannot /need not whether say A=B or A<B,

not A=B] iff A<B or A>B

and strongly connected in the second.

where A=B iff A<=B and B>=A in both cases

where <= is transitive , negative transitive, complementary, total, and reflexive

A>=B or B<=A

are considered complete

and

y

I want to know how to run game theory inside WSN and which tool supports that?

When analysing power relations and decision-making processes in developing countries it is evident that 'real politics' does not abide by the formal rules of the game. Rather, there is a considerable element of informality involved, meaning that formal rules are bypassed, evaded or simply disregarded. However, for outsiders, it is exceedingly difficult to come to grips with such informal processes.

I am looking for studies that manipulate not only the situational frame of social dilemma, like calling the interaction a Competition Game/Wall Street Game or Cooperation Game/Community Game, but that also compare those to a control or baseline. Most studies that I find do not do the comparison with a control. Only recent study I could find is Engel & Rand (2014).

Thanks in advance!

Max Wohlers

Engel, C., & Rand, D. G. (2014). What does “clean” really mean? The implicit framing of decontextualized experiments. Economics Letters, 122(3), 386-389.

I am writing an article on the use of Game theories to determine the outcome of a negotiated agreement. However, as I proceed, it is becoming rather apparent that The elusiveness of the determination of a negotiated outcome, as an inherent feature sorrounding negotiations, makes it unlikely that a simple schematic layout of the disputants options could infact facilitate successful outcome of negotiations, let alone predict the outcome.

Could someone kindly realign my train of thoughts.

Is there any solution for the extension of the Bellman optimality Equation for Markov decision problem while the state and action spaces both are uncountable and bounded and compact?

Hi, I need articles or research works dedicated to game theory problems with parametric payoff matrix. For instance, you can see in attached article that a parametric values were added in static Rock–Paper–Scissors game matrix. I need more researches and articles like this. Thanks

Literature in the energy internet and associated market clearance mechanism dealt with game theory based modelling with standard test grid. Is there any other technique (like GA,ANN) that could be used for the same?

I begin with some general question. Is the normative decision theory in primary form applied to real problems? I can hardly find examples of real payoff matrices among toy examples.

Back to main question. I would like to represent in a form of payoff matrix such a problem: incident commander after arriving at the fire ground has such alternatives: 1. Gathering further information; 2. Evacuating of people; 3. Extinguishing the fire.

Candidates to states of nature: fire will extinguish itself; people will evacuate thyself.

How to construct the payoff matrix for this problem. Should be the states of nature composed as a combination of the candidates' values:

State 1: won't extinguish itself, won't evacuate thyself;

State 2: will extinguish itself, won't evacuate thyself;

State 3: won't extinguish itself, will evacuate thyself;

State 4: will extinguish itself, will evacuate thyself;

Let assume that candidates are non mutually exclusive and independent.

Can anyone give me articles about roles of these contol mechanisms (internal auditor, external auditor and audit committee).

Thank you

I am looking for a theoretical economics study that can illustrate a seller's decision when he needs to select one of the two options: he can sell his product to a market with a fixed price (moderate) or a market with a random price (extremely low or high). How can he decide which market to go?

Other than explaining this using a simple risk preference approach, is there any theoretical study that explains determinants of his decision? I would be great if you can provide some suggestions.

Thanks.

I am looking for the methods like ELECTRE IV or MAXIMIN, and for papers where the problem of the criteriaincomparability is considered.

The topic of my thesis is fairness students in financial decision-making. We did an experiment where we fairness surveyed by the dictator game . I mean I need advice on what to put in the practical part . How to handle the data . What statistical methods I could use , I had found that the perception of risk ?

Let's consider a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (

**GNEP**) ,in which N players play a non-cooprative game with nondisjoint strategy sets. Under the assumption of**perfect information**game, we could formulate GNEP as Variational Inequalities (**VI**) problem in order to be able analyzing optimality and existence of the game solutions**[1]**. Now, I want to reformulate the GNEP under the assumption of**imperfect information**game as "Differential Variational Inequalities (**DVI**)" problem. Obviously, taking advantages of "decision dynamics" and "estimation dynamics" are required in imprefect games. How could I do this? And then, how do I solve DVI?Also, you could find

**[1]**from link below.The topic of my thesis is the perception of economic risk students. We did an experiment where we investigated the perception of risk by lottery games . I mean I need advice on what to put in the practical part . How to handle the data . What statistical methods I could use , I had found that the perception of risk ?

My research background is Operations Research and Social Simulation. More recently I got involved in discussing ways of linking Behavioural Economics models/ideas to Social Simulation. One method that seems to be well suited for this purpose is behavioural game theory. But there are still a few fundamental things I do not understand. Perhaps someone can help me with this.

I was wondering how the outcome of a behavioural game theory experiment helps one to solve concrete problems in the real world. What is the research process one would use? Do I start my investigation with having a concrete problem in mind and think about which game can help me to solve it or do I start my investigation with a game and then think about which concrete problem this could solve or do I just provide the results of a game and let other people find concrete applications in the real world?

Having read recently about the public goods games I was wondering if I can somehow use or link the outcome of such games to build social simulation models of shared houses. Does that make any sense?

In the studying of algorithmic game theory I have faced with the proposition ‘A nondegenerate bimatrix game has an odd number of Nash equilibria ’ .

**Could anyone introduce me some references for illustrative proof?**

I want to study the

**Evolutionary Game Dynamics**and its applications on Economics topic?It is kind of common knowledge in behavioral economics that there is such a thing as the "immediacy effect", i.e. subjects value rewards significantly higher, when they are obtained immediately.

But unfortunately there does not seem to be a paper, which studies this effect (apart from those concentrating on time preferences, which - if present biased - of course also produce a similar effect).

Do you know of experiments where this effect is analysed?

Thanks very much.

Michael

How to find the solution of multiple players Nash game?

Hello every one,

I use ATMS notion to describe my problem and I use label and nogood. I look for a paper which describes an algorithm that calculates these two sets (or one of them). I try to look on internet by nothing.

thanks in advance

Let us modelize a riddle:

We have a finite set of elements E and some subsets A_i.

For the riddle, an unknown element e is chosen in E and the player asks a sequence of questions " is e in A_i ?" An oracle answers yes or no. The goal is to find e.

The strategy of the player is modelized by a binary tree of questions (each node is labeled by a subset A_i with two branches (e is in A_i) or (e is not in A_i)). Notice that A_i can appear several times in the tree. Such a tree is said to be discriminatory if it allows you to find any element of e.

The problem is: build the discriminative tree of minimal height (we can consider the height as an average or the maximal one).

In fact, our goal is to have an algorithm that takes the A_i and builds the decision tree of minimal height.

This problem has probably been investigated for a long time. In which framework ? (data base, game theory, information theory?). If you know anything about this problem, please let me know because I didn't find anything on the web.

Please suggest papers apart from jensen n miller's paper on giffen behavior..

Are there any researchers who have published about the extensive form of population Game Theory and its applications?

My

*deceiver robot is supposed to decide on whether or not to leave a track and also the amount of pheromone to deposit in order to confuse the other robot seeking for him.***ant-inspired**-apparently the players are in

*and it is a***conflict***(for now of course, since deception in cooperative situation by convincing the rival do a part of your task in cooperation might be a step forward)***non-cooperative game**- on the way to extract eternal payoffs (on the basis of which, the robot under deception decides where to go), I use fuzzy inference to cover the uncertainties and have a real-world deception.

also the behavioral strategies for both of the robots are fuzzified throughout an honesty-deception axis (it means the deceiver can sometimes act honestly and also the other robot can sometimes trust what it observes)

- Finally after the decision-making happens, I have modeled it as

*, (deception successful: +1 for deceiver and -1 for the other, and vice versa if deception is defeated ), however I'm trying to have a game with fuzzy payoffs.***a zero-sum game**- I know it is a game with

**incomplete information**from the view of the robot under deception, maybe I can model it as a*signaling game.*- I know from the deceiver's point of view, it can be modeled as a kind of

*problem: he must decide on the track and pheromone on the corridors, but the resources here sound unbounded!***resource allocation**-I know the parameters deceiver wants to optimize are: track and pheromone and maybe where to hide, but I doubt about the optimization parameters for the other (maybe where to go to find the deceiver)

-on the basis of what, the players should decide on their behavioral strategy? (act honest/deceitful or act anti-deception/ trust ) ... maybe based on their experience (

**the game history**: the more time you've been deceived, the less you'll trust and also the more time your deception is defeated, the more deceitfully you'll act) .... then I'll face*repeated games**!*

**I would be greatly thankful to anyone who helps me with the issue and survive me from this huge pile of vague questions.**Does any one know or point out the method or technique used for the distribution of the coalition cost among the coalition members depending upon their contributions in the coalition. In other words, if a member of the coalition contributes more in the coalition as compared to others then the share of the coalition cost would be less as compared to others?

As Venter (1983) has suggested u'(w)=0 for w<0, utility for negative values is constant. A bit different treatment could be u(x)=-u(-x). But how is to calculate risk aversion (R) for situation when wealth value is negative and the agent can be considered to be bankrupt.

Do you agree that I can take R(w)=0 when w<0 since after going broke the agent is indifferent about going even more "broke"?

In a one shot game theory, if the action set is convex, but the utility function is a non-convex function on the action set, can it have an equilibrium?

Bias, experiments and methods. What is the trend?

There are three functions of money. Yes, that is what the books are telling us. But how can something which contains only a "meaning" of something hold any kind of value? My argumenting line is as follows: value is not real, it is human made. It is more a feeling than anything else. And even if we use some kind of matter which is quite stable in its materialized form, the condition of "keeping its value" is totally outside of this stuff. There are the external conditions, the stable condition of expectations of the inhabitants, and more totally external factors until the final one that is if you want to get something in exchange for this "storage," the other part must be there when you want it (which is a condition not connected to the existence of the medium of "storage of value").

So I would say, any storage of value function is only possible as long as a lot of external conditions are stable. Therefore there is really no possible way of saying "this is a storage of value," because everything of "this" points directly to the external conditions, and not to the medium which is used like a storage of value.

I am considering the relation between a player and his agent or agents in definition of the game.

I'm looking for data from prisoner's dilemma experiments in which participants played only one round of the game. A closely related experiment, which I found, is Goeree, Holt and Laury (J Pub Econ 2002) where participants play ten one-shot games without feedback between games (hence, no learning effects).

Any discussion of value is not precise as long there is no precise definition of value and how to measure it or where are the border lines of the value in focus.

One first question of value is: Is there a given absolute value scale - or is it just and only a relative relation of a given value of one part of the economy to the other parts or the total sum.

I strongly would say: It depends.

It depends of one condistion: Is there a measurable definition of "ONE PART OF ECONOMY" yes or no?

My argument is as follows:

The value of one produced part of a given economy is - in the first line - a relative value to the total sum of that given economy.

Which results in the saying that nothing inside of that economy can get a value bigger than 100% of that total value.

The second answer in the second line then is:

If you have a given MEASURABLE DEFINITION of ONE PART OF ECONOMY you end up in a situation where you can measure the economy in real terms - and by going over the total 100% rule back to the percentage of the one given product - you have a direct measurement possible for the true size of ONE PART OF ECONOMY - and therefore an indirect measure of the TRUE VALUE in absolute terms.

Does everybody follow what I mean? I mean, the quantity equation can be bound to a true measurment of real world units of each given economy - if you have a definition for what ONE PART OF ECONOMY is.

Here is the problem:

1. Alice wants to phone Bob.

2. Alice dials Bob's number and the person at the other end claims to be Bob's son Charles.

3. Bob and Charles have indistinguishable voices, so Alice cannot tell them apart on that basis.

4. Information asymmetry exists because Alice knows Bob well, but knows almost nothing about his son Charles.

5. Now it could be the person at the other end of the line is in fact Bob who is pretending to be Charles (maybe Bob doesn't want to speak with Alice and is rebuffing her).

6. The problem: Is there a question Alice can ask in order know whether the receiver is truly Bob or Charles? Is there a question that can be asked that will catch a bluff for sure? How can information asymmetry be exploited to distinguish Bob and Charles?

(Historical note: I did not think up this question. The originator was the German mathematician Ehrhard Behrends. He actually had a real situation of a strange phone call where he phoned a university colleague in his office. A person picked up the phone who claimed to be the son of the colleague, but the voice sounded exactly like the colleague. After the call was over, Ehrhard wondered if there was a question he could have asked that would make him sure if it was the son or not. There possibly is a solution to this problem, and as you will see it is a very interesting one).

As described in the papers: "Action Recognition And Prediction For Driver Assistance Systems Using Dynamic Belief Networks" and "Enrichment of Qualitative Beliefs for Reasoning under Uncertainty"

Conference Paper Action Recognition and Prediction for Driver Assistance Syst...

I'm thinking on corrupted societies: hiring an agent that communicates corruption to citizens can be seen as a signal of honesty.

I'm currently researching the dynamic moral hazard problem that arises in a multiple-agent framework - where two agents are in one team, such that production of output in each period is determined by unobservable effort by agents in teams. The principal is tasked with implementing the optimal wage schedule so as to obtain an optimal outcome. My problem is of intractable modelling, with clunky notations due to the number of players involved in the two-period game. Any thoughts on how to model this accurately would be greatly appreciated!

I studied this theorem:

Theorem

Let σ* be an ESS in a pairwise contest, then σ≠σ* and either

(1) π(σ*,σ*) > π(σ,σ*) , or

(2) π(σ*,σ*) = π(σ,σ*) and π(σ*,σ) > π(σ,σ).

Conversely, if either (1) or (2) holds for each σ≠σ* in a two-player game, then σ* is an ESS in the corresponding population game.

When might the first condition (1) be used? Mostly we use the second condition.

More context... Suppose an organisation were responsible for administering a process/system in which research proposals were received to be assessed by a group of experts. The admin organisation is criticised for a process that takes many weeks. How might the quality of decision making be kept high whilst the lead time of the process is reduced to a matter of days?