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Questions related to European Central Bank
Which approach is more effective in fighting economic crises: expansionary fiscal policy or stringent monetary policy?
Dear Researchers, Scientists, Friends,
In the face of economic crises, governments and central banks are faced with the choice of appropriate tools to stimulate the economy. Expansionary fiscal policy involves increasing public spending and lowering taxes, while a tight monetary policy focuses on controlling the money supply and raising interest rates to combat inflation. For the purposes of this discussion, I have formulated the following research thesis: expansionary fiscal policy can lead to a faster economic recovery by increasing demand, but at the same time it can increase the budget deficit and public debt. On the other hand, a strict monetary policy can effectively control inflation, but it can also slow down economic growth and lead to higher unemployment. Therefore, the analysis of the effectiveness of both approaches requires taking into account the economic context, including the level of inflation, unemployment and the state of public finances. It is important to understand that fiscal and monetary policies are interrelated and their inconsistency can lead to undesirable effects. An example would be a situation where expansionary fiscal policy is pursued simultaneously with restrictive monetary policy, which can undermine the effectiveness of both measures. Furthermore, the reactions of the financial markets to such measures can be unpredictable, which further complicates the assessment of the effectiveness of individual policies.
I have written about the sources of the high inflation that has occurred since 2021 as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic in the following article:
THE POST-COVID RISE IN INFLATION: COINCIDENCE OR THE RESULT OF MISGUIDED, EXCESSIVELY INTERVENTIONIST AND MONETARIST ECONOMIC POLICIES
I have described crisis management in companies in the article:
CRISES IN THE ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS ENTITIES AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT
I have described the key issues of anti-crisis state intervention in my article below:
Anti-crisis state intervention and created in media images of global financial crisis
I have described the key aspects of the monetary policy pursued by central banks in recent years in the following article:
Comparisons of the monetary policy of the central banks of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank and the National Bank of Poland
And what do you think about this?
What is your opinion on this matter?
Please reply,
I invite everyone to the discussion,
Thank you very much,
Best regards,
I invite you to scientific cooperation,
Dariusz Prokopowicz

To ensure the financial stability of the economy, is it more effective to introduce stricter regulations for investment banks, commercial banks and other financial institutions, or to create rescue mechanisms financed by the banking sector?
Dear Researchers, Scientists, Friends,
Financial stability is crucial for the proper functioning of the economy. Financial crises such as the one in 2008 have highlighted the need to strengthen the financial system. The two main approaches are to tighten regulations for commercial banks to prevent excessive risk and to create bailout funds financed by the banks themselves that can be used in crisis situations. For the purposes of this discussion, I have formulated the following research thesis: stricter regulations for commercial banks reduce the likelihood of financial crises, but can limit the availability of credit and hinder economic growth. On the other hand, bailouts financed by the banking sector ensure a quick response in crisis situations, but can lead to moral hazard, where banks take excessive risks, hoping for support in case of problems. Therefore, the analysis should take into account the impact of stricter regulations on financial stability and on the lending activities of banks and their ability to finance the economy. It is also crucial to examine the extent to which regulations affect the level of innovation in the financial sector and the competitiveness of banks in international markets. In the case of rescue mechanisms financed by the banking sector, it is important to analyse their effectiveness in mitigating the effects of possible financial crises and their impact on the risky behaviour of financial institutions. An important aspect is also the assessment of the costs of such mechanisms for the banking sector and the ways in which they are financed (e.g. through bank contributions). In addition, the potential social effects of both approaches should be considered, including the impact on savers, investors and taxpayers. The study should also take into account the experiences of different countries in implementing stricter regulations (e.g. Basel III) and creating rescue funds (e.g. Single Resolution Fund in the EU) in order to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of both strategies.
My articles below are related to the above issue in some aspects:
Comparisons of the monetary policy of the central banks of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank and the National Bank of Poland
Analysis of the effects of post-2008 anti-crisis mild monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank
ACTIVATING INTERVENTIONIST MONETARY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Synergy of post-2008 Anti-Crisis Policy of the Mild Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank
THE POST-COVID RISE IN INFLATION: COINCIDENCE OR THE RESULT OF MISGUIDED, EXCESSIVELY INTERVENTIONIST AND MONETARIST ECONOMIC POLICIES
What do you think about this topic?
Please answer,
I invite everyone to the discussion,
Thank you very much,
Best wishes,
I invite you to scientific cooperation,
Dariusz Prokopowicz

How do central banks' monetary policy decisions (interest rate changes, open market operations) affect the balance between inflation and unemployment in the long run?
This research question concerns a fundamental issue that is the subject of extensive debate in macroeconomics. It asks how central banks' monetary policy decisions (interest rate changes, open market operations) affect the balance between inflation and unemployment in the long term. The question is whether keeping interest rates low for a long time leads to higher inflation at the expense of employment growth or, on the contrary, promotes price stability with minimal unemployment. This implies that we are dealing with a question about the potential conflict or coexistence of these two phenomena in the context of monetary policy. Research shows that in the long term, monetary policy aimed at lowering interest rates can lead to an increase in inflation while keeping unemployment low, but at some point this balance may shift, where a further increase in inflation can negatively affect employment. In view of the above, this question is very important in the context of the conclusions to be drawn for economic practice, especially in the era of global economic crises and pandemics. The long-term effects of central bank decisions, such as lowering interest rates, have a direct impact on the pace of economic growth and the structure of the labour market. Research in this area allows for a better understanding of how to balance monetary policy to prevent negative effects in the form of high inflation or recession, while ensuring the long-term development of the economy.
My articles below are related to the above issues in some aspects:
I have written about the sources of the high inflation that has occurred since 2021 as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic in the following article based on my research:
THE POST-COVID RISE IN INFLATION: COINCIDENCE OR THE RESULT OF MISGUIDED, EXCESSIVELY INTERVENTIONIST AND MONETARIST ECONOMIC POLICIES
I have described the key aspects of the monetary policy pursued by central banks in recent years in the following article:
Comparisons of the monetary policy of the central banks of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank and the National Bank of Poland
I have written about the mild, synchronised monetary policy during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 in the following articles, among others:
Analysis of the effects of post-2008 anti-crisis mild monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank
ACTIVATING INTERVENTIONIST MONETARY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
What is your opinion on this matter?
Please reply,
I invite everyone to join the discussion,
Thank you very much,
Best wishes,
I invite you to scientific cooperation,
Dariusz Prokopowicz

Is raising interest rates by the central bank a more effective tool for fighting inflation or is it rather government intervention in the form of price regulation and subsidies?
Inflation is one of the most important challenges for monetary and fiscal policy. Central banks usually raise interest rates to limit the money supply and reduce inflationary pressure, but such a move can simultaneously weaken economic growth and increase unemployment. On the other hand, governments can use price regulations, subsidies and grants to mitigate the effects of inflation on citizens, but such measures can lead to market disruptions and further deepen economic imbalances. The question is whether it is better to fight inflation with classic monetary tools or with fiscal policy and administrative price regulation. For the purposes of this discussion, I have formulated the following research thesis, according to which raising interest rates by the central bank is a more effective tool in the long term, while government interventions may have short-term effects but lead to further market disruptions. This problem is therefore interdisciplinary in nature, as it affects both macroeconomics and economic policy. It requires an analysis of the impact of interest rates on the demand and supply of money, but also of the effects of government intervention on price dynamics and market behaviour. The final answer may depend on the economic context of the country concerned, the level of public debt, the structure of the labour market and the scale of global economic disruption.
My articles below are related to the above issue in some aspects:
THE POST-COVID RISE IN INFLATION: COINCIDENCE OR THE RESULT OF MISGUIDED, EXCESSIVELY INTERVENTIONIST AND MONETARIST ECONOMIC POLICIES
I have described the key aspects of the monetary policy pursued by central banks in recent years in the following article:
Comparisons of the monetary policy of the central banks of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank and the National Bank of Poland
I have written about the mild, synchronised monetary policy during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 in the following articles, among others:
Analysis of the effects of post-2008 anti-crisis mild monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank
ACTIVATING INTERVENTIONIST MONETARY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
What do you think about this?
What is your opinion on this issue?
Please answer,
I invite everyone to the discussion,
Thank you very much,
Best regards,
I invite you to scientific cooperation,
Dariusz Prokopowicz

Should the monetary policy of the central bank be more focused on stabilising inflation or on interventionist activation of economic growth?
Central banks such as the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve are faced with the dilemma of whether their main objective should be to fight inflation or to promote economic growth. High inflation erodes the value of money and reduces the purchasing power of citizens, while overly restrictive monetary policy can stifle investment and economic growth. Research shows that a focus on stabilising inflation leads to long-term economic stability, but at the expense of short-term economic growth. On the other hand, promoting economic growth through looser monetary policy leads to higher inflation and potential income inequality. Therefore, the above question is crucial in the macroeconomic debate and is of great importance for the country's economic policy. The choice between stabilising inflation and promoting economic growth is not an easy one, as the two objectives are contradictory. History shows that periods of high inflation have often led to economic uncertainty and financial instability, but at the same time, overly restrictive monetary policy has hampered growth and led to recession. A modern approach to monetary policy often involves a compromise between these two objectives, but the effectiveness of this approach depends on economic conditions, the structure of the labour market and the flexibility of the financial system. It is also worth considering the impact of technological innovation and the digitalisation of finance on the ability of central banks to control inflation and economic growth.
My articles below are related to the above issue in some aspects:
THE POST-COVID RISE IN INFLATION: COINCIDENCE OR THE RESULT OF MISGUIDED, EXCESSIVELY INTERVENTIONIST AND MONETARIST ECONOMIC POLICIES
I have described the key aspects of the monetary policy pursued by central banks in recent years in the following article:
Comparisons of the monetary policy of the central banks of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank and the National Bank of Poland
What is your opinion on this matter?
What do you think about this?
Please reply,
I invite everyone to join the discussion,
Thank you very much,
Best wishes,
I invite you to scientific cooperation,
Dariusz Prokopowicz

Does a zero interest rate policy lead to long-term economic stability or does it rather create speculative bubbles and imbalances in the financial markets?
Dear Researchers, Scientists, Friends,
Central banks around the world are increasingly using low or zero interest rate policies to stimulate investment and consumption. Proponents argue that cheap loans encourage companies to grow and households to increase spending. Critics, on the other hand, point out that a long-term policy of zero interest rates can lead to speculative bubbles, excessive debt and financial problems in the future. According to the accepted research thesis, a long-term policy of zero interest rates leads to an increase in debt and a speculative bubble in the financial markets, which can result in an economic crisis. History shows that keeping interest rates low for too long can lead to irrational investment decisions, overheating of financial markets and an increase in social inequality. An example of this is the 2008 financial crisis, which was caused, among other things, by excessive monetary policy easing and easy access to mortgages. Interdisciplinary research combining economics, finance and behavioural psychology can help to determine optimal monetary policy strategies in a dynamically changing economy.
My articles below are related to the above issue in some aspects:
THE POST-COVID RISE IN INFLATION: COINCIDENCE OR THE RESULT OF MISGUIDED, EXCESSIVELY INTERVENTIONIST AND MONETARIST ECONOMIC POLICIES
I have described the key aspects of the monetary policy pursued by central banks in recent years in the following article:
Comparisons of the monetary policy of the central banks of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank and the National Bank of Poland
I have written about the mild, synchronised monetary policy during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 in the following articles, among others:
Analysis of the effects of post-2008 anti-crisis mild monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank
ACTIVATING INTERVENTIONIST MONETARY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
What is your opinion on this issue?
Please answer,
I invite everyone to the discussion,
Thank you very much,
Best wishes,
I invite you to scientific cooperation,
Dariusz Prokopowicz

What effects on the economy can result from the use of modern technologies such as artificial intelligence and automation in the monetary policy of the central bank, especially in the field of inflation forecasting and interest rate management?
This question concerns the impact of technology on monetary policy decision-making. Technologies such as artificial intelligence and automation can revolutionise the way central banks forecast inflation, make interest rate decisions and monitor economic conditions. The use of such tools can improve the accuracy of decisions, but at the same time, it can also bring new challenges and risks. It is possible that the use of modern technologies, such as artificial intelligence, in monetary policy can improve the effectiveness of inflation forecasting and interest rate management, while minimising human error and increasing the speed of response to changes in the economy. Therefore, the use of technologies such as artificial intelligence in monetary policy can contribute to more precise forecasting of inflation trends and faster interest rate decisions. AI can analyse huge data sets, including macroeconomic and market data as well as information from the media, enabling central banks to respond more quickly to changes in the economy. However, there are also concerns about the independence of decisions made by machines, as well as risks associated with algorithmic errors. It is therefore necessary to understand and control the risks associated with automated decisions in such a crucial area as monetary policy, and to ensure that the technology is properly integrated with traditional methods of economic analysis.
My following articles are related to the above issues in some aspects:
I have described the key issues of opportunities and threats to the development of artificial intelligence technologies in my article below:
OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE APPLICATIONS AND THE NEED FOR NORMATIVE REGULATION OF THIS DEVELOPMENT
I have written about the sources of the high inflation that has occurred since 2021 as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic in the following article based on my research:
THE POST-COVID RISE IN INFLATION: COINCIDENCE OR THE RESULT OF MISGUIDED, EXCESSIVELY INTERVENTIONIST AND MONETARIST ECONOMIC POLICIES
I have described the key aspects of the monetary policy pursued by central banks in recent years in the following article:
Comparisons of the monetary policy of the central banks of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank and the National Bank of Poland
Analysis of the effects of post-2008 anti-crisis mild monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank
Synergy of post-2008 Anti-Crisis Policy of the Mild Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank
ACTIVATING INTERVENTIONIST MONETARY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
And what do you think about it?
What is your opinion on this issue?
Please reply,
I invite everyone to the discussion,
Thank you very much,
Best wishes,
I invite you to scientific cooperation,
Dariusz Prokopowicz

What impact did the central bank and government measures in 2020 have in response to the Covid-19 pandemic on inflation and the economic stability of the country in 2021-2023?
In response to the unprecedented challenges of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, both central banks and governments have taken a number of interventionist measures to mitigate the negative effects of the crisis, which, however, in the perspective of 2021-2023, caused significant repercussions for inflation and the country's economic stability. In some countries, a key element of these measures was the direct purchase of government bonds by the central bank and the financing of extensive aid programmes through the issuance of additional money, which resulted in a significant increase in the money supply. These interventions, although intended to protect jobs and support businesses, combined with global disruptions to supply chains and rising commodity prices, contributed to a sharp rise in inflation. In response to the growing inflationary pressure, central banks raised interest rates, which in turn slowed down economic growth and increased the cost of loans, destabilising the financial market. As a result, although the measures taken in 2020 were aimed at minimising the immediate effects of the crisis, their long-term consequences led to significant economic instability, which highlights the complexity and multidimensionality of crisis interventions.
I have written about the sources of the high inflation that has occurred since 2021 in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic in the following article based on my research:
THE POST-COVID RISE IN INFLATION: COINCIDENCE OR THE RESULT OF MISGUIDED, EXCESSIVELY INTERVENTIONIST AND MONETARIST ECONOMIC POLICIES
I have described the key aspects of the monetary policy pursued by central banks in recent years in the following article:
Comparisons of the monetary policy of the central banks of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank and the National Bank of Poland
And what is your opinion on this topic?
Please answer,
I invite everyone to the discussion,
Thank you very much,
Best regards,
I invite you to scientific cooperation,
Dariusz Prokopowicz

Can the central bank's monetary policy be green, can it support the green transformation processes of the economy, can it promote the realization of sustainable development goals, can it support the sustainable development of the banking sector, the financial sector and the economy as a whole, can it be environmentally and climate socially responsible, can it be multifaceted sustainable?
If the central bank were to lend money to commercial banks on additionally preferential terms, with a concomitant requirement that the money be used to finance commercial banks' implementation of green investment projects by their customers, and thus conduct a green lending policy of providing green loans, could this kind of activity conducted by the central bank be described as green central banking activity? And if the scale of low-cost green loans thus provided by the central bank to commercial banks developing green commercial banking were relatively large, could the concept of green central banking monetary policy be introduced for this kind of situation? The above questions arise from the ever-increasing scale of some commercial banks' activities of granting green loans, issuing green corporate bonds, and, in combination with other financial instruments, conducting green banking, whereby commercial banks provide their clients, including borrowers, with financing for business ventures described as green because they are part of the trends of green transformation of the economy, increasing the scale of implementation of sustainable development goals, implementing investment projects involving, for example, the development of green energy. on the development of green energy, construction of power plants generating energy from renewable and emission-free energy sources, construction of wastewater treatment plants, improvement of logistics of sustainable production, development of waste sorting and recycling systems, development of sustainable organic agriculture, development of green areas, carrying out processes of aforestation of post-industrial areas, development of electromobility, etc. In view of the above, in the situation of the ever-increasing scale of the conducted process of green transformation of the economy and the increasing scale of commercial banks' green loans, green leasing, issuance of green bonds, etc., it is also in the field of central banking that analogous processes of increasing the importance of green finance should take place.
I am conducting research on this issue. I have included the conclusions of my research in the following article:
I invite you to discuss this important topic for the future of the planet's biosphere and climate.
In view of the above, I address the following question to the esteemed community of scientists and researchers:
Can the monetary policy pursued by the central bank be green, can it support the processes of green transformation of the economy, can it promote the realization of sustainable development goals, can it support the sustainable development of the banking sector, the financial sector and the economy as a whole, can it be environmentally and climate socially responsible, can it be multifaceted sustainable?
Can the central bank's monetary policy be multifaceted sustainable, including whether it can be green?
What do you think about this topic?
What is your opinion on this issue?
Please answer,
I invite everyone to join the discussion,
Thank you very much,
Best regards,
Dariusz Prokopowicz
The above text is entirely my own work written by me on the basis of my research.
In writing this text I did not use other sources or automatic text generation systems.
Copyright by Dariusz Prokopowicz

Why aren't central banks currently lowering interest rates, which they had previously raised anti-inflationarily and for several months the inflation level has already been close to the inflation target?
Are central banks not lowering interest rates now, although they could do so given the drop in inflation, because they are afraid that inflation will rise again, or is it rather a matter of leaving the issue of interest rate cuts for the proverbial "black hour," i.e. is it rather to leave the issue of lowering interest rates to the proverbial "black hour", i.e. the occurrence of another economic crisis and crash in the capital markets, and to maintain the attractiveness of treasury debt securities, including above all treasury bonds, so that the cost of servicing the public debt does not increase significantly, so that citizens do not redeem treasury bonds but extend the term of their contracts for subsequent years, and so that subsequent investors, including foreign investors are interested in buying new series of treasury bonds issued?
As I write this commentary on the above question, it is early April 2024. Inflation, which had been rising rapidly since 2021 after the Covid-19 pandemic, then after central banks raised interest rates as early as 2022, inflation began to fall and fell particularly rapidly in 2023. In much of the developed world, falling inflation was already falling to near the inflation target in late 2023 or early 2024. Given the issues mentioned above, central banks could have already begun to cut interest rates, but they are still not doing so. Perhaps central banks are not lowering interest rates now, although they could do so given the decline in inflation, because they are afraid of a resurgence of inflation, or rather, the idea is to leave the issue of interest rate cuts for the proverbial "black hour," ie. the occurrence of another economic crisis and crash on the capital markets, and to maintain the attractiveness of Treasury debt securities, including above all Treasury bonds, so that the cost of servicing the public debt does not increase significantly, so that citizens do not redeem Treasury bonds but extend the term of their contracts for years to come, and so that subsequent investors, including foreign investors are interested in buying new series of Treasury bonds issued. Perhaps all of these considerations are taken into account and all of them to some extent determine the decision-making of interest rate committees (in Poland, the Monetary Policy Council operating at the central bank, i.e. the National Bank of Poland). In addition to this, other important factors that may be taken into account include the level of unemployment or, more broadly, the situation in the labor market, the level of economic prosperity in the economy, the issue of stability of the situation in the capital markets, the level of stock market indices on stock exchanges, the formation of exchange rates and the impact of this formation on imports and exports, the issue of the scale and share of long-term business and mortgage loans granted to citizens, entrepreneurs in previous years at variable interest rates. and the impact of changes in the oproc. of these loans by commercial banks during their repayment by borrowers on the economy's prosperity.
I described key aspects of anti-crisis soft monetary policy in the articles:
Synergy of post-2008 Anti-Crisis Policy of the Mild Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank
A safe monetary central banking policy as a significant instrument for liquidity maintenance in the financial system
THE NORMATIVE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL BANK ON THE MONEY MARKET IN POLAND
ACTIVATING INTERVENTIONIST MONETARY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
In view of the above, I address the following question to the esteemed community of scholars and researchers:
Are central banks not lowering interest rates now, although they could do so given the drop in inflation, because they are afraid that inflation will rise again, or is it rather a matter of leaving the issue of interest rate cuts for the proverbial "black hour," i.e. is it rather to leave the issue of lowering interest rates to the proverbial "black hour", i.e. the occurrence of another economic crisis and crash in the capital markets, and to maintain the attractiveness of treasury debt securities, including above all treasury bonds, so that the cost of servicing the public debt does not increase significantly, so that citizens do not redeem treasury bonds but extend the term of their contracts for subsequent years, and so that subsequent investors, including foreign investors are interested in buying new series of treasury bonds issued?
Why aren't central banks now lowering interest rates, which they had previously raised anti-inflationarily, and for several months now the inflation level has been close to the inflation target?
What do you think about this topic?
What is your opinion on this issue?
Please answer,
I invite everyone to join the discussion,
Thank you very much,
Best wishes,
Dariusz Prokopowicz
The above text is entirely my own work written by me on the basis of my research.
In writing this text, I did not use other sources or automatic text generation systems.
Copyright by Dariusz Prokopowicz

Is the issue of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) still in the realm of concepts likely to be introduced in the future or has this solution already been implemented in some countries?
The Covid-19 pandemic has resulted in the acceleration of the digitization and Internetization of various aspects of the business activities of companies and enterprises, Internet-implemented processes for the sale of products and services, Internet-implemented payments and settlements, Internet-implemented marketing communications with customers, and so on. Much earlier, in the 1990s, in some countries, the first companies began to develop their business activities, including the sale of certain products and/or services via the Internet, the first Internet businesses began to operate, Internet startups, dotcoms growing rapidly, portals offering Internet information services, earning money from the sale of Internet advertising, and so on. At that time, electronic banking was already developing rapidly, offering its banking services remotely, first to institutional clients, and then to individual clients, to citizens. Electronic banking initially providing remote banking services in the form of so-called home banking, and then at the turn of the century transformed into online banking and then into mobile banking. Successively, therefore, the electronification, digitization and Internetization of banking is progressing year by year. In some countries, as early as the late 1990s, there were already considerations about the future of Internet banking development. The possibility of a full transition of banking to online banking was considered, as well as the full replacement of money existing in traditional form, i.e. in the form of banknotes and coins, to the form of electronic money. Already at that time there were theories suggesting that soon, in a few years, all banking will become Internet banking, that physically existing bank branches will disappear completely, physically existing money will disappear from citizens' wallets and will be completely replaced by its electronic counterpart. A continuation of this kind of considerations is the transition of central banks to a kind of form of electronic central banking and the replacement of traditional money with digital currency generated and introduced into the economy by central banks within the framework of shaped monetary policy. In a situation where the progressive processes of digitization and internetization would also apply to central banking then monetary policy could also be subject to these processes. Well, during the Covid-19 pandemic, there was also an increased interest in the development of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) in some countries. Some countries have attempted to introduce digital currencies of central banks. An interesting issue is the possibility of involving Blockchain technology in the development of systems based on central banks' digital currencies, which could ensure a high level of security for these digital currencies. However, both the positive aspects of the introduction of central banks' digital currencies for the formation of monetary policy, which would also be implemented more digitally, are still not fully recognized. The negative aspects of the introduction of financial systems and their development based on central banks' digital currencies are also not diagnosed. It is not fully explored what new risks in financial markets can be generated by the introduction of central banks' digital currencies. It is not known how the introduction of digital currencies of central banks could affect the stability of financial systems, the situation in financial markets and the macroeconomic stability of the economy as a whole.
I have described the key issues of the central banking problem in my articles below:
Synergy of post-2008 Anti-Crisis Policy of the Mild Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank
Analysis of the effects of post-2008 anti-crisis mild monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank
A safe monetary central banking policy as a significant instrument for liquidity maintenance in the financial system
ACTIVATING INTERVENTIONIST MONETARY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Anti-crisis state intervention and created in media images of global financial crisis
I invite you to get acquainted with the issues described in the above-mentioned publications and to scientific cooperation in these issues.
In view of the above, I address the following question to the esteemed community of scientists and researchers:
Is the issue of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) still in the realm of concepts likely to be introduced in the future or has it already been implemented in some countries?
Is the issue of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) still in the realm of concepts or has this solution already been implemented in some countries?
What do you think about this topic?
What is your opinion on this issue?
Please answer,
I invite everyone to join the discussion,
Thank you very much,
Best wishes,
Dariusz Prokopowicz
The above text is entirely my own work written by me on the basis of my research.
In writing this text, I did not use other sources or automatic text generation systems.
Copyright by Dariusz Prokopowicz

How does the central bank combine taking care of the value of money by anti-inflationary tightening of monetary policy, including raising interest rates, with anti-crisis measures in a situation of high unemployment, i.e., in a situation in which the central bank anti-crisis eases monetary policy by, among other things, lowering interest rates?
In a situation of high inflation, the central bank anti-inflationarily raises interest rates. The side effect is to cool economic processes and weaken the economy. When there is a high level of unemployment in the economy, especially Keynsian unemployment and possibly structural unemployment then the central bank anti-crisis lowers interest rates. The side effect of the situation can be an increase in inflation. And what if the economy is plunged into a multi-faceted economic crisis, in which there is high unemployment, recession of the economy and high inflation. In such a situation there is stagflation. Due to high unemployment, the central bank may apply monetary easing. However, there is also high inflation at the same time, during which the central bank tightens monetary policy. Simultaneous easing and tightening of monetary policy can mean that there is no reaction at all regarding a possible change in strategy regarding monetary policy making. Then whether the central bank, caring about the value of money, will tighten monetary policy, including raising interest rates..., or, however, helping the government in conducting anti-crisis economic policy in an attempt to revive economic processes and contribute to the decline of high unemployment anti-crisis will ease monetary policy, including lowering interest rates, among other things, then other factors and determinants will probably decide, including mainly the factors determining the economic development of the country and/or the determinants of the formation of monetary policy taking into account monetary policy factors other than those mentioned above. Among these other factors and determinants of the formation of monetary policy may be the issue of influencing the formation of the national currency against other currencies.
I have described the key issues of the central banking problem in my articles below:
Comparisons of the monetary policy of the central banks of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank and the National Bank of Poland
Synergy of post-2008 Anti-Crisis Policy of the Mild Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank
Analysis of the effects of post-2008 anti-crisis mild monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank
A safe monetary central banking policy as a significant instrument for liquidity maintenance in the financial system
ACTIVATING INTERVENTIONIST MONETARY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Anti-crisis state intervention and created in media images of global financial crisis
In view of the above, I address the following question to the esteemed community of scholars and researchers:
How does the central bank combine caring for the value of money by anti-inflationary tightening of monetary policy, including raising interest rates, with anti-crisis measures in a situation of high unemployment, i.e. in a situation in which the central bank anti-crisis eases monetary policy by, among other things, lowering interest rates?
How does the central bank combine taking care of the value of money with anti-crisis measures in a situation of high unemployment?
What do you think about this topic?
What is your opinion on this issue?
Please answer,
I invite everyone to join the discussion,
Thank you very much,
Best wishes,
Dariusz Prokopowicz
The above text is entirely my own work written by me on the basis of my research.
In writing this text, I did not use other sources or automatic text generation systems.
Copyright by Dariusz Prokopowicz

Did the money that was printed and introduced into the economy during the Covid-19 pandemic and went into the capital markets, among other things, cause asset inflation in those markets, including the stock markets?
Did the significant amount of additional, printed, anti-crisis money that was injected into the economy during the Covid-19 pandemic and found its way into capital markets, among other things, pull stock market indexes upward and cause asset inflation in capital markets, including stock markets?
When there is a strong decline in the level of activity of economic entities, the rate of economic growth slows down, there is a risk of the emergence of a recession of the economy, a serious financial and/or economic crisis begins then the governments of individual countries, fearing a strong increase in unemployment, increase the scale of anti-crisis state interventionism, launch programs to activate the economic activity of companies and enterprises under mild fiscal policy and active fiscal policy. With the growing risk of deepening the scale of the financial and/or economic crisis
central banks lower interest rates with a view to lowering the cost of money lent by commercial banks in the form of bank loans and thus increasing liquidity in the banking sector and indirectly in the economy as a whole. When the World Health Organization declared a pandemic state of Covid-19 on March 11, 2020, there was panic in the capital markets involving panic selling of assets. The high level of uncertainty and investment risk prevailing in the capital markets, including those of the stock exchanges, caused companies and businesses to put their investment plans on hold and some had already begun to see declines in the level of sales of their product and service offerings. Subsequently, citizens' fears for their jobs quickly emerged and politicians, fearing the loss of public support, quickly began to launch processes that would result in the introduction of certain anti-crisis instruments. The sharp stock market crashes on the stock exchanges, which lasted for several days, as well as declines in industrial commodity prices, were halted when central banks strongly reduced the level of interest rates. During the Covid-19 pandemic, anti-crisis state interventionism was applied on a large scale to limit the scale of the development of the economic crisis. These anti-crisis interventionist measures were intended to prevent the economy from deepening into a recession in 2020 and the occurrence of stagflation in subsequent years. Stagflation is a particularly unfavorable type of deep economic crisis characterized by high inflation, sometimes hyperinflation and high unemployment. For capital markets, including the stock market, it is a particularly unfavorable type of economic crisis. Triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic and the lockdowns introduced during the pandemic, the global economic crisis starting in the spring of 2020 could, in many countries, as it did during the 2008 global financial crisis, turn into another financial crisis, a debt crisis of the state's public finance system with the simultaneous occurrence of a recession of the national economy. If the anti-crisis, interventionist measures introduced at the time, the aid programs launched for businesses, public institutions, for citizens within the framework of the use of available instruments of fiscal policy and monetary policy did not work, a situation of a significant deepening of the then economic crisis could occur. Then this deepened economic crisis could have been more severe than the one that occurred in 2008 and could have been characterized by stagflation. In such a situation, also the interventionist actions of central banks, e.g. by continuing to lower interest rates, could no longer work effectively because there was already an excess of money in the markets, citizens and companies on bank deposits in commercial banks held record high amounts of money and inflation had already begun to rise in many countries as of 2021. After the anti-crisis reduction of interest rates by central banks, which in many countries took place between March and May 2020, the stock markets quickly returned to prosperity. When this kind of situation lasts for a prolonged period over many months, quarters or even sometimes several years then stock prices can rise to levels described as highly overvalued which can then result in a stock market crash at a time when most market participants do not expect it. In the meantime, stock prices may rise on a "buy the rumors, sell the facts" basis. It is not out of the question that this principle worked in 2023-2024, as most investors active in the stock markets expected the start of the announced interest rate cuts by central banks. Expectations were reasonable since inflation had fallen to levels close to inflation targets and central banks had not lowered interest rates, which had previously been anti-inflationarily raised after the Covid-19 pandemic.
I described the key issues of the central banking problem in my articles below:
Synergy of post-2008 Anti-Crisis Policy of the Mild Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank
Analysis of the effects of post-2008 anti-crisis mild monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank
A safe monetary central banking policy as a significant instrument for liquidity maintenance in the financial system
In view of the above, I address the following question to the esteemed community of scientists and researchers:
Did the significant amount of additional, printed, anti-crisis money that was injected into the economy during the Covid-19 pandemic and found its way into capital markets, among other things, pull stock market indexes upward and cause asset inflation in capital markets, including stock markets?
Did the money that was printed during the Covid-19 pandemic, which was introduced into the economy and found its way to the capital markets, among others, cause asset inflation in those markets, including the stock markets?
Did the money that was printed and introduced into the economy during the Covid-19 pandemic cause asset inflation in capital markets, including stock markets?
What do you think about this topic?
What is your opinion on this issue?
Please answer,
I invite everyone to join the discussion,
Thank you very much,
Best regards,
Dariusz Prokopowicz
The above text is entirely my own work written by me on the basis of my research.
In writing this text, I did not use other sources or automatic text generation systems.
Copyright by Dariusz Prokopowicz

What is mainly determined by the issue of the possible introduction or non-introduction of the euro currency in Poland?
Do the media debates on the issue of the possible introduction of the euro currency in Poland continue to be dominated by politicized subjectivism instead of fully objective analysis and research?
For years, the media have been conducting sterile discussions based on the low level of economic knowledge of citizens. Discussions in the media by economic commentators tend to lack objectivity, as they are determined by subjective reference to studies conducted by certain institutions, including the NBP, which were also not conducted and commented on under conditions of full political impartiality. The government, without the influence of various pressure groups, prefers the stasus quo to which it is accustomed, to which it is condemned for the next 4 years after winning the elections, and maximizes the pros against the cons of a given state of affairs, that is, the situation of Poland having a national currency. In Poland, the main social group that would definitely benefit from the introduction of the euro in Poland are entrepreneurs, mainly importers and exporters who settle their business activities in euros and therefore bear the costs of hedging against currency risks. However, even this social group is apparently too weak to unite in organizations supporting the plan to introduce the euro. Regarding the issue of the plan to introduce the euro in Poland, there is no such plan in principle. There were first attempts to develop this plan as early as the late 1990s, but as it turned out, the issue of the dominant narrative in the media was politically determined in particular years, or rather, during the periods of the various ruling political parties. The political narrative of the PIS party is related to the policy of printing national currency, the printing of so-called anti-crisis additional domestic money. The second PIS argument for not introducing the euro in Poland is the loss of national monetary policy by the NBP, i.e. the central bank, which theoretically and according to current legal norms (the Polish Constitution and the NBP Act) is an independent bank from the government's fiscal policy, which is not in line with the facts given the political ties of NBP President Prof. Glapinski with the PIS party, which ruled for 8 years from 2016 to 2023. Another third key argument, partly objective and economic, suggests that Poland could adopt the euro in the distant future, when the economic potential of the Polish economy, the production capacity of industrial sectors, labor productivity determined, among other things, by the equipment of manufacturing processes with new technologies and innovations, the balance sheet totals of banks' financial capital, the level of real income of citizens, etc., will almost equal the analogous levels in the largest economy in Europe and at the same time the main trading partner with respect to Poland, i.e. the German economy. In addition to this, the arguments used to question the legitimacy of the introduction of the euro in Poland in recent years often include concerns about the increase in prices of many products and services, which would occur in the first years after Poland's entry into the eurozone. The basis for this argument is to point to such a phenomenon, which has occurred on a certain scale in countries where the euro currency was recently introduced. In a situation where such a phenomenon also occurred in Poland, the most affected would be citizens with the lowest and lower levels of income, citizens who spend a significant part of their income on the purchase of basic products, including food products. From the arguments presented, further arguments follow. Well, if in the situation of a much less developed Polish economy in relation to the largest economy in Europe, which is the German economy, the plan to introduce the euro currency in Poland would be implemented, the less developed Polish economy could continue to develop less well and would not necessarily catch up quickly with the economic development of Germany. On the other hand, there are supporters of the completely opposite theory claiming that if Poland adopted the euro now it would develop faster and thus catch up with Germany's economic development faster. But there are also supporters of the theory that these issues are not necessarily correlated, because it is usually the case that less developed countries, when they develop and are developing, growing countries then the magnitude of the rate of economic growth in such smaller and less developed economies is greater in comparison with the corresponding figures denoting the rate of economic growth expressed in percent, expressed in the indicator macroeconomic determinant Gross Domestic Product. So this issue is almost entirely "malleable," subject to politicized, subjective evaluation. However, if the policy had changed on this issue, a plan for the introduction of the euro had been developed, all the formal requirements of the European Union had been met in terms of the monetary policy and fiscal policy applied in the country and their effects in the form of similar to EU standards issues of the development of the exchange rate of the PKN against the euro and in terms of the level of debt of the system of public finances of the state, and after a few or more years in Poland the euro currency would have been introduced, then in many media commentaries consideration of the pluses of the situation would have begun to prevail instead of consideration of the minuses as before. Then it could turn out that loans would be cheaper, because ECB interest rates are lower than NBP interest rates. However, the fact that the ECB's interest rates are lower than those of the NBP is related to the issue of offering Treasury bonds to foreign investors, who need to be offered a correspondingly higher yield to cover the higher level of risks associated with the peculiarities of the Polish economy. In addition, the issue of higher interest rates of the NBP vis-à-vis the CBs is also related to the transactions carried out by the NBP on international financial markets, as well as the exchange rate of the national currency PLN against other currencies. On the other hand, changes in the exchange rate of the PLN against other currencies also matter to foreign investors conducting speculative investment activities in Poland using securities listed on the Stock Exchange, i.e. primarily investment banks and investment funds operating transnationally. On the other hand, when we ask whether there is any type of entity that cares about the continued existence of the domestic PLN currency in Poland, it is primarily domestic commercial banks generating much higher profits from the situation as it is now, and also the already mentioned foreign banks and investment funds. Well, it has happened more than once that in periods of internationally or globally developing financial and economic crises, a decline in the level of economic stability, an increase in various categories of financial and other risks foreign financial institutions, such as. Foreign financial institutions, such as banks and investment funds based in the City of London, taking advantage of the situation of increased sensitivity of the PLN currency to various crisis factors, the situation of increased amplitude of fluctuations of the PLN exchange rate against other currencies determined by the increase in uncertainty and risks developing in the scope of economic activities carried out by thousands of entities, carried out speculative transactions with the involvement of large financial resources in the foreign exchange markets increasing the scale of destabilization in the issue of the formation of the PLN exchange rate against the euro and other currencies. So, when you do not know what the issue is about it is about money, or when you seem to know what the issue is about you choose many different arguments for the situation, but unfortunately a situation determined mainly by politics and not economics.
Specific economic and financial aspects relating to the issue of the possible adoption of the euro currency in Poland in the precisely unspecified future I described in the following article:
NORMATIVE AND MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ENTERING EURO CURRENCY IN POLAND
Determinants of the introduction of the euro currency in Poland
In view of the above, I address the following question to the esteemed community of scientists and researchers:
Is the media debate on the issue of the possible introduction of the euro currency in Poland still dominated by politicized subjectivism instead of fully objective analysis and research?
What is mainly determined by the question of the possible introduction or non-introduction of the euro currency in Poland?
How is the issue of the possible introduction of the euro currency in Poland presented?
What do you think about this topic?
What is your opinion on this issue?
Please answer,
I invite everyone to join the discussion,
Thank you very much,
Best regards,
Dariusz Prokopowicz
The above text is entirely my own work written by me on the basis of my research.
In writing this text, I did not use other sources or automatic text generation systems.
Copyright by Dariusz Prokopowicz

In the following link, you can see "loans to deposits ratio of EU countries"
If you look at more detailed, this ratio was nearly %140 in the EU average in 2000 year.
However this ratio has declined from the 2008 to 2019
My question is
How can we explain this ratio in the context of the post keynesian monetary theory ? Because we expect that credits are equal to the deposits in the post keynesian monetary theory.
Sincerely
Engin YILMAZ
I am looking for the name of country that are using Personal Credit scoring system mandatorily. I need you help, please mention the name of the country where it is mandatory (not limited only for credit card but for generally).
Has the central bank's raising of interest rates, which has already taken place over a period of at least a few months, brought inflation to a halt?
Does an increase in the cost of money, a decrease in the creditworthiness of potential borrowers have more of a deconstructive effect than an anti-inflationary instrument?
Should the government additionally use fiscal policy instruments to lower the level of inflation?
What else can be done to reduce the level of inflation?
I have written about the origins of the high inflation that occurred after the Covid-19 pandemic from 2021 onwards on the basis of my research in my article below:
THE POSTCOVID RISE IN INFLATION: COINCIDENCE OR THE RESULT OF MISGUIDED, EXCESSIVELY INTERVENTIONIST AND MONETARIST ECONOMIC POLICIES
I have described key aspects of the monetary policies pursued by central banks in recent years in the following article:
Comparisons of the monetary policy of the central banks of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank and the National Bank of Poland
What do you think?
What is your opinion on the subject?
Please reply,
I invite you all to discuss,
Thank you very much,
I would like to invite you to scientific cooperation,
Warm regards,
Dariusz Prokopowicz

When, in a situation of high inflation, the number of companies and enterprises going bankrupt is increasing, the level of real income of economic entities and citizens is decreasing, the scale of investments is decreasing, the level of consumption is decreasing, the deconstruction of the economy is deepening, which is additionally reflected in the occurrence of cases of loss of financial liquidity and bankruptcy of banks, and the risk of stagflation is increasing, in such a situation should central banks continue to increase interest rates, treating the fight against inflation as a priority for monetary policy?
When a new risk factor emerges that threatens the efficient development of the economy, it can cause serious perturbations on financial markets, including capital markets. When the WHO declared a pandemic on 11 March 2020, uncertainty prevailed on the capital markets, with a strong stock market crash. The heavy discounting and panic selling of shares was only halted by significant, interventionist interest rate cuts by central banks, and this despite the low interest rates already in place at the time. Additional interest rate cuts were possible because inflation was low in many countries in 2020. Subsequently, lockdowns imposed on selected sectors of the economy and temporary national quarantines were introduced in some countries to slow down the transmission of the coronavirus. In order to limit the economic crisis and increase unemployment, governments introduced new anti-crisis programmes called, for example, Anti-Crisis Shields consisting of subsidies to workers' salaries, subsidies to companies, refinancing of fixed costs, temporary tax cuts, etc. In this way, additional funds were injected into the economy. In this way, large amounts of additional money were injected into the economy. The now familiar mechanism of interventionist, anti-crisis measures, which had previously been applied in the USA during the 2008 global financial crisis to commercial and investment banks and some companies in the non-financial sectors, was applied. In this way, a huge amount of additional money was injected into the economy. When, thanks to the coronavirus vaccines, the state of uncertainty in the financial markets and in the economy was significantly reduced in 2021, economies were rapidly recovering from the pandemic recession of the 2020 economy. From 2021 onwards, commodity prices and other categories of inputs began to rise. Consumption and inflation were also rising. In 2022, some central banks embarking on a plan to curb the scale of rising inflation began to raise interest rates, a process that continued until the first quarter of 2023, as inflation levels in many countries had already been in double digits for several months and continued to rise. The increase in interest rates by central banks resulted in an increase in the cost of borrowed money, bank loan instalments increased, and the availability of credit decreased. commercial banks, perceiving symptoms of the risk of another economic crisis looming on the horizon, tightened their credit policies, further restricting access to credit. The level of investment already started to decline from around mid-2022. Earlier, as economic growth started to decline as early as the beginning of 2022. In the second half of 2022, the beginning of a decline in citizens' real incomes was already noticeable in some countries, despite wage increases. This resulted in a decline in consumption levels, which deepened in the first half of 2023. From March 2023, inflation began to fall in some countries and the decline in economic growth reached its minimum. This seemed to be the beginning of the end of a weak economy exacerbated by the 2022 energy crisis. However, all of a sudden, in March 2023, financial institutions start to fail. In mid-March 2023, the sizable US banks Silicon Valey Bank and Signature Bank, which had been investing in securities as part of investment banking, go bankrupt. Paradoxically, they lost liquidity by investing in securities classified as those generating low investment risk, i.e. government bonds. But even these widely regarded as the safest financial instruments in a situation of misguided investment banking policy can lead to a serious crisis, insolvency and, consequently, bank failure. In such a situation, central banks find themselves at a kind of crossroads in terms of deciding whether to continue tightening monetary policy by continuing to raise interest rates or to change their strategy from hawkish to dovish, i.e. to a more benign one by ending interest rate hikes despite still elevated inflation. The decision on the aforementioned change of strategy could be interpreted by financial market participants as the start of a period of monetary easing. This would probably also have an impact on developments in financial markets. Therefore, the key issue is to decide what could deepen the economic downturn and cause more negative economic effects, i.e. the continuation of interest rate increases, which could increase the scale of bankruptcies of economic entities, or the end of interest rate hikes, which would slow down and prolong the rate of inflation decrease in subsequent quarters and possibly years.
In view of the above, I address the following question to the esteemed community of scientists and researchers:
When, in a situation of high inflation, the number of companies and enterprises declaring bankruptcy increases, the level of real income of economic entities and citizens decreases, the scale of investments decreases, the level of consumption decreases, the deconstruction of the economy deepens, an additional symptom of which are cases of loss of financial liquidity and bankruptcy of banks, the risk of stagflation increases, in such a situation should central banks continue to raise interest rates, treating the fight against inflation as a priority of monetary policy?
And what is your opinion on this?
What is your opinion on this subject?
Please respond,
I invite you all to discuss,
Thank you very much,
Best wishes,
Dariusz Prokopowicz

Why does raising interest rates by central banks have more of a slowing effect on the growth of the economy and a limited anti-inflationary effect?
Have central banks started a race to raise interest rates? The attempt to fight inflation results in a slowdown in economic growth and a depreciation of the national currency. During the SARS-CoV-2 (Covid-19) coronavirus pandemic, some central banks raced to add money and inject as much added money as possible into the economy treated as anti-decessionary, anti-recessionary money for a situation of exceptional economic crisis caused indirectly by the pandemic and more directly by interventionist type measures. The crash in the financial, capital, stock and commodity markets that occurred in March 2020 and triggered a deep recession in many countries was, among other things, the result of a new crisis factor, a new concept, a new term rapidly disseminated by the media and formally established by the World Health Organisation. This new factor was the establishment of the pandemic condition as a new economic crisis factor, which generated a high level of uncertainty. As a consequence of the interventionist measures applied on a record high scale, large amounts of printed money were pumped into the economies of many countries in 2020. In this way, the economies of many countries were thrown out of relative equilibrium and put on a path of rising inflation, which occurred in 2021 and was exacerbated in 2022 by the energy crisis initiated by the war in Ukraine. For smaller economies and less economically developed economies, raising interest rates will lead to deep economic crises. In 2022, on the other hand, many central banks are successively raising interest rates, commercial banks are so far over-liquid, on the other hand credit is becoming more difficult to access, companies are holding back on new investments, wage growth is slowing, rising unemployment is imminent and possibly stagflation in 2023. This puts the economies even more out of balance, as it will be an economic crisis of 2023 that lasts much longer than the Covidian one of 2020 and is more difficult to control with government interventionist measures, as these measures are exhausting themselves in their existing formulas. Is the so-called anti-crisis economic interventionism from the covid trap now falling into the trap of rising interest rates raised by central banks? To date, interventionist measures by central banks have been treated as the 'last resort' of anti-crisis measures. Perhaps indirectly, this issue has also been highlighted by the Nobel Committee, which awarded the 2022 Nobel Prize in Economics precisely for achievements in research on the genesis of emerging banking crises and their resolution by strengthening systemic security solutions for the banking system. But this time, do the hitherto anti-inflationary measures of central banking cease to work when other factors of economic policy, including the mild fiscal policy that activates economic processes, are activated and carried out by the government as part of the so-called policy mix? Should the central bank raise interest rates faster? When applied in parallel with a tightening monetary policy, does an easing fiscal policy result in a limited anti-inflationary effect of raising interest rates by the central bank? Or are commercial banks showing excess liquidity too slow in raising deposit and deposit rates despite the fact that they are raising lending rates? Or are there other reasons for this situation?
In view of the above, I address the following question to the esteemed community of researchers and academics:
Why does raising interest rates by central banks have more of a slowing effect on the growth of the economy and a limited anti-inflationary effect?
I describe this issue in much greater detail in the following recent article of mine:
Comparisons of the monetary policy of the central banks of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank and the National Bank of Poland
I have written about the sources of the high inflation that occurred after the Covid-19 pandemic from 2021 onwards and the subsequent anti-inflationary monetary policy on the basis of the research carried out in my article below:
THE POSTCOVID RISE IN INFLATION: COINCIDENCE OR THE RESULT OF MISGUIDED, EXCESSIVELY INTERVENTIONIST AND MONETARIST ECONOMIC POLICIES
On the subject of benign, synchronously conducted monetary policies during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, I have written, among others, in the following articles:
Analysis of the effects of post-2008 anti-crisis mild monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank
ACTIVATING INTERVENTIONIST MONETARY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
What do you think about this topic?
What is your opinion on this subject?
Please respond,
I invite you all to discuss,
Thank you very much,
Warm regards,
Dariusz Prokopowicz

How should central banking monetary policy be conducted so that it is realistically anti-crisis, i.e., so that it does not lead to further and even greater financial and economic crises than previous ones?
Prior to the Great Depression known as the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Federal Reserve Bank raised interest rates. When commercial and investment banks also raised interest rates at that time, the result was a significant decline in borrowers' creditworthiness. There was a crash in bank lending in the form of loans. There was a decline in investment, income, consumption, production, income growth, etc. Unemployment increased. There was a stock market crash on the New York Stock Exchange, which became a symptom and an additional factor in the development of a deep economic crisis. The result was a strong increase in unemployment and the pauperization of societies in many countries, including developed countries. The Great Depression of the time may also have been a significant factor in the emergence of negative public sentiment, a change in policy in Europe and the outbreak of World War II. The negative effects were many, and it was only the anti-crisis, Keynsian economic program based on activating demand through new publicly funded investments that pulled economies out of the crisis lasting several years. Years later, it was recognized that raising interest rates by the central bank in a situation flowing from the economy with symptoms of an impending crisis, instead of helping the economy it exacerbated the impending economic crisis. The prevailing opinion among economists at the time was that the central bank had misread those first symptoms of an impending economic crisis.
In contrast, prior to the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, the Federal Reserve Bank kept interest rates low for several years. Loans offered by commercial banks became cheaper. In addition, a system was created to provide systemic protection against banks, a system of government guarantees for any increase in systemic credit risk. The result was an increase in the sale of mortgages based on funds raised from subprime bonds for citizens who were not creditworthy. Rating agencies attached to investment banks issued the highest AAA recommendations for those investment financial instruments that contained already defaulted loans, i.e. bad loans. This led to the appearance of symptoms of the economic and financial crisis already in mid-2007. Real estate prices, instead of continuing to rise, began to fall, unemployment began to rise, and a significant portion of mortgages stopped being repaid. When the world's fourth-largest bank Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy in mid-September 2008, there was another wave of stock market repricing. This date was symbolically considered the beginning of the global financial crisis, the biggest financial crisis in the world's economic history. As part of the anti-crisis measures, a large amount of additional money was pumped into the banking system to limit the scale of the decline in commercial bank lending, in order to maintain liquidity in the banking sector. As a result, it was possible to limit the scale of the developing financial crisis.
In view of the above, sound monetary policy-making by the central bank is an important anti-crisis or pro-crisis factor in the economy. I investigated the sources of the global financial crisis through the prism of the credit risk management process in commercial banks and in the context of central banks' monetary policies. I have posted the conclusions of my research in publications on this issue, which, after publication, I also posted on my profile of this Research Gate portal. I invite you to join me in scientific cooperation on this issue.
In view of the above, I address the following question to the esteemed community of researchers and scholars:
How should the monetary policy of central banking be conducted in order to be realistically anti-crisis, i.e. not lead to further and even greater financial and economic crises than the previous ones?
I describe this issue in much greater detail in the following recent article of mine:
Comparisons of the monetary policy of the central banks of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank and the National Bank of Poland
I have written about the sources of the high inflation that occurred after the Covid-19 pandemic from 2021 onwards and the subsequent anti-inflationary monetary policy on the basis of the research carried out in my article below:
THE POSTCOVID RISE IN INFLATION: COINCIDENCE OR THE RESULT OF MISGUIDED, EXCESSIVELY INTERVENTIONIST AND MONETARIST ECONOMIC POLICIES
On the subject of benign, synchronously conducted monetary policies during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, I have written, among others, in the following articles:
Analysis of the effects of post-2008 anti-crisis mild monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank
ACTIVATING INTERVENTIONIST MONETARY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
What is your opinion on this issue?
Please answer,
I invite everyone to join the discussion,
Thank you very much,
I would like to invite you to scientific cooperation,
Best wishes,
Dariusz Prokopowicz

Is an effective anti-inflation policy possible in a situation where the government is pursuing populist socio-economic policies?
Is it possible to have an effective anti-inflation policy in a situation where the government is pursuing a populist, short-sighted economic policy instead of a forward-looking, reliable policy of sustainable and realistically pro-social economic development?
Can this kind of policy mix based on contradictory goals and incompatible actions lead to an economic crisis under ad hoc state interventionism?
The liberalisation of the functioning of financial markets since the 1970s, the change in international exchange rate standards by moving away from the Bretton Woods monetary system and towards floating exchange rate regimes initiated changes that led to an increase in the scale of volatility and risk in financial markets. On the other hand, the rise of central banking in terms of active monetary policy-making and monetarist liberalism led to the creation of additional unbacked money as instruments for short-term activation of economic processes and interventionist anti-crisis economic policies. According to the Austrian school of economic liberalism, this kind of action can lead to an escalation of destabilising situations in the financial markets and/or to financial and economic crises. This kind of situation occurred at the beginning of the 21st century and became one of the key factors in generating the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. In some countries, a new mechanism is being used to create additional unbacked money and inject it into the economy. This involves the creation of government-controlled public institutions in which new earmarked funds are created for government support and subsidy programmes for the cost of more expensive fuels, energy, etc., subsidy programmes for selected social groups, sectors of the economy, types of economic activity and/or programmes to finance further economic ventures. Money is added by being offered by government agencies who, representing the Treasury, offer government bonds directly to the central bank, which buys them, and in this way additional money is introduced into the economy without being covered by new products and services. This is a key factor in the rise of inflation in countries where, since the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus pandemic (Covid-19), this mechanism has been used on a historically large scale. In addition to this, public debt and the risk of destabilisation of the state's public finance system are on the rise, but in the official data provided by the government-controlled Central Statistical Office and other government think tanks, the published financial indicators do not present a complete picture of the state of the state's public finances. It happens that, in the context of a lack of ideas on how to reduce inflation and the prospect of a downturn in the economy in the coming quarters, this mechanism is the main instrument of populist economic policy of the government, for which the priority is first and foremost to win the next parliamentary elections. This is the situation in the country in which I operate and the next parliamentary and local elections are due to be held as early as 2023.
In view of the above, I address the following research question to the esteemed community of researchers and academics:
Is it possible to have an effective anti-inflation policy in a situation where the government is pursuing a populist, short-sighted economic policy instead of a forward-looking, reliable policy of sustainable and realistically pro-social economic development?
What do you think about this subject?
Please respond,
I invite you all to discuss,
Thank you very much,
Warm regards,
Dariusz Prokopowicz

Do central banks primarily raise interest rates to curb the rise in inflation or, if they do raise interest rates, do they do so slowly so as not to increase the scale of the prospective slowdown in economic growth, deepening the downturn in the economy in the quarters and years to come?
In Poland, the Monetary Policy Council raised the NBP interest rates for the 11th time on 7.09.2022. This time interest rates were raised by only 0.25 per cent.
After this yet another increase, the basic reference rate of the National Bank of Poland, i.e. the central bank in Poland, at which it lends money to commercial banks, is 6.25 per cent. This relatively gentle increase in NBP interest rates results from a combination of 2 opposing factors, which the MPC takes into account. Well, on the one hand, financial market analysts operating in various financial institutions etc. are forecasting another interest rate hike, as more market and economic factors suggest a continuation of inflation growth instead of a halt. Consumer inflation in August 2022 was 16.1 per cent and is on an upward trend. On the other hand, there are increasing signs of a slowdown in economic growth projected for the next months and quarters, a downturn in the economy, including a decline in production and consumption, and an increased risk of a recession in the economy in 2023 and possibly also stagflation if unemployment levels also increase significantly. The anti-inflationary and anti-crisis monetary policy strategies pursued by individual central banks are not uniform. In some countries, including large economies such as the USA, the central bank, i.e. the Federal Reserve Bank, raises interest rates in order to limit the level of inflationary growth. In some countries, despite relatively low inflation, interest rates are raised even though the exchange rate of the national currency against other currencies is altered by the increase. Such a situation has occurred since mid-2022 in Switzerland. However, there are countries where, despite rising inflation, interest rates have been lowered by the central bank such as in Turkey. Some central banks such as the European Central Bank are only just starting to raise interest rates and are doing so to a relatively moderate extent despite rising inflation in the euro area. Rising inflation in the euro area and the increasingly tight monetary policy of other central banks has resulted in an acceleration of interest rate increases also by the European Central Bank, which on 8.9.2022 raised interest rates by 0.75 per cent to 1.25 per cent. This was the highest single increase by this central bank in history. The aforementioned different approaches of the different central banks to the issue of inflation are due to the uneven recognition of the key priorities set for the current monetary policy conducted in the context of the current economic policy of the government and the macroeconomic situation of the economy. A key issue is what types of economic and financial risks are considered particularly relevant in the context of current and possibly also forward-looking macroeconomic developments in the economy. In addition, the key issue is also what is considered more dangerous for the economy by the decision-makers, i.e. whether it is more dangerous to maintain an easing monetary policy and continue to increase inflation or whether it is more dangerous for the economy to raise the cost of money, decrease the availability of bank credit and thus exacerbate the economic downturn.
In view of the above, I address the following question to the esteemed community of researchers and academics:
What is the currently dominant strategy in terms of anti-inflationary and/or anti-crisis monetary policy pursued by central banks?
Do central banks primarily raise interest rates to curb the rise in inflation or, rather, if they do raise interest rates, do they do so slowly so as not to increase the scale of the prospective slowdown in economic growth, deepening the downturn of the economy in the following quarters and years?
I describe this issue in much greater detail in the following recent article of mine:
Comparisons of the monetary policy of the central banks of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank and the National Bank of Poland
I have written about the sources of the high inflation that occurred after the Covid-19 pandemic from 2021 onwards and the subsequent anti-inflationary monetary policy on the basis of the research carried out in my article below:
THE POSTCOVID RISE IN INFLATION: COINCIDENCE OR THE RESULT OF MISGUIDED, EXCESSIVELY INTERVENTIONIST AND MONETARIST ECONOMIC POLICIES
What is your opinion on this subject?
Please reply,
I invite you all to discuss,
Thank you very much,
I would like to invite you to scientific cooperation,
Warm regards,
Dariusz Prokopowicz

I am currently working on a money supply simulation and there are some pieces of the puzzle that are still missing. One of them has to do with the purchase program of the ECB.
Say I am a pension fund which is holding a government bond which the ECB wants to purchase for 1000 EUR. With the purchase program the ECB creates money to purchase this bond but that money is digital central bank money which can not be transferred to my account. My question is, where does the money that I eventually receive om my account come from? How would that look when explained with the balance sheets of me (the pension fund), my bank and the ECB?
Thanks in advance,
Stef Kuypers
Is the independence of the central bank from the government full and real now? What is your opinion about the central bank's independence from the government?
Is it full and real independence? Should there be full independence or only on some issues?
Or maybe the central bank should run a fully coordinated, parallel cooperation with the government regarding the common economic policy?
Should the monetary policy of the central bank be coordinated with the government's budget policy and to what extent? How is it in your country now?
How do you assess the issue of cooperation between the central bank and the government?
Should the central bank be used by the government to conduct a specific interventionist, anti-crisis economic policy?
The key issues of central banking, including the role of central banks in the banking and financial systems of modern countries, the anti-crisis instruments of soft monetary policy used by central banks, the synergistic actions of central banks using the example of the FED, ECB and NBP are described in the following publication:
Comparisons of the monetary policy of the central banks of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank and the National Bank of Poland
And what is your opinion about it?
What is your opinion on this topic?
Please feel free to respond,
I invite you all to join the discussion,
Thank you very much,
Best regards,
I would like to invite you to join me in scientific cooperation,
Dariusz Prokopowicz

A few weeks ago Jerome Powell, chairman of the Federal Reserve, announced that from November they would begin a process of reducing the pace of asset purchases (tapering) in the face of rising prices (October's CPI was over 6%). Will interest rates rise at some point? Will the European Central Bank adopt any contractionary measures in the coming months?
Dear Researchers, Academics, Friends,
In my opinion, the monetary policy coordinated by central banks can not be objectively assessed without taking into account many specific, current determinations describing the condition of financial markets, the issues of financial risk management instruments applied, the condition of the economy and many other macroeconomic factors. The analysis of a particular monetary policy should take into account the dynamic approach of many variables, including cyclical fluctuation reflected in the changes of many economic categories on the financial markets and in the entire economy. A specific monetary policy may be interpreted and evaluated differently depending on many factors surrounding the condition, financial markets and the economy. In support of this thesis, I cite the following various situations surrounding the banking system and the condition of financial markets and the macroeconomic situation in the context of the cyclical nature of the economy:
1. The process of cyclical development of the national and global economy in a multi-annual perspective, which does not develop fully objectively and independently, is only coordinated by actively pursued economic policies in individual countries, primarily through fiscal and financial policy. To this should be added the issue of the growing importance of central banking in banking systems since the 1970s and the processes of globalization, deregulation, liberalization of transactions and the operation of financial markets, applied security instruments and credit risk management, including capital markets.
2. The impact of monetary policy on central banking on economic processes, when this policy is used, for example, to stimulate economic growth in the deep recession of the economic cycle of the entire national economy, in other words, as has been used many times in many countries since the 1970s. also after the appearance of the global financial crisis in September 2008. Initially, the Federal Reserve Bank in the USA applied such an interventionist anti-crisis solution, and then the European Central Bank in the European Union applied analogous interventionist anti-crisis programs. thanks to this, restoring the balance in the economies and restoring economic growth has worked more effectively and faster than if these interventionist anti-crisis programs were not applied.
3. Long-term, the same, analogical, similar to the same formula, the same goals and directions of action, such as monetary policy co-ordinated by a large central bank, which is also of international importance due to the importance of the US economy, ie monetary policy shaped by the Bank Federal Reserve in the USA. This has been the case since the 1990s until the global financial crisis in 2008. Consequently, this particular policy of the Federal Reserve bank before 2008 was considered by many economists to be incorrect, too low interest rates were maintained for a long time, which enabled commercial banks to broaden the liberalization of lending policy, which resulted in granting these loans to persons without creditworthiness when there were no reliable borrowers and the home sales market was growing, prices of real estate and securities on stock exchanges continued to grow speculatively, despite the fact that they were highly overvalued.
In connection with the above, in the current economic reality it is not practically justified to assess the dominant models of applied monetary policies in universal, timeless terms, detached from the specific economic conditions of a given country, from a specific moment in the business cycle, from specific standards of the institution's supervision of the financial system, on the specific quality of the effects achieved in the area of ??the security of the financial system being a derivative of the application of specific solutions and system prudential instruments in the credit risk management process, etc.
On the other hand, it is justified to make objective, scientifically verified assessments of the dominant models of applied monetary policies, but for a specific economic situation, for a given country, for a specific examined and posted financial system functioning in a specific economy, at a specific moment, phase of the economic cycle of the national economy, global situation, specific situation on the capital markets, the level of valuation of securities on stock exchanges, applicable standards and instruments for the security of the financial system, including the effectiveness of supervision institutions over the financial system, including banking, situtions on credit markets, specific scientifically tested and defined standards for the use of bank loans, i.e. level of credit risk for the majority of credit transactions, etc.
Do you agree with me on the above matter?
In the context of the above issues, I am asking you the following question:
How do you rate the monetary policy of the central banks?
I would like to invite you to discuss in the problems of central banking.
Particularly important issues of central banking, including the role of central banks in the banking and financial systems of modern countries I described in the following publication:
Comparisons of the monetary policy of the central banks of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank and the National Bank of Poland
And what is your opinion on this topic?
What is your opinion on this issue?
Please feel free to respond,
I invite you all to join the discussion,
Thank you very much,
Best regards,
I would like to invite you to join me in scientific cooperation,
Dariusz Prokopowicz

Dear Researchers, Academics, Friends,
When the global financial crisis began in the autumn of 2008, the central banks of some countries, primarily the Federal Reserve Bank in the USA and the European Central Bank in the European Union, undertook specific anti-crisis measures to reduce the negative effects of the financial crisis at the time.
In view of the above, how do you assess the role of central banking in the area of anti-crisis measures in the event of financial and currency crises?
Particularly important issues of central banking, including the role of central banks in the banking and financial systems of modern countries, the anti-crisis instruments of soft monetary policy used by central banks, the synergistic actions of central banks using the example of the FED, ECB and NBP, the mistakes made by central banks and the factors generating the escalation of financial crises, I described in the following publication:
Comparisons of the monetary policy of the central banks of the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank and the National Bank of Poland
And what is your opinion about it?
What is your opinion on this topic?
Please feel free to respond,
I invite you all to join the discussion,
Thank you very much,
Regards,
I would like to invite you to join me in scientific cooperation,
Dariusz Prokopowicz

Hi everyone,
I have difficulty to find some monetary and financial data for the Eurozone countries. In the IFS database of the IMF and even the WDI database of the World Bank, these data are no longer generally available since the launch of the Zone in 1999-2000.
As far as I am concerned, I'm looking for data such as bank credit, the different monetary aggregates (M2, M3, etc), etc., at a country level.
Please, where could I find these data even on an annual frequency.
Yours sincerely!
What are the pros and cons of having an independent Central Bank which can't be easily influenced by government officials?
Do most countries have an independent Central bank? Why or why not?
How do you assess the processes of globalization of financial and banking systems in the context of the analysis of the sources of the global financial crisis of 2008?
Please reply
Best wishes

The European Central Bank has the possibility to impose on banks penalties for non-compliance with the regulation. In addition, it controls the supervision of smaller banks led by the national supervisory authorities. It has the ability to independently take direct control over any bank in the country which is a member of a banking union. how would you rate these powers in the reform of the banking sector?
Hello,
I make a research regarding the credibility of the European Central Bank and I will like to know your specialized opinion on this subject. Please send me your answer on the following link: http://eurocercetare.wordpress.com/2012/01/26/about-the-credibility-of-the-european-central-bank/
Best regards,
Isabella
The current Euro-zone crisis briefly expresses by ‘too much sovereign debt accumulated within the area that are assumed to be governed by the euro common currency’. Is that OK ? So, if yes, let us recall both the ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ and the ‘Maästricht Convergence Criteria’ pointing on both: (i) budget deficits (i.e. < 3% of national GDP) and (ii) public debts (i.e. <60% of the same national GDP). Or, my question might here be a very multiple one:
(1) At least these two criteria were already written down, as rules in force, at the time the crisis came up – and several Euro-zone member States were failing from respecting them;
(2) So, who (which EU Organism, if not the EBC) was supposed to highlight such a situation even beforehand? And, if yes (if the EBC was the one), why was it different than that? In other words: why was it some member States engaging in the Greek, Irish, Portuguese and Spanish common sovereign debt problem afterwards, and not the EU’s organisms reclaiming the same, as previously?
(3) What about the above two documents? On the one hand, a couple of ‘corrections’ by member-States had come previously to the crisis (to relax some provisions, instead of corrective measures against breaking the pre-existing rules); on the other, nobody currently seems able to judge their scientific validity – complying with the convergence criteria, as properly, might avoid all financial crisis.
(4) Why does the ECB very miss its voice against all (member States’) pressures for “purchasing sovereign debts for the sake of ending this crisis”? Or, the Bank apparently could easy argue like: “how could You All ask me this since You All have broken all written rules so far? You All then modified the same rules, but then broken them once more…”
In my view, once more, there is just one question hiding beyond this above set of questions and it’s the crisis pushing it upwards: (5) To whom does the common currency really belong ? (member States, versus the Union itself).
And when the answer points to the Union, the final question here comes:
(6) Where or which is the Union’s real identity vis-à-vis its member States?
The recent decision of the Federal Constitutional Court regarding the European Central Bank’s OMT program is a reversal of its earlier decision of January 2014.
What are the causes of this dowbacking of the German constitutional court ?
The German court now accepts the authority and the decision by the European Court of Justice on the ECB’s OMT program of 2015. Why?
As the question reads, I would like data on individual investors (households) direct ownership (not through mutual funds, pension funds etc.) across European countries. From this article (see link, section 3) I deduce that such data is available from Eurostat or the European Central Bank, but I have not been able to locate the variables. Any help would be greatly appreciated.
The single supervisory mechanism (SSM) is a new system of banking supervision for Europe, and it comprises the ECB and the national supervisory authorities of the participating countries.
Without forming a national central bank of its own, and thus reestablishing its own currency, how can Greece escape neo-liberal structural adjustment?
Why is the ECB so worried about deflation when a country like Switzerland is experiencing negative inflation together with a healthy rate of economic growth and low unemployment? What makes Switzerland so different?