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  • In my opinion, the location of knowledge in the head or in the brain is a postulate, that is to postulate means "to suggest or accept that to theory or idea is true as a starting point for reasoning or discussion" (Collins). But Basis for Research. To postulate is "to assume to be very or exist; Take for Granted ”(Collins). And I would add to take for granted without any proof, and in any case not demonstrable .
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La plupart des théories de l'apprentissage et de l'enseignement sont basées sur le postulat que la connaissance est dans la tête ou le cerveau. Et si ce n'était pas le cas?
À mon avis, l'emplacement des connaissances dans la tête ou dans le cerveau est un postulat. Un postulat est un « Principe non démontré que l'on accepte et que l'on formule à la base d'une recherche ou d'une théorie » (CNRTL).
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As a rule, scientists are in the learning mode all their lives (however, there are also those who hold tightly to the knowledge gained in their youth). Learning and research are closely linked. Of course, the sense organs play an important role in any activity, including scientific. But how then to explain the phenomenon of Pontryagin (1908-1988), who lost his eyes at the age of 14 and became one of the most significant mathematicians of the 20th century? There was also Hawking, who didn’t have much at all ... I knew blind, deaf, legless and armless (the consequences of what is called “WWII” in the West, but not only) scientists. They were not much different from scientists (mostly only in everyday life), who had a "complete set" of the body. But I did not know a single person who was able to learn and did not have a head. However, sometimes professors are called headless quite complete children ... What about the practice of teaching deaf-blind-mute children (E. Keller, I. A. Sokolyansky, L. S. Vygotsky ...)? Does the author of the question confuse the processing of information and the channels for obtaining it? Not so long ago, I personally made sure that we see not what our eyes show us, it's a long story, the "visible picture" has changed a lot for me. But the world has remained almost the same! Neither I myself (however, this is not a criterion, fools never realize themselves as fools), nor those around me (maybe they don’t want to upset me?), did not notice changes in my ability of learning.
A distant relative of mine, a long time ago, fell and badly injured his head. Medics performed an surgery, removing a large hematoma from his skull. After that, he saw the world ... reversed and on a different scale for his left and right eyes. The scale then changed sequentially and continuously until it leveled off, and the "reversal" continued for about a year, and then visible picture suddenly returned to "normal". But all this time he continued to work on the book (he was a doctor of technical sciences) and in laboratory. He said that he quickly adapted to the inverted and distorted picture, he even read and wrote ... Those parts of his book that he wrote at that time were no smarter or dumber than the rest of the text. Maybe he used his brain...
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Did you know if there is any research about psychodrama (as a psychotherapy) and embodied cognition ?
Thanks for answers
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Here is a paper that might be helpful on psychoanalytic psychodrama and embodiment:
  • Scorolli, C. (2019). Re-enacting the bodily self on stage: Embodied cognition meets psychoanalysis. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, 492. Available online 5 April 2019, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00492
Regards, Keith
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Dear community,
We will conduct an experiment in which participants will learn a manufacturing procedure either with immersive or Desktop Virtual Reality. As a theoretical basis to explain potential differences I have chosen the embodied cognition theory since the ability to interact with gestures in immersive Virtual Reality is one of the biggest differences between the two media.
To quantify this relationship, I would like to measure the level of embodiment/enactment participants feel after either intervention. Are you aware of any standard questionnaires or recommendations to measure embodiment?
Thanks in advance for your help!
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Interesting topic.
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What has changed since this Pezzulo et al Paper?
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One place to get a sense (census?) of things related to the Pezzulo paper is to do a forward literature search: https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=14415125872999652537&as_sdt=400005&sciodt=0,14&hl=en
244 citations in 10 years. You can get a sense of the movement in the field by classifying these citations in various ways.
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Even if behavior was "embodied", wouldn't the brain notice? YES, of course: then the BRAIN would become the better "vehicle" for remembering, thinking, and "time travel" (i.e. prospective memory) -- possible (and possibly trivial) sensori-motor components notwithstanding. [ I am really quite tired of the "embodied" conceptualizations (which have yet to be shown as non-fictions *). See my writings. No one has argued against the views/approaches (content) in these writings NOR accepted/liked/or adopted them (now 1+ years (or 5+ years, depending how you look at it) and counting). ]
* Footnote: All this nonsense is ALL because NO PSYCHOLOGY OUTLOOK (other than my own) "believes in" anything psychological, innately guided, and emerging with ontogeny (which is not tenable). (The idea that learning is literally nearly always "the same" (outside of clearly always being associative in nature) is preposterous (think of a two -year-old and an adolescent -- and imagine any systematic and universal instruction you credibly might posit). P.S. Relatedly : "Culture" does NOT directly impinge on the individual -- the actual Subject and ultimate, but absolutely necessary, unit of analysis &/or explanation (for Biology or for Science). All executive or "meta" processes can NOT be properly shown to be anything but homunculi.)
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Dear Gerry Leisman
NONE of what you say is contrary to what I say. I don't, for my most reasonable position, have to believe there are no connections in/to the greater body, JUST THAT THEY ARE LIKELY TRIVIAL AND NOT ALONE (there are plenty of reasons to believe there are the most significant representations in the brain). Neuroscience as a big help to psychology is unlikely (brain patterns are more sophisticated than we can make sense of -- they are LIKELY as sophisticated AS THE NUANCES OF BEHAVIOR PATTERNS THEMSELVES; and, to wit, I have written essays on this and have most-reasonably argued that you must know the BEHAVIOR __PATTERNS__ very well to know what the more obscure brain indicators may refer to -- and DO THIS for the most part, NOT the other way around.)
Sadly all these BIG BELIEFS in/of embodying "representation" in sensori-motor ways is just because you do not have a belief/presumption/assumption structure to believe what is VERY likely, biologically: THAT THERE ARE SUBTLE, BUT IMPORTANT BIOLOGICAL BEHAVIOR SHIFTS WITH ONTOGENY -- these likely BASIC perceptual shifts, in a significant sense originating FROM THE ORGANISM ITSELF in appropriate environments. You are not stage theorists, which essentially means you cannot see behavior __PATTERNS__ (a very rare term, and when used : not correctly) or anything else of the TRUE BIOLOGICAL NATURE OF BEHAVIOR __PATTERNS__ AND PATTERNINGS OF patterns. And, as you are thus separated from the biology of BEHAVIOR ("just behavior", BEHAVIOR PER SE,) you are separated (needlessly) from science (strict empiricism) itself.
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Among the strongest findings in all of Psychology are on the Memories (the Memory systems and their inter-workings), yet you do not address them AT ALL (_AND_ are wrongly contrary to these findings). There is no chance of you finding any key observable (pivotal) evidence related to a view such as yours -- making your view, again, scientifically unacceptable (see "The Poverty of Embodied Cognition", --
-- also easy to find the FULL TEXT).
It is clear that you are a 'victim' of very inappropriate dualism: here (for one just thing, particularly): the idea of "memory as a separate thing" (just an aspect OF experience).
MOREOVER: I have also clearly shown in my writings that your beliefs are based on central ("founding") 'assumptions'; THESE ARE UNPROVEN AND LIKELY FALSE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS (read ME and learn).
As one first step to properly seeing your "idea system", just realize that by the definitions (found through research) on/of the Memories (those operating together): They comprise OUR EXPERIENCE ITSELF.
This nonsense of yours and some others has got to stop.
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Thank you for your comments and suggestions for further readings.
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I have heard that there is research linking reading to oneself silently to vocal fatigue. I can't find this anywhere. Does anyone know this research? Thanks for your help.
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Thanks, Albert. I’ll do that. That’s really useful. I appreciate your help.
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I am still of the mind that it is possible to have a science of Psychology where the only things studied are behavior patterns and associated environmental aspects. AND: Key to this is finding and having some most-significant, pivotal, foundational BEHAVIOR PATTERNS (DIRECTLY OBSERVABLE OVERT BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS) -- ones which can be seen at least at key times and, at least, at the INCEPTION of any significant new behavior patterns involved in major shifts in cognition and cognitive development. [ (THEN, otherwise, behavior is credibly just altered by simple, relatively easy-to-understand processes -- in particular, the various sorts of associative learning.) ]
My perspective and approach describes in great detail how this can be the case and the major necessary hypotheses are directly testable (verifiable), being verified by finding major yet-to-be-discovered DIRECTLY OBSERVABLE OVERT BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS (when you know how and when to look to find them). These major behavior patterns involve Memories-contextualized "perceptual shifts", with subtle but the clear overt behavior patternings as their aspects -- these, along with environmental aspects, BEING ESSENTIAL PROXIMATE CAUSES of behavior pattern change (not only with the new behavior patterning, but those also importantly at-times affecting already-existing behavior patterns). The major NEW inventions that allow for researching this, and having these phenomenon discovered, are the new eye-tracking technology (and computer-assisted analysis).
This is the way (not yet tried) to keep Psychology as "the science of behavior" [(the "behaviors" of the various sorts seen as important at one time in the history of Psychology or another and, NOW, ALL BEING "admitted" and seen as aspects of behavior)]. Of course the other (ONLY other) key things involved being the "triggering" (or key facilitating) ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS.
Has this definition of Psychology as "the science of behavior" been abandoned or corrupted [ with models by-analogy (e.g with information processing as could be done by a machine); OR phenomenon of uncertain relation to actual most-important behavior (e.g. crude neuroscience); OR by using instead elaborate speculative conceptualizations, which could NEVER have any direct evidence supporting them (e.g. "embodiment" 'theories') ] ? I say: "YES. PSYCHOLOGY, THE SCIENCE OF BEHAVIOR, has been abandoned and corrupted in at least these three ways."
BUT now, with a new perspective and with new ways to detect more subtle behavior patterns, we now CAN RETURN to the classic kind of definition Psychology has had over many decades (with the focus on "behaviors"/environmental factors thought to suffice). My perspective and approach ACTUALIZES this, and in the process eliminates any nature/nurture controversies BY BEING NOT ONLY PSYCHOLOGY IN THE CLASSIC SENSE BUT, at the same time, being the BIOLOGY OF BEHAVIOR -- the biological structure and nature seen in just behavior patterns THEMSELVES.
My "biology of behavior" project :
See especially:
and
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In my opinion, a sense of disappointment towards both neuroscience in general and analysis techniques in particular emerges from your "question".
But I'm really convinced that there is no reason at all to make such considerations.
One of your points seems to be the implementation of "machines" in psychology. Although I agree that the "technical technology" should not be de-humanized, this argument is quite shocking. "Machines" allowed to share, merge, and analyze big data with the same purposes that you can have when studying "classical psychology". To give some examples, graph analysis, advanced statistical modelling, neurofeedback, and further analysis carried by "machines" expanded our knowledge in the field of psychology and on related fields (e.g., neuroscience). Importantly, they OFTEN give straightforward evidence to trust or mistrust (both new and old) theories.
You should really reconsider your approach.
As an analogy, a contemporary biologist should not complain about "the old days of pure naturalism" because naturalism has evolved in contemporary fields of research.
Instead of searching for reasons to force a debate around how the novelty is not good, we should embrace the innovations and opportunities brought by new techniques and by theoretical development.
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Isn't it pure psychoticism to have the most fundamental unit of analysis of a presumed foundational behavior pattern of AN organism INCLUDE MORE THAN ONE ORGANISM'S BEHAVIOR necessarily (or really AT ALL (ever), FOR THAT MATTER)? Yes, yes, yes. YET see the following recent papers INSIST ON such an explanation NECESSARILY (as necessary -- i.e. no other "reasonable" way):
Enactive Mechanistic Explanation of Social Cognition
and
Mechanistic explanation for enactive sociality
They claim 25 years of such just-pure-speculative (and by-now obviously useless) "conceptualizations".
This embarrassing nonsense is what can happen when you do not know or do not examine or analyze your true base/foundational assumptions YET THOSE ARE very poor, baseless, and UNPROVEN AND MOST-LIKELY _NOT_ TRUE (because of inconsistencies with BIOLOGY, as I have clearly indicated in my essays). [ It is desperation for progress with a basic view and approach THAT CANNOT MAKE PROGRESS rationally -- it is desperation in science/"science" . ]
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Since basically the same criticisms hold for "embodied" 'theories', that should be noted here. The follow scathing peer critique holds against both enhancement 'theory' and "Embodied" 'Theories':
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How can you take or recommend a view or approach that will NEVER have any direct evidence?
Embodiment has NO direct evidence for it (OR any direct evidence even clearly related to it) **, and never will: it is worse than bad science:   it is not even science:  see: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303890892_The_poverty_of_embodied_cognition
Article The poverty of embodied cognition (full text at: link.springer.com/article/10.3758/s13423-015-0860-1 Add the https:// yourself, so RG does not hijack the link AND DIRECT YOU TO JUST THE ABSTRACT)
See also my Comments below the Project "declaration" (seen in the very top of this post).
** FOOTNOTE: This is to such an extent, that "embodiment 'theory'" or "enactivism" will technically NEVER be able to present an acceptable [scientific] hypothesis. Good approaches do a LOT of clear hypothesizing.
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Dear Pete Boltuc
No one has been able to SHOW that physics is relevant to psychology, or to much Biology, in general. Just because 2 things exist and are real does not mean they are sensibly relatable (with our 'seeing' and thinking). Even Kuhn recognized that connecting 2 apparently separate sciences requires (minimally) a "bridge"; you seem to have no appreciation for that .
I shall never learn any more physics. I know I do not need it.
All who have tried to connect physics to human behavior have seemed silly, irrational, or insane.
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No.
This notion or belief, and THAT is all it is, no matter what BIG impacts on thinking it has, and no matter what big effects such beliefs have in creating firm limitations on thinking (not even allowing people to think of certain phenomenon). [ In effect such false closures and thinking (and they are there) is a clear sign that something is wrong. ] This all-innate-at-birth-or-in-infancy notion of THE innate factors -- resulting in no real innate guidance thought to come up later in childhood -- and related beliefs (used as "assumptions") is from philosophy and not from ANY good observation and not related good understanding. 'Learning' explanations are given which have NO clearly related direct evidence at all, yet researchers and theorists are satisfied with what they basically just make up (and then attribute to such "self"-functioning of the organism), e.g. the fictions of 'executive' functions and all the "meta's" (a "man" within "the man") OR wild (unsupported and unsupportable) ideas about 'social learning' AND/OR the fictions of literal-supposed "EMBODIMENT" of 'action' giving us our thought -- such pure garbage being a big part of 'explanations'). [
[ Apparently, for higher learning, logic can just pop-up and pop-out when the time/circumstances are right (when earlier learnings have been well-processed); this is apparently where developmental maturation factors ORIGINATE INTERNALLY (!!???), no matter how not-environmentally based the POP-UP logic seems to be in its origin, i.e. NON-EMBEDDED. It is basically hocus-pocus. ]
Old-time philosophers can't "cut it" nowadays.
Because of these 'garbage' beliefs, we cannot differentiate different [levels of] learning -- this resulting in not defining or understanding learning well at all.
So many things work better and are seen in more understandable ways IFF one can see fundamental qualitative shifts in behavioral [response] patterns occurring (even if the beginnings of such behavior pattern changes are kind of simple and caused by seemingly simple CHANGES in VERY basic behavior patterns -- that works!). I am at the point where I basically do not need to listen much to people that think learnings are all basically the same and completely ubiquitous, operating in an "uninterrupted" way. (And, don't talk to me about "social" and "cultural" factors BECAUSE the individual organism clearly remains the "unit of analysis" and center of ALL true understanding -- if there is no account with the individual, there is NO accounting at all.)
Hey, graduate students: if you buy all the "crap", you are "tools".
[ P.S. Note how "innate action patterns" (or anything meaning that) are not even topics here on researchgate. Come on, people ]
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Sorry, important edits and some additions made to the Question 4 hr. after the original posting of the Question.
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Is knowledge related to our being in the world (earth)?
Would we have discovered the phenomenon of gravity?
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Domenico,
There is no question about this. Human life is certainly possible in weightless conditions. Many hundreds of humans have lived and worked in these conditions over the last 50 years.
Gravity would still be an identifiable phenomenon - indeed, in a microgravity environment experiments such as the Cavendish experiment would be even easier to perform!
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As those versed in ecological psychology know well, Gibson's approach was hard externalist and he made no effort to explain the internal neurological process involved in taking action wrt an affordance. So there is an explanatory gap which afaik, remains to be filled. (That is not to say that conventional internalist explanations do not have explanatory gaps :) I'd like to hear perspectives.
(I only put the ? because the robot told me to).
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You are absolutely right. Not only external conditions are important. Very critical functional state of a person, which determines the effectiveness of knowledge. But people often do not pay attention to this "inner" aspect. You are right, the leveling of personalities is unpromising.
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Hi there,
I'm about to contrast a picture description paradigm with a sentence completion paradigm under cognitive load. Can someone recommend a second task to induce this cognitive load which is suitable for both paradigms? What do you think of the Symmetry Span or Operation Span? Are these tasks too complex?
A better description of the tasks is decribed below.
Kind regards,
Sandro Kötter
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as Edward said, before deciding the kind of task to use you need to define several aspects of this task and it also depends on your conception of the resources available for processing (do you consider an energetic or unitary view such as Cowan, or Ellis & ashbrook) or componential models such as Baddeley's WM?
Additionally, do you want to collect data about the loading task? I recommend collecting performance measures for the loading task as you will be able to analyze whether participants have indeed focused on this task.
Do you want to interfere with processing involved in the sentence completion task? In this case, you need to have a task that also requires similar verbal processes, such a verbal load (with digits?), or in other terms that interfere with processing in the phonological loop.
Finally, you may also consider having two groups with different loads: low and high. However, it is better to collect data about the sentence completion task performed in single task situation. 
I often use secondary tasks in my research on writing (Olive, 2004 for example, or Olive 2010 the section on secondary tasks).
Hope this will help
Thierry
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Hi, are you familiar with any new, post-2010 (arbitrarily chosen), references dealing with semantic processing in the left and right hemisphere in healthy people? I am familiar with the "traditional" view that the left hemisphere deals with fine semantic coding by rapid selection of the dominant meaning, while the right h. activates concepts that are interconnected somewhat weaker (Myers, 1999).
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Dear Petar:
You may find some clues in the following articles. A quick way to check them out would be to search for "left" and "right" in each one.
Dehaene, Stanislas; Pegado, Felipe; Braga, Lucía W.; Ventura, Paulo; Nunes Filho, Gilberto; Jobert, Antoinette; Dehaene-Lambertz, Ghislaine; Kolinsky, Régine; Morais, José; Cohen, Laurent
2010 “How learning to read changes the cortical networks for vision and language,” in Science (The American Association for the Advancement of Science), vol. 330, 3 December 2010, pp. 1359-1364 (https://www.academia.edu/5606117/How_Learning_to_Read_Changes_the_Cortical_Networks_for_Vision_and_Language, accessed: 28 April 2017).
Lacey, Simon; Stilla, Randall; Deshpande, Gopikrishna; Zhao, Sinan; Stephens, Careese; McCormick, Kelly; Kemmerer, David; Sathian, K.
2017 “Engagement of the left striate body area during body-part metaphor comprehension,” in Brain and Language (Elsevier), vol. 166, pp. 1-18 (http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0093934X16300694/1-s2.0-S0093934X16300694-main.pdf?_tid=1b7ed1be-c24e-11e6-a1ed-00000aacb360&acdnat=1481755320_eec62dcf1b5fa33175ae96114d012186, accessed: 14 December 2016).
Lacey, Simon; Stilla, Randall; Sathian, K.
2012 “Metaphorically feeling: comprehending textural metaphors activates somatosensory cortex,” in Brain and Language (Elsevier), vol. 120, pp. 416-421 (http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0093934X12000028/1-s2.0-S0093934X12000028-main.pdf?_tid=172d4640-c24e-11e6-9b23-00000aab0f02&acdnat=1481755313_dc23386aaa455b2d6cf988cca04d5ac4, accessed: 14 December 2016).
Peele, Jonathan E.
2012 “The hemispheric lateralization of speech processing depends on what ‘speech’ is: a hierarchical perspective,” in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (Frontiers Media), vol. 6, article 309 (http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fnhum.2012.00309/full, uploaded: 16 November 2012, accessed: 1 July 2017).
Tian, Xing; Poeppel, David
2012 “Mental imagery of speech: linking motor and perceptual systems through internal simulation and estimation,” in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (Frontiers Media), vol. 6, article 314 (http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fnhum.2012.00314/full, uploaded: 28 November 2012, accessed: 1 July 2017).
Tillas, Alex
2016 “Grounding congnition: the role of language in thinking,” in Proceedings of the International Conference “Sensory Motor Concepts in Language and Cognition,” Liane Ströbel, editor, Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf University Press, pp. 193-217 (http://dup.oa.hhu.de/527/1/PilaC_Vol.%201_finale%20Druckdatei%20Inhalt.pdf, accessed: 8 July 2017).
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Does anyone know research that has used word stem completion or word fragment completion tasks to measure (dis)trust and/or paranoia?
Any suggestions are welcome! Thank you.
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Dear researchers. I am looking for papers and publications which explain how media is involved in determining human cognition (e.g. reading direction). Thanks for your help. Max
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Dear RG Colleague Max Bodendorf,
The contemporary subject and identity issues are object of my thesis (Monte-Serrat, 2013). I have studied the implications of materialism and image in the constitution of the subject, since the latter is constituted in enunciation, in the discursive and symbolic play (Lacan 1949; Pêcheux, 1988).So I associate the general and contemporary aspects of the image status with the social and technical dimensions of discourse (effects of meaning between interlocutors in a socio-historical context).
 I suggest you read Lacan 1949 (Mirror stage) and Michel Pêcheux 1975 (Les Verités de la Palice).
I wish you success in your research.
Best regards, 
Dioneia Monte-Serrat
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The definition psychology has for habituation, and its origination is the tendency to have decreased responsiveness to something. For that matter “Something that is new and incredibly exciting can become annoying.” We all have agreed that consciousness forms memories and, vice-versa, memories are a proof of being conscious. 
Therefore, on the one hand, we strive to be conscious and get as many active memories from our lives as we can, and, on the other, we unconscious but ontologically need to get rid of our conscious acts by creating habituations from everything all the time and led all our deeds deep into sub/un-conscious level of our psyche.
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If we talk in a straightforward manner, then the answer is that "habituation as fighting against consciousness and Self conscious". But after all, the process of getting used to, remembering and reproducing information depends also on the functional and specifically psycho-emotional state of a person, the modality and other characteristics of the stimulus, the environment and other factors. Thus, circumstances often change stereotypes.
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In work on stimulus equivalence formation associative pairs of stimuli are learned by one of several possible methods), such as A~B and B~C, where there is an overlap with one stimulus, B, serving in both pairs. In humans, on unreinforced tests, the novel associations BA, CB, AC, and CA can often then be demonstrated,(indicative of the formation of an equivalence class A≡B≡C) but not in other species. I characterise the nature of the relation between A and B, and B and C, in the trained relations, using the symbol "~" but much may depend upon how the participant interprets this relations. If it were interpreted as ">" only the novel association A>C could be derived from the serial relations A>B>C. These may be demonstrations of more complex relations arising from simpler associations, or alternatively that pre-existing "relational frames" that a human already possesses can be used to shape a particular apparently simple association the experimenter presents.
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Dear David,
very intresting question (when reading Jyh's answer I ask myself whether I actually understand the question correctly :)).
Anyway, you might find some hints when following Jan De Houwers work. For instance,:
Mitchell, C. J., De Houwer, J., & Lovibond, P. F. (2009). The propositional nature of human associative learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32(02), 183-198.
On page 190 there is a section called 'Verbal Instructions'. And I also remember attending a talk of his where he was speaking about equivalence and consequence in associative learning.
Although this does not really answer your question how to 'assess' or 'determine' 'how'  the type of instruction influences actual learning, but maybe this is a start :)
Best, René
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Why are we unable to visualize higher dimensional space? Is there any special feature or structure in the visuo-spatial area of our brain that limits our perception of the world in only 3-dimensions?  This is a question for neurobiologists.
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In an embodied cognition perspective, it can also be explained by the fact that all our sensorimotor interactions take place in a 3D space. As a child, we learn about our environment through the coupling between our actions and their sensory consequences. It can be assumed that our higher level cognition (i.e., thinking and imagining) is grounded in these low level sensorimotor contingencies.
In the same line, the following paper proposes that "The emergence of spatial notions does not necessitate the existence of real physical space, but only requires the presence of sensorimotor invariants called 'compensable' sensory changes.". These compensable sensory changes correspond to the changes in our perception that we can compensate by some bodily actions. According to the authors, this could be the key to understanding the notion of space.
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I would like to ask if you know if the affective components modulated by the visualization of affective images of the IAPS could be inhibited by the attentional processes that also underlie some psychophysiological variables like the conductance of the skin or the cardiac rate. That is, could the attentional processes hide the typical affective responses of the IAPS images?
Thank you very much to all
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Great question and I have no answer to offer, but my understanding is that skin conductivity, for example, is always a pretty reliable indicator of arousal, and one that is difficult to actively control for a participant.
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I am conducting a meta-analysis on the effect of facial feedback on emotional experience. I am seeking any unpublished studies, data sets, or “in press” papers that include a manipulation of facial posture (including facial posing, facial expression suppression, and Botox treatment) and self-reported emotional experience.
Please let me know by December 1st whether you have unpublished data you want to share.
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Frances and John, thanks for the leads!
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I develop participatory models and role playing games to understand the drivers of change in tropical landscapes. These games offer players the opportunity to play the role of a logging company or a government department, making decisions that will shape the future landscape - with economic, environmental and social impacts.
In a recent workshop, one of the participants concluded :
"I've known all these things, you read them in the reports. But now, somehow, I understand them, I feel the weight of the economical interests, I understand the complexity of the decisions we face"
This got me thinking - I have known for a while that the models and games I develop tend not to generate new knowledge - colleagues working on the topic for 25 years say - "yes, I know all that". Yet through the process of playing, of embodying the stakeholders they have been studying for years, something seems to happen and the cognition of the participants is changed.
I went looking for explanations of this.
Spinoza defined three forms of Knowledge - opinion, reason and intuition. 
Knowledge of the first kind (Opinion or imagination) can be gained by random exposure or hearsay. But it fails to convey the essence of things, and is the source of confusion and errors.
Reason, or Knowledge of the second kind,  is derived from possessing common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things . 
Intuitive science, the third form of knowledge "advances
from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things"
We know that people tend to form "the illusion of explanatory depth", (Fernbach 2013), which seems to me strikingly similar to Spinoza's first form of knowledge.
Getting back to our games, I think when a layperson is exposed to the complexity of the system ( the game are not simple) they have the opportunity to "shatter their illusion of understanding" and move on to higher levels of understanding.
But what happens when an expert says "Oh, I get it now!'. Would it be that he himself moved from reason ( the knowledge was his already, the figures in the reports he already knew, the causality links he was aware of) to "intuitive science" - where the essence of things is "felt' rather than deduced?
But then, what are the links between these forms of cognitions and Daniel Kahneman's Systems 1&2?
Systems 1 and 2 seem to share common attributes with the third and second forms of Spinoza's knowledge respectively. 
Or is system 1 simply the "opinion and imagination" Spinoza refers to? System 2 seems closely related to Spinoza's reason. But then, what is Spinoza's third form of cognition in Kahneman's system? Is it part of  System1?
Comments, and suggestions for further reading are welcome!
Claude
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Third form for Spinoza is more linked to System 2 because his intuition this is not the intuition described by System 1, but a metaphysical approach of the reason of System 2. If we can say this, it more like a System 2A. 
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Stephen Hawking uses his cheek muscles contractions that are detected by a sensor attached to a branch of his glasses, which can thus select the letters on a virtual keyboard of a tablet which a slider sweeps permanently the alphabet, one by one, then select words using a predictive algorithm since 2001. This system allows him to speak five words per minute and to give classes at the University of Cambridge until 2009. Borrowed and translated from https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Hawking
Various perspectives, such as enactivism, phenomenology, embodied cognition, and so on, postulate that the human being thinks through his body, and not only with his brain. But what about Stephen Hawking phenomenon? His motor skills are so much reduced. My question is: Does Stephen Hawking phenomenon contradicts the premise.
Hawking's motility is indeed very small, but he can communicate with his reduced motor skills and with the help of the infrared sensor, which extends his body. So my question: Does this reduced motility allow him to think or would he be able to think anyway even without any motility. I lean toward the former hypothesis. What is your own opinion?
ADD: my English writing is bad. Just in case, I wanted to say that I lean toward the first hyothesis stating that Stephen Hawking thinks through his reduced motility, and so I don't lean toward the second hypothesis. 
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Domenico:
The important thing, I think, is to keep an open mind, and to be enactively flexible when a new (from a personal perspective) experience challenges what one imagines one "knows."
Luis:
Thanks for the links. On with the search!
Postscript:
Connect the audio output device, turn up the volume, and click here:
Plan B, in case the latter link becomes inactive:
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Recent research of enactive and embodied cognition approach the study of cognition by testing the effects of language upon simple experimental tasks, but in natural conversations, the effect upon behaviour is not obvious in many cases, as the final effect upon behaviour may occur much later in time than the end of the conversation.
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Hi Norman,
I wish there was an easy answer to the question in your title. Hanne de Jaegher and Shaun Gallager make some suggestions in their TICS paper. Apart from that you could look at things like facial mimicry, bodily mimicry, blinks synchrony, movement coordination, etc. But it's difficult territory.
I'm not sure how your explanation relates to the question you pose in your title.
Best regards,
Sebo
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 What instrument have you used to measure self actualization?  I have seen the 12 characteristics of self actualization that Maslow described. Is there any kind of inay runner that tries to capture if people have those characteristics. Or is it more  measuring the experience of self actualization?  How about the concept of phone do you find that sufficiently related to Maslow's original idea of self actualization or is it just one experience of behavioral state that is linked 
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I would avoid the concept of self actualization like the plague--it is unintelligible--what is your purpose?
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Has someone done further research or a conceptual clarification on the "abstract body-model" proposed by Tsakiris, Haggard and Constantini which is proposed in the attached paper ?
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dear Max, i could find the following reference into the bibliography for the thesis of a [very good] Physio working in my Institute [abstract available in PubMed]: I hope this tiny hint may be somehow useful, Mauro C.
Beschin N, Robertson IH. Personal versus extrapersonal neglect: a group study of their dissociation using a reliable clinical test. Cortex 1997;33:379-84.
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Dear Friends on Researchgate,
I am currently working on a paper about metaphors consumers have learned in relation to a particular brand. Generally speaking, metaphors are relevant for people to make sense of the world and bestow meaning onto abstract concepts, like love or a brand. In their well-known Paper, Braun-LaTour et al. (2007) introduce the memory walk to uncover the earliest experiences consumers had with a brand. The transcripts of these early experiences help in uncovering the metaphor consumers have learned in relation to a brand.
Yet I wonder why we as researchers and brand managers should actually care about such metaphors? Is it meaningful to pursue research in this area? Studies on metaphor and embodied cognition seem en vogue at the moment, but in what way are they relevant for the scientific community and practioners? 
I am looking forward to your opinion and arguments.
Best wishes
Jens
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Metaphor is a fundamental aspect of human language.You cannot speak or write or sign without them.
There are thousands of books and research articles that have been produced over thousands of years. If you look into the earliest forms of writing, you will find that metaphor plays a critical role. The transition from hieroglyphs to alphabets or ideograms is based on metaphor. The reputation of people has been measured by metaphors for thousands of years. Kings have the hearts of lions. Gasoline and cereal brands prefer tigers. But for many, the lord is a shepherd and they are his sheep, even if they do have the heart of a lion and put a tiger in their tanks.
If nothing in the existing corpus of literary and scientific studies from ancient Egypt, ancient China, central America, south Asia, or anywhere else that writing systems were invented, up to the most recent analyses doesn't convince you that they are relevant, I can't imagine that there is anything that would convince you that they are relevant.
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Single-unit studies of cortical neurons indicate that memory and knowledge are widely distributed in overlapping and interactive neuronal networks, in accord with associationist and connectionist concepts (reviews below).  The currently most promising methods to study the structure and dynamics of those networks are neuroimaging, electrophysiology and neurocomputation during behavioral tasks or states that provide operational definitions of cognitive functions (attention, perception, memory retrieval, working memory, action planning, decision-making, etc.).  Those methods have certain limitations, however.  Neuroimaging has limited temporal resolution and cannot easily disambiguate structure (content) from function and excitation from inhibition.  Electrical signals may be simply epiphenomena and do not reveal the “code” or mechanisms of neural transactions within and between networks.  Computational models and algorithms of neural activity generally ignore the probabilistic (e.g., Bayesian) nature of network operations in language and behavior.
            Those limitations are not insurmountable, however. This post is an appeal for suggestions to refine, or perhaps combine, those methods to yield reliable data on cognitive networks while, at the same time, avoiding any “network phrenology.”
References:
J.M. Fuster - Cortex and memory: emergence of a new paradigm. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21:2047-2072, 2009.
J.M. Fuster and S.L. Bressler – Cognit activation: a mechanism enabling temporal integration in working memory.  Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16:207-218, 2012.
S. Haykin and J.M. Fuster - On cognitive dynamic systems: cognitive neuroscience and engineering learning from each other. Proceedings of the IEEE, 102:608-627, 2014.
S.E. Petersen and O. Sporns – Brain networks and cognitive architecture.  Neuron, 88:207-219, 2015.
J.L. Vincent et al. - Intrinsic functional architecture in the anesthetized monkey brain. Nature, 447, 83-86, 2007.
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Dear Fuster,
First of all, I would like to say I am a great fellow of your work, that inspire some of mine. Second, thank you for sharing your thoughts with the scientific community. I think this channel could be a good path to promote scientific discussion, and provide a wonderful tool to young and novel scientists as me to get in contact with great scientists as you. 
Regarding your post, I have to admit the challenges that scientific community is facing to measure brain dynamic and structure with an unique neuroimaging technic/algorithm with a high temporal and spatial resolution at the same time. 
For instance, fMRI and fNIRS is an indirect measured (BOLD) of brain activity, because they just measure the cerebral vascular tissue consumption, and not the Cerebral Metabolic Oxygen Rate (CMOR2). Besides, the increased oxygen transported to the brain area typically exceeds the local CMOR21,2. So, it is even more complicated, because we "fail" to have an accurate measured of brain structure, dynamics and activity in a single, reliable and valid technic/algorithm.
However, there are promising technics and methods that can be developed to overcome these amazing challenges:
1. Best in Temporal Resolution: MAGNETOENCEPHALOGRAPHY
2. Best Spatial Resolution: fMRI/DTI
3. Best Forthcoming Neuroimaging Technic: Optogenetic (as soon as we can apply this technic on human, we could sort out the methodological limitations we are facing today).
4. An algorithm that I like to measure the dynamics of brain networks is dynamic functional network connectivity (d-FNC).
5. One important advance in neuroscience would be to develop the measured by fNIRS of the cytochrome c oxidase (Cyt-Ox). It is the last enzyme in the respiratory electron transport chain of mitochondria or bacteria located in the mitochondrial or bacterial membrane. So, with this enzyme we could have a directed measured of CMOR2, and fNIRS enables its detection.
6. Nanotechnology and Neuroimaging  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23514423 
Summarizing, I think we are living in amazing time that would be revolutionized in the next years by the synergies of basic science (neuroscience, materials, energy, quantum) + information technology + engineering + market3.
Best,
References
1.Fox, P.T., Raichle, M.E., Mintun, M.A. & Dence, C. (1988). Nonoxidative glucose
consumption during focal physiologic neural activity. Science, Vol. 241, No. 4864,
(July 1988), pp. 462-4, ISSN 1095-9203.
2. Lin, A.L., Fox, P. T., Yang, Y., Lu, H., Tan, L.H. & Gao, J.H. (2008). Evaluation of MRI models in the measurement of CMRO2 and its relationship with CBF. Magnetic resonance in medical sciences, Vol. 60, No. 2, (August 2008), pp. 380-9, ISSN 1880-2206.
3. Alivisatos et al., Nanotools for neuroscience and brain activity mapping. (2013). ACS Nano, 7(3), 1850-66. doi: 10.1021/nn4012847.
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As we trundle along through our life's pursuits, there are causal forces at work that determine our future thoughts and actions.
Given some of the work that highlights the central role of exploratory movement for perception (that we act to detect information about the environment), it is possible that these constraints from the past determine solely our behavioral patterns, which in turn constrain the aspects of the environment that we perceive.
The case can also be made that past experience determines our interpretations of sensory stimulation and thus the actions engaged to select those sensations (following along the lines of Helmholtz' theory of unconscious inference). Of course both of these hypotheses may also be false!
Does past experience affect
1. Our cognition (thoughts, ideas, beliefs, etc.)
2. Our actions (which in turn determine the aspects of the environment we attend)
3. Both our actions and cognition
(a). Independent of each other
(b). Interdependently or cyclically
4. ...something else
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Dear Brandon,
            Yours is perhaps the most important question in the neurobiology of behavior.  I have dealt with it extensively in my research and in numerous writings; it is at the very center of the cognitive neuroscience of the cerebral cortex.  Here I will answer it as succinctly and critically as I possibly can, trying not to sound simplistic or sententious.  Almost all your tentative assumptions are basically correct and compatible with one another and with my answer below. Let me attempt to qualify them a bit and to support them with a few brain facts.
            Indeed, Helmholtz was right.  We remember what we perceive, and we perceive—intuitively or unconsciously--what we remember.  This is increasingly apparent to cognitive neuroscientists if we adhere to the empirical facts and put consciousness in its proper place, that is, by accepting that it is not essential to neural mechanisms but an epiphenomenon of them.  Most cognition is totally unconscious.  In any case, my argument here is centered precisely on a conjecture that you almost inconspicuously pose as a question: actions and cognition are interdependent cyclically.
1.  In the course of goal-directed behavior, the neural mechanisms that adapt the organism to its world in pursuit of the goal are cyclic, embedded in what I call the “perception-action (PA) cycle.” This is the biocybernetic cycle--with sensors, effectors, feed-forward and feedback--that from moment to moment adjusts the organism to the environment in pursuit of the goal.  Briefly, in the course of that pursuit, a given sensory stimulus comes through the senses, is analyzed in posterior (perceptual) cortex, and informs a new or corrective action in frontal (executive) cortex; that action will produce sensory changes in the environment, which will inform new or corrective action, and so on and so forth until the goal is reached.  In essence, therefore the PA cycle runs successively through the environment, through perceptual cortex, through frontal executive cortex, and back to the environment.
2.  The processing through posterior and frontal cortex will be carried out by neuronal networks (“cognits”) representing memory or knowledge (semantic memory) acquired by prior experience. Thus the actions will be informed, every step of the way, by updating or correcting prior assumptions about the world in a probabilistic—Bayesian—manner. That internal information (knowledge and memory) is hierarchically organized, from sensory and motor cortex at the bottom, for specific sensory and motor representation, to association cortex at the top, for representation and processing of sensory input information in the context of the past experience of the individual. Both large sectors of cortex, perceptual and executive, are structurally and dynamically interconnected.  The same is true for the cortices of both hemispheres.
3.  Most important in the human, where PA cycles are long, is that the frontal—executive—cortex possesses mechanisms that anticipate, and prepare for, actions and percepts.  Before a cycle is completed, these mechanisms pre-adapt the organism for anticipated change.  Thus the prefrontal cortex, which is the “vanguard” of evolution and of individual development (ontogeny), has both predictive and preadaptive properties that are unique to the human.  The human prefrontal cortex is eminently endowed for prediction and preadaptation, thus priming and to some extent “short-cutting” the PA cycle.  That cortex does this in cooperation with other brain structures, by engaging them in several prospective cognitive functions, prominently among them:  planning, attentive set, working memory and decision-making.  All suffer, to one degree or another, from injuries of the dorsal and lateral prefrontal cortex.
            I think this, although heavily abstracted, is plenty for this post.  I hope you will find it helpful.
Cheers, Joaquín
 References:
 JM Fuster - Cortex and Mind: Unifying Cognition. Oxford, 2003.
   JM Fuster and SL Bressler – Past makes future: Role of pFC in prediction.  J. Cognit. Neuroscience, 27: 639-654, 2015.
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I try some works giving effect to the theory of Embodied Cognition through practical examples and methods have already been tested in schools.
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8/25/15
I use John Hattie's, Visible Learning for Teachers (2012) to begin research like this.  Also, Robert Marzano has excellent books and research.
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In the Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition (https://www.routledge.com/products/9780415623612), Shaun Gallagher draws interesting comparisons between phenomenology and embodied cognition. Might anyone know similar or not so direct accounts that deal with this topic? Also personal opinions of this topic are appreciated. Thanks!
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You should check out the book "The Embodied Mind" (1992) by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch. The second chapter provides a historical revision of phenomenology and how it relates to cognitive science in general and to embodied cognition in particular. Also, check out Alva Nöe´s work, in particular his book "Out of our Heads"(2010) for an interesting and easy read on the subject. 
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As a psychotherapist I am interested in research on embodied, situated, grounded cognition. Hickoks critique of these approaches seems to be sound. Since I am not an expert in the field of neuropsychology I would like to know if there are arguments to question his position. How do the protagonists of embodied cognition object to his arguments?
Thanks for your ideas, Michael
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I BELIEVE DR. ELKONON GOLDBERG, A WELL RENOWNED PERSON IN THE AREA OF THE HISTORY OF FRONTAL LOBE FUNCTIONING AND RESEARCH, HAS A USEFUL OPINION ON THIS; HE CAN BE REACHED AT EGNEUROCOG@AOL.COM, AND IF POSSIBLE, I WOULD LIKE TO INVITE HIM TO RESEARCH GATE. LK - CAPS FOR ME - NOT YOU!
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I am searching for a neuropsychological task on mental rotation that directly compares abilities in rotating abstract shapes and/or letters with rotating body-parts (e.g., hands or whole-bodies). Ideally the task is applicable in clinical practice.
On a sidenote, can anyone provide me with a version of the hand-laterality judgment task?
Thanks in advance,
Andreas
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I have used a task of right-left orientation clinically for many years that I developed based on a British test using schematic human figures in four different orientations, half inverted, half upright, facing either forward or backward and holding a "large blue ball" in one hand only.  This task requires mental rotation and is described in my article in Developmental Neuropsychology, which I've attached in case it may prove of interest to you and your work.  Tom Snyder. 
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In the past five years, many theorists of Cognitive Science noticed that the Embodied Cognition Theory as a new theoretical model did not have embodied research methods. It was argued that the methods that use language or objective observation (laboratory experiments) were not sufficient to assess the nature of the embodied experience. Is there some embodied method to overcome the classical cognitive science methodology? Does this have to do with a return to philosophical Phenomenology? How do we reconcile phenomenological experience with a cognitive science that aims to create explanatory models in objective terms?
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Dear Louis Brassard:
1) I think there is a great deal of truth to the view that embodied cognition isn’t a theory, namely because of the disparate origins for the disparate ways in which different scientists believe cognition to be embodied. That said, I wouldn’t really call it a sub-movement, because I don’t think there is any movement that it is subordinate to. Within cognitive linguistics, research on and development of the ways in which cognition is embodied date back to the 80s and in particular with the groundbreaking book by Lakoff Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (which, despite being published 7 years after his co-authored Metaphors We Live by, was far more influential, specific, and clearly situated within an embodied view of cognition). Around that time another linguist, Ronald Langacker, was also developing a theory of language that incorporated embodiment, as were other “founders” of the umbrella framework of cognitive linguistics.  Meanwhile, psychologists like Eleanor Rosch were looking at cognition more generally and in terms of dissatisfaction with the reigning paradigm within cognitive science. Perhaps THE groundbreaking publication from psychology on embodiment is Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s The Embodied Mind (1991).  A few years later two other important works from other fields emerged: Thelen & Smith’s 1994 The Development of Cognition in Action (which, in addition to being an early work on embodied cognition from developmental psychology was also one of the earliest uses of a dynamical systems approach within psychology) & Hutchins’ 1995 Cognition in the Wild (a cognitive anthropology perspective). Finally, just before the 21st century, yet another line of inquiry, this time from robotics and AI, contributed to the development of the now disparate but large body of evidence supporting embodied cognition: Brooks’ Cambrian Intelligence. This is not by any means intended to be an exhaustive list of the fields or researchers who independently contributed to EC, but rather to emphasize that there was no movement that this research can be seen as a sub-movement of.
2) Although there is no single, cohesive EC theory that would satisfy all those who consider EC to be true, there are a number of widely shared core components. While I think your first description (if I am interpreting it aright) is fair, I am not sure about the second. EC proponents can and do believe that the world is understood through representations in the brain, and the nervous system is largely irrelevant to EC theories excepting in the ways already covered in your first characterization.
3) “There is nothing new under the sun.” It’s true that EC was not some wholly new paradigm (or set of paradigms) nor that the general idea was new. However, there was a great deal of novelty to the work and findings of the early developers of EC. In fact, Lackoff’s book mentioned above spends a fair amount of time on how traditional philosophy led to an understanding of categorization mostly rooted in Platonic philosophy. He cites Rosch’s work on prototype theory among other evidence that categorization is both fundamental to cognition, is not at all some modern cognitive science version of Plato’s Forms, and is embodied. Additionally, much of early EC research could not have existed except as a response to more mainstream theories/approaches. Had early cognitive scientists not posited that the brain is just another symbol processing machine and the symbols arbitrary, meaningless, and amodal, and had Chomskyan linguistics not provided the best ways in which to show this to be true only to fail repeatedly, we would likely not have seen linguists seeking better theories that led to cognitive linguistics, the re-introduction of neural networks in the connectionist program  that allowed cognitive psychologists to abandon the algorithms along with the “mind as computer” metaphor and look for other ways in which the brain might work. Of extreme importance was the idea that cognition wasn’t amodal but grounded in sensory modalities. Whatever parallels between EC and older philosophy exist, the idea that cognition is modal-specific or multimodal isn’t one of them.
4) Kant utterly rejected key components of EC. The fact that he distinguished between knowledge that required sensory experience or justification vs. that which didn’t is nothing like EC. It was Husserl, not Kant, who first tied conceptualization, categorization, and cognition all to perception. As for Piaget, one of the most important developments in developmental cognition was when Baillargeon thought to question Piaget’s mostly anecdotal evidence for object permanence. She demonstrated that infants did understand object permanence by developing a way to test whether or not Piaget’s conclusion was based upon his failure to take into account the limited motor skills infants had. Just because earlier philosophers and scientists connected bodily experience to cognition doesn’t mean they were fore-runners to modern EC. Piaget’s theories were largely wrong because he had used motor and perceptual capabilities as metrics to test what were very abstract, non-embodied stages of cognitive development. EC proponents do the reverse: they start with the abstract and test whether and how it may be rooted in sensorimotor experience/perception.
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From Jeannerod (2001): "...because all aspects of action appear to be involved during S-states, it seems a logical consequence of this rehearsal of the corresponding brain structures, and specifically the motor structures, that the subsequent execution will be facilitated. The presence of activity in the motor system during S-states would put the action representation in a true motor format, so that it would be regarded by the motor system as a real action. This facilitation would explain various forms of training (e.g., mental training) and learning (e.g., ob- servational learning) which occur during S-states (see Pascual-Leone et al., 1995). (p. S. 108).
What aspects of the model provide explanatory value for the phenomenon of mental practice? If Jeannerod (1994, 2001, 2006) suggests that there is an overlap between overt (executed) action and covert (simulated) action, what degree of overlap would either support or reject simulation theory?
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A marginal, peripheric aspect of the question ////  Focusing exclusively on the new, complex motor patterns.
In complex new motor patterns, it is impossible any overlap between overt action and covert (imitated) action. In any complex motor pattern (or, in Luria's  terminology, 'cinetic melody'), movement n must be modulated by the movement n+1. But when the pattern is new for the imitator, this modulation is impossible, since the learner/imitator does not know the following movement. Thus, the premotor planning of the entire pattern must be made with some degree of delay (i.e., without overlapping)
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In methodological, instrumental and operational therms, on what the Design Research becomes different ?
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Alessandro I can give you one surprisingly concrete example of this. It dates from about ten years ago when I was doing some research, later published in my book design in mind, on famous architects. In this case Santiago Calatrava. I visited him over several days in his office in Zurich and one day as I went into his room he was standing on tip toe and leaning forward until he started to fall with hands and arms stretched out in front of him. He was designing a diving board for a swimming pool and wanted to feel how the forces were distributed through his body. He told me that he often imagined how the human body would be configured to withstand forces in a structure. If you look in my book you can see examples of him drawing this particularly in the design of his New York cathedral scheme.
do give my regards to Alice and Fernando Pereira.
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Varela's neurophenomenology aims to marry modern cognitive science with Husserlian methods of phenomenological investigation. What is Varela's take on issues pertaining to the 'ego' or even the 'transcendental ego'? Is there any extended text addressing this issue? Could you please, if possible, provide details of these relevant texts?
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Dear Tom, I quote autopiesis and cognition (intro, pg. VX): 
"try to correlate the activity of the retina with the color experience of the world"....
"the new approach required us to treat seriously the activity of the nervous system as determined by the nervous system itself, and not by the external world; thus the external world would only have a triggering role in the release of the internally-determined activity of the nervous system".  
the ominiuos thing is that they not even quote them, the empiriocriticists!
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In Before and Beyond Representation, Lambros Malafouris’ proposes that enactive mark-making bootstrapped the Paleolithic mind into representation, both internal and external, This allows that representation may not be an innate capability, but a property of human culture, propagated via cultural training.What evidence do we have, ie in developmental psychology or anthropology or neurology, that internal representation is either innate or learned?
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I didn't have time to read fully this manysided thread, but perhaps I may add my argument whý there are no "inner" representations (from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/226206085_The_theory_of_the_organism-environment_system_II._Significance_of_nervous_activity_in_the_organism-environment_system?ev=prf_pub): 
According to the theory of the organism-environment system, the basic principle of nervous functioning is not that of information processing, but creation of such constellations of neurons which - joined to the other parts of the body and environment - may achieve behavioral results which are useful for the metabolism of neurons and through this for the whole organism. The neurons are in many ways the most sensitive cells in the body and their large-scale destruction leads necessarily to the restriction of the action possibilities of the whole organism.
From this point of view it is clear that neurons do not create maps of the environment, inner models or representations which would somehow correspond to homuncular perceptions. Such reproduction of the properties of the environment in the nervous system is simply not important from the point of view of appropriate behavior, and must be assumed only if the starting point of the theory of nervous functioning is based on the absolute separation of the organism and the environment.
The necessary condition for forming systems leading to useful results is not from the systemic point of view that nervous organization should reproduce the organization of the environment as some sort of representation or model. The only essential is that a system may be formed in which elements belonging both to the body and to the environment are fitted together. The structure of the body, of course, "reflects" the structure of the environment in the sense that by inspection of the bodily structure we may also conclude something about the possible structure of the environment. When looking at the body of an organism we may speculate on what kind of environment would be appropriate. The study of the organism is simultaneously the study of the environment.
Let’s make our point clear with one further example. The system for cutting wood consists of a saw and a tree. In order to have a well-functioning system the properties of the saw and those of the tree should not be the same, but rather different in the way which makes a result possible. In a system consisting of two sets of elements one set need not to reproduce the properties of the other in order to create, as a whole, a functioning system. On the contrary, to have a good system for cutting the saw must be hard and the tree soft, otherwise the system will not function properly. The structure of the saw reflects in some sense the structure of the wood, but only from the point of view of the result (cutting).
If we think that the nervous system must somehow reproduce or represent the organization of the environment this would mean that the representations in the nervous system would always lag behind the events in the environment. However, if we think that the essential feature in nervous functioning is its fit with the environment this means that the environment and the nervous system have the same time. Perception, for example, is simultaneous with the object of perception in the environment. This means also that a stimulus does not precede perception, but perception is a process in which the fit of neural elements with the environmental events defines the stimulus. Therefore, reaction time is not the time for the processing of the stimulus, but the time for organizing the result
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Rizzolatti and colleagues (1987) discuss their idea that the movement of attention has processing limitations due to how the oculomotor system is organized. They believe overt and covert orienting of attention are the consequence of how eye movements are programmed in the brain.  In Posner's cueing task, there is an attentional cost to shift attention to a invalidly cued area. Rizzolatti and colleagues (1987) used a similar cuing paradigm that showed longer latencies for invalidly cued locations across the vertical or horizontal meridians of the visual field, termed the 'meridian effect'. So, is this idea that shifts of attention are linked to oculomotor programming in the brain rather than a separate volitional mechanism of controlling attention part of the embodied cognition literature?
Rizzolatti, G., Riggio, L., Dascola, I., & Umiltá, C. (1987). Reorienting Attention across the Horizontal and Vertical Meridians: Evidence in Favor of a Premotor Theory of Attention. Neuropsychologia, 25(1A), 31–40.
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Dear Jenn,
IMO these kinds of findings definitely belong to the EC literature.
Perhaps more interesting however is to see how different EC 'strands' judge this finding. Sorry for my long answer I always try to be short.. and fail.
EC people with a background in 'standard', naturalistic, empirical science (cognitive neuroscience, mostly) would probably think this to be a nice illustration of how the physical properties of the *physical body* (physical-mechanical constraints) directly impact 'the way we think' (in a non-trivial way). Hence, cognition is embodied. It could help to argue against 'functionalism', the classic idea that the *implementation* of a cognitive process in a physical machine (the brain) is in some way 'trivial', one can always design another physical machine that does the same cognitive thing, and so the 'embodiment' of cognition (the fact that it is realized by a body and brain) is not what really matters to cognition. Rizzollati could counter functionalism saying that  the physical embodiment directly impacts cognitive content. There are 'in between' arguments within this group of people: Andy Clark is a strong proponent of the idea that physical constraints of the body can become part of the cognitive system (see his Being There book) but at the same time still holds on to functionalism (See a paper called "Pressing the Flesh..  ..")
Another strand in EC literature has roots in phenomenology. Phenomenologists, I guess, would be less enthousiastic about this finding as such: what does it really say? In their view talking about embodiment has nothing directly to do with the "physical machine that is our body", embodiment concerns our 'lived body', the sphere of interactivity that is defined by our action-perception couplings. Mistaking the lived body for the physical body is precisely what science (including cognitive science) did wrong. Even 'the world' is 'enacted' through our 'being in the world' and this entanglement of mind-body-world is what embodiment is all about. I guess when it comes to analysing the embodiment of our 'being' they are generally indifferent to empirical findings from the sciences. At the same time, Merleau-Ponty does continously refer to neurological cases to guide his analysis.
Then there's a group of modern philosophers who explicitly try to reconcile naturalism/science with phenomenology. I guess Noe and Evan Thompson are part of that group. I am curious to know how they can account for the strategy of taking empirical facts on brains to be a proof for a phenomenological insight, or the reverse. If you have ideas on this let me know thanks!
Then there is the ecological psychologists, followers of James Gibson. Gibson had no interest in phenomenology, to my knowledge, but his ideas on affordances and perception-action couplings are often used to explain or make concrete ideas put forward in phenomenological analysis (I just did so myself I realize, see also the work of Rietveld). Their theories however are in some way more 'physics' than 'psychology', and in any case strongly anti-cognitivistic/anti-mentalistic and often very mathemetical, and in that sense I should think that the Rizzolati findings could be of interest to the ecological psychologists. The point is just that they would need to understand the finding more specifically in terms of what it means for their theories of perception-action coupling in order to make the finding interesting. They would regard the superficial and less informative claim that 'because' there is a correlation between eye-mechanics and attention, therefore cognition 'is embodied', with the same kind of indifference as the phenomenologists.
What do you think?
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Using a standard histogram doesn't provide much information on which colors a human beholder would recognize. Are there any open/ free algorithms to evaluate the amount of, say, ten basic colors in any given RGB computer image?
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> I wonder if there are different approaches that at least come closer to our everyday perception
As Tonto said "who's 'we', white man?" (Its a joke about the Lone Ranger - may be culturally specific:) 
Its culturally determined.There are numerous popular examples. In Chinese there is no word for brown.'Brown' cows are red' The famous river is 'yellow'.  The ancient Greeks had no concept of 'blue'. Homer referred to a 'wine dark sea'. There is a story of Vygotsky doing research in Uzbekistan where his subjects adamantly argued that two browns were completely different because one was the color of pigshit and the other was the color of bread.
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Damasio et al. propose that somatic markers (feedback signals representing homoeostatic and other bodily states) play a pivotal role in our decision-making processes. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) is identified as the cerebral module of most relevance to the somatic system. Emotions are understood by SMH advocates as the feeling of the bodily states reported by the markers. Sufferers of damage to the VMPFC have consistently demonstrated anomalous emotional dispositions accompanied by poor decision making (both time-costly and poor outcomes), in the absence of further detrament (no loss of iq, working memory...). The role of emotions in decision making is proposed to be that of restricting the options put up for conscious consideration, based on biasing signals from the body. There is here a suggesting of tacit learning by the body, prior to conscious knowledge. (See the Iowa gambling task)
Smith and Elsworth (1985) and apparently others since then have identified six "cognitive appraisal dimensions" that can help distinguish emotions. Certainty, pleasantness, attentional activity, control, anticipated effort, and responsibility are all features of appraisal patterns underlying distinct emotions, and helping to define them.
Thus, we may find that certain emotions such as happiness and anger may share more relevant features than two emotions of the same valence (positive/negative). Since happiness and anger both construe appraisals of certainty and a sense of individual control over the situation, such cognitive dimensions might play a bigger part in determining the nature of the decisions made than the simple positive/negative valence distinction alone.
Do such considerations necessary undercut the Somatic Marker Hypothesis? Is there room for it to accept such dimensions to our emotions, without selling itself short?
Many thanks
Adam
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Dear Adam, there is no evidence for somatic states directly influencing appraisal. The influence should be by means of brain systems. The problem is that functional anatomical hypotheses as the involvement of ventromedial PFC in appraisal do not distinguish between a brain system that instantiates the somatic feeling and a brain system that makes the cognitive appraisal. This kind of distinction is made in the attached paper that proposes that the neuronal network makes the cognitive job and the astroglial network instantiates feelings.
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Language processing is probably neither wholly symbolic (cf. Tulving, 1984) nor wholly embodied (cf. Barsalou, 1999). Rather, on recent proposals, both cognitive systems would play a role (cf. Louwerse 2007; Mahon & Caramazza 2008).
In regard to possible modulators behind each system, evidence has suggested a dependence on task and stimuli, as far as I know. Now, on a further step, I intend to find out just when either symbol system will 'kick in.' 
I would appreciate any suggestions of relevant literature, as well as your own ideas. 
Thanks in advance,
Pablo
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  • Barsalou, L. W. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22. 577–660.
  • Louwerse, M. M. (2007). Symbolic or embodied representations: A case for symbol interdependency. In Landauer, McNamara, Dennis & Kintsch (eds.). Handbook of latent semantic analysis 107–120. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
  • Mahon, B. Z., & Caramazza, A. (2008). A critical look at the embodied cognition hypothesis and a new proposal for grounding conceptual content. Journal of Physiology - Paris 102. 59–70.
  • Tulving, E. (1984). Precis of Elements of Episodic Memory. Behavioural and Brain Sciences 7 (2): 223–68.
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Take a look at my colleague/friend Ho Ming's recent paper:
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I am researching on the distinction between manner-in-verb languages (e.g., English and German) and path-in-verb languages (e.g., Spanish and Greek). This issue has been researched extensively, both theoretically -- esp. by Dan Slobin -- and empirically -- e.g. by Lera Boroditsky and Anna Papafragou, with diverging results.
In relation to other areas in the battlefield of linguistic relativity (e.g., colour or gender categorization), the topic of motion seems to be the hardest 'nut to crack,' with research shedding totally opposite results. Now, I can think of two reasons for that, namely
(1) it is still unclear what speakers really focus on in their general attention to the world, as biased by their language. That is, where most research seems to indicate that we'll focus on what's encoded in our own language, there are also indications of the opposite (i.e. Papafragou, Hulbert & Trueswell 2008: 'participants spontaneously studied those aspects of the scene that their language does not routinely encode in verbs').
and (2) so-called manner-in-verb languages actually tend to encode path information with great frequency and detail (albeit as a satellite to the verb, e.g. the leaf floated OUT OF THE CAVE AND RIGHT INTO THE HOLE ON THE DRIFTING LOG), such that the language-specific dichotomy is a little blurry.
I would highly appreciate any opinions on these issues. Also, would you please direct me towards any recent publications of relevance (other than Gumperz&Levinson 1999, Boroditsky and Papafragou)? Thank you so much.
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Good! :)
looking forward...
Renata
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What is the role of gut feelings, nervous system, or the body in attention? Is it connected with bodily loops between the brain and the non-neural body? What does phenomenology say about it?
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Jakub,
"To what extent is attention (either conscious or unconscious) shaped and influenced by the embodied nature of our minds?
What is the role of gut feelings, nervous system, or the body in attention? Is it connected with bodily loops between the brain and the non-neural body? What does phenomenology say about it?"
These are interesting questions, and like so many in this territory, they query the concepts they deploy: ie what do you mean by 'attention'? Whose disciplinary vocabulary are you subscribing to? To foreground attention seems to imply that the 'brain events' are served by 'body events'. This, in my mind, is dubious reasoning charateristic of an internalist notion of mind - as if the body exists for the use of the brain. This seem backwards to me. If you take an autopoietic/evolutionary perspective, brain-body separation - in terms of control or heirarchy - seems silly. Its like asking why an octopus has tentacles.
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No doubt, the spatial character of count nouns and perfective verbs stems from boundary detection. But, the perceptual process responsible for distinguishing count and mass nouns, as well as perfective and imperfective verbs, is not spatial in the (top-down) sense of being near or far away, as Langacker suggests, but spatial perception in the sense of spatial versus temporal presence.
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I would suggest that the issue is a bit more complex. A closer examination of construal level theory (CLT) indicates that the issues are not as discrete as they may seem initially. Langacker (2012) and several scholars (e.g., Alony, 2006; Fauconnier & Turner (2008); Liberman et al., 2007) have recognized the cognitive interrelation of space, time, social distance, and degree of probability. Indeed, we see discussions of this interrelation as early as Lakoff & Johnson (1980). In these accounts, there is no difference with regard to cognitive processing across the four dimensions. Bar-Anan, Liberman, Trope, & Algom (2007) used a modified Stroop test as a way of confirmation.
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As far as I have been able to determine, in general, psychologists in the U.S. operate on the belief that blood flow, neuron development and other biological outcomes of increased blood flow to the brain explain why exercise is linked to higher academic performance/intelligence. Yet embodied cognition goes further, not denying the effects of blood flow, rather emphasizing the role of receptors throughout the body that utilize sensations from one's immediate physical environment to learn about the world, and possibly far more.
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The embodied cognitive perspective came about partly in response to the "brain as a computer" metaphor. One way to think of the distinction concerns what mental representations represent. The brain as a computer thinks of mental representations as abstract symbols, much like how a computer operates on binary representations that can, if complex enough, encode virtually anything. These abstract symbols are completely divorced from what it is that they represent, in the same way that there is nothing tying together words, like "DOG" from what it is that they represent (i.e., actual dogs) -- there is nothing about the visual symbols that constitute the English word for dog that suggests what it represents, and consequently, other languages have their own, equally valid word for 'dog'.
The embodied perspective, on the other hand, argues (depending how far you want to take it) that our mental representations are tied to what it is that they represent by virtue of how these representations entered the mind (i.e., through whatever apparatus our bodies provide). Thus, a mental representation of 'dog', at whatever level of abstraction, is rooted in the fact that we see, hear and touch dogs. Thus an embodied representation of 'dog' is tied to how we have experienced dogs via our bodies.
See early debates between Pylyshyn (non-embodied) and Paivio (embodied: dual-coding) and more recent work by Markman (non-embodied) and Barsalou (embodied: perceptual symbol system). I also have a recent paper (McNorgan, 2012) that discusses the plausibility of assumptions underlying the embodied perspective.
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The study of our mind as complex system implies the understanding of cognition in terms of socially organized phenomena. Similarly we need to observe our behavior as network of interactions, emotionally and mutually connected. Consequently in the context of educational processes we must extend the paradigm of science as shared reflection. In this perspective it's essential reconsider the qualitative aspects of educational relationship within the framework of scientific research.
Inside of debate we find keywords like mediation, communication, sharing, empathy, exchange, participation, embodiment.
What are the guidelines that we can create and share how research opportunities?
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Dear Afaq Ahmad,
Basically we could rephrase the question in the following way:
What contribution can give pedagogical reflection in the light of its experience in educational context, to further developments in scientific research, and vice versa, which methodological aid or which new perspective of formative design it can come from the neuroscience studies?
What are the actual margins of interaction between fields of study and research so apparently distant among them?
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We think about machine learning and cognitive computing. We are designing neurosynaptic machine interfaces. Famous psychologist 'Vygotsky' says: "External world models a mind". Can we measure / quantify the influence of social context on a cognitive computer?
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The mind (or brain) models the external world in some sense. This includes ontological models of the physical world, as well as the linguistic, social, ethical and cultural environment.
In fact, children do not in general know whether what they are learning is universal physical law, natural science fact, linguistic convention or cultural norm (see the writings of Piaget and work in Psycholinguistics). Learning about gravity, solid objects and hard knocks, the (positive and negative) information for learning comes from the physical world. Learning about fruit is a mix about learning about properties that mix the physical (Galileo and Newton could use apples as solid objects to learn about gravity), with the chemical and biological (what an apple or orange tastes like, that it is good to eat, that it is juicy), with the cultural (that we eat them in specific ways, that we can juice them in specific ways, that we eat them differently from each other or a grapefruit), with the linguistic (what words and grammar we use in association with them). A famous anecdote has a teacher showing a class of children a grapefruit which they recognize from colour and size and other physical characteristics as a grapefruit. But then she starts peeling, segmenting and eating it like an orange, and they change their minds and say it must be an orange.
Can we measure the effect of social context on a cognitive computer (whether an Artificial Intelligence or a Human Intelligence)? Yes, indeed we can... and it is an important source of information about how intelligence/cognition works. In fact, we always do, even though we may not realize it!! Every time we hear a sentence we interpret it in the physical, cultural, social and linguistic context. Here are some sentences that I have deliberately pseudophoneticized slightly to make more like hearing the speech - but in fact there will be prosodic context as well as (prior, current and/or subsequent or consequent) physical, social, cultural and linguistic context to help disambiguate the meanings.
Imgonnaworknow.
Timeflieslikeanarrow.
Imgonnarekanispeech.
Thehorseracedpastthebarnfell.
Thegreenscombinedwiththelibsvotedno.
The first one is understood differently depending on whether your wife knows its Saturday and you are not going in to work, or Friday and your are, or it is your teacher you are talking to, who is saying you are failing and you should drop out of the course.
The second is a famous artificial sentence, and could be about a particular kind of fly, timing flies, or time.
The third is also a famous artificial example that is understood differently depending on whether you are speech scientists talking about speech recognition, or hooligans talking about wrecking a nice beach.
The last two have the same grammatical forms and garden path - the second of the pair will give clues for understanding the first - it hinges on whether we interpret the -ed word as an active verb or a passive participle. The final verb phrase might be better replaced with a prepositional phrase (at the event on Friday, on the issue of abortion) so it can revert from participle to verb (but it still seems to require context to be a good sentence).
So these examples also tell you how. You test for the effect of any kind of context by devising experiments where the default or alternate understanding, or lack of understanding, is modified if the context is taken into account.
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There is now a large body of evidence that support the role of sensory and motor systems in semantic representation and processing. However, I've never heard about such evidence for bilingual's second language. Do you know of any paradigm that test L2 embodiment?
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HI Mäeva,
I Remember I attended a conference in 2010 in Granada (I send you the proceedings attached) and there was a speaker that made an experiment trying to replicate the ACE in bilingual participants' second language. They did not found significant results. They even could not replicate the original ACE effect, therefore, I suppose they cannot publish their data. But the procedure seemed to be consistent.
If you want to dive on the proceedings, I am sure that you will find this. And maybe you can contact the author.
Best,
Juanjo
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Mounia, thank you for sharing the InGrid concept and references. What I found most meaningful was the wording here: “We believe that the embodied experience depends on the permanence (temporary or not) of the object in the embodied space and the changes that can bring within sensorimotor contingencies. This can be obtained by having a completely immerged user in the space of interaction. By analogy, interactive tabletops can be experienced as an extension of the body because not only the users are immerged in the sensorimotor space but also through the space of shared and private knowledge. The sensorimotor contingencies of interactive tabletops represent the space of actions and sensations that can be defined by extracting the sensorimotor invariants in both peripersonal and extrapersonal spaces” (p. 4).
Are you envisioning this technology for the early classroom? It seems it would be such a potential way to break through very young conceptual boundaries between where the functional self ends and the group-enabled self begins (in the Piagetian sense). Two things very much stand out: one is your mention of pericutaneous space (how the sense of self extends through the tools and interfaces we use to their boundaries and a bit beyond), and the other was body ownership (functional permanence and what one might call identity-separability). Can you affirm my guess that you see these facilitating mechanisms as a means to extend proprioception and subsequent efficacy, and that any break in reinforcing modalities (space, vision, tactile feedback, control locus) severs this illusion? If so I am much in agreement and this was brought home to me during my research on illusion therapy (please see Henrik Ehrsson’s research and Ramachandran’s synaethesia connection as well).
As individuals, we urgently need meaningful confirmations that everything is okay, that we can effect positive changes for ourselves and our surrounds like anticipation of personal growth and retained control. The self does not end at luminal sensation, but at estimates of personal reach. It seems to me, belief for us is not just “passive change-response" (one for one) but "hopeful, step-responses" similar to the metaphor of keeping our belief in the air like a balloon. It is not easy if we lose attention on our goal to sustain our belief, but it gets easier as we add "more hands in the air" in this attempt (additional modalities as you indicate – touch, sound, what you so aptly call immergence). For those that remember the movie (Somewhere in Time), like Chris Reeve’s seeing the penny from the future, it takes only one disconsonant proof to undo a stream of very hopeful, consonant affirmations – such that now confirmation frequency becomes confirmation urgency instead - to anxiously regain lost belief. For children and therapy, it is not difficult to see how helpful the InGrid and similar designs might be in bridging the peripersonal space of childhood to the socially-buttressed extended space needed to succeed in life (to contribute individually and see the collectively beneficial goal).
Reference
Ziat, M., Fancher, J., Kilpela, K, Fridstrom, J., & Clark, J. J. (2013, April-May). InGrid: Rethinking the Embodied Space. Paper to be presented at ACM SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, Paris, France.
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Thanks so much Mounia for your reply and the additional video link. It is greatly helpful to see InGrid in use like this. Your mention of the pericutaneous space being composed of tools that have become proprioceptively mapped as limb extensions (spatially predicted and affecting "reach velocity") reminded me of some links I enjoyed exploring. Here they are in case you too might find them interesting (unless you have already). The one missing dimension of limb extension via tools seems to be the tactile confirmation along the entire span (even if the kinesthetic is there) which seems apparent in Flor et al. -- perhaps ranged by the skin cells themselves? What do you think? I would much appreciate your thoughts on this, and/or how you might be adding touch to the InGrid design as well. Again, thank you for your kind replies.
Flor, H., Denke, C., Schaefer, M., Grüsser, S. (2001). Effect of sensory discrimination training on cortical reorganisation and phantom limb pain. The Lancet, 357(9270), 1763-1764. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(00)04890-X.
Franz, E. A., & Ramachandran, V. S. (1998). Bimanual coupling in amputees with phantom limbs. Nature Neuroscience, 1(6), 443-444. doi:10.1038/2161.
Schmalzl, L., Thomke, E., Ragnö, C., Nilseryd, M., Stockselius, A., & Ehrsson, H. (2011). Pulling telescoped phantoms out of the stump: Manipulating the perceived position of phantom limbs using a full-body illusion. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 5(121), 1-12. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2011.00121.
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Listening to, and repeating a temporal structure (a pattern) is part of the musical training of many musicians, particularly for drummers and percussionists.
The ability to learn patterns depends on a plethora of factors.
While the drummer is trying to learn a pattern, several movements may be observed, but it is not yet clear why these movements are generated, and what exactly their function is.
Music education teaches us to involve the movement of the body as an effective strategy to embody more complex patterns.
Is this it true for all? Are there other strategies to effectively learn complex patterns?
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I agree with the above comments that this is indeed a rich and interesting area of study. How does the body form one's ability to perceive, learn and control simple and complex patterns of timing? I think the answer will necessarily be fairly complex, especially with regards to music.
There is some evidence that synchronising movement with a beat improves ones ability to anticipate upcoming beats and detect deviation in the tempo:
However, this needs to be tested for more complex movements/timing sequences.
I also think that there are different levels at which movement and musical timing might be meaningfully related to one and other. There is the induction of rhythm, and maintaining a constant tempo of repeated actions, which is undoubtedly important for percussive playing. There is also the dimension of expressive timing in music, which incorporates the temporal envelope of sequences of musical events. This level might more meaningfully be related to larger, more temporally-extended actions, such as ancillary gesture, dance, etc. Audiences seem sensitive to expressive gestures in perceiving music, and such movements vary with musicians' expressive intention and skill level. What form(s) the relationship between expressive movement and expressive musical timing can take is still a fairly open question, as is the nature of how the relationship is acquired. I am currently involved in doing some work to see if students can pick up and learn movement kinematics in playing from observation of gesture and if so how, but this is just the start of getting to answer these questions.
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I recently read an interesting article in Psychological Science called "Tall, Dark, and Stable: Embodiment Motivates Mate Selection Process''. According to the article, participants in an unstable chair were more likely to rate four celebrity relationships as likely to fail and reported a higher preference for stability related traits in potential mates than participants who completed the survey in a stable chair. Now, this is weird enough that I am currently pretty sceptical about it.
On the other hand, the famous Dutton and Aron bridge experiment showed that men who met a female experimenter after crossing a rickety bridge were more likely to call her and ask her out than men who met her and completed a survey before the experiment. So we know body states and cognitions don't by necessity occur independently of one another.
We think about physical sensations, and physical sensations can arise in response to thoughts we have. But if doing things as simple as manipulating the stability of a person's chair, or the temperature of a cup of coffee they're holding, or the amount of dirt in the room where they're viewing dating profiles actually can affect the way people perceive others' social relationships and what they desire from their own relationships, does that raise the possibility that human like intelligence requires a physical body that physiologically responds to changes in its external environment?
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Embodied cognition is definitely an additional asset that human's enjoy. It serves as another channel through which information can pass between the more instinctual (automatic) and intuitive (associative) areas of the unconscious mid-brain and cerebellum, and the more deliberate—and conscious—activity of areas of the prefrontal cortex.
The pattern recognition theory of mind would posit that this is an example of a priming of the brain by the recognition of "instability": the effect that the perception of actual instability has on the sensitivity thresholds of pattern recognition networks in the brain (i.e. those associated with "instability" as a gestalt contextual element).
Priming involves "implicit memory," which is a sort of intuition—created by overlaying perviously observed associations on top of current perceptions. This process enhances the function of visual pattern recognition by augmenting it with the probabilities of past observations.
So, in answer to the question of whether "human like intelligence requires a physical body that physiologically responds to changes in its external environment?": it is not so much that it needs a "body that physiologically responds to changes in its external environment"—for these physiological changes are simply reflections of implicit memory, they are information relays between the unconscious memory and the conscious experience. I would say that this relay is of high importance, but the physiological nature of this information relay is not a necessary factor. (It is, however, an efficient function, because physiological changes often simultaneously prime the behavior of the organism (by priming pattern recognition networks in the brain) and prepare for the behaviors that are in the repertoire of the primed behavioral state. For example, a rapid heart rate during fear not only relays the feeling of fear to the conscious brain, it also prepares the cardiovascular system for "fight or flight" behaviors.)
So it's not "necessary" for the information relay to be physiological in an AI system. In the case of the human organism, however, it certainly is convenient and efficient because of the dual role played by the physiological response in both priming behavior and preparing for the support of such behavior. This could be a useful application in a robotic system that needed to adjust physical operation dynamics for different behaviors, but is not an absolutely necessary component of "human like intelligence" (this information relay could theoretically be simulated or entirely disembodied).