Questions related to Embodied Cognition
- In my opinion, the location of knowledge in the head or in the brain is a postulate, that is to postulate means "to suggest or accept that to theory or idea is true as a starting point for reasoning or discussion" (Collins). But Basis for Research. To postulate is "to assume to be very or exist; Take for Granted ”(Collins). And I would add to take for granted without any proof, and in any case not demonstrable .
La plupart des théories de l'apprentissage et de l'enseignement sont basées sur le postulat que la connaissance est dans la tête ou le cerveau. Et si ce n'était pas le cas?
À mon avis, l'emplacement des connaissances dans la tête ou dans le cerveau est un postulat. Un postulat est un « Principe non démontré que l'on accepte et que l'on formule à la base d'une recherche ou d'une théorie » (CNRTL).
We will conduct an experiment in which participants will learn a manufacturing procedure either with immersive or Desktop Virtual Reality. As a theoretical basis to explain potential differences I have chosen the embodied cognition theory since the ability to interact with gestures in immersive Virtual Reality is one of the biggest differences between the two media.
To quantify this relationship, I would like to measure the level of embodiment/enactment participants feel after either intervention. Are you aware of any standard questionnaires or recommendations to measure embodiment?
Thanks in advance for your help!
Even if behavior was "embodied", wouldn't the brain notice? YES, of course: then the BRAIN would become the better "vehicle" for remembering, thinking, and "time travel" (i.e. prospective memory) -- possible (and possibly trivial) sensori-motor components notwithstanding. [ I am really quite tired of the "embodied" conceptualizations (which have yet to be shown as non-fictions *). See my writings. No one has argued against the views/approaches (content) in these writings NOR accepted/liked/or adopted them (now 1+ years (or 5+ years, depending how you look at it) and counting). ]
* Footnote: All this nonsense is ALL because NO PSYCHOLOGY OUTLOOK (other than my own) "believes in" anything psychological, innately guided, and emerging with ontogeny (which is not tenable). (The idea that learning is literally nearly always "the same" (outside of clearly always being associative in nature) is preposterous (think of a two -year-old and an adolescent -- and imagine any systematic and universal instruction you credibly might posit). P.S. Relatedly : "Culture" does NOT directly impinge on the individual -- the actual Subject and ultimate, but absolutely necessary, unit of analysis &/or explanation (for Biology or for Science). All executive or "meta" processes can NOT be properly shown to be anything but homunculi.)
Among the strongest findings in all of Psychology are on the Memories (the Memory systems and their inter-workings), yet you do not address them AT ALL (_AND_ are wrongly contrary to these findings). There is no chance of you finding any key observable (pivotal) evidence related to a view such as yours -- making your view, again, scientifically unacceptable (see "The Poverty of Embodied Cognition",
-- also easy to find the FULL TEXT).
It is clear that you are a 'victim' of very inappropriate dualism: here (for one just thing, particularly): the idea of "memory as a separate thing" (just an aspect OF experience).
MOREOVER: I have also clearly shown in my writings that your beliefs are based on central ("founding") 'assumptions'; THESE ARE UNPROVEN AND LIKELY FALSE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS (read ME and learn).
As one first step to properly seeing your "idea system", just realize that by the definitions (found through research) on/of the Memories (those operating together): They comprise OUR EXPERIENCE ITSELF.
This nonsense of yours and some others has got to stop.
I am still of the mind that it is possible to have a science of Psychology where the only things studied are behavior patterns and associated environmental aspects. AND: Key to this is finding and having some most-significant, pivotal, foundational BEHAVIOR PATTERNS (DIRECTLY OBSERVABLE OVERT BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS) -- ones which can be seen at least at key times and, at least, at the INCEPTION of any significant new behavior patterns involved in major shifts in cognition and cognitive development. [ (THEN, otherwise, behavior is credibly just altered by simple, relatively easy-to-understand processes -- in particular, the various sorts of associative learning.) ]
My perspective and approach describes in great detail how this can be the case and the major necessary hypotheses are directly testable (verifiable), being verified by finding major yet-to-be-discovered DIRECTLY OBSERVABLE OVERT BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS (when you know how and when to look to find them). These major behavior patterns involve Memories-contextualized "perceptual shifts", with subtle but the clear overt behavior patternings as their aspects -- these, along with environmental aspects, BEING ESSENTIAL PROXIMATE CAUSES of behavior pattern change (not only with the new behavior patterning, but those also importantly at-times affecting already-existing behavior patterns). The major NEW inventions that allow for researching this, and having these phenomenon discovered, are the new eye-tracking technology (and computer-assisted analysis).
This is the way (not yet tried) to keep Psychology as "the science of behavior" [(the "behaviors" of the various sorts seen as important at one time in the history of Psychology or another and, NOW, ALL BEING "admitted" and seen as aspects of behavior)]. Of course the other (ONLY other) key things involved being the "triggering" (or key facilitating) ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS.
Has this definition of Psychology as "the science of behavior" been abandoned or corrupted [ with models by-analogy (e.g with information processing as could be done by a machine); OR phenomenon of uncertain relation to actual most-important behavior (e.g. crude neuroscience); OR by using instead elaborate speculative conceptualizations, which could NEVER have any direct evidence supporting them (e.g. "embodiment" 'theories') ] ? I say: "YES. PSYCHOLOGY, THE SCIENCE OF BEHAVIOR, has been abandoned and corrupted in at least these three ways."
BUT now, with a new perspective and with new ways to detect more subtle behavior patterns, we now CAN RETURN to the classic kind of definition Psychology has had over many decades (with the focus on "behaviors"/environmental factors thought to suffice). My perspective and approach ACTUALIZES this, and in the process eliminates any nature/nurture controversies BY BEING NOT ONLY PSYCHOLOGY IN THE CLASSIC SENSE BUT, at the same time, being the BIOLOGY OF BEHAVIOR -- the biological structure and nature seen in just behavior patterns THEMSELVES.
My "biology of behavior" project :
Isn't it pure psychoticism to have the most fundamental unit of analysis of a presumed foundational behavior pattern of AN organism INCLUDE MORE THAN ONE ORGANISM'S BEHAVIOR necessarily (or really AT ALL (ever), FOR THAT MATTER)? Yes, yes, yes. YET see the following recent papers INSIST ON such an explanation NECESSARILY (as necessary -- i.e. no other "reasonable" way):
Enactive Mechanistic Explanation of Social Cognition
Mechanistic explanation for enactive sociality
They claim 25 years of such just-pure-speculative (and by-now obviously useless) "conceptualizations".
This embarrassing nonsense is what can happen when you do not know or do not examine or analyze your true base/foundational assumptions YET THOSE ARE very poor, baseless, and UNPROVEN AND MOST-LIKELY _NOT_ TRUE (because of inconsistencies with BIOLOGY, as I have clearly indicated in my essays). [ It is desperation for progress with a basic view and approach THAT CANNOT MAKE PROGRESS rationally -- it is desperation in science/"science" . ]
How can you take or recommend a view or approach that will NEVER have any direct evidence?
Embodiment has NO direct evidence for it (OR any direct evidence even clearly related to it) **, and never will: it is worse than bad science: it is not even science: see: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303890892_The_poverty_of_embodied_cognition
Article The poverty of embodied cognition (full text at: link.springer.com/article/10.3758/s13423-015-0860-1 Add the https:// yourself, so RG does not hijack the link AND DIRECT YOU TO JUST THE ABSTRACT)
See also my Comments below the Project "declaration" (seen in the very top of this post).
** FOOTNOTE: This is to such an extent, that "embodiment 'theory'" or "enactivism" will technically NEVER be able to present an acceptable [scientific] hypothesis. Good approaches do a LOT of clear hypothesizing.
This notion or belief, and THAT is all it is, no matter what BIG impacts on thinking it has, and no matter what big effects such beliefs have in creating firm limitations on thinking (not even allowing people to think of certain phenomenon). [ In effect such false closures and thinking (and they are there) is a clear sign that something is wrong. ] This all-innate-at-birth-or-in-infancy notion of THE innate factors -- resulting in no real innate guidance thought to come up later in childhood -- and related beliefs (used as "assumptions") is from philosophy and not from ANY good observation and not related good understanding. 'Learning' explanations are given which have NO clearly related direct evidence at all, yet researchers and theorists are satisfied with what they basically just make up (and then attribute to such "self"-functioning of the organism), e.g. the fictions of 'executive' functions and all the "meta's" (a "man" within "the man") OR wild (unsupported and unsupportable) ideas about 'social learning' AND/OR the fictions of literal-supposed "EMBODIMENT" of 'action' giving us our thought -- such pure garbage being a big part of 'explanations'). [
[ Apparently, for higher learning, logic can just pop-up and pop-out when the time/circumstances are right (when earlier learnings have been well-processed); this is apparently where developmental maturation factors ORIGINATE INTERNALLY (!!???), no matter how not-environmentally based the POP-UP logic seems to be in its origin, i.e. NON-EMBEDDED. It is basically hocus-pocus. ]
Old-time philosophers can't "cut it" nowadays.
Because of these 'garbage' beliefs, we cannot differentiate different [levels of] learning -- this resulting in not defining or understanding learning well at all.
So many things work better and are seen in more understandable ways IFF one can see fundamental qualitative shifts in behavioral [response] patterns occurring (even if the beginnings of such behavior pattern changes are kind of simple and caused by seemingly simple CHANGES in VERY basic behavior patterns -- that works!). I am at the point where I basically do not need to listen much to people that think learnings are all basically the same and completely ubiquitous, operating in an "uninterrupted" way. (And, don't talk to me about "social" and "cultural" factors BECAUSE the individual organism clearly remains the "unit of analysis" and center of ALL true understanding -- if there is no account with the individual, there is NO accounting at all.)
Hey, graduate students: if you buy all the "crap", you are "tools".
[ P.S. Note how "innate action patterns" (or anything meaning that) are not even topics here on researchgate. Come on, people ]
Is knowledge related to our being in the world (earth)?
Would we have discovered the phenomenon of gravity?
As those versed in ecological psychology know well, Gibson's approach was hard externalist and he made no effort to explain the internal neurological process involved in taking action wrt an affordance. So there is an explanatory gap which afaik, remains to be filled. (That is not to say that conventional internalist explanations do not have explanatory gaps :) I'd like to hear perspectives.
(I only put the ? because the robot told me to).
I'm about to contrast a picture description paradigm with a sentence completion paradigm under cognitive load. Can someone recommend a second task to induce this cognitive load which is suitable for both paradigms? What do you think of the Symmetry Span or Operation Span? Are these tasks too complex?
A better description of the tasks is decribed below.
Hi, are you familiar with any new, post-2010 (arbitrarily chosen), references dealing with semantic processing in the left and right hemisphere in healthy people? I am familiar with the "traditional" view that the left hemisphere deals with fine semantic coding by rapid selection of the dominant meaning, while the right h. activates concepts that are interconnected somewhat weaker (Myers, 1999).
Does anyone know research that has used word stem completion or word fragment completion tasks to measure (dis)trust and/or paranoia?
Any suggestions are welcome! Thank you.
The definition psychology has for habituation, and its origination is the tendency to have decreased responsiveness to something. For that matter “Something that is new and incredibly exciting can become annoying.” We all have agreed that consciousness forms memories and, vice-versa, memories are a proof of being conscious.
Therefore, on the one hand, we strive to be conscious and get as many active memories from our lives as we can, and, on the other, we unconscious but ontologically need to get rid of our conscious acts by creating habituations from everything all the time and led all our deeds deep into sub/un-conscious level of our psyche.
In work on stimulus equivalence formation associative pairs of stimuli are learned by one of several possible methods), such as A~B and B~C, where there is an overlap with one stimulus, B, serving in both pairs. In humans, on unreinforced tests, the novel associations BA, CB, AC, and CA can often then be demonstrated,(indicative of the formation of an equivalence class A≡B≡C) but not in other species. I characterise the nature of the relation between A and B, and B and C, in the trained relations, using the symbol "~" but much may depend upon how the participant interprets this relations. If it were interpreted as ">" only the novel association A>C could be derived from the serial relations A>B>C. These may be demonstrations of more complex relations arising from simpler associations, or alternatively that pre-existing "relational frames" that a human already possesses can be used to shape a particular apparently simple association the experimenter presents.
Why are we unable to visualize higher dimensional space? Is there any special feature or structure in the visuo-spatial area of our brain that limits our perception of the world in only 3-dimensions? This is a question for neurobiologists.
I would like to ask if you know if the affective components modulated by the visualization of affective images of the IAPS could be inhibited by the attentional processes that also underlie some psychophysiological variables like the conductance of the skin or the cardiac rate. That is, could the attentional processes hide the typical affective responses of the IAPS images?
Thank you very much to all
I am conducting a meta-analysis on the effect of facial feedback on emotional experience. I am seeking any unpublished studies, data sets, or “in press” papers that include a manipulation of facial posture (including facial posing, facial expression suppression, and Botox treatment) and self-reported emotional experience.
Please let me know by December 1st whether you have unpublished data you want to share.
I develop participatory models and role playing games to understand the drivers of change in tropical landscapes. These games offer players the opportunity to play the role of a logging company or a government department, making decisions that will shape the future landscape - with economic, environmental and social impacts.
In a recent workshop, one of the participants concluded :
"I've known all these things, you read them in the reports. But now, somehow, I understand them, I feel the weight of the economical interests, I understand the complexity of the decisions we face"
This got me thinking - I have known for a while that the models and games I develop tend not to generate new knowledge - colleagues working on the topic for 25 years say - "yes, I know all that". Yet through the process of playing, of embodying the stakeholders they have been studying for years, something seems to happen and the cognition of the participants is changed.
I went looking for explanations of this.
Spinoza defined three forms of Knowledge - opinion, reason and intuition.
Knowledge of the first kind (Opinion or imagination) can be gained by random exposure or hearsay. But it fails to convey the essence of things, and is the source of confusion and errors.
Reason, or Knowledge of the second kind, is derived from possessing common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things .
Intuitive science, the third form of knowledge "advances
from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things"
We know that people tend to form "the illusion of explanatory depth", (Fernbach 2013), which seems to me strikingly similar to Spinoza's first form of knowledge.
Getting back to our games, I think when a layperson is exposed to the complexity of the system ( the game are not simple) they have the opportunity to "shatter their illusion of understanding" and move on to higher levels of understanding.
But what happens when an expert says "Oh, I get it now!'. Would it be that he himself moved from reason ( the knowledge was his already, the figures in the reports he already knew, the causality links he was aware of) to "intuitive science" - where the essence of things is "felt' rather than deduced?
But then, what are the links between these forms of cognitions and Daniel Kahneman's Systems 1&2?
Systems 1 and 2 seem to share common attributes with the third and second forms of Spinoza's knowledge respectively.
Or is system 1 simply the "opinion and imagination" Spinoza refers to? System 2 seems closely related to Spinoza's reason. But then, what is Spinoza's third form of cognition in Kahneman's system? Is it part of System1?
Comments, and suggestions for further reading are welcome!
Stephen Hawking uses his cheek muscles contractions that are detected by a sensor attached to a branch of his glasses, which can thus select the letters on a virtual keyboard of a tablet which a slider sweeps permanently the alphabet, one by one, then select words using a predictive algorithm since 2001. This system allows him to speak five words per minute and to give classes at the University of Cambridge until 2009. Borrowed and translated from https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Hawking
Various perspectives, such as enactivism, phenomenology, embodied cognition, and so on, postulate that the human being thinks through his body, and not only with his brain. But what about Stephen Hawking phenomenon? His motor skills are so much reduced. My question is: Does Stephen Hawking phenomenon contradicts the premise.
Hawking's motility is indeed very small, but he can communicate with his reduced motor skills and with the help of the infrared sensor, which extends his body. So my question: Does this reduced motility allow him to think or would he be able to think anyway even without any motility. I lean toward the former hypothesis. What is your own opinion?
ADD: my English writing is bad. Just in case, I wanted to say that I lean toward the first hyothesis stating that Stephen Hawking thinks through his reduced motility, and so I don't lean toward the second hypothesis.
Recent research of enactive and embodied cognition approach the study of cognition by testing the effects of language upon simple experimental tasks, but in natural conversations, the effect upon behaviour is not obvious in many cases, as the final effect upon behaviour may occur much later in time than the end of the conversation.
What instrument have you used to measure self actualization? I have seen the 12 characteristics of self actualization that Maslow described. Is there any kind of inay runner that tries to capture if people have those characteristics. Or is it more measuring the experience of self actualization? How about the concept of phone do you find that sufficiently related to Maslow's original idea of self actualization or is it just one experience of behavioral state that is linked
Has someone done further research or a conceptual clarification on the "abstract body-model" proposed by Tsakiris, Haggard and Constantini which is proposed in the attached paper ?
Dear Friends on Researchgate,
I am currently working on a paper about metaphors consumers have learned in relation to a particular brand. Generally speaking, metaphors are relevant for people to make sense of the world and bestow meaning onto abstract concepts, like love or a brand. In their well-known Paper, Braun-LaTour et al. (2007) introduce the memory walk to uncover the earliest experiences consumers had with a brand. The transcripts of these early experiences help in uncovering the metaphor consumers have learned in relation to a brand.
Yet I wonder why we as researchers and brand managers should actually care about such metaphors? Is it meaningful to pursue research in this area? Studies on metaphor and embodied cognition seem en vogue at the moment, but in what way are they relevant for the scientific community and practioners?
I am looking forward to your opinion and arguments.
Single-unit studies of cortical neurons indicate that memory and knowledge are widely distributed in overlapping and interactive neuronal networks, in accord with associationist and connectionist concepts (reviews below). The currently most promising methods to study the structure and dynamics of those networks are neuroimaging, electrophysiology and neurocomputation during behavioral tasks or states that provide operational definitions of cognitive functions (attention, perception, memory retrieval, working memory, action planning, decision-making, etc.). Those methods have certain limitations, however. Neuroimaging has limited temporal resolution and cannot easily disambiguate structure (content) from function and excitation from inhibition. Electrical signals may be simply epiphenomena and do not reveal the “code” or mechanisms of neural transactions within and between networks. Computational models and algorithms of neural activity generally ignore the probabilistic (e.g., Bayesian) nature of network operations in language and behavior.
Those limitations are not insurmountable, however. This post is an appeal for suggestions to refine, or perhaps combine, those methods to yield reliable data on cognitive networks while, at the same time, avoiding any “network phrenology.”
J.M. Fuster - Cortex and memory: emergence of a new paradigm. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21:2047-2072, 2009.
J.M. Fuster and S.L. Bressler – Cognit activation: a mechanism enabling temporal integration in working memory. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16:207-218, 2012.
S. Haykin and J.M. Fuster - On cognitive dynamic systems: cognitive neuroscience and engineering learning from each other. Proceedings of the IEEE, 102:608-627, 2014.
S.E. Petersen and O. Sporns – Brain networks and cognitive architecture. Neuron, 88:207-219, 2015.
J.L. Vincent et al. - Intrinsic functional architecture in the anesthetized monkey brain. Nature, 447, 83-86, 2007.
As we trundle along through our life's pursuits, there are causal forces at work that determine our future thoughts and actions.
Given some of the work that highlights the central role of exploratory movement for perception (that we act to detect information about the environment), it is possible that these constraints from the past determine solely our behavioral patterns, which in turn constrain the aspects of the environment that we perceive.
The case can also be made that past experience determines our interpretations of sensory stimulation and thus the actions engaged to select those sensations (following along the lines of Helmholtz' theory of unconscious inference). Of course both of these hypotheses may also be false!
Does past experience affect
1. Our cognition (thoughts, ideas, beliefs, etc.)
2. Our actions (which in turn determine the aspects of the environment we attend)
3. Both our actions and cognition
(a). Independent of each other
(b). Interdependently or cyclically
4. ...something else
I try some works giving effect to the theory of Embodied Cognition through practical examples and methods have already been tested in schools.
In the Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition (https://www.routledge.com/products/9780415623612), Shaun Gallagher draws interesting comparisons between phenomenology and embodied cognition. Might anyone know similar or not so direct accounts that deal with this topic? Also personal opinions of this topic are appreciated. Thanks!
As a psychotherapist I am interested in research on embodied, situated, grounded cognition. Hickoks critique of these approaches seems to be sound. Since I am not an expert in the field of neuropsychology I would like to know if there are arguments to question his position. How do the protagonists of embodied cognition object to his arguments?
Thanks for your ideas, Michael
I am searching for a neuropsychological task on mental rotation that directly compares abilities in rotating abstract shapes and/or letters with rotating body-parts (e.g., hands or whole-bodies). Ideally the task is applicable in clinical practice.
On a sidenote, can anyone provide me with a version of the hand-laterality judgment task?
Thanks in advance,
In the past five years, many theorists of Cognitive Science noticed that the Embodied Cognition Theory as a new theoretical model did not have embodied research methods. It was argued that the methods that use language or objective observation (laboratory experiments) were not sufficient to assess the nature of the embodied experience. Is there some embodied method to overcome the classical cognitive science methodology? Does this have to do with a return to philosophical Phenomenology? How do we reconcile phenomenological experience with a cognitive science that aims to create explanatory models in objective terms?
From Jeannerod (2001): "...because all aspects of action appear to be involved during S-states, it seems a logical consequence of this rehearsal of the corresponding brain structures, and specifically the motor structures, that the subsequent execution will be facilitated. The presence of activity in the motor system during S-states would put the action representation in a true motor format, so that it would be regarded by the motor system as a real action. This facilitation would explain various forms of training (e.g., mental training) and learning (e.g., ob- servational learning) which occur during S-states (see Pascual-Leone et al., 1995). (p. S. 108).
What aspects of the model provide explanatory value for the phenomenon of mental practice? If Jeannerod (1994, 2001, 2006) suggests that there is an overlap between overt (executed) action and covert (simulated) action, what degree of overlap would either support or reject simulation theory?
Varela's neurophenomenology aims to marry modern cognitive science with Husserlian methods of phenomenological investigation. What is Varela's take on issues pertaining to the 'ego' or even the 'transcendental ego'? Is there any extended text addressing this issue? Could you please, if possible, provide details of these relevant texts?
In Before and Beyond Representation, Lambros Malafouris’ proposes that enactive mark-making bootstrapped the Paleolithic mind into representation, both internal and external, This allows that representation may not be an innate capability, but a property of human culture, propagated via cultural training.What evidence do we have, ie in developmental psychology or anthropology or neurology, that internal representation is either innate or learned?
Rizzolatti and colleagues (1987) discuss their idea that the movement of attention has processing limitations due to how the oculomotor system is organized. They believe overt and covert orienting of attention are the consequence of how eye movements are programmed in the brain. In Posner's cueing task, there is an attentional cost to shift attention to a invalidly cued area. Rizzolatti and colleagues (1987) used a similar cuing paradigm that showed longer latencies for invalidly cued locations across the vertical or horizontal meridians of the visual field, termed the 'meridian effect'. So, is this idea that shifts of attention are linked to oculomotor programming in the brain rather than a separate volitional mechanism of controlling attention part of the embodied cognition literature?
Rizzolatti, G., Riggio, L., Dascola, I., & Umiltá, C. (1987). Reorienting Attention across the Horizontal and Vertical Meridians: Evidence in Favor of a Premotor Theory of Attention. Neuropsychologia, 25(1A), 31–40.
Using a standard histogram doesn't provide much information on which colors a human beholder would recognize. Are there any open/ free algorithms to evaluate the amount of, say, ten basic colors in any given RGB computer image?
Damasio et al. propose that somatic markers (feedback signals representing homoeostatic and other bodily states) play a pivotal role in our decision-making processes. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) is identified as the cerebral module of most relevance to the somatic system. Emotions are understood by SMH advocates as the feeling of the bodily states reported by the markers. Sufferers of damage to the VMPFC have consistently demonstrated anomalous emotional dispositions accompanied by poor decision making (both time-costly and poor outcomes), in the absence of further detrament (no loss of iq, working memory...). The role of emotions in decision making is proposed to be that of restricting the options put up for conscious consideration, based on biasing signals from the body. There is here a suggesting of tacit learning by the body, prior to conscious knowledge. (See the Iowa gambling task)
Smith and Elsworth (1985) and apparently others since then have identified six "cognitive appraisal dimensions" that can help distinguish emotions. Certainty, pleasantness, attentional activity, control, anticipated effort, and responsibility are all features of appraisal patterns underlying distinct emotions, and helping to define them.
Thus, we may find that certain emotions such as happiness and anger may share more relevant features than two emotions of the same valence (positive/negative). Since happiness and anger both construe appraisals of certainty and a sense of individual control over the situation, such cognitive dimensions might play a bigger part in determining the nature of the decisions made than the simple positive/negative valence distinction alone.
Do such considerations necessary undercut the Somatic Marker Hypothesis? Is there room for it to accept such dimensions to our emotions, without selling itself short?
Language processing is probably neither wholly symbolic (cf. Tulving, 1984) nor wholly embodied (cf. Barsalou, 1999). Rather, on recent proposals, both cognitive systems would play a role (cf. Louwerse 2007; Mahon & Caramazza 2008).
In regard to possible modulators behind each system, evidence has suggested a dependence on task and stimuli, as far as I know. Now, on a further step, I intend to find out just when either symbol system will 'kick in.'
I would appreciate any suggestions of relevant literature, as well as your own ideas.
Thanks in advance,
- Barsalou, L. W. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22. 577–660.
- Louwerse, M. M. (2007). Symbolic or embodied representations: A case for symbol interdependency. In Landauer, McNamara, Dennis & Kintsch (eds.). Handbook of latent semantic analysis 107–120. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Mahon, B. Z., & Caramazza, A. (2008). A critical look at the embodied cognition hypothesis and a new proposal for grounding conceptual content. Journal of Physiology - Paris 102. 59–70.
- Tulving, E. (1984). Precis of Elements of Episodic Memory. Behavioural and Brain Sciences 7 (2): 223–68.
I am researching on the distinction between manner-in-verb languages (e.g., English and German) and path-in-verb languages (e.g., Spanish and Greek). This issue has been researched extensively, both theoretically -- esp. by Dan Slobin -- and empirically -- e.g. by Lera Boroditsky and Anna Papafragou, with diverging results.
In relation to other areas in the battlefield of linguistic relativity (e.g., colour or gender categorization), the topic of motion seems to be the hardest 'nut to crack,' with research shedding totally opposite results. Now, I can think of two reasons for that, namely
(1) it is still unclear what speakers really focus on in their general attention to the world, as biased by their language. That is, where most research seems to indicate that we'll focus on what's encoded in our own language, there are also indications of the opposite (i.e. Papafragou, Hulbert & Trueswell 2008: 'participants spontaneously studied those aspects of the scene that their language does not routinely encode in verbs').
and (2) so-called manner-in-verb languages actually tend to encode path information with great frequency and detail (albeit as a satellite to the verb, e.g. the leaf floated OUT OF THE CAVE AND RIGHT INTO THE HOLE ON THE DRIFTING LOG), such that the language-specific dichotomy is a little blurry.
I would highly appreciate any opinions on these issues. Also, would you please direct me towards any recent publications of relevance (other than Gumperz&Levinson 1999, Boroditsky and Papafragou)? Thank you so much.
What is the role of gut feelings, nervous system, or the body in attention? Is it connected with bodily loops between the brain and the non-neural body? What does phenomenology say about it?
No doubt, the spatial character of count nouns and perfective verbs stems from boundary detection. But, the perceptual process responsible for distinguishing count and mass nouns, as well as perfective and imperfective verbs, is not spatial in the (top-down) sense of being near or far away, as Langacker suggests, but spatial perception in the sense of spatial versus temporal presence.
As far as I have been able to determine, in general, psychologists in the U.S. operate on the belief that blood flow, neuron development and other biological outcomes of increased blood flow to the brain explain why exercise is linked to higher academic performance/intelligence. Yet embodied cognition goes further, not denying the effects of blood flow, rather emphasizing the role of receptors throughout the body that utilize sensations from one's immediate physical environment to learn about the world, and possibly far more.
The study of our mind as complex system implies the understanding of cognition in terms of socially organized phenomena. Similarly we need to observe our behavior as network of interactions, emotionally and mutually connected. Consequently in the context of educational processes we must extend the paradigm of science as shared reflection. In this perspective it's essential reconsider the qualitative aspects of educational relationship within the framework of scientific research.
Inside of debate we find keywords like mediation, communication, sharing, empathy, exchange, participation, embodiment.
What are the guidelines that we can create and share how research opportunities?
We think about machine learning and cognitive computing. We are designing neurosynaptic machine interfaces. Famous psychologist 'Vygotsky' says: "External world models a mind". Can we measure / quantify the influence of social context on a cognitive computer?
There is now a large body of evidence that support the role of sensory and motor systems in semantic representation and processing. However, I've never heard about such evidence for bilingual's second language. Do you know of any paradigm that test L2 embodiment?
Mounia, thank you for sharing the InGrid concept and references. What I found most meaningful was the wording here: “We believe that the embodied experience depends on the permanence (temporary or not) of the object in the embodied space and the changes that can bring within sensorimotor contingencies. This can be obtained by having a completely immerged user in the space of interaction. By analogy, interactive tabletops can be experienced as an extension of the body because not only the users are immerged in the sensorimotor space but also through the space of shared and private knowledge. The sensorimotor contingencies of interactive tabletops represent the space of actions and sensations that can be defined by extracting the sensorimotor invariants in both peripersonal and extrapersonal spaces” (p. 4).
Are you envisioning this technology for the early classroom? It seems it would be such a potential way to break through very young conceptual boundaries between where the functional self ends and the group-enabled self begins (in the Piagetian sense). Two things very much stand out: one is your mention of pericutaneous space (how the sense of self extends through the tools and interfaces we use to their boundaries and a bit beyond), and the other was body ownership (functional permanence and what one might call identity-separability). Can you affirm my guess that you see these facilitating mechanisms as a means to extend proprioception and subsequent efficacy, and that any break in reinforcing modalities (space, vision, tactile feedback, control locus) severs this illusion? If so I am much in agreement and this was brought home to me during my research on illusion therapy (please see Henrik Ehrsson’s research and Ramachandran’s synaethesia connection as well).
As individuals, we urgently need meaningful confirmations that everything is okay, that we can effect positive changes for ourselves and our surrounds like anticipation of personal growth and retained control. The self does not end at luminal sensation, but at estimates of personal reach. It seems to me, belief for us is not just “passive change-response" (one for one) but "hopeful, step-responses" similar to the metaphor of keeping our belief in the air like a balloon. It is not easy if we lose attention on our goal to sustain our belief, but it gets easier as we add "more hands in the air" in this attempt (additional modalities as you indicate – touch, sound, what you so aptly call immergence). For those that remember the movie (Somewhere in Time), like Chris Reeve’s seeing the penny from the future, it takes only one disconsonant proof to undo a stream of very hopeful, consonant affirmations – such that now confirmation frequency becomes confirmation urgency instead - to anxiously regain lost belief. For children and therapy, it is not difficult to see how helpful the InGrid and similar designs might be in bridging the peripersonal space of childhood to the socially-buttressed extended space needed to succeed in life (to contribute individually and see the collectively beneficial goal).
Ziat, M., Fancher, J., Kilpela, K, Fridstrom, J., & Clark, J. J. (2013, April-May). InGrid: Rethinking the Embodied Space. Paper to be presented at ACM SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, Paris, France.
Conference Paper InGrid: Rethinking the Embodied Space
Listening to, and repeating a temporal structure (a pattern) is part of the musical training of many musicians, particularly for drummers and percussionists.
The ability to learn patterns depends on a plethora of factors.
While the drummer is trying to learn a pattern, several movements may be observed, but it is not yet clear why these movements are generated, and what exactly their function is.
Music education teaches us to involve the movement of the body as an effective strategy to embody more complex patterns.
Is this it true for all? Are there other strategies to effectively learn complex patterns?
I recently read an interesting article in Psychological Science called "Tall, Dark, and Stable: Embodiment Motivates Mate Selection Process''. According to the article, participants in an unstable chair were more likely to rate four celebrity relationships as likely to fail and reported a higher preference for stability related traits in potential mates than participants who completed the survey in a stable chair. Now, this is weird enough that I am currently pretty sceptical about it.
On the other hand, the famous Dutton and Aron bridge experiment showed that men who met a female experimenter after crossing a rickety bridge were more likely to call her and ask her out than men who met her and completed a survey before the experiment. So we know body states and cognitions don't by necessity occur independently of one another.
We think about physical sensations, and physical sensations can arise in response to thoughts we have. But if doing things as simple as manipulating the stability of a person's chair, or the temperature of a cup of coffee they're holding, or the amount of dirt in the room where they're viewing dating profiles actually can affect the way people perceive others' social relationships and what they desire from their own relationships, does that raise the possibility that human like intelligence requires a physical body that physiologically responds to changes in its external environment?