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Explore the latest questions and answers in EU Law, and find EU Law experts.
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My project is on the production of a novel beer using non-traditional yeasts. At later stages, we are considering large scale production and commercialization.
The issue is, some of the yeast species that I am working on are not present in the Qualified Presumption of Safety (QPS) list of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), or in the Generally Recognized as Safe (GRAS) list of FDA. Although, there are articles and/or patents on their use for beer/wine production and they are present in IDF/EFFCA inventory of microbial food cultures.
The sources I found are a little confusing as I am not very familiar with this process.
My main question is, is having a QPS or GRAS status necessary for a species for their use in commercial production?
For a deeper understanding, my further questions are:
  • Is it the same for filtered beer, even if the microorganism will not be in the final product?
  • If we apply for QPS/GRAS, how long the process takes? - From my understanding, EFSA is updating their evaluation every 6 months, and their list every 3 years. Therefore, if I apply for a new species, the earliest possible approval would be in their next list?
  • Should we apply for QPS/GRAS for a new strain of a QPS/GRAS species if we want to commercialize?
  • If the new species belong to the same genus, would it help with the process? (For example, Lindnera jadinii is on the list, would it make it easier for Lindnera saturnus?)
  • Is the absence of toxic/harmful effects on the human, animal, environment is sufficient for this status, or are clinical studies required?
  • Would Anamorph/Teleomorph names of the same species in the list make any difference?
Thank you very much for all your help in advance.
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The compatibility of DLT-based applications with the GDPR has been reviewed in the past years, but the conclusions were in general not very sharp. Often, scholars underscored the fact that compatibility or lack thereof can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis. This is at least the conclusion I drew in my article on the matter, available at :
.Yet, I wonder if, with the recent developments in technology and applications, and with the better understanding of how the GDPR is implemented, time has come for a renewed assessment of the relationship between the two. Are there ways to make DLT applications a priori GDPR compatible? if so, how? Or, to the contrary, are DLT a priori not meeting the GDPR requirements? and if so why and what should be fixed when it comes to concrete use cases?
Many thanks for a lively discussion.
Christian Pauletto
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It's definitely tricky, as you have two opposing principles:
1) What happens on the blockchain, stays on the blockchain
2) The GDPR "right to be forgotten"
This implies that you can certainly never place any form of personal information on a blockchain, but only links to or hashes of such information. However, this in turn breaks another principle, namely that you should never sign something you don't know the content of. What happend if the information that is pointed to changes? Is it possible to perform a birthday attack on the hash by preparing two different messages with the same hash?
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In the context of national Italian law or in the light of European integration
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response under the common law. One of the most important duties of the state and its administrations is to maintain public order with its traditional and non-traditional purposes, including the protection of public security, public health and public tranquility, thus it bears the legal consequences and responsibility in the event of its failure by its duties. Covid 19 and its elimination ... in order to protect the lives and health of people ...
In short, the state does not bear legal responsibility for the emergence of Covid 19, but rather bears the legal responsibility for failing to fight it, because the emergence of the Corona virus is governed by the theory of force majeure.
In terms of civil law, the state has a legal and moral obligation to compensate those affected.
مرض فيروس كورونا المستجد (كوفيد‑19)
الحصول على آخر المعلومات
 
إرسال تعليقات
السجلّ
تم الحفظ
المنتدى
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On 1 July 2012, the preliminary reference procedure was introduced at the Supreme Court of the Netherlands. When lower civil courts face controversial points of law, they may refer a question of interpretation to the Supreme Court and request a preliminary ruling. This way, the Supreme Court should be able to provide legal practice with a faster and more specific response to pressing legal questions than through the ‘ordinary’ procedure.
This preliminary reference procedure is not a modern invention. It was already known in Rome, existed in a specific form in France (référé législatif, where a question of interpretation was referred to the legislator), was used at the Italian Corte Costitutionale and has been a powerful tool for the development of EU law by the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg (see the attached blog and article). Furthermore, Protocol 16 to the ECHR will allow highest courts of states that have ratified this Protocol to refer a question of principle to the European Court of Human Rights for an advisory opinion.
I wanted to use ResearchGate for a small comparative exercise. Perhaps you would like to answer the following questions. May lower courts in your country refer a question of interpretation to the highest court(s) in your country? Did such an instrument once exist, or is the introduction of such an instrument currently under consideration in your country?
I am also interested in literature on this subject and in other relevant international examples.
Your help is greatly appreciated,
Ruben
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The Curia of Hungary, as the highest instance judicial forum of the country, has the constitutional duty to harmonise the administration of justice within the Hungarian judiciary, mainly by means of rendering uniformity decisions. The Curia renders uniformity decisions in cases rasing issues of theoretical importance in order to ensure the uniform application of law within the Hungarian judiciary. Such decisions are binding on all Hungarian courts. The operative parts of uniformity decisions – as brief summaries – are accessible hereunder:
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Hi! I want to combine LPS injection with social defeat stress protocol to do research in inflammation. For technical reasons, I have to choose a dose that generates as less discomfort as possible. Does someone know the effect of LPS injection for rats in terms of discomfort? I was checking some publications in which they used from 0.1 to 2.5 mg/kg. Which dose in between can be one which does not gnerate rat discomfort more than level 2? (according to EU laws?
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Thank you very much for this useful information!
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The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been in force since May 2018 and thus for almost a year. Do you know of cases in which fines were imposed for violating the requirements of the GDPR? How high were these fines and which companies were affected? Background of the question are the fears of the fines at that time (up to 20 million Euro or in the case of a company up to 4% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the previous business year). To what extent were these fears justified?
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The report is in German but it covers other EU countries as well.
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The Ultra Vires Threat from National Constitutional Courts: Is It Becoming a Reality?
The German Bundesverfassungsgericht has in several of its judgments threatened that it can decide that acts of the EU institutions are ultra vires. While its statements in this regard have been followed by several other constitutional courts, until recently no court had actually found an EU act ultra vires. This has now changed following the judgment of the Czech constitutional court in Landtova, holding that a ruling of the Court of Justice was ultra vires. Was this an aberration or will we see more challenges to EU law and the Court of Justice courtesy of national constitutional courts
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A most interesting question, with multiple and open possible answers. From the view of European Union, the logical legal consecuence would be the procedure against that Member State for failure to fulfill its obligations under EU Law, which may be started by either the Commission (in its role as Guardian of the Treaties) or any other Member State, and which may end, preciselly in the EU Court of Justice, with periodical fines by time intervals of non fulfilment, as it is well known.
In the Melloni Case, the EU Court of Justice discarded any construction or reading of Article 53 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights against primacy of EU Law even when national Constitutions provide a higher level of protection of fundamental rights than that offered by EU Law. Nowadays, in Taricco II, a prejudicial reference recently made (in 2017), the Italian Constitutional Court poses the question of ultra vires, and litterally makes the hypothesis of the clause of Constitutional identity (Article 4.2 of the TEU) as a legal means to be able to declare void in Italy rules of EU derivative legislation in breach of fundamental principles of the national constitutional order. It is the first time that a national Constitutional Court suggests this clause with such a value of limit for EU Law primacy.
Although there is not an EU Court Sentence in the Taricco II case yet, it may be forseeable that any use of this clause will at least require to be explicitly cited in a prejudicial reference by a Constitutional Court when it contends that there is ultra vires. And more foreseeably, the ECJ will not admit easily that this clause may work as a national limit of EU Law primacy. Rather, it might act as a way to appeal a previous EU Court of Justice, if invoked by a Constitutional Court in a prejudicial reference, as it has been suggested by the Italian scholar Davide Paris in a recent, thought-provoking paper on Taricco II.
Mainly because of the new EU legislation on the area of freedom, security and justice (Framework Decision on the European Warrant of Arrest, Article 54 of the Schengen Convention, Dublin Regulations, etc), which  affects to (or even directly regulates and restricts) relevant fundamental rights, such as personal freedom itself, pressumption of innocence, ne bis in idem, due process of law, and several others, preliminary rulings forwarded by national Constitutional Courts to the EU Court of Justice (as, for example, in Melloni) are actually increasing.
And this increase seems to be foreseable in the next future, not totally but perhaps chiefly fuelled by the new EU legislation on the area of freedom, security and justice, in an european example of what American scholars labelled some decades ago as "judicial dialogue". In this case, between the EU Court of Justice and the national Constitutional Courts.
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The Court has jurisdiction to answer the questions referred and to provide all the guidance as to interpretation needed in order for the referring court to determine whether the national legislation is compatible with the ne bis in idem principle laid down in Article 50 of the Charter.
The protection against double jeopardy is ensured by Swedish law, EU law and the ECHR law. The Swedish system allows the prosecution of the tax avoider after the administrative court already has imposed a tax penalty. The double punishment consists in a tax penalty followed by an eventual criminal law sanction. The judgment in Åkerberg Fransson, Case C-617/10 clarifies some important issues.
First it must be said that all the questions referred have been found admissible in contrast with the advice of the AG Cruz Villalón. Moreover it is clear now that before the accession to ECHR, the EU does not have the formal competence to give any guidance in relation to a possible direct conflict between the Swedish law and the ECHR law. Thirdly the referring court is exclusively competent to deem the matter whether the tax penalty is a criminal sanction in nature.
The most interesting part refers to Swedish judicial practice which makes the obligation for a national court to disapply any provision contrary to a fundamental right guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union conditional upon that infringement being clear from the text of the Charter or the case-law relating to it.
This judicial practice is not permissible under EU law since it withholds from the national court the power to assess fully, with, as the case may be, the cooperation of the Court of Justice of the European Union, whether that provision is compatible with the Charter. EU law empowers the national courts since the whole foundation of EU law would be endangered if the preliminary ruling procedure could be so easily annihilated.
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The CJEU has developed a line of case law in which national procedural rules have been tested against the EU law requirement of effectiveness (i.e. case law on national procedural autonomy and effective judicial protection). In the framework of my Ph.D research I am looking for national court decisions throughout the EU that have used the CJEU's case law to set aside national rules of civil procedure. Alternatively, cases in which national courts have given a new interpretation to rules of national civil procedure in order to bring them in line with the EU law requirement of effecctiveness are also welcome. Many thanks in advance!
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You may want to check what happened in the UK after the Factortame decision(s) of the ECJ. I bet there are a number of national decisions following up...
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The Court of Justice of the European Union has developed a line of case law in which national procedural rules have been tested against the EU law requirement of effectiveness (i.e. case law on national procedural autonomy and effective judicial protection). In the framework of my Ph.D research I am looking for national court decisions throughout the EU that have used the CJEU's case law to set aside national rules of civil procedure. Alternatively, cases in which national courts have given a new interpretation to rules of national civil procedure in order to bring them in line with the EU law requirement of effectiveness are also welcome. I am particularly looking for judgments related to consumer protection but judgments in other areas are also much appreciated. Many thanks in advance!
Are you aware of national court decisions in which civil procedure rules were deemed to be contrary to the EU principle of effectiveness?
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Hi Janek - there are a few examples of problems between the UK and EU law regarding effectiveness in the field of motor vehicle insurance law. My colleagues and I have written about some of these in an article 'Irreconcilable Differences? The Road Traffic Act and the European Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives' which will be appearing in the Journal of Business Law in January next year.
Very best wishes,
James.
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I'm looking for publications / articles about cooperation between branded products [especially cosmetics and perfumes] and customs services. How protect consumers from unsafe products and how protect intellectual property and trademarks from illicit trade?
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The case law of the European Court of Justice obliges national courts to apply EU consumer law ex officio, especially in relation to unfair contract terms. I am interested to see what national practice is in that regard. In case you would be aware of cases in your jurisdiction in which a court has applied EU consumer law or national consumer law ex officio, please do get in touch!
Many thanks in advance!
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Hello Janek, in Spain we have recent cases in the Supreme Court, for example: 
Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 9 de mayo
de 2013 (nº 485/2012). In application of the ECJ
doctrine, declaration of the invalidity of “floor
clauses” and the validity of the loan or mortage
contracts. Criteria for the evaluation of the validity
of clauses in consumer contracts. No retroactive
effects. ?
 Sentencias del Tribunal Supremo de 24 de marzo
de 2015 (138/2015) and 25 de marzo de 2015 (nº
139/2015): Clarification that when there is a
declaration of invalidity of a floor clause, proceed
restitution to borrowers of interest that would have
been paid since May 9, 2013, date of the Sentence
of the Supreme Court.
Regards
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I am researching on the relationship between the preambles and the body of EU directives in the context of workers' rights to transnational information and consultation (specifically European Works Councils, but not exclusively). While it's obvious the body of the directives needs to be transposed on national level, the binding force of preambles is a point of discussion.
The questions I am looking at are:
1) Are Member States bound to transpose the content (concepts, not necessarily individual provisions) of the directives? The general opinion is: no, they are not. But, maybe other views or dissenting opinions are known to you?
2) If reply to the former question is negative then another question occurs: what's the role of preambles and if it is to stipulate 'the spirit of the directive' (legislator's intentions, goals, reasons, etc.) are national courts obliged (free?) to refer to preambles when deciding on national matters?
All arguments and references to papers/articles/research, etc. in favour of the importance/'binding' force of preambles are welcome (also in legislative areas other than EWCs/workers' rights).
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Hello Romuald,
This is indeed a very just and interesting question. Some remarks as to binding effect of the preamble of the community act have been presented in the CJEU judgment dated 24 November 2005, In Case C-136/04, Deutsches Milch-Kontor GmbH and in the CJEU judgment dated 2 April 2009, in case C-134/08, Hauptzollamt Bremen. According to these judgments: “the preamble to a Community act has no binding legal force and cannot be relied on either as a ground for derogating from the actual provisions of the act in question or for interpreting those provisions in a manner clearly contrary to their wording”.
I hope it will help in your research. 
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Ben Alaya, Air Baltic and Koushkaki were some on the cases, where the CJEU has read rights to entry, residence and visa in EU law.
Are you aware of other cases where the Court does that on the basis of the harmonization of EU law? Any pending cases?
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Thank you all for your replies.
That was all very helpful.
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In Poland an entry ban was also applied in asylum cases, accordingly, for a certain time. Fortunately this practice has now been abolished.
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The Directive says it applies 'without prejudice' to the qualification Directive. It is not clear what exactly that means and the qualification Directive does not mention entry bans. There is no CJEU case law on this point yet. The case law does say that the Returns Directive doesn't apply to asylum seekers, and it must follow that it doesn't apply to those who have protection in that Member State, since it only applies to third-country nationals whose status is not legal, whereas the qualification Directive gives people in need of protection the right to a residence permit. In my view the best interpretation is that the mere existence of an entry ban should not affect the assessment of an application for refugee status, because Article 31 of the Geneva Convention says that in principle refugees cannot be subject to penalties for irregular entry. The same provision of the Convention arguably means that if a person shows a genuine protection need, they cannot be subject to an entry ban and any ban which was imposed has to be repealed.
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I would be grateful if my colleagues experts in EU law could provide with the relevant criteria to ascertain whether researchers can claim equal treatment according to art. 56-57 TFEU when they take part in individual research projects financed by public authorities in Member States other than the one of their residence or nationality. Can analogy be brought to the fore here to oppose requirements which place this situation close to that of the freedom of establishment? For instance, to require a certificate issued by the State Ministry of Education on the official recognition of the HE certificate (which takes 2 years) in order to take part in a research project financed by a local authority.
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In addition to Frank Emmert's suggestion, I would also recommend that you send a request fro free legal advice to the European Commission's "Your Europe Advice" service - they will be able to provide you with personal advice on your EU rights and if appropriate refer your case to the SOLVIT problem-resolution network.
This is the link to Your Europe Advice:
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Each country has a peculiar system of election of Constitutional Court judges and every one of these models has its weaknesses. Procedure for the election of constitutional judges is considered to be one of the guarantees of their independence. Even more interesting is the question of the conditions that candidates for judges of the Constitutional Court must meet in order to be appointed.
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In Spain: 
"
Composition and organisation
The Spanish Constitutional Court is made up of twelve members appointed by H.M the King of Spain; of these, four are proposed by the Congress on the basis of a qualified majority of three fifths of its members; four are put forward by the Senate, with the same majority; two by the Government; and two by the General Council of the Judiciary (Art. 159.1 of the Spanish Constitution (CE)).
Judges of the Constitutional Court are chosen by constitutional mandate amongst renowned legal experts, performing their duties with independence. They may not be removed from office. Their appointment is for a period of nine years and once such term elapses they may not be re-elected for a subsequent term- without the possibility of immediate re-election, unless they have held office for less than three years-, without the law having established any age limit. In order to ensure continuity of the Court’s operations, it is renewed by thirds every three years (Art. 159.3 CE).
The Plenary Meeting of the Court elects a President from amongst its members by ballot; he is appointed by the King for a three-year term, and may be re-elected just once (Art. 160 CE and Art. 9 of the Public General Act of the Constitutional Court (LOTC)). This same procedure is also used to elect the Vice-President of the Court, likewise for a three-year term (Art. 9.4 LOTC).
The Plenary Meeting of the Constitutional Court comprises twelve senior judges and is chaired by the Court President. He is in charge of all proceedings within the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction, although appeals for the protection of constitutional rights (“recursos de amparo”) are only examined under reach-down jurisdiction, given that these remedies are in principle entrusted to the Divisions
There are two chambers in the Constitutional Court, the First Chamber is chaired by the Court President, whereas the Vice-President presides over the Second Chamber. Each Chamber, in turn, is broken down into two Sections, with three Judges in each of them. These Sections basically operate at the initial stages of any proceedings examined by the Court, deciding on the admissibility of appeals. All resolutions adopted by the Plenary Meeting, Chambers and Sections require the attendance of two thirds of their incumbent judges.
The Court has a General Secretariat, under the supervision of a Senior Legal Counsel, who is the head of all the constitutional legal counsellors employed by the Constitutional Court. "
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What are the positive and negative effect of the recast of Brussels I regulation? What effect does it have on English Common law?
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For the discussion on the exclusion of arbitration from the Brussels I (recast), I can recommend:
Brussels I and Arbitration Revisited– The European Commission’s Proposal COM(2010) 748 final
By Martin Illmer, Hamburg, RabelsZ 2011
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The future data protection package includes a General Regulation and a Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data.
However, the data protection package initially leaves unaffected Prüm regime as was pointed out by the European Data Protection Supervisor (Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the data protection reform package, 7 March 2012, 443, page 68 ).
The Amendment 6 of EU Parliament (14 March 2014) introduced it. (EP legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 COM(2012)0010 – C7-0024/2012 – 2012/0010(COD)) Today (4 December 2014) is in discussion within the Council (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/201285)
I am interested in know any comments or articles regarding this question, thanks!
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This paper perhaps does not respond to your question but is a good overview of the efforts to come to common ground and to identify the minimum standards between US-EU privacy law 
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From 2009-2011 I developed my research thesis on conflicts between market freedoms and fundamental rights in ECJ case law (Schmidberger, Omega, Viking, Laval, etc.) And I would like to update my work and to cite recent works on this topic. 
Many thanks. 
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Hi Joaquin,
Check out this article on "Substantial Reform of EU Merger Control on the Cards":  <http://antitrustconnect.com/2014/07/15/substantial-reform-of-eu-merger-control-on-the-cards/>. 
It may take you in a slightly different direction in searching for ECJ cases; however, I think the idea of MNCs being forced to enter a foreign market via greenfield investments rather than the preferred M&A route as one that is rich with research potential.  Could be I am so enthusiastic about this particular angle because, as an American, I deem the right to enter into lucrative financial arrangements and turn a profit to be a fundamental human right that governmental regulatory entities interfere with only at their peril.  Nonetheless, I suggest you look at the article and see if it inspires you (although not hailing from a society driven by market-based capitalism)  to expand your inquiry.
Gwen
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The single supervisory mechanism (SSM) is a new system of banking supervision for Europe, and it comprises the ECB and the national supervisory authorities of the participating countries.
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Dear Anna-Lena, 
Many thanks for your answer and your interesting information! Regards!!
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Dear colleagues,
I am trying to get information on this issue I saw a case in 2011:
24/11/2011: Commission takes Poland to Court over air quality and marine policy legislation and urges compliance with the Nitrates Directive
The European Commission is referring Poland to the Court of Justice of the European Union and asking for financial penalties to be imposed for two failures to transpose EU legislation into national law. Despite earlier warnings, Poland has failed to notify the Commission about the transposition of legislation on the Ambient Air Quality Directive, which should have been in place since 11 June 2010, and about a strategy to protect its seas, which should have been in place since 15 July 2010. On the recommendation of Environment Commissioner Janez Potočnik, the Commission is asking the Court to impose penalty payments. The penalty payments requested are 71,521€ per day for the Ambient Air Quality Directive, and 59,834€ per day in the case of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive. The penalties take into account the seriousness and duration of the infringements. They consist of daily penalty payments to be paid from the date of the judgment (assuming that there is no compliance by then) until transposition is completed.
I would like to know the procedure for calculation of the fine and how the number of days is determined.
Do you know if the fine was paid¡ and how much was it?
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Hi Xavier,
In addition, a nice case where a lump sum as penalty was laid upon Ireland (case C-279/11) involving the EIA directive 85/337/EEC. Ireland can not pay due to the crisis, and so the penaly was reduced...
It would be a nice job to find out how many penalties from the Court are actually payed in the end. I'm afraid you just have stumbled on one of these:
The air quality case against Poland C-48/12 where you are referring to, was removed from the register by order of the president of the Court of 8 January 2013, after intervention of France, Greece, Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Malta and Hungary, who came in to support Poland. The Order of the president: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=135572&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=304713. The intervention: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=124582&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=304713 (in French). I have found no documents on the content of the supporting action. So at least in this air quality case the penalty was withdrawn.
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In many member states of the EU (and specifically in Germany) each University is able to set its own standards of language requirements (some recommendations exist from the HRK, but neither regulation nor law).
Generally speaking a university can follow two tracks for education:
1) 'Elitism' and trying to attract the best (for professors, students, research, ...) which (can) lead to effect that entry language criteria are very high so no language student support has to be given or hinders academic understanding
2) 'Place of Learning' meaning that in a mobile EU for most languages students which not have acquired a academic level of the language and students must be given the chance to enter other Member States with medium language levels and continue learning the language at the host university/state
The highest administrative court in Bavaria has now recognized the discrepancy between European standards and unusually high demands of universities and in the Case of Fuentes given protection (http://www.discrimination.guru/?p=52)
What do you think?
PS: for mobile workers (doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, ...) it is already decided. Language levels must be uniform and low to avoid discrimination
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Dear Walter,
In case of English language courses, each faculty (not University) is free to determine entry threshold. So there is no central regulatory framework. However from practical standpoint, the overriding concern in case of opening new English language courses is to ensure successful launch which usually means that entry bar (at least at the beginning) is not set very high. Therefore the issue discrimination on grounds of language requirements is nonexistent in this aspect.
However there is "grey area" of legal basis for compatibility between various language certificates. There is no official equivalence table of a sort, therefore certain degree of arbitrariness is unavoidable here. I'd say this is the sphere where we may have potential for discrimination.
Hope these remarks prove to be helpful,
Best Regards,
Jakub
dr Jakub Kociubinski WPAiE UWr
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In its judgment on 27 February 2014 the Court of Justice ruled that where a Member State chooses to provide a financial allowance instead of asylum accommodation, the allowance must, inter alia, be sufficient to ensure a dignified standard of living and enable the asylum applicants to obtain housing, if necessary, on the private rental market. Are there any legal or practical consequences of this judgment in your country?
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I think that politicians go so slowly... that mybe in two years, but I think that actually there are no consequences of the C-79/13 Saciri judgment in Spain.  But it is very interesting, I will see!
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Advocate General Yves Bot has suggested that Spain’s actions against the European regulations implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection must be dismissed (C-146/13 and C147-13). 
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Thanks Javier and John for your suggestions. Anna, me too, but I am interested in see it!
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According to art. 3.8 of the directive 2008/115 "voluntary departure" means compliance with the obligation to return within the time-limit fixed for that purpose in the return decision. Is it right to use this notion interchangeably with the notion "voluntary return"?
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I have heard "departure" used far more often than "return" because "return" implies that the migrant is going back to their home country, which might not always be the case. "Departure" is ultimately what the state is requiring the migrant to do, regardless of where the migrant departs to.
There is also the issue of how voluntary departure works in practice. Often times there are significant pressures put on migrants to take the option of leaving voluntarily, so much so that it is hardly voluntary. I recently heard an advocate refer to "voluntary deportation" to describe how coerced these choices often are. Of course there are legal and procedural differences between voluntary departure and deportation, but from the migrant's perspective their may be few differences in the experience.
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Council Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons allows temporarily limited measures to receive refugees into the EU. Is there any legal reason the directive cannot be applied on the current situation of Syrians fleeing their country?
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The directive considers what to do when a mass influx of refugees either enters the European Union, or is going to enter in the very near future.
The directive applies"in the event of a mass influx or imminent mass influx of displaced persons from third countries who are unable to return to their country of origin, immediate and temporary protection to such persons" (Article 2(a))
Article 2(d): "mass influx" means arrival in the Community of a large number of displaced persons, who come from a specific country or geographical area, whether their arrival in the Community was spontaneous or aided, for example through an evacuation programme;
It does not say that the EU is going to create a means for refugees to enter the EU. Unless a "mass influx" of Syrians comes to the EU or is right on the border, the directive does not apply.
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Carrier sanctions
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Regulating Immigration Control: Carrier Sanctions in the Netherlands.
By: Scholten, Sophie; Minderhoud, Paul. European Journal of Migration & Law, Apr2008, Vol. 10 Issue 2, p123-147, 25p
pdf available on EBSCO
Member State Responsibility for Migration Control within Third States -- Externalisation Revisited.
By: Mc Namara, Frank. European Journal of Migration & Law, 2013, Vol. 15 Issue 3, p319-335, 17p
on EBSC is only abstract
Regards,
Agnieszka Parol
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It is almost implied that the environmental law must be uniformly applied cross-border in order to be effective. I attach below a new case from the CJEU C-258/11, only the AG Opinion has been delivered. Except the reinforcement of the importance of the precautionary principle and the specification that an effect which is permanent or long lasting must be regarded as an adverse one in the light of the named principle, the issue of admissibility is also interesting.
It is obvious that nature can not be divided in different jurisdictions, but the reality is that we all live on a political map. A very formalistic interpretation of the admissibility issue would lead to the conclusion that the question was inadmissible.
Economic Freedoms by analogy
According to settled case-law, the provisions of the Treaty do not apply to purely internal situations in a Member State (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑54/88, C‑91/88 an C‑14/89 Nino and Others [1990] ECR I‑3537, paragraph 11; Case C‑134/94 Esso Española [1995] ECR I‑4223, paragraph 17; and Case C‑389/05 Commission v France [2008] ECR I‑5397, paragraph 49).
However, even in a purely internal situation the Court’s answer may nevertheless be useful to the referring court, in particular if its national law required it to grant the same rights to an own national as those which a national of another Member State in the same situation would derive from European Union law. see, Joined Cases C‑570/07 and C‑571/07 Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez [2010] ECR I‑4629, paragraph 39; Case C‑393/08 Sbarigia [2010] ECR I‑6333, paragraph 23; and Case C‑245/09 Omalet [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 15
Where domestic legislation adopts for purely internal situations the same solutions as those adopted in Union law, it is for the national court alone, in the context of the division of judicial functions between national courts and the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU, to assess the precise scope of that reference to Union law, the consideration of the limits which the national legislature may have placed on the application of Union law to purely internal situations being a matter for the law of the Member State concerned and, consequently, falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of that Member State. Joined cases C-439/07 and C-499/07, paragraphs 58-59
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Yes, exactly even in cases where no cross-border element is de facto present, it may be very probable that a similar situation in the near future may involve a resident of another member state. Trade within the internal market is supposed to be free and even potential barriers, which only are likely to hinder the establishment & development of the internal market, are prohibited. (The market access type of approach) This is also the most usual case.
However there are some newer interesting cases coming from other fields than free movement. A very interesting one is the recent antitrust case concerned with a Hungarian Cartel Allianz Hungária Biztosító, case C-32/11. The judgment has been released today and the solution adopted does not follow the AG Opinion from 25 October 2012. I am happy to see that the Court took the view first that it had jurisdiction and second that the issue was admissible.
It's always a good feeling to discover that the Court has ruled in line with your own reasoning. http://www.concurrences.com/anglais/bulletin/news-issues/october-2012/the-ecj-advocate-general-cruz?onglet=1&lang=en