Science topic
Democratization - Science topic
Explore the latest questions and answers in Democratization, and find Democratization experts.
Questions related to Democratization
The structure of global politics over the past several decades, could be discerned through three distinct phases. Initially, the world was characterized by ideological bipolarity, where two major ideological blocs dominated international relations: the liberal democratic world (led by the United States and its allies) and the communist world (led by the Soviet Union). This era, known as the Cold War (approximately 1947–1991), was marked by intense rivalry between these two superpowers, each promoting its own political, economic, and social systems.
After the Cold War ended, a shift occurred towards a multipolar world, in which multiple influential powers (such as the United States, the European Union, China, Russia, Japan, and others) emerged on the global stage. This phase, spanning the next two decades, was characterized by a diffusion of power and a relative balance among different regions and nations. There was no single dominating rivalry, allowing for a more complex and interconnected global order, driven by economic interdependence, technological advancements, and new regional alignments.
In recent years, however, there has been a move towards a new form of bipolarity, now framed as a democracy-authoritarianism binary. This phase sees the global landscape divided between nations that support democratic governance and those that favor authoritarian rule. Unlike the Cold War, where the conflict was based on economic and ideological systems (capitalism vs. communism), this current division centers around political values and governance models (democracy vs. authoritarianism), with countries aligning themselves along these lines.
Overall, the shift represents a significant change from ideological divisions rooted in economic theories to a focus on the nature of political power and governance structures. The re-emergence of bipolarity reflects deeper tensions about how societies should be organized and governed in an increasingly interconnected world.
The new bipolarity reflected through the alliance of the undemocratic (Russia-China-North Korea) letting the multilateralism and its agencies down. The new binary challenges the global questions and their settlement through the legitimate means and facilitates the rule of the force and coercion.
Sharing this 2025 article on RETHINKING DEMOCRACY that just came out, you can check it when you have time
Rethinking democracy 108: Democratic and non-democratic systems: How external and internal paradigm dynamics should be expected to work under changing present-absent effective targeted chaos and independent rule of law conditions and competition for power?
(PDF) Rethinking democracy 108: Democratic and non-democratic systems: How external and internal paradigm dynamics should be expected to work under changing present-absent effective targeted chaos and independent rule of law conditions and competition for power?
Rethinking democracy 108: Democratic and non-democratic systems: How external and internal paradigm dynamics should be expected to work under changing present-absent effective targeted chaos and independent rule of law conditions and competition for power?
There're two outstanding facts in the history of the Russian higher education in the 21st Century: joining the Bologna process in 2003 and an expulsion in 2022. But inspite of geopolitical reasons of both events, no doubt we may observe now a somewhat exhausting the ideological backgrounds for such globalization processes and "democratic prospects" for today's world. Surely, we may attribute this new political agenda to occasionalities, but in fact, one it's necessary to recognize, that the war conflicts in the Post-Soviet space, "US conservative revolution" etc. are parts of a general trend, which is definitely influence higher education at a global scale. Some problems of this transformation have been treated here but it remains more general questions, what values, concepts, strategies and resources will determine the new era in the world-wide higher education in the near 10 - 15 years?
Have you ever read this article normal democratic outcomes and extreme democratic outcomes?
Muñoz, Lucio, 2017. Majority Rule Based True Democracy Under Complacency Theory: Pointing Out The Structure of Normal and of Extreme Democratic Outcomes Analytically and Graphically, Boletin CEBEM-REDESMA, Año 10, No. 8, October, La Paz, Bolivia.
As Catherine Eschle writes, "encampments are often key to creating and renewing democratic institutions. This was a focus of the ‘movements of the squares’ which included the 2011 15M encampments in Spain, the worldwide Occupy movement and the 2013 Gezi Park uprising in Turkey."
Eschle goes on to explain that "[c]amps can also be sites of democratic experimentation and possibility, because of their spatial form and because activists live in them while organising collectively."
An aspect that I would like to highlight about protest camps - or protests generally (sans encampment) - is how they are often maligned by people who adhere to other understandings of democracy, such as liberal representative ones. Instead of trying to understand what the protest is about, and trying to reflect on whether they should be supportive or against the issue/s at hand, there is a rejection of it all due to inconvenience (say Extinction Rebellion roadblocks) or modality ("this is not how democracy is done", "you are too young", "go home", etc).
In my experience, which is primarily within Anglophone countries, it feels as if the sorts of democracy borne of protests are marginal in society and I do think this impoverishes the "democraticity" (Helene Landemore's wonderful term) of such English-language/worldview dominant places.
What do you think? And, if you do not live in English-dominant places, do you feel that it is the same/worse or are the sorts of democracies borne of protests taken up more readily in your society/ies?
What does Donald Trump's re-election victory show us?
Is US society changing?
Can we attribute Trump's victory and his spectacular comeback to four years of failure by the Democrats (especially Joe Biden)?
Have you ever read this article? Some food for thoughts here:
Muñoz, Lucio, 2015. Moral and Practical Sustainability Gaps: Implications for the Current Liberal Development Model, Weber Sociology & Anthropology (ISSN:2449-1632), Vol. 1 (4) 2015, Article ID wsa_149, 317-320.
The poster symbolizes the power of Donald Trump and his neo-Nazi movement to ‘Make America Great Again’. Be warned: his playbook is totally Hitlerian and therefore should not be portrayed (as some in the Comedy club world have) as a political buffoon of no consequence. To start, the Democratic Party and its supporters need to wake up. And it is time that Americans form a Real 3rd Party (under the leadership of a Burnie-Sanders-like candidate) to give Americans choice at the ballot box, otherwise they will wake up to Donald Trump as president (for life) this November. Please tell me why I am wrong?
Are you familiar with the lessons learnt from the coming and going of BREXIT/Brexism and USEXIT/Trumpism in 2016-2024?
Here is a simple academic way of looking at the NEW LIBERAL DEMOCRACY LANDSCAPE where you have normal democratic outcomes competing for power against extreme democratic outcomes….
Muñoz, 2024. Rethinking democracy 102: What are the 3 fundamental lessons learned from facing exism movements and dictatorship threats 2016-2024?. In: CEBEM-REDESMA Boletin, Año 18, Nº 11, La Paz, Bolivia.
Can multiethnic nation, play politics without attaching tribal sentiment.
You have seen the comings and goings now of Trumpism, Brazilianism, and Brexism, 2016 to 2024 and the common theme is why they failed to persist in power ONCE THEY CAME TO POWER. You have seen the direction that exism movements take towards permanent authoritarianism. And you may be familiar with the environment in countries with permanent authoritarianism.
If you look at the evolution of democracy theory since 2016 paradigm shift from normal to extreme liberal democracies in some countries you and you adjusted your previous democratic thinking as now EFFECTIVE TARGETED CHAOS and THE NATURE OF THE COURT SYSTEM IN A CONJUNCTURAL CAUSALITY MODE play a key role. And you compare this environment to the one found in countries UNDER permanent authoritarianism you may see some similarities in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for them to keep power for ever between the structure of permanent authoritarianism from within and well as from outside.
If you take into account this, then you may be able to see that the necessary and sufficient conditions for permanent authoritarianism to stay in power for ever using this new thinking has technically not changed, it is the same before 2016 and it is now in 2024..
And this raises the question: What is the necessary and sufficient condition for permanent dictatorships to remain in power regardless of opposing democratic movements?
What do you think the necessary and sufficient condition is?
Note: The answer is short.
Since 2016 Brexit, the world needed to change the thinking behind traditional democracy as the democratic landscape changed, yet traditional democratic thinkers and actors have been acting as if the competition for power is STILL BETWEEN NORMAL DEMOCRATIC OUTCOMES that are happy to live within an independent rule of law system, when it is no longer the case as now a new variable came into play, legal targeted chaos, that when effective it is a game changer as it leads to extreme democratic outcomes that should be expected to be unhappy living under an independent rule of law system. To be able to answer general questions as the one here, we need to rethink democracy thinking.
And this raises the question: In terms of chaos, what is the necessary and sufficient condition for authoritarianism, permanent or temporary, to come to exist and persist?
What do you think is the answer to this question is from the point of view of just CHAOS?
Regime change often involves significant shifts in political, economic, and social policies, and it can have far-reaching consequences for the affected country and the international community. It may occur through: military intervention, diplomatic or economic pressure, or democratic process.
My question is that why international establishment do this? Your valuable remarks will be highly appreciated.
I corrected some typos in my file, the Democratic Evolution. How can I delte and load a corrected fine?
You see internal and external dynamics in majority rule-based countries with actual extreme democratic outcomes at play and in countries with want to be extreme democratic outcome around, all majority ruled based countries, but even though this has been going on since just before 2016 BREXIT and 2016 USEXIT and continues today with the coming of an extreme democratic outcome in Argentina...
Yet politicians in normal democratic outcome run countries have not yet CLEARLY figured out that the idea that DEMOCRACY is a mess within democratic competitors like NORMAL DEMOCRATIC OUTCOME AGAINS NORMAL DEMOCRATIC OUTCOME, where both are normal democratic outcomes with the best interest of the majority at hand but different approach has CHANGED as when competition is between A NORMAL DEMOCRATIC OUTCOME VERSUS AN EXTREME DEMOCRATIC OUTCOME the nature of the MESS changes as the extreme democratic outcome is not restricted or bound or it does not believe in the democratic values and rules under which it is born; and hence, cometition has a different structure. Hence, the way democratic outcomes compete with extreme democratic outcome needed to change since 2016, but it has not changed yet.
It seems normal democratic outcome run countries appear to be still following normal democratic theory when competing with EXTREME DEMOCRATIC THEORY/ exism theory, which indicates why they have been more often than expected been taken victim of the Murphy’s law under efficient targeted chaos.
Hence, everything changes when we shift from normal democratic outcome to extreme democratic outcome in majority ruled based countries, both internally (extreme democratic outcome vrs normal democratic outcome) and externally (extreme democratic outcome-based country versus normal democratic outcome-based country, and there is a reason to rethink to keep democratic norms where the best interest of the majority, not the minority, rules under majority rule democratic based systems.
And this raises the question: Does paradigm exism theory explain why normal democratic outcome-based countries should not be expected to get along with extreme democratic outcome-based countries?
What do you think? What is your view on the answer to this question.
You have seen the comings and goings now of Trumpism, Brazilianism, and Brexism, and the common theme is why they failed to persist in power ONCE THEY CAME TO POWER. If you look at the evolution of democracy theory since 2016 paradigm shift from normal to extreme liberal democracies in some countries you and you adjusted your previous democratic thinking as now EFFECTIVE TARGETED CHAOS and THE NATURE OF THE COURT SYSTEM IN A CONJUNCTURAL CAUSALITY MODE play a key role you may be able to see that the necessary and sufficient conditions for extreme democratic outcome to come to exist as temporary authoritarianism is different than the necessary and sufficient condition binding to persists under reelections at all costs and become permanent authoritarianism.
And this raises the question: What is the necessary and sufficient condition for exism movements to become permanent authoritarianism from within liberal democracies?
What do you think the necessary and sufficient condition is?
Note: The answer is short.
You have seen the comings and goings now of Trumpism, Brazilianism, and Brexism, 2016 to 2024 and the common theme is why they failed to persist in power ONCE THEY CAME TO POWER.
If you look at the evolution of democracy theory since 2016 paradigm shift from normal to extreme liberal democracies in some countries you and you adjusted your previous democratic thinking as now EFFECTIVE TARGETED CHAOS and THE NATURE OF THE COURT SYSTEM IN A CONJUNCTURAL CAUSALITY MODE play a key role.
If you take into account this, then you may be able to see that the necessary and sufficient conditions for normal liberal democratic outcomes to come to exist and persist has changed as conditions have changed.
And this raises the question: What is the necessary and sufficient condition for normal democratic outcomes to maintain power regardless of the coming and going of exism movements and dictatorship threats?
What do you think the necessary and sufficient condition is?
Note: The answer is short.
Some research indicates that the fist steps toward democratization of an authoritarian regime actually lowers state capacity. How strong is the evidence for this hypothesis?
Why I Asked About Democracy
I asked if democracy has really worked for the progress of a country or if it has contributed more to corruption and self-interest because I want to understand if democracy truly benefits people or if it has serious flaws. Democracy is often seen as the best way to govern, but I want to look deeper at both the good and bad sides of it.
Here are some reasons why this question is important:
1. Progress Evaluation
Democracy and Progress:
- Democracies are often praised for promoting economic growth, social development, and political stability. They allow people to participate in government and protect individual rights.
Key Question:
- Do democratic principles like freedom of speech, free elections, and the separation of powers actually help a country progress socially and economically?
2. Corruption in Democratic Systems
Democracy and Corruption:
- Even with checks and balances, democratic systems can still be corrupt. Corruption can weaken democratic institutions and cause people to lose trust in their government.
Key Question:
- How and why does corruption happen in democracies, and how much does it affect a country's progress?
3. Self-Interest and Populism
Self-Interest and Populism:
- Democracies can be vulnerable to populist leaders who exploit people's fears and desires for their own gain. This can lead to short-sighted policies and undermine democratic institutions.
Key Question:
- How can democratic systems protect themselves from the dangers of populism and leaders who act in their own self-interest?
4. Lessons from Different Countries
International Examples:
- By looking at different countries, both successful democracies and those that struggle with corruption and self-interest, we can learn important lessons.
Key Question:
- What can we learn from the experiences of countries like Norway, Brazil, the United States, South Korea, India, South Africa, and even our own Suriname?
5. Specific Context of Suriname
Suriname’s Reality:
- Suriname, like many other countries, has its own unique challenges and context. It's important to understand how democratic principles work within our specific political, economic, and social framework.
Key Question:
- How can Suriname apply lessons from other countries to strengthen its own democratic system and fight corruption?
Let me please clarify that what is the main characteristic of Democracy? Secondly, how do you see democracy in Turkey and Pakistan? What is the best democratic between Pakistan and Turkey?
The balance of power among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches is crucial for effective democratic governance, preventing the concentration of power and ensuring accountability. However, achieving this balance can be challenging, especially in the face of political polarization, institutional dysfunction, and external pressures. This topic discusses the principles of power balance in democracies, the common challenges to maintaining it, and potential solutions to strengthen democratic institutions and processes.
Autocratic systems offer swift decision-making and short-term stability but often at the cost of human rights and accountability. Democratic systems emphasize inclusivity, accountability, and protection of civil liberties, fostering long-term stability and sustainable development, which are crucial for the diverse and dynamic needs of developing nations. Considering all this, which model suits the best for developing nations and what are the factors that make democracy a better choice?
Having lived in Pretoria for a few months, I recognized the significant potential in South Africa, particularly through its decades-old infrastructure, and its ability to influence other African nations positively. I've been closely monitoring the political landscape since 2012, when I decided to travel there, and have observed notable developments. The African National Congress (ANC) lost its majority in Parliament in the 2024 elections after a 30-year reign. This event offers several critical insights and has extensive implications for both South Africa and the continent. The results showed ANC leading with 40%, followed by the Democratic Alliance with 21% and Jacob Zuma's MK party with 15%. The EFF, led by Joseph Malema, garnered less than 10%. Despite these figures, ANC factions, including the EFF, MK, and other smaller parties, still represented a significant force, though divided on issues like land and tribal affiliations.
Key lessons from this election include the importance of long-standing political parties remaining accountable to their electorate. The ANC's defeat highlighted the need for transparency, the implementation of anti-corruption measures, and good governance. Factionalism within the ANC likely contributed to its electoral losses by alienating many voters. Moreover, enduring socio-economic issues like poverty and inadequate public services have undermined trust in the ruling party, emphasizing the necessity for addressing these problems to retain political support. The shifting demographics, including younger and new voters, demand changes and have different expectations from their leaders, indicating that political parties must stay relevant and engage with these groups actively.
The end of ANC's dominance suggests a shift towards a more competitive political landscape, which could enhance accountability and inspire innovative policymaking. New leadership might introduce changes in economic policies aimed at reducing unemployment, improving education and healthcare, and stimulating economic growth. Furthermore, a change in leadership underscores the importance of democratic processes and the role of institutions in protecting democracy. However, transition periods can be unstable, and it is vital for new leaders to manage these changes cautiously to avert social unrest.
The comparative study of democratic and autocratic governance provides critical insights into how different political systems influence socio-economic development. By examining economic performance, social progress, institutional quality, and public participation, this discussion seeks to identify the strengths and weaknesses of each governance model. Participants are encouraged to share empirical evidence, case studies, and theoretical perspectives to foster a comprehensive understanding of the topic.
There was widespread social discontent/protest in the UK in 2016 after Brexit/2016 and in the USA after Trump/2016 after their exism movements won the democratic contest under effective targeted chaos.
The same has happened in other countries where liberal democracies under majority rule have produced an extreme democratic outcome since 2016, the latest case is ARGENTINEXISM/2023.
And this raises the question: Murphy's law remorse and widespread social protest/discontent after exism movements/extreme democratic outcomes come in to power: Are they linked?.
What do you think?
If you think that they are linked why do you think so?
If you think they are not linked why do you think so?
Note:
Key concepts: Murphy's law, Murphy's law remorse, effective targeted chaos, exism movements, extreme democratic outcomes, social discontent after the fact
What are the factors contributing to the rise of authoritarianism and democratic backsliding around the world, and how can we strengthen democratic norms and institutions?
How can we combat political polarization and rebuild trust in democratic institutions in the face of misinformation and disinformation?
Why is the aristocratic system not the alternative system to the democratic system, especially since this system did not take up sufficient space in government?
In an essay on the types of democracy used by members of the Church of Norway, Helge K. Nylenna points to the broader picture of the democracies (and democratic innovations) used/created by other non-governmental organizations.
Here I encourage that we try not to think of the "big" global NGOs but rather that we focus on the ones started locally, as community groups, ones that remain small in number.
These smaller NGOs are deeply underappreciated sites of democratic innovation and, in my experience with the literature, appear infrequently within the works of democracy's professional students (aka academics/lifelong practitioners in international democracy development and promotion).
Is there a small NGO that you know of that runs itself democratically?

There has not been any intentional probe on the role of youth and social media in reforming Nigeria’s democratic process whereas recent involvement of the Nigerian youth in socio-political matters and their engagement on different social media has shown the tendency to impact the democratic process and engineer changes that could herald reforms.
this is a dissertation in the partial fulfilment of Master degree
i need articles that are related to peace building and Democratic peace theory .
i will also need articles that have argued if Ghana is 'at peace'
I propose as subject for a discussion my PDF-PowerPoint "Remarks on Seyla Benhabib’s interpretations of the cosmopolitan rights". I prepared this PDF-Powerpoint for my lecture at the INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC-PRACTICAL CONFERENCE, Alfraganus University, Tashkent, 3-4 October 2023. My essay is dedicated to the analysis of aspects of Benhabib’s interpretations of the birth of cosmopolitan rights. The expression “the right to have rights” is contained in different works of Seyla Benhabib: it refers, in the thought of Benhabib, to the birth of a new constellation of human rights. This new constellation of human rights consists in the claim, which every individual may raise, to be acknowledged and protected as a person by the world community. In Benhabib’s view, rights and the interpretation of rights have profoundly changed after and thanks to the different covenants and conventions signed by the countries belonging to the world community for the protection of human rights: this process of transformation of the interpretation of human rights began with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. The new dimension of human rights is a cosmopolitan one: it is not merely a national dimension. This new dimension overcomes the dimension of particular countries; it promotes, and, at the same time, it calls for the creation of new juridical spaces. Through this new dimension, moreover, individuals are no longer seen as being only citizens of a particular country: individuals are elevated, thanks to the new dimension of the rights, to the condition of world citizens possessing rights which are independent of their belonging to a particular country. Cosmopolitan norms create a new universe of values, of juridical meanings and of social relationships that did not exist at all before the creation of these norms. Seyla Benhabib has expressed the birth of the new constellation of rights in many of her works such as, for instance, The Rights of Others. Aliens, Residents and Citizens, Another Cosmopolitanism. With Commentaries by J. Waldron, B. Honig, W. Kymlicka, and Dignity in Adversity. Human Rights in Troubled Times. The new dimension of rights directly (that is, without the mediation of a particular country) connects every individual to the world community: the right dimension does not depend on a particular country and it is not limited to the validity it possesses within a particular country. The authority that corresponds to and is responsible for, at least, some rights of the individuals is the world community. The right of men qua men, that is, the rights independent of a determined citizenship and not coinciding with a determined citizenship emerge gradually, even though this process is steadily being affected by backlashes. As covenants and conventions signed by the countries of the world community, Benhabib mentions the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948); the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (approved on 28 July 1951); the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination – ICERD – (adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 21 December 1965); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – ICCPR – (adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – ICESCR – (adopted by United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966); the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women – CEDAW – (adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1979); the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment – UNCAT – (adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1984). Within the new constellation of human rights, particular countries are being surpassed by the world community: particular countries do not represent the first and last authority for the acknowledgement of rights. Correspondingly, individuals possess determined rights qua human beings: to have certain rights does not depend on the individuals’ possession of a particular citizenship; to have rights depends on the fact that individuals belong to mankind. A new dimension of the individuals comes about: individuals are not only citizens of a country; they are, first of all, human beings, and they have to be recognised as human beings. Benhabib sees a fundamental difference between the Westphalian and the post-Westphalian concept of country and rights. Within the Westphalian interpretation of rights, countries are the first and last authority for the acknowledgement of rights. Within the post-Westphalian interpretation of rights, countries depend on common values and on common principles which they have accepted: countries obligate themselves to the protection of definite rights and definite principles; this means that countries acknowledge these rights and these principles as being over the sovereignty of the countries themselves. A new dimension of countries, a new dimension of rights, and a new dimension of individuals arise at the same time. An indispensable presupposition for the promotion of the integration between inhabitants of a country is, according to Benhabib, that citizenship does not depend on ethnos: to belong to a definite ethnos ought not to be the condition for possessing citizenship. If the condition for possessing a citizenship depends on belonging to a definite ethnos, all the inhabitants of a country not belonging to the definite ethnos are automatically excluded from citizenship. This kind of condition for possessing the citizenship of a country is steadily being used to bring about the exclusion of definite inhabitants and groups of inhabitants, for instance, the exclusion of all the inhabitants that have been compelled to or are compelled to migrate to a country. Benhabib strongly differentiates between the concepts of ethnos and of demos as criteria for the possession of the citizenship: Whereas the concept of ethnos represents a closed concept, the concept demos represents a completely different conception as regards the conditions for membership: demos is a flexible concept, since demos can always be modified by political decisions. Benhabib is particularly firm when it comes to all the structures establishing the right to citizenship on belonging to an ethnos; she is likewise firm as to all the structures excluding certain inhabitants of a country from the right to citizenship because these inhabitants belong to a culture which is different from the culture of the majority of a country: a democratic institution may not afford to forever exclude inhabitants from acquiring citizenship; every kind of such an exclusion is, in the opinion of Benhabib, simply not compatible with a democratic order. To conclude, I believe it should be noted that Benhabib endorses a kind of flexible, dynamic interpretation of the concept of culture: this means that cultures do not constitute unchangeable patterns; cultures are structures continuously changing: they are dynamic patterns. Moreover, Benhabib considers all individuals as not being prisoners of their own culture; Benhabib does not accept concepts like culture essentialism or culture reductions, as if individuals essentially belonged to only a culture and as if individuals could be reduced to only a culture: individuals possess cultures, they are not possessed by them. All individuals maintain, in the opinion of Benhabib, autonomy in relation to their own culture: individuals are more than just a culture.
In their essay, Erica Dorn and Federico Vaz make the assertion that:
"Current democratic structures designed to be representative of the people cannot adapt to the increasing number of people on the move. As a result, an overwhelming gap exists between the rapidly changing reality of democracies made up of ineligible voters, and the need for inclusive participation in the democratic process."
How, therefore, can representative democratic structures account for an increasingly mobile demos?
In his essay here (https://theloop.ecpr.eu/how-to-overcome-democratic-gridlock/), Pablo Ouziel states:
"Today, our ability to imagine democratic futures is diluted, and narrow perspectives on democracy are presented as universal. Such a state of affairs [...] calls for a conversation among democratic traditions that emphasises diversity and reciprocity."
From my perspective, a key to emphasising diversity and reciprocity, as Ouziel puts it, is to carefully describe the thousands of different manifestations of "democracy" (<- this includes synonyms in English and like-terms in other languages) that we can presently perceive.
I'm thinking, for example, of Panchayats, the Haudenausonee Confederacy, Black democracy, but also Tlaxcallan republicanism, decision-making among the Inuit (including their circumpolar democracy), and thousands of other already-existing examples like this.
I think that if people can understand these different manifestations (myself included!) they can then be equipped to use that information if they wish to do so by, for example, communicating it to others or implementing aspects of it/combinations of it, wherever they want in their lives.
What comes to mind for you when you read Pablo Ouziel's encouragements?
Democracy links to a genetic or epigenetic regulation? Can we create democratic mice or humans? The switch on/off of Democratic values depend on the social; memories; spatial properties of the individual or the society?
Are we democratic individuals or just members of social groups who follow?
Mencius/Confucius wrote the following some estimated 2,400 years ago:
"‘The people are the most important element in a nation; the spirits of the land and grain are the next; the sovereign is the least 民為貴,社稷次之,君為輕" (see book 7, part 2)"
As Li-Chia Lo explains, Mencius is here giving an explanation for the term "min ben" 民本 which, due to its adherence to sovereignty, is controversial among liberal democrats.
I find this controversy confusing, though, as liberal representative democracy has always been strongly adherent to the (at least) Westphalian nation-state. In fact, in practice it seems that the state is considered the most important in liberal democracies, the land (resources) secondmost, and peoples last. One could argue that the liberal democratic state is simply a synonym for an Emperor. Like an Emperor, the state must find ways to stay atop the "slippery egg" of legitimacy (as John Keane puts it from time to time), it must continue to prove its worth to the people in its capture lest they revolt, and it must also keep its power away from the people lest the elites lose it (and therefore lose their privilege or, as some paternalists see it, allow anarchy caused by state failure).
In short, I see more similarities between minben theory and liberal democratic theory than differences. Perhaps this is why there is discomfort among our liberal democratic peers about minben for it exposes the "Emperor/dictatorship" of electoral democracies (David Beetham recognized this dictatorship across more than 40 years of publishing democratic theory - so this is not a new position either).
Have a read of Li-Chia Lo's essay and let us know what you think. We'll be seeing more of these discussions between languages and their respective contested concepts.
"Ruthless", writes Jennifer Greiman, "is not a descriptor normally attached to democracy. Unlike familiar modifiers – constitutional, representative, direct – it does not simply describe a stable and recognisable form that the rule of a people might take. Instead, 'ruthless democracy' describes an egalitarian principle that is pursued without sentimental attachment to the permanence of any particular form. It is a commitment to the fundamental equality of human (and nonhuman) life that demands a receptivity to perpetual change."
As you can see for yourself in reading Greiman's essay, the concept comes from Herman Melville's many contributions to democratic thought. My favourites are the story of "round robins" (see image attached) - which is a democratic approach to mutiny and also Greiman's conception of "cetocracy", or a polity of whales.
What is it about ruthless democracy that draws your attention? What stands out for you?

The potential for AI to generate convincing fake content raises questions about misinformation, propaganda, and the influence it may have on public perception and democratic processes.

What is the propensity for authoritarian regimes to use quazi-democratic institutions, such as sham elections, stacked legislative bodies, etcetera, to undermine the public's confidence in democratic principles, thereby averting opposition?
Democracy, writes Nathan Pippenger, "involves a kind of cultural aspiration wrapped up in words and meanings."
But "[h]ow can this distinctive way of living together include all citizens when the demos comprises such different groups?"
The answer that Pippenger provides to this question is thrilling. He follows Ralph Ellison's example to argue that to understand a diverse community's democracy - and democratic aspirations - we need to examine its common talk.
"Ellison", Pippenger writes, "did not naively believe that the vernacular process would automatically resolve complex questions that arise in culturally diverse democracies. But his writings offer an account of how certain virtues of artistic and political importance — such as creativity, aesthetic sensitivity, and openness to novelty — can help citizens overcome social barriers without resorting to assimilation. In this way, he believed, the everyday workings of language and culture might promote a shared democratic life."
What would you say is your community's aspiration for democracy? And how did you get there through your understanding of the common talk around you?
Remi Chukwude Okeke argues that we need to demonstrate the effectiveness of democracy in, for example, families, schools, apartment buildings, etc., so that people can see, for themselves, that being democratic in those settings suits (at least) their self-interests.
Importantly, as Okeke and others point out, there are many benefits to being democratic in our social lives - benefits most of us do not get as our social lives are, in the majority, authoritarian in nature.
What is your proposal for how we can do this?
In my esteem, the key is to try to practice democracy or be democratic (however defined) in one's own family, etc., and to lead by example.
What do you think?
In the essay linked above, psychologist Fathali M. Moghaddam argues that "actualised democracy does not exist – yet. And this is because we have not yet achieved the psychological portrait of the democratic citizen in a demographically broad or especially multiracial sense."
To get there, Maghaddam avers, we each need to all get better at practising ten characteristics of thought which he sees as integral to manifesting (bringing about) the possibility of an individual behaving/being a democratic citizen.
These ten characteristics are given as follows:
1. "I could be wrong"
2. "I must critically question everything"
3. "I must revise my opinion as the evidence requires"
4. "I must seek to better understand those who are different from me"
5. "I can learn from those who are different from me"
6. "I must seek information and opinions from as many different sources as possible"
7. "I should be actively open to new experiences"
8. "I should be open to creating new experiences for others"
9. "There are principles of right and wrong"
10. "Not all experiences are of equal value"
Would you question any of these characteristics, want to change/rephrase one or more, or add to this list?
Hager Ali, in the essay linked above, makes what I believe to be a profound argument. Today, "autocracies around the world are emulating democratic features and democracies [are adopting] authoritarian characteristics". Perhaps this has always been the nature of regimes for as long as there have been regimes. Some are better at being "democratic" whilst others less so.
Ali demonstrates that we, private citizens, residents, and visitors of various sorts, need to get better at differentiating what makes a "real and existing democracy" - be that in a country or school or family - and why that's the case.
This is a formidable challenge as most of us are ill-equipped to understand the often delicate or nuanced differences between an act of democracy and an act of authoritarianism. Some say that "you know it when you see it" but I am not convinced. Today's ars politica are often sophisticated and power, as John Keane wrote a few years ago, has taken on a more spectral (shadowy) quality. We require an upgrade to whatever the perceptive faculty of ours that is responsible for detecting a democratically-formulated order of power.
Ali offers one approach to help us detect democratic order: democratic states control their militaries through civilian oversight.
What approach might you offer to help others detect "democracy"?
In July of 2021, a short essay of mine was published by invitation from the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (Religion & Ethics section: https://www.abc.net.au/religion/words-of-democracy-an-abandoned-science/13386940).
In that essay, I worked through an idea put forward by the philosopher Isaiah Berlin to argue that we can approximate democracy's total texture by collecting its many thousands of words (e.g. 'black democracy', 'democracy lite', 'archaic democracy', etc) and studying them, where they came from, why they exist, what their democratic credentials are (<- this must be recurringly participatory and not an 'expert only' determination), how they relate to one another in meaning or through bibliometrics, etc.
As enchanting as the idea was and remains (we are preparing a homegrown AI-supported open digital encyclopedia of the democracies), what brilliant thinkers like Alex Prior and nearly 100 others have shown, is that should a total texture of democracy ever be approximated it is going to require far more data than just words but also theories to help us all understand these many, and disparate, data.
For example, Prior suggests that we look to fractals: Benoit Mandelbrot is credited with the 'discovery' of fractal geometry which pairs art and math together so very well. Prior relies on fractal art/geometry as a metaphor to show that certain types of democracy - such as electoral majoritarianism - does repeat itself from the smallest scale to largest scale. Indeed, what Prior doesn't mention in his essay is that neurologists have shown that dendrites in animal brains rely on majoritarian decisions! (See: ) And that our planet, Gaia/Pachamama/Turtle Island/etc, is arguably itself majoritarian in how planetary systems self-regulate.
If you were to try to make sense of democracy's immense diversity in the world, how would you do it?
Reginald Oduor writes the following:
"Prior to the incursion of Western imperialism, a sizeable proportion of the governance models of Africa’s peoples placed a high premium on consensus-building rather than majoritarianism."
Oduor goes on to detail how elections across Africa today continue to stifle democratization in the continent and that's precisely because majoritarianism is used to shut down discussion.
The critical stance toward making a majoritarian decision first instead of last, as often happens in elections, was also struck decades ago by David Beetham. He, too, held the opinion that we should only use a majoritarian decision when all other options to reach a decision have failed.
In short, consensus-building, deliberation, etc., should be what we reach for first when it is time to decide who our representatives will be or when it is time to make any sort of decision.
What do you think? Why should reaching for a majoritarian decision be the last resort and not the first option to be tried?
Neology and sociolinguistics are at the crossroads of analysis for the democratization processes and need an integral approach combined with the concept studies to understand linguistic democratization dynamics fully.
Linguistic Democratization of the Modern English Language - one more book chapter of mine is now in the wild of the #openaccess academic realm. This chapter focuses on Functional Parameters of English Youth Slang Neologisms.
Thanks to prof. Nata Lazebna who co-edited this collective monography with prof. Dinesh Kumar - Studies in Modern English published by The Julius Maximilians University of Würzburg Press.
Big shout out to prof. Rusudan Makhachashvili who created and leads a network of Contemporary English researchers now being scattered across the globe but contributing wherever we are.
Shtaltovna, Y. (2022). Linguistic Democratization of the Modern English Language: Functional Parameters of English Youth Slang Neologisms // N. Lazebna / D. Kumar (Ed.), Studies in Modern English, Würzburg, 2022, p. 105-115. DOI: 10.25972/WUP-978-3-95826-199-0-105

Lucy J. Parry points out the exclusionary character of "mainstream" democratic theory. Parry writes:
"There is a disconnect between democratic innovations in academic research and practice. Hans Asenbaum and Friedel Marquardt have already pointed out that, to reinvigorate democracy, we need to engage with those who enact it outside academia in their day-to-day work and lives. Practitioners – including facilitators, designers, public servants, NGOs and consultants – have been somewhat neglected in this debate. Yet they are often on the frontline of democratic innovations, and their experience can greatly enhance our understandings of democracy."
For more, see: https://theloop.ecpr.eu/connecting-theory-to-the-messy-realities-of-democratic-innovations-in-practice/
I have discussed Parry's point on and off with colleagues since this essay was published and one of the recurring questions in these discussions is how to connect with practitioners.
Academics are trained in typically exclusive arts that rely on specializing in specific methodologies, adopting certain writing styles, using technocratic language, publishing in specialist outlets, and attending specialist events/developing specialist networks. This does not bode well for collaborating with experts who not only do none of these things but sometimes have little interest in the "high theory" that some democratic theorists promote.
What would be your suggestion for helping democratic theorists to connect with experts outside of academia?
How will emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and blockchain, impact democratic processes and governance structures?
What is the best way to conduct this study?
In the Netherlands, there are currently administrative law experiments in which people who instigate public order disturbances via social media can be dealt with (e.g. with a fine). The first court case shows that this cannot stand up under local rules (local ordinance). Are there any known examples from other democratic regimes where public order disturbances incited via the Internet are prevented through legislation or through cooperation with social media platforms? Please let me know, thanks!
It's talking about public opinion in democratic governance
In his essay here (https://theloop.ecpr.eu/untangling-description-deception-and-denunciation-a-linguistic-twist-to-the-science-of-democracy/), Rikki J. Dean states that: "[w]ords do not only describe, they also deceive and denounce".
This creates a puzzle for us. On the one hand, there are excellent reasons to trust that anyone can establish for themselves which words have some democraticity or democratness about them. They will be able to spot the fakes. On the other hand, there are arguably equally excellent reasons to say that this is not the case - that experts need to weigh in and provide advice on words and their meanings so that everyone can at least understand why x is considered "democratic" but not "y" and make up their minds from there.
What do we do in a situation where there seem to be two truths? Pursue them both at the same time? How would you solve this puzzle?
As a result of tools such as Chat GPT, Bing and others, What would be the main risks for democratic systems when using AI like these? personalized fake news? Perpetuation of biases? Or what other elements?
Anyone can kindly share a sample copy of (Principals Leadership Style) and (Teachers Job Performance) Questionnaires used in Parveen et al. 2022 study :Impact of Principal Leadership Styles on Teacher Job Performance: An Empirical Investigation or any other useful validated questionnaires. I'm looking at the impact of autocratic and democratic leadership styles on teachers performance. Thank you
In her essay, Paula Sabloff asserts that:
First and foremost, a democratic government protects people’s human rights as laid out in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Among these are the right to life, to freedom from degrading punishment or enslavement, and to follow one’s own beliefs. They also include the right to citizenship and, most relevant to dignity, the right to self-determination.
If you were asked to complete the sentence: A democratic government must ...
What would you come up with? What would be your answer or list of minimum requirements?
In reading John B. Min's essay here (https://theloop.ecpr.eu/a-democratic-philosophy-for-democracys-data-mountain/) I began to wonder about "democratic progresses" as opposed to the now all too familiar "democratic backslidings".
For me, at the moment, "democratic progresses" looks like a combination of private citizens (inclusive of residents and visitors, especially migrants), civil society (or public sphere) organisations, and public things/officials/institutions working together to develop trustworthy patterns of behaviour given to enhancing the power of people - especially marginalised individuals and groups.
These sorts of progresses are people-driven and advices are provided to them by so-called "democracy experts" (broadly conceived).
One example is the rising interest and practice in "sortive", "aleatory", or "sortition democracy".
What do you think? What examples come to mind for you and why?
Patricia Roberts-Miller begins her essay as follows:
"'Thucydides’ trap' is famous in international relations, used to describe a situation in which a rising power threatens an existing hegemon. It’s also a misnomer — it describes a 'trap' of no interest to the Athenian historian Thucydides. Neither is it applicable to the relationship between Sparta and Athens that would result in the regionally devastating Peloponnesian War, the history of which Thucydides wrote. The misnomer is the consequence of a misunderstanding of a quote from a secondary writer, and an anachronistic understanding of what it means to be a hero in classical literature."
This led to my asking: what does it mean to be a hero today especially in relation not only to "democracy" but to "the democracies" - the thousands of possible routes that we can take to be ever more democratic, ever better democratic people?
To my mind, perhaps because I am working on a book called "Democracy Therapy: Democratic Treatments for our Authoritarian Lives", such a hero tries to democratise their family, or school, workplace, condo/apartment building, local hospitals, their neighbourhood, domestic relations with non-human life, and so forth - all, notably, more social than political spaces.
What does being a hero of the democracies today mean to you?
In his essay, Ramon Van Der Does (https://theloop.ecpr.eu/the-best-use-of-our-limited-resources-in-service-of-democracy/) argues that: "We already know the cures for many of democracy's ills. What we lack are ways to realise the transition towards a deeply democratic society".
Why is that the case? What is preventing us from achieving deeply democratic societies?
"Democratic theory should account for diverse democratic practices happening worldwide. At a closer look, this deceptively simple proposition leaves contemporary democratic theory with a range of conceptual and methodological puzzles. How can we acknowledge plural forms of democracy in our normative and empirical endeavours? How can we gain a more comprehensive picture of diverse understandings of democracy in the first place?"
These are the words of Dannica Fleuss from Fleuss's essay here: https://theloop.ecpr.eu/gagnons-data-mountain-a-lookout-point-for-revolutions-to-come/
The puzzle of accounting for diverse democratic practices is, it seems to me, made up of philosophical and methodological challenges.
Philosophically: what is democracy? who constructs it? where? with what justification? would a specimen of it "count" as a "valid" democracy if, for example, that specimen falls more into the authoritarian family of resemblance than the democracy family?
Methodologically: what tools do we use to detect democratic practices when meaning is so variable? how can this work be done affordably? where is the data kept? who is overseeing that the benefit of this work goes to, e.g., marginalised scholars & practitioners (if not one and the same)?
Are there any emphases you would like to add to the puzzle or questions to its philosophical or methodological aspects?
Alex Prior makes the excellent point that "[w]e cannot simply airdrop a democratic institution and expect a democratic outcome, because the institution inevitably ‘lands’ on an already established context".
For more see his essay here: https://theloop.ecpr.eu/rethinking-understanding-democratic-trends/
Like others who have studied global histories of democracy, I take this "already established context" to mean that people - wherever they are to be found - innately understand what it means to, for example, resent a tyrant, want freedom from authority, and seek the autonomy to live as they see fit (collectively, individually). These feelings can turn into institutional/cultural "birth moments" or origination points of a form/type/kind/model of democracy.
Do you know of any resources that can help us map these "births" of the democracies?
As someone who is considered a newcomer in the architectural academic field, I found the typical teaching process to take place inside closed studios without engaging the community in whatever we are teaching.
Upon searching for the meaning of open education systems, most of the readings talk about the structure and the role of administration in the educational process. Yet, there seems to be limited writings on the quality of education itself, i.e. the production and delivering of knowledge inside the studios. Teaching manner, which takes the place of the learning manner, is a one-way direction from the teacher to the students.
Where is the community? Doesn't including the people ensure a more democratic design process? Do you think the teaching process should take place in a more open environment rather than the traditional studio rooms?
Thomas Bunting argues that "sport is a forum for democratic contestation" (https://theloop.ecpr.eu/sporting-democracy-as-illustrated-by-the-qatar-world-cup/).
What are examples of democracy or democratic contestation in sport?
In her essay, Sonia Bussu avers that "democracy is far removed from our daily lives". See: https://theloop.ecpr.eu/democracy-as-a-way-of-living/
I read this as meaning most of us do not have an "inner" or "psychogenic" democracy, most families/homes are not democratic, nor schools, workplaces, apartment/condo buildings, hospitals, aged care facilities, prisons, even many social/sporting clubs.
Why do you think our social lives are so far removed from democracy (meaning they are more authoritarian/autocratic in nature)?
We are probably all aware by now that artificial intelligence will disrupt virtually every single industry globally. It will eliminate millions of old jobs and create millions of new ones. Memorization, multiple-choice testing, or rote work will no longer be relevant to these new jobs. Even jobs in the service sector that traditionally need the "human touch," like nursing and teaching will be affected in one way or another.
Unfortunately, the developing world will probably make attempts to adhere to "tradition" and resist change. How can we democratize technology so that students gain the data and computer literacy needed to succeed in the job market of the future despite this resistance?
Friedel Marquardt avers the following:
"[The] naming and recording of various definitions of democracy gives place to those definitions that may not have been considered or acknowledged before, often eclipsed by more prominent definitions like liberal democracy. Identifying a manifestation as 'democracy' and applying the term to it has the effect of recognising a wide range of practices as democratic. It gives them legitimacy among the other more prominent democracies identified." (For more, please read Marquardt's essay here: https://theloop.ecpr.eu/who-gets-a-say-in-the-meanings-of-democracy/)
Which practices around you, perhaps ones you conduct yourself, are not formally part of the "canon of democracy" but should be?