Questions related to Continental Philosophy
Cleaning my bookshelf (and eliminating some items), I found a book the title of which ran: "How to read Heidegger" --- My reply: In no way! Do not do that. --- I did it, and I wrote long ago that I had not found in Heidegger anything which seemed to me (1) understandable, (2) true, (3) relevant and (4) new at the same time. --- Why is Heidegger considered a great philosopher? His exotic language does have a poetic dimension, but it looks empty at the level of content.
The title says it all really. I recently started my journey in continental philosophy, and Heidegger's hermeneutic circle caught my attention quickly. However, I'm not sure what's new about it really? What has been added by Heidegger's understanding of the circle to the field?
I'm slighly perplexed, but I hope some of you will guide me to the right direction
Also, if there are 'readings' that you think is essential for this topic, feel to free to recommend them :-)
Has there been a reading of Kant's transcendental aesthetic (particularly the trans. ideality of space) that makes use of our latest empirical findings on the matter? Anything from Visual Phototransduction to Relativity and everything in between.
While using empirical data to justify an argument from first principles seems incoherent, the debate screams for reconciliation.
Heidegger uses this term in SZ which has been translated in BT (p. 69-70) as "pregnant structures" to differentiate between the use of categories and I think the happenings of Dasein's everyday dealings with the world. Looking at other sources is confusing me as the surrounding language is full of ambiguity. Could someone please explain this to me in simple terms.
In this I mean other profound scholars that have defined hegemony as having the ability to represent those being dominated in a particular regime of representation.
If a proposition is non-analytic (that is, if it denies the existence of anything like categorical truths) is it then necessarily synthetic? Are there other alternatives?
There are two pillars of consciousness, that of intentionality, which includes thoughts, ideas, desires, motives and goals. The other side of consciousness is that of phenomena, which includes sensations, perceptions and feelings. These are troublesome for philosophy of mind philosophers because things such as color vision, the redness of red is not physical but is mental; the experience of a red rose is different from the physics of it all, this is related to the "Mary Problem" and what Goethe was pointing out, which is that Newtonian vision theory gives us everything about the theory of light but what we actually see and also perceive as beauty. Another example would be pain. One can pinch another and watch the physics and the biology of it all, but never will that observer 'feel' that other person's pain. The C Fibers can be watched and the damaged tissue, and the signals to the brain but one can't feel the pain of another. Also, ideas and other intentionalities aren't like tables and chairs that you can poke, prod and measure. They seem mental. like perceptions of color and feelings. Furthermore, reasons seem different than physical causes in that if you take a brain, blow it up to the size of a building and walk in what one would see is fat, protein and water, which translates into mostly dendrites, axons and synapses. No where do we "see" and idea. I don't want to debate my metaphysics or my epistemology though please.
However, what I want to know is if these two categories, that of intentionality and phenomena, as described above, fit into what Kant would call the noumenal realm.
Thank you ever so much for any help you may give.
I find myself going in a paradoxical loop when I think about the distinctions. Insofar that it seems that the two need each other instead of one being valid over another.
For example, let us begin by accepting Kant's refutation of t.realism. T. idealism allows us to demarcate between noumena and phenomena. The phenomena is of an empirical idealist existence. Yet my question is, does not the intersubjectivity constituted out of empirical idealism create a type of transcendental realism? As soon as he puts the thought to paper, and write a symbol to be interpreted by another, does he not instantiate an existence that he previously refuted?
I see Gadamer's philosophy in Truth and Method as radar.
An event happens we get certain signals. Based on these signals we send out a response (our response is heavily laden with language that plays us). This response hits the event and we get returned feedback. We recalculate and send back another response, this time we get a slightly nuanced feedback. We repeat this "dialogue" and eventually we get a sense of the form of this "thing".
The next time an event "like this" happens, based on the historicity of our being we know to engage it such manner. Yet, this case shows something different of the "thing" and so our knowledge of the thing grows yet is always revealing previously hidden realms.
Am I way off here?