Questions related to Aristotle
If you consider evolution law "fitest survive" it means what survive is traits are labeled fitest just because it did (empirical basis, not logical). Similarly, dynamics law means
"what accelerates is forcive" i. E earth(gravity), human (muscular).
In this case, care was taken by Newton to avoid this objection. Force is action and motion was considered action in Aristotle (and Common sense). By he made it passive (inertia property) and had a descriptive field devoted to it (kinematics) so that it Will not appear as action.
When I search for articles and understandings around decolonizing education, I find a lot of resources related to decolonizing the curriculum in general terms, decolonizing specific areas within higher education (e.g. history, art, politics, etc.). I find articles on understanding the theories and possible practices and praxes around what decolonization can look like.
However, what I do not seem to be able to find is this: how do we undertake decolonization of the teaching of education?
More specifically, reading lists and course content on introductory education courses, such as those on Year 1 education courses at university-level courses within the UK context, often start with content that reaches back to Ancient Greece, Aristotle and so on before jumping ahead to John Dewey and others. In this sense, the curriculum of education is overtly Eurocentric and white in nature.
Is there literature that addresses this particular area? I have read literature by Anibal Quijano, Maria Lugones, Lewis Gordon, Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Ramon Grosfoguel and many others... yet I'm still left wondering about this question. How do we undertake a decolonization of the very basis of education itself especially for prospective teacher-educators, those who study master's and doctorates of education who will likely be (re)introduced to Aristotle's philosophy of education (among others) that will not contextualize his role historically?
I propose for a discussion my study regarding some aspects of Aristotle's ontology. I am interested in all comments - apart from insults -.
The study has been published in the Revue Roumaine de Philosophie, Vol 64, Issue 1, January-June 2020, pp. 39-71.
Keywords: Aristotle, instance, Categories, Metaphysics, substance.
In my contribution, I deal with some aspects concerning the textures, which, in my opinion, represent the bearing structures of Aristotle’s ontology.
Throughout my investigation, I show that, within Aristotle’s ontology, the basic status of any individual/particular entity consists in its being an instance of a property or of a complex of properties: individual/particular entities are, constitutively, concretised properties. Neither bare entities, nor entities which could be neutral to all their properties, are admitted into Aristotle’s ontology; at least some properties represent the very framework of the individual/particular entities. Hence, essences do exist. Aristotle’s interpretation of individual/particular entities is an immediately essentialist one.
I show thereafter the presence, within Aristotle’s ontology, of features which constitutively determine the status of substance and of universal. The complex of the features related to substances and to universals implies the existence of ontological rules making up the framework of any substance as such and of any universal as such. These ontological rules precede the properties belonging to the particular concrete substances as members of a particular species or of a particular genus. Among the ontological rules which govern substances and universals, the rules stating the incompatibility between substance and universal deserve particular attention, since the transgression committed against these rules can provoke the collapse of the whole ontology.
My analysis ends with the description of some facets regarding the role of the essence within the biological field. For this purpose, the soul as essence of biological entities is described in its function as principle of development of the living entities.
I base my inquiry on passages taken from the Metaphysics Mu and Zeta, the Posterior Analytics, the De Caelo, the Categories and the De Anima.
Usually, literature is analysed by means of textual methods (textual analysis). As I am about to start analysing my selected novels for PhD using a philosophical theory, this question came to my mind.
Aristotle, in his book titled Politics, notes that one of the weak points in a democracy is that because people are considered "politically equal" they imagine they should be equal to everyone else in all other ways.
We see the same cultural movements occurring in our democracies today.
The push for equality in everything is being exploited by politicians everywhere through assorted wealth redistribution efforts, or efforts to lower education standards so that everyone can be awarded college degrees in something.
Prior to the Industrial Age, where almost limitless amounts of money have become available to governmentally empowered social tinkerers, making oneself "equal" to someone else was a personal responsibility. Now it appears "social leveling" has become the responsibility of government.
To make one citizen equal to another in as many ways as the social engineers can devise appears to be the aim of innumerable public efforts.
Is this a wise approach and do you think this will lead to a more harmonious and productive society in the future?
Many studies have shown the strong interdependence between philosophy and language, since the book of Aristotle, Thales, until the development of matters in our era into integrated theories that affected language and its curricula ... What are the most famous of these schools?
Scholastics have called "entia rationis" those objects, which do not and cannot exist in reality but only within the mind, such as chimaeras, privations (like blindness), negations (non-liquidity), relations of reason and the so called "second intentions" (like "genus", "species", "specific difference"). How much of this can be positively traced back to Aristotle and what would be the corresponding passages in the corpus aristotelicum?
Was Aristotle actually wrong when he stated: "Objects fall at a speed that is proportional to their weight. In other words, if you took a wooden object and a metal object of the same size and dropped them both, the heavier metal object would fall at a proportionally faster speed ". Or is it that he was smart enough to combine all the physical forces and give a sum up image of what would happen?!!
Aristotle was perhaps the first scientist, yet his writings traverse a gamut ranging from literature (literary theory and criticism) to politics and physics. What we now know as "science" was at some time in the recent past referred to as "natural philosophy." In our contemporary world, "science" is sometimes used interchangeably with "technology." During the European Renaissance, Leonardo da Vinci was an artist, yet he also designed models for airplanes, so was he a "scientist"? Is technology the offspring of science? Aristotle Renaissance Philosophy Designer
Ancient Greek civilization gave the world a lot of excellent philosophers, whose concepts interwoven with invaluable thoughts about education.
(384-322 BC) raised the mentor to the highest level in society: He created the Likey educational institution in Athens, which he supervised over twelve years. The writings written by him during these years were summaries of conversations that the philosopher conducted with his students in Likey. A. believed that man possesses both a vegetable soul (it needs nutrition and is doomed to decomposition), an animal soul (feelings, sensations) and a rational soul - pure, ethereal, universal and immortal. Therefore, in matters of upbringing, he did not prioritize concern for the afterlife immortal being and insisted on taking equal care of all three types of the human soul.
The most systematic views of Aristotle on upbringing and education are set forth in the treatise Politics.
Considering the eternal problem of the relationship between social and biological determinants in education, Aristotle took a flexible position. He believed that on the one hand, "only good offspring can come from good parents," and on the other, "nature often strives for this, but cannot achieve this."
So nowadays is it actual ? or we must up bring students in high education system ?
At first Aristotle tried to name and classify organisms based on structural similarities, and described ~520 species of animals. He believed that a name should reflect hidden reality or essence, and used phrases or single words.
Carolus Linnaeus developed and published the first comprehensive and consistent classification system for both plants and animals. He classified ~10,000 animals of which 2100 insect species in his book 'Systema Naturae (1758)'.
Western Philosophy has its foundation in the Greek world and Greek philosophers such as Aristotle, Plato and Aristotle were its founders and it deals with idea's such as epistemology (knowledge), empiricism, rationalism, metaphysics, realism, logic, language, mind and body, morality, ethics, aesthetics, politics and science. What is the basis of Islamic Philosophy? Where did it start, who are its founders and what are the major issues it deals with. If the issues are the same as in Western Philosophy, how do they differ from the Western approach or the Eastern approach?
Laozi is a famous philosopher in ancient Chinese, around 571BC/around 471BC. Aristotle, the famous philosopher of ancient Greek, the founder of Three logic laws, 384BC/322BC. Both of them had some properties of dialectical logic, then which of them is the real founder of dialectical logic?
Aristotle wrote in Politics III the following sentences:
"But there are difficulties about these forms of government, and it will therefore be necessary to state a little more at length the nature of each of them. For he who would make a philosophical study of the various sciences, and does not regard practice only, ought not to overlook or omit anything, but to set forth the truth in every particular. Tyranny, as I was saying, is monarchy exercising the rule of a master over the political society; oligarchy is when men of property have the government in their hands; democracy, the opposite, when the indigent, and not the men of property, are the rulers. And here arises the first of our difficulties, and it relates to the distinction drawn. For democracy is said to be the government of the many. But what if the many are men of property and have the power in their hands? In like manner oligarchy is said to be the government of the few; but what if the poor are fewer than the rich, and have the power intheir hands because they are stronger? In these cases the distinction which we have drawn between these different forms of government would no longer hold good."
Do you think these three forms always apply to current governments? Are not some of these governments uncorrectly called democracy, for example, as they are really oligarchies? Are there new forms of government which Aristotle omitted?
Looking to figure out the meaning of these words, and their frame of reference, both in a systematic and/or historical consideration (from Plato onwards). Bibliography suggestions are very welcome, as welll as both strictly academic (formal) and non-scientific (informal) explanations.
there is no agreement among scholars on defining revolution in its political and socioeconomic context, however, the political movements including revolutions faced several changes due to the developments on the structures and functions of states since Aristotle tell today. the post Washington censuses redefined the functions of governments and states, which influenced on the response of people and civil society. also, the social media became platform an tool for political protest. but tell now, scholars still rely on the traditional theorizing for revolutions. what do you think?
I quote from the Encyclopedia Britannica,
Aristotle used the term oligarchia to designate the rule of the few when it was exercised not by the best but by bad men unjustly. In this sense, oligarchy is a debased form of aristocracy, which denotes government by the few in which power is vested in the best individuals. Most classic oligarchies have resulted when governing elites were recruited exclusively from a ruling caste a hereditary social grouping that is set apart from the rest of society by religion, kinship, economic status, prestige, or even language. Such elites tend to exercise power in the interests of their own class.
The authors are correct here to emphasize “rule by the few,” rule “not by the best men” and the claim that oligarchy is a “debased” or corrupt form of aristocracy, in Aristotle's Politics. As we will see, the usage of the term “oligarchy” has in recent times been often replaced by talk of “elites” --which essentially leaves open the question of whether these elites are good or bad, whether their rule is corrupt, or –importantly—whether they rule in the interest of the common good. For Aristotle, the aristocratic decline into oligarchy consists in "the few" ruling in their own narrow self interest.
It is a recurrent idea that all forms of government are in the final analysis reducible to the rule of a few. Oligarchs will secure effective control whether the formal authority is vested in the people, a monarch, the proletariat, or a dictator. Thus, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels insisted that, throughout capitalism, the key capitalists had controlled the government; they coined the dictum, the state is the executive committee of the exploiting class. The Italian political scientist Gaetano Mosca likewise insisted that a ruling class always constituted the effective oligarchic control. Vilfredo Pareto elaborated the idea in his doctrine of the “elite.” The modern tendency to analyze social patterns in terms of an “elite,” although greatly reinforced by Pareto's theory, goes further back than Marx and Engels, who employed the term “elite” to describe the class-conscious communists, the leading group within the proletariat.
Here we begin to come to the idea of the “Iron law of oligarchy,” or the “inevitability of oligarchy,” though this becomes more explicit in the passage below. The Marxist description of the elite communists as an oligarchy is interesting and ironic partly because oligarchy became the charge raised against the Communist system by Djilas, the Yugoslav dissident and critic in his classic book, The New Class. If oligarchy could survive even the socialist abolition of private ownership of the means of production, then, of course, this makes the claims for the “iron law” all the stronger.
One of the most famous modern uses of the term occurs in “iron law of oligarchy,” a concept devised by the German sociologist Robert Michels to refer to the alleged inevitable tendency of political parties and trade unions to become bureaucratized, centralized, and conservative. His reasoning was that, no matter how egalitarian or even radical the original ideology and goals of a party or union may be, there must emerge a limited group of leaders at the centre who can direct power efficiently, get things done through an administrative staff, and evolve some kind of rigorous order and ideology to ensure the survival of the organization when faced by internal division and external opposition. Subsequent writers of various persuasions have attempted either to expand on Michels' thesis, extending it to legislatures, religious orders, and other organizations, or to restrict or criticize the thesis, charging that the iron law of oligarchy is not universal and that some unions and parties do maintain a viable system of democratic expression and governance.
If the “iron law” fails, then it must be the case that oligarchy is not inevitable under just any conditions, or in all situations. What then are the facilitating conditions and what kinds of conditions tend to defeat the rule or control of oligarchy?
Political science and sociology are beginning to differentiate more carefully between various types of control and power. The type of power held by a democratic party boss, while overwhelming in relation to any single member of the party, is very different from that wielded by the boss of the single party in a totalitarian and authoritarian pattern. Likewise, the control group within an organization does not occupy the same position under democratic conditions (which provide for the group's being effectively challenged by outsiders at any time) as it does under an authoritarian plan. If effective control changes hands as rapidly as it does in a city of the United States or a British trade union, it is doubtful that those exercising it should be spoken of as a “class” or an “elite.” The expression “the few” is too abstract to convey much information. Like the other purely numerical concepts of government inherited from Greek philosophy, oligarchy is an outmoded term, because it fails to direct attention to the substantive features of a government.
Well, if the term “oligarchy” is outmoded, it is somewhat surprising that the political scientists have begun to use near synonyms, such as “biased pluralism” --with the bias typically favoring the upper incomes. Again, there is “economic elite domination,” also quite current, which suggests in turn the theme of “policy capture,” and the domination of economic and tax policy by large-scale institutions and great wealth. No doubt, we want to distinguish between political control, kinds and conditions of political control --and with special attention to the reasonable prospect of a given ruling-set being turned out. The term, ”rule by the few” is indeed too abstract to capture even the concept of oligarchy. It is more a matter of “rule by the few”-- in their own self-interest, and ignoring the common good. Oligarchy is not merely numerical, it is also a moral and political concept –which can't be reduced to numbers alone.
See: the Britannica article, here: https://www.britannica.com/topic/oligarchy
Aristotle has spoken that living well and faring well is connected with happiness. This is called an eudaimonia (εὐδαιμονία). According to Aristotle, there is also an another component of happiness, hedonia, which means seeking and sensing pleasure (ήδονή means pleasure). The neuroscience of pleasure has recently gained large progress by connecting hedonic experience with particular structures of the brain and by coupling them to the interplay of phases of pleasure behavior cycle. But what about eudaimonia? It is accessible to valid and reliable measurement, if it is very complex and unique human experinece, without available animal models?
How can we assess it, with the exception of questionnaire methods?
Cognitive theories are of great importance to knowledge resources and learning strategies (attention, understanding, memory, reception, processing and processing of information). The learner's awareness of the acquired knowledge and the way in which he acquired it increases his mathematical activity. This activity, experience or training in the individual, changes his behavior. Cognitive theories are concerned with cognitive structure through the following characteristics: differentiation, organization, coherence, integration, quantity, quality and relative stability.
Structural theory has gained popularity in recent years, although its idea is not modern. Trends in structural theory can be observed through the works of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle (320-470 BC), who all spoke about "knowledge formation "He said.
I am researching on character formation and its role in aiding terrorism. i am looking at it from a literary perspective.
I will be grateful on assistance for materials that talk about character formation in literary studies.
for instance the arguments of aristotle on character formation.
I recently stumbled upon an alleged Aristotle's quote: "if something doesn't exist there is no word for it, and if there is no word for something, that something doesn't exist". I would be grateful if you, dear scholarly colleagues, could help me find its origin and/or fact-checked its existence.
Although philosophically analytics without reasoning seems wrong, in machine learning solutions it is commonly found. Recently DataScienceCentral had a related webinar regarding this issue - http://www.datasciencecentral.com/video/the-myth-of-the-machine-learning-black-box
Without disputing the deep learning model, I'd like to mention again the Occam's razor principle (leaner is better) regarding very complex matters.
As indicated, I'm interested in when and where the Politics may have been written? I suspect that it was begun in Athens when Aristotle was at the Lyceum. Hopefully someone will be aware of internal or external clues as to just when. Also, how long did Aristotle live after he was forced to flee Athens? Could he still have been working on the work up to his death? And how close do scholars think the work was to being finished?
Currently this project is postponed for some time. This ambitious project will suggest a comprehensive and durable architecture of South Asian politics, diplomacy, peace and development on the basis of visionary ideas of some prominent scholars from the East such as Chanakya (Kautilya), Vidur, J. Krishnamurti, Spivak and some contexts from the Mahabharat and the prophetic ideas by Plato, Aristotle and Machiavelli that could present the best road map for the long-term peace and stability in this region critically reading major developments (earlier if needed) and from 2000 to 2014 in terms of politics, diplomacy, so as to reflect on the peace and development in the region. I am seeking suggestion from anyone in relation to best approaches and methods to complete this research.
One one looks at Polybius's treatment of revolutions in Book 8 of his History, it looks as if he never read Aristotle's Politics book 5. In fact Polybius's account of the cycle of politeia looks more indebted to Plato and to Plutarch than to Aristotle. What evidence is that Polybius knew of Aristotle's Politics, or like most Roman authors, Aristotle's Politics was unknown to him?
As we know Heidegger in "Sein und Zeit" and in "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology" deploys a new program of human essence which is based on the mode of existence. In "Sein und Zeit" Heidegger repeats that the essence of Dasein is located in its existence, due to that fact he criticizes an understanding of essence as quidditas. I can understand why Heidegger didn't accept the Aristotelian and Thomistic reducing human essence to quidditas, but I can't understand why he thinks that both of them didn't have a strong philosophy of what he calls Dasein. Especially in case of Aquinas who had a powerful epistemology which influenced the subsequent tradition. I'll be grateful to get your opinions or links for books and articles connected with my question.
More precisely, "what is the origin of the regularities in nature which are represented (or purported to be represented) in our various recognized or accepted laws and principles regarding nature and natural events?" (this is H.G. Callaway's formulation of the original question). Such a philosophical question should be of interest to all scientists.
In classical philosophy, there are two ways of answering it:
a) Looking for an explanation outside nature. The concept of a transcendent God, the creator of nature and its order, explicitly appeared in Thomas Aquinae (the world comes from God and returns to God), Modern philosophers and scientists. It reappeared in the Contemporary epoch as a refusal of Darwinism, and/or related to some interpretations of Quantum Theory;
b) Looking for an explanation inside nature. Nature itself, being composed of both Form and Matter (Aristotle´s Hylomorphism) produces its order, in a process that has been currently called "self-organizing". In this view, God is not the creator of Nature, but - as in Aristotle´s concept of a First Mover - an ideal of perfection projected by natural beings.
It is clear that in spite of Aquinae´s affiliation with Aristotle, their philosophies are in opposite position in regard to the question about the origin of nature´s order.
Spinoza tried to conciliate both approaches, by equating God and Nature. In this case, God is not conceived as a transcendent being who creates Nature from nothingness, but as a being who is somehow immanent to Nature.
Plato, before Aristotle, presented a combined solution, assuming both the autonomy of natural principles (Ideas) and a Demiurge who prompts the manifestation of the principles into the world of appearances.
There is a possible third alternative, advanced by Kant in his cognitive approach to philosophical issues: to assume that laws and principles of nature are 'a priori' forms that the human mind imposes to sensory "matter". However, this alternative is actually reducible to the others. Cognitive forms should be natural or created by God (both possibilities are compatible in Spinoza's approach). For instance, the Piagetian version of Kantism assumes that these forms are biological, deriving from processes of interaction with the physical and social environment - therefore, he was committed to the self-organizing view.
Any suggestions on the distinction between teleological and ethical conduct? The first dates back to Aristotle, the second to Kant. Is it plausible that the two converge?
The categories are the attribution of a predicate to a subject. They are specifically supreme classes of every possible predicate, with which it is possible to order the whole reality.
For Aristotle, the categories are groups or primary genres which collect all the properties that may be the explanation of ‘being’. They are the predicaments of ‘being’, which refer to primary qualities (the immutable essences of objects), or secondary (the mishaps that may change).
The categories of Aristotle have an objective value, because they refer to concrete entities. Our judgments use them not only according to a relationship purely logical, typical of syllogism, but assembling them owing to the intuitive capacity to effectively grasp the relationship between the real objects. But beyond that, to each of the categories it relates a part of those semantic constructs of the discourse that have to do with the real world: for example, a name or a noun refers to the category of substance; the adjectives to quality, those indefinite to quantity, or to the relationship etc. It is therefore assumed that for Aristotle categories are a classification of the components which make a discourse.
Starting from the distinction between the objective level and the semantic one, that was not missed in Aristotle, who, however, would not know what to attribute to one and what to the other, Immanuel Kant admits that to judge, source of all objective discourse, is a 'multifaceted activity, which arises from the application of different categories or pure concepts, through which the intellect unifies multiple data from sensitive intuition.
These concepts, however, are transcendental, namely that they need starting data in order to activate, without which they would be empty: it's because of the sense organs that an object is "given," to us becoming a phenomenon; with categories then it is "thought".
Then, unlike Aristotle, for whom categories belonged to the ontological reality of ‘being’, the Kantian categories fit in to the intellect; that is, they become the ‘a priori’ functions, or means of working of our thought that frame reality according to its own preconceived scheme. They do not apply to reality in itself, but only to the phenomenon.
As in Aristotle the categories needed judgment to be used, then in Kant they require a supreme activity, of a thought in the process of being created, to exercise their unifying function of the manifold. The categories are the multiple facets of a prism which is called thought; they are unifying acts, but not yet active, only potentially activated.
This opens the question of the deduction of the categories, that is, how to justify the use we make of them: for example, is it legitimate to assign different categories to the same object?
This is the problem faced by Kant in the Transcendental Deduction of Critique of Pure Reason, to unify categories, finding a principle from which they can all derive. This principle will be found in the ‘I think’ or transcendental apperception.
Kant will be accused of having locked himself up in a subjectivism with no way out, given that his categories do not serve to know the reality as it is in itself, but only as it appears to us.
With Fichte they assume a different role: while Kant had intended to unify the multiple, for Fichte they assume the inverse aim of multiplying the uniqueness of the ‘I’, bringing it to divide and produce unconsciously the ‘non-I’. Thus the categories of the intellect have also a real or ontological value, albeit unconscious. The ‘thinking’ is to create, but only at the level of intellectual intuition.
In Hegel, instead, it is the same logic that becomes creative. The cognitive categories of Kant, which were merely "formal", become together "form and content": they are logical-ontological categories, determinations of the Idea as it proceeds dialectically. An object exists to the extent that it is rational, that is, only if it falls within a logical category.
For Nietzsche, finally, categories become the result of the evolution of the breed: their effectiveness would be given not by the ability to reflect what is true, but by the utility in aiding survival. Concepts taken and endorsed by ethological-philosophical studies of Konrad Lorenz, who defined the categories the 'apparatus image of the world. "
Plato, especially in the dialectic dialogues (f.i. Sofists), moving from the eleatic opposition of ‘Being’ and not ‘Being’ or, more exactly, of «what it is» to «what it is not », recognizes that, in this second term of the antithesys, the «not Being» is resolved in Being something else. "It is thus solved the mere negativity of each idea than the other, recognizes that, in this second term of the antithesis, the "not" will be resolved in '' be more. "It is thus explained the mere negativity of each idea than the other”.
Aristotle distinguishes alterity (understood generically as diversity, whereby all things are usually different) from the difference which is the dissimilarity between things of the same kind.
For the philosopher of idealism, ‘the something’, being characterized qualitatively, is in a negative logic contrast with'"other" than himself; he is not the other and then suffers the limit but, at the same time, this limitations kicks off a progressive alteration of its quality indefinitely (such as it happens in chemistry).
The term ‘alterity’ is often used in existentialism understood as alienation, division of the individual from himself.
On the contrary, for philosophers like Emmanuel Levinas (1905-1995) alterity not only is not a negative value, but it is the highest ethical one.
In particular, for Levinas, the first principle of ethics that, in this context, becomes metaphysical: If I do not violate my overarching categories, the mystery of the other, that is, if I do not bring it to a pre-determined and pre-judged essence, I get to a kind of knowledge that is real because it is a track of infinity.
Alterity is totally alien to the ego (split between self and the other) and, therefore, my experience will never be comparable to that of another person. I can not live the pain, joy and other limit experiences of another individual. For the Lithuanian philosopher ethics is the capacity of exit from the understanding as comprehension of the ‘other’ who is generally assimilated to himself and dispossessed of his alterity and diversity.
For many scholars, the reflection of Levinas on the ‘Other’ is one of the theoretical foundations of contemporary multiculturalism; that is it suggests a new and different vision of the relations between individuals and between cultures: as relations between diverse individuals, that - as such - should be recognized and valued. Only through this recognition it is possible to turn on an authentic communication between cultures, without hegemonic claims on each other. This is a fruitful perspective, through which, for example, it is possible to look in a new way the problems of relations between cultures that are caused by the migration processes taking place on a global scale.
The thought of Emmanuel Levinas developed, then, on two privileged sides: the 'phenomenological exercise of which he was among the first representatives in France and the Talmudic readings, inspired by Biblical and Hebrew themes. Starting from Heidegger, Levinas calls into question the primacy of the problem of Being, dominated by the principle of totality, to look in the appeal of alterity for the foundation of an authentic subjectivity.
Conducive to positively evaluate the alterity is the philosopher Salvatore Natoli (1942) who, reworking the Aristotelian concept of magnanimity, judges considering the good of the ‘other’ the best of all virtues: "The magnanimous person does not look down on others not because he underestimates them, but because he finds in the task he has set his measure "and" in this kind of self-control he becomes, paradoxically, more accessible to others; he becomes indirectly generous.
From Hegel on the problem of alterity and its relationship with the denial remained between the capital issues of dialectics. Different is the problem of alterity as a matter of the '' other person ', i.e. of the multiplicity of consciences.
In Hannah Arendt's concepts of liberty and responsability can you say that the influeence of Aristoteles is relevant and why? can you give examples?
Like Rowe, in his paper "The meaning of φρόνησις in EE", argues that Aristotle uses the term φρόνησις in the passages 1215b2, 1216a11 and 1216a37 as wisdom, without making it clear whether it is practical or theoretical wisdom. This would reveal a non-technical use by Aristotle in EE and would have several implications in the Aristotelian conception of ethics at this time, thus leading to the possibility of ethics still be seen as a theoretical science, approaching the EE of Platonic influence on Aristotle.
I don't "buy" the complete Rowe's interpretation, but I have to admit that the meaning of φρόνησις in those passages is very ambiguous.
The term appears in the first sentence of Topics VIII 5: "are evident now which should be (στοχαστέον) the goals / objectives of the respondent." And then Aristotle introduces a disjunction: every proposition put by the questioner must be either generally accepted (and that "generally" seems to appeal to the justification / rationale of the respondent) or generally rejected. After that follow the consequences of accepting or rejecting a proposition, namely that if the respondent accepts or rejects, must also assume that there is a total acceptance or total rejection, ie, it must stand as a kind of "universal respondent". After Aristotle also discusses the relationship between acceptance, rejection and relevance of propositions. My question is about the beginning of discussion to establish some normative way of thinking about the goals of the respondent.
"True" and "false" syllogisms in Aristotle's ANALYTICS. In Aristotle's ANALYTICS, what does Aristotle mean by saying that a syllogism is true or that it is false? For example, see POSTERIOR ANALYTICS, Book I, Chapter 32. More generally, where in the corpus is 'true' or 'false' applied to syllogisms, or to anything other than a proposition, and in each case what is meant?
Is this epideictic discourse rather than deliberative one? Or are the two types mixted according to Aristotle's harmony of rhetorical genres?
Would you say that there is an implicit logic in the Ethic or that the purpose of good in a way means truth?
We post-moderns are living through a time of questioning of "categories."
How did Aristotle handle examples "on the margins", "in the boundary," "in between"?