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I am looking for a quotation of the tale described below. I know it appeared at the beginning of an article or text on paraconsistent logic but I can't find that source nor any other authoritative source.
Two disputants come to a rabbi for a resolution. After hearing the first case, the rabbi says, “You are right.” When he hears the antagonist’s response, he says, “You are also right.” An observer says, “Rabbi, you said person A and person B are both right; they can't both be right!” The rabbi responds, “you are also right!”
I am looking at kant's whole transcedental aesthetic like a film roll and film , where outer sense objects are in a film roll that like in a roll they have all the scenes of a movie simultaneously but we cant see the film at once so it must be intuited in time spontaneously .
Hashim Haroon Yes, of course you can see a manifold of appearances. For example by empathy and trying to understand others. It does not mean that by understanding what they appearently see you will become that person.
Kant was not always right. His understanding was that those appearances occure in a certain order because time is within us.
It's crucial to remember that Kant's philosophy was very much a product of his time and cultural context. During the 18th century, Enlightenment thinkers like Kant were grappling with the legacy of the Scientific Revolution and the new ideas about the universe that it had introduced. One of the key ideas that emerged during this time was the concept of causation, which posited that every event has a cause and effect that can be understood through scientific investigation. This idea of linear causality and the passage of time was a central part of the scientific worldview, and it's reflected in Kant's philosophy as well.
By trying to see the world from other people's perspectives, we can begin to appreciate the diversity of experiences and viewpoints that exist, and recognize that our own understanding is just one of many. Throughout history, there have been many individuals who have challenged the prevailing beliefs and perspectives of their time, and offered new insights and ideas that were ahead of their time.
Jesus was certainly a revolutionary figure in his time, challenging the established religious and political authorities and offering a radical message of love, forgiveness, and social justice. Jesus showed people how to see beyond the narrow confines of their own limited perspectives and embrace a more holistic and interconnected view of the world. By teaching the principles of love, forgiveness, and empathy, Jesus encouraged people to recognize the inherent dignity and worth of all human beings, and to work towards seeing the manifold. With his death he created a very powerful symbol of the ultimate singularity.
Just as there are different types of celestial bodies in the universe, there are also different types of people with different personalities and ways of interacting with the world.
Some people may be like "black holes," drawing everything into themselves and leaving little room for others to shine. Others may be like "white holes," radiating energy and positivity that lifts up those around them. And of course, most people are somewhere in between, with a complex mix of traits and behaviors that make them unique and fascinating individuals.
One very interesting individual was for example Caspar David Friedrich. He was way more refined and developed than Kant.
RESPECTFULLY, pan-dualism is more plausible than pan-deism. All entities either are unique, or too different for perfect prediction. Plus, humans may be bound by some rules(genetics, environment, circumstances, etc.) but, without the fundamental choice to focus on life, human reason would be impossible. Plus, humans can lose all their cells yet survive and retain their individual identities. So, at least humans have some immaterial tracker(maybe souls). Pan-deism depends on the unlikely premise that a creator destroyed itself(thus, all existence are dubiously the creator’s debris). We don’t know who created us or how. Thus, pan-dualism has the most evidence, while making the least assumptions.
We contend that in the Kritik A70-76 (B95-101) Kant attempted to give what in modern terms would be a formal definition of the syntax of his logic (i.e. an inductive definition of judgment).
The question we wish to ask is, given such an analysis of Kant's logic, is the said logic sufficiently expressive (with regards to multiple generality) to formulate Kant's own analogies of experience ?
The original version of the second analogy in A was: for everything that happens there is something which succeeds it, according to a rule. Alles, was geschiet (anhebt zu sein) setzt etwas voraus, worauf es nach einer Regel folgt.
for all x. (if Happens(x) then there exists y such that Follows_by_a_rule(x,y))
We think this question might interest researchers who are interested in how multiple generality might have been dealt with in ancient and medieval logic.
Hi all, I was thinking in English as a global language but besides colonialism, does analytical philosophy contribute to the expansion of the English language and the promotion of science?
If you had to publish a book in philosophy of language-in-cognitive-sciences that is definitely not "continental" but also not strictly analytic, and discusses empirical (psychological, ethnolinguistic) studies too -- where would you submit your proposal?
CUP, for instance, explicitly restricts its field of interest to analytic philosophy of language.
Linguistic analytic philosophy seems to be the philosophy of the day -- represented more than 60% or 70% of academic philosophers in some or other manner. What Frege, Wittgenstein, etc. have said do contain a lot of truth, but should their claims and critiques be the broadest of truths? An example: Later Wittgenstein's insistence that very use of language is the working definition of language. Can we not say this of many other things?
"Motion" is to be found in everything. And why do these philosophers not "use", for example, the notion of "motion" as the fundamental instrument of analysis of everything?
"Interpretation" is yet another concept that may be used in order to analyze everything, and why not? In short, merely because the use-theory of language is useful, we cannot use this theory to analyze everything! But why this addiction in the minds of analytic thinkers with language?
I have mentioned one inconsistency of linguistic philosophy here. In the course of our discussion many more will emerge. I would myself contribute some more.
Bibliography
(1) Gravitational Coalescence Paradox and Cosmogenetic Causality in Quantum Astrophysical Cosmology, 647 pp., Berlin, 2018.
(2) Physics without Metaphysics? Categories of Second Generation Scientific Ontology, 386 pp., Frankfurt, 2015.
(3) Causal Ubiquity in Quantum Physics: A Superluminal and Local-Causal Physical Ontology, 361 pp., Frankfurt, 2014.
(4) Essential Cosmology and Philosophy for All: Gravitational Coalescence Cosmology, 92 pp., KDP Amazon, 2022, 2nd Edition.
(5) Essenzielle Kosmologie und Philosophie für alle: Gravitational-Koaleszenz-Kosmologie, 104 pp., KDP Amazon, 2022, 1st Edition.
Some counterfactual or partially counterfactual sort of modal statements, if they imply possible worlds, imply also some really (probabilistically with high truth value) possible worlds, and some necessary worlds. In which circumstances at all can there be other counterfactually possible worlds in reality? All possible worlds need not be necessary, but some of them might be, are, and will be necessary.
To find out in which all cases these causal possible worlds are real as past, present, and future necessary worlds, we need to investigate the possibilities that the physical laws with the presently available contingently physical and ontological information will permit us to accept the existence of other worlds as causally really existing.
But it is impossible to differentiate between counterfactual or partially counterfactual sort of modal statements!
Hence, visit the basic discussion text of: https://www.researchgate.net/post/The_Irrefutable_Argument_for_Universal_Causality_Any_Opposing_Position
Mathematical Generalities: ‘Number’ may be termed as a general term, but real numbers, a sub-set of numbers, is sub-general. Clearly, it is a quality: “having one member, having two members, etc.”; and here one, two, etc., when taken as nominatives, lose their significance, and are based primarily only on the adjectival use. Hence the justification for the adjectival (qualitative) primacy of numbers as universals. While defining one kind of ‘general’ another sort of ‘general’ may naturally be involved in the definition, insofar as they pertain to an existent process and not when otherwise.
Why are numbers and shapes so exact? ‘One’, ‘two’, ‘point’, ‘line’, etc. are all exact. The operations on these notions are also intended to be exact. But irrational numbers are not so exact in measurement. If notions like ‘one’, ‘two’, ‘point’, ‘line’, etc. are defined to be so exact, then it is not by virtue of the exactness of these substantive notions, but instead, due to their being defined as exact. Their adjectival natures: ‘being a unity’, ‘being two unities’, ‘being a non-extended shape’, etc., are not so exact.
A quality cannot be exact, but may be defined to be exact. It is in terms of the exactness attributed to these notions by definition that the adjectives ‘one’, ‘two’, ‘point’, ‘line’, etc. are exact. This is why the impossibility of fixing these (and other) substantive notions as exact miss our attention. If in fact these are inexact, then there is justification for the inexactness of irrational, transcendental, and other numbers too.
If numbers and shapes are in fact inexact, then not only irrational numbers, transcendental numbers, etc., but all exact numbers and the mathematical structures should remain inexact if they have not been defined as exact. And if behind the exact definitions of exact numbers there are no exact universals, i.e., quantitative qualities? If the formation of numbers is by reference to experience (i.e., not from the absolute vacuum of non-experience), their formation is with respect to the quantitatively qualitative and thus inexact ontological universals of oneness, two-ness, point, line, etc.
Thus, mathematical structures, in all their detail, are a species of qualities, namely, quantitative qualities, defined to be exact and not naturally exact. Quantitative qualities are ontological universals, with their own connotative and denotative versions.
Natural numbers, therefore, are the origin of primitive mathematical experience, although complex numbers may be more general than all others in a purely mathematical manner of definition.
Bibliography
(1) Gravitational Coalescence Paradox and Cosmogenetic Causality in Quantum Astrophysical Cosmology, 647 pp., Berlin, 2018.
(2) Physics without Metaphysics? Categories of Second Generation Scientific Ontology, 386 pp., Frankfurt, 2015.
(3) Causal Ubiquity in Quantum Physics: A Superluminal and Local-Causal Physical Ontology, 361 pp., Frankfurt, 2014.
(4) Essential Cosmology and Philosophy for All: Gravitational Coalescence Cosmology, 92 pp., KDP Amazon, 2022, 2nd Edition.
(5) Essenzielle Kosmologie und Philosophie für alle: Gravitational-Koaleszenz-Kosmologie, 104 pp., KDP Amazon, 2022, 1st Edition.
CAUSAL HORIZONAL RESEARCH: A METHODOLOGY IN PHYSICS
Raphael Neelamkavil
Ph. D. (Causality in Quantum Physics), Dr. phil. (Gravitational Coalescence Cosmology)
Causal Horizonal Research is a method that works beyond empirical methods in the positive sciences and serves at existential generalizations that are an essential condition for the possibility of positive sciences. Thus, it may be seen as (1) a philosophical method, but (2) a method of recognition of the foundations of positive sciences. The foundational notions of positive sciences need not themselves be formulated as merely empirically formulable notions!
Although a short text, the arguments here are an attempt to bridge the defects of statistical applications in the sciences and avoid the same in physical ontology, philosophy of physics, philosophy of science (in general), and in the various philosophical disciplines. Implications may be drawn to the philosophy of mathematics and to the foundations mathematics and the sciences in general.
The uninterruptedly but finitely contributive past-existent causal influences point ever backward for recognition of causal pervasiveness of the past horizon. Therefore, this must be accepted as a beckoning for consideration of causal pasts in any research, for achievement of the maximum rational adequacy with respect to the perceived causes of any particular existent process.
There are both already detected and easily detectable aspects and parts of the causal pasts. But there is also the portion of the causal horizon which is not easily discovered or discoverable. At any time, some of this portion of past-existent causal players will remain unreached. But its existence cannot be said to be an impossibility, whatever this portion is. This is what I call the ontological givenness of the causal horizon of anything whatever.
The whole of the past causal influences are together never fully actually traceable back from a given point of time by human intellects and instruments. All processes are in principle and in general ever better traceable and capable of being theoretically included, in general, in physical research and in physical-ontological research. Such theoretical traceability of causes is rejected by their probabilistically ontological exclusion at any given result, if merely probabilistic calculation is considered as the only mode of scientific inquiry.
Examples are the “probabilistically causal” results in QM despite the very finite Extension-Change distances between any two QM events and between a QM event and an arbitrarily chosen experimenter. The problem here is the utter lack of admission of the existence of the totality of the causal horizon, whether detected or detectable or undetected.
Due to the principle of inner-universe conservation of matter-energy, these past causal influences – the causal horizon – as influences at any time traceable to the future, are not annihilated into non-existence in their transformed existence in the present. Therefore, they have their real and ubiquitously causal significance from the past in the present of any process.
I propose, therefore, a physical-ontologically and cosmologically tenable Causal Horizonal Research (CHR)[1]into inner-universe causalities as traceable theoretically to the indefinite past of any process at inquiry – even in case of existence of the external originative cause of all that is physical within the cosmos. This can yield at least a more than vague and sufficiently broad outlook at some problematic issues of statistically causal reach into existent unobservables / quasi-observables within micro-physics, cosmology, physical ontology, and philosophy. That is, the status and extent of causal processes in the micro- and macro-cosmos, the relation of real causality with the recognition-level or calculation-level probability, randomness, chaos, catastrophe, etc. can be further elucidated and systematized by CHR.
If individual processes in the universe have had any measure of past causality active in their parts in any manner (wholly or allegedly partially), this demonstrates by definition the fact that any causal explanation of any process hints at all the processes (causal or allegedly non-causal) that are prior to a phenomenon / event / process, relative to the spatiotemporally connected posteriority of the thing being explained and the priority of the causes being generalized upon. The measure of Extension-Change (measured as space-time in science and ordinary parlance) that has already taken place is theoretically traceable.
Suppose that a certain process’s causal roots proper (or, to please Hume-inspired theoreticians, in terms at least of what we call antecedents proper) are conceivable in principle as having been existent in the past. Then there is no reason why the experimentally and theoretically in-principle feasible extent of statistically tracing the causal horizon should obstruct us from taking at least a theoretically general look at the ontological structure of past causal antecedent roots, and then from them still farther past roots, etc.
Some of it can be traceable in future instances of statistical inclusions; and some will ever remain unreached. But science must accept the existence of the latter – which is not the case in merely statistically characterized sciences.
The causal horizon’s ontological structure is, in general, the Extension-Change antecedent-horizonal processuality as something that existed in the past. The need to tracing causal roots is in simple terms the rational basis of the principle and procedure of CHR, granting the fact that the antecedents proper of all that is today, of all that we speak of, are in fact causes. Only when one tends to claim that causes are not causes arises theoretical impasses. To make sure in the present context that these are causes, science should always wait a finite amount of time. But the pragmatic attitude of severing the relation of the theory from the past-existent but so-far not-reached parts of the causal horizon is the case only in statistics and statistically oriented positive sciences, and nowhere else.
By positing causes (1) as ever having been active in the past of any current physical process, (2) as causally relevantly dormant in the present forms of existence of the current physical processes, the proposed ontological and cosmological methodology of CHR is theoretically implementable. The physical explanation for this is the physical principle of conservation as it is active towards the future proper in all past and present processes. Science and philosophy always want to witness the extent of reachable causality. Hence, the fact of not having already attained the capture of certain causal horizonal members of the past is no justification to be overly pragmatic of the past causes. This is where CHR takes us to.
This will not take us to a meaningless infinite regress. Any infinite regress without the involvement of an abruptly theorized non-causal and non-physical Creator will still be reasonable since the search is with reference to causes within the universe, and such an infinite regress within the universe should naturally be physically meaningful.[2]The stage for CHR in micro-cosmology and macro-cosmology (by this meaning all physical sciences) will thus be set. The major result from here is that in QM causation will somehow have be discussed from various angles, along with making the need for our methodology further explicit.
CHR is treated in my books of 2014 (Causal Ubiquity in Quantum Physics: Categories of Second Generation Scientific Ontology) and 2018 (Gravitational Coalescence Paradox and Cosmogenetic Causality in Quantum Astrophysical Cosmology):
[1] For detailed reflections, see Raphael Neelamkavil, “Causal Horizonal Research in Cosmology” (21-47), Journal of Dharma 34, 2 (April-June 2009).
[2] In order to circumvent infinite regress, we do not posit an unmoved creator as the final past end of any causal horizon. It is beset with metaphysical paradoxes. We keep the option of a continuously creating Divine open, but this is not needed for our more restricted methodology for physical research, namely, Causal Horizonal Research.
The Anthropic Notion of Existence and “Being-Becoming” in Heidegger: Heidegger’s continuous engagement with ‘nothingness’ in his works has not been about the non-existence of anything specific or the whole of what we call Reality or of its To Be. [-----] Heraclitus never had a notion of becoming that makes everything to escape into absolute nothingness; Parmenides never dissociated from human beings’ notion of being the apparent becoming. Apparent becoming, he thought, is a contradiction to his concept of being. Heidegger depended much on his re-interpretations of Heraclitus and Parmenides. None of them shewed away from Heidegger’s thought whatever is existent or seemingly existent into any absolute becoming or absolute seeming of becoming or absolute nothingness that would reduce the stuff of everything into a nothing in existence.
What Went Wrong in Heidegger's Thought: For the above reasons, within the ‘becoming’ that meant continuous activity, and beyond the ‘being’ that often presented the sense of permanence, Heidegger (1) did not think of the metaphysical approval of ontological commitments behind notions, thoughts, feelings, etc., sought a non-traditional notion of existence that he thought is discourse-bound and language-bound which thus became an anthropic notion of Being without commonalities with other existents, and (2), did not possess methods of dissociating (a) mere subjective and intersubjective objectivity from (b) subjectively and intersubjectively obtained objectivity via objectuality in discourse. Thus, he ended up holding only the (a) above and laughably anthropologized philosophy, science, and human institutions through a sense of superiority of the merely anthropically Being-thinking humans over all others. His politically overshadowing such a notion of Being-thinking humans by a vague identification of it with the Hitler race was naturally a gimmick to use the opportunity to save and elevate himself and his thought and additionally obtain a long opportunity to laugh privately of his own professor.
MacIntyre and Boghossian on Relativism and Justification
H.G. Callaway
Draft of 30 January 2024
(1,260ww +notes)
The contrast between Alasdair MacIntyre and Paul Boghossian on epistemic justification and relativism of justification illuminates the background issue of normative pluralism at stake in their distinctive rejections of relativism. In a significant sense, MacIntyre’s views on relativism and epistemic justification are closer to Putnam’s (and those of Dewey and Hook). Both Putnam and MacIntyre contest elements of epistemology found in Boghossian’s, and other more analytic approaches. The following passage comes from the “Postscript” included in the second edition (1984) of MacIntyre’s widely read study, After Virtue. “Morality,” MacIntyre argues, “which is no particular society’s morality is to be found nowhere.”
... the subject matters of moral philosophy at least—the evaluative and normative concepts, maxims, arguments and judgments about which the moral philosopher enquires—are nowhere to be found except as embodied in the historical lives of particular social groups and so possessing the distinctive characteristics of historical existence: both identity and change through time, expression in institutional practice as well as in discourse, interaction and interrelationship with a variety of forms of activity.[1]
Otherwise put, the point is that morality (and normative standards generally) exist only in social traditions; and, moreover, that the morality and standards of different times (and places) factually differ from each other. This is not to claim, however, that any normative standards factually in use are as good or valid as any others.
Though MacIntyre is an advocate and defender of a version of Aristotelian virtue ethics, he employs an epistemology which is alien to Aristotle. He disputes the claims, often found in analytic philosophy (and in its rejection of relativism), of timeless, universal standards of rationality above and beyond all variations of time and locality. MacIntyre’s position depends on a realist conception of truth (akin to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of truth as adequatio rei et intellectus) combined with cultural and historical variability of normative standards of justification.[2]It follows, then, on MacIntyre’s account of moral and normative traditions, and the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition in particular, that normative traditions are capable of and open to rational development or transformation—even into incompatible forms. This is to endorse a kind of pluralism while rejecting relativism;[3]and such development or transformation of a tradition is only plausible, if newly proposed normative standards can be shown capable of solving problems which could not be solved in accordance with pre-existing normative standards. Notice that this is very close to claiming that superior normative standards emerge in the course of successful inquiry.
The approach exemplified in MacIntyre’s writings with its recognition of a cultural pluralism of normative standards, contrasts with the approach of Boghossian and other prominent representatives of analytic philosophy—which treat of justification and normative standards abstractly and with claims on universal validity. The specific philosophical character of Boghossian’s criticism of the relativism of justification is fairly evident in his general account of the objectivity of reasons:
... the thesis of the objectivity of reasons can be stated as the claim that there is an objective fact of the matter which epistemic principles are true, which set of rules a thinker ought to employ to shape his beliefs, if he is to arrive at beliefs that are genuinely justified.
We certainly act as though we believe in the objectivity of reasons. We don’t behave as though anything goes in the way of belief, suggesting that we operate with a specific set of epistemic rules. And we don’t hold that others are at liberty to operate with whatever epistemic rules they like.[4]
On this and similar accounts of justification, the “objective fact” about “which epistemic principles are true” is available via analytical reflection; and the implicit assumption seems to be that cultural and historical variations and divergences from the true principles are in some fashion false or illusory. (Notice that this concept is not inconsistent with holding that a factual pluralism of different standards of judgment or sets of epistemic rules exist in different groups or historical periods.) It will prove important to ask, though, whether on this and similar accounts,[5]the epistemic principles supposed true are available to analytical reflection all at once. If we assume that they are, then we must wonder why the problems of epistemic justification have not been long ago settled—or settled over the past century of analytic philosophy. Surely, there has been some development and change in epistemology in analytic philosophy. The other horn of the dilemma is that if the true principles are not all-at-once available to analytic reflection, then the account of the true principles seems to be variable and subject to historical development.
In Boghossian’s critical discussion of relativisms of justification, the central point is that “the relativist thinks that we can only cogently talk about [proposition] P’s being justified relative to a communal epistemic practice C, for variable C”; and “... the core idea is this: whether, under the appropriate circumstances, a given body of information supports a particular belief isn’t some absolute relation between the information and the belief but is rather to be understood as obtaining only relative to some further parameter—the epistemic principles accepted by a community”[6]
The conflict between abstract, “universal” objections to the relativism of justification and views such as those of Dewey, Hook, Putnam—and Macintyre—may be fairly viewed in terms of the contextual character of epistemic justification. Insisting on the contextual character of justification, part of the point is to avoid a form of anachronism which consists of projecting current standards of justification into past evaluative judgments—ignoring the actual standards people had available to work with.
For example, consider whether nineteenth century physicists were at the time justified in their confident acceptance and esteem for Newtonian gravity and Newtonian mechanics. After all, Newtonian physics was well confirmed by any number of tests and the success of numerous predictions. There seems to be little sense in claiming that they were not justified, given the evidence then available, merely on the basis of their not knowing what only later came to light in Einstein’s physics. To suppose that nineteenth-century physicists were not justified in accepting Newtonian physics implies that they ought to have known of or should have considered, say, extreme accelerations and environments of extremely intensive gravity. But as the actual history of physics shows, the general relevancy of extremes of acceleration and gravity to the evaluation of Newtonian physics only became plausible in the context of Einstein’s theoretical proposals. Since the distinctive predictions of Einstein’s new physics have been born out, we have a good example of the emergence of revised standards of judgment in the course of further research and inquiry—including the normative standard of looking to new results of high-energy physics.
Regarding moral and normative, political claims and proposals, a similar point holds. Because of the development of knowledge and technology, human beings become able to do things which they could not have done earlier. In consequence novel activities and situations arise and new moral and political problems are encountered which had not been encountered before; and these new problems and question may overtax pre-existing and established means of resolution. In cases of moral and/or political conflicts, involving factually different standards of judgment and claims, the prospect is that new standards of judgment may arise from those cases where the conflicts can actually be resolved. But on the supposition of a single, true set of rules and standards for conflict resolution, it is more difficult to understand how it is that some conflicts can be resolved while many others persist with no plausible resolution in sight.
Notes:
[1]. Alasdair MacIntyre 1984, After Virtue, A Study in Moral Theory, second ed. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 265-266.
[2]. Alasdair MacIntyre 1988, Whose Justice, Which Rationality? Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. See p. 18. Cf. the helpful discussion of related points in Christopher W. Gowans 2011, “Virtue Ethics and Moral Relativism,” in Steven D. Hales ed. 2011, A Companion to Relativism. Oxford; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. See pp. 398-402.
[3]. See Alasdair MacIntyre 1999, “Moral Pluralism without Moral Relativism,” in K. Brinkman, ed. 1999, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy vol. I. Ethics. Bowling Green, OH: Philosophical Documentation Center, pp. 1-8.
[4]. Boghossian 2008, Content and Justification, Philosophical Papers. New York; Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 236.
[5]. Of particular interest are the Oxford University philosophers, defending virtue ethics and an apparent Oxford-orthodoxy on moral objectivity—including Elizabeth Anscombe (1919-2001) Philippa Foot (1920-2010) and the English-born and Oxford educated, New Zealand philosopher, Rosalind Hursthouse.
[6]. Boghossian 2008, Content and Justification, p. 248.
An open inquiry on the theory, application, and philosophical implications of QML.
Superposition is real, I know this. It's usually represented as containing contradictions (opposite spins of electrons). Therefore it's claimed that Aristotle's Logic does not work here. But is this "superposition thing" a quality or an explanation of a quality?
What if this particle disappers and appears so quickly that, and we're saying (while it's disappered) "it's in a superposition state" ? I mean, containing contradictions is OK for non physical being, because there is no existence at that moment? But when electron exists, it has only one spin. Is it possible to explain superposition in such way? Are there any similar comments by physicists?
As far as I know, these ideas have been used mainly in theological discussions. However, it seems to me that such ideas would also have application in more general discussions of Cartesian dualism and the mind–body problem, e.g. they could be used to describe what happens to the Cartesian soul or mind when one is sleeping dreamlessly or when one is unconscious.
THE EPISTEMOLOGY PRESUPPOSED BY PHYSICS AND OTHER SCIENCES
Raphael Neelamkavil, Ph.D., Dr. phil.
((This is the second part of the series in THE LOGIC, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND ONTOLOGY OF PHYSICS AND OTHER SCIENCES.))
1. The Logic of Physics (See the previous discussion's lead-text)
2. The Epistemology behind Physics
The whole of logic, epistemology, ontology, etc. are not the exclusive property of physics, or of any other particular science, or of all the sciences together. Each of them may apply the various general logical, epistemological, and ontological principles in ways suitable to their disciplines, but cannot claim that theirs is the genuine or the possibly best logic, epistemology, ontology, etc.
There is yet another manner, beyond the sciences, wherein (1) the object range and viewpoint range become the broadest possible in epistemology, and (2) the epistemological manner in which the two are connected becomes satisfactory enough to explain both the aspects and the procedures involved between them. This is a philosophical version of epistemology. Even this manner is not complete without including the various logics, epistemologies, and ontologies of the particular sciences.
Before pointing out the special manner in which physics could use the more general aspects of epistemology in itself, let me mention a general trend in science, especially physics. I have seen many students of physics and mathematics mistaking the logical ways in which they do experiments and theories as the same as the conceptual foundations of physics and mathematics.
They do not even think of the epistemology of physics. The clear reason for this is that their epistemology is a crude correspondence theory of truth, and this is outdated. Take any of the best physicists, and we can see in their works the underlying undefined epistemology being closer to the correspondence theory of truth than anything else. I would like to suggest in the following a clear spine of epistemological rudiments for physics.
The pragmatism and scientism at the foundations of practical physics does not accept anything other than the correspondence theory as prescriptive of all the truths of science. Of course, the amount of finality achieved in truths will be the measure of tenability of their truth-probability. But this is to be reserved to the most general truths derivable from any science or philosophy. Low-level truths are much beyond the purview of correspondence between the objectual and the theoretical. Unaware of these facts, most physicists take the difference lightly.
It is a pity that the students of the sciences and also philosophy students with scientistic orientations even think of their ways of permitting truth correspondence to all their truths as the sole possession of scientists, which they suppose are being usurped from philosophy in the course of the past centuries in such a way that philosophy will have ever less reason to exist, or no more reason to exist. Imaginably, in this pride they are encouraged by their presumption of possession of the scientific temper in an exceptional manner.
More evidently, there were and there are physicists holding that their use of logic, epistemology, ontology, etc. is final and that all other details being done by other sciences, especially by philosophy, are a mere waste of time. If you want me to give an example, I suggest that you watch some of the YouTube interviews with Stephen Hawking, where he declares philosophy as a waste of time, or as an unscientific affair. The same sort of claim is to be seen being made by many mathematicians: that logic is a by-product of mathematics, and that philosophers are falsely proud of having logic as their methodology.
The reason why the whole of logic does not belong to the sciences is that the viewpoint from which sensation, thought, and feeling may be exercised in the broadest possible manner is not exhausted even by totaling all the object ranges of all the sciences. Each of them does logic in a manner limited by its object range. How then can their logic be the best possible? There is one and only one general science of which the viewpoint is the broadest. It is that science in which the viewpoint is that of the direct implications of the To Be of Reality-in-total.
Against this backdrop, although the following definition might seem queer for many physicists, mathematicians, and other scientists, there are reasons why I define here epistemology for use in physics. The following definition itself will clarify the reasons:
The epistemology behind physics is (1) the science of justifications (2) for the systemic fact, the systemic manner of achieving, the enhancement of the systemic manner of achieving, and the foundations of systems (3) of rationally derivable and explicable theoretical consequences of human efforts (4) to grasp the connection between physically existent reality and their pertinent realities of all sorts (5) in an asymptotic approach of truth-correspondence from the procedures of knowing (in terms of the pertinent realities of existent realities) onto the physically existent processes of reality, (6) in a spirally broadening and deepening manner of truth probability, (7) which serves to achieve ever better approximations of the epistemological ideal of knowing, namely, Reality-in-general, (8) starting from reality-in-particular, and (9) by use of the highest theoretical generalities pertaining to Reality-in-total and its parts, namely, reality-in-particular.
The epistemology of physics does not take the viewpoint of the To Be of Reality-in-total. But it must obey the primary implications of To Be and the viewpoint of the To Be of Reality-in-total. What these implications are, will be treated below, under “3. The Ontology of Physics”. Epistemology in philosophy may be slightly more general than the epistemology of physics, in the sense that philosophy takes the viewpoint of all physical processes that exist and attempt to view every reality from that viewpoint alone. If not, philosophy has no justification for existence.
Naturally, the epistemology of the sciences will not be so general as that of philosophy. But obedience to it is better for the epistemology of physics; and the advantages of such obedience will be seen in the results of such physics and such sciences.
The epistemology of physics, therefore, will attempt to theorize, know, and predict all that exist, but from the viewpoint exclusively of experimentally / empirically verifiable methods based on what is directly or indirectly before us, namely, the physical processes at our reach. The epistemology of systematically and systemically (i.e., systematically of systems of systems … ad libitum) moving in the use of logic from the given existent physical processes to the details of the not immediately given but ever more minute or ever more distant physical existents is the epistemology of physics. The above definition would, in my opinion, be sufficient to cover as broad and minute procedures as possible in physics. Time has come to appropriate it in physics, lest much advantage be lost for too long.
Not that philosophy does not trust this approach of physics. But philosophy looks for the Categorial presuppositions of existence behind all that is verifiable or verified empirically and empirical-theoretically. These presuppositions are the starting points and guiding principles of philosophy. There is a stark difference between a methodology of this kind and the methodology of basing everything on the truths derived from empirical and empirical-theoretical research. Now from this viewpoint you may judge the following suggestions and determine whether the epistemology of doing physical science is as broad as that of philosophizing.
Every moment, our body-brain nexus is continuously but finitely in contact with itself and with a finite extent of the environment, more or less simultaneously, but in differing intensities, no matter however elementary. The primary mode of this is through sensation, using all available and necessary aspects of it as the case may be. Thought and feeling are possible only in continuity with sensation, and never without it.
But one special characteristic of the human brain differentiating it from others is that sensation, feeling, and thought can very consciously induct into, and consequently deduce from the presuppositions of, all that exist – no matter whether they are a finite environment or infinite – and all these solely from the finite experience from the finite environment at hand. This seems to be absent in less human living beings.
Moreover, the second, but more forgotten, characteristic of the human brain differentiating it from others is that sensation, thought, and feeling are affective, tending to itself and to others, in the broadest sense of the term ‘affective’. It is the manner in which every human being tends in his/her sensation, feeling, and thought. Hence, all processes of knowing will be coloured by affection.
The manner and then the so-constructed broader background in which sensation, feeling, and thought take place is affection, which we term also love in a very general sense. Sensation, feeling, and thought are the three interconnected modes of tending of the body-brain to itself and to the environment, tend always to connect itself with the environment.
But here too the important differentiating characteristic in human body-brains is their capacity to tend to the environment beyond the immediate environments, and further beyond them, etc. ad libitum. There is nothing wrong in theoretically considering that there is the tendency in humans to converting this sort of ad libitum to ad infinitum, irrespective of whether these environments can really go ever broader at infinity in the content of matter-energy within Reality-in-total. Infinity is another term here for generalizing.
Reality consists of existent reality and realities that pertain to existent realities in their groups. Existent realities are clear enough to understand. Realities pertinent to existent realities are never to be taken as belonging to just one existent reality. They are always those generalities that belong to many existent realities in their respective natural kind. These generalities are what I call ontological universals.
All generalizations tend beyond onto the infinite perfection of the essential aspects of the concepts pertaining to the object-range. Not that the object-range must be infinite. Instead, the tending presumes an infinitization due to the idealization involved in generalizations. This is a kind of infinitization that does not need an infinite Reality-in-total in existence. All the concepts that a human being can use are based in the infinitization of the essential aspects of the concepts in their ideality. But behind these mental ideals there are the ideals, namely, the ontological universals pertaining to the groups (natural kinds) of processual entities in the environment. These are the ideals in the things and are not in us. These too are idealizations at the realm of the natural kinds that form part of Reality-in-total.
Without loving in the sense of tending to, as human do, to the inner and outer environments in their generalities there is no sensation, feeling, and thought. The tending to need not be due to the love of the objects but due to the love of something that pertains to them or to the ontologically universal ideals pertaining to the objects. From this it is clear that the relation between the processual objects and the sensing-feeling-knowing mind is set by the ontological universals in the natural kinds of existent physical processes.
At the part of the mind there should be idealized universals of conceptual quality, because the ontological universals in natural kinds cannot directly enter and form concepts. This shows that the conceptual universals (called connotative universals) are the mental reflections of ontological universals that are in the natural kinds. In short, behind the epistemology of sensation, feeling, and thought there are the ontology and epistemology of loving in the sense of tending to, due to the otherness implied between oneself and the environment.
There may be philosophers and scientists who do not like the idea of love. I say, this is due to the many psychology-related prejudices prevalent in their minds. We need to ask ourselves what the major mode of exercitation of any activity in human beings, and none can doubt the role of love in epistemology. The physical foundations of love too are commonly to be shared with the foundations of other aspects of physical existence.
Such tending by the person is mediated within the person by the connotative universals. Their expression is always in terms of symbols in various languages. These are called denotative universals. Connotative universals get concatenated in the mind in relation to their respective brain elements and form thoughts and feelings. Their expression in language is by the concatenation of denotative universals and get formulated in languages as theories and their parts.
To put in gist the latter part of “2. The Epistemology of Physics”, I suggest that the ontological, connotative, and denotative universals and the love of human agents to these and the very existent processual entities are what facilitate knowledge. The psychological question as to what happens when one has no love does not have any consequence here, because psychology differentiates between love and non-love in terms of certain presumed expressions of love and non-love.
In the case of the natural course of life of humans, the choice is not between love and non-love, but instead, between increasing or decreasing love. We do not speak here of loving other human beings as a matter of ethical action. Instead, the point is that of the natural love that humans have for everything including for sensing, feeling, knowing, etc.
One might wonder here why I did not discuss mathematics as an epistemologically valid tool of physics and other sciences. I have already dealt with this aspect in many other discussion texts in ResearchGate, and hence do not expatiate on it here.
3. The Ontology behind Physics (soon to be given as a separate RG discussion session)
WHAT IS INFORMATION? WHAT IS ITS CAUSAL (OR NON-CAUSAL?) CORE? A Discussion. Raphael Neelamkavil, Ph.D. (Quantum Causality), Dr. phil. (Gravitational Coalescence Cosmology)
Questions Addressed: What is information? Is it the same as the energy or matter-energy that is basic to it? Is it merely what is being communicated via energy and different from the energy? If it is different, is it causally or non-causally different or a-causally? Is it something purely physical, if it is based on and/or identifiable to energy? What is the symbolic nature of information? How does information get symbolized? Does it have a causal basis and core? If yes, how to systematize it? Can the symbolic aspect of information be systematized? Is information merely the symbolic core being transmitted via energy? If so, how to connect systematically and systemically the causal core and the symbolic core of languages? If language is a symbolizing production based on consciousness and life – both human and other – and if the symbolic aspect may be termed the a-causal but formatively causal core or even periphery of it, can language possess a non-causal aspect-core or merely a causal and an a-causal aspect-cores? If any of these is the case, what are the founding aspects of language and information within consciousness and life? These are the direct questions involved in the present work. I shall address these and the following more general but directly related questions together in the proposed work.
From a general viewpoint, the causal question engenders a multitude of other associated paradoxical questions at the theoretical foundations of the sciences. What are the foundations of all sciences and philosophy together, upon which the concepts of information, language, consciousness which is the origin of language, and the very existent matter-energy processes are based? Are there commonalities between information, language, consciousness, and existent matter-energy processes? Could a grounding of information, language, etc. be helped if their common conceptual base on To Be can be unearthed, and their consciousness-and-life-related and matter-energy-related aspects may be discovered? How to connect them to the causal (or non-causal?) core of all matter-energy? These are questions more foundational than the former set.
Addressing and resolving the foundational question of the apriority of Causality is, in my opinion, the possibly most fundamental solution. Hence, addressing these is the first task. This should be done in such a manner that the rest should follow axiomatically and thus naturally. Hence, the causal question is to be formulated and then the possible ways of reflection of the same in mental concepts that may axiomatically be demonstrated to follow suit. This task appears to be over-ambitious. But I would attempt to demonstrate as rationally as possible that the connections are strongly based on the very implications of To Be. As regards language, I deal only with verbal, nominal, and attributive (adverbs and adjectives) words, because (1) including other parts of speech would go beyond more than double the number of pages and (2) these other parts of speech are much more complicated and hence may be thought through and integrated in the mainline theory here, say, in the course of another decade or more!
THE FATE OF “SOURCE-INDEPENDENCE” IN ELECTROMAGNETISM, GRAVITATION, AND MONOPOLES
Raphael Neelamkavil, Ph.D., Dr. phil.
With the introductory claim that I make here suggestions that seem rationally acceptable in physics and the philosophy of physics, I attempt here to connect reasons beyond the concepts of magnetic monopoles, electromagnetic propagation, and gravitation.
A magnetic or other monopole is conceptually built to be such only insofar as the basic consideration with respect to it is that of the high speed and the direction of movement of propagation of the so-called monopole. Let me attempt to substantiate this claim accommodating also the theories in which the so-called magnetic monopole’s velocity could be sub-luminal.
If its velocity is sub-luminal, its source-dependence may be demonstrated, without difficulty, directly from the fact that the velocity of the gross source affects the velocity of the sub-luminal material propagations from it. This is clear from the fact that some causal change in the gross source is what has initiated the emission of the sub-luminal matter propagation, and hence the emission is affected by the velocity of the source’s part which has initiated the emission.
But the same is the case also with energy emissions and the subsequent propagation of luminal-velocity wavicles, because (1) some change in exactly one physical sub-state of the gross source (i.e., exactly the sub-state part of the gross source in which the emission takes place) has initiated the emission of the energy wavicle, (2) the change within the sub-state part in the gross source must surely have been affected also by the velocity of the gross source and the specific velocity of the sub-state part, and (3) there will surely be involved in the sub-state part at least some external agitations, however minute, which are not taken into consideration, not possible to consider, and are pragmatically not necessary to be taken into consideration.
Some might claim (1) that even electromagnetic and gravitational propagations are just mathematical waves without corporeality (because they are mathematically considered as absolute, infinitesimally thin waves and/or infinitesimal particles) or (2) that they are mere existent monopole objects conducted in luminal velocity but without an opposite pole and with nothing specifically existent between the two poles. How can an object have only a single part, which they term mathematically as the only pole?
The mathematical necessity to name it a monopole shows that the level of velocity of the wavicle is such that (1) its conventionally accepted criterial nature to measure all other motions makes it only conceptually insuperable and hence comparable in theoretical effects to the infinity-/zero-limit of the amount of matter, energy, etc. in the universe, and that (2) this should help terming the wavicle (a) as infinitesimally elongated or concentrated and hence as a physically non-existent wave-shaped or particle-shaped carrier of energy or (b) as an existent monopole with nothing except the one mathematically described pole in existence.
If a wavicle or a monopole is existent, it should have parts in all the three spatial directions, however great and seemingly insuperable its velocity may be when mathematically tested in terms of its own velocity as initiated by STR and GTR and later accepted by all physical sciences. If anyone prefers to call the above arguments as a nonsensical commonsense, I should accept it with a smile. In any case, I would continue to insist that physicists want to describe only existent objects / processes, and not non-existent stuff.
The part A at the initial moment of issue of the wavicle represents the phase of emission of the energy wavicle, and it surely has an effect on the source, because at least a quantum of energy is lost from the source and hence, as a result of the emission of the quantum, (1) certain changes have taken place in the source and (2) certain changes have taken place also in the emitted quantum. This fact is also the foundation of the Uncertainty Principle of Heisenberg. How then can the energy propagation be source-independent?
Source-independence with respect to the sub-luminal level of velocity of the source is defined with respect to the speed of energy propagation merely in a conventional manner. And then how can we demand that, since our definition of sub-luminal motions is with respect to our observation with respect to the luminal speed, all material objects should move sub-luminally?
This is the conventionally chosen effect that allegedly frees the wavicle from the effect of the velocity of the source. If physics must not respect this convention as a necessary postulate in STR and GTR and hence also in QM, energy emission must necessarily be source-dependent, because at least a quantum of energy is lost from the source and hence (1) certain changes have taken place in the source, and (2) certain changes have taken place also in the emitted quantum.
(I invite critical evaluations from earnest scientists and thinkers.)
Psychology People :
I have a hard time believing that , in effect, few (if anyone) believes there might be a bit of "conditioning" to see a new perspective and approach. (Reflect on the fact that Buddha needed to use much repetition (and that in several different contexts) for people to "see" what he was talking about -- that is a fact.) See my next post (Discussion) for more.
In my opinion, more than 70% of strong academic departments of philosophy have concentration on linguistic-analytic philosophy in some or another way. We cannot say that this school is perfect. What are its defects? How to improve its foundations?
Aristotle distinguished between (proper) definitions which reveal the essential nature of a thing and (improper) definitions which determine the meaning (or reference) of a word. He raised the issue that it is difficult to determine the (essential) definition of a thing which may not exist, or whose existence is accidental.
Leibniz later distinguished between real and nominal definitions. A nominal definition is an enumeration of properties which are sufficient to demarcate a thing from others, but there is no guarantee that the thing exists - equivalently, that there is no contradiction in the definition – i.e., that the term has a reference. When the realization of a definition is shown (either a posteriori or a priori), then the definition is real, and can be used in an argument.
After Kant, the focus turned to the ('real') definition of concepts and their content; this approach persisted through Frege and took an empirical turn with, e.g., Hempel. On the other hand, only nominal-linguistic definitions were recognized by Quine, Strawson, and other analytic philosophers of language. Relatedly, the elimination of the analytic/synthetic distinction put further stress on the possibility of real (conceptual or essential) definitions.
So, is the distinction between real and nominal definitions still tenable and what is the basis of this distinction? Does it rely on the analytic/synthetic distinction at all?
I noticed that there is a structural similarity between the syntactic operations of Bealer's logic (see my paper "Bealer's Intensional Logic" that I uploaded to Researchgate for my interpretation of these operations) and the notion of non-symmetric operad. However for the correspondence to be complete I need a diagonalisation operation.
Consider an operad P with P(n) the set of functions from the cartesian product X^n to X.
Then I need operations Dij : P(n) -> P(n-1) which identify variables xi and xj.
Has this been considered in the literature ?
I usually ask more scientific kinds of questions, but this concerns me. The lifespan of humans is not long enough, in my opinion, but dogs get even less. Most dogs don't live past 16 years. The love from a dog can be so intense that it compares to the love that humans have for their children. It's not right that such a loving being should have such a short life. Was nature wrong about this?
Consider the two propositions of the Kalam cosmological argument:
1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
Both are based on assuming full knowledge of whatever exists in the world which is obviously not totally true. Even big bang cosmology relies on a primordial seed which science has no idea of its origin or characteristics.
The attached article proposes that such deductive arguments should not be allowed in philosophy and science as it is the tell-tale sign that human wrongly presupposes omniscient.
Your comments are much appreciated.
In reference to the attached document, it seems that scientist with the helping hand of metaphysics have created several scientific versions of Turtle All the Way Down viewpoint.
The article criticizes two widely accepted models for the genesis of the universe which can be listed under two hypotheses:
- Nothing
- Something
Both theories have been discussed in enough detail, but this question/discussion is related to the second theory.
[ These criticisms may apply more to studies in the behavioral sciences, those being the ones I know about. ]
There is a big tendency for researchers to do research that [supposedly] TRIES to "build on" previous research. AND, there is a belief that such studies will lead to better understanding of (/definition-of) core concepts in a "field". AND, ALSO, other even less related (less concretely or physically interrelated) studies, such as interdisciplinary studies, are believed to lead to better understanding as well.
I believe neither of these is necessarily the case or even likely true (and, to a notable extent, never true, with some research as it is). I believe it is more often NOT true that progress is being made these ways, since the unit of analysis and its aspects are not clear, OR that real (proven) developed relations have not been found. Given the present research ways (many having long, numerous historical/philosophical roots), I believe that more often than good, real desired results (from findings), the results will NOT be interpretable in any reliable or valid way. This an area where some good scientific analytic philosophers could be of good help (thus, the reason for the existence of this discussion question).
My view is that if you do not have well-guided/well-justified and WELL-related studies, specifically, with all phenomenon involved or of present interest RELATING AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO DIRECT OBSERVATIONS OF essentially FOR-SURE FOUNDATIONAL OVERT PHENOMENON __AND___/__OR___ a clear case or clear reflection of such actual phenomenon (and, here too, CONCRETE LINKS at some time were shown and INVOLVED), then you are "off-track". Such is needed for science advancement ITSELF (<-- this being key to science and a MAJOR indication OF REAL SCIENCE itself). [ (In Psychology, the subject and aims of studies and findings should be to illuminate KEY Behavior PATTERNS, by clearly relating all of them to directly observable overt behavior patterns that ARE reliably and validly seen (with clear concrete foundations) OR to such "things" THAT WERE (and, ideally: have been) once so clearly and reliably seen during development (i.e. ontogeny)) (yet notice: STILL there is plenty of latitude left for many types of concepts to be involved in proposed explanations, given development and the demonstrated possibilities of the huge capacities of the Memories).) ]
What is the significance of philosophy for the development of sciences in the 21st century and in the context of the current technological revolution and dynamic technological progress and growing global problems?
Please, answer, comments.
I invite you to the discussion.
Best wishes
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am a young PhD student who has just started the second year of the 4-year PhD programme. I am a political scientist specializing in British colonial political history, mainly South Africa and Ireland.
Some time ago, I finished writing a draft of my article on the question of liberty in the British Commonwealth, where the Irish Free State was a case study. The paper argues that understanding liberty as non-interference (Berlin, JS Mill and Bentham) was a foundation of the British policy towards its Dominions. It made the Commonwealth look more like a British colonial club, which was serving the interest of the Crown, and not a confederation of freely associated members (like the EU). Another argument is that Dominions, on the other hand, were subconsciously standing on the Republican understanding of liberty (Pettit, Mill, Harrington). The research uses Ireland to illustrate the abyss between the two concepts. It shows that the passionate Irish antagonism towards the Commonwealth was, to some extent, a result of that polarization of the viewpoints.
My question is the following. One of the respected reviewers has given me a comment that I must precisely explain how the two systems with their outlook on liberty apply to the question of collective freedom, the freedom of states, and not individuals. Thus, could you please help me with that? I felt that such an issue would pop up but was postponing its resolution until the comments arrived. How may I explain the application of the two outlooks to the freedom of the states? When does an individual transform into a collective? Is it possible to see a state as an equivalent of a living organism nowadays (IMHO, it is such an outdated and controversial concept that I would not dare following it to justify my logic)?
PS I was lucky to get comments from Skinner himself; however, I would love to hear as many thoughts as possible.
Thank you for any comments and recommendations.
Warm regards :)
In the 1980s Bealer wrote Quality and Concept which presented a type-free first-order approach
to intensional logic to compete with other higher-order, type-theoretic and modal approaches.
The presentation (both in the book and in a published article) is very sketchy (some non-trivial lemmas are merely stated) and the presentation is not easy to follow.
I was so impressed and intrigued by Bealer's philosophical arguments based on his system that I took it upon myself to clarify the presentation of his intensional logic and to furnish detailed proofs of the soundness and completeness results, which I hope might interest a larger audience. I wrote a paper containing this material which gives a general philosophical motivation and points out some open problems. I was interested in being sure of the correctness of these results before advancing to purely philosophical discussions on the advantage of this approach.
What would be a good journal to submit this paper to ?
From antiquity, one of the first fundamental areas of the development of thoughts and considerations being precursory trends for the subsequent development of specific fields of science was logic and philosophy. Analysis of the development of various directions, theories, concepts, trends, and philosophical schools in the context of the history of philosophical thought can also provide inspiration for contemporary considerations over specific guesses, the search for solutions to complex problems, and the planning of complex research processes.
Many philosophical concepts and trends from the past, formulated in other epochs, are in principle still valid despite the technical, technological and civilization progress made. I believe that many philosophical concepts and trends from the past concerning the role of man in the surrounding world, in relations with the environment, including the social and natural environment, man as part of nature in a sustainable ecosystem, etc. is still valid. Human life has changed due to technological and civilization progress. The current technological revolution, known as Industry 4.0, could, however, change human life in highly developed countries so far that these may be already noticeable in contemporary trends and philosophical concepts concerning antrolope, social issues, etc.
On the other hand, modern philosophical concepts can also describe the role of science in the 21st century in the context of successively growing global social, climate and natural and economic problems.
In view of the above, the current question is: Do you know any theories or directions of philosophical thought that inspire you to carry out scientific research?
Please, answer, comments. I invite you to the discussion.
Mathematics is the basis of exact sciences. The development of mathematics consists in the fact that, among others, new phenomena of the surrounding world, which until recently were only described in the humanistic perspective, are also interpreted in mathematical terms.
However, is it possible to write down the essence of artistic creativity in mathematical models and create a pattern model for creating works of art, creative solutions and innovative inventions? If that was possible, then artificial intelligence could be programmed to create works of art, creative solutions and innovative inventions. Will it be possible in the future?
Do you agree with my opinion on this matter?
In view of the above, I am asking you the following question:
Will mathematics help to improve artificial intelligence so that it will achieve human qualities of artistic creativity and innovation?
Please reply
I invite you to the discussion
Best wishes
I find it odd, for example, when I hear in the news that a parent forgives someone who intentionally caused severe injuries to their child. It seems to me that only the child has the right to forgive in such a situation.
Addendum: Let me also add for consideration the more extreme case of the parent or spouse of a murder victim forgiving the murderer. Although the state may have the right to pardon the perpetrator at some point, that is different from forgiveness, and it seems to me that no one has the right to forgive the perpetrator for the murder itself. To suggest otherwise would be tantamount to regarding the victim as property of which one has been deprived. It would be tantamount to forgiving someone for stealing and totalling your car.
Dear Scientists,
It was projected by some scientists that the Industrial/ petroleum civilization could collapse around the early 2022.
Therefore, I wish to know your views: Could COVID 19 be related to this?
What kind of scientific research dominate in the field of Philosophy of science and research?
Please, provide your suggestions for a question, problem or research thesis in the issues: Philosophy of science and research.
Please reply.
I invite you to the discussion
Thank you very much
Best wishes
Is the development of computerized advanced information processing technologies, ie technologies typical of the current technological revolution known as Industry 4.0, currently one of the major determinants shaping contemporary philosophical concepts describing the role of science and conducted research?
In some countries over 90 percent. official matters citizens now settle through the Internet at home. Similarly with payments and transfers via the Internet as part of electronic banking. In addition to laptops, tablets, smartphones and smartphones, more and more devices allow access to the Internet. Therefore, more and more devices offer various information services available on the Internet. More and more people use the Internet as the main global information medium. The time spent on reading books decreases and the time spent on browsing information portals and social media portals on the Internet increases. In this way, people's habits and social behaviors change. This situation can also influence the role and importance of science in the modern world.
Do you agree with my opinion on this matter?
In view of the above, I am asking you the following question:
Is the development of computerized advanced information processing technologies, ie technologies typical of the current technological revolution known as Industry 4.0, currently one of the major determinants shaping contemporary philosophical concepts describing the role of science and conducted research?
Please reply
I invite you to the discussion
Thank you very much
Best wishes
Even if behavior was "embodied", wouldn't the brain notice? YES, of course: then the BRAIN would become the better "vehicle" for remembering, thinking, and "time travel" (i.e. prospective memory) -- possible (and possibly trivial) sensori-motor components notwithstanding. [ I am really quite tired of the "embodied" conceptualizations (which have yet to be shown as non-fictions *). See my writings. No one has argued against the views/approaches (content) in these writings NOR accepted/liked/or adopted them (now 1+ years (or 5+ years, depending how you look at it) and counting). ]
* Footnote: All this nonsense is ALL because NO PSYCHOLOGY OUTLOOK (other than my own) "believes in" anything psychological, innately guided, and emerging with ontogeny (which is not tenable). (The idea that learning is literally nearly always "the same" (outside of clearly always being associative in nature) is preposterous (think of a two -year-old and an adolescent -- and imagine any systematic and universal instruction you credibly might posit). P.S. Relatedly : "Culture" does NOT directly impinge on the individual -- the actual Subject and ultimate, but absolutely necessary, unit of analysis &/or explanation (for Biology or for Science). All executive or "meta" processes can NOT be properly shown to be anything but homunculi.)
In mainstream intellectual humanitarian discourse we are often encouraged not to stereotype. While stereotypes are not always right, they tell part of the truth. So how far does the rejection of stereotypes or widely circulated statements divert us from seeing the truth?
How popular are Hegel's ideas in the USA? Can we say that his influence on Communism indicates his being marginalized in American philosophical circles?
The question I really wanted to "kick off" this thread:
Why would local (times/spaces) -- any number considered singly (or reflected on afterward and/or considered together in ways -- but still as they were, singly) -- ever to be thought to show what we ARE in terms of the Biology of Behavior?
One should not have such poorly contextualized thoughts but, as I will indicate, this is the nature of a lot of recognized and long-standing philosophy. Typical philosophy, not thoroughly guided by science.
I shall try to indicate how such normal experience could/should NOT be likely to reveal most-key behavioral development -- the core biological functioning of behavior.
[ FOR THIS ESSAY: Think in terms that philosophers most often think in, and a major and central kind of behavior psychologists think about: thinking itself; and, think of that specifically AS IT ADVANCES IN MAJOR WAYS, and thus specially in qualitative shifts leading to significant new ways to imagine and conceptualize. ]
The beginning question (at the top of the body of this essay) is basically to ask: can we conjure up the very nature of a major biological system, THAT BEING THE BIOLOGICAL SYSTEM OF OUR OVERT BEHAVIOR PATTERNS (as it unfolds with ontogeny)? Can we do this just by "force of will" or strong intent, finding exactly that which is key in experience (during ontogeny/development) as it emerges? I say, no. That would not be well-adaptive, for one thing; we don't want to rely on OUR precision, but rather our "body's" ability to HAVE precision: somehow "in" developing some CORE (key aspects) of behavior patterns which, specifically, are the core of new qualitative ways of thinking . Such important new aspects are likely possible because of some added precision (true discriminativeness and realized similarities) "reflected" in some memory capacities, as knowledge develops (or, more accurately, HAS developed). AND, THEN, as we, with our capacities are exposed to "more" , in key important situations/circumstances, those faculties 'see' more (we would say, in today's psychology terms: “more enters working memory”).
How have Western philosophers done on such matters? How have they addressed this?
Western philosophy: how could one criticize this? Here's a major general way: A major topic and abiding concern in that field is about thought, esp. thought about thought; but, this and other matters pondered, are characterized by precisely the LIMITED phenomenology of OUR thinking (and just what-all that does), AS DONE, IN EFFECT, "LOCALLY".
But what's the problem? What else do we have? Oh, the woe of those who do not know:
We have good knowledge of the nature of, AND limitations of, some central faculties (the Memories) -- good science data here; considering THAT, we have the ability to compare situations/responses looking for cross-situational/circumstances differences and cross-situational/circumstances similarities WITH THAT KNOWLEDGE AND PERSPECTIVE GUIDING US. This is NOW NOT the phenomenology of raw experience, though it is clearly related to such experience -- and MUST be related to such experiences -- but now to "track" or go "beyond" the phenomenology of local (times/spaces) experience. This gives us a way, and a legitimate way if we are fully empirically grounded (and know how to stay that way), to detect changes, NOT JUST those DUE TO regular ("local") experiences, but others related to, or due to, other behavior pattern changing, indicated by "clues" through/by/with our knowledge.
Why might this be important? Because: what we ARE, in/with our behavior patterns, may well be beyond any particular experiences AS WE ACTUALLY EXPERIENCE THEM -- beyond the regular (ordinary, usual, normal) PARTICULAR local experiences. Sound strange?; it's not. Ask yourself:
Is there any reason we should expect that we are so smart that we can actually see or detect the ultimate mechanisms of the biology of behavior? I think NOT. But, with our abstracting, reflective abilities and good knowledge of major faculties/capacities (and of changes in the content, and in the organization, that occur there), we can get an idea of what species-typical or species-specific qualitative changes might well occur over ontogeny AT KEY POINTS.
That way, we can ask: what sort of changes in behavior patterns (think of: changes in thinking) are in accord with biological principles and consistent with the way biology is (or may be), AS IT COULD OPERATE, and those maybe contributing to aspects of behavior that WE, AS SENTIENT BEINGS, CANNOT DIRECTLY (wholely-as-it-is-relevant) "fully" experience, in our normal ways. YET I assert also, that the biology of behavior CAN be realized INDIRECTLY by making differentiations and comparisons across key circumstances (of thought -- when the topic is cognitive development, as it is here), SOMEHOW using what we do already know (from behavioral science, and often NOT from normal experience). If all is done in a correct way, we will generate the testable empirical hypotheses.
Though the whole phenomenon (that is, all aspects) of qualitative change may not all be something we experience explicitly (or, at least, as something that seems at all notable in thought), we could hypothesize mechanisms of the qualitative change in some of these very aspects of overt behavior . Again, these not fully obvious or obvious for what-they-are because some key aspects of the qualitative developments of thinking are not directly obvious that way (in regular experience): these are likely exactly some of (or some aspects of) those behavior patterns AT THE INCEPTION of the “new” which is central to and resulting in NEW developments and new cognitive abilities. THEN, the question should be: what aspects of behavior patterns could be involved which may well be sufficient but not disruptive?; are any of these not only overt, but detectable and in some way measurable, given our present technological prowess? I say yes, yes. Specifically here, I assert: "Perceptual shifts", BEING the innate guidance, as aspects of important learning-related experiences (but not typical learning), may be there and suffice. [ These "perceptual shifts" could well be the development of "time-space-capacity availability" (i.e. basically "GAPS" of-a-nature in visual-spacial memory due to development , i.e. with the integrations and consolidations THAT come with development and HAVE ALREADY OCCURRED). ]
This would result in "looking" at key aspects/parts and CONTEXTS in new ways (new real concrete 'parts' of situations or combinations of 'parts' of real concrete situations). BUT: "looking at" does not likely or necessarily REQUIRE that this immediately results in “seeing more", but just sets up an orientation, used again (and again) in similar circumstances to see "the more", when there is "the more" to see and we are not to much otherwise occupied to see it. [ Here, the "looking at" I am talking about, may seem to be of the scientist who is doing the studying. Though this may be, in some senses, similar, this paragraph is describing the developing Subject, at major points in ontogeny. ]
About one engaged in good developmental psychology science: While our new way of thinking about things now can be, in a sense, of an "non-local" nature, the relevant aspects of the environment (circumstances) are never as such, but rather that which is with us (the Subject) and before us (the Subject) in the concrete real world: either as important context OR that important context with newly important content.
[ Do not be surprised to see edits to this essay for a while.]
P.S. The above is what I am all about. If you want large papers and hundreds of pages of essay, related to this, see:
and
Analytic philosophy is certainly not what it once was. The sense of conviction in its core mission and figures is gone. At the same time, analytic philosophers continue to control most philosophy departments.
So, is analytic philosophy dead or alive? Or a zombie, perhaps?
Since I'm interested in Conceptual Analysis, I've been searching for work making use of this "research method". What surprised me is that almost half of the papers I found are from the field/discipline of Nursing Studies/Research. Considering that arguably all scientific fields/disciplines (sociology, psychology, mathematics, engineering, linguistics, law, economics, physics, philosophy, medicine, etc.) could equally employ Conceptual Analysis, can anyone explain to me the special connection there seems to be between Nursing Studies/Research and Conceptual Analysis? Thank you!
Hi! I'm looking for theories, methods and approaches to study the history/evolution/conception of a given concept/term/label/topic within a given scientific discipline, mainly through the (textual) analysis of the discipline's (pivotal) writings. I'm particularly interested in approaches that would draw from ontology, terminology, conceptual analysis, conceptual history, historiography, etc., but I don't really know where to start. I'm especially interested in what the discipline's most influential writers have to say about a specific object, however they might have labelled it, and how the discipline's various theories and approaches regard that object. The approach would have to work both semasiologically (from a label to its concepts) and onomasiologically (from a concept to its labels), as there is no necessary relation between a given label and a given concept. Any ideas? Thank you very much!
I'm currently developing a project looking at instances of cultural and symbolic violence towards nature, whether this creates/contributes to stigma, and how it compares to, or causes, physical violence (i.e farming of livestock, crushing insects due to fear). Particularly interested in snakes and spiders as used to symbolise an evil, violent, or manipulative trait in a human, or other sentient antagonistic force in a piece of fiction.
Seeking to answer questions such as:
Is our use of certain creatures to represent these things in any way unethical?
What does symbolic violence towards 'strange' creatures indicate about our tendencies to do this with differential prejudice towards humans? And is challenging symbolic violence towards living creatures necessary on all levels to combat it between human groups?
So, does anyone have recommendations for reading on this? And, are there any available studies analysing the impact of nature representation on societal approach to specific animals?
Thanks,
Connor
Rationality is itself an elusive term. There are debates on the definition and criteria of rationality. The primary assumption of the naturalized and non-naturalized rationality on normative conditions has been a puzzling issue.
Neither Naturalist nor non-naturalist able to provide universally recognized criterion like laws of physics.
Quick answer : NO (and why on Earth would you expect we are? (or that we on ourselves, by ourselves, naturally would be? <-- sounds like old-time junk philosophy to me). And this will remain the case without good directed science -- and , as yet, some of the very most-central studies are not only yet to be done, but yet to be envisioned or accepted by our near-medieval present Psychology. ( [Some of] All that is modern can VERY WELL NOT be congruent with all-else that is modern.)
[ ( Title of this post intentionally made to mirror de Waal's book title: Are we Smart enough to know How Smart Animals Are? ) ]
See a good portion of my writings (all available on RG) for more.
For Psychology (and other aspiring sciences and for even for good established sciences): Isn't it better to speak and write in terms of "conditions-for" instead of 'causes'?
My answer: Yes. Yes. Yes. Most usually. (Most certainty for a Biological science, like Psychology; HERE I am talking about a science of behavior patterns PER SE (i.e. "just behaviors"). (What is closest to a 'cause' is what ethologists call: proximate causes.))
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For some certain persons: If you do not like negative feedback, do not read below the line, directly below.
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This present Question is especially for some certain individuals (who I read): The above Question is something useful to think about OTHER THAN philosophy and especially philosophical Questions about "Consciousness" and "philosophy-and-science". Those Questions are useless, senseless, ridiculous Questions that most certainly will lead nowhere (certainly nowhere useful). Consider my present Question instead, for "therapy".
"What is life?" question answered such;
Dostoevsky: "Hell"
Socrates: "Agony"
Nietzsche: "The Power"
Picasso: "Art"
Gandhi: "The War".
What is "Life" for you?
I am working in statistical seismology and we are running into a HIGHLY controversial topic. What can we say about the largest possible event (earthquake) that could happen in an area based on data? We make estimates, but what reliability do these estimates carry? There are epistemic and random uncertainties involved. There are many theoretical estimators for this quantity but many scientist doubt that they are of any practical value. I do not believe we seismologists are qualified to do more than "rambling" about the problem and I think some input from philosophers would be extremely enlightening.
I refer to papers:
Pisarenko VF (1991). Statistical evaluation of maximum possible magnitude. Izvestiya Earth Phys 27:757–763
Zöller, G. & Holschneider, M. (2016). The Maximum Possible and the Maximum Expected
Earthquake Magnitude for Production-Induced Earthquakes at the Gas Field in Groningen, The
Netherlands. Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am. 106, 2917-2921.
Zöller, G. (2017) Comment on “Estimation of Earthquake Hazard Parameters from Incomplete Data
Files. Part III. Incorporation of Uncertainty of Earthquake‐ Occurrence Model” by Andrzej
Kijko, Ansie Smit, and Markvard A. Sellevoll. Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am. 107: 1975-1978.
Many scientists lived who have milestone the world with his studies from past to present. Which scientist has been a role model for you through his studies or his/her behavior? Which have their properties, behaviors, inventions or principles, etc., leading to you or your studies? For example, "Karl Popper's Basic Scientific Principle Falsifiability" rules to me. Karl Popper is defining the inherent testability of any scientific hypothesis by this principle.
How do poets perceive and comprehend the world around them as well as their own personal experiences?
How are fresh insights and new ways of understanding formulated by poets about the commonplace and the ordinary? Would appreciate sharing your ideas and recommendations!
Thanks!
What should be the most important criteria for appointment to the career steps in universities? What are the conditions deserve to progress on the career steps? What are the conditions of advancement in your country? Do you think these criteria are objective and correct criteria for academic advancement? Is should common criteria develop all over the world?
Academic freedom. A Problem
The staff of the Britannica
writes:
"the freedom of teachers and students to teach, study, and pursue knowledge and research without unreasonable interference or restriction from law, institutional regulations, or public pressure. Its basic elements include the freedom of teachers to inquire into any subject that evokes their intellectualconcern; to present their findings to their students, colleagues, and others; to publish their data and conclusions without control or censorship; and to teach in the manner they consider professionally appropriate. For students, the basic elements include the freedom to study subjects that concern them and to form conclusions for themselves and express their opinions....
What do you think about?
In your country, what role and rights have individual scholars?
What do you think about philosophy?
Do you think Philosophy is the sanctity of reason or a sort
of pure phenomenism, only methodologically helpful?
Do you think philosophy is the study of the logical deterministic concatenation at the basis of human action?
Does have philosophy a scientific significance, which implies that philosophy is a purely scientific approach?
What mind wandering activities do you indulge in?
The mind wanders and the body? Are there activities that are associated to mind wandering?
Here is a potential list.
· Doodling.
· Colouring in.
· Walking and other sports such as running where attention is not the main focus.
· Kicking stones.
· Sky gazing.
· Hair twitching.
· Flying a kite.
The Genetic Fallacy is an informal fallacy of reasoning — viz. one of the so-called fallacies of irrelevance – in which an argument or claim is based on someone's or something's history, origin, or source, i.e. when an idea or argument is either accepted or rejected because of its source, rather than – allegedly – its merit.
Are there any circumstances under which an argument based on an idea's or a concept's origin might have merit? Please explain and/or give an example.
Why are there still pseudo-scientific conspiracy theories that undermine obviously confirmed facts and scientific knowledge in the present era of publicly available large amounts of scientific knowledge?
Why in the present age of computerization, the digitization of knowledge resources and the huge scientific knowledge available on the Internet are still created pseudoscientific conspiracy theories, sometimes absurd claims of the type that the Earth is flat, that evolution is a fiction, that some people are aliens from outside the Earth etc.? For what reason and for what purpose are these types of irrational pseudoscience theories created?
Please reply
I invite you to the discussion
Thank you very much
Best wishes
The fundamental separation between self and other, (by 'other' I mean the outside world or what is non-self) is an assumption? Isn't the idea of noumenon is a phenomenon? I am searching for literature for discribe the cause of separation (or illusion of separation) between self and other. What theory or logic do you recommend me?
Dear Colleagues and Friends from RG,
In order to answer this question, the concept of happiness should first be precisely defined, because in different cultures, in different communities of individual regions of the world, in situations of different mentality and general social awareness, the concept of happiness does not always mean the same.
For example, happiness can be interpreted with living conditions. On the other hand, happy living conditions are, for example, living in a beautiful, natural environment with the closest people who would also feel happy in such a setting.
I invite you to the discussion and scientific cooperation.
Best wishes.
Dariusz Prokopowicz
Dear all,
I wonder where the notion comes from that individuals stop striving to improve (whatever), when they are satisfied. Or other way round: where comes the idea from that some degree of dissatisfaction is a good or even necessary impetus for activity or effort. On which theory is this view of man and human activity based?
I am looking forward to your suggestions on where I could find the theoretical background of the idea of an inverse relation between happiness and effort.
Many thanks in advance.
Susanne
If a very high % of higher ed. students think: "open my brain and just pour the knowledge in" we may be doomed in discovering things for bad sciences (with no one willing to look at whole systems of understanding -- though they do not work).
There has always been a disturbing % of students (including ones who have become professors) that had this basic attitude and approach. Now, in this iPhone, etc age, it seems the % may have reached "critical mass" for hopelessness.
The good news: one or a few people could process a whole new system and investigate it (these students being among some very rare subset). These students (several) could make entire good careers out of such work. They may well occupy some seats on a plane to Oslo some day too. AND:
Frankly: analytic professors OWE THE WHOLE WORLD SUCH ANALYSIS for penance for their false persuading assertions that have messed up behavioral science FOR 100 YEARS !!
I'm interested in finding out about the nature of ethical knowledge for an epistemology course. However, I am not sure how to go about doing this -- do I apply the standard test of knowledge (JTB+x) or are there other ways of relating metaethics to epistemology?
I must now, at least for a moment, speak more generally:
FIRST: _YES_, I said DELUSION and meant it in its typical and serious meaning.
We must curb clearly (when examined realistically and rationally -- and all based on REAL actual experience, as it is) wrongful behavior (HERE: action), speech, and thought, _OR_ I profoundly 'feel' the clear sense of misery and extinction. I, myself, and with and for those I know well, 'see' all this with certainty, too -- though it is possible not all of these people 'sense' doom, admittedly. I do (for what that might be worth).
I say most-active efforts must personally be made to curb _ALL_ of this, no matter how benign it may SEEM to be (for reasons YOU can understand as well) -- THAT IS my view. (What may seem like "a little" may beget A LOT.) (Thus-changing MAY or may not be possible; it IS clearly unlikely, looking at "theory" (esp. Psychology; and, its research), philosophy, and history: but this should make us really try, not give up.) [ Before extinction: many, many terrible troubles may precede this (of course). Not wanting to be so thoroughly unpleasant, let me say: Have a nice day. Reading all my "stuff" would help, this day and henceforth. (WE must stop playing in the 'fields' of our Earth.)
P.S. I posted a very positive and affirmative (pro-adaptation) answer to: https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_do_you_choose_between_two_or_more_mutually_exclusive_hypotheses_with_equal_explanatory_power_and_scope . Perhaps this will help you know the whole "me" and not be negative or skeptical. And: I am consistent. ]
- A moment is the smallest difference between two states of the same matter in the space.
- Time is the continuous flowing of multiple consecutive moments.
I don't know if you could comment or not, but above is my proposition.
Comment définir le temps ?Aujourd'hui je vous propose une définition simple du temps. Dites-moi ce que vous en pensez !
- L'instant (le moment) c'est la plus petite différence entre deux états d'une même matière dans l'espace.
- Le temps c'est l'écoulement continue de plusieurs moments successifs.
