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[ These criticisms may apply more to studies in the behavioral sciences, those being the ones I know about. ]
There is a big tendency for researchers to do research that [supposedly] TRIES to "build on" previous research. AND, there is a belief that such studies will lead to better understanding of (/definition-of) core concepts in a "field". AND, ALSO, other even less related (less concretely or physically interrelated) studies, such as interdisciplinary studies, are believed to lead to better understanding as well.
I believe neither of these is necessarily the case or even likely true (and, to a notable extent, never true, with some research as it is). I believe it is more often NOT true that progress is being made these ways, since the unit of analysis and its aspects are not clear, OR that real (proven) developed relations have not been found. Given the present research ways (many having long, numerous historical/philosophical roots), I believe that more often than good, real desired results (from findings), the results will NOT be interpretable in any reliable or valid way. This an area where some good scientific analytic philosophers could be of good help (thus, the reason for the existence of this discussion question).
My view is that if you do not have well-guided/well-justified and WELL-related studies, specifically, with all phenomenon involved or of present interest RELATING AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO DIRECT OBSERVATIONS OF essentially FOR-SURE FOUNDATIONAL OVERT PHENOMENON __AND___/__OR___ a clear case or clear reflection of such actual phenomenon (and, here too, CONCRETE LINKS at some time were shown and INVOLVED), then you are "off-track". Such is needed for science advancement ITSELF (<-- this being key to science and a MAJOR indication OF REAL SCIENCE itself). [ (In Psychology, the subject and aims of studies and findings should be to illuminate KEY Behavior PATTERNS, by clearly relating all of them to directly observable overt behavior patterns that ARE reliably and validly seen (with clear concrete foundations) OR to such "things" THAT WERE (and, ideally: have been) once so clearly and reliably seen during development (i.e. ontogeny)) (yet notice: STILL there is plenty of latitude left for many types of concepts to be involved in proposed explanations, given development and the demonstrated possibilities of the huge capacities of the Memories).) ]
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Dear Spencer Miles
I agree with everything you said. You flushed some things out and addressed some nuances. Your post is a very welcome contribution.
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As far as I know, these ideas have been used mainly in theological discussions. However, it seems to me that such ideas would also have application in more general discussions of Cartesian dualism and the mind–body problem, e.g. they could be used to describe what happens to the Cartesian soul or mind when one is sleeping dreamlessly or when one is unconscious.
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Interesting. I will search for information.
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What is the significance of philosophy for the development of sciences in the 21st century and in the context of the current technological revolution and dynamic technological progress and growing global problems?
Please, answer, comments.
I invite you to the discussion.
Best wishes
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6 October MMXXI
That's a really good question, and perhaps unanswerable.
I see Science in one corner and Philosophy in the other corner--opposite one and other.
Will they come out to fight each other, or to cooperate?
This quandary should be talked about more frequently.
Cordially...
ASJ
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Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am a young PhD student who has just started the second year of the 4-year PhD programme. I am a political scientist specializing in British colonial political history, mainly South Africa and Ireland.
Some time ago, I finished writing a draft of my article on the question of liberty in the British Commonwealth, where the Irish Free State was a case study. The paper argues that understanding liberty as non-interference (Berlin, JS Mill and Bentham) was a foundation of the British policy towards its Dominions. It made the Commonwealth look more like a British colonial club, which was serving the interest of the Crown, and not a confederation of freely associated members (like the EU). Another argument is that Dominions, on the other hand, were subconsciously standing on the Republican understanding of liberty (Pettit, Mill, Harrington). The research uses Ireland to illustrate the abyss between the two concepts. It shows that the passionate Irish antagonism towards the Commonwealth was, to some extent, a result of that polarization of the viewpoints.
My question is the following. One of the respected reviewers has given me a comment that I must precisely explain how the two systems with their outlook on liberty apply to the question of collective freedom, the freedom of states, and not individuals. Thus, could you please help me with that? I felt that such an issue would pop up but was postponing its resolution until the comments arrived. How may I explain the application of the two outlooks to the freedom of the states? When does an individual transform into a collective? Is it possible to see a state as an equivalent of a living organism nowadays (IMHO, it is such an outdated and controversial concept that I would not dare following it to justify my logic)?
PS I was lucky to get comments from Skinner himself; however, I would love to hear as many thoughts as possible.
Thank you for any comments and recommendations.
Warm regards :)
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It is not so much a transformation as mutual integration. A community consists of individuals, and individual liberties have restrictions or limitations because individuals are located in a community and their actions impinge on other members of their community whose liberties also need to be taken into account.
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In the 1980s Bealer wrote Quality and Concept which presented a type-free first-order approach
to intensional logic to compete with other higher-order, type-theoretic and modal approaches.
The presentation (both in the book and in a published article) is very sketchy (some non-trivial lemmas are merely stated) and the presentation is not easy to follow.
I was so impressed and intrigued by Bealer's philosophical arguments based on his system that I took it upon myself to clarify the presentation of his intensional logic and to furnish detailed proofs of the soundness and completeness results, which I hope might interest a larger audience. I wrote a paper containing this material which gives a general philosophical motivation and points out some open problems. I was interested in being sure of the correctness of these results before advancing to purely philosophical discussions on the advantage of this approach.
What would be a good journal to submit this paper to ?
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Look at the journals listed in the bibliography of the entry for "Intensional Logic" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
Some more recent work by Bealer is also referenced.
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From antiquity, one of the first fundamental areas of the development of thoughts and considerations being precursory trends for the subsequent development of specific fields of science was logic and philosophy. Analysis of the development of various directions, theories, concepts, trends, and philosophical schools in the context of the history of philosophical thought can also provide inspiration for contemporary considerations over specific guesses, the search for solutions to complex problems, and the planning of complex research processes.
Many philosophical concepts and trends from the past, formulated in other epochs, are in principle still valid despite the technical, technological and civilization progress made. I believe that many philosophical concepts and trends from the past concerning the role of man in the surrounding world, in relations with the environment, including the social and natural environment, man as part of nature in a sustainable ecosystem, etc. is still valid. Human life has changed due to technological and civilization progress. The current technological revolution, known as Industry 4.0, could, however, change human life in highly developed countries so far that these may be already noticeable in contemporary trends and philosophical concepts concerning antrolope, social issues, etc.
On the other hand, modern philosophical concepts can also describe the role of science in the 21st century in the context of successively growing global social, climate and natural and economic problems.
In view of the above, the current question is: Do you know any theories or directions of philosophical thought that inspire you to carry out scientific research?
Please, answer, comments. I invite you to the discussion.
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"Pure logical thinking cannot yield us any knowledge of the empirical world; all knowledge of reality starts from experience and end in it. Propositions arrived at by purely logical means are completely empty as regards reality" (Einstein, 1934/1954 p. 271)
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Mathematics is the basis of exact sciences. The development of mathematics consists in the fact that, among others, new phenomena of the surrounding world, which until recently were only described in the humanistic perspective, are also interpreted in mathematical terms.
However, is it possible to write down the essence of artistic creativity in mathematical models and create a pattern model for creating works of art, creative solutions and innovative inventions? If that was possible, then artificial intelligence could be programmed to create works of art, creative solutions and innovative inventions. Will it be possible in the future?
Do you agree with my opinion on this matter?
In view of the above, I am asking you the following question:
Will mathematics help to improve artificial intelligence so that it will achieve human qualities of artistic creativity and innovation?
Please reply
I invite you to the discussion
Best wishes
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Dear Stan Sykora, Boris Pérez-Cañedo, Baidaa Mohammed Ahmed,
Thank you for answering the above question and participating in this discussion.
Regards,
Dariusz Prokopowicz
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I find it odd, for example, when I hear in the news that a parent forgives someone who intentionally caused severe injuries to their child. It seems to me that only the child has the right to forgive in such a situation.
Addendum: Let me also add for consideration the more extreme case of the parent or spouse of a murder victim forgiving the murderer. Although the state may have the right to pardon the perpetrator at some point, that is different from forgiveness, and it seems to me that no one has the right to forgive the perpetrator for the murder itself. To suggest otherwise would be tantamount to regarding the victim as property of which one has been deprived. It would be tantamount to forgiving someone for stealing and totalling your car.
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There are some unpardonable acts ... such as murder, administrative and financial corruption ... and many others ... Sometimes forgiveness of some people's bad deeds leads to their persistence in corruption ... It is safe to punish an offense of etiquette ..
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Dear Scientists,
It was projected by some scientists that the Industrial/ petroleum civilization could collapse around the early 2022.
Therefore, I wish to know your views: Could COVID 19 be related to this?
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patently.
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What kind of scientific research dominate in the field of Philosophy of science and research?
Please, provide your suggestions for a question, problem or research thesis in the issues: Philosophy of science and research.
Please reply.
I invite you to the discussion
Thank you very much
Best wishes
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Problem of what counts as a good scientific explanation... Salmon, W. C. (1984). Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world. Princeton University Press.
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Is the development of computerized advanced information processing technologies, ie technologies typical of the current technological revolution known as Industry 4.0, currently one of the major determinants shaping contemporary philosophical concepts describing the role of science and conducted research?
In some countries over 90 percent. official matters citizens now settle through the Internet at home. Similarly with payments and transfers via the Internet as part of electronic banking. In addition to laptops, tablets, smartphones and smartphones, more and more devices allow access to the Internet. Therefore, more and more devices offer various information services available on the Internet. More and more people use the Internet as the main global information medium. The time spent on reading books decreases and the time spent on browsing information portals and social media portals on the Internet increases. In this way, people's habits and social behaviors change. This situation can also influence the role and importance of science in the modern world.
Do you agree with my opinion on this matter?
In view of the above, I am asking you the following question:
Is the development of computerized advanced information processing technologies, ie technologies typical of the current technological revolution known as Industry 4.0, currently one of the major determinants shaping contemporary philosophical concepts describing the role of science and conducted research?
Please reply
I invite you to the discussion
Thank you very much
Best wishes
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Philosophy of science focuses on metaphysical, epistemic and semantic aspects of science... American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed.). 2011.
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Even if behavior was "embodied", wouldn't the brain notice? YES, of course: then the BRAIN would become the better "vehicle" for remembering, thinking, and "time travel" (i.e. prospective memory) -- possible (and possibly trivial) sensori-motor components notwithstanding. [ I am really quite tired of the "embodied" conceptualizations (which have yet to be shown as non-fictions *). See my writings. No one has argued against the views/approaches (content) in these writings NOR accepted/liked/or adopted them (now 1+ years (or 5+ years, depending how you look at it) and counting). ]
* Footnote: All this nonsense is ALL because NO PSYCHOLOGY OUTLOOK (other than my own) "believes in" anything psychological, innately guided, and emerging with ontogeny (which is not tenable). (The idea that learning is literally nearly always "the same" (outside of clearly always being associative in nature) is preposterous (think of a two -year-old and an adolescent -- and imagine any systematic and universal instruction you credibly might posit). P.S. Relatedly : "Culture" does NOT directly impinge on the individual -- the actual Subject and ultimate, but absolutely necessary, unit of analysis &/or explanation (for Biology or for Science). All executive or "meta" processes can NOT be properly shown to be anything but homunculi.)
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Dear Gerry Leisman
NONE of what you say is contrary to what I say. I don't, for my most reasonable position, have to believe there are no connections in/to the greater body, JUST THAT THEY ARE LIKELY TRIVIAL AND NOT ALONE (there are plenty of reasons to believe there are the most significant representations in the brain). Neuroscience as a big help to psychology is unlikely (brain patterns are more sophisticated than we can make sense of -- they are LIKELY as sophisticated AS THE NUANCES OF BEHAVIOR PATTERNS THEMSELVES; and, to wit, I have written essays on this and have most-reasonably argued that you must know the BEHAVIOR __PATTERNS__ very well to know what the more obscure brain indicators may refer to -- and DO THIS for the most part, NOT the other way around.)
Sadly all these BIG BELIEFS in/of embodying "representation" in sensori-motor ways is just because you do not have a belief/presumption/assumption structure to believe what is VERY likely, biologically: THAT THERE ARE SUBTLE, BUT IMPORTANT BIOLOGICAL BEHAVIOR SHIFTS WITH ONTOGENY -- these likely BASIC perceptual shifts, in a significant sense originating FROM THE ORGANISM ITSELF in appropriate environments. You are not stage theorists, which essentially means you cannot see behavior __PATTERNS__ (a very rare term, and when used : not correctly) or anything else of the TRUE BIOLOGICAL NATURE OF BEHAVIOR __PATTERNS__ AND PATTERNINGS OF patterns. And, as you are thus separated from the biology of BEHAVIOR ("just behavior", BEHAVIOR PER SE,) you are separated (needlessly) from science (strict empiricism) itself.
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In mainstream intellectual humanitarian discourse we are often encouraged not to stereotype. While stereotypes are not always right, they tell part of the truth. So how far does the rejection of stereotypes or widely circulated statements divert us from seeing the truth?
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I'm suggesting none of your examples. You can call the question a mental exercise by "entertaining an idea without embracing it" which is the sign of an educated mind. Please don't put words in my mouth. You could have thought of proverbs like for example "Like father like son", or "Easy come easy go".
Here is another question that might interest you: "What has the world lost by abolishing slavery?". Again, my intention is FAR from suggesting the premise that slavery is good, but can we deny the historical fact that at some point of history parts of American southern economy depended on it?
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How popular are Hegel's ideas in the USA? Can we say that his influence on Communism indicates his being marginalized in American philosophical circles?
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Leading thinkers as Hegel, Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Freud, Braudel, or some (few) others are classic authors. Their books and theories have a lasting intrinsic value regardless of ideologies, politics, manipulations, and "popularity". It doesn't simply matter if they are or not "popular" since their ideas, theories, and erudite interpretations will last.
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The question I really wanted to "kick off" this thread:
Why would local (times/spaces) -- any number considered singly (or reflected on afterward and/or considered together in ways -- but still as they were, singly) -- ever to be thought to show what we ARE in terms of the Biology of Behavior?
One should not have such poorly contextualized thoughts but, as I will indicate, this is the nature of a lot of recognized and long-standing philosophy. Typical philosophy, not thoroughly guided by science.
I shall try to indicate how such normal experience could/should NOT be likely to reveal most-key behavioral development -- the core biological functioning of behavior.
[ FOR THIS ESSAY: Think in terms that philosophers most often think in, and a major and central kind of behavior psychologists think about: thinking itself; and, think of that specifically AS IT ADVANCES IN MAJOR WAYS, and thus specially in qualitative shifts leading to significant new ways to imagine and conceptualize. ]
The beginning question (at the top of the body of this essay) is basically to ask: can we conjure up the very nature of a major biological system, THAT BEING THE BIOLOGICAL SYSTEM OF OUR OVERT BEHAVIOR PATTERNS (as it unfolds with ontogeny)? Can we do this just by "force of will" or strong intent, finding exactly that which is key in experience (during ontogeny/development) as it emerges? I say, no. That would not be well-adaptive, for one thing; we don't want to rely on OUR precision, but rather our "body's" ability to HAVE precision: somehow "in" developing some CORE (key aspects) of behavior patterns which, specifically, are the core of new qualitative ways of thinking . Such important new aspects are likely possible because of some added precision (true discriminativeness and realized similarities) "reflected" in some memory capacities, as knowledge develops (or, more accurately, HAS developed). AND, THEN, as we, with our capacities are exposed to "more" , in key important situations/circumstances, those faculties 'see' more (we would say, in today's psychology terms: “more enters working memory”).
How have Western philosophers done on such matters? How have they addressed this?
Western philosophy: how could one criticize this? Here's a major general way: A major topic and abiding concern in that field is about thought, esp. thought about thought; but, this and other matters pondered, are characterized by precisely the LIMITED phenomenology of OUR thinking (and just what-all that does), AS DONE, IN EFFECT, "LOCALLY".
But what's the problem? What else do we have? Oh, the woe of those who do not know:
We have good knowledge of the nature of, AND limitations of, some central faculties (the Memories) -- good science data here; considering THAT, we have the ability to compare situations/responses looking for cross-situational/circumstances differences and cross-situational/circumstances similarities WITH THAT KNOWLEDGE AND PERSPECTIVE GUIDING US. This is NOW NOT the phenomenology of raw experience, though it is clearly related to such experience -- and MUST be related to such experiences -- but now to "track" or go "beyond" the phenomenology of local (times/spaces) experience. This gives us a way, and a legitimate way if we are fully empirically grounded (and know how to stay that way), to detect changes, NOT JUST those DUE TO regular ("local") experiences, but others related to, or due to, other behavior pattern changing, indicated by "clues" through/by/with our knowledge.
Why might this be important? Because: what we ARE, in/with our behavior patterns, may well be beyond any particular experiences AS WE ACTUALLY EXPERIENCE THEM -- beyond the regular (ordinary, usual, normal) PARTICULAR local experiences. Sound strange?; it's not. Ask yourself:
Is there any reason we should expect that we are so smart that we can actually see or detect the ultimate mechanisms of the biology of behavior? I think NOT. But, with our abstracting, reflective abilities and good knowledge of major faculties/capacities (and of changes in the content, and in the organization, that occur there), we can get an idea of what species-typical or species-specific qualitative changes might well occur over ontogeny AT KEY POINTS.
That way, we can ask: what sort of changes in behavior patterns (think of: changes in thinking) are in accord with biological principles and consistent with the way biology is (or may be), AS IT COULD OPERATE, and those maybe contributing to aspects of behavior that WE, AS SENTIENT BEINGS, CANNOT DIRECTLY (wholely-as-it-is-relevant) "fully" experience, in our normal ways. YET I assert also, that the biology of behavior CAN be realized INDIRECTLY by making differentiations and comparisons across key circumstances (of thought -- when the topic is cognitive development, as it is here), SOMEHOW using what we do already know (from behavioral science, and often NOT from normal experience). If all is done in a correct way, we will generate the testable empirical hypotheses.
Though the whole phenomenon (that is, all aspects) of qualitative change may not all be something we experience explicitly (or, at least, as something that seems at all notable in thought), we could hypothesize mechanisms of the qualitative change in some of these very aspects of overt behavior . Again, these not fully obvious or obvious for what-they-are because some key aspects of the qualitative developments of thinking are not directly obvious that way (in regular experience): these are likely exactly some of (or some aspects of) those behavior patterns AT THE INCEPTION of the “new” which is central to and resulting in NEW developments and new cognitive abilities. THEN, the question should be: what aspects of behavior patterns could be involved which may well be sufficient but not disruptive?; are any of these not only overt, but detectable and in some way measurable, given our present technological prowess? I say yes, yes. Specifically here, I assert: "Perceptual shifts", BEING the innate guidance, as aspects of important learning-related experiences (but not typical learning), may be there and suffice. [ These "perceptual shifts" could well be the development of "time-space-capacity availability" (i.e. basically "GAPS" of-a-nature in visual-spacial memory due to development , i.e. with the integrations and consolidations THAT come with development and HAVE ALREADY OCCURRED). ]
This would result in "looking" at key aspects/parts and CONTEXTS in new ways (new real concrete 'parts' of situations or combinations of 'parts' of real concrete situations). BUT: "looking at" does not likely or necessarily REQUIRE that this immediately results in “seeing more", but just sets up an orientation, used again (and again) in similar circumstances to see "the more", when there is "the more" to see and we are not to much otherwise occupied to see it. [ Here, the "looking at" I am talking about, may seem to be of the scientist who is doing the studying. Though this may be, in some senses, similar, this paragraph is describing the developing Subject, at major points in ontogeny. ]
About one engaged in good developmental psychology science: While our new way of thinking about things now can be, in a sense, of an "non-local" nature, the relevant aspects of the environment (circumstances) are never as such, but rather that which is with us (the Subject) and before us (the Subject) in the concrete real world: either as important context OR that important context with newly important content.
[ Do not be surprised to see edits to this essay for a while.]
P.S. The above is what I am all about. If you want large papers and hundreds of pages of essay, related to this, see:
and
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Philosophy and science are the tow sides of a coin! To be a scientist one should have the ability to philosophize and to be a good philosopher one should rely on rational thought emanating from empirical evidence! So it would be better to say that 'science without philosophy' and 'philosophy without science' is useless! Similar to the Word of Jesus that 'salt without its saltiness' is worthless!
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Analytic philosophy is certainly not what it once was. The sense of conviction in its core mission and figures is gone. At the same time, analytic philosophers continue to control most philosophy departments.
So, is analytic philosophy dead or alive? Or a zombie, perhaps?
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I agree that Analytic philosophy emphasizes the study of language and the logical analysis of concepts. But isn't there a third characteristic of Analytical philosophy, namely, to stay informed scientifically and to study the results of natural science as Carnap, Hempel or Quine did? I don't think this strand of philosophy is dead and it doesn't deserve to be a Zombie. Accompanying and observing science critically is a task that still needs philosophers.
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Since I'm interested in Conceptual Analysis, I've been searching for work making use of this "research method". What surprised me is that almost half of the papers I found are from the field/discipline of Nursing Studies/Research. Considering that arguably all scientific fields/disciplines (sociology, psychology, mathematics, engineering, linguistics, law, economics, physics, philosophy, medicine, etc.) could equally employ Conceptual Analysis, can anyone explain to me the special connection there seems to be between Nursing Studies/Research and Conceptual Analysis? Thank you!
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Etienne,
There will be a few reasons for this - such as a high proportion of nursing research that is what I call 'naval-gazing' research i.e. trying to make sense of 'abstract' things and 'what is the nature of things'. There may be multiple terms for these 'issues' and those terms are often used interchangeably/incorrectly. Concept analysis is designed to bring clarity to this prevelant issue in nursing. Of course, it isn't just unique to nursing though - which is why you will see it with other disciplines.
Another reason is that most of the seminal frameworks i.e. Morse, Rodgers, Walker and Avant, Hupcey etc were developed by nurses.
A further reason, and one that some might not like me saying, is that it can be deemed as 'easier' research compared to other methodologies and yet still publishable. The data for concept analysis is narrative data derived from the existing literature. It does not require sampling and setting techniques, the recruitment of participants, ethics approval - nor data collection in the physical clinical field.
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Hi! I'm looking for theories, methods and approaches to study the history/evolution/conception of a given concept/term/label/topic within a given scientific discipline, mainly through the (textual) analysis of the discipline's (pivotal) writings. I'm particularly interested in approaches that would draw from ontology, terminology, conceptual analysis, conceptual history, historiography, etc., but I don't really know where to start. I'm especially interested in what the discipline's most influential writers have to say about a specific object, however they might have labelled it, and how the discipline's various theories and approaches regard that object. The approach would have to work both semasiologically (from a label to its concepts) and onomasiologically (from a concept to its labels), as there is no necessary relation between a given label and a given concept. Any ideas? Thank you very much!
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For the evolution of a mathematical conception you might look at Imre Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery.
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I'm currently developing a project looking at instances of cultural and symbolic violence towards nature, whether this creates/contributes to stigma, and how it compares to, or causes, physical violence (i.e farming of livestock, crushing insects due to fear). Particularly interested in snakes and spiders as used to symbolise an evil, violent, or manipulative trait in a human, or other sentient antagonistic force in a piece of fiction.
Seeking to answer questions such as:
Is our use of certain creatures to represent these things in any way unethical?
What does symbolic violence towards 'strange' creatures indicate about our tendencies to do this with differential prejudice towards humans? And is challenging symbolic violence towards living creatures necessary on all levels to combat it between human groups?
So, does anyone have recommendations for reading on this? And, are there any available studies analysing the impact of nature representation on societal approach to specific animals?
Thanks,
Connor
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Interesting that in the film based on Hermann Hesse's novel, Siddhartha, it is a cobra which kills Siddhartha's beloved wife, though snakes were considered holy and wise in some versions of theology. Also interesting is that the Rod of Asclepius- Ράβδος του Ασκληπιού - emblem of healing for medicine is a snake (not to be confused with the caduceus which also has a positive connotation as the staff of Hermes). The myth of Tiresias has him changing genders when he strikes and wounds snakes as they are mating, and then switches back with the when he witnesses them again seven years later-- all this leading to him being blinded by Hera when he reports on which gender more enjoys sexual pleasure. Snakes were autochthonous- "sprung from the earth" - much as Athena sprang from Zeus's thigh. They had wisdom. Obviously also snakes and dragons as well as rats are somewhat revered or at least respected in Chinese astrology, since all 3 creatures have zodiacal years. The moral of all this may be that it is an ill wind that blows no good and that, as with humans, there are powerfully positive and negative individuals in all species. Cross-cultural influences shared by ancient Hindu, Greek and Egyptian mythology (Hermes Trismegistus) may have many antecedents in earlier Mesopotamian mythology as well- the caduceus may have originated with the Sumerian god Ningishzida, god of the underworld and the autochthonous vegetation which sprang.therefrom. By the way, lest anyone be under the delusion that I knew all this before I started writing, I owe huge thanks to Wikipedia for all but Hesse's novel and the myth of Tiresias. I confused the caduceus with the rod of Ascepius like many others in the USA, including health organizations who use the caduceus with its two snakes rather than the rod with its single snake and is entwined around a more primitive staff.
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Rationality is itself an elusive term. There are debates on the definition and criteria of rationality. The primary assumption of the naturalized and non-naturalized rationality on normative conditions has been a puzzling issue.
Neither Naturalist nor non-naturalist able to provide universally recognized criterion like laws of physics.
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Rationality is a complex construction. Rationality includes logical inference and avoiding inconsistency, but it also involves judgements where the rational agent is trying to uncover truths or at least be sufficiently right to maximise chances of survival. It is tempting to say that rational agent will always try to follow a strategy to achieve some objectives. That may be true, but rationality requires more by requiring the rational agent to assess evidence in support of or against a judgement in a way that is verifiable by another rational agent. I think that the requirement of evidence assessment is normative; otherwise the rational agent could end up supporting a judgement that is not supported by evidence at all. But judgement is often a matter of subjective likelihood, and theories emerge when accounting for the evidence which do not meet the currently accepted norms for acceptance. Examples of this include in science include Galileo's theory of cosmology and Mendel's theory of genetics. Thus rationality is amenable to the imposition of norms, but the norms themselves need to be adaptable to revision in the light of new evidence and new theories which account for that evidence.
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Quick answer : NO (and why on Earth would you expect we are? (or that we on ourselves, by ourselves, naturally would be? <-- sounds like old-time junk philosophy to me). And this will remain the case without good directed science -- and , as yet, some of the very most-central studies are not only yet to be done, but yet to be envisioned or accepted by our near-medieval present Psychology. ( [Some of] All that is modern can VERY WELL NOT be congruent with all-else that is modern.)
[ ( Title of this post intentionally made to mirror de Waal's book title: Are we Smart enough to know How Smart Animals Are? ) ]
See a good portion of my writings (all available on RG) for more.
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No. The advancements in Science and Technology in various sectors of science and engineering are marvelous, but still its a long way to walk to answer this question..
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For Psychology (and other aspiring sciences and for even for good established sciences): Isn't it better to speak and write in terms of "conditions-for" instead of 'causes'?
My answer: Yes. Yes. Yes. Most usually. (Most certainty for a Biological science, like Psychology; HERE I am talking about a science of behavior patterns PER SE (i.e. "just behaviors"). (What is closest to a 'cause' is what ethologists call: proximate causes.))
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For some certain persons: If you do not like negative feedback, do not read below the line, directly below.
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This present Question is especially for some certain individuals (who I read): The above Question is something useful to think about OTHER THAN philosophy and especially philosophical Questions about "Consciousness" and "philosophy-and-science". Those Questions are useless, senseless, ridiculous Questions that most certainly will lead nowhere (certainly nowhere useful). Consider my present Question instead, for "therapy".
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RE: «Isn't it better to speak & write in terms of "conditions-for" instead of 'causes'?»
Wouldn't the conditions have to be casual conditions? Sure, causal explanation is pragmatic or interest-relative, and we focus on a causal factor that's relevant to us. So to light a match I think of causing it to light by striking it, our usual practice. I suppose in a certain kind of anaerobic environment, a more salient action might be injecting oxygen at the moment and point of striking.
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"What is life?" question answered such;
Dostoevsky: "Hell"
Socrates: "Agony"
Nietzsche: "The Power"
Picasso: "Art"
Gandhi: "The War".
What is "Life" for you?
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Life is happiness, confusion, upliftment, sadness, thankfulness and surprises
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What determines human behavior in daily life?
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The role of genetic factors should not be underestimated.
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I am working in statistical seismology and we are running into a HIGHLY controversial topic. What can we say about the largest possible event (earthquake) that could happen in an area based on data? We make estimates, but what reliability do these estimates carry? There are epistemic and random uncertainties involved. There are many theoretical estimators for this quantity but many scientist doubt that they are of any practical value. I do not believe we seismologists are qualified to do more than "rambling" about the problem and I think some input from philosophers would be extremely enlightening.
I refer to papers:
Pisarenko VF (1991). Statistical evaluation of maximum possible magnitude. Izvestiya Earth Phys 27:757–763
Zöller, G. & Holschneider, M. (2016). The Maximum Possible and the Maximum Expected
Earthquake Magnitude for Production-Induced Earthquakes at the Gas Field in Groningen, The
Netherlands. Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am. 106, 2917-2921.
Zöller, G. (2017) Comment on “Estimation of Earthquake Hazard Parameters from Incomplete Data
Files. Part III. Incorporation of Uncertainty of Earthquake‐ Occurrence Model” by Andrzej
Kijko, Ansie Smit, and Markvard A. Sellevoll. Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am. 107: 1975-1978.
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and Albania ...
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Many scientists lived who have milestone the world with his studies from past to present. Which scientist has been a role model for you through his studies or his/her behavior? Which have their properties, behaviors, inventions or principles, etc., leading to you or your studies? For example, "Karl Popper's Basic Scientific Principle Falsifiability" rules to me. Karl Popper is defining the inherent testability of any scientific hypothesis by this principle.
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Prof Jordan Peterson, who is also an active member of Researchgate.
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How do poets perceive and comprehend the world around them as well as their own personal experiences?
How are fresh insights and new ways of understanding formulated by poets about the commonplace and the ordinary? Would appreciate sharing your ideas and recommendations!
Thanks!
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Poets see essence of things.
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What should be the most important criteria for appointment to the career steps in universities? What are the conditions deserve to progress on the career steps? What are the conditions of advancement in your country? Do you think these criteria are objective and correct criteria for academic advancement? Is should common criteria develop all over the world?
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Generally, the main indicators of research quality are gross numbers of publications, publication in journals deemed to be ranked highly, publication by commercial publishers, high levels of publication citation, international recognition, competitive grants, and completed supervisions of research degrees. While these are used to varying extents as indicators of research quality, their relevance must be considered in light of discipline-specific considerations.
I believe that whatever the country, academic promotions should be tied to the under-listed criteria.
1. Sustained performance – performing at the standard expected for the bottom quartile of the level above the current level of appointment
2. Superior performance– performing at the standard expected at the midpoint of the level above the current level of appointment
3. Outstanding performance – performing at the standard expected between the midpoint and the top quartile of the level above the current level of appointment
4. Outstanding Plus performance – performing at the standard expected of the top quartile of the level above the current level of appointment
5. Not Sustained performance – performing no higher than at the current level of appointment
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Academic freedom. A Problem
The staff of the Britannica
writes:
"the freedom of teachers and students to teach, study, and pursue knowledge and research without unreasonable interference or restriction from law, institutional regulations, or public pressure. Its basic elements include the freedom of teachers to inquire into any subject that evokes their intellectualconcern; to present their findings to their students, colleagues, and others; to publish their data and conclusions without control or censorship; and to teach in the manner they consider professionally appropriate. For students, the basic elements include the freedom to study subjects that concern them and to form conclusions for themselves and express their opinions....
What do you think about?
In your country, what role and rights have individual scholars?
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There can never be academic freedom when we work under ideological structures, well laid out structures of education, nationalism and producing knowledge to add to regimented fields of knowledge. Curiously to go beyond all these with all imaginations and ideas running free from fear is smashed.
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What do you think about philosophy?
Do you think Philosophy is the sanctity of reason or a sort
of pure phenomenism, only methodologically helpful?
Do you think philosophy is the study of the logical deterministic concatenation at the basis of human action?
Does have philosophy a scientific significance, which implies that philosophy is a purely scientific approach?
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Philosophy is a focused attempt to clarify important issues, especially the discourse typically employed in conjunction with those issues. It is a discipline that seeks to identify and correct language that attends to discourse concerning such issues. It thus argues for or against certain positions, and supports rational argumentation with available facts or scientific findings. Its arguments are offered in consideration of the relevant history of philosophy and especially the history of the topics at stake. It is not, therefore, mere opinion.
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What mind wandering activities do you indulge in?
The mind wanders and the body? Are there activities that are associated to mind wandering?
Here is a potential list.
· Doodling.
· Colouring in.
· Walking and other sports such as running where attention is not the main focus.
· Kicking stones.
· Sky gazing.
· Hair twitching.
· Flying a kite.
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Sky gazing
Best Regards Holly B. F. Warren
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The Genetic Fallacy is an informal fallacy of reasoning — viz. one of the so-called fallacies of irrelevance – in which an argument or claim is based on someone's or something's history, origin, or source, i.e. when an idea or argument is either accepted or rejected because of its source, rather than – allegedly – its merit.
Are there any circumstances under which an argument based on an idea's or a concept's origin might have merit? Please explain and/or give an example.
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Logical fallacies have an element of truth about them; it is just that they are not sound arguments in all circumstances. I agree with H.G. Callaway that reputation of expertise is important, whether that is a peer-reviewed journal with a high ranking, or a professor from a prestigious university writing an article. Reputation can be a guide to likelihood of truth, although it is no guarantee (because the whole community may be wrong, but the strongest arguments that support a conclusion turn out to be false). In my view, heterodoxy is important for the development of any discipline, but insights from experts with orthodox views rightly carry the greatest weight.
A more famous example of a logical fallacy of value is abductive reasoning: if A, B IMPLIES A, therefore B. This is clearly a fallacy; but the truth in it is that there is a causal or explanatory relationship (or constant conjunction) relationship between B and A, then the inference may be valid. In any case B IMPLIES A, A increases the likelihood of B.
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Why are there still pseudo-scientific conspiracy theories that undermine obviously confirmed facts and scientific knowledge in the present era of publicly available large amounts of scientific knowledge?
Why in the present age of computerization, the digitization of knowledge resources and the huge scientific knowledge available on the Internet are still created pseudoscientific conspiracy theories, sometimes absurd claims of the type that the Earth is flat, that evolution is a fiction, that some people are aliens from outside the Earth etc.? For what reason and for what purpose are these types of irrational pseudoscience theories created?
Please reply
I invite you to the discussion
Thank you very much
Best wishes
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The so-called irrational is an essential element of human nature and a heightened if sometimes misjudged adjunct to scepticism. Disbelieving received or given knowledge and ideas is essential to scientific and philosophical discovery. Myths and story making are pronounced human traits.
But in the end many conspiracy theorists appear unwilling to do the hard work of finding genuine proof.
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The fundamental separation between self and other, (by 'other' I mean the outside world or what is non-self) is an assumption? Isn't the idea of noumenon is a phenomenon? I am searching for literature for discribe the cause of separation (or illusion of separation) between self and other. What theory or logic do you recommend me?
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I'd suggest the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge about other minds. This distinction has, of course, a long tradition in philosophy, but to provide some reference: Donald Davidson's "First Person Authority" in Dialectica 38 (2‐3):101-112 (1984), and reprinted as the first chapter in his "Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective" (2001, Oxford University Press). Or just google "first person authority"...
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Dear Colleagues and Friends from RG,
In order to answer this question, the concept of happiness should first be precisely defined, because in different cultures, in different communities of individual regions of the world, in situations of different mentality and general social awareness, the concept of happiness does not always mean the same.
For example, happiness can be interpreted with living conditions. On the other hand, happy living conditions are, for example, living in a beautiful, natural environment with the closest people who would also feel happy in such a setting.
I invite you to the discussion and scientific cooperation.
Best wishes.
Dariusz Prokopowicz
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When he feels that he was the cause of the happiness of others
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Dear all, I wonder where the notion comes from that individuals stop striving to improve (whatever), when they are satisfied. Or other way round: where comes the idea from that some degree of dissatisfaction is a good or even necessary impetus for activity or effort. On which theory is this view of man and human activity based? I am looking forward to your suggestions on where I could find the theoretical background of the idea of an inverse relation between happiness and effort.
Many thanks in advance. Susanne
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Surely Buddhism is one place to go-whereby every effort at gratification produces unhappiness-whether self-improvement, fulfilment of ambition, search for love-unhappiness is the result (not complete of course just in the sense of ideal love, ambition, etc). A very pessimistic viewpoint of which the only release is nothingness. I prefer living and grumbling.
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If a very high % of higher ed. students think: "open my brain and just pour the knowledge in" we may be doomed in discovering things for bad sciences (with no one willing to look at whole systems of understanding -- though they do not work).
There has always been a disturbing % of students (including ones who have become professors) that had this basic attitude and approach. Now, in this iPhone, etc age, it seems the % may have reached "critical mass" for hopelessness.
The good news: one or a few people could process a whole new system and investigate it (these students being among some very rare subset). These students (several) could make entire good careers out of such work. They may well occupy some seats on a plane to Oslo some day too. AND:
Frankly: analytic professors OWE THE WHOLE WORLD SUCH ANALYSIS for penance for their false persuading assertions that have messed up behavioral science FOR 100 YEARS !!
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I agree with you that independent research and study are the keys to all difficulties
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I'm interested in finding out about the nature of ethical knowledge for an epistemology course. However, I am not sure how to go about doing this -- do I apply the standard test of knowledge (JTB+x) or are there other ways of relating metaethics to epistemology?
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I recommend the underappreciated classic article by Peter Glassen, “Are there unresolvable moral disputes?” which gives a response-dependence or “ideal observer” account of moral objectivity. It is constructed so that moral value (rightness) is analysed in a way that could be regarded as a reduction to epistemic value (qua being implicit in the concept of knowledge). The article can be downloaded here: http://en.bookfi.net/s/?q=peter+glassen&e=1&t=0 Do NOT click on the title; click on "Download (PDF)" instead. I have a few relevant PPTs from my teaching days that I can email you. If you're interested email me here: karl dot pfeifer at usask dot ca
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I must now, at least for a moment, speak more generally:
FIRST: _YES_, I said DELUSION and meant it in its typical and serious meaning.
We must curb clearly (when examined realistically and rationally -- and all based on REAL actual experience, as it is) wrongful behavior (HERE: action), speech, and thought, _OR_ I profoundly 'feel' the clear sense of misery and extinction. I, myself, and with and for those I know well, 'see' all this with certainty, too -- though it is possible not all of these people 'sense' doom, admittedly. I do (for what that might be worth).
I say most-active efforts must personally be made to curb _ALL_ of this, no matter how benign it may SEEM to be (for reasons YOU can understand as well) -- THAT IS my view. (What may seem like "a little" may beget A LOT.) (Thus-changing MAY or may not be possible; it IS clearly unlikely, looking at "theory" (esp. Psychology; and, its research), philosophy, and history: but this should make us really try, not give up.) [ Before extinction: many, many terrible troubles may precede this (of course). Not wanting to be so thoroughly unpleasant, let me say: Have a nice day. Reading all my "stuff" would help, this day and henceforth. (WE must stop playing in the 'fields' of our Earth.)
P.S. I posted a very positive and affirmative (pro-adaptation) answer to: https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_do_you_choose_between_two_or_more_mutually_exclusive_hypotheses_with_equal_explanatory_power_and_scope . Perhaps this will help you know the whole "me" and not be negative or skeptical. And: I am consistent. ]
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اسف
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In my opinion, philosophy can help in describing the methodology of generating specific new, innovative formulas and research concepts that in the 21st century may concern, among others, the issues of artificial intelligence, data processing in Big Data resources, robotics, biotechnology, new online media and many other developmental fields of knowledge and new technologies.
In view of the above, the current question is: Does philosophy help in the creation of new research formulas?
Please, answer, comments. I invite you to the discussion.
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Of course. What we perceive as at the core of existence, knowledge and ethics affects what we want to know about the world, but also the methods to use and the ways to verify new knowledge. Just think of Newton and gravity and the mechanistic era that followed.
Luciano Floridi, a professor of the philosophy of information and Internet ethics at Oxford Internet Institute is a good author to begin to read on this issue. He says that every time needs a philosophy ”of its time, and for its time”, and that the information society, ”the infosphere”, urges us to formulate a philosophy where information itself is a value and where also machines can process information. Check him up! He has an account on RG and many lectures on youtube.
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I am not necessarily talking about faith in any divine being, but a faith in an equal human being. Could it be said that having faith brings more to mind that having trust? Is trust a simplified version of having faith in someone? Or are they synonyms? I am writing an article about trust and I would like to have your opinion. Any comments welcome.
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When we talk about “trust” and “faith” in the religious context, both are the two sides of the same coin.
When we talk about “trust” and “faith” with the relationships that we have with humans in the society, we trust some people, for example our good friend,s but we do not have a faith on them.
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- A moment is the smallest difference between two states of the same matter in the space.
- Time is the continuous flowing of multiple consecutive moments.
I don't know if you could comment or not, but above is my proposition.
Comment définir le temps ?Aujourd'hui je vous propose une définition simple du temps. Dites-moi ce que vous en pensez !
- L'instant (le moment) c'est la plus petite différence entre deux états d'une même matière dans l'espace.
- Le temps c'est l'écoulement continue de plusieurs moments successifs.
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Time is an abstract concept that we experience. what we measure with clocks may not be the same as what we experience. There are many kinds of Time. Newton was the first physicist who used the symbol "t" for time in his equations to describe the physical phenomenon. This Newtonian Time was Absolute and was shown by Einstein that it is not measurable with our clocks. Our clocks measure Einsteinian Time. This time depends on the Frame of Reference as shown in the Special Theory on Relativity. The time measured by Galileo depended on Gravity and it is not the same as the Absolute Newtonian Time, since the pendulum moves at different speed depending on it's position. It moves slower on top of mount Everest than at the bottom. With General Theory on Relativity Einstein introduced another kind of time. This time is slower at the base of mount Everest than at the top. Neurologically there is the temporal lobe time. this is based on the way the temporal lobe arranges our experiences to form a narrative. there are disorders where this narrative is not exact and gives rise to phenomenon called de ja vu and jamais vu and amnesias. Genetically, there is another time which is based on the length of the telomeres on the chromosomes. they relate to the biological age of a cell or body which has limited correlation to the chronological age. this is seen in people whose physical health is much younger or much older than their chronological age. An example is progeria where the physical age of the person is highly accelerated. Therefore we cannot talk about a single entity called Time as it does not physically exist. thanks.
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Dear professor Graham Oppy,
-My research regards the Christian philosophy of religion (since 14 years of lectureship) that is based upon the analytical philosophy.
-The analytical philosophy is based upon (to a great extent) the mathematics and the laws of thought.
-Well, mathematics both as arithmetic and geometry is limited, whereas the Christian philosophy of religion regards a.o. God Who is unlimited.
-Consequently, can the Christian philosophy of religion or the Christian metaphysics be computationalized? Thank you for the answer! Marc
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Thank you, Karl, for the very relevant suggestions! Marc
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If scientists got some money, what they will do with it?
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Research in comfort
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What if a client asks for six car garage and a swimming pool in an independent urban house? What if a client does not share the ethics and values of sustainable living – can there be sustainability in architecture, if values and ethics are absent in the users?
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Dear Dilshad Ara,
I couldn't agree with you more. "Sustainability" has become trendy, that is why it has started losing its original meaning, thus new words come up to fill in this gap (e.g. biomimicry) , until they also lose their meaning and we will searching with new to replace them fast, in our consumist way.
Once with my partner, we had a client, who wanted a bioclimatic house, where the basement, where the living room would be, would be elevated to the 1st floor, so that his guests could enjoy the view. We were trying to convince him that the heating and cooling load we would manage to lower by bioclimatic design would be nothing compared to the energy consumed for lifting up and down a floor, but as he said, he wanted to impress his guests in all ways, including sustainability.
So, yes, unless lifestyle changes, sustainability becomes an ethical code (as permaculture), and not merely a design or decision making process, we will always be ending up with such oxymoron demands. Prof Wright is right that it helps with legislation and requirments, but as long as extravagance is trendy, we will often be asked to 'sustainabilise' extravagance.
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Classical foundationalism, Reidian/Plantingian foundationalism, or something else? Why? 
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I am partial to Susan Haack's so-called foundherentism, which combines elements of both foundationalism and coherentism in that it allows for experientially justified empirical beliefs without requiring privileged basic beliefs, and allows for widespread mutual dependence among beliefs without resulting in circularity. Her crossword puzzle analogy suggests how there might be such noncircular mutual support among beliefs.
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Is there a distinction between strong or complete qualitative probability orders which are considered to be strong representation or total probability relations neither of which involve in-com parables events, use the stronger form of Scott axiom (not cases of weak, partial or intermediate agreements) and both of  whose representation is considered 'strong '
of type (1)P>=Q iff P(x)>= P(y)
versus type
(2) x=y iff P(x)=P(x)
y>x iff P(y)>Pr(x) and
y<x  iff P(y)<Pr(x)
The last link speaks about by worry about some total orders that only use
totallity A<=B or B<=A without a trichotomy https://antimeta.wordpress.com/category
/probability/page/3/
where they refer to:
f≥g, but we don’t know whether f>g or f≈g. S
However, as it stands, this dominance principle leaves some preference relations among actions underspecified. That is, if f and g are actions such that f strictly dominates g in some states, but they have the same (or equipreferable) outcomes in the others, then we know that f≥g, but we don’t know whether f>g or f≈g. So the axioms for a partial ordering on the outcomes, together with the dominance principle, don’t suffice to uniquely specify an induced partial ordering on the acti
.
 The both uses a total order  over
totality
A <=B or B >=A
l definition of equality and anti-symmetry,  A=B iff A<=B and B>=A
A<= B iff [A< B or A=B] iff not A>B
A>=B iff [A>B or A=B]iff not A<B
where A>B equiv B<A,and
A>=B  equiv B<=A iff (A<B)
where = is an equivalence relation, symmetric, transitive and reflexive
<=.=> are reflexive transitive, negative transitive,complementary and total
, whilst <, > are irreflexive and ass-ymetric,
transitive
A<B , B<C implies A>C
A<B B=C implies A>C
A<B, A<=B implies A>C
and negatively transitive
and complementary
A>B iff ~A<~B
<|=|>, are mutually exclusive.
and where equality s, is an equivalence class not denoting identity or in-comparability but generally equality in rank (in probability) whilst the second kind uses negatively transitive weakly connected strict weak orders,r <|=|>,
weak connected-ness not  (A=B) then A<B or A> B
whilst the second kind uses both trichotomous strongly connected strict total orders,  for <|=|>,.
(2) trichotomoy A<B or A=B or A>B are made explicit,  where the relations are mutually exclusive and exhaustive in (2(
(3) strong connectected. not  (A=B) iff A<B or A> B, and
and satisfy the axioms of A>= emptyset, \Omega > emptyset , \Omega >=  A
scotts conditions and the separability and archimedean axioms and monotone continuity if required
In the first kind <= |>= is primitive which makes me suspect, whilst in the second <|=|> are primitive.
Please see the attached document.And whether trich-otomoy fails
in the first type, which appears a bit fuzzier yet totality holds in both case A>=B or B<=B  where
What is unclear is whether there is any canonical meaning to weak orders (as opposed total pre-orders, or strict weak orders) .
In the context of qualitative probability this is sometimes seen as synonymous with a complete or total order. , as opposed to a partial order which allows for incomparable s, its generally a partial order, which allows for comparable equalities but between non identical events usually put in the same equivalence class (ie A is as probable as B, when A=B, as opposed, one and the same event, or 'who knows/ for in-comparability) Fihsburn hints at a second distinction where A may not be as likely as B, and it must be the case
not A>B and not  A< B  yet not A=B is possible in the second yet
A>= B or A<=B must hold
which appears to say that you can quasi -compare the events (can say that A less then or more probable,  than B ,but not which of the two A<B, A=B, , that is which relation it specifically stands in
but yet one cannot say that A>B  or A<B
)
and satisfy definitions
and A<=B iff A<B or A=B iff B>=A, iff ~A>=~B, where this mutually exclusive to A<B equiv ~B>~A
A>=B iff A>B or A<=B
iff iff B>=A where this mutually exclusive to A>B equiv ~B<~A
and both (1) and (2) using as a total ordering over >= |<=
(1)totalityA<= B or B<=A
(2)equality in rank and anti-symmetric biconditional  A=B iff A<=B and B>=A where = is an equivalence relation, symmetric, transitive and reflexive
(2) A<=B iff A<B or A=B, A>=B iff A>B or A<=B
(3) and satisfy the criterion that >|<|>=|<=,  are
complementary, A>B iff ~B<~A
transitive and negatively transitive,
where A<B iff B<A and where , =, <|> are mutually exclusive,
The difference between the two seem to be whether A>=B and A<= B is equivalent to A=B; or where in the first kind, it counts as strongly respresenting the structure even if A>=B comes out A>B because one could not specify whether A>B or A=B yet you could compare them in the sense that under <= one can say that its either less or equal in probability or more than or equal, but not precisely which of the two it is.
either some weakening of anti-symmetry of the both and the fact that the first kind use
whilst the less ambiguous orders trich-otomous orders use not  (A=B) iff A<B or A> B; generally trichotomy is not considered, when it comes to using  satisfying scotts axiom , in its strongest sense, for strict aggreement
and I am wondering whether the trich-otomous forms which appear to be required for real valued or strictly increasing probability functions are slightly stronger, when it comes to dense order but require a stronger form of scotts axiom, that involves <. > and not just <=.
but where in (1) these <=|>= relation is primitive and trich-otomoy is not explicit, nor is strong connected-ness whilst in (2)A neq B iff A>B or A<B
>|=|< is primitive and both
(1) totality A<= B or B<=A
(2) A<B or A=B or A>B are made explicit,  where the relations are mutually exclusive and exhaustive in (2(
and (2) trichotomy hold and are modelled as strict total trichotomous orders,
as opposed to a weakly connected strict weak order, with an associated total pre-order, or what may be a total order,
, or at least are made explicit.  I get the impression that the first kind as deccribed by FIshburn 1970 considers a weird relation that does not involve incomparables, and is consided total but A>=B and B<=A but one cannot that A is as likely as B, or that its fuzzy in the sense
that one can say that B is either less than or equal in probability to A, or conversely, but if B<= A one cannot /need not  whether say A=B or A<B,
not A=B] iff A<B or A>B
and strongly connected in the second.
where A=B iff A<=B and B>=A in both cases
where <= is transitive , negative transitive, complementary, total, and reflexive
A>=B or B<=A
are considered complete
and
y
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You are way too dispersed.
Try to undestand well the more basic stuff, one topic at a time.
Then move on.
Do not start from Gleason or weak measurements  for eample.
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I’m looking for any work done on the concept of freedom (interchangeable with liberty) which analyzes it in terms of form and content. My meaning is that the concept of freedom is construed as consisting of two different and opposing elements. The form of freedom is understood as an independent choice between alternatives. It is a formal notion of freedom because it concentrates on the mere existence of alternatives open for the independent subject to choose from, and disregards the actual and concrete choice that has been made. From a formal point of view, as long as the subject has a wide enough range of alternatives to choose from, and is not forced or coerced in any way to choose (or not to choose) any of the given alternatives, the subject is free, and there is no substantial difference between the different alternatives. I.e. different alternatives such as growing red roses, studying philosophy or joining ISIS, will all be regarded as essentially equivalent. By contrast, the content element of freedom emphasizes the concrete choice that has actually been made. It regards the content of the choice and evaluates it according to some criterion or principle (e.g. moral, political, utilitarian, etc.). From a content point of view it is a necessary condition of the freedom of the subject that she’ll not only choose independently, but also that she’ll choose the right choice (by some standard or criterion). The simplest way to describe the opposition between the two elements is by noting that any constraint we put on the content will necessarily reduce the range of alternatives open for choice. It is also noteworthy that the two elements may be construed as prerequisites for a comprehensive notion freedom, thus making the opposition between them necessary. The formal element is necessary for the obvious reason that there’s no freedom without free choice. And the content element is necessary because without it free choice becomes completely arbitrary.   
Any work related in any way to the issues I described will be helpful. The famous negative vs. positive concepts of freedom does not, to the best of my knowledge, invoke explicitly the form-content distinction. And the only work I know of which is somehow close to this distinction is Charles Taylor's 'What's wrong with negative liberty'.
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I do not have access to recordings of or notes taken about lectures or conference discussions on these topics by Dr. Donald Davidson. I took courses from him around 1960. In one course on Mind (if I remember correctly) he argued that if anyone acted without reference to preceding events, personal preferences, or anticipated results, then nobody would say that said person was "free." They would say that the person was demented, not that he was free.
Rather unexpectedly, I found a similar understanding of the matter given in terms of the philosophy of Mencius, and provided with remarkable lucidity in one of a semester of lectures given by Professor Tang Jun-yi during the year that he was the honored guest of the Philosophy Department of National Taiwan University. After the key lecture, I asked him whether he had published on the subject. He said that he indeed had published, but it was during the early years of China's war with Japan, printed somewhere in the western part of China where most scholars had fled, and he had no idea of where any extant copies of that article might be found.
The discussion in its Chinese context was not given in terms of "liberty" or "freedom" or "free choice." The discussion can, however, be illustrated in terms of there being a range of choices that matter in many or most social interactions (and in other contexts as welll), and while there might be some limitations on the probability of success of the several possible choices for action that one might make, none of the limitations would prevent an individual from trying to make them work. (To modify an example from the Mencius, if your father rustled a cow, you could choose to be a good citizen and turn him in to the police, you could be a good son and choose to help him escape capture, or you could pretend to know nothing at all about the theft. Mencius wouldn't even bother with the hypothetical if he didn't believe that any individual who landed in that situation could make a voluntary choice for one of at least those three alternatives.)
I am not sympathetic to your second mode, the definition of freedom in terms of "content." 
"From a content point of view it is a necessary condition of the freedom of the subject that she’ll not only choose independently, but also that she’ll choose the right choice (by some standard or criterion)." I don't think "the right choice" has anything to do with freedom, and neither would Mencius or Tang Jun-yi. 
The complement to the "formal possibility" in the Mencian system is the understanding that people can and generally do have competing motivations (or drive states) that influence them, for purely internal reasons, to have competing impulses to take each of the competing paths. The alternative to suffering something like buyer's remorse lies in learning by experience and introspection to balance the various motivations, or drive conditions so that in retrospect one will not have reason to regret a hasty action.
According to their way of looking at things, in many cases many paths of action might be about equally productive of a desirable outcome, while other courses of action might be rejected without there being much cause for indecision. Whether a chosen course of action turned out to be better or worse would only emerge as the result of a retrospective look at one's life or one's recent path. At that point one might say, "If I'd known I couldn't make it as a physics major, I might have chosen Stanford over Rensselaer Polytech." 
These issues, from the standpoint of a 17th centurey Confucian are discussed in The Preservation of Human Nature by Yan Yuan, available in draft form at http://www.china-learn.info/Philosophy/Philosophy.html
 Sorry to post this hasty response. There appears to be no way to edit an earlier posting on ResearchGate. Too bad. 
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The title says it all really. I recently started my journey in continental philosophy, and Heidegger's hermeneutic circle caught my attention quickly. However, I'm not sure what's new about it really? What has been added by Heidegger's understanding of the circle to the field?
I'm slighly perplexed, but I hope some of you will guide me to the right direction
Also, if there are 'readings' that you think is essential for this topic, feel to free to recommend them :-)
Thanks!
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There are many differences between Heidegger and previous versions of the “hermeneutic circle”:
1) Heidegger never recover the “circle of the hole and the part” present in romantic hermeneutics (e. g. Schleiermacher).
2) Heidegger’s version of the circle has an ontological character: Dasein is the being that understands the being he is. In this previous understanding of himself rest also an implicit understanding of being in general, that makes possible the explicit formulation of the question about the sense of being.
3) This ontological aspect of hermeneutics distinguishes Heidegger from Dilthey, who sees hermeneutics as the methodology of spiritual sciences.
4) Heidegger’s formulation of the circle is a critique of the metaphysics of presence and the subject-object relation (an aspect absent on biblical and judicial hermeneutics).  
5) Heidegger develops the pre-structure of understanding (Vorhabe, Vorgrif und Vorsicht), an element absent in previous versions of the circle.
6) In Heidegger’s later thinking the hermeneutic circle is related to the “turn” or “Kehre” of the being itself along the history.
There are also many differences between Heidegger and Gadamer that are not usually mentioned. In the Cambridge Companion to Gadamer, you can find a non-exhaustive comparison between Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s versions in the article by Jean Grondin: “Gadamer’s Basic Understanding of Understanding.
Good luck,
Andrés.
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I have a student trying to find out what Denzin (and others) says about ontology and epistemology in education research and can't really find. Denzin seems to say as much as I would about engineering - any help will be appreciated 
thanks 
ania 
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The average man in our time has an underground, unconscious vision of the world, which absorbs from the media, the family and school. The concept of material, with which a sense of reality is based, has been modified over time and today emerges as a vague concept, evanescent and virtual, nourished by the suggestions of computer science. Epistemological awareness is necessary to understand and unmask representations "swallowed" unconsciously , which have become a priori the categories with which we interpret the world. Such awareness is a decisive step toward the conquest of freedom and needs a profound look on the origins of concepts and representations used by science: concepts that in our time dominate the visions of the world that the individual deceives himself as having created autonomously  and freely.
The materialism of West has no more to do with the philosophy and ideologies. It has to do with the loss of the pathos of image of the world that has origin from ignorance, i.e. from non-truth. And the loss of the concept of form was for centuries after the Renaissance the first sign of this poverty, since the form represents the supreme manifestation of being. Heidegger had tried to give an answer to the question of the poet Hölderlin located in the elegy Brot und Wein: "which is the task of the poet in time of poverty?". No time has suffered from poverty as our present time.
Within the Western world exists a marked epistemological polarity that starts with the so-called “linguistic turn” This dichotomy is often underestimated, or for the most part ignored, despite having a fundamental role in the historical philosophical context of our era. The linguistic turn originates from the need to go beyond the “platonic myth” of the idea as reality in itself, reducing sensible reality to mere representation of thought developing in empirical temporality (psychologism). Actually the problem is older and concerns, as Husserl tried to show in his Erste Philosophie, the dialectics between idealism and skepticism. Its development ranges from the time of Plato and the Skeptiks, through the English nominalism of the Oxford Franciscan Friars to the realism of ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas, to Descartes rationalism and English empiricism. Aphorism 90 of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: “It is as if we had to penetrate through phenomena: our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, to the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena. We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the kind of statement we make about phenomena… Our investigation is therephore a grammatical one.”
Basically, Wittgenstein suggest we can say nothing about what phenomena are, but we must concern ourseves with what is said about phenomena. Hence the concept of linguistic game becomes essential, and is used repeatedly in many other aphorisms in the same work. Analytical Philosophy has its origin as a philosophy of language.
I think that the vision of the world of Denzin has been influenced by analytical philosophy. In Denzin’s work, inspired by Charles Wright Mills, it seems that the Wittgenstein’s linguistisic game is brought on the plane of media communication that takes place through the informatics and becomes a computer game.
All this represents a further step toward abstraction of concepts and phenomena, for which the post-modern culture has content of extreme ontological relativism. The vox populi and  the idiographic level of their individual lived experience become essential.
I think that the urgent need of our times should require an ontology and a founding epistemology coming from the self-conscious elaboration of the Mitteleuropean philosophical tradition.
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I'm looking for any work dealing with Rousseau in relation to Berlin's 'Two concepts of liberty' and the debates which follow, or to contemporary work on freedom such as Raz' autonomy based concept of freedom or Petit and Skinner's concept of republican liberty. 
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Berlin, of course, refers to Rousseau in his widely read essay "Two Concepts of Liberty" and sees him as advocating a positive as opposed to a negative concept of freedom. Berlin also wrote a critical essay on Rousseau included in his book "Freedom and its Betrayal."  In addition, Bernard Williams, taking a similar view of Rousseau, refers to Rousseau's notion of freedom in his essay "Liberalism and Loss" in the book "The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin" (Edited by  Mark Lilla, Ronald Dworkin, Robert B. Silvers) and his essay "From Freedom to Liberty" in his book "In the Beginning was the Deed."
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Has the experimental science got limits in its discipline? Many actual knowledges are not consequence of repetitive experiments. Regarding the sources of science, are they limited to experimentation? Other disciplines as history, unique experiences, philosophy, etc., can they be more important for the man?
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The theory of General Relativity was inspired by pure imagination (affected by philosophy) followed by mathematical formulation and then experimental validation.
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What is Creatures and Creators Matrix?
Behind all the activities there are mindsets………And apparently mindset have mind at backend.........Seemingly Artificial Intelligence is not so well developed yet to produce mindsets without original biological alive brain present inside the body......wondering what will happen when Artificial Intelligence will produce mindset by own.............!! 
Creatures and creators will learn definitely from each other...............about that scenario here are few questions
What do you think which directions the future AI based mindset can adopt and why?
What can be the basics and further developmental requirements of such mindsets?
And up till what extent such mind set can go to fulfill the desires?
What will be the factors which can have effects on it?
How good and bad will exist for AI based mind sets and what will be expected frame of reference (s)?
It can be foreseen that if space exploration don’t give them (AI based mindsets) the way out then a tough match will get play at Earth and In case of way out among cosmos then Nature will get a very strange events waves might be beyond space-time-relativity, if so then will natural laws get evolution, if again yes then in which direction and what will be the future matrix of Creatures and Creators?
Thanks
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 In a sense it has already happened. Think of large scale "Big Science" research projects involving hundreds of specialized collaborators from a variety of disciplines. No individual researcher can have an in-depth knowledge of the whole, yet conceivably all the detailed knowledge can be integrated within an expert system that can be used to answer questions beyond the intellectual capacity (intelligence) of any of the individual researchers. 
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In the second paragraph of "What is a Theory of Meaning?" Dummett writes: "I share the belief that this is the most fruitful approach to the problems within this area of philosophy, although I should not feel capable of giving a demonstration that this was so to someone who denied it (...)". Who is Dummett referring to?
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In my first comment I presumed that the question was about the proposer of the idea “that this is the most fruitful approach”. If, on the other hand, the question is about “someone who denied it”, then there are many philosophers who would deny it. The most important would be Ludwig Wittgenstein.
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From Wikipedia, the emotivism is defined as the set of ethical theories that, in the Ethics and Philosophy  of twentieth century, especially at the Anglo-Saxon philosophers, argue that moral judgments have no cognitive value but that emotions and feelings that accompany them determine an incentive conditioning to act morally.
Immanuel Kant brought an indictment of psychologism. For the German philosopher, in fact, this conception was irreducible to the feeling that could never be confused with morality. Feeling is something impulsive, weak, inconsistent, on which morality can not rely on ":a certain sweetness of soul that passes easily into a warm sense of piety, is beautiful and lovable, because it reveals a certain participation in the events of others [...] but this good-natured sentiment is weak and blind. "
The term "emotivism", introduced in the syntax of scientific language, has been created in the last century with the recognition of semantics of use and as distinction between indicative and emotional valence of human discourse implemented in the article: 'The meaning of meaning' written by C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards. In order that the term ‘emotivism’ had a less extended sense, it is necessary to wait for the definition of Ayer. For him the word "emotivism" merely indicates an attempt to reduce the ethical discourse to the emotional use.
For Charles Leslie Stevenson moral judgments must be traced to personal emotional causes, but rather than in feelings, morality has its origin in the psychological sphere and the opposing moral attitudes can be explained as those that occur with a sense of satisfaction.
Also for Stevenson moral judgments are of emotional and private nature, but rather than being direct expression of feelings, they refer to "attitudes", to psychological dispositions to approve or disapprove courses of action, and the contrasts between different moral attitudes develop in similar manner to the conflicts that arise in the realm of taste. Against the reduction of moral judgments to emotions, theoretical proposals, such as Hare’s, have tried to re-establish the specific nature of moral language, connecting it to a form of practical rationality.
So, if starting from Principia Ethica of G. E. Moore (1903) research for an ethics free from naturalistic or metaphysical assumptions had begun to ponder on the meaning of moral terms commonly used, with the affirmation of emotivism, this application of the methods of analytical philosophy to ethics is seriously contested. The ethical emotionalism is a significant moment in the way, peculiar to the Anglo-Saxon moral philosophy of the twentieth century, which led to the affirmation of the studies on meta-ethics (at the expense, at least until the sixties, of normative ethics) and of analyses on the moral language .
The emotivism, in the radical formulation drawn by A.J. Ayer, is however a moment of profound criticism of the philosophical path because It supports the lack of meaning of moral statements.
The emotivism in its most complete and radical form consolidates, however, with the publication in 1936 of the work 'Language, Truth and Logic' by A.J. Ayer, a work in which the author, in accordance with the prescriptions of logical positivism, applies to the judgments of ethics and to the expressions of the mysticism the principle of verification.
The criterion used here to test the authenticity of those who present themselves as statements of fact is the criterion of verifiability. We say that a statement is significant in a factual sense for any given individual, if and only if it knows how to verify the proposition that the statement is intended to express. Specifically, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as true or false.
The ethical emotivism refuses the status of verifiable expressions, and then all those propositions that express command, state of mind, moral convictions; the only propositions with sense are those to which is possible to apply the principle of verification, i.e. those that can be true or false.
The neo-positivist tradition before the Second World War considered the ethical propositions as meaningless, as not attributable to tautologies nor to empirical statements: the emblem of this condemnation is the script 'Language, Truth and Logic' by Ayer. The consequence of such conviction is that ethical propositions are nothing but expressions of feelings or emotions. From these assumptions, Stevenson builds on the ethical emotivism, that he at first distinguishes between empirical propositions and tautologies, on the one hand, and ethical propositions, on the other. While the former has a complete sense and a descriptive meaning, which gives rise to cognitive acts in the listener, the second (ethical one) has also an emotional meaning. In other terms they evoke emotions and feelings in those who listen. So the ethical propositions, despite the absence of descriptiveness, have, in their prescriptiveness, a precise meaning, which is an emotional one. To clarify this distinction, Stevenson uses a rather effective example: if I say "this man is a black", I formulate a proposition having descriptive and, consequently, a cognitive value (in fact, this proposition gives me information about the reality in front of me) . If I say "this is a black man," I formulate an emotional proposition, that rather than describing reality, elicits a negative feeling in the listener.
Then, when I express a proposition like "do so because it is a good deed," I am somehow providing descriptive elements, but end up being reabsorbed in the emotionality: in fact, when I say "do so because it is a good action ", rather than describe reality, I want to persuade you to act in a way which I think is positive. Stevenson insists on the impossibility of descriptive cogency of moral statements: compared to Ayer, he emphasizes the subjectivity of such statements, opening the door to a possible relativistic drift (stemming from the lack of objectivity of moral statements that allow me to define universally what is 'good').
Although very constructive, the road of emotivism is a path not entirely satisfactory. Considering emotivism as a meta-ethical theory that neglects the existence of moral disagreements and does not admit the normative value of evaluations, it incurs in the same charges of reductionism it introduces in relation to other theories. In this way, the emotionalism takes the dead end of reductionism.
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[Distinguished Professor Emeritus, University of Waterloo]
The core truth of emotivism was appreciated long ago by David Hume, and before him by Aristotle who said "Intellect alone moves nothing." All the so-called "cognitivists" somehow thought that if Jones accepts some moral proposition ("You ought to do x"), then Jones would actually DO x as a result. But why would he, if the 'ought' had no sort of involvement with Jones's "emotions", feelings, desires, dispositions to act?
That said, the contrast of noncognitivism and cognitivism is pretty much one of those professional dichotomies on which philosophers thrive. But it's a bad contrast, for practical propositions are always, and necessarily, both (as Hume, again, pointed out right at the start of his Inquiry Into the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals). No proposition can be practical if it has NO "descriptive" content. ("Eat this" contains the word 'this', whose referent must be established before the addressee can know what he is supposed to do.) In all the interesting cases, the cognitive network is enormously wide, and in the case of Morals - as Hume points out - it reaches to all men. That is, in morals, we look for principles that reach to everybody. And in order to do so, they must somehow appeal to everyone's interests.
So if emotivism is understood as some enthusiasts originally described it, it's a cmplete nonstarter. But so is cognitivism, as defined by philosophers (that is, the thesis that ethical sentences are entirely descriptive in their meaning. Mind you, you can make the emotional appeal fall out of an ostensibly descriptive construction: is "I like peaches" descriptive? OK, but what it describes is an attitude, and if it is true, it entails that I have that attitude. If that's enough to get us off the ground into our needed "emotionality" then descriptivism is fine, so long as the range of descriptions inludes the very attitudes that emotivists (correctly) perceive to be essential to the business of ethics.
Finally, let us remember that whether our starting premises be of descriptive or of prescriptive form, there is still logic - of getting from one sentence to another. {Cf. hare: "take all the boxes to the station!; "this is one of the boxes" therefore, "take this to the station" is a perfectly valid and obvious essential sort of reasoning in practical matters. When we get to basic morals, the role of fairly abstract, extremely general reasoning, becomes properly prominent.
So the answer to the question "Why reduce the ethical discourse solely or primarily to an emotional issue?" is that we don't do any such thing; but on the other hand, we have to recognize that ethics is practical, and therefore must have a core that "engages the emotions" (construed broadly.)
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 ‘Becoming’, understood as an endlessly scroll of reality, was one of the most important and complex philosophical concept that was opposed by ontological vision of static essence and dynamic one (like Heraclitus) (Wikipedia).
The term ‘becoming’ in philosophy involves a change not only in space, as in the original meaning, but also in time.
The problematic nature of the definition of ‘becoming’ arised initially from the consideration that the primordial substance had to be conceived as unique and immutable: but if it was so, how would you explain the origin from it of the multiplicity of things? If at the beginning, the unique essence was water, as such was to remain forever and not give rise to the multiplicity of beings.
But it is clear that talk about life of the substance amounted to a contradiction ‘in terminis’, as it always defines identical with itself, and therefore immutable, something which in effect becomes living and constantly changing.
Becoming is, according to Heraclitus, the essence of Being, because everything is subject to time and change. Even what seems static to sensory perception in reality is dynamic and constantly changing.
Everything flows into the thesis that identifies in the fire the symbolic beginning of all things. This element symbolizes quintessential movement, life and destruction.
Becoming is therefore the immutable law; ‘logos’ regulates the alternation of birth and death. It is the identity of the different, i.e. the element which unifies what in all the many things is constant. Becoming is in fact made up of opposites that coexist in things: the uphill road is the same as downhill. It appears for the first time a dialectic conception of reality.
But not everyone is able to recognize ‘logos’, the law that governs the world. Only a few are "awake" and can recognize the common law of logos, the others, the "dormant," living in a dream, are prisoners of the opposition, of struggle and the conflict, unable to rise to the unity of all :
The harmony of things, for Heraclitus, lies in its constantly changing and in continuous conflict between opposites. This concept is defined as ‘polemos’, which allows the existence of all things.
The Eleatics, contrary to Heraclitus, did not rely in senses that reveal the movement. The emotion generates the opinion of mortals who live in the illusion whereby it believed true the existence of ‘becoming’ as a mixture of being and not being. But not being does not exist nor can be thought.
Thinking and being are the same thing for which being is not and cannot be ‘not being’, while ‘not being’ is not and cannot be.
Moreover, how is it possible to think of birth as a transition from ‘non-being’ to being, and death as a go from being to not be? Birth and death are only appearances of being, not generated (nothing comes from nothing), eternal (nothing ends in nothing), still, unique (because if they were two, it should be separated from ‘non-being’), compact and well-defined ( similar to a perfect sphere).
This is Parmenides' belief that contrasts sharply with that of those who supported the thesis of Heraclitus.
The end of the paradoxes is to prove that to accept the presence of motion in reality involves logical contradictions superior to those who deny ‘becoming’ and is therefore better, from a purely rational point of view, rejecting the sensible experience and say that reality is still and ‘becoming’ does not exist.
To be out of the impasse of the two mystical theories of Parmenides and Heraclitus, appearing, despite contradicting both logically founded, pluralists philosophers, materialists have a solution more rationalistic and naturalistic, treating the ‘becoming’ as ‘being’, marking the conceptual severity of the first compared to the second.
For ‘becoming’ is essential to think that there is a multiplicity of edifying beings: beings, and pluralists argue that in fact at the beginning of world history there was a great variety of primeval elements with the faculties of Parmenides’ ‘being’, that is, eternity and immobility.
In this way, birth is not a transition from ‘not being’ to ‘being’, but an aggregation of the primitive entities that, for Empedocles are the four elements of earth, water, air and fire, for Anaxagoras what he calls seeds, for Leucippus atoms as indivisible and elementary building blocks.
Each of us is born with a changing association of these multiple primary elements, which are in themselves always identical to themselves and immutable. Death will be nothing but the separation of these elements that will go back each his own part of their being primary.
This apparent conciliation of being and becoming, went to meet a difficulty: if the multiple beings presented themselves at the beginning and remained immutable and then still to safeguard the requirements of the Eleatic being, as was explained later their aggregation and disintegration?
The problem is actually placed by monists in opposition to the pluralists, but has its own explanation. In fact, the pluralists did intervene from outside forces such as Love and Hate, for Empedocles, or Nous, for Anaxagoras, had been submitted clarifying the aggregation and breakdown of the primary elements.
The first to compete with the concept of non-existence of the vacuum were the Eleatics with their philosophy based on being as the only reality. Only ‘being’ can be thought, as ‘not being’ does not exist.
The difficulty for the ancient mind, which persists in the thought of Parmenides, to conceive the void (emptiness)seems to be related to the theory on the archaic Greek thought about a "mythical" age, understood as the transition from primitive thought to that rational adult, where word was not distinguished from thing. A sort of fusion of language, reality and truth for which the Greeks had a vision of reality as a "show", therefore not distinguishing between visibility, existence and thought: only what was visible really existed and could thus be thought of and hence the difficulty of thinking the ‘not being’, the void, that is not visible and which therefore does not exist.
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There are two important philosophers that think otherwise, Democritus (460-370 b.c.) and Lucretius (99 - 55 b.c.). Both believed in the atomic structure of nature: everything is composed of a diverse number and proportion of four types of atoms: fire, water, earth and air. They proposed that it is the infinite arrangement and proportion of atoms of the four elements that explains why there are so many different objects in nature. 
Neither Greek nor Roman philosophies were monolithic in their way of understanding nature. Not everyone agreed with the idea of a single primordial substance. Lucretius' De rerum natura or On the nature of things is the first scientific book in the West. It is impeccably writen in extraordinaryly aesthetic verse and even contemporary scientists and mathematicians like Michel Serres have proved that some of the theories of Lucretius anticipated aspects of thermodynamics. It seems Democritus and Lucretius were better prepared to anticipate contemporary science. 
De rerum natura is one of the most engaging science books I have read in my life. I recommend it to you. :-)
Best regards
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The 'understanding' is a very complicated and sensitive term. It's quite a long time that I have been focusing on logical specification, representation and analysis of [constructivist] understanding. Now, I feel the need to use the knowledge of the appropriate researchers from different fields (e.g., psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, learning sciences, philosophy, knowledge processing and cybernetics) to make the logical comparisons between the answers. The question may seem to be very general, but I want the researchers in different fields to make it more specific with regard to their own conceptions and relying on their own policies.  
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Farshad Badie 
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Knowledge is all that one can learn by rote. It is the information concerning a process that could be stored in a computer and incorporated in a computer program. It is information and process steps that could be used in a check list or an operating procedure. It is the information and relationships that management by bureaucracy requires.
Understanding is knowledge that includes the how and why. Someone who understands has developed an intuition of the process. One may acquire through practice the how of a process. The how of a process allows proficiency and a level of expertise. The why of the process is necessary to apply the process and innovate. Innovation may be altering of the process as conditions change or applying the process to a new situation. There are many aspects of process why. What is to be accomplished? When or whether it is necessary? Who or what is affected? What are the limits? When or how is it applied? Is the process proper for the situation? When have you done enough? ...
There may be a difference in semantics when you and I use 'conceptual realization.' I mean you must merge the how and why to apply knowledge in a meaningful way. The how and why are necessary to form a concept and make it real. Understanding is the merging of how and why with the comprehension of all the aspects of the process why.
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Language, as an expression of the various 'knowledge' is subject to continuous transformations. I’d like to focus in particular on one of them in the field of scientific research.
As science can not critically verify its own assumptions, it is up to history, epistemology, philosophy and to the analysis of language to deepen the horizons of pre-understanding of each scientific proposition. In particular this is the understanding of a reality based on the assumption and tradition of antecedent interpretations, which precedes the direct experience of reality itself.
Popper was very attentive about  the instrumental aspect of science (and therefore also to language), not interested in things in themselves, but to their verifiable aspects through measurements. Therefore, he invited not to interpret theories as descriptions or using their results in practical applications. He recalled that, as "knowledge", science is nothing but a set of conjectures or highly informative guesses about the world, which, although not verifiable (i.e. such that it is possible to demonstrate the truth) they can be subjected to strict critical controls.
This is evident from various texts and  Popper emphasized these ideas in ‘The Logic of Scientific Discovery’: "Science is not a system of certain assertions, or established once and for all, nor is it a system that progresses steadily towards a definitive state. Our science is not knowledge (episteme): it can never claim to have reached the truth, not even a substitute for the truth, as probability .... "
We do not know, we can only presume. Our attempts to conceit are guided by the unscientific belief, metaphysical in the laws, in the regularities that we can uncover, discover.
A kind of approach which is not exempt from ethical questions because the operation has fluid boundaries. The borders can be crossed, leading to the possibility of manipulation and abuse of power against the same identity and autonomy of the persons involved.
As Bacon we could describe our contemporary science - the method of reasoning that today men routinely apply to Nature - consisting of hasty advances, premature and of prejudices. But, once advanced, none of our advances is supported dogmatically. Our research method is not what is to defend them, to prove how right we were; on the contrary, we try to subvert them, using all the tools of our logical, mathematical and technical ‘baggage’".
Hence the maximal caution: "The old scientific ideal of episteme, of absolutely certain and demonstrable knowledge, has proved an idol.
The need for scientific objectivity makes it inevitable that every assertion of Science remains necessarily and forever to the status of an attempt. The wrong view of science is betrayed because of its desire to be the right one. Since it is not the possession of knowledge, of irrefutable truth, that makes a man of science, but the critical research, persistent and anxious for the truth ".
[In this regard I consulted the following texts: H. R. Schlette, Philosophie, Theologie, Ideologies. Erläuterung der Differenzen, Cologne, 1968 (Italian transl c / o Morcelliana, Brescia, 1970, pp. 56, 78); G. Gismondi, The critique of ideology in the science foundation's speech, in "Relata Technica", 4 (1972), 145-156; Id., Criticism and ethics in scientific research, Marietti, Torino, 1978].
Then, Hermeneutics, applied to language, to human action and ethics allows to articulate text and action. An action may be told because it is the human life itself that deserves to be narrated; it presents possible narrative paths that the individual highlights, excluding others. Story and action also confirm the inter-subjectivity dimension of human beings: the action can be told because it is the same human life that deserves to be told. The story presents thoroughly the three moments of ethical reflection: describe, tell and prescribe.
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I just put my book up on Amazon: Give Space My Love: An Intellectual Odyssey with Dr. Stephen Hawking. The brief book description is below.
If any of you would like a complementary copy of the book just send me an email with your physical address. bristol at isepp.org
Per your starting question it focuses of whether science and talk about science. My background is philosophy of science: Popper, Lakatos and Feyerabend. The last was my honors advisor at Berkeley.
The central narrative tension uses Dewey distinction between the Spectator and the Participant representation of inquiry (and the place of inquiry in the universe). Quantum Mechanics and Relativity both force us to (toward) a Participant framework. I argue that there were two paths to complementarity (and the limits of the scientific research program) in the 20th century, one is in the new physics and the other comes from Popper's Question (about falsifiability of all meaningful theories).
Personally I have transitioned from philosophy of science to philosophy of engineering – 'a new name for an old way of thinking' (viz. James's remark about pragmatism). I have a couple of Linus Pauling Memorial Lectures on YouTube if you are curious about where all this goes beyond the book. 
Freewill and the Engineering Worldview
Bristol May 3rd, 2013  http://youtu.be/kZjJukntqHM
Life Ascendant: A Post-Darwinian Worldview
Bristol May 21st  2014  http://youtu.be/i2mwhk-6a3A
What is Engineering? What is the Value Context of Engineering?
What is the Value Context of Engineering?
Bristol July 30th 2015 (China) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vc1lI8Ox7qM
BOOK DESCRIPTION:
Who is the real Dr. Stephen Hawking? Is he a detached Spectator seeking a mathematical description of a deterministic, objective reality – ‘out there’? Or is he an embodied Participant in the universe seeking to bring about a more desirable future? The timeline of the book is a four-city lecture tour the author organized for Hawking in the early 1990s (Portland, Eugene, Seattle and Vancouver BC). Hawking’s powerful meetings with students with disabilities, officially collateral events, were remarkable. However, the greater significance of these ‘stories of the road’ is better appreciated in the context of the central narrative question of the book: the nature of the universe and our place/role in it.
The author, a philosopher of science (Berkeley, London), engages Hawking, his graduate assistants and eventually his nurses in what starts as a critical review of the ‘new physics’ of Einstein, Bohr and Heisenberg. The question of the limits of classical science expands to questions of the limits of all supposedly objectivist, ‘one right answer’ ideologies – in biological, socio-economic, and political realms. Is everyone ‘really’ selfish? Is the world objectively competitive or cooperative? In a parallel critical review of the ‘new philosophy of science’ the contributions of the author’s mentors, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Kuhn and Popper mark a parallel path to complementarity, undermining the Spectator representation of detached ‘objective’ inquiry.
Through his personal interactions Hawking reveals himself as a Participant, concerned with ‘how we should live’. He steers us toward a more desirable, moral future.
The new post-scientific Participant understanding of the universe requires a paradigm shift to a More General Theory that can both explain the successes of science and yet understand them in a new way. In the More General Theory, our embodied Participant inquiry is understood in a new way wherein the sciences and the humanities are necessarily re-unified.
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Irrationalism is that way of thinking in opposition to the doctrines that relate to reason as the only instrument which, through distinctions, definitions and deductions, is able to give a coherent, clear and distinct vision of reality.
At the end of the nineteenth century positivism and idealism were blamed for having formulated an abstract conception of reality as the result of a theoretical reflection that, based on the Absolute and scientistic fideism, ignored the reality of life.
In particular, the irrationalism of Schopenhauer's thought is found in the theory of life as a blind manifestation of an arbitrary and alternative principle to reason: an irrepressible will to live, unbridled and irrational, that does not  pursue any phenomenal purpose other than to increase itself. The will to live produces pain but not for itself or for an evil connotation, because it is pure "noumenon". Pain, in fact, is born when the will to live objectifies in bodies that - wanting to live - express a continuing tension, never satisfied, to that life which appears to them as always missing than they would like. The more you have lust for life, the more is the suffering.
"We delude ourselves constantly that the desired object can put an end to our will. Instead, the object wanted assumes, just when it has been reached, another form and under it reoccurs. It is true that the devil always teases us in new forms. "
The will, being irrational and blind, cancels any worldview as ideologically organized. Order and harmony give way to madness, irrationality and instincts dictated by the will which is the essence, the thing itself to everyone.
However, in contradiction with the inscrutable and inevitable character of its irrationality, from that there would be no way out without recognizing to man any chance of conscious choice, Schopenhauer asks man a rational and moral task of liberation from that there would be no way out without recognizing to man any chance of conscious choice, Schopenhauer asks man a rational and moral task of liberation from pain through self-denial of the will to live: asceticism.
"The identity of the subject of knowledge and that of the will appear here as a prodigy. In fact, can you never know the will? Can the will do that will? On the other hand, knowledge can guide the will, which is what drives, what creates the world? » Schopenhauer asks man a rational and moral task of liberation from pain through self-denial of the will to live: asceticism. "The identity of the subject of knowledge and that of the will appears here as a prodigy. In fact, you never know the will? Can the will do other than to will? On the other hand, can knowledge guide the will, which is what drives, what creates the world? »
Schopenhauer therefore, arguing that "only the elimination of the will of life in general can free us," not completely devalues the role of reason, conceived as a platonic expression of life itself that wants to know becoming self-conscious". The will is the thing itself of Kant; and Plato's idea is fully adequate and exhaustive knowledge of the thing itself, is the will as an object. "
This awareness coincides with the self-denial of the will, and thus allows to leave the senseless cycle of desire, death and rebirth.
Therefore, in relation to the above, there is to consider that the absolute irrationalism concerns teachings which insist on the absurd, senseless, without any purpose of reality.
Of this current an outstanding representative is Schopenhauer who considers nature, man, history ruled by a blind desire that haunts all creatures and unleashes a brutal, senseless, perennial and universal conflict. Also Schelling and Kirkegaard fight in the name of irrational instances, the ‘panlogism’ and the absolute reason of Hegel. Recently, irrationalism has reappeared with existentialism, a theme used by both the Nazis and fascism, as well as the Frankfurt School. The modern irrationalism seems lead to a radical awareness of the historical and theoretical limits of the Western ‘ratio’.
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Dear Gianrocco,
Two year before his death Husserl wrote the Crisis of ... and three year before the WWII which is a high point in the Crisis and not the last unfortunatly.  Husserl is then in a mode of evalutation of his whole life effort and tries to see what is happening into an historical philosophical perspective of the Eurepean modernity.  He is less in the mode of promoting his phenomenology than in the mode of focusing on what is wrong , what went wrong, what is the nature of the crisis.  He see that philosophy is not in this time of crisis providing the answers that would be necessary, that philosophy has retreated from giving these answers, that philosophy has even promoted the views that there is no answers to what really matter for humans, on the biggest questions that philosophy used to address and that christian theology used to address and now at the time of the storm it is now evident that  the house is built on  sand.  Three centuries prior to those time, at the time of a crisis of Western Christendom , the 30 years War , there was a group of Millenium reformed european christians who had a program for European humanity that might have avoided what has been our history, a general european secularisation.  Among them was the father of modern western education: Jan Amos Komenský (1592-1670) also known as Comenius.  Comenius then addressed the newly created Royal Society whose views then reflected those of Hobbes, Descartes and Spinoza that we should base education not only one book, the book of Nature i.e. the study of what is visible with the senses but on Three books: the book of Nature, the book of Reason (Man), the Bible (God).  By the book of Reason means the human Mind created at the image of God which provides us with providential intuition.  Like Pascal in the same period, he saw that the revelation in the Judeo Christian tradition as the reveletion of the same light as the one revealed in the other two book but this time through prophetic interpretation of history through the age.  So Comenius was a man of science, reason , and Faith and saw the three as coming from the same light and totally irreduceble to each other.  Comenius had a meeting of 4 hours with Descartes and Descartes commented that Comenius was wrong in trying to mix religion with science of Nature.  Comenius commented that only focusing on the book of Nature will lead to nihilism and  threat to the unity of knowledge. So our world is the world of Descartes, the world of parts, the world than fell apart because we did not choose then the world of Comenius, the world of the Whole/Panharmonia.  I find Pascal's catholic position much closer to Comenius reformist position than the position of Descartes the Jesuit catholic position.  Here we see a divided not located at the catholic protestant divided.  I see Kant's transcendalist idealism as a deformation of Comeniusm's book of Reason.  Kant honestly intended to save freedom and christian morality from the reduction of all to the Book of Nature and so constructed the second book of Reason, the a priori transcendal knowledge.  But while Comenius book of reason which was a platonist one was transparent to the light of God, the one of Kant was totally opac and was used as a road block to the book of Nature allowing morality to free itself.  But this opacity, the severing of the thing in itself created a crisis and this has created false way out in total relativistic freedom.  Goethe and Herder, and Maine de Biran are the first to find the way to link the different books but yet in vague ways.  Goethe is really the first phenomenologist before the letter.  Herder/Vico are the first to see the importance of history, culture , tradition , interpretation for access to the truth.  Husserl phenomenology is center subsuming scientific objectivisation into an experiential reason.  But contrary to Geothe delicate empicism it is not engaged and fully participatory.  His bracketing is passive very much like the experience of meditation.  I practiced meditation on a daily basis for 15 years and it naturally lead us towards a kind of distance towards what is experience.  The participatory phenomenology of Goethe is a art based approach to science where the scientist is not objectifying but is participating in the phenomena and get insight in this participation.  Here the book of reason and the book of nature are meeting.  I will close this rather long post here.
Jan Amos Comenius - the teacher of nations
Regards
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How important is this feeling in our day to day life and does this play a role in the making of a man family and country.
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I would go so far to say that the feeling of gratitude is as good as money in Higher realms as well as the road to get there. Certainly it inspires persons to perform heroic and self-less acts and I believe, even responsible for civilization as we know it. Everywhere we see an absence of gratitude, we see loss of civility and value of/towards life.  As for spiritual values, it's second only to kindness.
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The study of the philosophy of spirituality in the formal field of nursing has brought this to my attention. I am aware of transcendence possibly being a key part of the philosophy of spirituality in nursing. Emerson and Kant comment on transcendence but each view is different; the effect of time I speculate. So if time indeed has an effect on the evolution of the meaning of transcendence, what then does it mean today?
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First of all, transcendence is not the key part in the philosophy of the nurse or medicine spirituality, but spiritual or religious experience of the patient. This experience is perceived as a helping hand in patient's recovery process. This is the main reason why medicine (nursing) spirituality has an interest in transcendence. If the experience  is  a core, it is not transcendent any more, but it is immanent. Regarding the meaning of the term transcendence, it does not change (see Kielkiewicz, K., Dalzell, T., Towards Comprehension of Spirituality through Its Semantics)
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The beginnings of logical positivism which aimed to exaltation of science as a promoter of scientific and technological progress can be traced back to 1910-1921, when a group of intellectuals met in a cafe in Vienna to discuss Mach’s philosophy of science (Empiriocriticism) .
The most characteristic statement of logical positivism is that a proposition that has meaning only to the extent that it is verifiable (principle of verification). It follows that have meanings only two classes of propositions:
 • the empirical propositions (empirical truth), as all weighs fall toward the center of the Earth, which are verified by experiments; this category also includes scientific theories;
• the analytic propositions(analytic truths), as the sum of the interior angles of a convex quadrilateral is 360 degrees, which is true by definition; this category includes mathematical propositions.
All other propositions, including those ethics and aesthetics, on the existence of God, are not "with meaning", and belong instead to "metaphysics".
Logical positivism was one of the first manifestations of analytical philosophy. In the first half of the twentieth century, the two expressions became virtually interchangeable.
One of the main objections raised by critics of positivism is an accusation of inconsistency; its fundamental principles, in fact, are propositions obviously not empirically verifiable and equally obviously not tautological.
The response of the positivists to this criticism is that logical positivism does not pretend to be a system of axioms that can prove his consistency (Godel's theorem).
Other objections can be formulated from the criterion of verifiability. In particular, only existential propositions ‘positive’ (there is at least one white crow) or universal propositions ‘negative’ (not all crows are blacks) are characterized by a verification method clear (finding a white crow); the same can not be said of the negative existential propositions or universal positive. A statement like ‘everything’ falls toward the center of the Earth, in fact, can not be proven absolutely true.
In fact, this objection does not tend to show an internal contradiction of the positivist approach, but only to highlight its potential weakness as a philosophy, or the inability to rule definitively on the truth of certain propositions with sense. Ayer and other positivists this limit was totally acceptable and even necessary. In ‘Language, Truth and Logic, Ayer poses a distinction between strong and weak verification. The strong verification is to establish conclusively the truth of a proposition; the weak, to make sure that such a proposition is probably true (for example, because it has never seen a weight rise spontaneously from the ground).
According to Ayer, in philosophy, just as in science, no proposition, except a tautology, can never be more than a probable hypothesis. In fact, we can consider a tautology as a true statement for any truth value of the elements that compose it. For example, the statement "All ravens are blacks, or at least there is a crow that it is not," is a tautology, because it is true both in the case where the crows are blacks, both in the event that not all are. An ironic but very clear example is the following definition: tautology is "what is tautological.
In spite of the difficulty of explaining from a point of view empirical universality and necessity of the logical and mathematical laws, such a combination between positivism and logic was made possible by the arguments set out by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, one of the works from which the Vienna Circle took great theoretical encouragement. In Tractatus Wittgenstein says, in fact, that the laws of logic and mathematics are tautologies, i.e. propositions devoid of factual content but true in any circumstance. Hence a cornerstone of logical positivism: the bifurcation of all revealing propositions in analytical, whose truth value depends on their logical form or from the meaning of the component terms, and synthetic, whose value of truth depends on  experience.
If the first acquire a particular significance for the simple fact of being part of a certain language, the latter, having to derive its sense from experience, pose a problem with regard to the evaluation of their meaningfulness. Also in this case the solution was offered by the Tractatus, in which Wittgenstein presents an image of the relationship between language and world based on an isomorphism. [There is talk of isomorphism when two complex structures can be applied one on the other, that is to correspond one to another, in such a way that for each part of one of the structures there is a corresponding part in the other structure] ; In this context, we say that two sides are corresponding if they have a similar role in their structures so that a proposition makes sense when its shape represents a possible fact, and this fact is true when it really happens.
Exploiting such information and combining it with the idea that at the basis of the scientist activity there are inductive procedures, the neo-positivists formulated the empirical criterion of significance, whereby a proposition has meaning if, and only if, it is verifiable. The meaning of a proposition, according to this criterion, is the same as the method of its empirical verification (that is the set of experiences necessary to know whether the proposition is true). Method without which the proposition is devoid of cognitive significance(experience being the source of knowledge), and therefore cognitively useless.
With this, the traditional positivistic aversion towards everything that disparagingly was called "metaphysical" was a convenient device: a metaphysical theory is not false, but senseless (from a cognitive point of view, because it still maintains an "emotional" meaning), and therefore excludable without worrying to show its falsity.
Finally, it was pointed out that the proposition with which the criterion was expressed was neither synthetic nor analytic, and therefore not going to be part of the sphere of propositions accepted by neo-positivists as cognitively significant. Thus began a kind of process of 'liberalization' marked by different stages, which led to formulate the criterion no more in terms of "verifiability", but in those of "confirmability": a proposition is meaningful if it is in "agreement" with experience, an agreement that, far from determining final verification, leads to its growing confirmation and expressed in terms of probability.
More precisely, given a set of basic propositions in direct contact with experience and describing situations inter-subjectively attemptable, a proposition is significant if it or propositions deductible by it are not contradicted by those of the base, and the confirmation resulting from such agreement increases the degree as many are the basic propositions favorable.
It was thus guaranteed to scientific laws that legitimacy denied by the original criterion: they are confirmed indirectly, by inheriting empirical significance from particular propositions deductible by them, at least until the latter stand the test of experience. On the other hand, by restricting attention to the systems of propositions, such as those that make up the scientific theories, it has been avoided falling into the traps of metaphysics remaining within the language. Therefore crucial importance took the basic propositions, through which the whole language, as far as the propositions and terms more distant from the experience (so-called theoretical ones), made sense.
'Protocols', in the terminology of Neurath, included corporate names of entities and observable properties and space-time determinations: terms and expressions of the very language of physics. Phenomenalism of the beginning was so replaced by physicalism, which, focusing on language, aimed to provide a more coherent way to achieve the traditional purpose of unity of all knowledge.
In conclusion, logical positivism ended up being absorbed by analytic philosophy, which inherited both the interest in language and attention to science. However, despite the failure of its program of unification of knowledge, intellectual efforts made to achieve the purpose, the relevant results obtained in the field of philosophy of science and logic, as well as the lively debate sparked in the philosophical world, a positive assessment of its history had to be considered positively.
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Dear Tommy,
your intervention is quite “dense”! Then, I wish to choose one among the interesting questions.
I insist in saying that If we become aware of how many and humanly important are problems that remain inaccessible to the logic of science, it is to say that we are still in the dark. The observation may seem disappointing. But it is objective, necessary and can be beneficial. In fact, it's just disappointing for the diehards ideologues and scientists, not for conscious researchers.
If we want to go to a new humanism, understood not so much in the traditional literary sense, but rather as a unified and balanced vision of man, it is necessary that those who deepen the naturalistic study and those who meditate on its trans-naturalistic dimension  do not lose sight of each other, keep the conversation alive and dialoguing do not behave like lawyers of a thesis, but as men seeking.
Today, in particular, we must ‘problematize’ scientific theories, consider the poles of scientific activity and the heart of scientific knowledge. They are ingenious constructions  aimed at describing reality in a coherent and understandable way. Being partial, provisional and conjectural, they require continuous additions, corrections and revisions, which invite all the knowledge to appropriate caution.
In scientific knowledge there are unsuspected depths and thicknesses, expressible as original experience and surplus of meaning, allowing a glimpse on the wider meaning of the scientific and the empirical experience. They relate scientific knowledge to the wonder and admiration shown by the classical philosophy.
The scientific view of how an appropriate speech to their field, can dilate, thus alleviating the alienation and lack of communication between the various types of knowledge. This, without affecting each other's differences, but guaranteeing the independence, freedom, specific expertise, sociocultural role and relational-communicative dimension of all.
Recent developments in the thinking and science offer  to cultural dialogue another set of useful elements to all knowledge. This is the new scientific vision of a universe in which order, disorder, necessity, chance, chaos and complexity are no longer unique and absolute elements, but ingredients carefully measured by a design information and ordering intelligence. This raises issues of great philosophical depth: epistemological, heuristic,  metaphysical. Heuristically and ethically relevant are also the intrinsic values of genuine scientific attitude: intentionality, purpose, freedom, responsibility, historicity, social, culturalism, solidarity, justice, and development of their capacities, etc.
The scientific effort, so experienced, shows that: a) the intelligible reality is inexhaustible, being immensely rich, varied and complex; b) it allows an indefinite number of prospects to explain and understand it; c) knowledge and disciplines express only one of these perspectives, grabbing only one aspect of reality. This shows the need to multiply the perspectives and tools (ideas, terms, concepts) rather than exclude them and interchange  their acquisitions as much as possible.
 All the best,
 Gianrocco
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In the late nineteenth century the structure of knowledge was being defined in such a way as to suggest that philosophy could definitely disappear. In the course of the century some key disciplines of philosophy, such as logic and psychology (as a study of thought, or mind), had become autonomous sciences.
Even anthropology, sociology, linguistics, political science, which once were part of the territory of philosophy, now boasted the status of specialized sciences. "If philosophy was something one could do without it", wrote Ortega y Gasset, "there is no doubt that in the late nineteenth century it would definitely be dead." Afterwards the perspective of the 'end of philosophy' has been a favorite theme of the reflections of philosophers.
However, just the sciences that had threatened the scientific and public role of philosophy in the twentieth century came to results that would require the intervention of those general thoughts that were fundamental characteristics of philosophy, and were definitely excluded from scientific methodology.
The discoveries of physics (quantum theory, relativity) and after the events of logics (development of non-classical logic, the birth of the analytic philosophy of language), and towards the mid-century, the beginning of the great informatics revolution presented a completely different cultural situation to hypothesize a new importance and new roles for philosophy.
It is in this framework that in the second half of the twentieth century one of the most important meta-philosophical issues in the history of philosophy occurs: the comparison/conflict between the analytic tradition and the one called 'continental' (analytics-continentals). In fact, at a time when science and public life seemed to consult again philosophy, it found herself scattered in many and diverse currents, but definitely broken into two main strands, which were expressed in different styles of research, theoretical vocabularies, canons.
The analytic philosophers (generally) defend a kind of philosophical work very attentive to logics and argumentation, respectful of science and common sense, preferentially an outsider to public life and the media. Philosophers called 'continental' - instead - generally did not care much about the argumentation; they had no sympathy for logics, nor for common sense or science, but they were very interested in the public use of philosophy, and were associated with the mass media, speaking often in the newspapers and in cultural debates. From these differences of principle very different philosophical styles emerged.
The perception of this "great divide", whose origins lied in the late nineteenth century, it deepened in the course of the century, and in the last years of the twentieth century works emerge interested in a general reconsideration of the dispute, and in mediation efforts.
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Political debate.Philosophers like Rawls, Nozick and Sen have had a huge impact on the political landscape and their names often occur in newspaper columns. Does this mean that only Harvard should score on impact? The fact that these thinkers have had an impact on the political landscape is due to the culture of discussion and reflection that philosophy departments offer to their students through their research and teaching. These students then go on in journalism, politics, policymaking etc. The agents of this type of impact, i.e. philosophy faculties around the world, will sadly remain under the radar.
 Argumentative skills. Philosophy department train students in logical reasoning, critical thinking and scientific method. Students then export these skills in the pursuit of law, scientific research, medical diagnosis etc. But the philosophers that provided these tools will remain under the radar. The situation can be compared to the relationship between calculus and engineering. The mathematics department may have a low score on impact, because their impact in the provision of tools to the engineer would be lost in the measurement of impact.
 Professional ethics. Professionals face moral dilemmas throughout their careers and are called upon to make principled morally defensible decisions within their respective roles – be it business, medicine, human relations, etc. In introducing cohorts of aspiring professionals to the history of moral theory, we provide our students with the tools for moral reasoning that will be invaluable in their future careers. Such impact is of great importance to society, but is bound to get lost in measurement.
 Culture. It is not uncommon for successful writers, film directors, entertainers, … to have an undergraduate degree in philosophy. A society’s cultural achievements is often assessed in terms of its philosophical depth. But once again, the chain of impact from the philosophical work to the actual cultural output is simply too long to be measured by impact factors.
Good Life. Last but not least, we live in a culture in which so many people face episodes of mental health—often in need of direction in their lives. Religion has lost its relevance for many people in today’s increasingly secularised world. Communal support is often lacking due to the anonymity of the metropolis. Counselling services are of great importance, but they are a cure rather than a prophylactic. ‘We read in order to know that we are not alone.’ Philosophy has by no means a monopoly on the task of providing insight in the eternal questions that touch on the meaning of life. But it cannot be denied that it is a substantial contributor. When we do lectures and run discussions on the eternal questions and some of our alumni tell us many years later that these courses ‘made a huge difference in their lives’, then have we, as professional philosophers, had ‘impact’? We think so. But no impact factor has any chance of measuring this.
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Consciousness means knowledge that captures the sense of unity emerging from the fragmentation and disorder. According to the Latin etymology, consciousness indicates the awareness of the feelings of human beings according to the relationship they have with the principles of morality.
Formerly, consciousness has meant something different from what is considered today in the philosophical context. Not all the ancients divided man in mind and body. Indeed, there was a widespread idea that man had three functions relatively independent named "intellectual center", " motor-instinctive center " and "emotional center." Consciousness "indicated that inner state of harmony among the three centers that, if reached, allowed man to elevate his reason.
In philosophy, consciousness acquires a theoretical value in those authors who understand it as interiority and make the return to consciousness of recollection in themselves, the main tool to capture basic truths, otherwise inaccessible. Throughout the history of philosophy it has assumed special significance distinguishing itself from the generic term of awareness, an activity with which the subject comes into possession of a knowledge.
The American philosopher John Searle joins consciousness to self-consciousness: "Consciousness is a set of states and subjective processes. They were of self-awareness, interior, qualitative and individual. This is for me – Searle says - the meaning of the term "consciousness". "The term is thus brought to the psychoanalytic terminology that considers it as a condition of conscious attention as opposed to the situation of unconscious sleep.
In the context of consciousness, philosophy has intended to consider not only the sensorial data but also the complex interiority represented by feelings, emotions, desires, thoughts, as well as the sense of personal identity.
The process of the analysis of interiority is called introspection that can sometimes be confused with reflection improperly understood as synonyms.
In Stoicism and Platonism to refer to consciousness meant to relate to that "dialogue of the soul with itself" which characterized the final production of the Platonic dialogic works where the literary and philosophical form of dialogue was replaced by that of the monologue.
Therefore, in defining consciousness, the philosophical vision seeks to grasp  the sense of knowing and describing the forms, especially ‘a priori’, of its configuration: that means the dialectics that permeates the relationship of subject and object.
It is above all with Christianity, beginning with Saint Paul, that the concept of consciousness is assimilated to that of moral as the common language well demonstrates when it speaks of "voice of conscience" that would suggest how to behave, what principles are within us that would drive to the right path from which we deviate for our innate human weakness. Conscience, in fact, in religious thought is conceived as a source of truth, of those principles that are the basis of every right want: referring to one's conscience, it would know without any doubt how to act rightly and even if concrete action is deformed or contrary to what is stated by the consciousness ,that would be due to our human imperfection.
With Descartes the term consciousness takes on the connotation of "subjective awareness" of ourselves, while all the mental contents, of which we are mindful, are only "ideas".
This Cartesian conception is found throughout the English empiricism, up to David Hume, approaching the belief whereby what the individual perceives is created by his conscience. In fact, Hume asserts that thought can go to the limits of the universe but always remaining in the essential setting of consciousness and knowing only  sensitive  "impressions" or "ideas" of reason without any cognitive certainty.
Against this interpretation Immanuel Kant reacted immediately in the ‘ Critique of Pure Reason’ where he distinguished empirical consciousness, based on the single individual sensitivity and an awareness in general or "transcendental apperception" that is expressed in the '"I think", an activity of thought that belongs to all men, structurally identical in all as formal activity of knowing. It is realized through the synthetic judgment a priori across the different "categories".
The Kantian “I think” will become the absolute “I” of Fichte and  of the prime Schelling: while the individual  ‘empirical I’ is found to be increasingly limited by the ‘non-I’, the objects, in the theoretical and practical activity, the absolute ‘I’, principle of all reality, in opposition to the ‘non-I’, in an original self-awareness, and self-creation.
Consciousness, then, is so tense to the knowledge of the outside world while man with self-consciousness will become aware of his rationality as connected to the reality that he interprets and forms.
The understanding of consciousness as perception of something can be found in the twentieth century in the philosophy of Husserl and some authors of existentialism such as Jean Paul Sartre and Karl Jaspers.
The necessary reference of consciousness towards an object is called by Husserl, in the work ‘Ideas for a pure phenomenology’, "intentionality" and this meaning has penetrated into contemporary research, both in the continental and analytic philosophy.
In many cultural systems, consciousness is compared to the soul. However, the metaphysical sense of consciousness is only a philosophical abstraction that originates from different religious beliefs as a pure act of faith.
As a conclusion, it is in the consciousness and by its virtue that cognitive science and cognitive psychology - but also, more generally, knowledge and cognition - find their common ground: that unity to which both can be traced. A unit that allows to keep the duality, and then the differentiation that justifies the manifold experience, but also transcends it, in the ideal value that is intended to express.
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Dear Gianrocco Tucci:
"According to the Latin etymology, consciousness indicates the awareness of the feelings of human beings according to the relationship they have with the principles of morality."
Not according to the OED or the OLD (Oxford English Dictionary and Oxford Latin Dictionary, respectively).
"Not all the ancients divided man in mind and body. Indeed, there was a widespread idea that man had three functions relatively independent named "intellectual center", " motor-instinctive center " and "emotional center.""
It's true that Descartes' dualism isn't to be found within all ancient (or even non-Western early modern) thought. But I am not sure the "three functions" model you propose is found outside of e.g., Plato or a tiny sample of ancient philosophical texts. I wrote a paper on this years ago that is admittedly quite limited in scope but which, I think is more representative of ancient conceptions of self, psychic/cognitive activity, and cognitive faculties than the tripartite model:
"It is above all with Christianity, beginning with Saint Paul, that the concept of consciousness is assimilated to that of moral as the common language well demonstrates when it speaks of "voice of conscience" that would suggest how to behave, what principles are within us that would drive to the right path from which we deviate for our innate human weakness."
Interesting proposition. But I don't recall reading anything in Paul or Koine Greek of Christian texts more generally that indicate so sophisticated an understanding or indeed a conception of consciousness, and certainly not in Paul's epistles. I would welcome counter-examples, of course!
"Against this interpretation Immanuel Kant reacted immediately in the ‘ Critique of Pure Reason’ where he distinguished empirical consciousness, based on the single individual sensitivity and an awareness in general or "transcendental apperception" that is expressed in the '"I think", an activity of thought that belongs to all men, structurally identical in all as formal activity of knowing. It is realized through the synthetic judgment a priori across the different "categories"."
I think you may be conflating Kantian descriptions of knowledge (or access to knowledge, or categories of possible knowledge) with consciousness. Kant is pretty clear, inasmuch as he ever is, regarding consciousness in particular points of his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, e.g., "ich existiere als Intelligenz, die sich lediglich ihres Verbindungsvermögens bewußt ist"
Specifically, I think that for Kant this fundamental irreducibly of consciousness isn't realized through categories so much as knowledge is attained by this consciousness through categories (or "synthetic judgment a priori thereof).
"As a conclusion, it is in the consciousness and by its virtue that cognitive science and cognitive psychology - but also, more generally, knowledge and cognition - find their common ground: that unity to which both can be traced. A unit that allows to keep the duality, and then the differentiation that justifies the manifold experience, but also transcends it, in the ideal value that is intended to express."
I would tend to agree, but I think that the posited "unit" is quite an assumption that, while I think warranted, must be better defended. Also, the cognitive sciences have numerous common grounds, categorization being perhaps even more fundamental than consciousness, as it can be studied through machine learning, animal studies, linguistics, neuroscience, philosophy, etc., via a far more empirical route than is possible with consciousness. Great post by the way!