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Hi, I'm conducting an investigation on internet addiction, measured with IAT (Internet Addiction Test) by Young. I've done most part of the results but would like some feedback on the tests I've chosen and if they are indeed correct. 

So in overall the variables I've used are

Age - continuous 

Sex - nominal

Relationship status - single, married, "together"

Internet use for: Games - Never/Low/Medium/High

Internet use for: Social networks - Never/Low/Medium/High

Recreational time spent online a day - Less then 1/1-2/2-5/5-8/8+

NEO-FFI - personality

BSI - depression, hostility, anxiety and social problems

and finally IAT

For the most part I've used T-Tests for sex, age, relationship. And Pearson Correlation for IAT and BSI; for IAT and use of games, social networks and time spent online. Then partial correlation controlling time spent. 

And finally a multiple hierarchical regression. Block 1 - all the demographic and questions of use and time. Block 2 - personality. The problem with this one is that some of the groups go as low as 14 individuals. For example on the use of social networks only 14 never use them. 

Thank you

In most articles reviewed, Bayesian Probability Ranking (BPR) was used with implicit feedback. Is it possible to used it with explicit feedback? Resources will be appreciated that talks about it's use with explicit feedback.

Thanks

One of the challenges that organizations faces nowadays is to capture implicit knowledge and then share to all employees who need it. What are the best ways to capture implicit knowledge in organizations? And what are the best ways to share implicit knowledge among employees in organizations?

Please share with me your experiences, any interesting ideas, any previous studies that you think I should look at. Your feedback and thoughts are much appreciated.

Jan Schoenmakers asked (on Jul 21, 2008 3:14 pm):

"

In my opinion, a really interesting question would be:

Do we need a new approach to communication in information theory?

Background: Most information and communication models in IT base on "classical" mathematical theories of communication that imply linearity and see context and ambiguity mostly as confounding variables. However, to understand, manage and reduce the complexity of e.g. Web 2.0, many argue we need a better understanding of (implicit!) semantics, and more constructivist approaches that accept the non-linear nature of communication, pay more attention to feedback-loops and retroactive cause/effect schemes.

What do you think? Is this just unneccessarily adding complexity? Or the key to success in evermore complex networks?

"

Hello everyone,

I have two questions.

1、How to consider the tension of mooring lines on structural responses in fluid-structure interaction

I am simulating the fluid-structure interaction of floating offshore wind turbine (FOWT) under wind-wave loads through STAR-CCM+ and Abaqus.

Abaqus calculated the structure response through implicit unsteady analysis, and STAR-CCM+ v2306 calculated the fluid loads by SIMPLEC algorithm.

FOWT has mooring lines in real cases. STAR-CCM+ could calculated the mooring load through the theory of catenary.

However, the interface between Abaqus and STAR-CCM+ could not transfer the tension of mooring lines from STAR-CCM+ to Abaqus

I cannot build mooring lines in Abaqus.

How could I consider the effects of mooring lines on the structural responses of HAWT.

2、how to improve the efficiency in the DFBI morphing

The background domain and overset domain exchange the information in each iteration, which cost much time. Could the exchange happen once in each timestep?

Any feedback on the approach/idea itself is welcome too.

I would like to collaborate with other educators/mathematicians/statisticians on an article about different interpretations of and experiences with quantitative reasoning courses across different institutions. I am interested in applications of teaching research (teaching experiments, research cycles, zones of proximal development, etc.) to QR courses. As educators we sometimes forget that we are also teaching researchers, a role that is not always realized but is practiced by default. We design courses and assessment tools, we collect student data, we analyze student feedback and our own designs to adjust our courses to improve the attainment of goals that are set by us, or by our colleagues. More often than not, we might not go the extra few steps to properly formulate our hypotheses, conduct our experiments as scientifically as possible, and organize and publish our work. Most of us have pure mathematics/statistics research interests, and concentrate our research skills and products towards those areas, discounting the research we automatically undertake as educators. I, myself, was only recently made aware of the official framework of teaching research when I took on the role of editor on a soon to be published book on the topic by Bronislaw Czarnocha and Vrunda Prabhu, among other contributors. I have also contributed a chapter in the book describing the Science/Mathematics Interdisciplinary Workshop at Hostos Community College. This workshop was developed jointly by me, Yoel Rodriguez and Francisco Fernandez (also co-authors of the chapter).

The educational philosophy and the institutional structure of Eugenio Maria de Hostos Community College (HCC) is driven by its history, its student population and its overarching mission: Consistent with the mission of The City University of New York (CUNY) to provide access to higher education for all who seek it, Eugenio María de Hostos Community College was established in the South Bronx to meet the higher educational needs of people from this and similar communities who historically have been excluded from higher education. The mission of Eugenio María de Hostos Community College is to offer access to higher education leading to intellectual growth and socio-economic mobility through the development of linguistic, mathematical, technological, and critical thinking proficiencies needed for lifelong learning and for success in a variety of programs including careers, liberal arts, transfer, and those professional programs leading to licensure (Hostos, 2014) The college takes great pride in its historical role in cultivating students from diverse ethnic, racial, cultural and linguistic backgrounds, ― "An integral part of fulfilling its mission is to provide transitional language instruction for all English-as-a-Second-Language learners," as well as a variety of different specialized "education offerings to foster a multicultural environment for all students." (Hostos, 2014) To further advance the college's goal and to foster a rich learning environment, equipping students with necessary tools and affording them accessibility to a wide spectrum of opportunities, HCC, together with some of its senior CUNY college partners, currently offers several joint-degree/dual-admission programs: A.A./B.A in Criminal Justice, jointly with John Jay College, A.S./B.S. in Forensic Science, also jointly with John Jay College, and several A.S./B.E. programs, jointly with City College (CCNY). The latter include degrees in Mechanical, Civil, Chemical, Electrical and Environmental Engineering. Additional joint A.S./B.S. programs, in Chemistry, Earth Science and Biology, are presently being developed in association with Lehman College with the assistance of an NSF grant, and will be available to HCC students soon (Project SEED, 2012). Unlike articulation agreements, the current HCC-CCNY engineering partnerships are jointly registered, dual admission programs designed to meet the licensure guidelines of the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET).

The most common difficulties found among HCC students taking science courses, as is the situation nationwide, are inadequate problem-solving foundations, lack of abstract-analysis skills and a lack of sufficient ability to make connections with previous knowledge, specifically, with concepts in mathematics such as trigonometry, geometric and algebraic operations on vectors, and an adequate understanding of introductory calculus (Zumdahl A266). Some of these students have never taken physics, or any science course, for that matter, during their previous educational endeavours. As a result, by the time they take the course, they often already have come to “dislike” physics, and feel frustrated and discouraged because they do not understand it. Furthermore, even when they understand the concepts, they find it very difficult to solve physics problems because of lack of visualization and critical thinking skills. These could be some of the reasons why many students do not consider science careers as professional options despite the great demand in the United States for potential scientists (AACU 9; Mervis, “NIH Told” 328; Mervis, “NIH Wants” 1119; Rochin and Mello 305), as well as mathematics and science middle school and high school teachers. To address this problem, among others, the Natural Sciences Department and the Mathematics Department, with the help of the Office of Academic Affairs at Hostos, created and began offering the Intersession Science Institute in the winter of 2010. This institute was tailored primarily for students enrolled in one of the four initial Hostos Engineering programs (Civil, Chemical, Electrical and Mechanical), but is open to all students who intend to take a Physics or Chemistry course for their respective degrees.

Here's a link to a partial version of the chapter:

The book, still at the final editing stage, is "the story of the interaction between Teaching-Research and Creativity, both mathematical and pedagogical. Creativity had explicitly been introduced into Teaching-Research NYCity Model by Vrunda Prabhu through the Bisociation theory of Arthur Koestler formulated in his Act of Creation (1964), which was found to correspond to Prabhu’s spontaneous organization of the Learning Environment in her classes of mathematics at the Bronx Community College of CUNY. Bisociation, that is, the creative leap of insight that connects previously unconnected frames of reference, allowing the reality to be experienced in several planes at once – the definition of an Aha moment or the Eureka experience - defines also a bisociative framework that makes bisociation possible. It is the framework composed of at least two unconnected frames of reference. Teaching-Research, the integration of two “habitually unconnected” frames of reference, teaching and research, is therefore such a bisociative framework which particularly strongly promotes pedagogical and mathematical creativity in the classroom. It is fascinating to mention that the same bisociative theory recently became the basis for the Computer Creativity, a new domain in Artificial Intelligence (Berthold, 2012). Collaborative investigations into Human and Computer Creativity based on the bisociation theory promise to be a fascinating “bisociative” endeavour. The story of the book has many interweaving themes, some of them explicit and some of them implicit. The explicit themes are formulated by the guiding theme of each unit and their chapters. The structure and organization of the volume introduces the reader to basic TR ideas ...that are applied to the design of instruction in the context of Creative Learning Environment in the classroom... We apply TR methods to the creation of several learning trajectories in Arithmetic and Algebra... we demonstrate the creative power of different bisociative frameworks through TR collaborations of mathematics with different academic disciplines. [Another unit] discusses different roles of a concept map, a pedagogical conceptual tool, which we found very useful in TR work as manifestly evident throughout the book. We close the book with a unit that reports on and analyses two different Professional Developments of Teacher-Researchers, in Tamil Nadu, India and in Europe, each creating a developmental model of a teacher-researcher adapted to the conditions of teaching and learning.

The implicit themes, on the other hand, crisscross different chapters in different units. One of the central such implicit themes is, of course, the relation between practice and. theory and research results. Many aspects of this relationship are weaved in throughout the book. Application of learning theories to classroom practice, derivation of research hypotheses from pilot teaching-experiments. Special attention was given to the presentation and weaving in the bisociation theory into the basic fabric of mathematics education research and practice The relationship between learning mathematics and learning language has been one of the more pressing themes given that our colleges Hostos CC and Bronx CC are minority colleges. Of course, the themes of creativity, discovery and understanding with related methodological comments reappear freely in many different contexts and chapters. Teachers-researchers are the only ones who can establish fruitful relationships between the theory and research results underlying the approach of Learning Trajectories, the backbone of the curriculum design, and their practical classroom utilization, assessment and refinement. Yet in order to fully use the potential of the teaching-research for classroom activity, teachers need to be awarded the systematic time for reflection (see Chapter 6.2). "

Currently, I am very heavily involved in applying the above theory to the subject of quantitative reasoning and literacy, and am very curious about similar projects that other educators might be undertaking for a collaborative effort on a QRTR theory and practice investigation. I am currently teaching and developing the following courses:

Quantitative Reasoning 1: This course is designed to help students gain an understanding of fundamental numerical and quantitative skills and their application to everyday life. The focus will be on applying basic mathematical concepts to solve real-world problems, and to develop skills in interpreting and working with data in order that students become able to function effectively as professionals and engaged citizens. Topics will include problem-solving and back-of-the-envelope calculations, unit conversions and estimation, percentages and compound interest, linear and other models, data interpretation, analysis and visualization, basic principles of probability, and an introduction to quantitative research and statistics. Another important objective of the course is a clear introduction to and a development of appropriate working knowledge of MS-Excel as well as some of the software’s most common applications in a variety of contexts.

Quantitative Reasoning 2 - Quantitative Research Methods: This course is aimed at developing students’ ability to (i) identify a well-formed data-based research question, (ii) find, analyze and present the relevant quantitative information in support of the pertinent argument, and (iii) to compile all results and construct a sophisticated data analysis project. Building upon QR1’s numerical and quantitative skills, this course will focus on quantitative research methods and skills, including elements of statistical analysis and their application to business and social sciences. Students will develop an ability to identify, understand, and critique primary and secondary research in industry, scholarly, government, and other specialized publications; they will also gain familiarity with the use of large data sets.

A major goal of learning and consciousness is to automate behavior [i.e., to transition from ‘thinking slow’ to ‘thinking fast’, Kahneman 2011], so that when an organism is subjected to a specific context that an automatic response will be executed with minimal participation from volitional circuits (i.e., the neocortex). When one needs to enter a secure area, it is common for one to be confronted with a keypad upon which one must punch out the code to gain entry. At the beginning of learning the code, one is given a number, e.g., ‘3897’, which must be put to declarative memory. After having entered the facility on numerous occasions, one no longer needs to remember the number, but just the spatial sequence of the finger presses. Thus, the code has been automated by the brain. In fact, often the number is no longer required, since the nervous system automatically punches out the number using implicit memory (something like never needing to recall the rules of grammar to write correct sentences).

So, how does the brain automate behavior? The first clue to this question comes from studies on express, saccadic eye movements (Schiller and Tehovnik 2015). Express saccades are eye movements generated briskly to single targets at latencies between 80 and 125 ms. In contrast, regular saccades are saccadic eye movements generated to a single or to multiple targets (as used in discrimination learning such as match-to-sample) whose latencies vary from 125 to 200 ms, or greater depending on task difficulty (see Figure 14). The behavioral context for the elicitation of express saccades is to have a gap between the termination of the fixation spot and the onset of a single punctate visual target (Fischer and Boch 1983). The distributions of express saccades and regular saccades are bimodal, suggesting that two very different neural processes are in play when these eye movements are being evoked. After carrying out lesions of different parts of the visual system (i.e., the lateral geniculate nucleus parvocellular, the lateral geniculated nucleus magnocellular, area V4, the middle temporal cortex, the frontal eye fields, the medial eye fields, or the superior colliculus) it was found that lesions of the superior colliculus abolished express saccades, and for all other lesion types the express saccades were spared. Thus, a posterior channel starting in V1 and passing through the superior colliculus mediates express saccades (Schiller and Tehovnik 2015). Furthermore, the minimal latency for express saccades (i.e., 80 ms) is accounted for by the summed, signal latency between the retina and area V1 (i.e., 30 ms), the signal latency between area V1 and the superior colliculus (i.e., 30 ms), and the signal latency between the superior colliculus, the saccade generator, and the ocular muscles (i.e., 20 ms, Tehovnik et al. 2003)[1]. What this indicates is that express saccade behavior bypasses the frontal cortex and the posterior association areas of the neocortex (i.e., V4 and the medial temporal cortex), and is transmitted directly from V1 to the brain stem[2].

For oculomotor control, parallel pathways occur between (1) the posterior and the anterior regions of the neocortex (i.e., including, respectively, V1 and the frontal eye fields[3]) and (2) the brain stem ocular generator, which mediates ocular responses in mammals (Figure 15, Tehovnik et al. 2021). The idea that parallel pathways between the neocortex and brain stem mediate specific responses, such as the V1-collicular pathway subserving ocular automaticity, is not new. Ojemann (1983, 1991) has proposed that a multitude of parallel pathways subserves language, since once a language is mastered, it becomes a highly automated act, and electrical perturbation of a focal neocortical site affects a specific component of a language, but not an entire language string, as long as the remaining parallel pathways are intact. Global aphasia occurs when all the parallel pathways of Wernicke’s and Broca’s areas are damaged (Kimura 1993; Ojemann 1991; Penfield and Roberts 1966).

Why is it that express saccades and regular saccades alternate across trials in a quasi-random order (Schiller and Tehovnik 2015)? Lisberger (1984) has studied latency oscillations across trials for the vestibuloocular reflex by measuring the onset of an eye movement after the beginning of a head displacement. He found latency values as low as 12 ms and as high as 20 ms (Lisberger 1984; Miles and Lisberger 1981). At a 12-ms latency, the signal would need to bypass the cerebellar cortex and be transmitted from

the vestibular nerve through the vestibular nucleus (which is a cerebellar nucleus) to the abducens (oculomotor) nucleus to contract the eye muscles within 12 ms (Lisberger 1984). At a 20-ms latency, the signal would pass from the vestibular nerve to the cerebellar cortex by way of the granular-Purkinje synapses and then to the vestibular and abducens nuclei to arrive at the muscles within 20 ms. The difference between the fast and slow pathway is 8 ms, and it is the additional 8 ms through the cerebellar cortex that allows for any corrections to be made to the efference-copy code[4].

In the case of regular versus express saccades, the minimal latency difference is 45 ms (i.e., 125 ms – 80 ms = 45 ms, Schiller and Tehovnik 2015). So, what could explain this difference? Regular saccades utilize both posterior and anterior channels in the neocortex, for paired lesions of the superior colliculus and the frontal eye fields are required to abolish all visually guided saccades (Schiller et al. 1980). Perhaps, the longer latency of regular saccades as compared to express saccades is due to transmission by way of the frontal eye fields for regular saccades, as well as having the signal sent through the cerebellar cortex via the pontine nuclei and inferior olive to update any changes to the efference-copy code. Express saccades, on the other hand, utilize a direct pathway between V1 and the saccade generator, with access to the cerebellar nuclei (i.e., the fastigial nuclei[5], Noda et al. 1991; Ohtsuka and Noda 1991) for completion of a response at a latency approaching 80 ms—a latency that is too short for frontal lobe/temporal lobe participation and the conscious evaluation of the stimulus (at least 125 ms is required for a frontal/temporal lobe signal to arrive in V1, Ito, Maldonado et al. 2023)[6]. Utilizing the fast pathway would not permit any changes to the efference-copy code and furthermore there would be no time for the conscious evaluation of the stimulus conditions. This general scheme for slow versus fast ‘thinking’ (Kahneman 2011) can be applied to any behavior, as the behavior changes from a state of learning and consciousness to a state of automaticity and unconsciousness[7]. At any one time the human cerebellum can update as many as 50,000 independent efference-copy representations (Heck and Sultan 2002; Sultan and Heck 2003). And we know that during task execution that the entire cerebellar cortex is engaged including circuits not necessary for task execution (Hasanbegović 2024). This global reach assures that all aspects of a behavior are perfected through continuous sensory feedback; hence, evolution left nothing to chance.

The number of neurons dedicated to a behavioral response decreases as a function of automaticity. This translates into a reduction in energy expenditure per response for the neurons as well as for the muscles[8]. The first evidence for this idea came from the work of Chen and Wise (1995ab) on their studies of neurons in the medial and frontal eye fields of primates (see Figure 15, monkey). Monkeys were trained on a trial-and-error association task, whereby an animal fixated a central spot on a TV monitor, and arbitrarily associated a visual object with a specific saccade direction by evoking a saccadic eye movement to one of four potential targets (up, down, left, or right) to get a reward (see Figure 16, left-top panel, the inset). An association was learned to over 95% correctness within 20 trials; unit recordings were made of the neurons in the medial and frontal eye fields during this time. The performance of an animal improved on a novel object-saccade association, such that the neurons exhibited either an increase in unit spike rate over an increase in the proportion of correct trials (Figure 16, novel, top panel), or an increase followed by a decrease in unit spike rate as the proportion of correct trials increased (Figures 16, novel, bottom panel, and Figure 17, novel, top panel). When the neurons were subjected to a familiar association, the discharge often assumed the same level of firing achieved following the asymptotic performance on novel associations: namely, high discharge and modulated (Figure 16, familiar, top panel) or low discharge and unmodulated (Figure 16, familiar, bottom panel; Figure 17, familiar, top panel). Accordingly, many neurons studied exhibited a decline in activity when subjected to familiar objects[9]. Although 33% of the neurons (33 of 101 classified as having learning-related activity) exhibited a declined and a de-modulation in activity during the presentation of a familiar object (e.g., Figure 17, familiar, top), this proportion is likely an underestimation, since many such neurons may have been missed given that unit recording is biased in favor of identifying responsive neurons. For example, a neuron that exhibited a burst of activity on just one trial could have been missed due to data averaging of adjacent trials, using a 3-point averaging method (Chen and Wise 1995ab).

For cells that had the properties shown in figure 16 (novel, top panel) for novel objects—i.e., showing an increase in activity with an increase in task performance—there was no delay in trials between the change in neural firing and the change in performance, as indicated by the downward arrow in the figure representing ‘0’ trials between the curves; this suggests that these cells were tracking the performance. Also, there was a group of cells that exhibited an increase and a decrease in unit firing such that their response to novel and familiar objects declined with the number of trials as well (Figure 16, bottom panels, novel and familiar). This indicates that the decline in activity was being replayed when the object became familiar. Finally, for neurons that exhibited an increase and decrease in spike activity over trials, the declining portion of the neural response (at 50% decline) always followed the increase in task performance by more than half a dozen trials, as indicated by the gap between the downward arrows of figure 16 (novel, bottom) and figure 17 (novel, top), illustrating that these neurons anticipated peak performance. Some have suggested that the short-term modulation in the frontal lobes is channels to the caudate nucleus for long-term storage (Hikosaka et al. 2014; Kim and Hikosaka 2013). More will be said about this in the next chapter.

Imaging experiments (using fMRI) have shown that as one learns a new task, the number of neurons modulated by the task declines. Human subjects were required to perform a novel association task (associate novel visual images with a particular finger response) and to perform a familiar association task (associate familiar visual images with a particular finger response) (Toni et al. 2001). It was found that as compared to the novel association task, the familiar association task activated less tissue in the following regions: the medial frontal cortex and anterior cingulate, the prefrontal cortex, the orbital cortex, the temporal cortex and hippocampal formation, and the caudate nucleus. Furthermore, the over-learning of a finger sequencing task by human subjects from training day 1 to training day 28 was associated with a decline in fMRI activity in the following subcortical areas: the substantia nigra, the caudate nucleus, and the cerebellar cortex and dentate nucleus (Lehericy et al. 2005). Also, there was a decrease in activity in the prefrontal and premotor cortices, as well as in the anterior cingulate.

Finally, it is well-known that a primary language as compared to a secondary language is more resistant to the effects of brain damage of the neocortex and cerebellum, and a primary language, unlike a secondary language, is more difficult to interrupt by focal electrical stimulation of the neocortex (Mariën et al. 2017; Ojemann 1983, 1991; Penfield and Roberts 1966). Accordingly, the more consolidated a behavior, the fewer essential neurons dedicated to that behavior. Once a behavior is automated, there is no need to recall the details: e.g., punching out a code on a keypad no longer requires an explicit recollection of the numbers. This is why a good scientist is also a good record keeper, which further minimizes the amount of information stored in the brain (Clark 1998). By freeing up neural space, the brain is free to learn about and be conscious of new things (Hebb 1949, 1968).

1. Automaticity is mediated by parallel channels originating from the neocortex and passing to the motor generators in the brain stem; behaviors triggered by this process are context dependent and established through learning and consciousness.

2. Express saccades are an example of an automated response that depends on a pathway passing through V1 and the superior colliculus to access the saccade generator in the brain stem. The context for triggering this behavior is a single visual target presented with a gap between the termination of the fixation spot and the presentation of the target.

3. The rhythmical activity between express behavior and non-express activity across trials is indicative of the express behavior bypassing the cerebellar cortex and non-express behavior utilizing the cerebellar cortex to adjust the efference-copy code.

4. Express saccades or express fixations are too short in duration (< 125 ms) for a target to be consciously identified. It takes at least 125 ms for a signal to be transmitted between the frontal/temporal lobes and area V1 to facilitate identification.

5. Automaticity reduces the number of neurons participating in the execution of a behavioral response; this frees up central nervous system neurons for new learning and consciousness.

Footnote:

[1] The long delay of 30 ms between V1 and the superior colliculus is partly due to the tonic inhibition of the colliculus by the substantia nigra reticulata, which originates from the frontal cortex (Schiller and Tehovnik 2015).

[2] Cooling area V1 of monkeys disables the deepest layers of the superior colliculus, thereby making it impossible for signals to be transmitted between V1 and the saccade generator in the brain stem (see figure 15-11 of Schiller and Tehovnik 2015).

[3] In rodents, the frontal eye field homologue is the anteromedial cortex, and the neurons in this region elicit ocular responses using eye and head movements (Tehovnik et al. 2021). In primates, the frontal eye fields control eye movements independently of head movements hence the name ‘frontal eye field’ (Chen and Tehovnik 2007).

[4] These short latencies are for highly automated vestibular responses. Astronauts returning from space have severe vestibular (and other) problems, and it takes about a week for full adaptation to zero-G conditions (Carriot et al. 2021; Demontis et al. 2017; Lawson et al. 2016). It would be expected that the latencies would far surpass 20 ms, since now vestibular centers of the neocortex (to engage learning and consciousness) would be recruited in the adaptation process (Gogolla 2017; Guldin and Grüsser 1998; Kahane, Berthoz et al. 2003). Patients suffering from vestibular agnosia would be unaware of the adaptation process, as experienced by astronauts (Calzolari et al. 2020; Hadi et al. 2022).

[5] The discharge of monkey fastigial neurons begins to fire 7.7 ms before the execution of a saccadic eye movement (Fuchs and Straube 1993). This nucleus is two synapses away from the ocular muscles.

[6] Presenting an unfamiliar object during an express fixation of an object (i.e., a fixation of less than 125 ms; fixations between electrically-evoked staircase saccades evoked from the superior colliculus are about 90 ms, Schiller and Tehovnik 2015) should fail to be identified consciously by a primate; on the other hand, the identification of a familiar object will only occur using ‘subconscious’ pathways during an express fixation, which are pathways at and below the superior colliculus/pretectum and the cerebellum (see: De Haan et al. 2020; Tehovnik et al. 2021).

[7] The conscious and unconscious states can never be totally independent, since the neocortex constantly monitors the behavior of an animal looking for ways to optimize a response in terms accuracy and latency (Schiller and Tehovnik 2015), and this interaction explains the variability of response latency across a succession of trials.

[8] Lots of aimless movements are generated when learning a new task (Skinner 1938), and when building knowledge, one must dissociate the nonsense from facts to better solve problems. This initially takes energy but in time automaticity saves energy.

[9] When we (Edward J. Tehovnik and Peter H. Schiller) first reviewed this result for publication, we were mystified by the decline of neural responsivity with object familiarity, even though we accepted the paper based on its behavioral sophistication and the challenges of recording from such a large number of neurons (i.e., 476) using a single electrode.

Higher-order thoughts as necessary and sufficient condition of consciousness

As per (Rosenthal, 2005), “[HOTs] do not transfer the property of being conscious from themselves to their targets; indeed, they don’t induce any changes whatever in those targets” [p.185 …] A mental state’s being conscious is not strictly speaking a relational property of that state. A state’s being conscious consists in its being a state one is conscious of oneself as being in. Still, it’s convenient to speak loosely of the property of a state’s being conscious as relational so as to stress that it is in any case not an intrinsic property of mental states” (p.211).

As per (Wilberg, 2010), “a mental state is conscious if and only if it is accompanied by the [suitable] HOT that one is in that state [p.618 …]. It seems that the [suitable] HOT must represent, at least roughly accurately, the individuating features of that state. [p.619 …] Consciousness as a property of token mental states [p.625]”.

As per (Berger, 2014), “Rosenthal’s version of HOT [higher-order thought] theory, according to which a suitable HOT  is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness … consciousness is best understood as a property of individuals, not a property of states. […] Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (“HOT”) theory of consciousness, which holds that one is in a conscious mental state if and only if one is aware of oneself as being in that state via a suitable HOT (see, e.g., (Rosenthal, 2005)). [p1…] Consciousness is, as Rosenthal often emphasizes (e.g., 2009, p. 166), a matter of how one’s mental life appears to one. But appearance and reality can in general diverge. [p2…] Although many theorists do assume that consciousness is a property of states, this assumption is questionable. Indeed, Rosenthal himself has been explicit that consciousness is not a property conveyed by HOTs to first-order states (2005, p. 185). […] The fundamental motivation for HOT theory is the claim that one is in a conscious state only if one is aware of oneself as being in that state. Rosenthal has called this fact about consciousness the “Transitivity Principle” (TP) because it explains what is for one to be in a conscious state in terms of one’s transitive [transitional, intermediate] awareness of being in that state (2005, pp. 3–4). It is clear, however, that the TP offers a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for consciousness. […] According to HOT theory, suitable HOTs are the states in virtue of which there are these subjective impressions. A suitable HOT is an occurrent intentional state that asserts the content that I am in some state. […] Since a targetless HOT does not accurately represent any state, there is no state to exhibit consciousness. In such a case, one only seems to be in a conscious state. Hence Wilberg proposes his No Consciousness Account of targetless HOTs. On Wilberg’s view [(Wilberg, 2010)], HOTs are necessary, but not sufficient, for consciousness. […] But because Wilberg maintains that a state’s being conscious involves its acquiring the property of consciousness, he denies that the subjective appearance of being in a certain state is sufficient for consciousness. On Wilberg’s view, one is in a conscious state if and only if it appears to one that one is in a state via a suitable HOT and, in addition, one is in that state. So while consciousness does concern mental appearance, Wilberg maintains that it is a ‘matter of (rough) correspondence between appearance and reality’ (2010, p. 630). […] If one reports seeing a red apple, such a report signals that it appears to one that one sees a red apple—and all there is to a conscious state, we think, is the subjective appearance that one is in some state. Since appearances in general need not correspond to reality, it is implicit in our folk conception of consciousness that consciousness is a matter of mental appearance, whether or not those appearances are accurate. […] To accurately capture our ordinary conception of consciousness, then, HOT theory should maintain that a suitable HOT is not only necessary but also sufficient for consciousness—and this is the version of HOT theory that Rosenthal defends. On Wilberg’s No Consciousness version of HOT theory, by contrast, the mere subjective appearance of a state is insufficient for consciousness. For Wilberg, if one has a targetless HOT that one sees a red apple, seems to see a red apple, and on that basis reports that one sees a red apple, one’s report does not indicate that one consciously sees the apple. In severing the connection between verbal reports and consciousness, Wilberg’s view violates a feature central to both our commonsense and experimental approaches to consciousness. […] There is thus independent reason to think that consciousness is not a property of existing first-order states conveyed to them by HOTs. […] Again, all that matters for consciousness is a suitable impression that one is in a state. According to HOT theory, HOTs are the states in virtue of which one has the subjective impression that one’s mental life is some way. And HOTs are, of course, states of individuals. It is thus compatible with the folk conception of consciousness that consciousness is not a property of states, but a property of individuals—namely, the property of being aware of oneself as being in a state. […] So though it is acceptable shorthand to say that one is in a conscious state only if one is aware of that state, it is more accurate to say that one is in a conscious state only if one is aware of oneself as being in that state. This way of casting the TP yields a version of HOT theory according to which one is in a conscious state if and only if one is aware of oneself as being in that state via a suitable HOT. This explains why the content of a suitable HOT is that I am in a particular state, not merely that there is such a state. […] On Rosenthal’s view, by contrast, what a HOT makes one aware of is, strictly speaking, oneself. So if one has a suitable HOT, one’s HOT always renders one aware of something that exists—namely, oneself.13 If one has a HOT, then one exists; as Descartes said, a thought requires a thinker […] Sometimes one is aware of oneself as being in a state that exists (when one’s HOT is accurate) and sometimes one is aware of oneself as being in a state that does not exist (when one’s HOT is targetless). […] One way to unpack Rosenthal’s claim would be to hold that when one has a suitable HOT, one exhibits the property of being-in-a-conscious-state, wherein this is understood to be the property of an individual who is suitably aware of being in some state.15 [if HOT theory holds that consciousness is a property of an individual’s representing itself, then the theory is not really a higher-order theory of consciousness at all … HOTs render individuals aware of themselves as being in states. …] What [consciousness] might seem to be a property of a state is actually a property of an individual’s representing itself as being in a state. […] Conscious states are whatever states one is subjectively aware of oneself as being in. So there is, after all, a way in which we can comfortably describe consciousness as attaching to states, even in cases of targetless HOTs. If we do so, as Rosenthal proposes, we apply the property of consciousness to notional states. But this too is accommodated by HOT theory. We often apply properties to notional objects. And it is unclear what evidence could be brought to bear upon the decision between the view that consciousness is a property of notional states and the view that it is a property of actual individuals representing themselves as being in those notional states. […] What it is for one to be in a conscious state is for one to have the suitable appearance of a state, whether or not one is in that state. This is not to say that consciousness does not exist or that it is only a matter of appearances. HOTs and the appearances that they reflect are real, though it is the individuals, and not the states, that are conscious.”

It seems that first we need to investigate the necessary and sufficient conditions for HOT and then investigate if these conditions are the same as that for consciousness.^[1]

[1] Email discussion with Jacob Berger (Nov 2015):

Vimal (11/3/15): What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for HOT?

Berger (11/3/15): As Rosenthal conceives of it, HOT theory holds that a mental state is conscious if and only if one has a suitable HOT about it. Now, there is some debate about what 'suitable' means. Rosenthal claims, at least, that the HOT must arise in a way that does not seem to be the product of inference or observation. But there may be other conditions that need to be met. 

Vimal (11/3/15): You and Rosenthal seem to claim that HOT is the necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness. However Wilber seems to claim that HOT is the necessary but not sufficient conditions for consciousness. Your wrote, “the TP offers a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for consciousness”. 

“Rosenthal claims, at least, that the HOT must arise in a way that does not seem to be the product of inference or observation. But there may be other conditions that need to be met.”

From this it is not clear to me what the necessary and sufficient conditions for HOT are. What is the origin of thought and HOT?

My understanding about necessary and sufficient conditions is as follows: “The necessary conditions for consciousness are those conditions that must be satisfied in order to have consciousness, i.e., if any of them is missing then the entity is not conscious. The sufficient conditions for consciousness are conditions, if satisfied, guarantee that the entity is conscious.” (Vimal, 2015f).

Could you please elaborate it in detail as much as you can?

Berger (11/4/15): You're right that Rosenthal and I think that a suitable HOT is necessary and sufficient for consciousness, whereas Wilburg argues that such a HOT is only necessary.  I try to make the case for why Wilburg is mistaken in the paper I sent you.

As I say there, the TP (which is the motivation for HOT theory) only specifies a necessary condition for consciousness: namely, a mental state is conscious only if you're aware of it somehow.  But being aware of a mental state isn't sufficient for consciousness because, after all, I can become aware of a mental state of yours, but that need not--and indeed cannot--make it conscious.  

So Rosenthal tries to generate a theory of consciousness--HOT theory--that not only captures the TP, but also specifies what kind of awareness is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness.  And this is what we capture by saying that the HOT, in virtue of which a state is conscious, has to be "suitable."  

As Rosenthal argues (e.g., on p. 27 of that book), a mental state need not be conscious if we are aware of it in a way that seems to be mediated by inference or observation.  If you tell me that I'm happy, and I really am happy, my state of happiness still need not be conscious.  My state of happiness is conscious if and only if I'm aware of it *and* it doesn't seem to me that I'm aware of it because of  inference or observation.  That isn't to say that I am not in fact aware of it because of inference or observation, only that it doesn't seem that way to me.  So at least one part of what it is for a HOT to be suitable is for it not to seem to arise as a product of inference or observation.  In other words, you have to seem to be directly aware of it.

Does that help?

Vimal (11/5/15): [I] An individual (consists of body, brain and mind) has innumerable states including conscious, unconscious, and non-conscious states. Therefore, it is more precise to consider a specific state of an entity.

    [II] Let us interpret the HOT theory of consciousness in the least problematic extended dual-aspect monism framework (eDAM) (Vimal, 2008, 2010a, 2013, 2015a, 2015b), where a state of an entity has two inseparable aspects: 1pp-mental aspect and 3pp-physical aspect. [1pp: first person perspective and 3pp-third person perspective.]

     In the eDAM framework, the optimal definition (that has the least number of problems) of consciousness is: consciousness is the mental aspect of a state of a brain-mind system or a brain-process from the first person perspective; consciousness has two sub-aspects: conscious function and conscious experience (Vimal, 2010b).

As per (Berger, 2014), “Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (‘HOT’) theory of consciousness, which holds that one is in a conscious mental state if and only if one is aware of oneself as being in that state via a suitable HOT (see, e.g., (Rosenthal, 2005)).”

In the eDAM, a self is the subjective experience (SE) of a subject (from first person perspective) (Bruzzo & Vimal, 2007), which is different from the objective experience of the subject (from third person perspective). The former includes inner feeling of ‘I”-ness, whereas the latter is the experience of her/his own body as an object similar to that of any object.

Therefore, in the eDAM, Rosenthal’s HOT theory holds one is in a conscious mental state if and only if one is aware of ‘the subjective experience of the subject’ as being in that state via a suitable HOT.

In the eDAM framework, the suitable HOT entails the relationship between three kinds of signals: the self-related neural-network signal interacts with the result of the interaction/matching between stimulus-dependent feed forward (FF) signals and cognitive feedback (FB) signals. Here, stimulus could be either exogenous (external target stimuli) or endogenous (internal stimuli without external target, internal target could be internally generated target as in dreams, imaginations etc.). 

In the eDAM, the first-order state is the state related to “the interaction/matching between stimulus-dependent feed forward signals and cognitive feedback signals”, which is not conscious yet; it needs some entity to experience the matched specific experience; and that entity is the self. The self is the SE of the subject, which is the 1pp-mental aspect of the self-related state of the mind-brain system; the 3pp-physical aspect of this state is the self-related neural-network and its activities. Thus, a HOT theory is consistent with the eDAM framework.

To sum up, if suitable HOT is the necessary and sufficient condition for consciousness, then the necessary and sufficient conditions for the suitable HOT are the same as that for consciousness.

“The necessary conditions for access (reportable) consciousness are as follows: (1) the formation of neural-networks; (2) wakefulness; (3) reentrant interactions among neural populations; (4) fronto-parietal and thalamic-reticular-nucleus attentional signals that modulate consciousness; (5) integrated information (F) at or above threshold level; (6) working memory; (7) stimulus contrast at or above threshold; and (8) neural-network proto-experiences that are superposed potential subjective experiences (SEs) embedded in a neural-network as pre-cursors of SEs. The necessary conditions for phenomenal (non-reportable) consciousness are (1)-(3) and (5)-(8), i.e., the same as access consciousness except attention.” (Vimal, 2015a).

[III] Once we accept a suitable HOT then the eDAM addresses the difference between Rosenthal’s/your and (Wilberg, 2010)’s views and controversy related to external targetless HOTs. It seems that, for Wilberg, target means external stimulus only. Target needs to be precisely defined as it could be internal or external stimulus. This is because we can have experiences or HOT in our imagination (e.g., I can imagine red apple that will create a state) or in our dream for endogenous stimuli/targets even if there is no external target. A state related to this is can be thought of state for the endogenous/internal target without external target; this is what I understood by targetless HOT, where a target is an external stimulus. The state of the tip-of-tongue related to author’s name need to involve self to make the HOT as a suitable HOT. 

[IV] There are over 40 meanings assigned to the term ‘consciousness’, which were categorized in to two groups: functions and experiences as elaborated in (Vimal, 2009). Rosenthal and you seem to include experiences related to both internal and external targets for consciousness; whereas, Wilberg seems to use only external target in his definition of consciousness. Thus, different meanings are assigned to the term “consciousness” leading to further confusion.

Thus, Rosenthal and you seem to defend the view by implicitly using internal target also in consciousness, whereas Wilberg seems to use only external target and hence conclusions appear contradictory, although in reality there is no contradiction. Misunderstanding arose because of the lack of the precise definitions of target and consciousness and their use.

[V] To sum up, as long as self is involved in interactions, i.e., all three kinds of signals (self, FF and FB) interact, then the self should be able to experience the specific experience; otherwise, a first-order state will be created via the interaction/matching of FF and object related FB signals, but there is no entity (such as self) to experience it.  This explanation addresses the controversy between first-order and high-order frameworks.

What are your comments on the above view?

[VI] Query: [1] What are the origins of thoughts? Our thoughts could be due to intrinsic activities and/or because of extrinsic stimuli. Is this correct?

[2] Thoughts, HOTs, attention, memory are included in cognition. Cognition is a functional sub-aspect of consciousness, whereas our subjective experiences are the experiential sub-aspect of consciousness. If a suitable HOT (functional sub-aspect of consciousness) is necessary and sufficient condition for the experiential sub-aspect of consciousness, then this is consistent with the hypothesis of 1-1-1 correspondence between function, related experience, and related neural correlates. Do you agree?

Berger/Vimal (11/10/15)

[II]

Berger: I'm not sure if this is entailed by eDAM, but my version of HOT theory does not hold that the 1pp mental appearances of consciousness are distinct from the 3pp physical features of their brains.  I think mental appearances are just brain activity that a creature is aware of in the right kind of way.  So we have two perspectives, the 1pp and 3pp, on the same thing.  It may not seem like the same thing, but it is.

Vimal:  The eDAM also says that the information is precisely the same for both aspects/perspectives; in addition, they are inseparable, except HOT bases on problematic materialism (consciousness is generated by non-conscious matter such as brain) and eDAM bases on the least problematic dual-aspect monism.

          Berger (11/19/15): I obviously don't think that materialism is problematic--I think it's reasonable to think that consciousness can be generated by non-conscious matter.  This is especially clear if you grant a HOT model on which thoughts can occur nonconsciously (and so are unproblematically material) and that consciousness is just a product of certain kinds of thoughts.

          Vimal: There are over 40 meanings attributed to the term ‘consciousness’ as elaborated in (Vimal, 2009), which were identified and categorized according to whether they were principally about function (thoughts can be considered as functional aspect of consciousness) or about experience. If you attribute the product of certain kinds of thoughts as consciousness then perhaps there is not much problem. However, the experiential aspect of consciousness (what it is like to be …) is different and materialism has serious well-known explanatory gap problem as elaborated in (Vimal, 2010d, 2013).

[IV]

Berger: I agree that the term 'consciousness' is highly ambiguous.  And your idea that Wilberg and I are just talking past each other because we're using different notions of it is an interesting one.  But I'm not sure that's what's going on.  On my view, a conscious state is a state that it (suitably) seems to you that you're in--and I think Wilberg agrees.  And we both agree that, whenever it seems to you that you're in a state, there is something that exists--namely, the HOT in virtue of which it seems to you that way.  What we disagree about is whether or not the state that it seems to you you're in must exist for there to be consciousness.  I say it doesn't: You can be in a conscious state that doesn't exist--which is to say that it can seem to you that you're in a state that you're not in fact in.  Wilberg disagrees.  He thinks that if it seems to you that you're in a state, but you're not in that state, you're not in a conscious state.  I think he's wrong because consciousness isn't a property of the target state (the state you're aware of being in, but might not be in), but a property of you--to be in a conscious state is to be aware of yourself as being in a state.  So in that way we disagree about what the predicate 'conscious' applies to.  I say it applies to creatures; Wilberg says it applies to the target of a HOT.  Perhaps that's what you had in mind? As I say in the paper, though, we often do apply 'conscious' to the target states, and that's fine as far as it goes.  It's just that it is, in a way, misleading and a kind of loose talk.

Vimal: So difference is: you claim that consciousness is property of a creature to resolve the problem of targetless HOT; whereas, Wilberg claims that consciousness (C) is the property of a state (S) of the creature. Since a creature can have innumerable states, one of them may be conscious of seeing redness of ripe tomato, i.e., (S1, C1), second may be related to the taste of the sugar, i.e., (S2, C2), third may be listening to music, i.e., (S3, C3), etc. If you assign consciousness to the creature then it should be the same experience in all states of the same creature, which is obviously not true in this example. Therefore, a specific experience/consciousness should be assigned to a specific state.

Berger (11/19/15): That's a nice argument.  But I don't think it shows my view is problematic. I think that when we say that "a creature C is in a conscious state S" we mean that the creature has a certain property--namely, the property of being aware of itself as being in S.  But that means that the creature can be in many different kinds of conscious states at once--that is, the creature has many kinds of properties.  The creature might be aware of itself as being in state S, state S1, state S2, etc.  And being in those conscious states are all distinct properties of the creature.

Vimal: Yes, S is a unified state as the superposition of S1, S2, etc. Does Wilberg claim that micro-consciousness Ci is the property of ith state Si of the creature? If this is true, then macro-consciousness C is the property of unified macro-state S of the creature at that moment, which is the same as saying C is the property of the creature. Thus, there is no contradiction. Now, let ripe-tomato is missing, then (S1, C1) will be missing also. However, the creature can now imagine ripe-tomato from her memory; this will create S’1, with corresponding C’1. Again, I do not see any contradiction.

[VI]

[1] Berger: I think so.  Sometimes I am caused by extrinsic stimuli to have a thought.  An apple causes me to see the apple and that causes me to think that there's an apple.  But sometimes I can just "bring up" a thought myself endogenously.  I just sit here and think that Paris is in France.  How I do that, however, is something that is still unclear to me.

[2] I'm not sure I agree.  For one thing, I think much thinking (and cognition generally) occurs without being conscious.  According to HOT theory, a mental state is conscious iff one is aware of it via a HOT--but those HOTs need not be, and typically aren't, themselves conscious.  So cognition is not a functional sub-aspect of consciousness, it's the other way around.  And on my view, the expression 'subjective experience' just means conscious mental state.  So while I agree that you can't have a mental function without some neural activity (because mental functions just are neural activities), I don't think you have to have experience--some mental activity occurs without consciousness.  Indeed, that is what HOT theory is trying to account for: the difference between conscious mental states and mental states that occur outside of consciousness.  Does that help?

Vimal: Well, I guess, I was not clear. If you want to pick up a coffee, then function is picking up, experience is where the cup is, and the structure is all related anatomy and physical activities. In this example, structure : function (cognition) : experience (consciousness) :: 1:1:1 and this triad is inseparable for a specific time, specific space, and specific condition; otherwise, if there is any mismatch then you will not able to pick up the cup.

Berger (11/19/15): I agree that our cognition and experience is often wrapped up.  But one of the key motivations for HOT theory is that many kinds of mental activity, including thought, can occur without experience at all.  There are many commonsense and experimental examples of unconscious thinking and arguably even unconscious acting that do not require the creature to be aware of itself as thinking or acting.  If so, then experience isn't inseparable from action.  It often accompanies it, but it need not.  Or at least that's what I think.

Vimal: In that case experience is missing, but function (unconscious thinking) and related structure must remain intact. Missing does not mean separable; it means experience is latent because once you become conscious then experience, function, and structure return back to be inseparable. This example does not violate the doctrine of inseparability of aspects and sub-aspects.

 References:

Berger, J. (2014). Consciousness is not a property of states: A reply to Wilberg. Philosophical Psychology <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2013.771241>; <(penultimate draft: https://www.academia.edu/2465437/Consciousness_is_Not_a_Property_of_States_A_Reply_to_Wilberg>, 27(6), 829-842.

Bruzzo, A. A., & Vimal, R. L. P. (2007). Self: An adaptive pressure arising from self-organization, chaotic dynamics, and neural Darwinism. J Integr Neurosci <http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/2007-Bruzzo-Vimal-self-JIN-p541-566.pdf>, 6(4), 541-566.

Rosenthal, D. M. (2005). Consciousness and mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Vimal, R. L. P. (2008). Proto-experiences and Subjective Experiences: Classical and Quantum Concepts. J Integr Neurosci [Available at <http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/2008-Vimal-PE-SE-classical-quantum-JIN-0701-P49.pdf >; Latest update: <http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/2010-Vimal-PE-SE-classical-quantum-LVCR.pdf >], 7(1), 49-73.

Vimal, R. L. P. (2009). Meanings attributed to the term 'consciousness': an overview. J Consciousness Stud <Available: http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/2009-Vimal-Meanings-LVCR-2-10.pdf >, 16(5), 9-27.

Vimal, R. L. P. (2010a). Matching and selection of a specific subjective experience: conjugate matching and subjective experience. J Integr Neurosci [<http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/2013-Vimal-Matching-Selection-LVCR-3-1.pdf >], 9(2), 193-251.

Vimal, R. L. P. (2010b). On the Quest of Defining Consciousness. Mind Matter (Available: < http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/2010-Vimal-DefineC-LVCR-3-2.pdf >), 8(1), 93-121.

Vimal, R. L. P. (2013). Emergence in Dual-Aspect Monism. In A. Pereira Jr. & D. Lehmann (Eds.), The Unity of Mind, Brain and World: Current Perspectives on a Science of Consciousness (pp. 149-181). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. [Longer version is available for comments: <http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/2012-Vimal-Emergence-UMBW-CUP.pdf >].

Vimal, R. L. P. (2015a). Necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness: Extended Dual-Aspect Monism framework. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research [Available: <http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/2015-Vimal-Necessary-sufficient-conditions-Conciousness-LVCR-7-1.pdf >] [DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.1587.9124], 7(1), 1-28.

Vimal, R. L. P. (2015b). Segregation and integration of information: extended Dual-Aspect Monism framework. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research [Available: <http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/2015-Vimal-IIT-in-eDAM-LVCR-4-1.pdf >] [DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.1974.3445], 7(2), 1-39.

Wilberg, J. (2010). Consciousness and false HOTs. Philosophical Psychology, 23(5), 617-638.

I had a very short paper rejected by Phys Rev Lett (below). Obviously, not easy to publish in PRL.

However, this paper was given short shrift, rejected just three days after submission. Thus, presumably not even sent for expert review. I have asked for any feedback.

My question: if there is a fatal flaw, as implied by PRL, then what is that flaw ?

Conventional quantum teleportation requires a classical Alice->Bob co-channel, for transmission

of decode information, hence actual information transfer. This paper proposes digital quantum

teleportation, requiring no such co-channel.

In principle, digital QT allows infinite speed information propagation, without attenuation or

maximum range. Though always with inevitable measurement speed limitation.

Quantum teleportation is increasingly well explored and has been demonstrated all the

way from semiconductor chip level [Bennett et al., PRL, 1993], to earth to orbiting satellite over distances ~ 1000 km [Juan Yin et a.l, Science, 2017].

The usual requirement for a classical Alice->Bob co-channel, for transmission of decode

information, hence actual information transfer, means that the effective speed of information

transfer is at the speed of light, or below.

However, using digital signalling, that co-channel is not required for actual information

transfer. Thus no upper speed, or range, limitation.

The key step is to use qubit-pair ensembles. And then either collapse them fully, or not.

Consider qubit-pair ensembles: 1a-1b, 2a-2b, 3a-3b, ..., Na-Nb.

No cryptography involved here. No complicated info-coding or -decoding.

Always collapse everything, all qubit-pairs of an ensemble in any a-box, all to state |1>. Then the corresponding b-box goes to all |1>'. Nothing unknown at all.

For an uncollapsed a-box, the corresponding b-box will always be mixed, 50:50.

Thus, we can either collapse (all to state |1>) any a-box, or not collapse that a-box.

Collapse any a-box and the corresponding b-box states will all be |1>'.

Do not collapse any a-box and the corresponding b-box states will be mixed 50:50.

Thus we can always tell unambiguously, when we have collapsed, or not collapsed, an a-box.

Then digital signalling in terms of collapsed, C, or uncollapsed, U, ensemble box-pairs just looks like: CCUCUUUCCUCUCUU... .

Collapse, or do not collapse, the a-boxes. Then at an appropriate time, measure all the respective b-boxes. And the corresponding C or U, b-box states will be obvious, i.e., all |1>' or 50:50.

Direct digital information transfer. Instantaneous transmission. Infinite range. Zero attenuation. Though clearly, finite measurement speed.

-- Apart from actual measurement times, in principle, instantaneous actual info-transmission across the whole Universe.

Thus, *actual* digital info transfer, without any classical Alice->Bob co-channel. 

-- No 'less that the speed of light' classical transmission. 

-- For the simplest digital transmission, with no encoding/decoding scheme, this gives arbitrary upper speed limit, depending on speed of measurement and distance transmitted.

-- A much simpler method than conventional quantum teleportation. No cryptography. Unless at digital coding CCUCUUUCCUCUCUU... level.

Conclusion

A digital QT scheme has been described, which should allow infinite speed propagation of information, without attenuation, over arbitrary distances.

The above would, in principle, allow instantaneous communication across the whole Universe. An interesting speculation then arises whether the necessary entangled quantum well pairs might already be extant, from the Big Bang? Identifying and utilising them would be another matter.

So where is the fatal flaw ? All thoughts and comments welcome.