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What is the role of central in governance of the state?
Question
  • Oct 2018
Corruption in police departments: Undoubtedly subject matter is concerned with the government of the state but representation was submitted to the accountable public functionaries of state and senior rank officers in the state and when the aggrieved didn't get justice then he preferred to submit the application before the central government as justified in the federal system where central monitors the activities of the government through its agent i.e. governor and his office and this agent gives its report to centre that whether the government is running in accordance with the framework of the constitution or not? Consequently, the central government takes action in order to establish the machinery of the state in accordance with the framework of the constitution if the state does not support then centre may also take action against the government of the state. Here applicant is aggrieved with the lawlessness and anarchy in the state so wants to seek interference of the appropriate public functionaries in the matter against the unlawful step of the public functionaries of the state but incompetent staffs of the government of India habitually as made practice, sending the matter to state in the name that matter is concerned with the state government which is reflection of lawlessness, anarchy and chaos in the system. When our courts have been unresponsive, then where to seek justice a common man is a burning question?
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Can a simple majority rule decision in a two-party democratic system of governance lead to an optimal economic development and policitical justice?
Question
  • Dec 2017
Currently, we are witnessing the polarization of industrial countries along party lines without any cross-over from one party, or the other and decisions are based on a simple majority rule. Such a winner-takes-all attitude is expected to have profound implications on the welfare of the bottom sixty percent of the population. The downward spiral of policies (economic, political, social, moral, environmental, and ethical) that affect lives of the people on either side of the political spectrum (Labor/Conservative party in U.K. - Parlimentary democracy and Liberal/Conservative parties in the U.S.-Constitutional democracy) are frightening, to say the least. Such a state affairs, not only makes democratic governance ineffective, but also cuts at the core of democracy. What does this mean for the future of democracy as a pillar of economic development? Does the scenario painted above suggest the need for a viable third party?
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  • 3 Answers
Shura and democracy Relationship:
Question
  • May 2011
Sadek Jawad Sulaiman (an Omani intellectual) regards democracy and Shura as synonymous in conception and principle, although they may differ in details of application, on the basis that both Shura and democracy reject any government lacking the legitimacy of free elections, accountability, and the people's power, through the constitutional process, to impeach the ruler for violation of trust. The logic of Shura, like the logic of democracy, does not accept hereditary rule, for wisdom and competence are never the monopoly of any one individual or family. Likewise, Shura and democracy both reject government by force, for any rule sustained by coercion is illegitimate. Moreover, both forbid privileges – political, social, and economic – claimed on the basis of tribal lineage or social prestige.
Shura and democracy are thus one and the same concept. They prod us to find better and better realizations of the principles of justice, equality, and human dignity in our collective socio-political experience. (Sadek J. Sulaiman, ‘Democracy and Shura’, in Charles Kurzman, Liberal Islam – A Sourcebook (NY: OUP, 1998), pp. 96-98, p. 98)
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What are the state options regarding National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius?
Question
  • Jul 2012
There has recently been a lot of news articles of States claiming that they will refuse to enforce “Obamacare” despite the recent SCOTUS ruling in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 567 U. S. ____ (2012). Some misinformation about state options is circulating on the internet regarding state options after this historic decision. We have decided to weigh in on the matter.
First, the readers of this article and others are encouraged to read the opinion at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/11-393c3a2.pdf. One is advised to read the entire provision, but the opinion itself is encompassed between pages 7 and 66.
The Supreme Court ruled the ACA was constitutional in part and unconstitutional in part. The constitutional portion was the individual mandate, while the unconstitutional portion was the Medicaid expansion and the threat of losing Medicaid funding.
Individual Mandate
The individual mandate was strenuously found constitutional by the herculean legal acrobatics of Chief Justice Roberts. The basis of enforcement for this portion of the ACA is federal in nature. It will get collected by the IRS during tax collection (with certain procedural exceptions.)
States have little to no ability to stem IRS efforts to collect taxes. So while there are some rumors that states will be able to “opt out” of this portion of the ACA. There does not seem to be a legal mechanism for states to use to shield their citizens from federal tax law. Short of congressional intention to allow states to opt out with incentives written in to inspire participation, the supremacy clause of the Constitution does not allow states to avoid and/or nullify federal laws.
Therefore we can conclude that states cannot assist their citizens to avoid the individual mandate and the taxes which come along with non-compliance.
Medicaid Expansion
While the individual mandate was found constitutional, the Medicaid expansion penalties on states was ruled unconstitutional. In the opinion Roberts explained that more than 10% of state budgets can be traced to Medicaid funding. The ACA basically penalizes any state which does not participate in the expansion program by cutting their Medicaid funding. Roberts found (through equally strained legal logic) that allowing Congress to do this would be to allow the federal government to twist state arms in a rather draconian manner.
Roberts continued, however, by explaining that while removing existing Medicaid funding would not be permissible; Congress could condition the expanded Medicaid funds upon acceptance of the Medicaid expansion portion of the ACA.
States are therefore free to “opt out” of the Medicaid expansion. Indeed, several have already given signals that they intend to do so. This would leave millions who would qualify under the new Medicaid rules out in the cold in non-participating states. Will this last? The author does not believe so for the following two reasons:
The Economic Drain From Non-Participating States to Participating Ones
To explain the logic of our reasoning, we are going to simplify the United States. First let us assume there are two states: Red State and Blue State. Also we shall assume that each state gets exactly 10% of its budget from the federal subsidies to fund their Medicaid programs. According to Roberts, it is not within the powers of Congress to eliminate that 10% in the event that either Red State or Blue State opts out of the Medicaid Expansion. All other variables in the state economies remain the same.
Red State chooses to opt out, while Blue States decides to accept the new expansion. Red State is not rewarded with the expanded Medicaid funds, while Blue State is. Therefore Red State's Medicaid funding remains exactly 10% of the state budget. But Blue State now has the original 10% + X% extra funding. Because this funding is federal in nature, it means that all US citizens are paying taxes into this system.
The inevitable conclusion is that with everything remaining the same except Medicaid funding levels, Blue State is gaining X% taxes at the expense of Red State federal tax payers. In other words, Blue State coffers are expanding thanks to the work of Red State. Over time it is expected that Red State will find this unacceptable and in order to stop hemorrhaging funds to the other state will eventually come to accept the Medicaid expansion. This is simply a variation of the classic Prisoners' Dilemma problem from Game Theory. (Dodge, 2012). Non-acceptance becomes punitive in nature, while acceptance comes with a reward; therefore all states will eventually find it in their best interest to participate.
Returning to the 50 state reality of the United States, it is inevitable that some of the states will accept the terms of the Medicaid expansion. Cash strapped California would be one the author would guess will accept the terms. Others will join and with the above logic in place, non-participating states will suddenly find that they are at a fiscal disadvantage and weakening yearly. Therefore unless modifications are made by Congress to this system, the author predicts on this alone that eventually all 50 states will find the financial incentive to comply to be too great.
Inequality of Coverage
If a state fails to accept the Medicaid expansion funds, they will potentially leave millions of their citizens in a more precarious situation compared to other states. Politically, it would be logical for the opposing party to capitalize on states choosing this policy to run their opponents out of government. Not only will they be able to point to the preceding logical argument, but they will be able to frame the argument in terms of inherent fairness (ie: “Why is that Californian making X dollars a year enjoying Medicaid while you make the same money and have to pay more for insurance?”)
This inequality of coverage will creating a political liability for the parties in states which choose not to participate. Politicians are inclined to keep their jobs, and anything which will jeopardize their reelection will be closely watched. Local government will be loath to maintain non-compliance status if the populace begins to questions why they must toil under their state government decisions while neighboring state citizens are reaping benefits from their federal taxes.
Therefore while these decisions may be made for short term political gain, it appears that this decision will slowly build up as a political liability until the “unfairness” of the decision will force compliance.
Conclusion
Based on the logic of the Supreme Court, state governments will not be able to opt their citizens out of the individual mandate. However they will be able to reject the new Medicaid expansion rules. Economic and political forces are likely to inspire non-compliant states to participate in the long terms. If the current law remains unchanged, all 50 states will eventually transition to the new Medicaid expansion rules.
The only logical reason to remain non-compliant would be that the Medicaid expansion requirements would cost the states more in revenue than the addition Medicaid funds they would receive as a subsidy would return.
References
Dodge, R.V. Schelling's Game Theory: How the Make Decisions 137 (2012)
National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 567 U. S. ____ (2012)
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