重伸’s scientific contributions

"When we try to apply practical rules of pure reason to judgment of action in the real empirical cases, we find something required which mediates between the law of freedom and the empirical reality. It corresponds to the fact that theoretical reason requires a schema for applying pure concepts of understandingto the knowledge of empirical objects. Though theoretical reason can use pure intuition of time and space, it is not the case with pracitical reason. Because practical reason concerns only the determination of will, it does not require any intuition. Kant asserts that practical reason can use universal laws of nature as a type of moral law, and therefore it can apply moral laws to real cases of action. Here he is carrying the analogy between natural laws and moral laws as he did when he defined the first form of the categorical imperative in Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals. According to him we can judge whether a maxim is morally acceptable or not by regarding maxims of act as universal laws of nature. Kant calls this process ""typic of pure practical reason"", making it the medium for the application of the laws of pure reason to the empirical reality. This means that moral law always presupposes its application to the empirical reality, and therefore is conceived in the tension with the reality."

"What did Kant assert in 'Of the Deduction of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason? He made the deduction of Pure Concepts of the Understanding in the ""Critique of Pure Reason."" It demostrated that the Categories had the objective validity in the empirical knowledge, because they were the conditions of experience. It does not go well similarly with the deduction of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason. Though the Law of Morality stands fast as the fact of Pure Reason, how it has the objective validity in practice cannot be proved. But from this fact, the deduction of Freedom becomes possible. The Possiblity of the freedom of will was allowed in the critique of theoretical reason, but the substance of freedom was not determined. So when the Pure Practical Reason determines the substance of freedom by its law.the freedom gets its contents,and real meaning. At the same time through the realizatron of this free will the Moral Law gets its objective reality. So the Reality of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason is demonstrated by the Possibility of the deduction of Freedom,though the direct deduction of those principles is impossible."

"Kant asserts that the freedom is the condition of the existence of morality and the morality is the condition of consciousness of freedom. If the morality can be fit for human being, the freedom of the will must be premised. But the world where human beings live is ruled by the laws of nature. The incidents of nature happen necessarily according to the laws of nature. So human conduct, which happens in this world, is ruled by the laws of nature and happens necessary. But human conduct, as far as is done with the consciousness of moral law, must be acted freely. Namely human conduct is at the same time free and necessary. Kant solves the contradiction by the division of phenomena and things themselves. The human mind is considered the thing itself, and so free from the category of cause and effect. But human conduct appears in the phenomenal world, and so ruled by the categories and put under the natural necessity. Kant pays attention to the function of conscience (Gewissen). A human being, when he thinks his conduct to be against the moral law, considers that the conduct was able not to be done and this is repentance. If the conduct is under natural necessity, repentance has no meaning. So the function of conscience proves that the moral laws are always working in the human mind, and a human being is always free in his conduct. But on the other hand the conduct of a human being in the world must be considered under the natural necessity. How can we understand this contradiction? The conduct of human beings, when acted out, cannot be considered as not having been done. But must always be judged by the conscience. We are always asked the meanings of our conduct. This real world is ruled by the laws of nature and is the one united necessary world. But it is the world where human conduct is done. So the world itself must be judged by the moral laws. This world is always questioned by the moral meaning for human beings. And the questioning itself makes the structure of this world. Perhaps, I think, Kant indicated this character of the world."

"Kant asserts that the incentive which makes humans head for moral act is their feeling of respect for the moral law. The moral law exists a priori as the law of reason and directly determines the will. But it is merely formal and has not any content. Therefore the law itself has not any reference to human feelings. According to Kant, the morality is not grounded on feelings and desires, but rather on negation of them. The morality is grounded on the observance of the moral law. Then what motivates the human will to the morality? Kant maintains that the moral law determines directly the human will, forming the law of the will, which prevents feelings and desires from intervening the exercise of the will. It arouses the feeling of displeasure in the human mind, but it realizes the moral law, arousing the feeling of respect at the same time. This feeling of respect for the moral law is the incentive which makes the will head for the moral act. The feeling of respect for the moral law also arouses Interest in the morality in our conducts. And this interest undergoes logical scrutiny through the maxim of conduct, breeding consciousness as to whether the maxim applies universally or not. That is to say, the interest provides a way in which the moral law realizes itself in actual condusts. Kant calls this series of the movements of mind the true 'Moral Sentiment'."

"In ""Critical Elucidation of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason"" Kant tries to clarify some points of his Moral Theory, which he discussed in the ""Analytic of Pure Practical Reason"". Kant's Phylosophy depends on the pure reason. But reason is distinguished into theoretical reason and practical reason. Theoretical reason endeavours to grasp the ohjects; and objects are given to senses. We accept objects through senses and then grasp them and make concepts. But practical reason has moral principles a priori and makes them realized in the world. So theoretical reason starts from sensation and progresses to concepts, but practical reason has the fundamental principle of morals and progresses to sensation (feeling). Accordingly theoretical reason and practical reason advance in opposite direction. But they are two sides of the same pure reason. So they must have the same construction. In the first Critique Kant starts from the theory of sensation. But there he enquires the conditions a priori of sensation, which don't depend on sensation but give foundation to it. And they belong to the pure reason. So in the philosophy of Kant the central point is pure reason, and this pure reason devides itself to two spheres of reason. And we must recognize the unity of reason behind two functions of reason. The next point is the distinction of the doctrine of happiness and the doctrine of morals. The former is based upon empirical principles. Following this doctrine, the observation of moral principles is for happiness. And the conditions of happiness must be known empirically. But moal theory must be based upon principles a priori of pure reason. Thus we must refuse the doctrine of happiness. But Kant does not negate the meaning of happiness for the human being. It is quite normal to desire happiness. But when there is moral conflict, we must prioritize moral principle. The principles of morals are the foundation of human life itself."

"Kant asserts that the incentive of pure practical reason is the feeling of respect for the moral law. This feeling is called the conciousness of duty. And the origin of duty is the human condition; that is, human beings belong to the sensible world and at the same time are a member of the intelligible world. In so far as he belongs to the sensible world, he acts according to the inclination i. e. feelings and desires but in so far as he is a member of the intelligible world, he acts by another incentive than inclination, i. e. the determination of will by the moral law. Such a condition of human beings Kant calls the Idea of personality. Being a person, the human being belongs to the intelligible world and the laws of this world determine his will and must become the incentive of conduct. But how is it possible, that the determination of the will by the moral law becomes the incentive of human conduct? The reason of it is that human being is a member of the intelligible world, and the Gospel commands Love God above all. In this case the command : Love God means to do all duties willingly. But human being belongs to the sensible world as well, so he is determined by inclination and so it is impossible that he willingly obeys to the moral law. The moral law can arouse the feeling of respect only by negating inclination. Then how is it possible that the consciousness of duty makes possible the realisation of morality by negating inclination? Kant knows that we can not answer this question, but we must assert the moral-act as the fact of practical reason. In the other hand, Epicurians assert that a human being wants his happiness by nature, and so moral practice is a wise choice of conduct. And according to that theory of moral sense the moral practice itself is included in contents of happiness. Kant criticises these theories, which assert the connection between happiness and moral practice. But, I think this character is involved in the Kant's theory, when he asserts that the moral law is always the condition of human good and happiness. The happiness of human being mainly consists of satisfaction of inclinations but it needs the morality d. i. universal good as the condition of his happiness. Then according to Kant's theory also the universal good is presupposed in the every day practice of human life in the sensible world."

"Morality requires the premise of freedom. But in the empirical world all things happen according to the necessary connections of causality. The human actions are also under the same necessity as the real actions. Kant solves this contradiction by separating the plenomena and things themselves. According to Kant the phenomena means the world which is seen through the subjective conditions (Idealitat des Raumes und der Zeit). The soul as thing itself is one which is preceeding the subjective conditions. And this soul as thing itself can make free practises by reason. Moral freedom is suppoted by the moral laws a priori. The moral laws are inherent in the mind of every one as fact of reason. They can extend human knowledge over the real world to the intelligible world. But the free conduct of humans is considered as the incidents happening according to the natural necessity, and so cannot have moral character according to Kant's meaning. I assert that we can remove this difficulty by thinking about the intention to the universality in the conduct directed by inclinations. The contradiction of human beings contains the intention to the universality of conduct."

"Kant accepts that the practical function of pure reason has the different peculiar meaning from the theoretical knowledge. The pure reason can determine the will and produce the real action of man. And that is the aplication of the category of causality to the pure practical reason. So the laws of pure practical reason (moral laws) as the cause can produce the real practices of man. Kant's critique of reason was the effect of Hume's critique of the law of causality. Hume asserts that the concept of causality as the concept a priori has not any reality, and he negates its real adequacy. But Kant demonstrates that the concept of causality has the adequacy a priori to the objects as the appearances, because it is the condition of experience. And he asserts that the concept of causality has its place in the pure reason and its applicabity to the object in general. When the pure reason acts practically, can the pure reason be the cause to determine the will as noumenon. Then the reason is regarded as causa noumenon and can determine the acts and will of human being by the practical laws of pure reason (moral laws). And then the pure reason is regarded as a member of the intelligble world and determined by the different order from the laws and order of the real world. And this is the extension of pure reason beyond the real world of experience and the reason has the right of this extension. But this extension of knowledge can have only the practical meaning but not any theoretical meaning. Then what is the theoretical meaning of practical action in this real world? This is the problem of Kant's practical philosophy. We can consider this theory not as the two- world theory, but as the theory which asserts the two-aspects in the same real world."