Zack Bowersox’s research while affiliated with Washington University in St. Louis and other places

This article reports the results of an empirical research design testing the relationship between a state’s use of conscription and the public’s level of political participation. Although few previous studies have investigated conscription’s influence on political levels in times of war, none have yet to analyze conscription’s impact on political participation during peacetime. We, therefore, study the relationship between voter turnout and military conscription using a global sample with the expectation that citizens in states that practice conscription will be more politically engaged during times of no conflict. We perform logistic regression models on a global sample (1982–2008) and find that those states that do practice conscription see their citizens participate in the electoral process at a higher level.

Two key factors said to create conditions in which forced labor occurs are a lack of information regarding fair pay, and a lack of bargaining power for laborers. In short, employers can take advantage of laborers through favorable information and power asymmetries. If this is the case, then we might suspect that in those states where labor unions are stronger, trafficking for the purpose of forced labor should be less likely as they are able to mitigate both factors. Logistic regressions testing just such a relationship provide support, at both the individual and state level, for the assertion that where union density is greater labor trafficking is less likely to occur. While not addressing the socio-economic roots of labor trafficking, these findings do suggest a market-side response to this crime.

Previous work addressing China’s censorship regime has primarily focused on public information from social media sites and not information shared more intimately. This article focuses on semi-private information and its impact on collective action, using an original experiment to test established censorship theories in this overlooked domain. The results suggest that censors treat information critiquing the government and calling for collective action with equal hostility, unlike in the public domain in which the former category is more likely to be disregarded. Further, this article finds evidence of human involvement in semi-private domain censorship. This study aims to complement existing literature on authoritarian control of information with a view to the regime’s effort to prevent collective action and political opportunities that can be exploited by dissent.

It is commonly believed that some rebel and terrorist groups are apt to fund their operations through human trafficking and the illicit trade in exploited labor. Recently, groups like Boko Haram have committed large-scale kidnappings while the Islamic State has sought to recruit Western women via the Internet with each group having been accused of both sexual exploitation of victims and profiting from their sale. Other groups like the Lord’s Resistance Army of Uganda and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone kidnapped and trafficked youths to replenish their ranks with child soldiers. Yet, these cases represent only a fraction of those that could in fact be tested for this link. By examining the effects of trafficking on the duration and outcome of intrastate conflict, this paper finds that states who are better at addressing the crime of trafficking, are more likely to experience a shorter conflict. While there is no evidence that trafficking can tip the scales of conflict one way or the other, it is likely that trafficking can at the very least sustain a rebel group materially.

Despite the oft noted negative connection between natural disasters and human trafficking, no quantitative study has been performed. Natural disasters, like conflict, can destroy homes and the economic security of individuals forcing them to migrate and making them targets for traffickers. This article tests the link between a state's ability to address trafficking and natural disasters, testing the popular prediction that a state's capabilities will be strained as increased natural disasters occur thus producing a negative effect. The findings though demonstrate that states are actually more likely to perform better in their efforts to confront trafficking. I argue that this is because natural disasters actually strengthen and enhance the state, and particularly its security institutions, in responding to these events. I place these findings in the context of other recent quantitative studies of trafficking that have also produced contradictory results when compared with the field's qualitative studies.

Recent literature has suggested that a state’s being awarded the title of host for the Olympics or FIFA’s World Cup can increase bilateral trade flows (Rose & Spiegel, 2011) and their political status (Rhamey & Early, 2013). Another potential side effect of these large-scale events is the increase in sex tourism and human trafficking. The influx of visitors to a host state is thought to increase demand on the local sex industry. Similarly, the need to build new stadia and infrastructure arguably increases the likelihood that trafficked labor will be utilized. This article examines the record of host states in addressing human trafficking as compared to a global sample. The findings suggest that international sporting event hosts (FIFA World Cup and Olympics) are positively affected by these events when it comes to prosecuting human traffickers, but Olympic states are negatively affected in the dimension of trafficking prevention. This suggests that the Olympics produce varying demands on a state that can increase the demand for trafficked individuals.

Recently, the Winter Olympic Games in Russia and the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup in Brazil have drawn attention as much for politics as the excitement of the competitions. Russia’s pursuance of discriminatory homosexual policies made it the target of international rights groups; Brazil’s exploitation of the poor for the sake of hosting the World Cup led to several high-profile protests ahead of the event. These large-scale international sporting competitions provide a ready-made platform for naming and shaming states that may have dubious human rights records. The question remains as to whether or not the shaming of these host states by international groups effectively changes a state’s behavior. This paper argues that states facing increased global media attention while hosting an event are likely to substitute repression of physical integrity rights with repression of civil and political rights in an effort to maintain favorable appearances internationally. However, I find support for both physical and expressive rights improving in states when shaming is conditioned on the selection to host an international sporting event.

This article examines the effects of social spending on political participation and various forms of collective action conditioned on a state's level of respect for empowerment rights. It brings the language of rights to the more well-developed comparative study of voter turnout. I theorize that a state which spends more on social initiatives drives down economic and social barriers between individuals and the polls or participating in collective action. This increases the substantive use of rights guaranteed formally by the state. I find that spending helps most where rights are already respected. I also find that spending can negatively impact participatory democracy where these rights are less well established. Ultimately, I conclude that institutional strength has a greater effect on the substantive use of rights than social spending.