Yutian Zhou’s scientific contributions

... Prior literature has studied incentives in AMMs, but no prior work has simultaneously modeled and analyzed the following three properties of CLMMs: (1) LPs can only invest up to a fixed budget, (2) LPs in CLMMs can invest different amounts in different price ranges, and (3) LPs compete against each other for fees, and thus must take into account other LPs' strategies and their budgets [26]. Most existing works focus on the study of a single LP's strategy [23] or on the case where LPs are identical [10,23,24,29,30,35], and in both cases the budget is assumed to be unlimited [35]. For legacy AMMs, [35] proposes a framework using symmetric games to show the uniqueness of the symmetric Nash equilibrium. ...

Reference:

Game Theoretic Liquidity Provisioning in Concentrated Liquidity Market Makers