Yoshifumi Konishi’s research while affiliated with Sophia University and other places

We investigate efficiency properties of binary ecolabels in a homogeneous good market with heterogeneous consumers. Faced with the minimum technology standard, firms make endogenous entry, certification, and price/quantity decisions. We consider both perfect and imperfect competition with or without sunk fixed costs. Our findings are as follows. Ecolabeling alone does not achieve the first-best outcome and, to achieve the second best, may need to set the standard less strict than the efficient level. Without sunk fixed costs, ecolabeling can achieve the first-best outcome provided that both the technology standard and the complementary pollution tax are set at efficient levels. With sunk fixed costs, however, differential excise taxes that would restore allocative efficiency induce more entry than optimal, and thus, can be even welfare decreasing relative to no tax outcome. Tightening the technology standard may ameliorate such an adverse effect of the corrective tax system by reducing excessive entry and pollution per output by the certified firms.Highlights► We investigate efficiency properties of binary ecolabels in a market with heterogeneous consumers. ► Firms make endogenous entry, certification/technology, and price/quantity decisions. ► Without fixed costs, a mix of technology standard and corrective tax can restore full efficiency. ► With fixed costs, the corrective tax can be welfare decreasing relative to no tax. ► Tightening technology standard may mitigate such an adverse effect of the corrective tax.

We evaluate the welfare consequences of the new U.S. arsenic standard for drinking water, using contingent valuation survey and recent cost data for the small rural community water systems in Minnesota that have had arsenic levels above the new standard prior to its implementation. Using variation in actual arsenic levels and an elicitation method that recognizes the dependence of welfare values on both ambient arsenic concentrations and self-protection levels, the welfare values of the new arsenic rule are estimated at 6–23 per household per year for communities with less than 10 μg/L of arsenic currently in their water and 31–78 for communities with more than 10 μg/L of arsenic. Given cost estimates of 230–2,006 and the fact that a substantial portion of the cost needs to be internally financed, the new rule may have substantially negative welfare consequences for a number of small communities.

Our primary concern in this paper is to determine to what extent small communities have difficulty meeting the new stricter 2001 standard for arsenic levels in their drinking water. To do this we survey water users in rural Minnesota communities that had arsenic levels in their water supply exceeding 10 ï­g/L during 2001-2006. Our survey results show that after obtaining complete information concerning the arsenic levels in their drinking water consumers with relatively low levels of arsenic were willing to pay $8-9 annually, while those with high levels of arsenic are willing to pay$15-17 annually. We also found that consumer’s willingness to pay (WTP) didn’t vary by community size. Thus, we conclude that compared to compliance costs ($58-327 per capita annually) small rural communities were likely to find it difficult to cover the cost of compliance through increased water charges. Since many of the communities have to cover these costs of compliance by raising water charges, we ask the basic question: are there better treatment options for these rural communities that will lower the cost to consumers? One option might be to encourage individual householders to use household water treatment devices for communities serving fewer than 500 people. The devices could be made available by the local entity supplying the community’s water possibly at a subsidized rate along with complete information about the arsenic level in the water supply.

This paper identifies information that may be important in determining the benefits of preventing toxic water contamination (or equivalently cost of nonaction) when a given toxification occurs. It attempts to identify information and behavior issues that need to be considered when we estimate benefits and weigh them against the costs of removing toxins. This paper also provides “scenarios†for three toxic pollutants that are found in water bodies. We make use of two alternatives--one for developing countries and the other for developed countries--to demonstrate, with specific examples of arsenic, mercury and Atrazine, how benefit estimates and control policies vary with different assumptions concerning behavior/information and type of chemical contamination. A comparison with EU evaluation experience is also carried out.

Why do countries� greenhouse gas (GHG) intensities differ? How much of a country�s GHG intensity is set by inflexible national circumstances, and how much may be altered by policy? These questions are common in climate change policy discourse and may influence emission reduction allocations. Despite the policy relevance of the discussion, little quantitative analysis has been done. In this paper we address these questions in the context of the G7 by applying a pair of simple quantitative methodologies: decomposition analysis and allocation of fossil fuel production emissions to end-users instead of producers. According to our analysis and available data, climate and geographic size � both inflexible national characteristics � can have a significant effect on a country�s GHG intensity. A country�s methods for producing electricity and net trade in fossil fuels are also significant, while industrial structure has little effect at the available level of data disaggregation.