Ying Dai’s research while affiliated with Southwest Jiaotong University and other places

To improve delivery efficiency and reduce delivery costs in last-mile delivery, this study explores a vehicle routing problem in which the courier provides simultaneous pickup and delivery services to customers with roaming locations. The problem is formulated as a mixed integer linear programming model to minimize the total travel cost. We then develop a two-stage metaheuristic that combines a random selection greedy insertion algorithm and a large neighborhood search algorithm. The computational results show that our algorithm has certain advantages in solution quality and computational time compared to the commercial optimization solver. Moreover, incorporating simultaneous pickup and delivery into the vehicle routing problem with roaming delivery locations can significantly reduce the total delivery cost as the number of customers increases.

Motivated by the diverse services provided by various on-demand service platforms to satisfy customers' different needs, we investigate the pricing of an on-demand crowdsourced delivery platform (CDP) with differentiated service levels. Using a multinomial logit model, we propose a two-sided market framework for investigating the pricing decisions of a CDP with two differentiated service levels under a general variable commission scheme and a fixed-rate commission scheme. The results show that (i) the two-sided pricing mechanism (price and wage decisions) allows the supply to match the demand for different service levels, except when the CDP adopts a fixed-rate commission scheme; (ii) depending on the magnitude of the fixed commission rate, adopting a fixed-rate commission scheme has different impacts on the equilibrium outcomes. We also extend our model by including the commission scheme and multiple service levels. The results show that (i) the CDP can achieve a higher optimal profit under the courier classification scheme than under a benchmark variable commission scheme, and (ii) offering senders and couriers diversified service levels benefits the CDP. Our work provides CDP practitioners with a quantitative tool for pricing for service-level menus.

Based on previous research on blood donation incentives, we investigated the effectiveness of two incentives—eligibility for free blood transfusions and improving individual credit scores—and explored the psychological mechanisms underlying these effects. We conducted four studies to explore the relationship between incentives and blood donation intention. The results showed that eligibility for free blood transfusions was more effective than improving individual credit scores due to the mediating effect of perceived attractiveness. Meanwhile, improving individual credit scores failed to play an effective role and was significantly lower than eligibility for free blood transfusions due to the mediating effect of perceived threat to freedom. We further found that after adding the moderating variable of involvement, there was no difference between the two incentives due to the weakened mediating effects of perceived threat to freedom and perceived attractiveness in the high‐involvement group. This study establishes two effect paths from incentives to perceived threat to freedom/perceived attractiveness to blood donation intention, explaining the effectiveness of incentives.

This study focuses on evolutionary game analysis of supply chain (SC) strategies with fairness concerns. First, the equilibrium solutions under the eight combined strategies are obtained through the Stackelberg game. Subsequently, evolutionary game theory is applied to analyze the stability of these equilibrium solutions and to discuss the evolutionary stability strategy of the tripartite game. The study suggests that the effect of distributional fairness concerns on SC pricing differs from that of peer-induced fairness concerns in the short term. Implanting fairness concerns into SC pricing decisions is always detrimental to the supplier and not always beneficial to retailers. From a long-term perspective, only one evolutionarily stable equilibrium point exists. Retailers do not pay attention to the fairness of the channel profit distribution, and the supplier does not consider the fairness of retailers. The results help enterprises understand the influence of fairness preferences on pricing decisions and provide a reference for the efficient operation of SCs.

Purpose This study explores the impact of EN's (venture entrepreneurs, simplified as EN) jealousy fairness concerns coefficient on two-stage venture capital decision-making in cases of symmetrical and asymmetrical information. It discusses the equilibrium solution of two-stage venture. Design/methodology/approach The principal-agent model was established based on multiple periods, and differentiated contracts were established at different stages. The validity of the models and the contract was verified by numerical simulation. Findings The results suggest that with the increase in the EN fairness concerns coefficient, the effort level of EN decreases continuously and decreases faster in the second stage because this is the last stage. The level of VC's (venture capitalist, simplified as VC) effort declines first and then increases; that is, VC will increase the effort level when the fairness concerns coefficient increases to a certain threshold. To motivate EN to pay more effort, VC will increase the incentive to EN in the first stage. However, it will reduce the level of incentive to EN in the second stage. In the limited stage of venture investment, consider that the fairness concerns of EN do not make the profits of EN and VC achieve Pareto improvement simultaneously. Originality/value First, the authors implanted fairness concerns into multi-stage venture capital and discussed the impact of fairness concerns on the efforts and returns of both parties. Second, among the influencing factors of the project output, the authors consider the bilateral efforts of EN and VC, the working capacity of EN, the initial investment scale, and the external uncertain environment.

Based on the Shapley value fairness concern framework, a fairness concern utility system is established for the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with one manufacturer, one retailer, and two competitive collectors. Under the five models (one centralized and four decentralized), the influence of competitive strength and fairness concern degree of collectors on the pricing decisions is analyzed. The following conclusions can be obtained: (1) When the manufacturer considers the fairness concern of the collectors, fairness concern is a way for the collectors to obtain more profit. Whether the manufacturer "proactively"considers the fairness concern of the collectors is an approach to benefiting the collectors but only in the case of "active"consideration, there is less self-loss to the manufacturer. (2) When the collectors' fairness concern cannot be considered by the manufacturer, the equilibrium recycling price sets lower for the purpose of achieving more profit by the collectors. At this point, the profit of the collectors and the manufacturer is the lowest, and so is the return rate of the CLSC. (3) When the collectors do not care about whether they are being fairly treated but the manufacturer "actively"takes the fairness of the collectors into consideration, the collectors get "unexpected"attention from the manufacturer, which makes the performance of the collectors more positive than it is when their fairness concerns are taken into account. The profit increased by the collectors is more than that lost by the manufacturer, so the profit of the CLSC is the largest. Additionally, our findings provide some managerial insights on the pricing decision in the case where the collectors consider fairness concern.