Xiu-de Chen’s research while affiliated with Guangdong University of Technology and other places

This paper applies the sample of the Chinese listed companies during 2004 to 2010, and tests the effect of managerial power in executive compensation contracts by analyzing the relationship between managerial power and compensation levels. It is found that managerial power has a significant positive impact effect on monetary compensation and perks, and the effect of managerial power in China's capital market is confirmed. Further studies showed that corporate ownership has a significant moderating effect on the effect of managerial power. Specifically, the effect of managerial power in executive compensation contracts has different levels of existence both in the state-owned and private enterprises, but State-owned enterprises are more prominent. In the local state-owned enterprises, executives prefer to grab the monetary private benefits by using their power, while in the central state-owned enterprises; executives prefer to grab perks and other non-monetary private benefits by using their power.?

This paper studies the stickiness of CEO compensation by verifying the existence of asymmetric relations between CEO compensation and corporate performance in Chinese listed companies during 2005 to 2012, the results show that the marginal increase of CEO compensation in the case of corporate earnings to be significantly greater than the marginal reduction in the case of corporate deficit, which is tantamount to say that the stickiness of CEO compensation exists. Further research finds that the stickiness of CEO compensation in Chinese listed companies has not yet demonstrated significant time-varying trends; but there is sign of increased. We also find that the stickiness of CEO compensation can be suppressed by improving of regional marketization, shareholding system reform and diversified equity of state-owned companies, supervision of government, media and general public, and matrix control strategy.