Vyacheslav Fos's research while affiliated with Carroll College and other places

... Over the last 20 years, many OECD countries have observed reforms in their funding schemes, while many others are considering future reforms. A number of studies highlight the distributive consequences of the moving to a fee-paying system (Hearn and Longanecker (1985), Looney and Yannelis (2015), Chakrabarti, Fos and Liberman (2020)), largely because of the differential financing constraints across socio-economic groups and the implied debt of shifting the burden onto students. ...

... Institutional investors have various governance practices and investment horizons, which influence firm performance [34,92] and their attitude toward corporate sustainability and, as a result, their interests in ESG information [33][34][35][36]. Study [93] argues that institutional investors are different in terms of their nature, so it is important to explore the different groups of institutional investors and assess which group will have the biggest effect on corporate sustainability. ...

... This phenomenon has invited a lot of research on the relationship between social media features and capital market features in various countries such as South Africa (Nyakurukwa & Seetharam, 2022), China (Zhang & Liu, 2021), and India (Mehta et al., 2021). The posting media used also vary, example, StockTwits (Cookson et al., 2021;Chang et al., 2021;Al-Nasseri et al., 2021;Audrino et al., 2020), Twitter (Nyakurukwa & Seetharam, 2022;Tan & Tas, 2021;Giannini et al., 2019), Facebook (Siikanen, 2018;Hasan & Wang, 2021), and Telegram (Tsuchiya, 2021). The Chinese version of social media is also widely used, for example WeChat (Zhang, 2021) and Sina Weibo (Xu et al., 2017). ...

... Our assumption of expressive motives for information collection would not apply to blockholders that have the potential to swing an election. There is abundant evidence that blockholding is common, for example, Dasgupta et al. (2021) find a typical American corporation had one blockholder with at least 5 percent ownership during the period 1999-2017. ...

... A violation of this restriction may arise if the inclusion is based on a firm's stock market performance, which in itself could either reflect or affect governance outcomes. Further, index inclusion 38 Albuquerque et al. (2020b) find that more than 75% of Schedule 13D announcement returns can be attributed to value creation. When they consider a subsample of filings by activist hedge funds, more than 92% of the Schedule 13D announcement returns can be attributed to value creation. ...

... The swift rise in student aid in recent years made educational debt the largest non-mortgage liability for U.S. households (Brown et al., 2014). From 2000From -2001 to 2016-2017 the total (average per student) aid grew from $108.5B to $240.1B ($9,762 to $16,343). 1 This exponential growth has attracted the interest of economists and policymakers, as high levels of educational debt may adversely affect students' future consumption, investment and personal default decisions (Dearden et al., 2008;Rothstein and Rouse, 2011;Chakrabarti et al., 2020;Krishnan and Wang, 2019;Goodman et al., 2019;Mueller and Yannelis, 2019;Mezza et al., 2020). While a growing literature studies the relationship between student aid and graduate outcomes, much less is known about potential effects on families' intertemporal choices. ...

... Finally, this article relates to the growing literature on activist short selling. Appel, Bulka, and Fos (2018) find that the increasing disclosure of short positions by activist hedge funds is linked to sharp stock price declines. Ljungqvist and Qian (2016) explain the revelation of research by short sellers as a consequence of limits to arbitrage on the short side, which motivates the study of short campaigns in particular. ...

... In spite of early literature indicating that shareholders have limited ability to vote out directors in uncontested elections [30,31], a number of recent empirical studies show that shareholder voice as expressed through votes in director elections is related to director careers, meaning that shareholder activism in the form of voting stimulates directors to establish a reputation as a diligent monitor. For example, Fos et al. (2018) point out that more effective monitoring will be implemented by directors since the election approaches [32]. Zhang (2021) reports that the risk of being removed by shareholders motivates directors to adopt corporate policies that align the interests of shareholders [33]. ...

... Second, we do not explicitly model the underlying managerial agency problem and therefore abstract from managerial responses to the threat of intervention. This is common in the literature on activism and on takeovers (with Scharfstein [1988] and Fos and Kahn [2019] being notable exceptions). While endogenizing the managerial agency problem goes beyond the scope of this paper, our results predict when activism or a takeover poses the relevant or greater threat, which in turn should affect optimal managerial responses. ...

... Also within this literature, my paper builds on the findings of Fos (2017) andBebchuk et al. (2020), who show the increase in the probability of board turnover following activist campaigns that result in proxy contests and settlements, respectively. They attribute the changes in company policies and operating performance to the board turnover due to activist interventions. ...