Victor Kumar’s research while affiliated with Boston University and other places

A Better Ape covers the evolution of morality from the birth of our ape family through the evolution of human species and all the way up to the development of modern societies. In this summary, we highlight several main elements of this account: the co-evolution of morality with intelligence and complex sociality; the role of social institutions and religious morality in the cultural evolution of behaviorally modern humans in prehistory; the increasing complexity of the moral mind through biological evolution in apes, gene-culture co-evolution in various human species, cultural evolution in Homo sapiens, and rational-cultural evolution in recent centuries; and, finally, a cultural evolutionary model of progressive and regressive moral change on which a key factor driving moral progress is social and democratic integration.

We respond to four sets of criticisms of our book, A Better Ape. Against Kristin Andrews, we argue that human normativity is more than just the social maintenance of behavioral conformity, and that one of its functions is to enable humans to adapt to changing environments. Against Jay Odenbaugh, we argue that sympathy, loyalty, trust, and respect are emotions, and that norms are capable of motivating behavior on their own. In response to Mara Bollard, we develop a view about the content of moral emotions, and explain how essentialism might also have positive effects in moral cognition. In response to Joshua May, we defend the power of social integration to foster moral progress and expand our taxonomy of moral progress.

Darwin’s understanding of evolution by natural selection changes our view of nature and our place in it. It allows us for the first time to see clearly who we are and why. In particular, Darwinian evolution explains why we are moral creatures. Arising through gene-culture co-evolution, the moral mind is anchored in moral capacities for emotion, norms, and reasoning that together make possible successful interdependent living. In modern humans, the pluralistic moral mind is shaped by social institutions like family, politics, and religion. This account is distinct from “just-so stories” that lack adequate empirical evidence and from Social Darwinism that mistakenly deduces moral truths from descriptions of evolutionary processes. But evolution can inform a theory of rational moral progress and resistance to moral regress. Empirically demonstrated feedback loops among the moral mind, complex social structure, and knowledge gained in interactive reasoning advance moral inclusivity and equality.

Chapter 7 describes the evolution of institutional morality within family, religion, military, economic, and political institutions. Moral norms of authority evolved within these institutions and were key to the social division of labor that can benefit everyone but often resulted in personal privilege. Norms of purity arose from the need to fight disease but often became in religious and other institutions a means for men to control women. Religious institutions function to reinforce moral norms and create a sense of community but also exclude others from moral consideration. The core moral norms, including those of autonomy, play a role in the functioning of military, economic, and political institutions because individuals at any given level of the hierarchy must rely on each other for the division of labor to function well. These same institutions drive moral diversity across cultures, for example, in individual freedom and respect for honor.

Chapter 2 describes the human evolution of the collaborative moral emotions of trust and respect and the reactive moral emotions of guilt and resentment, among other emotions, that together facilitate forms of cooperation that were not possible earlier. Prisoner’s dilemmas, in particular, cannot be resolved without the trust and respect, reinforced by reactive emotions and the deep empathy that is embodied in those emotions. Empirical studies of chimpanzees and young human children show these emotions are innate but also flexible. Though degrees of moral exclusivity between groups and gender inequality were likely present throughout human evolution, the emotions driving them were, nevertheless, adaptively plastic, depending on the physical/social environment. The expressive nature of emotions was an adaptation for learning how to coordinate moral responses in light of the motivations of others.

Gender inequality, racial inequality, and class inequality subordinate some groups to others, even when none is excluded from moral consideration. Ideologies that have no factual basis serve to justify the inequalities. Each reinforces the other, creating self-sustaining institutional structures that perpetuate injustice. A similar quandary arises globally, because nations, rich and poor, are politically and socially structured to look after themselves and the rich within them. A proposed model for change is to encourage a positive feedback loop that begins by breaking down segregation across social roles to create a more equal distribution of knowledge and agency in support of the consistent application of moral norms. Social-role integration in turn can disrupt further the moral inequalities that depend on segregated social roles and begin to undermine the misinformation that depends on mistrust generated by subordination. Climate change threatens human survival and cannot be adequately addressed without greater global equality.

Chapter 8 offers an evaluative theory of moral progress and moral regress that explains how rational moral change is possible. Moral progress, distinct from progress in well-being, is illustrated by key examples, like the abolition of chattel slavery and reduction of gender inequality. The possibility of a traditional global theory of moral progress is rejected in favor of non-ideal theory that explains how to reduce moral exclusivity and inequality based on what has already worked locally. Moral progress theory seeks to promote realizable ends by identifying positive feedback loops between the moral mind, social institutions, and knowledge. Facilitated by social integration, relevant knowledge reveals facts that are needed to apply moral norms or moral inconsistencies that result from their misapplication. In both respects rational moral change is achieved when morality scaffolds socially interactive reasoning to reveal morally relevant knowledge. Such knowledge tends to foster the social conditions that make moral knowledge possible.

Morality evolved in our lineage over four stages. First, in apes and their ancestors, natural selection favored moral emotions that underpin psychological altruism. Second, within the Homo genus, gene-culture co-evolution produced norms, norm learning, and moral reasoning. Third, as humans became modern, social institutions such as religion modified the moral mind, adding new norms, expanding moral circles, and creating new social hierarchies. Fourth and finally, over the last few hundred years, morality has evolved in progressive and regressive ways, as humans either solved or exacerbated problems of exclusion and inequality. One major problem threatens collective survival: humans must evolve morally to avoid the disastrous effects of climate change.

Chapter 5 describes how knowledge evolved through socially interactive reasoning that would not have been possible without morality. To overcome confirmation bias and other impediments to knowledge, it is necessary to reason with those with different perspectives who do not share the same biases. Such social reasoning must be guided by mutual respect and trust as well as honesty and fairness if it is to achieve mutual knowledge. Moral reasoning is shown to be no exception. It must appeal to facts already known to apply moral norms. On the other hand, while appeal to moral norms can be self-serving, moral consistency reasoning provides a significant constraint. It proceeds by comparing examples that are not different in relevant respects where the application of the norms is inconsistent. Consistency reasoning can be used to criticize cases where individuals are excluded from moral consideration when they are not relevantly different.

Some examples of moral exclusivity are: (1) chattel slavery in the British Empire and the United States, (2) anti-Black racism in the United States since the Civil War, (3) homophobia before its decline during the past few decades in North America and Europe, (4) transphobia in these same places, and (5) speciesism in factory farming worldwide. Moral progress was eventually achieved in the first case, slow progress in the second, sudden progress recently in the third, at best moral stasis in the fourth, and moral regress in the fifth. What best explains progress or its absence is a feedback loop between (a) morality, (b) social structure, and (c) knowledge. It best explains the gains and losses in inclusivity where the relevant knowledge is of facts needed to apply moral norms consistently. Progress when possible is at best incremental. The final section addresses the objection that rational moral change so conceived is morally conservative.